ORGANIZING TRANSNATIONAL MORAL CONSERVATISM:
HOW U.S. CHRISTIAN AND TAIWANESE “PRO-FAMILY” MOVEMENTS CONVERGE, DIVERGE, AND COLLIDE

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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Since the 1990s, sexual rights, including marriage equality and LGBT education, have become the subject of global cultural conflicts. My research tracks the birth and growth of Christian conservative activism against the sexual citizenship of “tongzhi” (LGBT+) people in Taiwan. A young democracy, Taiwan is often viewed as “the beacon for Asian gays” because it is friendly to sexual minorities, recently becoming the first Asian society to legislate same-sex marriage. However, such images understate Western Christian conservatives’ global expansion into East Asia, and their influence upon the anti-gay agenda of Taiwanese pro-family activists.

In this dissertation, I analyze Taiwanese pro-family Christian activists’ mobilization, focusing upon their relationship with Euro-American conservative organizations, and examining the transnational networks they have developed. What social factors, in addition to religion, transformed these Christian conservatives’ homophobic attitudes into heterosexual hegemonic protests against tongzhi people’s sexual citizenship? How did they gain power and hegemony in a majority Buddhist/Taoist country? How have they influenced social policies and popular attitudes toward sexual minorities, reinforcing patriarchy and heteronormativity?

This dissertation is based on 18 months of ethnographic research, along with 62 in-depth interviews with informants across the political spectrum, content analyses of multi-media publications, and more than 200 Christian books related to family, marriage,
and sexuality. Cross-national data and hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) were also used to examine whether Christian conservatives’ attitudes toward homosexuality represent the voice of the “silent majority,” as they claim.

This study shows that Christian conservatives in the Global South are not passive recipients of Western culture. Rather, they reassemble transnational anti-gay knowledge and resources strategically, mixing American conservatism with local traditions in order to oppose marriage equality and tongzhi education. Faced with the closure of Exodus International (an ex-gay organization) and the legalization of same-sex marriage in Christian-majority countries, Taiwanese conservatives have deliberately sought a path that is relatively autonomous from the Western. At times, they portray themselves as the guardians of Chinese culture and indigenous traditions, condemning American LGBT-affirmative policies as Western invasion and moral corruption that will lead to societal collapse. These various approaches show the convergence, divergence, and collision among Taiwanese Christian conservatives and their Western counterparts.

Institutionally, Taiwanese Christian conservatives have achieved power from their alliances with the former authoritarian government and from what I call the “transnational sex-religious network.” This network consists of global flows of religious leaders, gospel commodities, pro-family organizations, anti-gay ideas, and conservative repertoires that center sex-negative morality and fundamentalist theology at its core. Ultimately, the transnational sex-religious network seeks to “spiritualize” heteronormativity and evangelize the world with Christian fundamentalist doctrines of marriage and sexuality.

My research bridges sociological research on religion, sexualities, and transnationalism. It analyzes sexualities in relation to the growth of global Christianity, revealing transnational networks of moral conservatism, and critically examining the growth of global social inequalities.

**Keywords:** transnational sexualities, global Christian conservatism, pro-family movement, gender equity education, marriage equality
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Dedicated to my family:

LEE Hsiu-chu 李秀菊, KAO Chin-Yuan 高金源, and KAO Yin-Yao 高穎耀

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION .......................................................... ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................... iv

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: SOCIAL CONSERVATISM CROSSING BORDERS .............................................................. 1
  1.1 Prologue: When a letter flew across borders ........................................ 1
  1.2 Contextualized research inquiries .................................................. 10
  1.3 Religion and transnationalism ........................................................ 18
  1.4 Globalization and sexual conservatism .......................................... 25
  1.5 Revisiting gender and sexualities in Taiwanese contexts .................. 32
    1.5.1 “Queering” Taiwan and education policies .............................. 32
    1.5.2 Revisiting gender and sexuality ............................................. 37
    1.5.3 Theorizing Tongzhi: An indigenous sexual subjectivity .............. 41
  1.6 Theoretical framework and research contribution ......................... 48
  1.7 Data and methods ........................................................................ 50
  1.8 Chapter briefs .............................................................................. 52

CHAPTER 2 HOW TO BRING YOUR FELLOWS UP CONSERVATIVE: A RELATIONAL HISTORY OF PRO-FAMILY MOVEMENTS ........... 59
  2.1 The first party alternation and the first conservative petition (2000) .... 63
  2.2 The first Bill of Same-Sex Marriage and tongzhi education (2004-2008) 70
  2.3 “True Love Alliance” and gender/sexual diversity curricula (2008–2012) 76
  2.4 Pro-family campaigns and diverse family formation (2012–2014) .... 86
  2.5 First Christian-based party: Faith and Hope League (2015–2016) .... 95
  2.6 Constitutional Court’s ruling and its discontents (2016–present) ......... 98
  2.7 A relational history of conservatism .............................................. 105
    2.7.1 The U.S.-Taiwan relation ...................................................... 108
    2.7.2 The pro-tongzhi and pro-family relation .................................. 111
    2.7.3 The education-marriage relation ........................................... 113

CHAPTER 3 WHAT MOTIVATES PRO-FAMILY CHRISTIANS? CONTESTING RELIGIOUS REDUCTIONISM ................................................. 117
  3.1 Categorized motivations .............................................................. 119
  3.2 Is religion decisive? —The scripture, anti-homosexuality, spirituality, and leadership ................................................................. 126
    3.2.1 Scripture ............................................................................ 126
    3.2.2 Conceptions of anti-homosexuality ....................................... 136
    3.2.3 Spirituality ......................................................................... 148
    3.2.4 Leadership within the Christian community ......................... 152
  3.3 Socio-economic motivations: Politics, money, and human resources .... 160
    3.3.1 Politics ............................................................................ 161
    3.3.2 Money ............................................................................. 169
    3.3.3 Human resources .............................................................. 172
  3.4 Summary: Beyond “religious reductionism” .................................... 176
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

List of Tables

Table 2.1  Tongzhi education-related competence indicators in the Grades 1–9 Curriculum Guidelines .................................................................75

Table 2.2  Overviews of Three Gender Equity Education Materials Targeted by Pro-Family Movements..............................................................80

Table 3.1  Version Comparisons of Homosexuality-related Words in the Book of 1 Corinthians 6:9.................................................................131

Table 3.2  The Population of Top Seven Christian Denominations in Taiwan, 2015...... .................................................................153

Table 3.2  English (NIV) and Taiwanese (MUV) Versions of “The Lord’s Prayer”.164

Table 4.1  Comparison of the U.S. and Taiwanese Sexual Conservative Knowledge Ecosystems with Select Organizations.................................189

Table 5.1  Operationalizations, Means, and Standard Deviations of Variables ......254

Table 5.2  Attitudes toward Homosexuality by World Religions.............................256

Table 5.3  Attitudes toward Homosexuality by 40 Countries ................................257

Table 5.4  Hierarchical Logistic Regression of Mean Attitudes toward Homosexuality by Religious Behaviors, Beliefs, and Belonging .........................258

Table 5.5  Cross-Level Interactions and Inter-Dimensional Interactions in the Hierarchical Logistic Regression of Mean Attitudes toward Homosexuality .................................................................................260

Table 5.6  The Inter-dimensional Effects of People’s Religious Behavior and Belief on Attitudes toward Homosexuality Varying by Religious Belonging ...262
List of Figures

| Figure 1.1 | Research questions and the theoretical framework ........................................ 50 |
| Figure 3.1 | Means and Standard Deviations of Pro-Family Leaders’ Motivations Evaluated by Respondents .................................................. 121 |
| Figure 3.2 | Means and Standard Deviations of Pro-Family Followers’ Motivations Evaluated by Respondents .................................................. 124 |
| Figure 3.3 | Taiwanese Christian Conservative Group Rainbow 7’s Conception of Homosexuality ................................................................. 141 |
| Figure 3.4 | Seven Mountain Theory ................................................................................. 166 |
| Figure 3.5 | Evidence of Three Churches Using the Anti-Marriage Equality Event to Do Fundraising ...................................................................... 170 |
| Figure 4.1 | Assimilation of pro-family movement symbols in France and Taiwan .... 183 |
| Figure 4.2 | The Glocalized Pro-Family Knowledge Production Eco-system in Taiwan ..................................................................................... 191 |
| Figure 4.3 | “Asian Cross”: Regional Circulation of Christian Conservatism .......... 203 |
| Figure 5.1 | The Analytic Framework of Two Levels and Three Dimensions on Attitude toward Homosexuality .................................................... 228 |
| Figure 6.1 | Conservatives’ Organization of Transnational Sex-Religious Networks.. 277 |
| Figure 6.2 | The Transnational Network of An Anti-tongzhi Church (the Third Largest Christian Church System in Taiwan) ................................................. 282 |
Chapter 1

Introduction: Social Conservatism Crossing Borders

1.1 Prologue: When a letter flew across borders

In July 2011, as I sat in my New Jersey home working on my doctoral studies, a snapshot photo from my Taiwanese LGBTQIA activist colleague appeared in my Facebook messenger. The photo showed my Taiwanese name (KAO Ying-Chao, 高穎超) chalked onto a classroom blackboard and prayed over by dozens of evangelical and charismatic Christians. Below my name were the names of three famous professors of gender education and two officials of the Ministry of Education (MOE). This event occurred at a public hearing for pedagogical materials and curricular guidelines on gender equity education (xingbie pingdeng jiaoyu, 性別平等教育; hereafter, GEE) in Changhua, a city in central Taiwan. We became the targets of these Christians’ prayers because we had publicly engaged in GEE research and trainings for years, promoting progressive reforms of gender relations, contending with patriarchal and heteronormative hierarchies, and advocating substantive equal status among people of different genders and sexualities.¹ These Christians attacked educational materials about women’s reproductive

¹ The professors are three of the editors of GEE supplementary materials authorized by Taiwan’s Ministry of Education (MOE) to research and develop pedagogies of GEE for equipping instructors with relevant gender literacy, curricula, and instructional tools to teach students enrolled in elementary schools and high schools. I had served as the administrative assistant (someone like a project manager) of the national-level GEE curriculum and instruction counseling committee. This committee, authorized by Taiwan’s Ministry of Education and led by Professor Anthony Wang at National Taipei University of Education, aims to promoting the national policy of gender equity
rights, comprehensive sex education, and ideas that they perceived as deviating from their heteronormative program. The top two discursive enemies on their list are sexual emancipation (性解放)\(^2\) and tongzhi (同志) — an overarching indigenous term in Taiwan and other Sinophonic areas referring to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, gender/sexual questioning, intersex, ally, and asexual people (i.e., LGBTQQIAA). (For the books under attack, see Hsiao, Wang, Hong 2009; You and Tsai 2009.)

For these Christians, those who promote gender equity and tongzhi friendliness are demons attempting to steal away their sacred nation. They pray for God’s re-dominion over their promised land by “converting” our minds and by cleansing homosexuality and other non-conventional genders and sexualities, which they articulate as sins, abominations, and moral contaminations that induce natural disasters and foment societal disintegration.

These praying Christians are sympathetic supporters of the so-called “True Love Alliance” (TLA, 真愛聯盟), which was one of the first nation-wide anti-gay groups fighting against the implementation of the tongzhi-friendly (LGBTQ+-friendly) education program in the textbooks of grade levels 1–9 (elementary and junior high schools). The TLA was a vocal group of angry parents, teachers, professors, and religious leaders. They

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\(^2\) The “sexual emancipation” movement is a Taiwan-localized version of Western sexual liberation movements. Its major advocate is Dr. Josephine Chuen-juei Ho (何春蕤), distinguished professor, Department of English, National Central University (NCU), Taiwan. With her leadership, the Center for the Study of Sexualities at NCU has been the power plant of Taiwanese sexual liberation movements, producing and spreading knowledge about pornography, female sexualities, queers, transgender, public sex, bestiality, and other dozens of non-conventional sexualities. See the Center website at: http://sex.ncu.edu.tw/
charged that the MOE-edited gender pedagogical materials, and their editors, promoted sexual emancipation at school, coerced students to join gay pride parades, and created an epidemic of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and teenage pregnancies. Discourses of privacy and parents’ guardian rights were employed by the TLA to resist, they claimed, the government’s violation of parental authority over underage youth (Taiwan True Love Alliance 2011).

At that moment, few people involved, including myself, foresaw that Christian conservative groups inspired by and following the TLA would continue to demonize issues of marriage equality (same-sex marriage), HIV/AIDS prevention policies, transgender restrooms, and other gender/sexual issues. These prayers and fierce face-to-face confrontations in the public hearings were the battle drums and sparks that ignited an unprecedented series of culture wars in modern Taiwanese history. We were just starting to experience and digest the traumatic shocks and nightmarish fears stemming from the misogyny, homophobia, and heterosexism that were becoming mainstream and even hegemonic in our public life. At that time, we had no capacity to take a “Google Earth view” of the situation to understand that what was occurring in this East Asian island country was the product of globalized social conflicts over fundamentally different moral/sexual standpoints, as well as of an international vanguard of Christian conservativism and its transnational anti-gay networks.

***

At the beginning of Taiwanese culture wars, I observed one prominent source of negative information against tongzhi people’s autonomy, self-identification, and sexual citizenship in a translated document titled “Letter to School Officials.” The letter was
originally issued by Tom Benton (2010a)—then-president of the American College of Pediatricians (ACPed)—later translated from English into Chinese (Benton 2010b), and re-published in the 2010 summer issue of Rainbow 7 in Taiwan. (Rainbow 7 is the quarterly magazine of the Taiwanese chapter of former Exodus International, an organization that aims to convert all homosexuals “back to” the straight life.\(^3\) This letter received overwhelming attention from various anti-gay supporters in Taiwan, being especially prominent in the TLA campaign. Christian conservative leaders and followers frequently cited this letter and the “knowledge” it contained for the purpose of opposing marriage equality legislation, the implementation of GEE, and other progressive policies that would have safeguarded the rights of gender and sexual minorities.

The letter claims that there is no scientific evidence that individuals are born gay or transgender. Rather, the letter states, “[A]s many as 26% of 12-year-olds reported being uncertain of their sexual orientation, yet only 2–3% of adults actually identify themselves as homosexual” (Benton 2010b:12, which cited Remafedi, Resnick, Blum, et al. 1992). Taiwanese Christians interpreted this finding as implying that 80% of children who identify as homosexual will automatically transform into “normal” (straight), while less than 20% of them will remain homosexual because, they calculated, 2% divided by 26% equals 8% and 3% divided by 26% equals 12%. Both 8% and 12% are less than 20%. Thus, they inferred that no education friendly to homosexuality should be taught in schools because it would make children feel confused about their sexual orientation, so that children would become “fixated” in homosexuality and unable to move on to the

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\(^3\) “Seven” of this organization’s title emphasizes that the divine biblical rainbow has seven colors. The rainbow flag used by global LGBT activists has only six colors and thus should be fake and incomplete.
next stage of their life course: developing heterosexual affection and, eventually, marrying an opposite-sex person.

The letter further promotes a therapy that could “successfully treat” homosexuals and convert them into heterosexuals by pointing to multiple social, familial, and genetic factors that affect sexual orientation and gender identity (cited from Collins 2007). Tom Benton, author of the letter and the ACPed president, warns his readers that adolescents with gay or lesbian identities suffer from higher levels of mental and physical problems than their heterosexual counterparts. He suggests that if schools discourage students from coming out or being self-affirmative as gay, they can reduce the risk of suicide in students by 20% each year (Benton 2010b:13; cited from Remafedi, Farrow, and Deisher 1991).

In the Taiwanese/Chinese version of the letter published in *Rainbow 7*, the letter and the academic sources it cites were framed as “Western science,” used frequently as talking points by anti-tongzhi campaigners in Taiwan to support changes to pro-tongzhi curricular guidelines, to hinder the implementation of *tongzhi education* in grade levels 1–9 (Taiwan Ministry of Education 2008:23), and to resist legislation on marriage equality. The wide circulation of the letter in Taiwan generated fear, anxiety, and confusion among Taiwanese tongzhi, who had already embraced non-heterosexual identities and practices, and their heterosexual allies and family members.

Around 2011–2012, as a junior sociologist early in my doctoral training, I

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4 Citing a study from the National Association for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality (NARTH), the letter told school officials that “[a]mong adolescents who claim a ‘gay’ identity, the health risks include higher rates of sexually transmitted infections, alcoholism, substance abuse, anxiety, depression and suicide” (Benton 2010b:13; see also in Phelan, Whitehead, and Sutton 2009).
intervened in social debates over this letter, its purported scientific knowledge, and its anti-gay discourses. Using my bilingual literacy to trace the letter’s origin, I discovered that it draws on a variety of U.S. evangelical churches, research institutes, and activist organizations that are fighting against the tongzhi rights movements, sexual citizenship, and pro-gay scientific research. These organizations are actively engaged in disseminating their Christianity-motivated “findings” to the rest of the world. Thus, the letter is merely the tip of the iceberg in this transnational, cross-continental enterprise of Christian conservatism and its global moral campaigns.

There are two major problems in the letter: (1) its messages are based on distorted knowledge and intentional mis-citations and (2) it joins a body of self-proclaimed “scientific” research that is biased by its moral assumptions (Kao 2012). First, the assertions made in the letter derive from intentionally misquoted or mis-cited scientific research. For example, Dr. Gary Remafedi, a professor of pediatrics at the University of Minnesota, was frequently cited in the letter. He publicly clarified that some pediatricians had “deliberately distorted [Remafedi’s] research for malicious purposes” (Pinto 2010). In addition, Remafedi (1991, 1992) did not, as the letter claims, emphasize the relationship between gay children’s confusion about their sexual orientation and the high risk of suicide. Instead, he found that children eventually accepted their nonconforming sexual identities in a heteronormative society. The ACPed President, in other words, exaggerated the problems that led to Remafedi’s research and intentionally ignored Remafedi’s findings and conclusion.

The letter also cited a book on genetics by Dr. Francis S. Collins, director of the

5 In a press interview, Dr. Remafedi said, “It’s obvious that they didn’t even read my research […] I mean, they spelled my name wrong every time they cited it” (Pinto 2010).
National Institutes of Health (NIH), to justify the claim that homosexuals can be converted by their own free will. Responding to this claim, Collins stated on the NIH’s official website:

It is disturbing for me to see special interest groups distort my scientific observations to make a point against homosexuality. The American College of Pediatricians pulled language out of context from a book I wrote in 2006 to support an ideology that can cause unnecessary anguish and encourage prejudice. The information they present is misleading and incorrect, and it is particularly troubling that they are distributing it in a way that will confuse school children and their parents. (Collins 2010)

Although these authors publicly clarified their findings and sent requests to ACPed to stop mis-citing their work, Benton refused to revise his letter. He insisted that he had the right to use any research that he wanted and asserted that, even if these researchers did not support his conclusions, their research did (Pinto 2010).

Second, the letter was not an exception to, but was an example of, numerous distorted studies produced by a self-sustainable system of actors with a specific moral agenda (see Stein 2006 on Christian “science”). While ACPed portrayed itself as a scientific institute without political or religious concerns, its website clearly stated its moral stance and its assumed sexual-political objectives. It asserted “the fundamental mother-father family unit, within the context of marriage, to be the optimal setting for the development and nurturing of children and pledge[d] to promote this unit” (the “Core Values” of the American College of Pediatricians n.d.). ACPed also assumes that sexual abstinence until marriage is the ideal for adolescents. The organization’s objectives include promoting heterosexual monogamous families and affirming parents’ rights and responsibilities regarding their children’s education.
ACPed is not the flagship academic organization of pediatrics in the United States that it presents itself to be, however. The actual leading pediatric institution is the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), which was founded in 1930 and comprised 62,000 pediatricians and specialist members in 2014 (http://www.aap.org/). Formed in 2002, ACPed, by contrast, represents around 200 members (Pinto 2010), who split from the AAP after the latter published a policy statement supporting the legal adoption of children by same-sex co-parents or second parents (Committee on Psychosocial Aspects of Child and Family Health–American Academy of Pediatrics 2002). Based on a considerable body of professional research, the AAP’s policy recognized that “children with parents who are homosexual can have the same advantages and the same expectations for health, adjustment, and development as can children whose parents are heterosexual” (339). In response, the most conservative pediatricians established their own association, American College of Pediatricians (ACPed), to contend with the AAP’s discourse on homosexuality. Thus, the ACPed produces research that promotes heterosexual, monogamous marriages and families based on traditional Judeo-Christian values (Waller and Nicolosi n.d.), but its Christianity-driven findings are problematic when evaluated in light of the rigorous criteria of scientific methodologies.6

The influence of the ACPed’s letter is not confined within U.S. national borders. In an increasingly globalized world, it is important to consider both the domestic and transnational effects of anti-gay knowledge, especially its extended cultural influence in the borderless digital world. Although American researchers clarified many flawed

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6 After the United States legalized same-sex marriage in 2015, the ACPed turned their attention to promote cis-genderism and condemn non-conventional gender identities and performance.
statements in Benton’s letter in the two months after its publication (from late March to May 2010), the Chinese translation of the letter retained the same biased information when it was published, without any revisions or footnotes, in the June issue of Rainbow 7. Further, original citations in the English version were deleted from the Chinese translation, obstructing skeptical readers from examining the validity and reliability of the document’s claims.

Professional clarifications of the letter’s academic dis-integrity and mis-citations, however, failed to halt its viral diffusion from the West to the East. According to my tracking (Kao 2012), after the letter was translated in Taiwan in mid-2010, the Chinese version then migrated from Taiwan to Hong Kong, where it was duplicated exactly in a Christian newspaper in June 2010. Less than half a year later, it returned to Taiwan, spreading from Protestant communities to Catholic networks through an e-newspaper published by a private Catholic university. In August 2011, the Chinese letter returned to the American continent, where it was disseminated among members of a Chinese Catholic church in Dallas, Texas.

The letter’s journey not only signals the consolidation of a burgeoning Christian moral and scientific enterprise but it also demonstrates how Christian science and sexuality transgress national borders and rally right-wing conservative minds by distorted science. I call this kind of exporting of toxic and harmful knowledge “D-waste” (discursive waste), comparable to the toxic “E-waste” (electronic waste) that Euro-American countries dumped into the Global South. Exemplified in the ACPed letter’s story, this global diffusion and circulation of D-waste from the U.S. helped to fuel the Global Southern culture wars between Christian conservatives and supporters of
gender and sexual equity. It also helped Euro-American religious leaders expand their transnational moral enterprise and religious businesses.

1.2 Contextualized research inquiries

Years later, I came to understand that the campaign of the True Love Alliance and the wide dissemination of the ACPed letter marked the initiation of the contemporary culture wars in Taiwan. Taiwan’s culture wars joined worldwide battles over gender and sexual issues regarding homosexuality, marriage equality, LGBT education, all-gender restrooms, and other gender/sexual citizenships. However, Taiwan is a different and ambivalent case located in between two extremes: the American conservative politics on one end, and the newly emerging, but overwhelmingly “successful” state-sponsored homophobic legislation and societal witch-hunt in Uganda, on the other. Compared to the United States and Uganda, Taiwan is somewhere in the middle. During the second decade of the 21st century, Taiwan’s conservative social movements based on moral values were growing rapidly into unpredictable political movements; however, Taiwan’s three-decade long process of democratization since 1987 and its thriving tongzhi and sexual minority communities and civil movements since 1990 have generated defensive forces to contain the rise of conservative politics.

Much as Stein (2001) observed in an Oregon anti-gay campaign, the culture wars over non-conventional genders and sexualities in Taiwan also mobilized emotional, material, and social resources. In the 2011 public hearings described above, many blatant in-your-face homophobic slurs and hateful condemnations traumatized my pro-gay and pro-gender-equality interviewees. The public hearings reached little mutual
understanding and empathy. What they accomplished was creating a new curricular
guideline to stop junior-high-school students (grader 7–9) from recognizing their own
sexual orientations at an institutional level, and to begin the first chapter of Taiwanese
sexual conservative politics through instilling fear, anxiety, and social polarization.

A series of anti-gay events have since unfolded from 2011 to the present. In 2012, Campus Fellowship (校園團契), the largest inter-denominational Christian system focusing on colleges and high schools, held a conference titled “Vanishing Gender Boundaries (消失的性別界線),” which highlighted the worries among conservatives about the taken-for-granted gender binary boundary fading out in contemporary society. Organizers of this conference invited Hong Kong and Taiwanese religious leaders to refresh and re-inscribe traditional gender ideas in Christian students and pastors. The goal was to train hundreds of attendees to be what I call the “spiritual reserve army,” to talk back to pro-gay discourses and resist gender equity education.

In 2013, the legislation protecting non-heterosexual family rights made new progress. The bill drafts of same-sex marriage, domestic partnership, and multi-family members received national attention and attracted hundreds of thousands of supportive petitions; the “Bill of Marriage Equality” (Same-Sex Marriage) was sent to the Legislative Yuan (Taiwan’s Parliament) and passed the first reading. This move scared moral conservatives. To stop this trend, Taiwanese Christian leaders, accompanied by other religious representatives and politicians, initiated both local and national campaigns. They lobbied and petitioned people, successfully organizing a rally of 150,000–300,000 people, they claimed, to occupy Ketagalan Boulevard (a politically symbolic place in front of Taiwan’s Presidential Hall) on Nov 30, 2013. This rally was accompanied by
Christian songs, moral shouting, and the prayers of fundamentalists to convert gays and lesbians. There were exaggerated positive testimonies of heterosexual marriage and family values, and even a protester wearing a Third Reich, Nazi-era uniform advocating the death of tongzhi. Participants wearing Ku Klux Klan-like high hats raised their hand to pray for these “devils” in their eyes; security guards made circles with arms to restrict the mobility of pro-tongzhi activists who expressed dissent. This rally became what people later called “the 1130 Event,” an event full of discriminatory confrontations, overt shame, macro and micro-aggressions, and public and physical ghettoization. It is a memory so traumatic that even I cannot finish these sentences without bearing tears in my eyes to this day in the spring of 2018.

The mass protest of the 1130 event led to the death of the same-sex marriage bill in that legislative term. Meanwhile, Christian conservatives pushed city/county-level lawmakers to publicly interrogate the school screening of the pro-sex pedagogical video *Shall We Swim?* (qīngchūn shuǐ yàng, 青春水漾) (Yu 2011), igniting another wave of battles over the GEE program that focused on comprehensive sex education and the sexual pleasure of adolescents.

The year 2014 marked a turning point for Taiwanese Christian conservatives. It was the year when they turned from passive to active on gender/sexual issues. These Christian conservatives mimicked the titles of progressive organizations and organized many gender and AIDS organizations to sit in governmental committees. The national-level GEE committee recruited more than two conservative members, who effectively used proposals and anti-gay speeches to obstruct the progressive GEE agenda. Also in 2014, the Presbyterian Church of Taiwan (PCT), the country’s largest Christian
denomination, first officially defined marriage as the union between one man and one woman in its pastoral letter (Presbyterian Church of Taiwan 2014, Jun 10). This widely-called “anti-tongzhi pastoral letter” (反同牧函) became part of the arsenal of conservatives within PCT in their struggle against liberal Presbyterians and their mission to build pan-Christian alliances with evangelicals and charismatics.

In late 2015, Christians of Mandarin-speaking sectors, mostly evangelicals and charismatics, formed the first Christian party in Taiwanese political history, Faith and Hope League (FHL, 信心希望聯盟). They used electoral campaigns of legislators to reinforce heteronormative family values at the national and regional levels. Although they did not win seats in the Legislative Yuan in early 2016, their impact has remained and they will likely continue through the following regional and national elections. After the 2016 national elections, the new Legislative Yuan had become dominated by the relatively tongzhi-friendly Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨), accompanied by the firmly tongzhi-friendly pro-leftist New Power Party (NPP, 時代力量) and a few liberal young members from the conservative pro-China Nationalist Party Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨). Catching a momentary political opportunity, trans-partisan lawmakers initiated a new version of the Marriage Equality Bill, that quickly passed the first reading and was sent to the Judiciary and Organic Laws and Statutes Committee (JOLSC, 司法及法制委員會) for general and line-by-line examinations. In response to this new wave of marriage equality legislation, moral conservatives organized waves of protests and rallies outside the Legislative Yuan and on Ketagalan Boulevard, arguing that any change of the definition of marriage should be determined by referendum. “Marriage and Family,
Determined by All People (婚姻家庭，全民決定)” was their thematic slogan.

Republican Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the rise of right-wing populism in the West further energized Taiwanese Christian conservatives. They began to claim that the protection of heterosexual marriage and traditional family values is the “new world trend” (新世界趨勢), as exemplified by President Trump’s election, and that passing same-sex marriage legislation is out of date. Any institutional protection for gender and sexual minorities would destroy Taiwan’s thousand years of Chinese heritage and cut Taiwan’s umbilical cord linking it to its cultural mother — Mainland China. Implicitly, their attack on the institutionalization of more equal sexual citizenships was deeply bound with divisive nationalism.

The ascendancy of Christian conservatism in Taiwan may not be anything new, especially for those raised in a predominantly Christian society in the West. Considering that Christians only occupy 5–7% of the Taiwanese population, however, I argue that the political force of Christian conservatism is both remarkable and difficult to comprehend in the Taiwanese context where the religious market is dominated by Buddhists, Taoists, and folk belief worshipers. Why were Christian conservatives able to develop a powerful political regime in Taiwan? How did they, a rather religious minority, become such a formidable force in pushing their agenda of enshrining LGBTQIA inequality and opposing equal sexual citizenship, including marriage equality and tongzhi education?

It is even more sociologically puzzling to consider the paradox that these Christian conservative forces emerged out of one of the most socially progressive countries in Asia. Indeed, Pulitzer Prize–winner Andrew Jacobs, reporting in the New
York Times, described Taiwan as a “beacon for Asian gays” [sic.] because of Taiwan’s friendliness toward tongzhi communities (Jacobs 2014). Taiwan is prominently different from neighboring countries, where same-sex relationships are criminalized (in Brunei) and where engaging in gay sex may be punished by 100 lashes (in Indonesia) or two years in jail (in Singapore). Taiwan’s democracy and vibrant civil society, by contrast, allowed room for various gender and sexual minorities and their supporters to organize civil organizations and launch social movements since 1990. Starting in 2003, Taiwan has hosted annual LGBTQIA pride parades that have attracted international guests from more than twenties countries. To expedite marriage equality legislation in the Legislative Yuan, a protest concert was held on December 10, 2016 in front of the Presidential Palace and gathered an estimated number of 250,000 supporters — an unseen record of its kind in Asia. Moreover, Taiwan’s progressive educational and employment protections and resource provisions covering different genders, gender identities, gender temperaments, and sexual orientations are also unique in Asia. And so, the question remains: how and where did Christian conservatism come to exist in Taiwan?

The drastic contrast between progressivism and conservative ascendancy in Taiwan calls for many sociological inquiries. My scholarly inquiry began with a set of grounded questions: Who are these anti-tongzhi and pro-family Christians? What social characteristics constitute their groups or organizations fighting for heteronormative family values and opposing marriage equality and tongzhi education? How have they developed influential movements that have shaped not only domestic politics and culture, but also global sexual landscape?

These grounded questions evolved alongside my pilot studies in Taiwan, where I
witnessed firsthand the fervor and passion of Taiwanese Christian conservatives and their fealty to their anti-gay, pro-family beliefs. I wanted to step into their social worlds and understand what motivates their collective action opposing the implementation of gender equity education and marriage equality legislation. Unlike those in my field who have a rather reductive understanding of the anti-gay and pro-family movements, I consider religion only one of many social factors as the imperative of political ambitions for the Christian conservatives. The truth is, not all Christians holding beliefs of homophobia and fundamentalism eventually take action to join anti-gay petitions, lobbies, and protests. These Christians have various reactions to tongzhi sexual citizenship and fundamentalist calls for anti-gay politics.

This gap between the disparate homophobic attitudes and anti-gay political actions among Taiwanese Christian conservatives led me to dig deeper into the multi-faceted levels of their belief systems and social worlds. Many Christian conservative activists have professed utter devotion to anti-gay campaigns, but in reality few of them know many LGBTQIA people or have daily interactions with them. If so, what does the opposition to tongzhi education and marriage equality mean to them? This consideration of motivations of these Christian conservatives began informing my inquiries into their mobilization strategies.

Mobilization of social movements is highly related to whom to be mobilized: the demographic composition. Living in a society dominated by Buddhism, Taoism, and polytheist folk beliefs, Christians in Taiwan are a religious minority, demographically at an estimated 5–7% of the population. According to the report of “2016 Taiwan Social Change Survey,” early in 2011 when the first wave of the religious right emerged,
Christians only comprised 5% of the Taiwanese population (Protestants 4% and Catholics 1%). During the apex of the culture wars in 2016, the Christian proportion slightly increased to 6% (Protestants 5.4% and Catholics 0.6%) (Fu, Chang, Yeh, and Hsieh 2017). While many Christian leaders in my field celebrated the 1% increase as their cosmic victory and one step closer to their Christian Kingdom, this nominal increase may have mainly derived from sampling errors, with no statistical significance. The demographic data imply that Christianity lacks religious hegemony in shaping Taiwanese residents’ spiritual lives and mental structures.

Lack of religious hegemony does not necessarily translate into a weakness of political hegemony, however. In fact, Christian churches and religious organizations in Taiwan have enough capacity to lobby government officials and national and local lawmakers effectively by formal or underground channels in order to shape educational policies and marriage laws based on their own religious values. How did the Taiwanese Christian conservatives form their mobilization strategy to launch nation-wide anti-gay campaigns? Who constituted the conservative “pro-family” movements? How did they work from the micro-level (small groups) to a national party and, eventually, create impacts that exceeded the nation? From the perspective of social movement theory, why did a small group of Christian conservatives have such disproportionate power to leverage their political appeals? Looking globally, I am curious to explore how these Taiwanese Christian conservatives materialized their domestic networks and articulated overseas connections.

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7 Another wave of data collected by the think tank led by Christian sociologists and scholars showed that Protestants occupied 4.7% of the Taiwanese population while Catholics was 0.6% (Yi ed. 2014:38). This finding echoed with the one of Taiwan Social Change Survey.
To what extent do Taiwanese Christian conservatives influence gender and sexual inequalities domestically and transnationally? Below, I examine the meanings of the basic sociological concepts of the transnational versus the global and the international, situating Taiwanese anti-gay conservatism within these contexts. I also review how sociologists of religion take the transnational approach to understand the role and dynamics of Christianity in the era of heightened globalization. Furthermore, by indigenizing ideas of genders and sexualities in Taiwan, I discuss how studies of the globalization of gender/sexuality have shed light on the global diffusions of moral conservatism that have established the foundation upon which Taiwanese Christian conservatism has been erected. Lastly, I also show how my research contributes to the literature of sociology of sexualities, religion, and transnationalization.

1.3 Religion and transnationalism

Historically, religion has always been transnational. Judaism and Islam expanded their territories and dominated many regions of the world long before modern nation-states emerged (Roberts and Yamane 2012:379; Wuthnow 2009). Although religious expansion across borders is nothing new, the extent of global religious interactions and convergence, and the speed and breadth of religious practitioners’ border-crossing movements and communication, are both contemporary and phenomenal. In an era of globalization, certain flows of people, media, ideas, finance, and technology cross boundaries more freely and “liquidly” than ever before, substantially modifying contemporary social landscapes and sexual institutions (Appadurai 1990:296; Bauman 2000). Other flows are strictly monitored or sanctioned, such as the flows of immigrants
and refugees. Modern people experience the uncertainty, anxiety, and mal-functionality of their unpredictable globalized life and morality (Bauman 2003, 2006, 2007; Bauman and Donskis 2013, 2016). For Christian conservatives, the global sexual liberation movements and trends of legalizing sexual citizenship, such as marriage equality, are one of the main reasons for their anxiety and uncertainty. To manage this fuzzy uncontrollability and sexual fluidity of modern life, many religious people have begun to counter the imagined moral impurity attached to sexual minorities, demonizing them as evil spirits and self-ghettoizing in a homogeneous religious group.

A small but prominent group of studies analyzes the association between religion and transnationalism, which has been often overlooked by the literature on migration. Roberts and Yamane (2012), for example, indicated that religion has affected and is affecting global society. Globalization increases modernization and the secularization of social structures, while transnational migration affects the religious climates of sending and receiving countries by changing the demographic composition of religious believers. Simultaneously, religious practitioners and organizations play significant roles in international politics. This is particularly true of the Roman Catholic Church and international NGOs sponsored by U.S. evangelicals. Along with missionaries, these players intervene in international politics in the roles of providing foreign welfare, charity, medical and humanitarian aid, and local infrastructure. Taking advantage of advanced technology and mediation, U.S. American televangelists and worship leaders have found new “markets” by broadcasting their programs overseas as their domestic influence fades (395). Affordable international airfare, for example, allows Ugandan anti-gay religious leaders to be trained and enjoy annual retreats in the United States and to preach and
advocate against homosexuality in their home country (Williams et al. 2014). U.S. religious organizations have directly and indirectly affected the politics and economy of foreign countries and international organizations through their decades-long international interventions. Their overseas tasks both consolidate and reinforce their hegemony over U.S. American politics, foreign policy, economy, and culture.

The literature on religion and transnationalism has developed new analytical approaches for understanding religious practices and organizations on the move, as they are no longer encumbered by national borders. Wuthnow and Offutt (2008) suggest replacing fixed and static concepts of religious identity with “transnational religious connections” that better explain the dynamics and reciprocal movements of global flows of people, resources, services, and information (209–211). According to their research, more than 42,000 U.S. citizens were working as full-time Protestant missionaries in foreign countries in 2001, a significantly higher number than in the 1950s. In contrast, fewer Catholic priests are serving abroad nowadays than in 1968. In addition to engaging in religious transmigration and tourism, 1.6 million U.S. churchgoers per year participate in transnational missions as short-term volunteers. The Global Issues Survey estimated that these volunteers, on average, stay eight days overseas, individually spending USD$1,000 per trip and contributing a total of $1.6 billion dollars to international transportation. Forty-four percent of those interviewed reported that their congregations engaged in foreign short-term missions or relief work in the past year, and 48% said that their congregations invited a foreign guest speaker during the same period (218–219).

Alongside the increased flows of people, the flows of resources have also continued to proliferate. These resources are disseminated across borders in the form of
remittances, religious funding, humanitarian aid, and religious products and information. In total, U.S. Protestant churches and religious agencies invested more than $3.7 billion in international ministries, sponsoring roughly 65,000 non-U.S. citizens working in foreign countries in 2001 (Wuthnow and Offutt 2008:221). One denomination (the Southern Baptist Convention) allocated $283 million to its International Mission Board in 2005, supporting more than 5,000 full-time religious workers preaching abroad (217). The cross-border migration of people and resources simultaneously generates variegated cultural effects. These U.S.-based religious connections modify the structures of equality and inequality in other countries, promote U.S.-defined democracy under the guise of religious freedom, and export hegemonic global Anglo cultural symbols and narratives (e.g., promoting English as 750 million people’s first or second language) (226). Based on these data, it is clear that U.S. Christianity is a significant global force that is still increasing its momentum for exporting its beliefs and crystallizing transnational religious connections between personnel and resources.

Notably, the transition from the globalization of religion to religious transnationalism implies a theoretical turn. The idea of globalization usually assumes the United States and Western Europe as the center of the global economy and culture, while non-Euro-American areas that have deviated from the center are modernized and westernized (e.g., McDonaldization) (Ritzer 2015[1993]). Some of my Taiwanese interviewees held a similar viewpoint, arguing that Christianity must be a Western import. However, transnationalism sheds light on a two-way or multiway discursive direction of movement and distribution. In my use, the TRANS-national highlights the ongoing processes of back-and-forth mobility that are constantly transporting, translating,
transforming, and transgressively moving across national and cultural borders.

Trans-nationalism also emphasizes the multiple global centers emerging of the Global South. For example, Jenkins’s (2011[2002]) concept of global Christianity indicates that churches in the Global South have independently thrived and expanded to have little relationship with their presumed spiritual and institutional origins in the Global North.

In other words, people living in or migrating from the Global South should not be understood as passive recipients of global culture. Instead, they have developed various strategies of glocalization to negotiate the ways in which globalization and localization converge. In a study of immigrants as football fans, for example, Giulianotti and Robertson (2007) suggested that there are four types of glocalization. Some social actors endeavor to preserve their original cultures, practices, and meaning systems by deviating from the new environment (relativization). Others selectively appropriate pragmatic institutional or behavioral patterns from the new culture to make it possible to maintain their core traditions (accommodation). Shifting from an emphasis on the local to the global, another group of social actors melt local and global cultures to create distinctly hybridized cultural practices, institutions, and meaning systems (hybridization). The final group of social actors prefers embracing the new, mostly hegemonic culture, and they sometimes abandon their own traditions (transformation).

Using a similar approach to study transnational religions, Levitt (2004) classified the organizational relationships between U.S.-based religious institutions for immigrants and their counterpart institutions in the original countries according to three types of processes: extending (religious organizations or governments in the sending countries fiscally or institutionally supporting the organizations that their people formed in the
receiving countries to which they migrated), *negotiating* (organizational leaders in the sending and receiving countries flexibly negotiating what kind of personnel and resources to mutually transport), and *recreating* (religious migrants using their own cultural systems to change the new society).

The concept of glocalization shows the strengths of explaining immigrants’ cultural reconfiguration after moving to the Global North and demonstrates Global Southerners’ reactions to the importation of Western culture. However, the concept of glocalization is limited in its ability to address the autonomy and capacity of Global Southerners to execute, reassemble, and generate new transnational religious flows that affect the original producers of culture. Its scope of analysis also fails to examine the process through which sexual morality and knowledge continuously evolve and transform when they cross various borders. As Mora (2007) reported, Pentecostal missionaries and telecasts, originally transported and translated from the United States to Brazil, are now repackaged and broadcasted in Spanish-speaking communities in New York City, for example. African American gospel music was imported into Ghana and remixed with local hip-hop, then traveled back to the United States and earned a new audience in Atlanta with its distinct hybridity (Wuthnow and Offutt 2008:227).

When a new border-crossing trend becomes prominent, the transnational perspective helps to explain how religious artifacts transgress national borders rapidly and reciprocally. In this trend, believers and nonbelievers in the Global North are affected by the religious activities of Global Southerners, whose influence is usually ignored or underestimated by the Global North. Re-centering the power of social actors in the Global South also encourages scholars to reconsider who is at the “core,” if any, to shape
global religious landscapes and sexual institutions (c.f., Wallerstein 1974, 2004).

My reflections on religion, glocalization, and transnationalism guided my research to ask further questions of pro-family Taiwanese movements. What is the pro-family Taiwanese movement’s position in relation to the transnational conservative networks? What kind of knowledges, sexual moralities, strategies, and resources have pro-family Taiwanese activists globally integrated and, conversely, emitted back to other countries in the Global South and North? Additionally, while many Christian conservatives in Taiwan and the United States claimed that their anti-tongzhi and heteronormative ideology represented the voice of the “silent majority,” do they truly represent the majority of international attitude toward homosexuality? Built on Wuthnow and Offutt’s (2008) “transnational religious connections,” I explored what kind of social ontology emerges from the development and consolidation of the glocal and transnational efforts of the Taiwanese pro-family movements? If we discard the static analysis of religious identity and focus on visualizing the dynamic border-crossing trajectories of moralities and knowledge, what does this epistemological world map look like? What kinds of social connections and belongingness have Christian conservatives’ actions produced (c.f. Stein 2001), and what kinds of social dynamics have been the unintended consequences of these religious actors’ love and care? With these questions answered, we can better understand transnational society using a dynamic perspective at the intersection of religion, gender, and sexuality.

While Taiwanese pro-family activism is deeply embedded in the structure of globalization, it has been influenced by and impacts the global flows of conservative objects, ideas, media, technology, human bodies, and institutions, as Appadurai has
implied (1990). My study, however, takes this approach one step further, to analyze global society by revealing various means used for religious transnational networking and illustrating the influences and infrastructures of the transnational moral networks. I found that the Taiwanese pro-family movement received direct influence from Western conservative groups with reservation, accessed resources through third-party detour routes, and participated in the regional circulation of conservative enterprise in East and Southeast Asia. In this network, Taiwanese conservatives also played an active role in producing anti-tongzhi resources and discourses and exporting them to neighboring countries, as well as in sending conservative elements back to impact Taiwanese and Chinese American communities (see more in Chapter 4).

1.4 Globalization and sexual conservatism

The final part of my dissertation critically examines what kinds of sex hierarchies and heteronormativites have been consolidated and re-produced in the development and transnational expansion of the pro-family Taiwanese movement. This move is meant to put studies of global religion and transnational sexualities into conversation. The aim of my study is to bring the perspective of sexualities and gender back to the literature on transnational religious studies and to add a discussion about religious influences over the globalization of sexualities to the conversation.

Notably, although scholars have highlighted the increasing symmetry and reciprocity of transnational religious institutions between the Global South and North, sexuality is usually missing in these religious studies and analyses. Among the few scholars who use a global or international perspective to address how sexualities and
cultural politics migrate across borders, Binnie (2004) has revisited the significance of the state and its undeniable influence on sexualities in the era of globalization. While other scholars suggest that the state’s power will shrink significantly and be replaced by the global forces, Binnie’s research argues that, as globalization continues to grow, the state remains a power actor in manipulating and governing the flows of global sexualities. Moreover, state power is increasing in the management of border control and the establishment of self-interested and protectionist structures to impede or to expedite selected global flows (Ritzer 2015).

This perspective echoes my earlier documentation of the development of Taiwan’s pro-family movement. Although the globalization of Western-oriented science, knowledge, and moralities plays a prominent role in the conservative campaigns, both pro-family and pro-tongzhi movements still target the state apparatus, especially the incumbent administration and the majority party in Congress, to advocate for their appeals. Both liberal and conservative activists’ expectations of the state have given the state more room to manipulate its power over tongzhi- and gender-related policies. Under the guise of human right and universal values, political interests remain the priority of politicians who run the state apparatus. (More discussion of this phenomenon will be provided in the concluding chapter.)

Another aspect of the globalization of sexualities sheds light on how international organizations generate sexual hierarchies and sexual moralities that structurally influence individual countries. Buss and Herman’s (2003) frequently-cited book *Globalizing Family Values* examined how the Roman Catholic Church and U.S.-based Christian Right organizations developed a plan for global activism through multiple international
organizations and conventions, including the UN, the World Health Organization, and their affiliates. These religious players promoted conservative, evangelical versions of family and marriage. Their pervasive anti-sex, anti-abortion, anti-contraception, and anti-non-procreative heterosexual sex campaigns have created a strong voice against the “global liberal agenda,” which includes, for them, international feminism and secular humanism (Buss and Herman 2003:xix). Keywords, in Appadurai’s (1990) sense, such as human rights, democracy, modernity, family, equality, and (religious) freedom are the main battlefields in the Christian Right’s international political agenda. These organizations that waged international battles received financial support and discursive supplies from the Vatican, U.S.-based think tanks, research centers and institutes, and other conservative allies. Meanwhile, their increasing power in international politics helped them accumulate political and financial assets, enhancing their hegemony in their homelands.

These exceptional studies explain what kinds of social institutions facilitate the international expansion of U.S. Christian conservatism. These studies are inevitably U.S.-centric, however, often ignoring the discursive impact of U.S. Christian conservatism on the Global Southern actors and their continued reassembling of U.S. cultural exports into hybrid cultures. In other words, their analytic frameworks and heuristics are, unfortunately, confined by theories of Western-centric internationalization and globalization that fail to consider transnationalism — even though some researchers have used these terms simultaneously. Using the literature of globalization of sexualities to think through my study of the pro-family Taiwanese movement, I ask: how do these Taiwanese react to the global sexual conservative ideologies and agenda generated by
international organizations? How does the “glocalization” of sexual conservatism — i.e., the mutual interactions between global and local conservatism based on sexualities — change, create, extend, and/or intensify sexual inequalities in the Global Southern society of Taiwan?

Looking back to the literature about Global Southern sexualities, I found a few studies about Christianity in East Asia and Africa that helped enlighten some aspects of my approach. Josephine Ho (2008, 2010) critiqued the negativity of global governance produced by the transnational alliance of the U.S. Christian Right and Christian-based local and international NGOs in Taiwan. She argued that these Taiwanese Christian-based NGOs, earning prestige from their international companions, have worked closely with liberal states to legislate many aggressive sex/gender-related laws that constrain women’s and sexual minorities’ freedom of sex speech and activity. Their legislative campaigns have produced social/sexual discontent against increasingly visible bodies, identities, and sex information of tongzhi and other queer subjects (Ho 2008:463).

As she was trained as an English literature critic, Ho’s critiques are insightful, but her evidence may be not strong enough to support her grand statements. Ho’s data are unsystematically drawn from reports and news articles that fall short of showing a multifaceted picture of Christian conservatism’s influence on Taiwan’s gender equity education and the sexual climates in the larger society. Moreover, although Ho claims to speak for sexual subalterns, her methodology leaves little room for the voices of those who are multidimensionally oppressed at the bottom of the sex hierarchy. Confined to her unique positionality in Taiwanese sex politics, Ho’s portrait of the Taiwanese sexual landscape under transnational Christianity over-represents the dark side of the story,
while multiple positions and subjectivities of various social actors in the field — including educators, feminist and tongzhi activists, and church and state leaders — are missing from her analysis. Thus, it is necessary to incorporate more empirical data from multiple sources, including fieldwork, participant observation, and in-depth interviews with conservative, liberal, and radical sides. The triangulation of multifaceted data provides a more solid ground from which researchers can examine the processes by which Christian conservatism and the state work together to reproduce sexual inequalities at the local and international levels. This approach also gives voice to people positioning themselves as different shades on the sexual politics spectrum.

By contrast, Wong (2013) used a sociohistorical perspective (compared to Ho’s discursive approach) to analyze the connection between Christian Right organizations and local politics in Hong Kong. Wong’s study explains that the rise of Hong Kong evangelical activism — a triangular network of a research institute, a social movement association, and a pro-family alliance — has roots in Hong Kong’s colonial history. These roots substantially shaped Hong Kong’s sex education landscape and society at large. Most importantly, Wong’s research insightfully shows that Christian conservatives’ sexual moral campaign indirectly created political stakes in Chinese nationalism. Situated in the political structure divided between the pro-democracy and the pro-establishment (pro-Beijing) camps, the newly-thriving evangelical activism in Hong Kong implicated and advocated for traditional Chinese family values, lending more political currency to the pro-establishment campaign. Therefore, “sexual morality articulated in the name of the preservation of traditions, whether they are Christian or Chinese, has fed an autocratic political movement of Hong Kong that partakes [of] the dangerously divisive politics of
the fundamentalist religious movements around the globe” (Wong 2013:340). My research follows Wong’s approach of examining Taiwan’s pro-family activists’ relationship to and articulation of nationalism, especially Communist China’s ongoing threat over Taiwan and potential battles over Taiwan-China unification.

Outside of East Asia, flows of transnational U.S. Christian conservatism have also reached the African continent. Studies report that U.S. evangelicals have intervened deeply in the native epistemological systems, as well as local cultures, national identities, and societal politico-economies of various African countries and other countries in the Global South (Shoko 2010; Anderson 2011; Oliver 2013). In Uganda, hidden behind the legislation of a so-called anti-homosexuality bill, is the process by which local conservative politicians and religious leaders appropriated and assembled selective readings of the Bible and reified interpretations of colonial African traditions to legitimize their anti-gay positions. A coalition of Ugandan conservatives and transnational U.S. evangelicals, such as Scott Lively, not only secured and produced their own economic interests and political currencies, but they also broadened the gap of power inequality within Ugandan society and between the Global North and South (Oliver 2013:84–85). In short, the ubiquitous, multidimensional expansion of U.S. Christian conservatism in Africa has morphed into “a Pentecostal, evangelical invasion” (83).

Putting together Asian and African studies of transnational evangelicalism and research on the globalizing of conservative sexuality, I found the main gap in the literature is a truly transnational perspective to delineate and discuss the (re)production, circulation, and network infrastructure of Christian conservative morality and knowledge.
In the writings in both English and Chinese, some scholars claimed that their religious subjects are influenced by transnationalism. However, their own radical voices are much louder than the solid data collected from the social actors of whom they are speaking (Ho 2008, 2010). Other research insightfully points out that transnational Christian evangelicalism ubiquitously shaped the sexual hierarchy at either the international (Buss and Herman 2003) or local level (e.g., Oliver 2013; Wong 2013), yet failing to consider transnational society as an entity of the sociocultural system.

To reimagine the ontology of transnational society, I utilize a Latourian approach in order to reconceptualize transnational society as rather a network assembled by sexual ideas, bodies, objects, and institutions (Latour 2007; Phillips 2006; Fox and Alldred 2013). This conceptual move leads to a transition from a focus on transnational religious connections (Wuthnow and Offutt 2008), which presumably imply bilateral relations between sending and receiving countries, to what I call the “transnational sex-religious network” (TSRN, hereafter). TSRN refers to a multi-lateral, symmetrical networking process that takes place between the Global North and South by Christian conservatives working on border-crossing tasks related to religion and sexualities. The network could be tangible and contingent, powerful and unstable, evolving and conflicting, expanding in one part and breaking in another at the same time. Hereafter, the debate shifts from how the intersection between religion and transnationalism is shaping some parts of Taiwanese society to how and why these sexual entities are contingently assembled and/or reassembled in the fluid transnational network. This further inquiry leads me to ask: To what extent and how the (re)assembled sexual conservatism influences tongzhi subjectivities and other sexual ideas, bodies, objects, and institutions in this transnational
era. (More detailed discussion will follow in Chapter 6.)

1.5 Revisiting gender and sexualities in Taiwanese contexts

This study on the rise of the Taiwanese pro-family movement and Christian conservatism touches upon four sociological subfields: the intersection of gender and sexuality, religion, globalization and transnationalism, and broader politico-economics. These subfields have their own autonomous influences on Christian conservatism in Taiwan, but they also interactively connect to each other while shaping the social phenomena that I present in this dissertation. Next, I provide a brief introduction to the Taiwanese gender and sexual environment in order to explain the contexts from which the Taiwanese pro-family movement emerged. To focus on a genealogical map of sociological knowledge and lay a foundation for the following analyses, I use the Taiwanese native perspectives to decolonize and critically review the concepts of gender, sexuality, “tongzhi,” and “anti-gay.” Understanding these basic terms will help to better understand the conservatism against the progressive institutionalization of gender and sexualities.

1.5.1 “Queering” Taiwan and education policies

As an East Asian island society southeast of China and south of Japan, Taiwan is often ignored on the radars of international sociologists of gender and sexualities. Even scholars working on East Asian studies tend to incorporate Taiwan under the wings (if not the shadow) of China studies, taking for granted the one China policy assumed by the governments of the United States and People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the policy’s implications for cultural borders. Others studying East Asian gender and masculinities
only put a spotlight on what occurs among regional mega-powers such as Japan, Korea, and China (e.g., Taga 2005), while silencing the voices of thriving scholarly communities of Taiwanese masculinities (e.g., Chen 2004; Kao and Bih 2013; Kao 2017).

From my perspective, Taiwan’s position in global gender and sexualities studies written in English, much like its position in international politics, is very “queer” in itself. Like many queer subjects, Taiwan is presumably closeted in scholarly work and international politics. This reality forces scholars who study Taiwan to continuously “out” their own scholarship to prove their existence and earn readers’ sympathetic attention. Like other excessively pathologized queer subjects suffering from heteronormativity, Taiwan’s self-identification is often overwritten by mega-powers that sponsor normative discourses in their own interests. Taiwan, with its own self-elected democratic administration, territory, armed force, and sovereignty, meets every condition necessary to be called a state; the only disadvantage is its weak international recognition and the fact that a rising mega power, China, claims Taiwan as its own and repeatedly denies the reality of Taiwan’s political autonomy and economic self-sustainability by bullying Taiwan and marginalizing it from other international players. Taiwan’s positionality is much like that of sexual minorities who self-claim as gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, queer, gender-queer, or other sexual and gender non-conventionality. They continuously receive denials of their identities from an outside authority in a paternalistic way, just as adolescents are denied their autonomy to self-determine their gender and sexual identities. It also works as trans* people cannot change their registered gender categories or create their own categories because that very demand will introduce chaos to the administrative system, to bathrooms, driver’s licenses, social security numbers, and to school
registration, as transphobic parents claimed. Taiwan, indeed, is an international queer.

For an institutionally silenced and marginalized subject, it seems necessary to be repeatedly coming out and securing her/his/zir own space. Defending and fighting for one’s own rights is an experience shared by many queer subjects, and Taiwanese have also fought this fight. The famous slogan from Queer Nation, “We’re queer; We’re here; Get used to it,” can be seamlessly applied to Taiwanese people, who are denied entry at the gate of the United Nations and expelled from international diplomatic and academic meetings under China’s threats.

This is the larger political background of Taiwanese gender and sexualities studies and the macro structure that I, as a transnational sociologist studying the Taiwanese anti-gay pro-family movement, frequently encounter in daily life and academic contexts. To queer Taiwan’s international existence in this way is vital to understanding the sexual politics and Christian conservatives’ reactionary social movements and the controversies generated by Taiwanese Christian conservatives’ stance of anti-Taiwan-autonomy and pro-Chinese-tradition.

To overcome its externally imposed geo-political limitations and bolster its eligibility for recognition as a legitimate state, Taiwan society and government usually over-perform to fulfill the conditions that, in its imagination, modern societies should meet. In her study on the early development of Taiwanese lesbian media and popular culture, Australian scholar Fran Martin (2003) describes “Taiwanese modernity” as “a multilayered and internally fractured social, cultural and historical space” (11). She suggests,
If there is a Taiwanese modernity, it is a highly syncretic formation that has been shaped in fundamental ways by Japanese colonialism, Chinese Republican culture, the U.S. military presence and economic aid, and KMT Cold War political and cultural practice. [...] This mix has been further complicated by the attempts of successive central governments to redefine Taiwan’s modernity through appeals to the values of democracy, liberalism, and pluralism. As a result [...], modernity in Taiwan is defined more by rupture and disjuncture than by any universal or unifying qualities (Martin, 2003: 11).

Martin’s probe into Taiwan’s sexual modernity is insightful, but it would be misleading to explain away Taiwan’s efforts to fulfill international standards of “democracy, liberalism, and pluralism” as a monolithic desire to earn international recognition. Often, it is Taiwanese agents themselves who dream of better well-being in a more equal and just society and then actively import and localize the constructed international values in local battles against indigenous patriarchy and heteronormativity. This dynamic process of “glocalization,” the various ways of hybridizing or re-creating global and local cultures in different proportions (see Giulianotti 2007), can be observed in Taiwan’s implementation of the international policies of Gender Mainstreaming and Gender Equity Education.

Stromquist’s (2007) overview of international gender equity education highlighted Taiwan as a “notable exception” for its efforts to create policies that help girls and women to fight against sexual discrimination and harassment in schools or universities, much like U.S. Title IX (37, 39). My interviewee Professor Su reported that she, as a senior professor of gender and education and a feminist movement veteran, received and studied the documents of U.S. Title IX from her colleague of Nordic welfare studies and decided to build Taiwan’s own system with reference to both the U.S. example and Taiwanese contexts. The product of her research and activist team is Taiwan’s Gender
Equity Education Act (Taiwan Government 2013[2004]; “GEEA” hereafter). The GEEA, enacted in 2004, requires instructors and administrators at all levels to actively establish a gender-friendly learning environment and to develop supportive materials for students of diverse genders and sexual orientations. According to the Act, instructors’ pre-service and in-service training should cover principles and praxes that foster and enhance their gender equity consciousness. The Act institutionally combats sex and gender inequality by changing the power structure of the educational bureaucracy. It requires all educational institutions, from the Ministry of Education (MOE) to universities and schools, to organize a committee of GEE. The committee must be headed by the top leader of the institution (e.g., the minister, president, or principal) and comprise a membership in which the proportion of either women or men is not less than one-third. Hsieh and Lee (2014:6), agreeing with Stromquist’s evaluation, indicated that Taiwan’s GEE Act is “highly distinctive and forward-looking,” according to global standards.

However, not all Taiwanese parents and professors feel comfortable allowing their children to receive “highly distinctive and forward-looking” education, especially when it relates to progressive gender and sexual concepts. In the first seven years of GEEA’s implementation (2004–2010), major resources were allocated to the prevention and resolution of sexual harassment and sexual assaults as well as to awakening frontline instructors’ gender consciousness and sensibility. After four hours of gender equity education per semester, instructors and students in Taiwan gradually agreed that gender should not be binary and that it is normal to accept people who express variant genders.

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8 Notably, a special edition of journal *Chinese Education & Society* (2014; vol. 47, issue 4) collects nine articles to discuss Taiwan’s Gender Equity Education Act, examining its developmental history, relevant organizational actions within and without the government, and its effects on curriculum and instruction.
and gender performances (e.g., boys can be feminine; girls can be masculine; we should respect people as themselves). Nevertheless, diverse sexualities, much unlike genders, engender moral panics because teachings about sexualities, including sexual orientation, sexual identity, abortion, and safer sex, remain a landmine zone where few instructors dare to tread, anticipating backlash from angry parents. In this context, the incorporation of LGBT-friendly curricula into textbooks inevitably ignited conservative groups’ protests and foresaw the rise of anti-gay and pro-family movements in Taiwan. To understand its development contextually, it is also necessary to examine the meanings of basic terms used in this new culture war: gender, sexuality, and “tongzhi.”

1.5.2 Revisiting gender and sexuality

Broadly speaking, the debates on gender in the second wave of feminism began as a dialogue about and critiques on biological determination that was based on a binary view to categorize people into two sexes: male and female (Ameling 2007; Fausto-Sterling 2005; Fujimura 2006; Martin 1991). Pioneer researchers rejected the reduction of biological and medical discourses and argued that such a binary understanding of “sex” would narrow and limit our understanding of human behaviors and social interactions, thus producing unequal social systems. Rather, the term “gender” suggests various social performances, identities, practices, relations, and ideologies that derive from, but are not limited to, people’s unique sexual characteristics. Social beings’ genders are constructed and regulated by the cultural scenarios of gender, in which gender performativity takes place (Butler 2008[1990]), but social beings also have agencies that react to the highly-gendered system and social structure and seek ways to change it individually or collectively (for conceptual developments of gender, see Hacker
With this framework of gender genealogy in mind, I need to remind readers that it would be misleading and a distortion to impose this Western understanding on the Taiwanese use of “xingbie” (性別), which is usually translated as “gender” by Western reporters. In Taiwan’s context, the epistemological revolution from sex to gender required linguistic invention. The Chinese term “xingbie” (性別) is originally used to refer to sex, as shown on the binary category of male and female on identification cards, insurance cards, restroom designs, and medical records. To introduce the idea of gender, gender studies scholars gradually agreed to add the adjective “shehui” (social) before xingbie for the purpose of emphasizing the social construction of gender: as a result, a word meaning something akin to “socially constructed sex category” (shehui xingbie，社會性別) became the Taiwanese term for “gender.” On the other hand, sex was re-translated as shengli xingbie (生理性別, biological sex), leaving linguistic room for the medical and physiological use of xingbie while making the distinction from shehui xingbie (social gender).

While Taiwanese scholarly work on gender has generated a more diverse understanding of gender, the institution of GEE focuses on gender categories, gender temperaments, gender identity, and sexual orientation. For example, Article 12 of the GEEA states:

The school shall provide a gender-fair learning environment, respect and give due consideration to students, faculty, and staff with different gender, gender temperaments, gender identity, and sexual orientation. Moreover, it shall establish a safe campus environment (Taiwan Government 2013 [2004]).
In Article 2, the GEEA regulates seven keywords, two of which are related to gender. The Act defines “gender equity education” as an education “to generate respect for gender diversity, eliminate gender discrimination and promote substantive gender equality.” It also defines “gender identity” as “an individual’s awareness and acceptance of his or her own gender.” The GEEA provides a legal foundation and strategy to recognize the significance of gender in schools and universities. It also protects students, instructors, staff, and employees’ rights to awareness, acceptance, and the self-identify of their own gender in the way in which they feel comfortable while their gender identities are legally protected and supported within the educational system. This legislation also built a foundation for the protection of transgender, gender queer, bi-gender, and other gender questing students as early as 2004.

Interestingly, the definitions in the GEEA, a law’s name that starts with “gender,” mainly focus on the “sexual” terms, including of sexual assault, sexual harassment, sexual bullying, and their occurrence on campus. This is partially due to the fact that women (a gendered identity) are usually the ones suffering from these sexual incidents. The GEEA’s definition of sexual assault refers to “any sexual offense defined by the Sexual Assault Prevention Act,” which refers to certain crimes regulated in Criminal Law. Sexual harassment is defined as cases related to the following, and their degree is not deemed as punishable as sexual assault:

i) Unwelcome remarks or conduct that carry explicitly or implicitly a sexual or gender discriminating connotation and, thereby, adversely affect the other party’s human dignity, or the opportunity or performance of her or his learning or work.  
ii) A conduct of sexual or gendered nature that is served as the condition for oneself or others to gain or lose rights or interests in learning or work. (GEEA Article 2)
Finally, “sexual bullying,” a new term added after the Act’s amendment, means “ridicule, attacks, or threats directed at another person’s gender characteristics, gender temperaments, sexual orientation, or gender identity by using verbal, physical or other forms of violence” (ibid.). The Act’s emphasis on sexual assault, sexual harassment, and sexual bullying represents its main purpose, which is to solve sexual cases that have been frequently occurring on campus in violation of students’ educational rights. However, in Taiwanese practitioners’ usage, these sexual cases are called “xingbie shijian” (gender cases), which implies that gender’s meaning has expanded to incorporate sex and sexuality.

My detailed discussion intends to highlight one point: Gender, as an overarching term, overshadows sexualities in current Taiwanese institutions. While sexualities remain controversial and unspeakable in public settings, gender opens a back door for sexualities to sneak into governmental meetings, provide educational lectures in schools, and occupy small sections in students’ textbooks of Civil Society and Health Education. In the late 1990s, a group of self-named sexual emancipationist feminists, led by Josephine Ho, striking to argue against women-only and gender-only feminists and emphasizing the importance of sexualities, including female sexuality, homosexuality, queer theories, and other non-conventional sexualities discussed by Krafft-Ebing and his colleagues. The camp of Taiwanese sex emancipationists coined a term, “xing/bie (性／別),” in which the slash highlights the hidden “sex(uality)” in gender studies, variations of gender and sexual cultures, and this camp’s anti-state-feminism and radical leftist queer approach.

The variations from “xingbie” to “xing/bie” much expand the meaning and
genealogy for Taiwanese use of “xingbie” that is not included in the English word “gender.”

[41] After the bath of sex emancipationism, more and more officials and scholars use “xingbie” referring to both socially constructed gender and multiple sexualities. This evolution paved the way for tongzhi (LGBTQQIAA people) to receive more righteous treatments in formal institutions. However, it also produces loopholes for conservatives to attack what they call the “chaotic and confusing teaching of gender concepts” in schools.

1.5.3 Theorizing Tongzhi: An indigenous sexual subjectivity

The capacity of “gender” (xingbie) to absorb and incorporate sex and sexuality also shows in the GEEA’s enactment rules. Instructors and professors who teach gender equity education curricula “shall cover courses on affective education, sex education, and gay and lesbian education in order to enhance students’ gender equity consciousness” (Article 13, Enforcement Rules for the Gender Equity Education Act, ER for the GEEA hereafter; see also GEEA Article 17). This rule literally defines education related to gender equity as including topics of sex and gay and lesbian identities, implying that gender, now conceived as an umbrella term, covers sexualities.

This institutionalization is groundbreaking in both its domestic and international scope. Internationally, the Taiwanese model of GEE displays a tactical way to integrate education of social justice for sexual equality into gender education with shared foundation of equality. The intersectionality of gender and sexuality has to be taught simultaneously. This move drags the curriculum of LGBT and other sexual minorities away from the umbrella of “sex education” in American academic and pedagogic

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[41] In the following chapters I will use gender for reducing Taiwanese jargons that may hinder English readership, but the gap between “xingbie” and gender should be kept in mind.
structures, for example. It weakens the tight bonds of over-sexualization and physiological professionalism attached to queer subjectivity, opening up more opportunities in class to discuss the social climates, historical inventions, and intersectional sufferings of sexual minorities.

Domestically, the GEEA legislation opened a door for openly coming-out sexual minority subjects to be legally invited to speak in Grade 1-12 classrooms and universities to share their life stories. Through face-to-face interactions, these guest speakers have helped students to understand the histories and subcultures of sexual minorities and to eliminate stereotypes about sexual minorities who have been often typically portrayed in mainstream media and through traditional socialization as perverts, psychos, suicidal victims, drug addicts, sex addicts, child abusers, pedophiles, and HIV/AIDS patients.

From 2004 to 2016, the GEE fundamentally changed a whole generation of students’ understanding of LGBT people, which paved the way for the current campaign for marriage equality, reported social worker Chi-Wei Cheng (a senior and famous LGBT activist in Taiwan). Director Cheng witnessed a generational change of high school students’ perception of tongzhi people in a decade. When GEE was just passed, tongzhi guest speakers stepped into classrooms with a main mission to help students to know/acknowledge/understand “tongzhi” (sexual minorities) since most students knew few tongzhi in person. Nowadays, Cheng said, most students have tongzhi friends; some classes even openly recognize “class couples” (bandui, 班對) and generously wish them blessings. These guest speakers’ instructional mission becomes to provide strategies to help solve daily, practical problems, such as “I have a crush on someone; (how) should I express my feeling to her/him?;” “My parents disagree with my partnership with my
classmate, what should I do?” or “How can I find my Ms./Mr. Right?”

This generational change of Taiwan’s attitude toward tongzhi was vividly described in my informal talk with Chih-Liu Peng, the former chairperson of Taiwan Tongzhi Hotline Association (TTHA), the largest and oldest national organization for gay rights in Taiwan. Peng concluded, “If our first decade of [Taiwan’s LGBT movement] was to fight for *letting society acknowledge the existence of tongzhi*, in this decade we are fighting for *letting Taiwan society live with tongzhi*” (my emphasis, field-note 2017.1.4).

Unlike gay and lesbian, tongzhi, as an idea, has deep roots in the genealogy of traditional politics. Thus, readers should be careful when interpreting the meaning of “tongzhi.” Although some researchers use the terms “tongzhi” and gay or lesbian interchangeably (Hong 2013; Jones 2007; Wei 2016; Worth 2017), I believe that it would be misleading to equate tongzhi with gay and lesbian, queer, or any other English terms that have become laden with their own specific genealogy rooted in Western cultures and histories. In the modern Sinophonic system, the term “tongzhi” (同志) derives from the translated Soviet Communist terminology, comrade, which was used pervasively to address revolutionaries in both the Nationalist revolution and the Communist liberation in the first half of the 20th century — e.g., CHIANG Kai-Shek tongzhi (蔣介石同志), MAO Zedong tongzhi (毛澤東同志).10 As a symbol projecting the socialist utopia, tongzhi (comrade) eradicated the division between gender and class that was implied in traditional salutes — e.g., sir/madam and Mr./Mrs. (see Wong 2008 for details of the terms’ linguistic genealogy).

In 1989, the first Hong Kong Lesbian and Gay Film Festival generated the first

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10 When referring to Chinese names, I follow the original name sequence (family name, then given name) and capitalize family names.
cultural scene in which “lesbian and gay” were translated into the single Chinese term, tongzhi. On a semiotic level, “tong” (同) means the same, similar, or homogenous. Many gay-related Chinese terms begin with “tong,” such as tongxinglian (homosexuality, 同性戀), tongzhilianzhe (homosexuals, 同性戀者), tongxingai (homophilie), and tongzhilian kongjuzheng (homophobia, 同性戀恐懼症). Many people in my field chose to use tongxing hunyin to refer to same-sex marriage, rather than tongzhi hunyin, because they are aware that it was biological sex (and gender) that rejected man-man or woman-woman couples from legal recognition under the marriage institution, regardless of whether they identify themselves as tongzhi or not. “Zhi” (志) stands for will, goal, ideal, aspiration, and ambition. Thus, “tong-zhi,” altogether, suggests comrades of sexual politics, i.e., fellows with the same comradeship and political aspirations for sexual justice — a sexual semiotic stolen and “queered” from the Communist lexicon. Based on this genealogy, I would argue that tongzhi, as a concept, has the DNA of queering and subversion in its blood; it is not merely another identity that will ultimately replicate the identity politics in Western gay liberation movements.

In its early use, tongzhi referred to lesbian and gay, as shown in the translation of the Hong Kong festival. Later, Chou (2000) suggested in his famous but controversial book Tongzhi: Politics of Same-sex Eroticism in Chinese Societies, that tongzhi is “the most popular contemporary Chinese word for lesbians, bisexuals, and gay people [in Taiwan, mainland China, and Hong Kong]” (Chou 2000:1). I agree with Chou’s statement on the popular use of tongzhi in cross-strait Sinophonic communities. However, Chou ignored the synchronicity of the Euro-American terms lesbian, gay, and queer interventions into Sinophonic contexts.
In the Taiwanese context, “tongzhi” studies can imply lesbian and gay studies and queer studies at the same time, depending on the contexts, theoretical framework, and methodologies. The paradigmatic shift from identity-based and citizenship-oriented lesbian and gay studies and politics in the 1960s–1980s to anti-identity and de-normativity-oriented queer studies and politics in the 1990s in American academia is not how most Taiwanese conceive of and sense these terms. The rise of lesbian and gay movement and studies in Hong Kong and Taiwan coincidentally occurred at the time that Queer Nation and queer theories occupied the Western sexualities scholars’ attention (e.g., Butler 1990; Rubin 1993[1984]; Vance 1993). Through pioneer scholars’ introductions and translations, both queer theories and lesbian and gay studies were imported to Taiwan in the early 1990s as re-assembled knowledge, and both were positioned under the umbrella term tongzhi studies.

The synchronicity of the intervention of tongzhi and transnational cultural diffusion of lesbian, gay, and queer is, in part, Martin (2003) suggests, the “disruption” of the Taiwanese tongzhi community from its imagined origin and utopia in the West. Indeed, the re-assemblage of lesbian, gay, and queer hidden underneath tongzhi, I argue, is another example of East Asian “compressed modernity” observed in intimacy and familial relations. According to CHANG Kyung-Sup (2010), compressed modernity is a civilizational condition in which economic, political, social and/or cultural changes occur in an extremely condensed manner in respect to both time and space, and in which the dynamic coexistence of mutually disparate historical and social elements leads to the construction and reconstruction of a highly complex and fluid social system (Chang 2010a:446).

Recent scholarly works have found that social developments of compressed modernity
have occurred widely in East Asia, including South Korea (Chang 2010a, 2010b), Japan (Ochiai 2011), South China (Ma 2012), and Taiwan (Lan 2014).

Therefore, the disruption and compression of different paradigms of Western modernity of sexual liberation exist in the Sinophonic term tongzhi simultaneously and conflictingly. While some scholars regard tongzhi as another Chinese term replicating gay and lesbian identity politics (e.g. Worth et al. 2017), I argue that tongzhi intrinsically contains the queer spirit. The social construction of tongzhi per se has been an appropriation from the heteronormative Communist revolutionary linguistic system. The National Father of the Republic of China SUN Yat-Sen’s famous slogan to encourage his revolutionaries — “The revolution has not succeeded; tongzhi (comrades), keep fighting!” (革命尚未成功, 同志繼續努力) — has been seamlessly utilized to stir up contemporary morale for sexual rights. The use of tongzhi also destabilizes, sexualizes, and queers the heteronormative orders in Chinese Communism and Taiwanese Nationalism. I have not observed any comparable queering appropriation of political lexicon in the Western context at the moment.

In this sense, tongzhi “capture[s] the indigenous features” of the Sinophonic non-conventional gender and sexual subjectivities that “lesbian,” “gay,” and “queer” fail to reflect. Although many Taiwanese still use these Anglo-Saxon terms in different contexts and evolve them into creative local terms, tongzhi has theoretical significance for “its positive cultural references, gender neutrality, desexualization of the stigma of homosexuality, politics beyond the homo-hetero duality, and use as an indigenous cultural identity for integrating the sexual into the social” (Chou 2000:2; see more discussion of Chinese homosexualities and their “queer flows” in Kong 2011).
Moreover, I have observed that tongzhi shows more semiotic flexibility than lesbian and gay. While tongzhi expanded from “lesbian and gay” to “lesbigay” by including bisexuals in the 1990s, transgender was welcomed into the tongzhi camp in the early 2000s through Josephine Ho and her colleagues’ introduction (Ho ed. 2003), her organizing of the first Taiwanese transgender groups (Taiwan Transgender Butterfly Garden, TG 蝶園), her translation of Stone Butch Blues (Feinberg 1993), and other select pieces of Judith Halberstam, Leslie Feinberg, and Minnie Bruce Pratt. Since 2015, although the English title of Taiwan’s tongzhi Pride Parade remained “Taiwan LGBT Parade,” its self-introduction and theme statement have included “LGBTIQA individuals with multiple minority identities” (Taiwan LGBT Pride 2015, Oct 30; 2016, Apr 17). In addition, as a post-AIDS social movement, Taiwan tongzhi activist communities barely marginalized BDSM people, which was unfortunately the case in the 1980s–1990s in the United States (Sisson 2007). On the contrary, a BDSM leader participated in part of the core leadership of the 2005 Taiwan Pride Parade, showing how inclusive the overarching “tongzhi” roof could be. In the meantime, Taiwanese tongzhi movements allocate significant amounts of resources and discursive space for other minority issues other than marriage equality. They include anti-bullying and anti-discrimination in schools and employment, disabled people’s sexualities, the human rights of people with HIV/AIDS, care for family and education, polyamory and open relationships, BDSM and fetishism, and other sexual minorities and stigmatized sexualities (for more discussions of tongzhi, see Grossman 2000; Lau et al. 2017; Laurent 2005; Lee 2003; Wong 2008). In fact, I observed that Taiwanese tongzhi movements have never prioritized marriage equality over these issues in the first two decades of their history. They postponed marriage
equality on their agenda as late as the 2010s, partially learning from the queer critiques against their Western counterparts.

In short, tongzhi in contemporary Taiwan refers to the sum of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) and more. Its meaning can be narrowed to indicate lesbian and gay by adding a gender term prior to tongzhi, such as nu tongzhi (female tongzhi) and nan tongzhi (male tongzhi). On other occasions, tongzhi is used to show the inclusive interpellation of LGBT and intersex, queer, asexual, and allies of straights (LGBTIQA), along with other sexual subjects (e.g., BDSMer). Its meanings vary according contexts. Each contingent inclusion and exclusion generates potential functions, conflicts, and new power relations.

However, the rapidly growing and aggressively inclusive subjectivity of “tongzhi” is inevitably accompanied with wider attacks from conservative camps. “Anti-tongzhi” (fan-tongzhi, 反同志), or simply the abbreviated version “anti-tong” (fan-tong), could mean anti-gay, anti-sexual emancipation, anti-BDSM, anti-education of sexual pleasure, or anti-any-forms-of-non-conventional-genders-and-sexualities. Without acknowledging the multilayers and genealogies of “tongzhi” and gender/sexualities in Taiwan’s context, we could not fully understand the complexity of “anti-tongzhi” conservatism and what their collective actions are against for.

1.6 Theoretical framework and research contribution

To sum up, this research documents the rise of the pro-family movement and Christian conservatism in Taiwan. I studied its historical development, motivations, and mobilization strategies, unpacking its operating mechanism. With multi-sourced data, I
visualized the transnational network of pro-family movements between Taiwan, the United States, and other neighbor countries, typologizing their networking strategies. More importantly, my research challenges one American stereotype of Asian conservatism by showing how Taiwan’s development of gender equity education and tongzhi marriage/family rights movement are radically progressive, not following the Western linear agenda. On the other hand, my data show that Taiwan produced or re-assembled conservatism, which impacted its regional neighbors and subsequently flowed back to the United States and other countries to shape their political and social climates.

In addition, this research uses cross-national and representative survey data to examine Taiwanese and American Christian conservatives’ self-claim of representing the “silent majority.” I found that Christian conservatives tended to be unaware that their own attitudes toward homosexuality are significantly influenced by their religious behaviors, beliefs, and organizational belonging. Protestants, the core constituency of anti-tongzhi conservatives, have comprehensively received negative impact from their religious engagement and national economic and religious factors that would decrease the likelihood for Protestants to be tolerant toward homosexuality. Those who claim that their voices represented the “silent majority,” unfortunately, often ignored how unrepresentative their attitudes towards homosexuality are in relation to the heterogeneous opinions of the world population.

Based on my empirical findings, I suggest a new theoretical framework for analyzing the cultural diffusion of Christian conservatism, pro-family movements, and sexual moralities in the transnational era. Figures 1.2 shows how pro-family movements
in Taiwan are shaping and shaped by the intersection between religion, the state, transnationalism, and gender and sexuality (including tongzhi).

1.7 Data and methods

To answer a set of research questions, I conducted a mixed-method study that included in-depth interviews, participant observation, content analysis, and quantitative tests with hierarchical linear modeling. I first analyzed *Rainbow 7*, the quarterly publication of the former Taiwan chapter of Exodus International, an international organization that aims to convert gays and lesbians to heterosexuals to live a so-called
“holy” (i.e., heterosexual or asexual) life. From September 2015 to August 2016, I conducted participant observation in many gatherings of Christian conservatives who were prominent in opposing marriage equality and tongzhi education. I joined their worship in evangelical and charismatic churches, listened to their weekly testimonies, prayed with Presbyterians, and sang songs loudly with my arms in the air at their international conference where Korean and Taiwanese megachurch leaders preached in a gigantic stadium. To observe people on the other end of the spectrum of sexual politics, I also joined liberal Presbyterians’ reading groups and sex-radical activism activities.

In addition, I interviewed 62 respondents, including pastors, church goers, conservative organization leaders and lawyers, professors, and non-governmental organization workers. The characteristics of the respondents widely covered the sexual political continuum, from totally anti-gay to moderate conservative, through convertible, and to firmly gay-friendly. This wide-range purposive sampling based on sexual attitudes provided breadth and depth of data and multiple angles from which to understand the rise of Taiwanese Christian conservatism, its operation, and the possible functions and conflicts that it may generate. Following IRB approval and obtaining my interviewees’ informed consent, the 62 interviews generated 240 hours of recording. Each interview lasted, on average, 3.87 hours. The field notes of interviews range between 6,000 and 20,000 Chinese characters. All of these efforts were invested to understand how Taiwanese Christian conservatives developed into and operated as strong political power that shaped domestic and transnational societies and produced gender and sexual inequalities.

To examine Taiwanese and American conservatives’ self-claim that their attitude
against homosexuality represents the “silent majority,” I used a representative dataset from the 2008 wave of International Social Survey Programme, including the opinions of people from 40 countries, to test its generalizability. Furthermore, I employed the technique of hierarchical linear modeling to develop a two-level and three-dimensional framework that includes religious belief, behavior, and belonging to analyze how the three religious dimensions variously influence attitudes toward homosexuality. In addition to individual-level religious factors, I examined national level factors, including democracy, economic development, and a country’s dominant religion, to determine whether and how these macro factors shape sexual attitudes while interacting with individuals’ religious behaviors, beliefs, and belongings. The goal of this part of the research is to generate a comprehensive analytic framework for examining the claim to “silent majority” status proposed by international Christian conservatives and to understand how the mechanism of religions at different dimensions and levels shapes people’s attitudes toward homosexuality. (More details of my data, variables, and models will be discussed in Chapter 5.)

1.8 Chapter briefs

This dissertation includes six chapters, analyzing the development of Taiwan’s pro-family movements and sexual conservatism and their effects on transnational sexual politics through the theoretical lenses of religion, culture wars, social movements, gender and sexuality, globalization and transnationalism, and intersectionality. In the current chapter, Chapter One, I use the story of an anti-gay letter authored by an American conservative professional organization to show how discourses and resources of sexual
conservatism transnationally travel around the world and flow reversely back to their birthplace. To understand the “demons” that Taiwanese conservatives have targeted, I examine the basic terms used in this culture war, including “xingbie,” “tongzhi,” and their ambivalent relations to the English terms, gender and sexualities. This chapter also builds a brief history as groundwork for understanding the rise of the pro-family movement in Taiwan, providing critical readings on the literature of religion and transnationalism and the globalization of Christian conservatism based in East Asia.

**Chapter Two** aims to answer two basic questions: Who are these sexual conservatives? How have they developed the pro-family campaigns into such strong political power in such a short period (2011–present)? I document and illustrate the history of Taiwanese Christian pro-family movements in a way that reflects three pairs of relations: 1) the relationships between Taiwan and the United States, 2) the relationships between progressive advancements in sexual citizenship and Taiwanese Christian conservatives’ opposition, and 3) the interactions and alternations between the social institutions of family/marriage and education. With evidence of Taiwanese conservatives’ elasticity and liquidity of temporality, I argue that Taiwan’s pro-family movements and their accompanying culture wars were not and will not be another proxy or extension of the U.S. culture wars. It is true that the Euro-American produced conservative movements have significantly influenced Taiwan’s pro-family movement, for example the third-wave Pentecostal Movement and the international business of Western pastors, such as Billy Graham and Peter Wagner, to name a few. However, Taiwanese conservatives have arranged their agendas with relative autonomy for the purpose of responding to local traditions and contemporary sexual progressive changes, even as they
condemn these changes as representing the invasion of Western sexual liberalization. The analytic concepts of conservatism and culture war are re-considered in Chapter 2, based on the Taiwanese experience.

Why were groups of Christian conservatives willing to spend money, time, and resources engaging in politics and publicly opposing tongzhi movements? Chapter Three shows that their motivation is not simply their religion. I first use survey data to show the priority of eight hypothetical motivations, and discuss each of them in details with interview and ethnographic data. I found that, although religious scripture and anti-homosexual behaviors are two prioritized and religious motivations of anti-tongzhi activists, yet they contain much internal conflicts and inconsistencies that make the religious motivation unsettled. The motivation of competing for leadership within Taiwanese Christian communities further challenges the notion that frames pro-family activism as a divine action solely based on religion, showing how power disrupts religious logics. The Holy Spirit loves tongzhi people more than how much their mothers love them, my interviewee reported. Spirituality is highly religious but should not be considered as a motivation for pro-family activism.

In addition, I examine the other group of non-religious, socio-economic motivations of pro-family movements. Concerns of politics did play an important role in these Christian conservatives’ calculation, but it may be a means, not an end. Also, their ultimate goal is to evangelize Taiwan, China, Jerusalem, and the whole world, making Christians the kings of all nations and the Earth a Christian Kingdom. Oppositions to marriage equality and tongzhi education are just two small steps for Christian conservatives to wipe out the stones on their way to that ultimate goal. Some liberal
people in my field also charged conservatives that they did so for the purposes of money and human resources. However, my data show that, while money and church membership are mutually intertwined factors, Christian conservatives’ political actions in fact produced more social skepticism toward their unpublished financial records and internal damages to their church membership than they anticipated.

Departing from the domestic level, Chapter Four zooms out to reveal the regional and transnational levels of active pro-family movements’ global flows. Based on my mixed-methods data, Taiwanese pro-family movements’ transnational flows can be categorized into four types: sanitized Western flows of interconnection (direct imports), channeling neighbor’s water (detours), Asian regional circulation (that I refer to as the “Asian Cross”), and Taiwanese conservatives’ self-production of anti-tongzhi discourses that they export back to the region and the Western. Christians conservatives in Taiwan are not passive recipients of Western conservatism. They actively articulated globally accessible resources and discourses to fuel their local battles over sexual citizenship, while affecting sexual inequalities in both Global North and South.

In Chapter Five, I take the quantitative methodology approach and hierarchical linear modeling, using cross-national survey data collected from 40 countries to examine whether or not Taiwanese and U.S. American pro-family activists’ attitudes toward homosexuality actually represented the “silent majority,” as they claimed. The results show that Christians in fact have significant different sexual attitudes and received distinct influences from their religious beliefs and behaviors that make their sexual attitude unrepresentative, compared with people of other religions or no religion. Within Christians, Protestants and Catholics reported significantly different opinions about
homo sexuality, albeit collectively believing in Jesus Christ. Protestants are highly sensitive to the national dominant religion in the country they live in. If they live in a Protestant-dominated country, their attitudes toward homosexuality are more tolerant; otherwise, their insecurity because of religious diversity reduce their tolerance toward sexual minorities. This effect is also unique to Protestants. Therefore, I argue, international Christian conservatives’ claim that they represent the voice of “silent majority” is not only a false claim. It effectively reflects how these Christian conservatives are ignorant about their own attitude toward homosexuality having been structured by the one-dimensional religious belief, behavior, affiliation, and the national scenarios they live in.

The concluding **Chapter Six** summarizes my empirical findings and theorization, in addition to providing policy implications and suggestions for implementation. During the Obama administration, the U.S. evangelical/charismatic enterprise seemed to decline, but, in fact, it diffused to the Global South, including Taiwan, to regain power, collect money, and organize transnational networks, as shown in the empirical chapters. Interestingly, while Taiwan’s 2016 presidential election led the island country to step onto the liberal and socially progressive track, the former self-identified leading democracy, the United States, has begun to face the return of conservative politics, radical challenges to democracy, and political chaos from populism and authoritarianism. Without putting the political swing in both Western and Eastern countries into the same conversation, scholars will never know the full picture of globalization and transnational flows of moral conservatism and accompanied sexual inequalities.

For English-speaking readers, this understanding starts with a contextual reading
of gender and sexual regimes in the Global South, and the rise and development of
conservative power against them. My research on Taiwanese pro-family and anti-tongzhi
conservatism provides a window to observe global conservative networks, and suggests a
way to intervene for achieving sexual and social justice.
Chapter 2

How to Bring Your Fellows Up Conservative:

A Relational History of Pro-Family Movements

2009

When the first African-American president, Barack Obama, took over the White House, liberal and radical voters in the U.S. championed his commitment to social progress and inclusion. However, on the other side of the world, Uganda held its first national conservative conference, where the American evangelical pastor Scott Lively told African religious leaders and politicians that the “international homosexual agenda” would steal their children from parents. His address planted the seed for the “anti-homosexuality bill” that would follow. In the same year, Taiwan witnessed its first anti-homosexuality parade convened by inter-denominational Christians. Their slogans on blood red signs read, “Use Jesus Christ’s love to build families, maintain families (以基督的愛建立家庭，維護家庭),” “God bless the marriage of one man and one woman (神祝福一男一女的婚姻),” “Marriage is one-man-one-woman, one-husband-one-wife, and one-life-one-course (婚姻是一男一女、一夫一妻、一生一世),” “Homosexual parades incur catastrophes (同性戀遊行招至大災難) [sic.],” and “God loves people, but hates sins (神愛世人，恨惡罪惡).” Conservatives started to seize power and occupy public spaces in Taiwan and Uganda while liberals in the United States were celebrating the opening of a new era.
During this year, I was the administrative assistant of Taiwan’s Ministry of Education Gender Equity Education Counseling Committee, working with a group of professors and teachers to help promote gender equity and tongzhi education by instructing city- and county-level seed instructors in how to implement these ideals in their grades 1–9 classrooms. Some of my colleagues showed a contemptuous disregard for the anti-homosexuality parade, viewing it as an aberration.

2015

The U.S. Supreme Court declared that same-sex marriage is a Constitutional right in a 5-4 ruling; accordingly, all fifty states had to legalize marriage equality and lift any bans against this right. In its second term, the Obama administration sent a LGBTI special envoy to tour the world and advocate for the human rights of sexual minorities, the values of democracy, and American progressiveness. At the same time, Taiwan was witnessing the formation of the first Christian party, which aimed to spread its fundamentalist family values and to stop any legislation in favor of tongzhi, transgender people, and other sexual minorities. The success of marriage equality in the United States stirred up fear in Taiwanese Christian conservatives, who claimed that Taiwan must not become a corrupted “city of the plain” and that legislating in favor of same-sex marriage would bring Taiwan catastrophe and extinction. “Taiwan is an independent country,” those Christian conservatives cried out. “Taiwan should not follow the international trend and cut off its Chinese traditions.”

During that year, I began my study of Taiwanese pro-family movements and transnational sexual conservatism as a PhD student at Rutgers University. Many of my American liberal and radical friends in metropolitan areas showed little interest in the
topic of conservatism. To them, the world was on the right track toward a more just and
equal ideal: the Tea Party had disappeared, the economy was recovering, and gay couples
could get married. Why, they might ask, should we care about conservatism overseas?

2017

Taiwan’s first female president, TSAI Ing-wen (蔡英文), won the election on her
own merit rather than through familial political connections, as many female presidents
in other Asian countries had done.11 In May, Taiwan’s Constitutional Court, with eight
out of fifteen seats taken by liberal chief justices nominated by TSAI, ruled in favor of
marriage equality. This ruling suggested that present Civil Law disallowing same-sex
couples to marry legally was in opposition to the Constitutional rights of equality and
marriage. The Legislative Yuan should also compensate for the loss of individual people
within two years of the ruling, May 24, 2017, by making or amending laws to respond to
the decision in favor of tongzhi rights. Taiwanese pro-family and anti-tongzhi
conservatives knew that they may have lost this battle. Nevertheless, they tried to
manipulate the “legislative techniques” (methods and skills of lawmaking) to create
“separate but equal” institutions while targeting other moral issues, such as tongzhi
education, HIV/AIDS prevention, and drug-related sex.

On the opposite side of the planet, Republican President Donald Trump took over
the White House after a long campaign that disseminated racism, sexism, homophobia,

11 My comparison here is limited to female presidents in Asia. For example, the former
South Korean President, Park Geun-hye (2013–2017), won the election with the support
of people who remembered the good years led by her father, another former President
Park Chung-hee (1963–1979). The first female president in the Philippines, Corazon
Aquino (1986–1992), did not emerge as a politician until her husband, Senator Benigno
Aquino, Jr., was assassinated in 1983. TSAI was elected as Taiwanese President without
the kinds of political heritage from her family.
xenophobia, Islamophobia, and neo-liberal protectionism through his authoritarian right-wing populism. After his election, my liberal and radical friends suddenly began to care about conservatism. Some were shocked that a conservative regime was back in power and frightened by the hostility and insecurity it would likely bring to their lives. Others took to heart Obama’s encouraging words that the way in which the United States develops has never been a straight line, but a series of “zig-and-zags.” “[S]ometimes we move in ways that some people think is forward and others think is moving back” (The White House - Office of the Press Secretary 2016, Nov 9).

Taiwanese Christian conservatives apparently felt that U.S. politics was moving forward. They cited Trump’s anti-transgender policy on restrooms and military personnel and his appointment of the religious vice-president Mike Pence as signs of the new direction. They called out to pro-tongzhi supporters, declaring that being conservative and respecting traditional family values was the new international trend. Furthermore, they implied that ideas of marriage equality and political correctness were out-of-step with the rest of the world.

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These three snap-shots provide glimpses of the parallel political and cultural climates in the United States and Taiwan during the past decade, showing the international context in which Taiwanese Christian conservatism and pro-family movements have rapidly grown. This chapter aims to answer three basic questions about such movements: Who are these anti-tongzhi and pro-family Christian conservatives? How have they developed influential movements so quickly that are powerful enough to shape the political agenda on sexual issues? Moreover, from the perspective of social
movement theory, why do Christians—a religious minority in Taiwan—have such disproportionate power to leverage their political appeals?

This is not a linear and anthropocentric history that assumes any single person or any particular social group can foresee or dominate the future development of conservative politics (c.f., Skocpol 1979). Rather, I suggest that the birth and growth of Taiwanese pro-family conservatism is a socially contingent and transnationally liquid phenomenon (Bauman 2000) that has been constituted by three interwoven relational tendencies: those between the conservative and progressive, between the United States and Taiwan, and between education and marriage. The three snap-shots presented above encompass these themes. Next, I will illustrate the process through which Taiwanese Christian conservatism has grown to what it is, using empirical data to conceptualize the three pairs of relationships and to analyze the social factors that make Christian conservatism and anti-tongzhi movements possible. While students of queer politics have learned how to “raise queer kids” socially and discursively (Sedgwick 1991), it is time to understand how social conditions “bring up conservatives” and enhance their power.

2.1 The first party alternation and the first conservative petition (2000)

I need to make it clear that Taiwanese sexual conservatism is in process and did not form a publicly recognizable entity. In fact, the term “conservative” is more commonly used in Taiwan as an adjective than a noun. In other words, “conservative” does not indicate a fixed identity or a political camp. Taiwanese people use the word “conservative” to refer to relative positions across the sex-political spectrum. There is no institutional design, such as a census form or a sociological survey questionnaire, asking
people to check boxes for “conservative,” “liberal,” “independent,” or “radical.” This categorization of political identities that American voters have acknowledged for decades made no sense to my Taiwanese respondents. To be clear, some respondents who have knowledge of the American political categorization did use this schema to frame the dynamic of “culture wars” in Taiwan (c.f., Hunter 1992; Zimmerman 2002; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2010[2005]). However, the term “conservative,” as an adjective, was used to describe, analyze, or position the relationship between the narrator and the others. No one self-identified as a conservative. No institutional forces made people choose their political position(s) using this term.

To the general public in Taiwan, sexually conservative politics did not exist until the 21st century. Since World War II, the actual dominant issue that has driven political division in Taiwan is the island regime’s relationship to China—unification or independence (tong du, 統獨)—along with its accompanying national identities and party orientations—pro-China China and the subsequent relocation of CHIANG’s government to Taiwan around 1949. In contrast, DPP grew from anti-KMT, democratic civil forces during the period of Martial Law, and was officially founded in 1986. DPP tends to speak for labor unions, to protest against anti-nuclear plants, and to work closely with feminist movements. It receives support from “Taiwanese-speaking churches,” composed mainly of the Presbyterian Churches in Taiwan, the largest Taiwanese Christian denomination. Although the KMT regime ended the longest period of martial law seen among nations at the time in 1987, it was not until thirteen years later that

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12 This binary frame is inevitably simplistic and overlooks many gray zones between the two parties, but it provides a useful shorthand for readers to understand the development of sexual conservatism in Taiwan.
Taiwan finally witnessed the first party alternation. In 2000, the first non-KMT president CHEN Shui-bian (DPP, 陳水扁) took over the Presidential Office. That politically important year shaped the basic political structure in which sexual conservatism developed. It was also the year when the first public sexual/cultural battle in Taiwan occurred.

After the first liberal party president CHEN Shui-bian formed the administration, he swiftly organized a human rights committee in the Presidential Office to fulfill his campaign promises. A draft of the Human Rights Protection Basic Law (人權保障基本法草案), released one year later, clearly supported protections for gender equity and the rights of homosexuals. It regulated that “men and women are equal before the law,” except biological differences and their accompanying social roles. It further stated that “The state should respect homosexuals’ rights. Same-sex men and women can organize their families and adopt children based on the laws” (Article 24). In its explanations, the draft argued that the idea of homosexuality (tongxinlian) has been gradually acknowledged by international countries. Thus, “in order to protect homosexuals’ human rights,” it mandated that the state must respect homosexuals’ rights and give them the rights to form families and to adopt children based on the Constitutional right to equality.13

While this ground-breaking draft of human rights protection was eventually buried after a series of partisan conflicts, it exerted political pressure on the KMT, which took action to respond to the societal climate of social reform. At that time, a KMT

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13 The Constitution of the Republic of China (Taiwan) requires that, “All citizens of the Republic of China, irrespective of sex, religion, race, class, or party affiliation, shall be equal before the law” (Article 7).
political rising star, MA Ying-jeou (馬英九), served as the mayor of Taiwan City. He initiated the first ever government-sponsored tongzhi civil activity in Taiwan: Taipei Tongzhi Civil Movement (or Taipei Tongzhi Festival, 台北同玩節). This program funded many events, including a carnival-like vendor festival at a fashionable movie theater plaza, a rainbow-flag-raising ceremony, and an exhibition of tongzhi history. An informational handbook of tongzhi cultures, lexicons, stories, Q&A, and legal and social resources was distributed to local bureaus and neighborhoods via the city government’s bureaucratic system. Two thematic forums were composed of international and local LGBT activists. President CHEN held an official meeting with two “international” (actually both American) LGBT activists, Michael Bronski and Nan Hunter, collaborating with the Taipei City government to construct a friendly and liberal atmosphere.

This human rights achievement prompted a backlash from conservative churches. Anxious conservatives formed the first public and national assembly of anti-tongzhi organizations to voice their opposition to government-sponsored policies for tongzhi citizens’ human rights. This backlash should be understood against the background of Christian revival in Taiwan. At the turn of the millennium, Taiwanese Chinese-speaking churches had experienced twelve years of a national religious movement, “Year 2000 Evangelistic Movement” (二○○○年福音運動). This religious movement was led by one of the most influential Christian leaders, CHOW Lien-hwa (周聯華), who was also the official pastor of former president CHIANG Kai-shek and his three-generational family church. CHOW was one of the few Taiwanese Christian leaders who had incomparable political power and social ties across denominations (i.e., Chinese-speaking and
Taiwanese-speaking churches). Initiating this movement in late 1987, CHOW set up three goals for growing the Christian community (2,000,000 Christian believers, 10,000 churches, and 200 missionaries) by the year 2000. He and his organization, Chinese Christian Evangelistic Association (CCEA, 中華基督教福音協進會, 2011), achieved their third goal with 204 missionaries sent, but they failed to meet the goals for conversions and new church establishments. Their goals remained unfulfilled during my fieldwork time (2015–2017) and the time of this writing (2018). In practice, the Taiwanese Christian population experienced its second largest growth from 1990 to 1999 since the World War II. According to a survey by CCEA (2011), the Taiwanese Christian population grew from 557,483 to 780,529, an increase of 40%. The CCEA successfully provided a platform for both Presbyterian (Taiwanese-speaking) and non-Presbyterian (Chinese-speaking) churches to work together on the goals of the evangelistic movement. This platform established a stage for Christians to swiftly organize and counter the socially progressive agenda initiated by both DPP and KMT political leaders at national and municipal levels.

This first assembly of Taiwanese Christian churches published a public letter to president CHEN and Mayor MA, expressing feelings of “surprise and puzzlement.” On the one hand, the assembly recognized governmental efforts to establish an “international metropolis” that respects minorities and multiple cultural developments. “Christian churches have no discriminatory stance toward tongzhi communities,” they emphasized. In an emotional tone, however, they argued that “homosexuals’ troubles and shadows of gender identity” are “due to psychological and biological influences.” Therefore, Christian churches were willing to accept and care for tongzhi communities in order to
change their gender (xingbie) orientations by providing long-term care and counseling (Xia 2000).

On the other hand, they felt that, in spite of the thriving tongzhi rights and visibility, the churches spoke for “the silent majority.” They emphasized that “Christian faith and ethics consider that homosexuality is a sin. […] Homosexuality is as sinful as heterosexual sins (extra-marital sex and adultery) and moral sins (lies, envy, hatred), along with other lawful crimes. [Homosexuals, like others,] all have failed to achieve God’s standards, and thus [people who committed them] need to repent” (Xia 2000). In the letter, they refer to graphic scenes in Euro-American LGBT movements, condemning their vulgar, dirty, sexually provoking, ambiguous, lustful, and erotic pornographies. They also worry that Taiwan’s tongzhi activities would follow Euro-American LGBT activists’ footsteps, and consequentially “fail to earn societal recognition for tongzhi communities.” They say they fear that this activity would result in a confrontation between tongzhi communities and the “general social people” they claim to represent (Xia 2000). This letter swiftly received a progressive response from the pastor of the first gay church in Taiwan, Rev. Elias TSENG, and ultimately failed to stop the president’s meeting and the Taipei Tongzhi Festival. This government-sponsored tongzhi activity continues to be held yearly to the present day (2018).

During the first culture battle, the first assembly of anti-tongzhi conservatives moved from the underground to high visibility. This assembly was composed by the following religious players:

- The Exodus Prayer Center (later, Rainbow 7, the Taiwanese chapter of the Canadian-founded Exodus International for a certain period);
Chinese Christian Evangelistic Association;
Chinese Christian Relief Association;
Taiwan Holiness Church (a denomination influenced by the American Holiness missionaries in Tokyo and distributed to Taiwan by Taiwanese students studying in Japan);
Episcopal Diocese of Taiwan (established by Province 8 of the Episcopal Church in the United States);
Scripture Union in Taiwan (an institution founded in United Kingdom);
Chinese Campus Crusade for Christ (derived from Campus Crusade for Christ, founded by Bill and Vonette Bright in California);
Bread of Life Christian Church in Taipei;
Chinese Baptist Convention;
Taiwan Conservative Baptist Church;
Taiwan Friends Church (Quakers Association);
Eden Christian Church;
The Bible Society in Taiwan; and
Asian Missiological Graduate School (CCEA 2000).

Following their initiation, it was reported that 90 churches and 408 people in total joined the petition to echo this opposition (Lei 2000, Sep 5).

The roster of this anti-tongzhi assembly implies three important messages. First, while the majority of Taiwanese in 2000 were unfriendly to sexual minorities, most took no public action against them. Christian churches and organizations were the only entities who used existing national social networks to assemble and take action rapidly to oppose democratic sexual citizenship. Second, it is equally important to recognize who did not participate. The largest Taiwanese denomination, the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (PCT), did not add its name to this roster. PCT’s absence is partially due to the

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14 According to the 1998 Taiwan Social Change Survey (Round 3, Year 4), 59.9% of the respondents stated that homosexuality was against the good customs and morals in Taiwanese society. Only a quarter of the respondents disconnected homosexuality from morality (Chu 1999:232). A following survey conducted in 2001 confirmed that less than 10% of respondents personally knew homosexual people (9.88%) while more than 80% had no homosexual friends or family members (84.1%) (Fu and Yi 2004). These surveys show that around 2000, homosexual people in Taiwan were less visible and condemned as immoral.
long-term division and mistrust between PCT and the churches in the roster. Given that this was the year in which the first pro-Taiwan party DDP took power, it is reasonable that PCT did not want to oppose the policy of its old political friend. The Lutheran denomination was also missing from the roster. The Catholic Church and the Miracle Top Church, two key players in the anti-tongzhi and pro-family campaigns to follow, did not join this first wave of organizations either, but they later participated in the petition. The Catholic Church held its own press conference after the petition was released.

Third, many denominations that joined in this anti-tongzhi assembly had a genealogy that could be traced back to roots in the United States or United Kingdom. However, their theological umbilical cords were cut or at least narrowed during Taiwan’s Martial Law period. During the authoritarian rule after World War II, many Taiwanese denominations lost the channels of international travel and communication with their Western “mother churches.” Thus, many Taiwanese denominations, just holding the “brands” of Western denominations, began developing their own locally hybridized theologies in a relatively closed social system (interview with Josephine Hsu 2016.06.21). Although the political leader among the participating denominations is pastor CHOW who belonged to the Baptist denomination, the one that governed the largest membership and most franchise churches was a local Taiwanese church, Bread of Life Christian Church (BLCC) in Taipei.

2.2 The first Bill of Same-Sex Marriage and tongzhi education (2004-2008)

In president CHEN’s second term, the two most important progressive gender and sexual movements were the initiation of a same-sex marriage bill and the passage of the
Gender Equity Education Act (GEEA). In 2006, DPP lawmaker HSIAO Bi-khim (蕭美琴) proposed the Same-sex Marriage Bill, which suggested the legal protection of same-sex adults’ marital rights and regulations regarding surrogacy children, adoption, children’s last names, etc. This was the first bill about same-sex marriage in Taiwanese legislative history, receiving approval from 38 other lawmakers. However, another 23 lawmakers’ oppositional petition prohibited the bill from passing the first reading. It was returned to the Procedure Committee and never moved forward.

In the same year, the fourth Taiwan Pride event was titled “[Multi-forms of Family] Go Together” (一同去家遊), and one of the highlights was a blessing ceremony for four tongzhi couples (mostly lesbians) by the first publicly ordained gay pastor, Rev. Elias TSENG. This event again stirred up opposition from conservative churches. Pastor CHANG Maosong (Miracle Top Church, a 40-year independent church in the Covenant Church brand) initiated a press conference at the Taipei City Council with other religious leaders and politicians. CHANG opened the conference by emphasizing that, “Same-sex marriage will be the beginning of societal disasters. Building a healthy morality should be the government’s responsibility” (Gospel Herald 2006, Aug 28). Under large “ANTI-same-sex marriage” and “ANTI-government’s sponsorship on the tongzhi civil movement” signs, CHANG warned that “Mayor MA has been proud of promoting gay activities. […] We firmly oppose Taipei becoming a so-called ‘tongzhi paradise’” (ibid.).

Conservatives who participated in this press conference included eight religious leaders and two politicians:

- Pastor CHANG Maosong (Miracle Top Church);
- Pastor Nathaniel Shen-Zhu CHOW (Bread of Life Christian Church in Taipei);
• Pastor Peter Zhi-sen CHU (Taipei Truth Church);
• Pastor GU Qi-yun (New Life Cellular Church);
• Pastor CHEN Zhi-hong (Director General, Taiwan Lutheran Church);
• Pastor CHU Tai-shen (Taipei New Glory Church; the President of the Taipei Christian Church Association);
• Bishop Joseph CHENG Tsai-fa (Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Taipei, Archidioecesis Taipehensis);
• Rev. Louis Aldrich (Fu Jen Faculty of Theology of St. Robert Bellarmine);
• Legislator Joanna LEI (Legislative Yuan); and
• LIGENG Gui-fang (Taipei City Councilwoman) (Gospel Herald 2006, Aug 28)

This array of anti-tongzhi leaders was different from the one forming the first public presence in 2000. This press conference did not present an image of national pan-Christian church solidarity on the issue of anti-same-sex marriage, but instead, concentrated on leaders from the Taipei metropolis. Church leaders chose to use their own names rather than hiding behind church names. In addition to the BLCC, many new churches participated in this anti-tongzhi camp, including the initiator Pastor Chang’s Miracle Top Church, Taipei Truth Church, New Life Cellular Church, and Taipei New Glory Church. Notably, a Catholic priest and a bishop participated in this round of the anti-tongzhi campaign, which had previously been dominated by Protestants.\(^{15}\) This conference was also the first anti-tongzhi campaign in which national and municipal politicians formally sat together with religious leaders, creating the public image of a political and religious alliance on conservative anti-tongzhi moral values.

While the same-sex marriage issue failed to make any legally substantial progress during this period, gender and sexual progressive movements enjoyed a giant leap

\(^{15}\) Their cross-religious collaboration may be based on Protestants’ support during the same period of the Catholic initiated anti-abortion campaign, which aimed to create more barriers for pregnant women to access the techniques of artificial termination of pregnancy, including the extension of pregnant women’s “thinking period” and the necessity of a husband or parent’s permission. The conservatives lost that battle, also.
forward following the Gender Equity Education Act (GEEA) legislation in 2004. As discussed in Chapter 1, GEEA protects students, teachers, and staff in schools from being discriminated against based on their gender, gender performance, gender expression, and sexual orientation. Its Enactment Rules stipulate that the national gender equity education “shall cover courses on affective education, sex education, and gay and lesbian education in order to enhance students’ gender equity consciousness” (Article 13). This is the legal basis for tongzhi education being institutionally separated from sex education in the Taiwanese context. As a result, teaching tongzhi education to students in schools and universities became mandatory at the national level. The passage of GEEA opened the door for sexual minorities to serve as invited external lecturers, sharing their personal stories and gender-diversity knowledge with grades 1–12 and college students. This marked an educational opportunity that was barely possible before this law. In contrast, up through 2018, fewer than half of American states have laws that mandate curricula about sexual minorities.

Tongzhi education seeks to incorporate the cultures, histories, and knowledge of tongzhi into formal curricula in schools and universities. A requirement to include tongzhi education in four hours of gender equity education per semester at all schools and universities has been the law since the passage of GEEA. However, most schools adopted some forms of activity or additional curricula. No hours were institutionally allocated to gender and tongzhi-related curriculum in students’ formal curricula (such as language, math, science, society—those classes that occupy hours on students’ weekly schedules and are evaluated by examinations). To open up campus space for tongzhi students and to awaken all students’ tongzhi consciousness, some instructors invited openly tongzhi
volunteers or guest speakers to make speeches in classes, held school-wide gatherings, or directed student clubs. Others organized book exhibitions and poster demonstrations in libraries or counseling rooms. A few instructors combined all of these strategies to organize a “tongzhi week” (同志週).

In this period, due to the scarcity of local instructional materials, a number of influential—and sometimes controversial—American pictorial children’s books were introduced into Taiwan. These included *And Tango Makes Three* (Richardson, Parnell, and Cole 2005), *King and King* (Haan and Nijland 2003), *Molly’s Family* (Garden and Wooding 2004), and *Daddy’s Roommate* (Willhoite 1990), among others. Meanwhile, a group of feminist scholars and frontline instructors visited Swedish gender education institutes and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to learn systematically about the Swedish and Canadian versions of comprehensive sex education and pedagogy, transforming and incorporating them into the Taiwan system. These activities and additional instructional materials earned significant attention and broke centuries of silence on tongzhi issues in the public educational environment. However, tongzhi, as bodies of knowledge and existing sexual subjectivities in Taiwan’s histories, remained hidden from the formal curricula (i.e., textbooks and so-called “serious classes” like language, sciences, citizenship and society, etc.). The amendment of the gender equity education curricula for Grades 1–9 education created an opportunity to resolve this

16 See the special edition of *Gender Equity Education Quarterly* (published by the Ministry of Education, 2004) for reports and notes covering these visitors’ observations of Sweden’s gender research center, the National Women’s Archive, and other governmental departments. This comprehensive issue also includes their reflections on Sweden’s pedagogical practices in high schools and kindergartens, NGOs (including the Swedish Association for Sexuality Education, aka Riksförbundet för sexuell upplysning, RFSU), urban landscapes (e.g., libraries, subway art, the Museum of Dolls), and citizens’ daily gender/sexual lives.
Table 2.1 shows the “competence indicators” in the “Grades 1–9 Curriculum Guidelines (Gender Equity Education)” for tongzhi education. The original curricular guidelines drafted by the amendment team suggest that 5th and 6th graders need to foster a capacity of “acknowledging diverse sexual orientations.” The 7th to 9th graders need to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main concept</th>
<th>Secondary concepts</th>
<th>Learning level</th>
<th>competence indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sexual orientation</td>
<td>Elementary School Graders 5–6</td>
<td>1-3-3 Acknowledging diverse sexual orientations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Junior High School Graders 7–9</td>
<td>1-4-3 Understanding one’s own sexual orientation (before amendment)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender identity</td>
<td>* Respecting diverse sexual orientations (revised after the True Love Alliance)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Diverse gender characteristics | Elementary School Graders 1–2 | 1-1-2 Respecting characteristics of different gender people |
| Graders 3–4 | 1-2-2 Being aware of stereotypes related to gender characteristics |
| Graders 5–6 | 1-3-4 Reasoning diverse aspects of gender characteristics |
| Junior High School Graders 7–9 | 1-4-4 Recognize the influence of stereotyped gender characteristics on individuals |
| | 1-4-5 Accepting one’s own gender characteristics |

Note: This version of gender equity education curriculum guidelines was under revision in 2006-2007, promoted from the central government to textbooks and grass-root schools in 2008-2010, and officially enacted from 2011 to 2017.
“understand their own sexual orientation(s)” (Taiwan Ministry of Education 2008:23). Following these guidelines, textbook production teams and frontline instructors can develop their own lessons plans.

After years of research (2006-2007), practical preparation, and promotion (2008-2010), tongzhi-education curricula were set to be implemented in the textbooks and formal curricula of Grades 5–9 for the first time in Taiwan’s educational history in 2011. From 2004 to 2008, there were no nationally prominent conservative forces opposing tongzhi education. The educational work of Taiwanese tongzhi movements in schools and universities had gradually expanded with a low profile, making sporadic lectures and additional activities, and attracting little public resistance. Any opposition to tongzhi education occurred more often at the individual school level rather than at the municipal or national level. However, the implementation of tongzhi education in nationally-circulated textbooks triggered Christian conservatives’ alarm, anger, and fear, leading to the rise of national pro-family movements.

2.3 “True Love Alliance” and gender/sexual diversity curricula (2008–2012)

The first national conservative mobilization against tongzhi people’s sexual citizenship occurred in 2011 as an opposition to the implementation of gender and sexually progressive instructional materials and curricular guidelines. The group that organized this campaign, the “True Love Alliance” (TLA, 真愛聯盟), was the first national pro-family organization in Taiwan. While curricular guidelines and “competence indicators” about gays, lesbians, bisexual, and transgender people were relatively abstract and required pedagogical training to interpret (Table 2.1), three government-sponsored
supplementary materials for instructors on how to teach gender equity education in Grades 1–12 became the targets of Christian conservatives. This section will contextualize the production and content of the three materials and explain what anti-tongzhi conservatives opposed.

*Understanding Tongzhi: A Manual of Educational Materials* (認識同志教育資源手冊) was designed to facilitate middle-school instructors’ tongzhi education from the perspectives of knowledge, practices, instruction, and resources (Chao, Kuo, and Liu 2008). This edited volume, the first tongzhi education-related book published officially by the Ministry of Education in Taiwan, discussed the definitions and identities of LGBTSQ, which represented lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, gay-friendly straight (straight ally), queer, and questioning people. This book further instructed high school teachers on how to build a tongzhi-friendly atmosphere in schools, counseling, and families. It not only addressed the needs of tongzhi students, but also invited readers to understand the situations of tongzhi and transgender teachers. In addition, it presented practical pedagogies (praxes) for tongzhi education, tongzhi human rights, and the affective and sex education of tongzhi youth. To ensure that instructors could read and teach without too much additional effort, the book provided a model lesson plan and dozens of links to instructional and social resources related to tongzhi and transgender groups.

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17 To prepare to implement gender equity education into formal curricula, the three supplementary strategies were formulated and executed to educate active instructors, many of whom received little education about feminism and critical sexuality in their pre-service training. A three-level counseling system was established to hold training camps, national conferences, and regional forums and to develop lesson plans for promoting gender equity education at the national, city/county, and school levels (Kao 2009, 2010).
To close gaps in the instructors’ gender equity education (a scope larger than, but which included, tongzhi education), the Ministry of Education in Taiwan also invited two groups of scholars to develop supplementary manuals for instruction in elementary schools and junior high schools, respectively. *We Can Teach Gender These Ways* (Hsiao, Wang, Hong, eds. 2009) compiled works by 28 authors, from teachers to principals to social activists, covering dozens of gender and sexual issues in elementary schools. Rather than enforcing strictly designed lesson plans, *We Can Teach Gender These Ways* used dozens of self-reflexive teaching stories (narratives) to demonstrate how to generate dialogues with grades 1–6 students regarding diverse gender characteristics and tongzhi education. It also included issues of affection, body and sex education, diverse performance of gender roles, education about diverse families, the rebuilding of gender equality folk cultures, and the inclusion of gender in mathematical and scientific classes (Hsiao, Wang, Hong, eds. 2009:4-6).

Designed for junior high schools, *Teach Gender Well* followed a transformative lesson plan paradigm, providing substantial strategies and approaches for how to blend or incorporate gender and sexuality issues into existing formal curricular structures (You and Tsai eds. 2009). For example, the lesson on “Diverse Desires/Sexualities and Gendered Human Rights” (多元情慾與性別人權)—designed by teacher Keng-yu Cho (卓耕宇)—discussed “diverse xingbie” (multiple genders and sexualities), *xingbie renquan* (gender/sexual human rights), and diverse *xingbie* citizenship (citizenship of sexualities). This lesson plan aimed to lead students in grades 7–9 to consider what constitutes human rights and what kinds of rights students might lose if they were transgender women, transgender men, male tongzhi, or female tongzhi. It further
introduced the histories and meanings of the six-color rainbow flag, a movie about gay rights activists *Milk* (Gus Van Sant 2008), and Taiwan’s LGBT Pride Parade. The lesson plan suggested that teachers integrate this four-class lesson plan with existing versions of civil education for Grade 7 (Cho 2009:168–210). The rest of the book covers reflections on body image and media representation, understanding diverse gender characteristics, and bullying due to non-conventional gender performance in schools; these issues are linked to the learning areas of health and physical education (健康與體育) and integrative activities (綜合活動). The lesson plans and instructional ideas covered by the three materials were progressive and cutting-edge for the first decade of the 21st century in both Taiwan and the United States (see Table 2.2 for highlights of each book).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Titles and Target Audience</th>
<th>Topics Covered</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><em>Understanding Tongzhi: A Manual of Educational Materials (2008)</em>&lt;br&gt;For instructors of middle schoolers (graders 7–12)</td>
<td><strong>Knowledge</strong>&lt;br&gt;- Understanding issues of gender and tongzhi&lt;br&gt;- Definitions of LGBTSQQ&lt;br&gt;- Social, family, and individual perspectives on tongzhi&lt;br&gt;<strong>Praxis</strong>&lt;br&gt;- Tongzhi-friendly campus and student counseling&lt;br&gt;- Tongzhi and transgender teachers’ coming out and challenges&lt;br&gt;- Tongzhi couples and self-composed families&lt;br&gt;<strong>Instruction</strong>&lt;br&gt;- Affective and sex education of tongzhi youth&lt;br&gt;- Career exploration of tongzhi youth&lt;br&gt;- Tongzhi human rights education&lt;br&gt;- Sample of lesson plan&lt;br&gt;- Social and instruction resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>We Can Teach Gender These Ways (2009)</em>&lt;br&gt;For instructors of elementary school students (graders 1–6)</td>
<td>- General gender issues&lt;br&gt;- Practical teaching reflections&lt;br&gt;- Diverse gender characteristics&lt;br&gt;- Tongzhi education&lt;br&gt;- Affective education&lt;br&gt;- Body and sex education&lt;br&gt;- Diverse performance of gender roles&lt;br&gt;- Education of diverse families&lt;br&gt;- Rebuilding the equal cultures of folk beliefs&lt;br&gt;- Gendering math and sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Teach Gender Well (2009)</em>&lt;br&gt;For instructors of junior high school students (graders 7–9)</td>
<td>- Theories and concepts&lt;br&gt;- Body, identity, and subculture&lt;br&gt;- Diverse gender characteristics and body performance&lt;br&gt;- Diverse desires, sexuality, and gender human rights&lt;br&gt;- Gender-based bullying on campus&lt;br&gt;- Instruction resources: books, pictography, comics, drama, movies, music videos, radio broadcasting, and websites.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Taiwanese Ministry of Education’s publication and promotion of these instruction materials and implementation of sex and tongzhi education in schools received applause from many grassroots instructors and professionals. However, the progressive moves and ideas represented in the three manuals were confronted with harsh criticism and a fierce backlash from conservatives. In fact, before the first pro-family and conservative group, True Love Alliance, launched its national petition and multi-media campaign, many conservatives had used their political connections to influence these policies in clandestine ways. The year 2011 was within the first term of MA Ying-jeou, who finished eight years as Taipei City Mayor and won the presidential election in 2008. KMT, the party with which MA was affiliated, had many formal and informal ties with the majority of pro-family churches, which are mostly Chinese-speaking, pro-China churches, with a genealogy composed primarily of mainlanders. Christian conservatives covertly lobbied officials of the Ministry of Education and members of the Legislative Yuan (parliament) and asked politicians with whom they were familiar to pressure officials for policy changes. Their goal was to halt the implementation of all tongzhi-friendly educational materials and curricular guidelines.

Given that this all occurred during a KMT administration and that conservative churches were the KMT’s major constituency, one might have expected them to succeed in stopping the circulation of pro-tongzhi materials. Apparently, this traditional way did not work. The failure made them reluctantly use social movement techniques to create political pressure for policy changes. This overall social and political context finally gave birth to the TLA, an unregistered but nationally powerful conservative group formed in
early 2011 and composed of concerned parents, teachers, activists, and religious organizational workers with Christian backgrounds.

The TLA, as a group, believed that these materials violated the goal of gender equity education. They argued that teachings about diverse genders and sexualities in the three books would “probably confuse children’s gender cognitions, encourage adolescents to have sex, and guide them to develop diverse sexualities (homosexuality, bisexuality, transgender, and even uncertainties)” (Taiwan True Love Alliance 2011, Apr 28). They opposed teaching students the topic of “diverse families (male-male marriage, female-female marriage, and couples who separate sex and love)” (Taiwan True Love Alliance 2011, Apr 28). The TLA’s statement in their public petition of the time states:

1. **We respect** and we do not discriminate based on an individual’s gender [xingbie] orientation, but we **oppose** including materials of diverse sexualities, diverse families, and diverse marriages in the Grades 1–9 levels.
2. **Stop** distributing inappropriate instructor’s resource manuals, lesson plans, and materials to national elementary and junior high schools. Stop holding related training activities. **Re-edit** [all materials].
3. While re-editing the materials, it is necessary to use comparable pages to include discourses on gender education that are “**different from sexual emancipation (性解放).**” Single-aspect holders should not be recruited as experts on gender education. [The Ministry of Education] should invite parents, experts on teenage/child psychological development, and professionals in life education, character education, curriculum, and ethics to participate.
4. As to **solving** practical problems of gender discrimination/bullying, gender identity, and stereotypes about gender characteristics, [the Ministry of Education] should more **actively** implement teaching life education, character education, and appropriate sex education, rather than just passively teaching sex emancipation, safe sex, and tongzhi education. (Taiwan True Love Alliance 2011, Apr 28; original italics)

To advocate on behalf of their appeals, the TLA launched public petitions and media coverage, claiming that they collected more than 430,000 signatures by the end of
2011. They successfully fomented skepticism about the curricular guidelines and the supplementary instructor’s manuals, although a significant amount of information was criticized as distortion, mis-citation, and pro-discrimination (Taiwan Truth Alliance 2011).

The TLA successfully launched its campaign and won national coverage by taking advantage of an important political opportunity. Its rise coincided with the intra-partisan pre-elections of legislators in two major Taiwanese parties (KMT and DPP) at the time. Employing this timing, the TLA successfully pushed cross-partisan legislators to speak for its interests, held three congressional press conferences on the same day in May, and mobilized incumbent legislators to pass a supplementary decision to hold more public hearings and revise the curriculum. These timely pressures on legislators made it possible to create more national public spaces in which conservatives could disseminate their moral values and apply social leverage to produce institutional changes.

A total of eight regional public hearings and numerous national-level meetings were held during the middle of 2011, leading tongzhi and gender education activists to face fervent conservative opponents for the first time. In public hearings, pro-tongzhi supporters—including students, instructors, and parents—shared their stories about sexual minorities being discriminated against at schools, explained basic gender and sexuality concepts, and described in emotional tones how gender education had brought about important changes among the students. They were confronted by boos, shaming slurs, personal attacks, and statements that pathologize homosexuals, connecting them to AIDS. Often, opponents directed patriarchal and heteronormative questions to the adult supporters, such as “Do your parents know you are gay?,” “Do your parents know you
are here?,” and “Which parents hope to see their children become gay?” This time, anti-tongzhi hatred and stigma were not communicated through the media. They were thrown directly into the faces of gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgender people, as well as their friends and teachers.

Many of my pro-tongzhi respondents recalled the scenes that they experienced in this 2011 series of public hearings with tears. Six interviewees mentioned the same striking scene: After a public hearing in Tainan (a Southern city in Taiwan), a huge crowd of Christian teenagers wearing all white T-shirts lined two sides of a hallway, staring at pro-tongzhi supporters from behind facial masks. There was no way out except through this hallway. These teenagers sang Christian holy songs loudly, passionately, and repeatedly to “welcome” (purify) open gays, lesbians, and their supporters. In our interview later in 2016, the church’s pastor told me that these teenagers were not mobilized by the church. He said that they voluntarily took this collective action to express their ideas and faith. However, I also heard from a local professor that her female student was among these “singing angels” only under peer pressure. Her student wrote an apologetic letter to the pro-tongzhi professor because she knew that her professor would feel hurt seeing the student among the anti-tongzhi groups.

One of the most influential consequences of the 2011 public hearings and face-to-face confrontations was that they brought heteronormativity and sexual conservatism to life in Taiwan. Heterocentric family values and sexual stigmas are not merely abstract ideas or media representations. They are real. The sense of deep fear and

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18 My IRB procedure and informed consent form came with a long directory of national and local hospitals and mental health clinics for interviewees’ use. These emotional reactions were not beyond people’s daily minimum risks, and they all came with respondents’ consent.
loss that many experience come from these confrontations. The TLA campaign traumatized supporters of gender equity education and tongzhi activists, including students, professors, and their friends. It was during this campaign that my name was written on a blackboard and prayed over by a group of Christians to convert my pro-tongzhi stance (a story that I describe in Chapter 1).

After this battle, some pro-tongzhi professors and supporters withdrew themselves from the frontline of gender equity educational activities at the national level, shunning opportunities to face conservative leaders. Others remained emotional as they recalled this experience. Conservatives successfully damaged the pro-tongzhi campaign’s human resources (i.e., the “armed forces” in the culture wars), decreased morale, and inflicted socio-psychological wounds that would take a long time to heal. Meanwhile, conservatives’ overtly heterosexist narratives and behaviors also enraged some people and pushed them to take action later.

The pro-family TLA won the 2011 battle in part when the MOE decided to revise the competence indicator for 7th–9th graders from “understanding their own sexual orientation(s)” to “respecting diverse sexual orientations” (shown in Table 2.1). My pro-tongzhi interviewees interpreted this amendment as sending the message that teenagers cannot recognize their own sexual orientations in high schools. What students will learn by this revised competence indicator, they argued, is “fake respectability” (hypocrisy) rather than true recognition through understanding and self-affirmation. Parts of the three instructor manuals were revised under the MOE’s supervision without the consent of the original authors. The manuals were quietly reprinted and distributed to schools, but the MOE dared not upload their electronic documents to its official website.
During this period, Christian conservatives focused on opposing educational policies and instructional materials that promoted ideas of gender and sexual diversity, especially non-conventional sexual minorities, gender performance, and access to autonomous abortion. The “public image” of the TLA was vague and somewhat invisible. Its infrastructure was weak and out of date. There was only a one-page website with text on a poorly designed white background showing how fast the number of petitioners went up. At this time, a conservative political ecosystem did yet not exist. Only a male researcher of life ethics with a Catholic background went on a lecture tour in cities where public hearings were held to mobilize Christians to oppose the pro-tongzhi guidelines and materials. It was clear that Christian communities were operating to mobilize an opposition, but no specific church or organization claimed or presented the TLA campaign.

2.4 Pro-family campaigns and diverse family formation (2012–2014)

If the previous period was a harsh beginning to the contemporary culture wars in Taiwan, the period of 2012–2014 saw the first massive rally of Christian conservatives in their quest for institutional power. During this period, education and marriage had become the top two targets of pro-family activists. They alternated their focus between the two issues to maintain a national climate of moral panic and conservatism.

On the issue of education, Christian conservatives achieved success in 2014 when at least two conservative scholars who regularly made anti-tongzhi comments and advocated for heteronormative practices sat on the national-level committee of gender
equity education (GEE), which was designed to promote equality and inclusion. Although these conservative scholars had no specific experience with gender or sex education training or a record of publishing on these subjects, the MOE assigned them seats in order to “hear different voices” and “perfect the policy formation” (Jiang 2014). In this way, the MOE implied that the previous GEE committee, composed predominantly of pro-equality and pro-tongzhi scholars and teachers, failed to represent the voices of the larger society, so the MOE assigned committee members hoping to reconcile social conflicts before implementing new policies.

During this term (2014–2015), the national GEE committee was reported as being dysfunctional and sluggish because many progressive policies were being obstructed by conservative representatives. Committee members spent a significant amount of time and energy simply communicating basic knowledge (e.g., What is gender/sexual diversity? Does the GEEA include tongzhi education?). If the goal of conservatives was to postpone the implementation of gender and sexual diversity education and to exhaust pro-tongzhi representatives, they obviously succeeded.

Conservatives’ experiences of seizing political power and participating in decision-making indirectly inspired other anti-tongzhi representatives to seek seats on gender equity education committees at the city and county levels, further institutionalizing conservative values. Using local committees to contest the center (i.e., communist China’s tactic of “local places containing the center,” 地方包圍中央) became the tactical strategy that conservative campaigns started to use in this period. In fact, before conservatives turned their attention to education, halting changes to the heteronormative monogamous marital system was their main focus.
Taiwan’s progressive movements fought to reform heteronormative marriage, but they never focused only on monogamous marriage. Coverage in the Western media of Taiwan’s progress on family-related rights tended to only partially represent the issue of same-sex marriage, using orientalist world views and Western-centric schemas to understand Taiwan’s advances in this area (e.g., Fuchs 2016, Dec 8; Horton 2016, Nov 18; Rauhala, 2017, Apr 20). Their approach was flawed. Thus, the Western representation of Taiwan’s progress in marriage equality was limited, biased, misleading, colonial, and orientalist (Said 1978).

In fact, Taiwan’s first marital rights advocacy organization (Taiwan Alliance to Promote Civil Partnership Rights, hereafter TAPCPR) drafted and promoted the so-called Bill of Diverse Family Formations (hereafter DFF Bill, 多元成家法案), which included three bills:

1. A Bill of “Same-sex Marriage” that seeks the equal legal recognitions for couples regardless their genders;
2. A Bill of “Civil Partnership” with which any Taiwanese citizens can establish partnerships with no mandatory responsibility of sex, sexual loyalty, or cohabitation, regardless of their genders or sexual orientations. Heterosexual couples can benefit from this Bill also.
3. A Bill of “Multiple-person Family Systems” in which more than two people who cohabit and support one another for living can protect their legal rights. This Bill goes beyond the scope of monogamy.

The TAPCPR announced the so-called “triplets” draft bill of the Civil Code revision in July of 2012, sending the package to the Legislative Yuan to seek support in the fall of 2013. Eventually, only the draft Bill of Same-Sex Marriage was accepted and signed by

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19 They include the New York Times and Washington Post.
legislators (Taiwan Alliance to Promote Civil Partnership Rights n.d.).

In other words, it is untrue to suggest that Taiwan “replicated” the Western model or affirmed same-sex marriage based on a Western standard. This kind of Western imperialist argument is wrong in two ways. On the one hand, Taiwan’s progressive movements had learned widely from Western models in different times and countries and produced its own assembled and newly-created versions. The first two bills of the three—same-sex marriage and civil partnership—represented the so-called “compressed modernity” (Chang 2010) by trying to complete two legal goals in a relatively short time. Passing similar legal measures took many Western countries much longer, sometimes decades.

The third bill challenged the assumption that a legal union called “marriage” should only exist between two people. The proposed multiple-person family system radically subverts the assumption of monogamous relationships, expanding the definition of families to include, for example, a group of multiple lesbians and straight women raising children together. This Bill also provided legal protection for cohabiting orphans or a group of religious practitioners (such as nuns and monks in the same temple) taking care of one another. Although these groups of people have no blood ties, marital status, or partnerships, they can use the “Multiple-person Family Systems” to establish the legal status of their intimate group in order to negotiate their rights in contracts and to help each other with medical decisions, property, and other legal matters. Ideally, people who choose this type of family formation are not bound by obligations of sexual intercourse or strict rules of divorce that have been applied to traditional marriage for centuries. Obviously, the idea of a multiple-person family system is too “queer” to be
acknowledged by Western mainstream media. They therefore ignored Taiwan’s queer family proposal, representing the legislative movement as affecting heteronormative marriage only. In this narrowed scope, Taiwan was portrayed as another follower from the Global South who replicated the success of same-sex marriage in Western countries. A local move toward sexual citizenship became transformed into a way to re-inscribe Western cultural imperialism and social colonialism.

The challenges that Taiwanese pro-tongzhi activists faced came from both international misrepresentations and domestic backlashes. Later, in Oct 2013, the same-sex marriage bill (the first DFF Bill) passed the first reading in the Congress, next moving to the Judiciary and Organic Laws and Statutes Committee (司法及法制委員會). This historic leap encouraged pro-tongzhi supporters and stirred up the second wave of a conservative backlash. Pan-religious organizations formed the Big League of Taiwan Religious Groups Protecting Family (hereafter, the Pro-Family League, 台灣宗教團體愛護家庭大聯盟). The Pro-Family League claimed to represent all religious groups, including Protestantism, Catholicism, Taoism, the Unification Church (統一教), i.e. Family Federation for World Peace and Unification), and Tientism (a group of Chinese folk belief sects 天帝教), among others. For the first time, Taiwanese anti-tongzhi forces expanded from Christian communities to incorporate other mainstream religious organizations in Taiwan. In the meantime, some religious members of the Pro-Family League were criticized by fellows of their own religions on the grounds that that this small group of people could not represent the whole religion.

Later, mainstream evangelical and charismatic churches (those former Chinese-speaking Protestant churches) quietly separated themselves from the Pro-Family
league and organized their own Alliance for the Next-generation’s Happiness (hereafter Happiness Alliance，下一代幸福聯盟). Together, the Pro-Family League and the Happiness Alliance initiated the petition against the DFF Bill and mobilized believers to collect signatures. They also organized believers to make “overwhelming calls” to “paralyze” the daily operations of pro-marriage-equality legislators’ offices. My informant reported that, even if legislators and their staff held strong beliefs on gender/sexual (xingbie) equity, they could not resist these forces of protest.

This wave of conservative backlash reached its climax with an enormous rally held in front of Taiwan’s Presidential Hall, the most important political symbol in Taiwan. The protesters declared that marriage is composed of one man and one woman, one father and one mother, one life and forever (一男一女、一夫一妻、一生一世), and they opposed amending the definition of marriage in Article 972 of the Civil Code.20

During this campaign, same-sex marriage and other family formation bills were framed as efforts to encourage and legitimize promiscuity and adultery, to destroy marriage and family ethics, and to pave the way for polygamy. The conservatives charged supporters of multiple family formation as evil people who deprived all children of their right to have a normal family. Christian conservatives believed that the tongzhi movement (LGBT activism) was a vocal and violent minority that bullied the silent, moral majority (see taiwanfamily.com for details). Pro-family activists claimed that this protest successfully organized 300,000 people in the streets, making it the most popular protest that year; the police reported 88,000 people.

20 A series of “ones” in conservatives’ marriage slogan (one man, one woman, etc.) implied these Christian conservatives’ obsessive belief in the oneness of their God and God’s hostility against sexual diversity.
This massive rally occurred on Nov 30, 2013, and it was later named “the 1130 Event,” or the “1130 Rally,” for its tremendous influence. During this peak in Taiwan’s culture wars, anti-tongzhi churches disseminated propaganda, reinforced homophobic discourses, and mobilized people to join their rally. They used mainstream and Christian TV and newspapers, weekly church events and services, street petitions, informal family gatherings, personal persuasion at workplaces, and endless messages through social media (such as the apps LINE and Facebook) and other personal communications.

Under such unprecedented propaganda and peer pressure, many social ties were disrupted; many social groups were dismissed. A large number of church-goers, both tongzhi and heterosexual, broke off relationships with their formerly close spiritual siblings and parents. Others were expelled from their religious groups and social media circles due to disagreements on the tongzhi issue. Muted conflicts became visible and exacerbated. Collective emotions fluctuated daily as society’s sexual attitudes toward homosexuality became further polarized. To many of my pro-tongzhi interviewees, the 1130 Rally became one more traumatic memory on top of the wounds received in the 2011 public hearings when they faced the 2011 True Love Alliance campaign.

After the 2011 and 2013 waves, Taiwanese pro-family activists learned that education and family/marriage were two social institutions that they could use to actualize their Christian moral values. To stop, or at least delay, the implementation of sex and tongzhi education and the legislation of same-sex marriage, pro-family activists took a series of actions. In 2014, they successfully lobbied and sent two anti-tongzhi professors into the MOE gender equity education committee to impede many progressive policies (discussed earlier).
Moreover, in May 2014, conservatives within the relatively liberal Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (PCT) passed a heterosexist pastoral letter in its yearly General Assembly, stating that PCT local churches should express love and care toward homosexuals while firmly defining marriage as a union between one man and one woman. Thus, the liberal gray zone in the PCT of non-judgment on homosexual issues became more black and white, with little remaining space open for dialogue. Although this letter was criticized as an instance of plagiarism from Hong Kong conservative churches’ anti-tongzhi statement and some charged that its passage at the assembly relied on unethical rules of procedure, the letter nevertheless became the basis by which conservative Presbyterian leaders manifested their heteronormative “pure faith.” The letter also served as the official source for conservative Presbyterians’ collaboration with Chinese-speaking church leaders in campaigns to oppose sexual citizenship.

While there was no massive conservative rally in 2014, the fact that conservatives grabbed seats in the MOE and reified the PCT’s definition of marriage with a pastoral letter were important. These institutional accomplishments produced structural influences in the long run. In fact, I observed that year 2014 marked a key turning point for pro-family movements in Taiwan. That year, both Taiwan and Hong Kong underwent ground-breaking political protests with the 318 Sunflower movement in Taiwan and the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong. These political movements fought for substantial democracy, for anti-authoritarianism, against China’s economic invasion, and against free trade motivated by political and military concerns. The movements have transformed entire generations of those 45 years old and younger in both societies. Paradoxically, these regional radical political movements also inspired pro-family conservatives, who
copied radicals’ discourses and turned them into conservative propaganda.

They formed several conservative media outlets and organizations that started to produce distorted information systematically. For example, Kairos News was established as an online media outlet to produce anti-tongzhi, anti-trans*, and pro-family news with the aim of countering other online news media’s pro-tongzhi stances. To generate a grassroots influence, several conservative associations were registered with names that clearly imitated their liberal counterparts. The Lutheran Taipei Truth Church founded “Chinese Children and Adolescents AIDS Care and Prevention Association” (中華兒少愛滋關懷防治協會)21 and the Shilin branch of BLCC formed the Taiwan AIDS Care Association (台灣愛滋關懷協會), portraying themselves as HIV/AIDS human rights NGOs to compete for governmental seats and school pedagogical opportunities. In addition, Taichung Grace Church founded the Taiwan Xingbie Human Rights Protection Advocacy Association (台灣性別人權維護促進協會), a name easily confused with the long-term radical left-wing organization Gender/Sexuality Rights Association, Taiwan (台灣性別人權協會).

Conservative efforts to establish their own organizations transformed their religious convictions into civil groups. The secular image of religious organizations justified their participation in government meetings and schools as non-religious citizens. It provided “a revolving door” for religious people to become involved in secular politics without troubling over the separation of church and state. In the meantime, the year 2014 also marked a turning point for Taiwanese conservatives, who changed from being passive recipients of Western and Asian regional anti-gay discourses and strategies to

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21 [http://www.nohiv4child.org/]
being active producers of local conservative resources. (See further discussion about transnational conservative networks in Chapter 4.)

2.5 First Christian-based party: Faith and Hope League (2015–2016)

From 2014 to 2016, many of my pro-tongzhi interviewees were concerned that, according to news reports, conservative leaders had formed a coalition with KMT’s main leaders, including the Chief Speaker of the Legislative Yuan. Their meetings projected an image of a tight “buddy-buddy” bond between conservatives and KMT leaders, who promised to defeat the Same-sex Marriage Bill. However, my participant observations and interviews showed another side of the story. The coalition between KMT and Christian conservatives was not as stable as outsiders imagined. The threatening “1130 Rally” was supposed to have demonstrated “the fist” of Christian conservative communities to the KMT one year before the 2014 mid-term election. KMT needed to discover how large a constituency the Christian conservative community had before deciding whether or not to respond positively to conservatives’ anti-tongzhi demands at the risk of losing independent voters. In the meantime, after the 2014 Sunflower Movement, Taiwanese society was inclined to support radical social reforms and anti-KMT politics. This climate led to a landslide defeat of the KMT in the late 2014 mid-term election.

Christian conservative churches shared a national identity and ethnic background similar to that of the KMT. However, Christian conservatives had developed their own political agenda by this time. To some extent, like leftists, these conservatives learned lessons from their experiences with the democratic Sunflower Movement. They
understood that they needed to have their own organizations and platforms in order to lead the debate on their preferred social issues. More importantly, they had a sense that the KMT was unreliable and untrustworthy because its administrative legitimacy and political power were rapidly flowing away. It seemed unwise to rely on a party that had a low chance of winning the presidential election of early 2016. Moreover, the KMT was deemed untrustworthy because its members had failed to keep their political promises to Christian conservatives. My interviewees did not tell me what political promises or exchanges they had earned from the KMT, but some in my field site complained implicitly that even Christians became corrupted when they took on the role of politicians or businesspeople. They had to compromise, so they failed to follow the Christian creeds (i.e., heteronormative family values).

Together, these political backgrounds set up the social conditions for the birth of the first Christian-only party: Faith and Hope League (FHL). Pro-family activists understood that they needed a political representative in Congress who could truly speak for them without reservations or considerations of political compromise. To be clear, they need “their own” political spokesperson, a person whom they could fully control. To achieve this, the majority churches and politicians that had formed the Happiness Alliance for the 2013 “1130 Rally” and that opposed government-sponsored tongzhi activities in 2006 organized their Christian party, FHL, in September of 2015.

While outsiders saw the formation of FHL as representing another wave of conservative solidarity and expansion, I found that they did this at great risk. The FHL party formation was announced, to many Christians’ surprise, at a conference on public theology. This conference, held by the China Evangelical Seminary, was designed to
dissuade party-oriented Christian leaders and politicians from pulling entire Christian communities into political campaigns. Some Christian scholars seriously warned such “pro-party” Christians that this move would violate the separation of church and state, creating conflict and confrontation within churches.

These scholars were right. When the FHL used the 2016 presidential and legislative election as a political opportunity to promote their family values, healthy city, and anti-tongzhi ideologies at the national level, they ended up creating unsolvable self-contradictions. Everyone knew that the FHL was a Christian-based party, since it used obviously Christian Evangelical and Charismatic styles of “worship and praise” (敬拜讚美) music and ceremonial procedures to lead political rallies. However, the FHL refused to admit officially that its family values came from Christianity. When people used Christian theology and biblical teachings to challenge its political positions, FHL leaders and followers repeated the line that they were a party, not a church. According to my participant observation, the FHL functioned more like a cult than a political party. It had only a few hundred members due to its strict standard of eligibility: all party members must be Christians.

In this way, the FHL had a paradoxical effect. The party formation strategy, originally designed to expand and promote Christian morality, eventually forced the party to hide its religious identity, hence decreasing the visibility of Christianity in Taiwan’s public sphere. These conservative actors’ identities as Christians first came to be replaced with the spiritually empty titles of concerned parents, teachers, politicians, and professionals. Evangelizing Taiwan in the form of a political party turned out to secularize conservatives’ public identities. This was the unintended consequence of the
formation of the FHL on its Christian conservative supporters. As a result, the FHL received only 1.69% of votes for legislators-at-large, failing to win any seats in the 2016–2020 Legislative Yuan. My informants reported that, starting in early 2017 they are reorganizing Christian communities by preparing them to promote a new, cross-denominational Christian party that will run in 2018 city- and county-level elections and participate in the 2020 presidential and legislative election.

2.6 Constitutional Court’s ruling and its discontents (2016–present)

The 2016 presidential election proved to be another turning point for both the pro-family and the pro-tongzhi movements. TSAI Ing-wen, a relatively pro-tongzhi and progressive female leader, was elected in early 2016. During her campaign, TSAI posted a video on her Facebook page announcing: “I am TSAI Ing-wen. I support marriage equality.” The video has had 1.2 million views and 6.2 thousand shares (as of Feb 2018), earning the support of pro-tongzhi communities.

After the election, however, TSAI began focusing on mainstream political issues, such as transformative justice and reforms of vocational pension insurance systems, thus marginalizing marriage equality from her priority agenda. Nevertheless, several cross-partisan lawmakers from the DPP, KMT, and NPP (the New Power Party, a young left-wing, pro-Taiwan party) collaboratively initiated a new Bill of Marriage Equality (an amendment to the Civil Code). They used the timing of the tragic death by suicide of a famous gay NTU professor of English, Dr. Jacques PICOUX, who was kicked out of the apartment that he co-bought with his partner, JC ZENG, by ZENG’s family. The apartment was registered under ZENG’s name because he was younger than the professor,
but ZENG passed away earlier due to cancer. ZENG’s family had demanded that
PICOUX move out after ZENG’s death. Experiencing depression from losing a sincerely
loved partner and control over a familiar place in which the couple had created memories
together for years, PICOUX committed suicide in mid-October 2016, which was later
reported by his student, a pro-tongzhi attorney, on her Facebook page.

This tragic and dramatic story of the gay couple quickly attracted the media’s
attention, stirring up a national wave of sympathetic understanding regarding tongzhi
issues. A KMT legislator, HSU Yu-Jen (許毓仁), used the case in a congressional
interrogation to criticize the TSAI administration’s omission of and inefficiency with
respect to tongzhi couples’ marital rights. In response to this criticism, a pro-tongzhi DPP
feminist legislator, YU Mei-you (尤美女), was asked to put forth a new Bill of Marriage
Equality (hereafter the Bill), which she had discussed with pro-marital rights NGOs since
the election (Jan 2016). Based on the new post-election public opinion and tri-partisan
support, the Bill quickly passed a first reading and was sent to the Judiciary and Organic
Laws and Statutes Committee (hereafter, the Judiciary Committee) for examination.

This legal progress stimulated the next, third wave of conservative mass
mobilization. On the basis of their collaboration at the 2013 “1130 Rally” and in the
2015–6 FHL election, Protestant conservatives again led a series of protests supported by
(unrepresentative) pan-religious leaders from the Pro-Family League and 300 so-called
Presbyterian pastors from Southern Taiwan. From November to December of 2016, the
boulevards and streets next to the Legislative Yuan and the Presidential Office became a
stage from which both pro-family and pro-tongzhi groups showed their “fists” (i.e., their
mobilization capacity). At least five pro-family/anti-tongzhi rallies (Nov 14, 17, and 24;
Dec 3 and 26, 2016) and three pro-tongzhi rallies (Nov 28, Dec 10, Dec 26, 2016) took over the streets when the Judiciary Committee was examining the Bill, questioning officials of related departments in the Executive Yuan and holding public hearings. It was reported that the anti-tongzhi camp mobilized more than 200,000 people on Dec 3, while the pro-tongzhi concert on Dec 10 gathered an estimated number of 250,000 people at its climax on a day of pouring rain. After seeing the unprecedented pro-tongzhi population, a conservative leader, TZENG Xian-Ying, later cited police estimates and stated that the anti-tongzhi rally attracted 70,000 people while the pro-tongzhi rally gathered 75,000 supporters. He used rhetoric to maintain the public impression that progressive and conservative forces remained at a 50:50 split over the sexual issues.

The most violent conservative rally occurred on Dec 26, 2016, when the Judiciary Committee began to examine the Bill line-by-line, integrating different versions from the three parties. Both camps held simultaneous mass rallies of thousands of people, confronting each other with a barrier of police forces between them. Toward the end of the committee examination, conservative leaders and supporters sensed that the tendency was not in their preferred direction, so they imitated the repertoires of the 2014 Sunflower Movement to attack and try to occupy the Legislative Yuan. Veteran anti-tongzhi pastor, ZHANG Maosong, and a new conservative rising star pastor, CHAO Xiao-yin, among other unrecognizable leaders, led the crowd to climb the fences and walls of the Legislative Yuan, intending to occupy the Parliament and stop the passage of the Bill. A former conservative pro-China female lawmaker smuggled a male anti-tongzhi protester into the meeting room. He interfered with the meeting but was swiftly removed by a current lawmaker’s assistant and the police.
Eventually, the Judiciary Committee reached a consensus and completed the examination with two versions of the Bill amendment. One directly amended the definition of marriage in the Civil Code, allowing tongzhi and heterosexual couples to share the same law. The other version created a new chapter within the Civil Code specially designed for tongzhi couples. This strategy squashed the third version, which conservative supporters preferred. It created a new special act for tongzhi couples’ use but did not change the wording of the Civil Code. This was meant, they claimed, to preserve superior and valuable heterosexual marriages and families (i.e., through a “separate but equal” status for tongzhi citizens). After this examination, the Bill was sent out of the Judiciary Committee for the consideration of the entire Legislative Yuan, party negotiations, and a second reading. This is where the Bill stands to date (as of February, 2018). No more progress has been made in the Legislative Yuan since late 2016.

Facing this consequence, conservatives used their political bargaining power to meet with DPP summit politicians many times. President TSAI assigned her Catholic Vice President to establish a new “communication platform” at the presidential level, inviting both liberal and conservative camps to develop dialogue and reach consensus. Naturally, there was no consensus to reach with mutual compromises impossible because, to religious conservatives, this was not a secular “culture war.” In conservatives’ minds, anti-tongzhi was, is, and will always be a “cosmic war,” in which there is only white and black, light and dark. People are either pro-Jesus or pro-Satan. There is no room for negotiation. Compromising on moral values means spiritual corruption. (For more discussion of religious motivations, see Chapter 3.) Predictably, the communication
platform ceased in early 2017, with the societal chasm of sexual attitudes still polarized and unbridgeable.

Interestingly, around the same time, the Constitutional Court decided to examine the same-sex marriage case filed by both a gay veteran activist, CHI Chia-Wei (祁家威), and the Taipei City Government. At that moment, Taiwan’s Constitutional Court was composed of fifteen Justices, with seven relatively liberal and tongzhi-friendly Justices nominated by President TSAI and approved by the Legislative Yuan. After a public debate on March 24 and two months of examination, Taiwan’s Constitutional Court announced to the worldwide media its ruling in favor of same-sex marriage. The first ruling of the Court reads,

The provisions of Chapter 2 on Marriage of Part IV on Family of the Civil Code do not allow two persons of the same sex to create a permanent union of [an] intimate and exclusive nature for the committed purpose of managing a life together. The said provisions, to the extent of such failure, are in violation of both the people’s freedom of marriage as protected by Article 22 and the people’s right to equality as guaranteed by Article 7 of the Constitution [sic.] (Article 1, the Press Release of the Constitutional Court, May 24, 2017).

Based on my interviewees’ interpretations, the Taiwanese Constitutional Court referred to the American case, but it deliberately chose a different logic to rule in the case on the basis of marriage freedom and the basic right of equality rather than on consolidating the centrality of marriage as “the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice and family,” as U.S. Justice Anthony Kennedy argued.

The historic date was May 24, 2017. The ruling required the Legislative Yuan to amend or enact relevant laws for the equal protection of marriage freedom in two years.
The legally technical process for achieving this goal, however, remains open. If the Legislative Yuan fails to act in two years, same-sex couples will be able to register their marriages directly with the city or county governments using a written document signed by two or more witnesses (starting on May 24, 2019).

During this period, I lived in another double world. My Taiwanese pro-tongzhi colleagues immersed themselves in a celebratory climate, anticipating a brighter future and increasing social justice, which was coming to fruition by a Constitutional Court substantially led by liberal Justices nominated by the first female president. In the other world, my American colleagues had to face a misogynist Republican president who showed hostility toward many progressive bills and policies and nominated a young conservative Justice, Neil Gorsuch, to sit in a lifetime position on the Supreme Court. This was a reverse experience in sharp contrast to the moment when the American Supreme Court ruled in favor of same-sex marriage in mid-2015 as Taiwanese tongzhi were facing the rapid ascendancy of Christian conservatism.

After Taiwan’s Constitutional Court’s ruling, Christian and other religious conservatives tried many ways to overturn, or at least delay, the trend toward marriage equality. Pro-family activists organized several protests in front of the Judicial Yuan from March to May, 2017. They also raised an administrative lawsuit against the Judicial Yuan, which does not make sense under Taiwan’s constitutional structure, as the Administrative Court is only in charge of the lawsuits against the Executive Yuan and the administrative branch at other levels, which are separate from the Judicial Yuan.

Facing their double failures in the Legislative and Judicial Yuans, conservatives of the Pro-Family League accused both institutions of making black-box determinations.
They claimed that both decisions were made based on political considerations and, thus, against the Constitution. However, the fact is that the Constitutional Court’s ruling equals the Constitution in Taiwan. On the other hand, pro-family activists deepened their connections with regional and national parents’ organizations, condemning current gender education-related textbooks as encouraging homosexuality and promoting premature sexual behaviors. In 2017, parents replaced religious leaders as the new façade of pro-family activism, initiating multiple lawsuits and institutional accusations against individual instructors who used condoms and dildos to demonstrate safer sex and self-protection practices. They also attacked professors who gave talks about how to prevent HIV/AIDS at drug sex parties (Huang 2017, Aug 2; Huang 2017, Aug 4).

Christian conservatives never gave up in the culture and cosmic wars. After the referendum law was amended with a lower initiation threshold in late 2017, conservatives took the new political opportunity to initiate three referenda in early 2018. Their contents included:

1. “Referendum of marriage definition”: Do you agree that marriage should be limited to the union of one man and one woman? (Jan 24, 2018)
2. “Referendum of age-adaptive gender equity education”: Do you agree that, in the stage of national education, underage children should not receive tongzhi education? (Jan 31, 2018)
3. “Referendum of no change of marriage definition”: Holding the assumption of marriage defined as a union of one man and one woman, do you agree to protect two same-sex people’s rights to manage a permanent shared life with a special law? (Feb 9, 2018)

Those who initiated the three referenda were Protestant conservatives who organized the FHL and the “1130 Rally.” They publicly argued that their actions received support from their American colleague, Brian S. Brown (President of the National Organization for
Marriage; President of the World Congress of Family), proudly showing Brown’s encouraging video on the front page of their website (https://taiwanfamily.com/). The referenda remain under examination by the Central Election Commission and its public hearing at the time of this dissertation writing. If they pass examination and earn enough petitions, they may be voted on in late 2018 during the mid-term election.

### 2.7 A relational history of conservatism

This chapter explores grounded inquiries into who anti-tongzhi Christian conservatives are and describes the regime of moral conservatism that they have established. More importantly, I illustrate the dynamic process through which Taiwanese anti-tongzhi conservatism has developed into a political regime powerful enough to shape policy. According to the data shown above, it is clear that, from 2000 to 2018, Christian conservatism in Taiwan grew from an informal assembly composed of dozens of churches to a fully-fledged moral enterprise equipped with its own media, political party, political candidates, and HIV/AIDS and gender education organizations. The enterprise includes more than 400,000 believers trained as what I call the “spiritual reserve army” who are ready to be mobilized for mass rallies. The enterprise also has church-related think tanks, foundations, academic journals, flocks of Christian scholars, and counseling institutes. (Chapter 4 provides more discussion of this ecosystem.)

While I often use the singular “it” to refer to Christian conservatism, I do not mean to imply that Christian conservatism operates as a persistent, homogenous, and well-organized centralized entity. It does not. Echoing Skocpol’s (1979) historical view of social revolutions, I observed that no one foresaw the birth and growth of Christian
conservatism in Taiwan. At the turn of the century, no one could have predicted that Christian conservatives would be politicized and publicized to the same extent as the secular social movement activists that they had scorned and devalued as a mob of rogues. In these Christians’ subjective interpretation, they did what they did for the pure purpose of reacting to urgent moral emergencies, such as government-sponsored tongzhi activities, national tongzhi education, and bills in favor of diverse family formations. They described their collective action as a “reluctant” response and a calling from God (whose messages were intermediated through religious leaders).

In sociological terms, the birth and growth of Taiwanese Christian conservatism is a contingently constituted social conglomeration that has been produced through a dynamic process of social interaction, conflict, and integration. The idea of Christian conservatism sounds like a well-rounded entity, but, in fact, only “Christian” is used as a socially understandable identity in Taiwan. “Conservative” is more often conceived as an adjective and an evolving identity at an early stage than as a box on the census form with a meaning that every Taiwanese knows.

The ongoing and ambiguous nature of Christian conservatism and its supporters in Taiwan suggests that there is no easy answer to the question of who they are. In 2018, they were mainly composed of core religious leaders from metropolitan mega-churches (such as the Lutheran Taipei Truth Church, Bread of Life Christian Church in Taipei, Taichung Grace Church, and Banner Church in Taichung). Their evangelical and charismatic arms extend to anti-tongzhi Presbyterians in Southern cities, such as Tainan, Kaohsiung, and Pintung as well as churches in Eastern counties where indigenous Taiwanese are concentrated and people’s lives are less urbanized and less exposed to the
multiculturalism of gender and sexualities. The national expansion of former “Chinese-speaking” churches implies a competition with the liberal headquarters of the so-called former “Taiwanese-speaking” PCT in Taipei and the leadership of PCT in Taiwanese Christian communities (discussed in Chapter 3).

In addition to this horizontal and geographic axis of Christian conservatism, it is important to acknowledge its vertical and hierarchical axis, including the national, municipal, organizational, and interpersonal levels. The national platform of Christian conservatism operates in the same way as NGOs (e.g., Taiwan Christian League and the Next Generation’s Happiness League) and parties (e.g., FHL and the unnamed new one). These national organizations cannot function without support from the city- and county-level “prayer networks” and Christian associations, networks or associations that are only open to formal and on-duty pastors who mingle regularly (weekly or monthly) to pray and share messages. Through these circuits, regional mega-churches share resources and infrastructures with smaller churches while giant players gradually accumulate power and reputation. To serve as giant players, mega-churches have to learn to implement “church growth” techniques to boost and “transplant” (reproduce) their organizations. Their organizational strategies include rituals and music of “worship and praise,” prayer and fasting, and charismatic styles (such as healing, driving out ghosts, speaking in tongues, and movements of the Holy Spirit). To grow churches, Christian conservatives also reshape their organizations by introducing apostolic training programs, prosperity theology, and imported foreign bureaucratic models (such as a “two-wing system” and a “spiritual family” structure). These rituals and organizational strategies allow believers to become more emotionally and inclusively attached to their churches, but they also create
more room for churches to monitor their members through activities, informal interpersonal connections, and social media (such as closed groups on LINE and Facebook).

Organizational developments at the national, regional, organizational, and interpersonal levels have shaped the conglomeration of Christian conservatism into a real political power strong enough to manipulate the political agenda. Christian churches in 2018 are not what they were in 2000. It is important to note that the development of Christian conservatism is not linear nor one-dimensional. Based on my detailed description above, I suggest that it is necessary to analyze the history of Christian conservatism through three pairs of relationships: the relationship between Taiwan and the United States, between the pro-tongzhi and pro-family movements, and between the social institutions of education and marriage.

2.7.1 The U.S.-Taiwan relation

My evidence shows that the role of the United States in Taiwan’s case of Christian conservatism is not that of a role model nor of a culturally imperial director. During the period under study, Americans’ roles were both plural and secondary. Sometimes, they served as resources providers, passively responding to the local needs of Taiwanese conservatives and waiting for the locals’ introductions. Taiwanese conservatives played the roles of gatekeeper, cultural broker, or discursive sanitizer with agency to determine which Western cultures and histories they were going to select for their organizations and followers. In other situations, Americans were framed as a negative model of Western corruption due to sexual liberation (emancipation) and moral degradation. This imagined United States became an easy-to-use reference, giving discursive leverage to religious
leaders’ rhetoric as they warned their believers about the Western invasion of same-sex marriage and homosexual subcultures. (However, interestingly enough, many of these Christian conservative leaders also studied abroad in the United States or sent their children to receive American educations.) Through these mirroring techniques and occidental framings of the United States, Taiwanese anti-tongzhi Christian conservatives define who they are by laying claim to who they are not. In other words, Taiwanese Christian conservatism shapes its “self” by mirroring and constructing a conflicting image of the United States.

At this point, readers should have a clear sense that the larger picture of conservatism in Taiwan is very different from the American model. American president Ronald Reagan redefined American conservatism as a stool with three legs: economic conservatives (neo-liberalism), social conservatives (morality and family values), and nationalist conservatives (defense, foreign policy, xenophobia, and alt-right and white supremacist). This American metaphor has shaped international scholars’ conceptions of conservatism since the 1980s. However, this American model does not exactly fit the Taiwanese context. Evaluated by the American standard, both major parties in Taiwan (the KMT and DPP) are worshipers of neo-liberalism, free trade, and globalization; neither can be called a leftist party. However, given Taiwan’s authoritarian history, the state apparatus in Taiwan has served as a massive caregiver by offering the National Health Insurance system to all citizens and maintaining pension insurance systems for governmental employers, laborers, military personnel, farmers, and other unemployed nationals. As to the third leg, Taiwan, as a society, has been polarized toward two nationalisms: pro-China (unification with China) and pro-Taiwan (Taiwanese autonomy
and ultimate independence). It is difficult to determine if one is more nationalist or more conservative than the other.

Thus, the second leg of social conservatism is the only aspect to which American and Taiwanese conservatisms are comparable. Although it is true that not all social conservatives in Taiwan are Christian, it is equally true that Christian churches clearly lead the series of moral campaigns to oppose same-sex marriage, tongzhi education, tongzhi pride parades, and government-sponsored tongzhi activities. They have been fighting these culture wars (cosmic wars in their spiritual world) for nearly two decades.

Meanwhile, it is also wrong to impose the entire array of American social conservatism and culture war issues on our understanding of Taiwanese social conservatism. As reported in this chapter, what has occupied the national public sphere in Taiwan is marriage and family, education, anti-abortion, and HIV/AIDS and sexual health policies. The education issue was raised in the context of gender equity and tongzhi education, of which there are no comparable national cases in the United States. On the other hand, Taiwanese liberals do not have to engage in the debates over school prayer, evolutionism vs. creationism, gun control, and the denial of global warming, as their American counterparts do. Issues of anti-immigration, the separation of church and state, drug control, sex work, and speech liberty versus speech monitoring are all established social issues in Taiwan, but they are beyond the scope of this dissertation (c.f., Fiorina, Abrams, Pope 2010[2005]; Hunter 1992).

Thus, it is unwise to impose the American model of conservatism on the Taiwanese case under study. It is also misleading to use an American-centric view to reduce the case of Taiwanese Christian conservatism to a primitive replication of an
American counterpart and to predict that the Taiwanese case will develop along the lines of American civilization. Rather, I argue that Taiwanese Christian conservatism has to be analyzed in a way that puts it at the center and considers it an inter-autonomous entity in the Taiwanese, Asian-regional, and transnational contexts. My contextualized comparison and examination of Taiwanese and American conservatisms in this sub-section, however, should make it clear that Taiwanese Christian conservatism can be understood in relationship with its American counterpart.

2.7.2 The pro-tongzhi and pro-family relation

The idea of “conservative” should not be taken for granted as an essentialist and self-evident social identity or position. Rather, as I show in this chapter, “conservative” is not a being, but a becoming. It is an interactive process in which a set of social groups who hold a fundamentalist interpretation of their scripture as an anti-tongzhi text inter-subjectively define who they are by continuously halting and rejecting implementations of progressive sexual citizenship. In other words, (anti-)sexualities have defined Christian conservatism. After 2014, conservatives began to learn how to portray themselves as concerned citizens, to hide their religious identities, to develop a moral enterprise infrastructure, and to produce local anti-tongzhi discourses. For example, these Christian conservatives claim that they are not “anti-tongzhi” (fan-tong). They love tongzhi; they just want to protect the social foundation of marriage and family (pro-family).

Therefore, I argue, that without pro-tongzhi movements, there would be no pro-family Christian conservatism in Taiwan. Christian conservatism is not a universally existing entity once hidden somewhere in so-called tradition and history. Instead,
Christian conservatism is a contemporary product that has been socially manufactured by Taiwanese modernity: by Taiwan as an unrecognized state craving international recognition through its democratic accomplishments, by Taiwan’s economic development and its increasing social trust, and by Taiwan’s acceptance of sexual diversity. Taiwanese society’s ground-breaking move toward tolerating sexual diversity and its rapid social changes influenced by the globalization and glocalization of sexual information and institutions (e.g., marriage equality and gender education), have struck Christians’ nerves. Their reactionary ideas, prayers, narratives, and collective actions against these social changes have constructed a distinct Christian conservatism in Taiwan.

Christian conservatism has been shaped in, and is shaping, the relations between the pro-tongzhi and anti-tongzhi/pro-family camps. This conservative regime dawned in the span of years from 2000–2008 and officially emerged in 2011 as an informal group to fight sex and tongzhi education. To stop the implementation of the Bill of Diverse Family Formation, it proliferated and expanded into a pan-religious coalition in 2013. The Protestant division of this assembled force further developed its moral enterprise into grassroots associations in 2014, organized the first Christian party (FHL) in 2015, and participated in the 2016 legislative election. All of their efforts, they claimed, were meant to use political power to oppose the legitimization of marriage equality and homosexuality.

After failing to win the election, the FHL focused on stopping the liberal legislation of same-sex marriage and on generating anti-tongzhi protests and discourses against the Constitutional Court’s ruling in favor of same-sex couples in 2017. Pro-family
activists’ attention then turned to gender education. As new parent-centric organizations formed, the traditional interpretations of family, gender, and sexuality were used to lobby city- and county-level politicians, some of whom were planning to run for local election in 2018. A new pan-denominational Christian party has also been formed for the 2020 presidential and legislative elections.

These conservative moves would never have happened if the pro-tongzhi movements had not successfully achieved milestones in tongzhi education and marriage equality. In other words, it is the processes of expanding sexual citizenship that has, in part, produced Christian conservatism in Taiwan socially and relationally.

2.7.3 The education-marriage relation

The third relationship between education and marriage and familial systems emerges from the interactions between pro-tongzhi and pro-family movements. In the developmental process of Christian conservatism, the issues of education and marriage/family took turns occupying their anxiety. They first paid attention to marriage (2006 and 2009), then turned to tongzhi education (2011), and then went back to marriage and diverse family formations (2013). After their organizational expansion in 2014, they accumulated more capacity to focus on both issues simultaneously, interweaving the two issues during their legislative election campaign (2015–2016) and their anti-marriage equality rallies (2016–2017). Of the recent three referenda, two focused on the heteronormative definition of marriage while only one targeted tongzhi education (2018). Education and marriage/family became two social institutions that Christian conservatives targeted and desired to occupy, colonizing these secular
institutions with their own moral values. Taking turns addressing the two issues helped Christian conservatives to maintain and consolidate their national and local influences.

In other situations, they deliberately blocked education and marriage/family issues from each other for the purpose of securing the legitimacy of conservative power. For example, anti-tongzhi and pro-family scholars who were assigned to sit in the national gender equity education committee in 2014 refused to discuss their stances on same-sex marriage and diverse family formations while trying to blend themselves into the social institution of education. After the Constitutional Court ruled in 2017 that Taiwanese tongzhi couples could begin legally marrying in two years, conservatives in Taipei City’s government meetings tried to increase the seats occupied by parent representatives from one to four and remove all the gender and sexual diversity curricula from Grades 1–12 textbooks. Pro-tongzhi committee members asked them, “In two years, Taiwan will legislate same-sex marriage. Do you want our children not to learn Taiwan’s new legal progresses?” Conservatives refused to respond. Using words, or no words, to conceal the intertwined relationship between education and marriage/family served as a way for conservatives to build firewalls against their failures in the battle over one social institution (marriage/family) by engaging in battles over the other (education).

At the institutional level, it is safe to say that the progressive gender equity education has empowered a generation of young Taiwanese with more diverse knowledge about gender and sexuality since 2004 and thereby paved the way for progress in marital rights. However, the success of marriage equality ironically threatened the development of progressive education. The acknowledgment by many conservative leaders that they had lost the battle over marriage prompted the decision to seize back
(take over) the institution of education with Christianity. In this way, they hoped to produce a new generation of young Christians: youth with Christian values who would represent another chance to win a victory in their own way. Education, thus, became a prescription to help Taiwan’s conservative Christians heal from their defeat on the battlefield of marriage and family values.

They do have the right to dream in that way. Nevertheless, their dream may sour in two years. Predictably, after May 2019, when same-sex marriage becomes legislated and gradually occurs commonly in Taiwanese daily life, the educational system will have to respond to this social change in ways that will include redesigning school registration forms, changing and creating salutes, incorporating tongzhi parents into teacher-parent activities, and developing curricula about multicultural families, to name a few. At that time, Christian conservatives will have to find a new way to deal with the exponential changes resulting from new interactions between the social institutions of education and marriage/family.

***

To conclude, based on my historical illustrations and analyses, I have argued that the birth and growth of Christian conservatism in Taiwan is not a linear nor a predictable development of so-called “traditional values.” Rather, Christian conservatism is a contemporary social fact that has been produced by Taiwanese modernity at the intersection of the three social relations: the convergent and divergent relations between Taiwan and the United States, competitions and interactions between the pro-tongzhi and pro-family movements, and the reciprocal and frictional relations between the two social institutions of education and marriage/family.
Anti-tongzhi conservatives, in other words, are not inherently programmed to be conservative. Like liberals and queers, conservatives are also social products. These three social relations have brought up Taiwanese fellows conservative and “co-parented” the Christian conservative regime. After gaining an understanding of the pro-family movement’s relational history and its social conditions, one might ask, “What motivates these Christian conservatives to devote their time and resources to anti-tongzhi campaigns?” I will elaborate on what I learned about the motivations of conservatives from my observations, interviews, and participation in their social worlds in the next chapter.
Chapter 3

What Motivates Pro-Family Christians?

Contesting Religious Reductionism

The social factors that motivate pro-family activists in Taiwan to oppose same-sex marriage and tongzhi education are complex. They are often simplified and seen as having a religious motive, especially among Christians (Christian fundamentalism, to be specific) in the case of Taiwan. I observed that both pro-tongzhi and anti-tongzhi people tend to use religion (zongjiao, 宗教) or faith (xinyang, 信仰) to explain pro-family activists’ non-negotiable and persistent anti-homosexual attitudes. Pro-tongzhi supporters, literally or indirectly, often argue that rights to equal sexual citizenship, including marriage equality and tongzhi education, are human rights and that the government’s political agenda should not be kidnapped by religious forces.

On the other hand, religion plays an ambiguous role in anti-tongzhi people’s explanations about their activism motivation. In public, they have intentionally blurred their religious backgrounds. Many pro-family and anti-tongzhi supporters have learned to manage their public images as concerned teachers, professionals, and parents (especially “mothers with two kids,” 兩個孩子的媽). They have actively mobilized secular discourses, such as studies of medicine, psychology, sociology, child pedagogy, and human development, to support their positions on anti-homosexuality under the guise of
doing good for children and societal stability. However, their secular façade of concern for children and society masks the fact that religion, especially Christian teachings about anti-sodomy and sexual purity, is the unspoken core reason for their opposition to tongzhi sexual citizenship. This is most obviously evident when they use “religious freedom” as their main argument to protect their “rights” to oppose marriage equality and to treat other people unequally based on sexualities. Religion is also used to justify their demands of not allowing their own children, or all children in the whole nation, to learn curricula that includes tongzhi sexuality and not providing services (such as bakery services or wedding photography) to tongzhi couples. I call this tendency of both pro- and anti-tongzhi people’s use of religion to hold a one-dimensional view of pro-family movements’ motivation “religious reductionism.”

In fact, what has motivated Taiwanese pro-family activists to oppose tongzhi people’s sexual citizenship is more complex and self-conflicting than what religious reductionism suggests. This chapter uses both quantitative and qualitative data from my mixed-methods interviews with respondents from a wide-ranging political spectrum to explain why these groups of people have devoted their time, passion, and resources to prohibit the marital and education rights of strangers. Based on their evaluations of pro-family activists’ and supporters’ motivations, I examined eight social factors and found that, based on my survey results, their motivations can be better classified into three prioritized groups:

1) **Primary motivations**: Religious teaching, anti-homosexuality, and leadership in the Taiwanese Christian community.

2) **Secondary motivations**: Politics, money, and human resources.
(3) *Subordinate motivations*: Spirituality and other economic factors, such as earning land, mortgage, stock shares.\(^{22}\)

This chapter goes beyond the scope of religious reductionism and shows that the pro-family and anti-tongzhi participants’ motivations are plural and *not purely religious*. These multiple motivations have been intersectionally constructed by religious, cultural, politico-economical, spiritual, and social factors. Even the religious factor is contested by its self-contradictory theological and spiritual system. None of these can fully explain the actions and intentions of pro-family movements without considering their interactions with other factors. At the same time, the eight factors are not equally important. They hold different degrees of explanatory power for analyzing why pro-family activists are so oppositional to tongzhi people. This fact both confirms and diminishes the significance of religion to pro-family activism.

### 3.1 Categorized motivations

In my interviews with 62 people from different camps of sex politics, I selected 38 people involved in Christian communities in Taiwan and used a simple questionnaire containing eight ordinal variables to measure what motivated pro-family activists to oppose marriage equality and tongzhi education based on respondents’ observations. I asked respondents, “Why are pro-family movement participants willing to devote so much time, energy, and resources to opposing tongzhi education and same-sex marriage?” Eight variables were provided for respondents to evaluate: religious teaching, spirituality, politics, money, human resources, other economic factors, leadership in Taiwanese

\(^{22}\) My interviewees usually interpreted the motivation of non-monetary assets in a different way from money. Thus, it was measured as an independent factor.
Christian community, and anti-homosexuality. Each variable was measured with a five-point ordinal scale, with 1 as least important, 3 as moderate, and 5 as most important. For example, a respondent answering 5 on the spirituality variable means that this person considered spirituality a very important motivation of pro-family and anti-tongzhi activists.

To my surprise, many respondents, after hearing the question, coincidentally asked me the same question in response: “Do you mean pastors or believers?” This intuitive inquiry shed light on a sharp distinction in motivation between religious leaders and followers. I had not acknowledged the importance of this rank gap before communicating with insiders. Both in public discourses in Taiwan and in international literature about conservative politics, authors tend to use the attitudes and discourses of religious leaders to represent the whole body of sexually conservative communities. This representation may lead to a semi-correct direction when first-hand data about conservatism is scare, but this also produces problems, as it allows religious leaders’ own situated discourses to overshadow the rest of the broadly conservative population. Thus, to make my quantitative measurement more sensitive to different motivations based on hierarchical positions in churches, I followed respondents’ leads and invited them to evaluate the importance of the eight factors as separately influencing the motivations of religious leaders (pastors; mushi 牧師) and believers (church-goers; xintu 信徒). Their quantitative responses to the two were summed up and sorted in a descending order. The results are shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.
Figure 3.1 shows respondents’ evaluations of pro-family movement leaders’ motivations, sorted by the means of the variables. The results suggested categorizing the eight measured motivations into three groups. The first group, primary motivations, includes factors of religion (mean = 4.11), anti-homosexual behaviors (3.97), and leadership in the Taiwanese Church communities (3.59). The second group, secondary motivations, encompasses politics (3.14), money (3.06), and human resources (2.95). The final group, subordinate motivations, includes spirituality (2.34) and other economic factors (2.30). Please note that there are significant differences between the means of the third and fourth factors (3.59 vs. 3.14) and the sixth and the seventh factors (2.95 vs. 2.34), which makes my categorization of three groups reasonable and less arbitrary.
(More qualitative analyses of their meanings of all variables will be provided in the next sections.)

Standard deviations, a sociological index of heterogeneity, are shown as error bars in Figure 3.1 (the numbers are hidden for clarity but available upon request). The wider the error bar, the more heterogeneous the respondents’ evaluations of the specific variable were. Among the eight factors, leadership in Taiwanese Christian communities, human resources, and politics are the three that have the greatest standard deviations (1.67, 1.65, 1.62). This means that respondents have the widest variations and greatest disagreements when considering how these three factors drive religious leaders’ motivations for opposing tongzhi sexual citizenship. In contrast, respondents had relatively consistent opinions about religious leaders’ religion and spirituality driving their anti-tongzhi motivations (SDs are low, at 1.11 and 1.35).

Figure 3.1 suggests three insights into what has motivated pro-family movement leaders to oppose same-sex marriage and tongzhi education. First, it is unsurprising that the top two reasons are their religious teachings and hostile opinions about homosexual behaviors based on their religion. Nevertheless, the scripture (i.e., their interpretation of the Bible) is not the only religious reason given. What the respondents see as equally important to religious leaders’ anti-homosexuality is their use of homosexual issues to secure or maintain their own leadership in Taiwanese Christian communities or to compete for stronger and higher leadership positions. This finding suggests that, from respondents’ perspectives, intra-religious politics and power relations matter to pro-family movement leaders’ motivation. Intra-religious politics were also reported as more important than religious leaders’ intention to use sexual issues to intervene in
traditional politics (the fourth factor). The three primary motivations convey an important message: although religion plays a key role in motivating religious leaders’ actions against tongzhi people’s sexual citizenship, the definition of religion should not be reduced to religious teaching. Social relationships and power hierarchies within religious communities are also among pro-family leaders’ main concerns.

Secondly, not all religious factors are as important as religious teaching and intra-religious politics. Spirituality, a factor that fundamentally differentiates religious movements from secular social movements, only serves a subordinate and marginalized role in religious leaders’ motivations, according to respondents’ evaluation (my qualitative interview data will provide more explanations on this). Thirdly, respondents suggested that religious factors are not the sole factor that motivates religious leaders to oppose equal sexual citizenship between tongzhi and heterosexual couples. Material factors—including considerations of politics, money, and human resources—are these leaders’ secondary motivations. Only taking into consideration both cultural/religious and politico-economic factors will generate a larger picture of the pro-family movement’s motivations. In the meantime, not all material factors are equally important. In addition to money, other economic factors—such as securing or collecting more land, mortgages, and stock shares—were not on religious leaders’ minds in their opposing of equal sexual citizenship.

Figure 3.2 presents how respondents evaluated pro-family followers’ motivations. Pro-family movement supporters’ motivations are better categorized into four groups, rather than into the three groups as shown in leaders’ motivations. The primary motivations of supporters include only religion (4.13) and anti-homosexual behaviors
(4.05). There is a significant gap between anti-homosexual behaviors and the third motivation, leadership in Taiwanese Christian communities (3.17), which is closer to politics (3.00). Tertiary motivations include human resources (2.59) and money (2.58). The most subordinate motivations are spirituality (2.06) and other economic factors (2.03).

Notably, respondents considered intra-religious politics and competition for leadership in Christian communities a less important motivation for supporters than for leaders. Its ranking makes intra-religious leadership only a secondary motivation in the supporters’ group. Likewise, the rankings of human resources and money place those factors as tertiary motivations. With this said, the priority given to the eight motivations
under consideration in the supporter group was not substantially different from that given in the leader group. Compared with the leader group, only the motivations of human resources and money were switched in order in the supporter group, with an insignificant difference between the two motivations.

These survey results only partially supported my respondents’ intuitive insight that religious leaders and supporters have different motivations for opposing sexual citizenship. There are minor differences between the two groups, but the overall motivational patterns and priorities proved similar in both groups. That is, religion and anti-homosexual behaviors are the most important factors seen to motivate both religious leaders and supporters to oppose marriage equality and tongzhi education. Spirituality and other economic factors are the least important factors. The motivations in between are the major socio-economic factors, including intra-religious and mainstream politics and economic and human resources. The standard deviations in the supporter group present the same pattern as that of the leader group.

Based on the results depicted in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, I observed that the major motivations of pro-family movement participants included both religious and material factors. Thus, “religious reductionism,” the logistic to reduce religious conservatives’ anti-tongzhi actions to purely religious motivation, is flawed and partial, as it overshadows the influence of the political and economic concerns behind their collective actions. On the other hand, not all religious factors contribute to the rise of religious conservatism. Respondents indicated that religious teaching and scriptures suggesting anti-homosexual behaviors are indeed crucial motivations to their collective actions; however, another religious factor, the movement of the Holy Spirit, is subordinate in
these conservative activists’ motivation.

In short, religion is a *partial* and *imprecise* explanation to Christian conservative pro-family activists’ motivation. It is partial due to ignoring other socio-economic contributors; it is imprecise because it obscures the internal dissents and self-contradictory factors within the complex mechanism of religion. To better elaborate the quantitative findings with inter-subjective interpretations, I used qualitative interview data to examine the eight motivations, as reported in the following sections. Again, I take both religious and non-religious perspectives to critique the taken-for-granted explanation of “religious reductionism” on pro-family activists’ motivation.

### 3.2 Is religion decisive? —The scripture, anti-homosexuality, spirituality, and leadership

Regarding religious factors, I suggest that it is important to scrutinize critically the impacts of scripture, consciousness of anti-homosexual behaviors, spirituality, and leadership within the Christian community and to differentiate their relatively independent but also intertwined effects.

#### 3.2.1 Scripture

To some extent, it is safe to say that the Christian scripture (religious teaching) significantly shapes Taiwanese Christian conservatives’ pro-family and anti-tongzhi values. In the Christian scripture, only six to seven lines in the Bible have been frequently cited by Taiwanese Christians to condemn homosexuality and non-conforming gender performances as sinful, abominations, unnatural, profane, and unacceptable. For example, Genesis 19 has been interpreted by Taiwanese Christians as God condemning and
punishing promiscuity and “sodomy” (male homosexual intercourse). The popular story relates that the men in the city of Sodom asked Lot to surrender the two visiting angels for the crowd to “do whatever we want[ed]” (任我們所為, Mandarin Union Version Genesis 19:5). Because “the outcry of sins are great before the face of the Lord” (罪惡的聲音在耶和華面前甚大, Mandarin Union Version Genesis 19:13)\(^\text{23}\), the Lord sent the two angels to destroy the two depraved cities, Sodom and Gomorrah, with a rain of brimstone and fire (Genesis 19:15, 24). This is one of the most frequently cited verses that pro-family activists have used to oppose marriage equality, tongzhi education, and other sexual citizenships. With fear and anxiety, they revert to God’s punishment of these “Cities of the Plain” when discussing tongzhi-related issues. They truly believe that their God punishes mortal sexual immorality with natural disasters, of which the yearly typhoons and earthquakes seen commonly in Taiwan are signs. If they fail to stop the implementation of marriage equality and tongzhi education, God’s punishments will be even more severe and catastrophic and God will destroy Taiwan eventually, these pro-family Christians believe with no doubt.

While Genesis is vague in referring to homosexuality, other texts have been cited to strengthen the belief that their God execrates homosexuality from humanity. For

\(^{23}\) Note that the Mandarin Union Version (MUV) used here is significantly different from other popular English versions. For example, the Modern English Version (MEV) states “have relations with them;” the King James Version (KJV) states “we may know them.” The mainstream Christian conservatives in Taiwan believe that the Bible has no errors and the only orthodox version is the Mandarin Union Version. Other translations of the Bible are meant to question their faith on oneness and their God’s authority, they believe. 

\(^{24}\) Note that the Mandarin Union Version used here emphasizes the outcry of sin while other popular English versions do not. For example, the Modern English Version (MEV) states “the outcry against its people has grown great before the presence of the LORD;” the King James Version (KJV) states “the cry of them is waxen great before the face of the Lord” (my italicization).
example, “You shall not have illicit sexual relations with mankind, as with womankind; it is abomination” (Leviticus 18:22). 25 “If a man has illicit sexual relations with another man as with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination. They shall surely be put to death. Their blood guilt shall be upon them” (Leviticus 20:13). Taiwanese mainstream churches assume that the main persona of the Bible is a heteronormative male, interpreting the two texts as meaning that God hates homosexuals to death (“have illicit sexual relations with mankind”). Although Taiwan has never been fundamentally colonized by Western Christian civilizations (except by the Netherlands and Spain for a very short time in the 17th century), there have been Christian extremists in Taiwan who aggressively condemned homosexuals to burning and death.

The pro-family Christians in Taiwan in my field believe that the existence of homosexuals violates two essential principles rooted deeply in their (Christian) morality. First, Christian morality emphasizes abundant reproduction. Pro-family Christians believe that God blesses people to be “fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth … bring forth abundantly in the earth, and multiply” (Genesis 9:1; see similar in Genesis 9:7). Thus, based on Christian conservatives’ literal interpretations, homosexuals are those who are essentially infertile, having no way to produce their own babies naturally, and therefore are inferior to heterosexuals, who can procreate in a natural (God-blessed) way. When people criticize this interpretation as discriminating against heterosexual couples who are infertile and those who choose not to procreate, they frequently refer

25 The Mandarin Union Version uses a vague verb referring to sex, “苟合” (gouhe, which means “mess up” in contemporary words). I translate it as “have illicit sexual relations” back to English. Other English versions use a metaphorical verb “lie with,” such as “Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is abomination” (KJV); “You shall not lie with a man as one does with a woman. It is an abomination” (MEV).
back to an essentialist argument that these heterosexuals are exceptions while homosexuals are designed to be unable to fulfill their procreative vocation. In the meantime, Taiwanese Christian conservatives’ stance on reproductive techniques leans toward that of the international Catholic Church. They oppose textbook material stating that abortion is a reasonable and understandable option, try by any means to postpone children’s and adolescents’ age of their first sexual experience, and advocate eliminating any sex-related information, except physiological knowledge about sex organs, from curricula. Adolescent’ brains are too premature to absorb information about sex, they argue.

Secondly, Taiwanese Christian conservatives cite texts from the New Testament to frame homosexuality as an unorthodox, promiscuous, and shameful abomination. Their most frequently-cited verses from the New Testament are the following two:

Because of this, God gave them over to shameful lusts. Even their women exchanged natural sexual relations for unnatural ones. In the same way the men also abandoned natural relations with women and were inflamed with lust for one another. Men committed shameful acts with other men, and received in themselves the due penalty for their error. (Romans 1:26–27; my italics)26

Or do you not know that wrongdoers will not inherit the kingdom of God? Do not be deceived: Neither the sexually immoral nor idolaters nor adulterers nor men who have sex with men[a] nor thieves nor the greedy nor drunkards nor slanderers nor swindlers will inherit the kingdom of God. (1 Corinthians 6:9–10)27

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26 This is from the New International Version (NIV). https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Romans+1%3A26-27

27 This is from the New International Version (NIV). The NIV comes with a footnote [a]: 1 Corinthians 6:9. The words men who have sex with men translate two Greek words that refer to the passive and active participants in homosexual acts. https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1+Corinthians+6%3A9-10&version=NIV
The references to homosexuality in these two texts are not literally straightforward, and scholars have argued that when the scripture was transformed from sayings into writings, people had no concept of what we call homosexuality in modern definitions. Homosexuality was not a constructed idea or category until sexology made it so in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century (Foucault 1990[1976]; Boswell 1980). However, Taiwanese Christian conservatives do not know or deliberately ignore these critical readings of historical invention and changeability of sexual ideas, insisting that what God condemned in these texts, written in the Middle East centuries ago, means exactly the same as the tongzhi people they are facing in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century Taiwan.

What makes this literal reading more problematic is that which is lost, added, or created in translation. Table 3.1, for example, highlights comparisons between three Taiwanese versions and 21 English versions of translations of words referring to male-related sexuality and gender in 1 Corinthians 6:9.\footnote{Sources: Bible Gateway (https://www.biblegateway.com); UBS Open Han Bible Project (http://cb.fhl.net/). Due to the limits of the author’s language skills, this table only includes the available versions of English, Chinese (Mandarin), and Taiwanese Hók-ló. Versions of Taiwanese Hakka and other indigenous languages require other scholars to explore.} The two most widely-used Taiwanese Bibles—\textit{Mandarin Union Version} (MUV, 和合本) and \textit{Today’s Chinese Version} (TCV, 現代中文譯本)—both state that those who cannot inherit God’s kingdom include “作孌童的” (those who act as catamites/pedophiles/peredasty) and “親男色的” (those who approach male beauties).
Table 3.1  Version Comparisons of Homosexuality-related Words in the Book of 1 Corinthians 6:9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Versions of the Bible</th>
<th>The words used to refer to male-male sexual relations in 1 Corinthians 6:9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taiwanese Languages</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandarin Union Version (MUV, 和合本)</td>
<td>“作娈童的” (those who do catamites, pedophiles, pederasty) and “親男色的” (those who are approaching male beauties)²⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Today’s Chinese Version (TCV, 現代中文譯本)</td>
<td>“作娈童” (those who do catamites, pedophiles, pederasty) and “親男色” (those who are approaching male beauties)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern Taiwanese Hok-łó Translation (MTHT, 現代台語譯本漢字、羅馬字)</td>
<td>“作男娼的、好男色的” (choh lâm-chhiong ê, hòⁿ lâm-sek ê) (who are male prostitutes and love male lust/beauty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>English</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1599 Geneva Bible (GNV)</td>
<td>“wontons, ... buggerers”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete Jewish Bible (CJB)</td>
<td>“who engage in active or passive homosexuality”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporary English Version (CEV)</td>
<td>“who ... is a pervert or behaves like a homosexual”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easy-to-Read Version (ERV)</td>
<td>“men who let other men use them for sex or who have sex with other men”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Standard Version (ESV)</td>
<td>“men who practice homosexuality”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Heritage Version (EHV)</td>
<td>“males who have sex with males”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOD’S WORD Translation (GW)</td>
<td>“homosexuals”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Children’s Bible (ICB)</td>
<td>“men who have physical relations with other men”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Standard Version (ISV)</td>
<td>“male prostitutes, homosexuals”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King James Version</td>
<td>“effeminate, [...] abusers of themselves with mankind”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²⁹ The texts in the parentheses are my translation from Chinese back to English to show English readers what they mean in Chinese contemporary interpretation. They apparently have crucial differences with the Bible(s) in English or in Greek.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Versions of the Bible</th>
<th>The words used to refer to male-male sexual relations in 1 Corinthians 6:9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(KJV)</td>
<td>“boy prostitutes, ... sodomites”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New American Bible (Revised Edition) (NAB)</td>
<td>(in footnote: The Greek word translated as boy prostitutes may refer to catamites, i.e., boys or young men who were kept for purposes of prostitution, a practice not uncommon in the Greco-Roman world. In Greek mythology, this was the function of Ganymede, the “cupbearer of the gods,” whose Latin name was Catamitus. The term translated “sodomites” refers to adult males who indulged in homosexual practices with such boys.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New English Translation (NET)</td>
<td>“passive homosexual partners, practicing homosexuals”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New International Version (NIV)</td>
<td>“men who have sex with men” (In footnote: The words “men who have sex with men” translate two Greek words that refer to the passive and active participants in homosexual acts.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New King James Version (NKJV)</td>
<td>“homosexuals” (in footnote: That is, catamites)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Life Version (NLV)</td>
<td>“men who act like women, or people who do sex sins with their own sex”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Living Translation (NLT)</td>
<td>“Those who are male prostitutes, or practice homosexuality”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox Jewish Bible (OJB)</td>
<td>“effeminate call boys ... homosexuals”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revised Standard Version (RSV)</td>
<td>“sexual perverts”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revised Standard Version Catholic Edition (RSVCE)</td>
<td>“homosexuals”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldwide English (WE)</td>
<td>N.A. (No mentions of anything relevant to homosexuality at all.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Meanwhile, the Modern Taiwanese Hōk-ló Translation (MTHT), in the same place, suggests “作男娼的、好男色的” (who are male prostitutes and love male lust/beauty; choh lâm-chhiong ê, hōⁿ lâm-sek ê). Catamites are apparently different from male prostitutes. Translations of the Bible in different Taiwanese languages produces confounding interpretations. Moreover, there are a few Taiwanese Christian scholars and pastors reminding readers continuously that the catamite (adolescent boys serving for male adults’ amusement) was a special kind of social role existing in that ancient moment and a certain social context. This role barely exists in the contemporary era, so that what God condemns here does not apply to modern homosexuals. Despite this clarification, most Christian conservatives in Taiwan continue interpreting this text simply as “homosexuals” and assume that homosexuals are lustful pedophiles who love to kidnap minors due to their uncontrollable sexual impulses.

More confounding meanings can be found in comparisons between Taiwanese and English versions. Among the 21 English translations shown in Table 3.1, some versions suggest simply “homosexuality” (GW, NKJV, RSVCE); others differentiate the two words used here as referring to the passive and active roles of homosexuality (CJB, ERV, NET), which instead refer to the powerful and powerless positions in sex. Some versions only indicate an abstract idea of homosexuality (GW, NKJV, RSVCE); others specify male homosexual behaviors (ESV, EHV, ICB, NIV, NLV, NLT), leaving leeway for those who only have homosexual drive or identity but no sexual practices.

Different translations also produce variations in the age referred to. In some versions, the first word refers to boy prostitutes (NAB); others just refer to male prostitutes in general (ISV, NLT, NRSVCE). A few versions condemn not only same-sex
sexual orientation, but also non-conventional gender. Two versions replace the “catamite” word with “effeminate” (KJV, OJB) and one with “men who act like women” (NLV). This translation makes the text out to punish any men whose gender performances are not socially considered masculine and who are more feminine, regardless of their sexual orientations or the gender of their sexual partner(s). In other words, this translation may condemn effeminate heterosexuals, even those who marry a woman and procreate. However, not all English translations of this passage have a word condemning homosexuality, male-to-male sexual behaviors, or men with femininity. The Worldwide English version is the most notable exception.

My examination of these translational versions of 1 Corinthians 6:9–10 suggest two messages. First, even careless readers can observe how translations of the Bible can lead to inconsistent interpretations of God’s condemnation, distorting people’s perceptions of what the texts mean. This relativist interpretation of the canonic scripture is particularly important in questioning those Taiwanese Christian conservatives’ fundamentalist belief that all Bibles are the same. It also shows how rigid these Christian minds are as they insist that the version they have used for generations (i.e. Mandarin Union Version) is the only orthodox version in the world. Second, Taiwanese versions have much narrower variations in their translated meanings. These verses are simply interpreted as clues to condemn catamites and homosexuals as lustful, shameful, and non-righteous, failing to differentiate sexual behaviors, sexual identities, gender performances, and age variations.

This simplistic interpretation of the Bible was consistently verified by my triangular analysis of the interview data. When I asked why Christian conservatives were
motivated by religion to oppose marriage equality and tongzhi education, ST (an indigenous man in his mid-age) responded, “The Bible states explicitly, one man and one woman. If we [do] homosexuality, we will be like Sodom. God will destroy [us].”

Pro-family Christians are anti-gay “because the church teaches them so,” reported Donald (a closeted gay in his young adulthood working in a conservative Christian organization that funded anti-tongzhi activities). Mariah (a pro-tongzi professor of education) reported that she could not think of any other reasons why highly-educated people are so hostile against same-sex lovers except for their religion.

I introduced a cultural-relativist interpretational approach on the anti-gay texts of the Bible into my interviews and field participation in Taiwanese conservative churches. I politely mentioned different ways to translate and interpret the Bible, as I show above, when I had the valuable chance to interview the firmly anti-tongzhi and pro-family leaders. Pastor Tseng (a male pastor whose church mobilized the largest crowd to protest tongzhi education curricula in a 2011 public hearing in Kaohsiung, Taiwan) responded:

Anyone who has been reading the Bible seriously would have to agree that Christianity opposes homosexuality. […] I think that the general teaching is this. You think about the church history … the majority of the church history, not its minor part. You see, the church’s teaching should not have something like “recognizing tongzhi (gay) marriage.” Therefore, based on the church teaching, there is the teaching of [opposing same-sex] marriage. (Interview with Pastor Tseng, 2016.8.5)

Richard (a male college student who had visited dozens of churches in many cities) offered different observations. He found that,

Some consider homosexuality as sin; some consider what is sinful is only homosexual behaviors. Some people think that as long as you are attracted to same-sex people, you cannot be saved. Others think that it’s okay to have same-sex attraction but definitely no same-sex romantic relationship. Great
variations [of interpretation] exist. (Interview with Richard, 2016.8.11)

On the other side of the scale, some of my pro-tongzhi interviewees provided sharp critiques of the social functions of the conservative church’s simplistic translations and interpretations. Josephine Hsu pointed out, for instance, that “Some people see anti-tongzhi as ‘truth’ because this interpretation can fulfill and correspond to these religious leaders’ worldviews of religion.” Yohan considered religion to be the easiest way to retrieve a concept that provides an excuse to mobilize huge amounts of people and resources to oppose the development and implementation of tongzhi rights, “for the sake of God’s ‘kingdom come, [His] will be done on earth as it is in heaven’ (deriving for The Lord’s Prayer). In this way, interpreting the Bible as anti-homosexual becomes a core value and a crucial pillar that bolsters and sustains pro-family Christian conservatives’ hopes and worldviews, preventing their homogenous social and spiritual worlds from collapsing.

3.2.2 Conceptions of anti-homosexuality

Given the important impact of Christian scripture, I kept hearing skepticism during my fieldwork over whether Christian scripture or Christianity in general is the main motivation for pro-family and anti-tongzhi leaders. People holding this skepticism often noted that surveys show that half of the Taiwanese population oppose homosexuality and same-sex marriage while only 5% of Taiwanese are Christians. Thus, they inferred, anti-homosexuality is a more decisive factor than Christianity in determining the anti-tongzhi and pro-family stance.

Nevertheless, I found that what Christianity contributes to anti-tongzhi campaigns is that it reifies a symbolic system, a hierarchy of moral values, and an epistemological
structure. As Stein suggests, describing a North American anti-gay political campaign, “Evangelical churches provided a vocabulary and infrastructure through which these communal aspirations and ambient fears could be articulated, and a Christian right organization gave these fears a face and a name: homosexuality” (Stein 2001:216).

Evidently, scapegoating homosexuals for alleviating fear and anxiety is a shared “playbook” among both American and Taiwanese Christian conservatives. In other words, anti-homosexuality is socially “functional” for settling conservatives’ socio-psychological turbulence.

Taiwanese Conservatives who argued that it is not religion driving their anti-tongzhi campaigns often added that, “We do not hate tongzhi. We love them. We only condemn homosexual behaviors, rather than homosexuals as human.” This Taiwanese conservative stance echoes American conservatives’ cliché: “Love the sin, hate the sinner.” Some Taiwanese conservatives further emphasized that homosexuality is a sin, but while homosexuals are sinners, so are all Christians. God loves sinners but hates sin, they argued, so homosexuals should get rid of their sinful homosexual behaviors, which are as condemnable as drug use and murder. Thus, people who employ this reasoning can remain guilt-free while maintaining their homophobic conclusion.

Many layers are compressed in this complex debate about religion (Christianity) and anti-homosexual behaviors. In general, the majority of my interviewees believed that religion (Christianity) and anti-homosexual behaviors were two sides of the same coin regarding what motivates pro-family activists (e.g., interviewees Grace and Yohan). My respondent Grace commented that the motivation behind anti-homosexual behaviors

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30 Thanks to Arlene Stein for providing this comparable observation.
“works the same with the teaching of the scripture” (Interview with Grace, 2016.7.27). To others, anti-homosexual behavior is religious, but only part of religion. Pastor Tseng argued the reason he and his church are against same-sex marriage and tongzhi education is “based on faith” and that values about “sexual behaviors are included in faith.” He further exemplified his point by referring to the Old Testament King David’s story of stealing another man’s wife and giving birth to an illegitimate son who later attacked David himself, that any marriage violating the rule of one man and one woman will lead to disaster and catastrophe.

An anti-homosexual sensibility has been so deeply and widely embedded in anti-tongzhi Christian conservatives’ mindsets that many interviewees could not tell whether their intolerance of homosexuality came from their religion or their personal sexual values. A few interviewees who had the capacity to sense a hegemonic and dominant sexual culture in religion analyzed the religious forces in another way. They reported that living in a Christian life has shaped hostility against homosexual behaviors: “because they (anti-tongzhi Christians) feel that God dislikes homosexual behaviors, because Good TV (the most popular Christian TV channel, 好消息频道, Good News TV) tells them so, because pastor KONG Hee (an influential Singapore evangelical pastor, 康希) says so, and because their own pastors say so,” Wei-jen Chen explained, rolling his eyes. Clay (a seminary professor) reported blatantly that using opposition to homosexuals as the reason to oppose same-sex marriage and tongzhi education is “the most obvious and straightforward reason [excuse], because it violates the rule created by God!”

While some of my interviewees found that Christian conservatives’ anti-homosexual attitudes were consistent and pervasive, my fieldwork observations
directed me to examine how Christian conservatives think about sexualities when they used the term tongxinglian (homosexuality, 同性恋) and what they meant by “fan-tongxinglian” (anti-homosexuality). In Christian conservatives’ minds, what is the tongzhilian to which they are fervently opposing?

Conceptualizing sexuality is a long-term debate in the history of critical sexualities studies. Stein (1989) differentiates between the historical development of three paradigms of sociological and ontological understanding of sexuality: sexual drive (from Freud), sexual behavior or conduct (from Kinsey and Simon and Gagnon), and sexual identity and the critiques of power and knowledge that have codified and surveilled sexual identity (from Foucault). Plummer (2013) further showed that contemporary “critical sexualities studies” have ramified to more than two dozen relationships that sexualities articulate in combination with other social institutions and forces, for example “stratification of sexualities by class, race, gender and age;” the “globalization of sexualities;” HIV/AIDS and sexual health; “[r]epresentation, pornography, and mass media communication of sexualities;” to name a few (see Plummer 2013:756–759 for more detail). Nevertheless, conservative Christians in my field did not follow this Western conceptual genealogy of sexualities. They have created their own way of conceptualizing (homo)sexuality, and have situated hostility against it based on their personal experiences and the social relations or conflicts with which their organizations are connected.

Rainbow 7, the Taiwanese version of Exodus International, for example, is the Christian conservative group in Taiwan that “knows homosexuality best,” from pro-family activists’ perspective. In the early stage of my fieldwork, I registered and
successfully participated in their training program “Rainbow 7 Caring Homosexuals Training: Primary Class” (2015.11.10–11), joining four dozen pastors, elders, and cell group leaders to learn who is homosexual, what makes them such, and how to use religious teaching to “care” (guanhuai, 關懷) and be accompanied with “these people.”

In this training, lecturers told us that homosexuals are different! Figure 3.3 is my translation of the framework provided in the official handbook of Rainbow 7, Knowing and Doing: A Manual of Tactics of Caring Homosexuals (知與力行：關懷同性戀教戰手冊), which is secretly distributed and only accessible to those who attended the workshop (Rainbow 7 Taiwan, 2015). The figure shows that Rainbow 7 suggests that Taiwanese Christian conservatives differentiate homosexuality into four layers: people who have homosexual orientations, homosexuals, people living a homosexual lifestyle, and people who participate in tongzhi activism. After their long explanations, I got the sense that Rainbow 7 does not advocate changing anyone of non-heterosexual identity into heterosexuals, as they did years ago. Now, they tolerate people who have homosexual orientation, seeing it as a sin like many other sins. They do not condemn those who have homosexual identities, either. However, they argue, “what is opposite to homosexuality is not heterosexuality, but holiness and purity (聖潔).” Many of my Christian interviewees reiterated the vocabulary of holiness and purity. Thus, they advocated using religious rituals, such as prayers, fellowship, Bible reading, and service attending, to get rid of the “old life” or the “old self” (老我) of those who have same-sex attractions and those who had ever lived a gay lifestyle.
By “gay lifestyle,” what these Christian conservatives mean is certainly not a lesbian couple or a group of lesbians watching TV and raising cats at home while enjoying cooking and reading *The New Yorker*. A gay lifestyle, in Taiwanese conservatives’ use, refers to gay men who frequent bars, parks, saunas, and home parties for promiscuous, sexually epicurean lifestyles. This bias and stereotype certainly does not apply to all gay men, and perhaps not many gay men at all, but it is the imagined suffering and moral depravity that Rainbow 7 has asked all mainstream conservative churches in Taiwan to “save” all homosexuals from. This boundary creates what I call a
moderate anti-homosexuality among Taiwanese Christian conservatives: condemning gay lifestyle and behaviors, but not condemning homosexuals as human beings.

This moderate revision of anti-homosexuality, however, harshly criticizes those who actively participate in tongzhi activism. In Figure 3.3, the bubble referring to tongzhi movement participants is marked in the darkest color, which symbolically reflects that tongzhi activists and their followers are the top target of Taiwanese Christian conservatives. They literally stated that homosexuals do not equal tongzhi movement groups. The latter are “groups which use social movements to achieve specific goals; not all of their members are homosexuals; and those who control the groups are mainly not homosexuals” (Taiwan Family Protection 2013). They further created a dysphemism to demonize gay activists as “同運份子” (tongyan fenzi, similar to “those gay activism bigots”). Here is how pro-family activists carefully divided homosexuals and their supporters from tongzhi activists:

*Homosexuals are not our enemy.* If we think in their shoes for a while, homosexuals have many hurts (harms) and anger in their minds from being discriminated against and disrespected. Friends who oppose [same-sex marriage] have to sympathetically understand this kind of feeling. Homosexuals are not our enemy. Do not criticize or hurl invectives to them, either. We need to respect them. What we want to oppose to is the “Bill,” along with the forces and groups which promoted this movement at the back (abbreviated as gay activist groups “tongyun tuanti” hereafter; *gay activist groups and homosexuals are not the same; people in gay activist groups are not necessarily homosexuals.*) What we are opposing to is the Bill [of Marriage Equality] that the nations have no consensus with, that will create societal disturbance, and shake the national foundation. The institutions of marriage and family relate to everyone in this nation and the future of the next generation. Those overseas still have many controversies [over this issue]. Careless promotion will result in a backlash from the other end of the society, which has larger power. Doing so, *are the tongzhi activist groups who are hidden behind promoting the Bill really doing good to homosexuals? If being willing to initiate dialogue with this, isn’t it to make those homosexuals who are truly minorities shoulder the nation-wide blames that did not have to happen and bring more negative impressions on them? (Taiwan Family Protection, 2013; my
In this manifesto-like statement, pro-family activists use pleasant words to divide homosexuals from tongzhi activist groups, downplaying the population that tongzhi activists represent (see also in Kwan 2014, Jun 17; Qingzhu 2017, Jan 9). In their conception, homosexuals are a lovely, suffering, real minority, and harm-free; tongzhi activists are blamable threats to society. To them, tongzhi activists are a fake minority that is aggressively changing marriage and family institutions. They express “care” and “sympathy” to address the discrimination and disrespect that homosexuals suffer, but these emotional mobilizations obscure the fact that they and their heteronormative teachings have been sources and promoters of this very discrimination and disrespect. In other words, pro-family activists are distinguishing between “good gays” and “bad gays” using the distinction between public and private. Private homosexuality can be understood if these tongzhi are confessing their “sin” and seeking for repentance and redemption. Instead, public homosexuality and tongzhi activists’ “overt” campaigns for equal sexual citizenships are absolutely abominable to these pro-family Christian conservatives.

In the meantime, tongzhi activist groups are re-framed as powerful bad guys who hide their true agendas, who manipulate homosexuals and other supporters, and who are the ones really producing negative impressions and hostility against homosexuals. Here, by reframing the narratives, pro-family Christian conservatives successfully efface their notorious anti-gay and hateful image, establish a new public impression in the name of love and care, and demonize tongzhi activist groups as the real victimizers. Through this framing transformation, powerful feminist words like love and care have been exploited
and appropriated to decorate conservatives’ propaganda against sexual minorities.

Taiwanese Christian conservatives, including the Catholic priest spokesperson and many evangelical Protestants, also frequently cited Catholic Pope Francis to justify their differential treatments of homosexuals and gay activist groups (Reporter 2014, Oct 27; 2015, Oct 6; UCAN 2014, Oct 27). They argued that Pope Francis’ famous 2013 statement in response to the question of whether there were gay lobbies in the Vatican (“If a person is gay and seeks God and has good will, who am I to judge?,” BBC News 2013, Jul 29) was meant to express love for “gay persons” but condemn the “gay lobby.” They translated and interpreted the Pope’s use of “gay lobby” as tongzhi activist groups. However, the Pope’s use of “gay lobby” was, in fact, not gay groups that lobby in Congress. He was specifically referring to a group of priests in the Vatican who organized underground groups based on their sexual attractions and those who use others’ homosexual orientations for blackmail (Tornielli 2013, Nov 6). The same clarification was published in Taiwan by a law scholar who examined the Pope’s original text in Italian (Chang 2014, Dec 26). Nonetheless, Taiwanese Christian conservatives continued targeting tongzhi movements, demonizing their claims and parade signs and minimizing their representativeness of the sexual minority population. What “anti-homosexuality” means to conservatives, in this sense, is opposing tongzhi activism.

More importantly, to these conservatives, anti-homosexuality is not only contemporary, but also about the past and the future at the same time. They are against homosexuality, especially homosexual behaviors (i.e., sodomy) because they “are afraid that their existing values cannot be recognized or affirmed [by society]; they will be destroyed. Their existing value is [the heterosexual marriage of] one man and one
Owning homosexual behaviors is just the surface reason,” said a serious Christian and seminary professor, Assa Lee (Interview 2016.7.30). Thus, if Taiwan formally legislates same-sex marriage, these Christian conservatives’ worldview and moral value system will be substantially shaken. No wonder they keep saying that they worry about “the Earth shaking, mountains moving, and family values being destroyed” if tongzhi couples can get married. Due to sudden societal changes in sexual values, their stable past of nostalgic harmony is deemed to turn upside down. So, they are resisting.

The change is also about their future. Conservatives in Taiwan have been deeply concerned about the education of their children and offspring. If same-sex marriage comes about, they worry that their children will have to receive a kind of corrupting education that will pollute their minds and bodies (i.e., God’s gifts). This concern, projecting a darker future, is reflected in one of the nationally prominent conservative group’s titles, Happiness for the Offspring Alliance (下一代幸福聯盟), which implies that being tongzhi, allowing same-sex couples to get married, or receiving LGBTQ-friendly education will not bring people happiness.

Andrew Chang, a nationally famous pro-family and anti-tongzhi leader, reported that most people oppose tongzhi movements without being aware of homosexual behaviors. Instead, they oppose activists who keep promoting gay activism. “Because they found that, gay activists lecturing about ‘tongzhi education’ at school would ‘question your sexual identity.’ They said to students, ‘you have never tried, how do you know you are not [gay]?’” This made tongzhi education appear as a “homosexuals-raising movement (同性戀養成運動).”

Secretary Chang emphasized during our interview, “Taiwan Religious Groups
Love and Protection of Family Big Alliance [TFBA hereafter, 台灣宗教團體愛護家庭大聯盟，簡稱護家盟] respects tongzhi people’s rights,” but that “we firmly oppose tongzhi education and same-sex marriage as a kind of propaganda, education, ideology, and social movement” (interview 2016.8.7). He said that pro-family supporters worry about more and more gays and lesbians “to be produced” by tongzhi education and marriage equality, which will make heteronormative family values no longer imperative or universal.

Whenever anti-homosexuality is related to the future, it usually comes with fear (interview with Ju-hui Chu 2016.7.18)—fear of uncertainty and fear of losing control of their own children, their moral imperatives, and their freedom to judge. This fear of an unimaginable future is represented in their famous antisame-sex marriage argument appealing to non-conventional sexualities. Many conservatives in Taiwan appeal to the public’s fear by saying that if same-sex marriage is passed and if the standard of heterosexual marriage is lifted, what can “we” use to stop people in multi-person unions, bestiality, incest, and pedophilia from being legitimately and legally married (Cheng 2014, Jul 22; Kwan 2012, Nov 22; Reporter 2014, Oct 27; Taiwan Family Protection n.d.). In one national public hearing, Secretary Chang argued that, if same-sex couples can get married, people can marry a Ferris Wheel. His words swiftly became the material of numerous netizens’ sarcasms.

In extremist situations, conservative leaders have cited the research of sex emancipationist Karlwittpopper (1997:354) as threatening the public: if the baseline of heterosexual marriage is lifted by same-sex marriage, all other abnormal “sexual minorities” would be legitimized: “homosexuals, bisexuals, the third person (in adultery),
the promiscuous, prostitutes, women enjoying sex, group-sex lovers, cross-dressers, transsexuals, those who love family members (incest), cross-generational lovers, fetishists, zoophiles (zoosexuals), excrement lovers, necrophiles, SM, bondage lovers, voyeurists, exhibitionists, the seniors and the youth who pursue sexual satisfaction, HIV/AIDS patients, illegitimate children,” along with “practitioners of oral sex and anal sex, nude models, victims of sexual assaults, lovers of the disabled people, pre-marital sex, sexual fantasies about the unethical” (Kwan 2012, Nov 22; see also in Reporter 2014, Jun 18). Based on this slippery slope argument, the only way to stop this “catastrophic future” of sexual depravation from happening is to stop same-sex marriage by any means now.

Conservatives’ proliferation of sexualities discourses suggests that Taiwanese Christian conservatives’ reasons for opposing homosexuality are not simple. They are complex and temporally sensitive. Conservatives have mobilized emotional rhetoric to differentiate homosexual orientations and identities from homosexual lifestyles and political participation, dividing homosexuals from tongzhi activist groups. In doing so, they have carefully hidden the religious motivations of their anti-homosexuality and substituted other reasons for opposing marriage equality and tongzhi education: by demonizing tongzhi activists, and mistranslating the Pope’s statement, for example. They appeal to public fears and moral panic by over-generalizing and using the “slippery slope fallacy” to exaggerate the future “hell” that same-sex marriage may bring to Taiwan.

31 The slippery slope fallacy is a kind of logical fallacy with which people making an argument unreasonably exaggerate or over-generalize the consequences that a minor action may lead to. Their ludicrous inference makes this argument illogical and fallacious. For example, Secretary Chang’s argument that the legalization of same-sex marriage will lead to that people can legally marry a Ferris Wheel has been ridiculed by many Netizens
Their sense of “fan-tong” (anti-homo, anti-tongzhi, 反同) not only speaks to the present, but also maintains their past and creates their future in such a way that the future can continue to justify their heteronormative privilege in the past and the present.

Christian conservatives do not want life to have any kind of “bad sex,” in Rubin’s term (1993[1984]). Thus, they package up all “abnormal sexualities” into the word, tongzhi. Anti-tongzhi means anti-tongzhi activism, anti-tongzhi education, and anti-marriage equality. Anti-tongzhi means anti-all-sexual-diversities. To kill them in the future, they have to kill them all in the present.

The two factors discussed above show the complexity of religion as a motivation for initiating and participating in pro-family anti-tongzhi campaigns. In contrast, the factors of spirituality and competing leadership within Christian communities suggest that religion can be a force to counter heteronormativity, insofar as what is argued in name of religion is not purely religious.

3.2.3 Spirituality

Many anti-tongzhi, pro-family churches in Taiwan emphasize the force of the Holy Spirit, following the third wave of global Pentecostalism (e.g., Peter Wagner 2006). Some employ charismatic music styles in their Pentecostal worship (e.g., the music of “Stream of Praise” 讚美之泉). Others have transformed their rituals from traditional service rituals to emphasize healing, exorcism, speaking in tongues, telling prophecies, long prayers, and non-rational activities. This kind of prayer and worship style had been widely observed in many anti-tongzhi political campaigns, including the 2013 Stand-out for the Happiness of the Offspring protest and the 2016.11.14 aggressive rally outside the
Legislative Yuan. Nevertheless, whether or not spirituality is a religious motivation for these Christian conservative activists and supporters is debatable.

A few of my interviewees admitted that conservatives follow biblical teaching and were “moved by the Holy Ghost” to oppose marriage equality and tongzhi education (interview with ST 2016.7.30). Many recognized the relativity of individuals’ access to the Holy Spirit. As Pastor Tseng, whose church mobilized dozens of young believers to oppose tongzhi education, told me,

Everyone has different communion with the Holy Spirit. We bear the burdens, for God, with these accomplishments. […] Based on the church’s stance, it is not wrong for us to pray for this issue [of anti-homosexuality]. […] In the last days, there is no ambiguity. If you do not stand with Jesus Christ, you stand at the opposite side. For the sake of the church and believers, the Holy Spirit moves/touches [us] to respond correctly/righteously while facing the time to take side, various arguments, and different accusations and attacks.

Pastor Tseng’s report implies two messages. First, their opposition to any bills regarding sexual citizenship derives from the movement of the Holy Spirit, who affirms that their secular actions are righteous. Second, anti-tongzhi is a black-and-white issue; there is no gray zone for ambiguity or further negotiation. However, it is unclear how, if his statement about the relativity of the Holy Spirit is true (The Spirit gives everyone different messages), how he ensures that everyone in his church receives the same inspiration to oppose sexual citizenship, without any dissent. Here, spiritual relativism contests theological essentialism.

In fact, another two interviewees, Clay and Assa Lee, reported drastically opposite spiritual experiences: The Holy Spirit told them that God loves tongzhi (LGBTQ people) (interviews 2016.7.27, 2016.7.30). Assa Lee and Clay both are highly religious
Charismatic Christians and local religious leaders. They have served as prophecy tellers and Charismatic trainers in area churches for many years. Assa Lee himself has had many spiritual experiences, including hearing God’s words spoken directly to him and having visionary dreams. According to his report, he has sung with angels, fought with a soft evil spirit, and seen the bed and the table in his room become animated, resonating harmoniously with Händel’s Hallelujah. While he was puzzled by those anti-tongzhi people who use the literal interpretations of the Bible to oppose homosexuality, the Holy Spirit revealed to him a vision of a “dispersive prism.” Lee told me that, in physics, scholars were debating whether light is a wave or a particle. In fact, it is both. This analogy of light, in Assa Lee’s interpretation, was the way in which the Holy Spirit told him that God is like light, full of seven colors. The Bible, for him, is a dispersive prism. A dispersive prism can only prove that the light is a wave, as the Bible reveals one part of God’s nature. Humans needs to see the other part of God that is not revealed by the Bible, just as a dispersive prism does not show light as particle but that does not mean that the particle aspect of the light does not exist. After the Holy Spirit suggested this analogy to him, he drew the conclusion that “The Bible is ‘the main reference’ to know God,” but this implies that the Bible cannot be equal to God, Lee told me.

Built on these spiritual experiences, Assa Lee has been sensitive to God’s voice, he reported. So, when he was lost and struggling with his sexual orientation and social conflicts between his faith and his sexuality, one day he wandered into a park near his home. He heard God telling him, “Even your mother can accept you [as tongzhi]. Wouldn’t it be Me who accepts you more? (你媽媽都能夠接納你，我豈不是更能接納你？)” This, he believed, was God’s way of pushing him to accept himself as God’s
creature when he was reluctant to face his sexual orientation, Assa Lee said. With his personal story and many spiritual experiences, Lee affirmed to me that anti-tongzhi activists were *not* moved by the Holy Spirit, because “the Holy Spirit would not move people this way!” He laughed out loud (interview 2016.7.30).

Some interviewees were actually critical of using the Holy Spirit to justify anti-tongzhi campaigns. Pastor Cheng argued, for instance, that “these people [pro-family activists] had no ideas about spirituality. Their Charismatic spirituality is just to brag about themselves for establishing legitimacy for their behaviors” (interview 2016.4.19). Holding some skepticism toward the norms of speaking in tongues and seeing visions, Esther Lin, a Christian lawyer in her early thirties, explained her Charismatic pastor’s emotional leadership as “performance.”

The evidence provided in this section questions the use of spirituality as a motivation to justify pro-family activism. Spirituality is, indeed, a fundamental and substantial element of religion, one of the three entities in the Christian trinity. However, its unobservability and relativity raise questions about its commonality among pro-family activists. The interviewees who had deep and long-term spiritual experiences reported intriguing stories for rejecting the motivation of using spirituality as a religious reason to oppose tongzhi sexual citizenships. Based on these examples, I argue that not all religious aspects can be equally used to motivate Christians to oppose tongzhi. Spirituality is a religious aspect that resists being mobilized as a motivation to oppose marriage equality and tongzhi education. In some extreme cases, like Assa Lee’s, spirituality is employed as a sacred source leading to sexual liberation and self-acceptance for sexual minorities, which helps to obstruct anti-tongzhi mobilization in his own church.
3.2.4 Leadership within the Christian community

Furthermore, not all religious decisions are made for sacred reasons. Many interviewees reported that issues of anti-marriage equality and tongzhi education have been used by “the grand pastors” as a way to compete for or maintain leadership within the Taiwanese Christian community. This communal competition for authority needs to be understood in the Taiwanese church context.

According to the 2015 Taiwan Social Change Survey (Round 7, Year 1), 6% of the Taiwanese population are Christians, estimated at roughly 1,407,702 people (Fu 2016; 2015 July household Survey). Among Christians, 4.5% are Protestants (~1,056,000 people) and 1.5% are Catholics (~352,000 people). Table 3.2 shows the ranked seven largest Christian denominations in Taiwan in 2015, along with their religious market shares. The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (PCT) is the oldest and largest denomination. Its missionary roots come from the Presbyterian Church of England (included into the United Reformed Church now today) missionary, Dr. James Laidlaw Maxwell in 1865, and from the Canada Presbyterian Church’s missionary Rev. George Leslie MacKay. During my stay in the field, the PCT occupied nearly a quarter of the Protestant denomination, outnumbering the second rank by 10%. It was the first social organization to advocate Taiwan independence and autonomy, as early as the Cold War in the 1970s, holding tight relationships with the pro-Taiwan Democratic Progress Party (DPP).

32 https://www.ris.gov.tw/346;jsessionid=F8C698E11B3CA78E963C1ADA6A9773EE
33 Canada Presbyterian Church is the predecessor of the Presbyterian Church in Canada and the United Church of Canada.
However, like many mainstream White Protestant churches in the United States, the PCT faces issues of an aging population, generational gaps, growth stagnation, or losing believers among the younger generation, in particular. While the Presbyterian Church U.S.A. (PCUSA, hereafter) changed its policies in 2011 and 2013 to ordain openly gay pastors and to re-define marriage as the “unique commitment between two people” for the purpose of recognizing same-sex marriage, the largest Taiwanese

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According to the 2015 amendment to the PCUSA’s Book of Order: “Marriage is a gift God has given to all humankind for the wellbeing of the entire human family. Marriage involves a unique commitment between two people, traditionally a man and a woman, to love and support each other for the rest of their lives. The sacrificial love that unites the couple sustains them as faithful and responsible members of the church and the wider community. In civil law, marriage is a contract that recognizes the rights and obligations of the married couple in society. In the Reformed tradition, marriage is also a covenant in

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Table 3.2  The Population of Top Seven Christian Denominations in Taiwan, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denominations</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Churches</th>
<th>Estimated market share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Presbyterian Church in Taiwan</td>
<td>254,604</td>
<td>1,234</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Local Churches (Meeting Hall)</td>
<td>145,018</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Bread of Life Christian Church</td>
<td>72,070</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. True Jesus Church</td>
<td>55,603</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Chinese Baptist Convention</td>
<td>51,553</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Taiwan Lutheran Church</td>
<td>26,866</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Taiwan Holiness Church</td>
<td>19,964</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

denomination, as an institution, has hesitated to follow its American model. (This is related to the strategy of “filtered Western imperialism” discussed in the next chapter.)

The main reason for the PCT’s hesitation is clear: inside, the current moderate liberal leadership worries that conservatives will take power; outside, PCT is fearful that the homosexuality issue will lead to “church cleavage” (教會分裂), which will institutionally threaten its leading position in the Taiwanese Christian community. In fact, PCT has a long history of congeniality and friendly relations with sexual minorities. The majority of the founding members of the first gay church in Taiwan, Tong-Kwang Light House Presbyterian Church (Tong-Kwang Church, hereafter), came from PCT, imitating the Presbyterian system in their new church. In 2004, four PCT pastors ordained the first openly gay pastor in Taiwan, Rev. Elias Tseng, in their own names (not under the authority of presbyteries as the ritual usually should be). Due to the challenges of the gay church and pastorship, the PCT initiated a research project and launched its first research report on homosexuality issues, The Report of the Homosexuality Issue Research Project, whose liberal viewpoints shook many conservative minds and surprised liberal observers (Presbyterian Church in Taiwan - Research and Development Center 2004). These small but positive footprints left a mild tongzhi-friendly impression on tongzhi activists and scholars of sexualities.

Nevertheless, as tongzhi people’s marital and educational rights have been gradually institutionalized in the second decade of the 21st century, PCT’s leadership and tongzhi-friendliness both have received unprecedented challenges from a newly-formed conservative coalition. The franchises of the Bread of Life Christian Church, plus the which God has an active part, and which the community of faith publicly witnesses and acknowledges” (Smith 2015, Mar 17; my emphasis).
Chinese Baptist Convention, plus the Taiwan Lutheran Church (led by Taipei Truth Lutheran Church, 台北真理堂) have formed the major basis of the anti-tongzhi campaign machine since the 2013 “1130 Rally” and after. The grand coalition of these three denominations has outnumbered the population of the Local Churches, making it the new second largest Christian conglomeration in Taiwan (Top 3+5+6 = 14.2%). Since 2011, this conglomeration has held yearly national pro-family events, such as “Happy Family Walk” in major Taiwanese cities and established a new platform, “Pray for Taiwan” (Taiwan Christian Alliance, 台灣基督教聯盟), to organize cross-denominational pro-family civil actions and affairs. The symbol of family value and happiness is effective. After all, who doesn’t want to have a healthy family and happiness? This branding and overarching slogan has successfully obscured denominational differences, repressed old frictions, healed or at least hidden historical traumas, and miraculously, in their words, incited an unanticipated number of local and smaller churches to join the conglomeration. The happy family idea has been disseminated through and articulated by regional (city- and county-level) cross-denominational prayer networks, integrating regional mega-churches into the camp. The regional mega-churches include the Top Church franchise in the Great Taipei area, the (Evangelize China Fellowship) Grace Church and the Banner Church in Taichung, the Wu Chang Church and the Blessed and Blessing Church in Kaohsiung, and Korean pastor David Yonggi CHO’s Pure Gospel Church’s Taiwanese son- and grandson-churches in Taitung and other cities. The second largest denomination, Local Churches, also joined the Happy Family Walks in the recent years.

Furthermore, the 2013 “1130 Rally” and the pro-family and anti-tongzhi events
that followed provided an opportunity for Protestant conservatives to collaborate with Catholics in the name of a pro-family alliance. It is safe to say that the series of pro-family campaigns, mobilized to oppose tongzhi education and marriage equality, gave these non-Presbyterian churches a basis to unite and compete for leadership in the Taiwanese Christian community, challenging the long-term leadership of the PCT. This anti-tongzhi coalition has been consolidated by the founding of more institutions, including new news media (Kairos News), websites,\(^{35}\) social media, foundations, think tanks, and its own political party, Faith and Hope League (FHL).

Using the anti-tongzhi issue as the way to compete for intra-Christian leadership occurred not only between denominations, but also within denominations. From within the PCT, a few Presbyterian pastors in Southern Taiwanese cities became national celebrities because of their prominent anti-tongzhi actions. On Nov 17, 2016, 300 cross-denominational pastors “headed to the North” from Southern cities, such as Tainan, Kaohsiung, and Pintung, for the purpose of stopping the congress committee’s examination of the Marriage Equality Bill. This action was led by Presbyterian pastors mainly, which symbolizes that the current DPP administration’s hard-core constituency PCT has been dismantled by the tongzhi issues. Conservative Presbyterians used this action, along with its long-term challenges in the General Assembly, to foster a new alliance between the Southern and indigenous presbyteries, cutting the indigenous churches’ historical alliance with Northern liberal churches.

Many interviewees reported that anti-tongzhi issues have provided good leverage to help Southern conservatives take power in the current General Assembly. Jing-Hao

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\(^{35}\) [https://taiwanfamily.com/](https://taiwanfamily.com/)
observed that some pastors participated in pro-family campaigns to struggle against the current secretary-general. “[They] use anti-tongzhi to consolidate their own political positions. […] The mainstream voice in church is this [anti-tongzhi], so most pastors hold this opinion. Those who occupy the upper-class positions will echo the anti-tongzhi leaders to secure and consolidate their own power” (2016.7.29).

In some cases, the leadership competition happened between relatively conservative local churches and liberal seminaries and religious institutions. A famous and shocking case was ignited by a Tainan Presbyterian pastor, Jason Ji. On Oct 31, 2013, a month before the 2013 “1130 Rally,” Rev. Ji targeted three relatively liberal and tongzhi-friendly branches within the PCT community—the General Assembly’s Research and Development Center, Taiwan Church News Network, and Tainan Theological College and Seminary—for their pro-tongzhi attitudes. The last straw was a seminary Master’s student openly gathering colleagues to discuss multi-family formation bills, including for marriage equality, domestic partnerships, and multi-family members. Rev. Ji called upon the Seminary administration to clarify its own stance, as did the Church News Network and the General Assembly. “Otherwise, do not think about doing fundraising in my church next year,” he warned with threatening words.

This elevated Rev. Ji from a local pastor to a nationally famous anti-tongzhi Great General. He helped to organize the aforementioned 2016 petition and protest of 300 pastors’ heading North. He led a non-Presbyterian crowd to boycott the leading pro-tongzhi feminist lawmaker, YU Mei-Nu’s, lecture in a Tainan forum on marriage equality held by his own denomination. He also stood on the political platform of the Stability of Power (安定力量聯盟) in favor of recalling lawmaker HUANG Kuo-chang
(New Power Party, 黃國昌) for his and his party’s affirmative support of the marriage equality bill. Anti-tongzhi and family issues have, indeed, caused Rev. Ji to experience swift upward mobility in political power within the Christian community, portraying him as a prominent flag bearer in opposition to homosexuality. His title as pastor of the Presbyterian Church (pro-Taiwan) helped to signify his participation in the anti-tongzhi campaigns of the Pray for Taiwan (pro-China) alliance to be interpreted as a cross-denominational collaboration for church unification. Again, on the anti-gay stance, churches unite. Anti-tongzhi sexuality transcends disputed nationalism.

Predictably, most religious leaders disclaim the possibility that one of their motivations for opposing marriage equality and tongzhi education derives from competition for leadership. Some interviewees critiqued this motivation on the grounds that leading pro-family churches have had strong leadership and massive memberships for years. “Supporting or opposing the homosexuality issue will not let you become a leader in Tainan or in Taiwan,” said Pastor Tseng. Andrew Chang, the Secretary of the inter-religious pro-family alliance, emphasized that having leadership over the Christian community was not one of their concerns or goals.

However, during my fieldwork, I observed many tactical nuances, worries, and concerns about Christian leadership among pastors. One pastor in a Southern HW church admitted in his sermon that he would silently compare the sizes of neighboring churches to evaluate his success (field note 2016.7.31). Clay, a seminary professor, reported that churches in Southern Taiwan place a strong emphasis on political wrestling among churches and denominations. On pro-family and anti-tongzhi issues, they consciously or unconsciously compete for the number of members of their own churches or
denominations who they can mobilize to join the campaigns; this is especially important for the leaders in large churches. The more people that a church has, the greater its competition for “pastoral authority” (interview with Clay 2016.7.27).

With these dialectic considerations of intra-Christian leadership noted, I observed two kinds of church dynamics during the pro-family mania. In one direction, there was a trend of “extremists kidnapping moderates” and moving them toward the extremist stance. Interviewee Mariah described this trend as follows: “There is collaborator competition among pastors. Once someone calls for [anti-tongzhi] actions and I do not follow. … [These leaders] worried about their members being attracted out [to other churches]” (interview 2016.8.3).

In my participant observation, I collected even more extreme cases. The series of pro-family and anti-tongzhi campaigns silenced those previously-moderate pastors, forcing them to “affirm” their anti-tongzhi stances firmly and publicly. This pressure derived from other churches and from within their own church. Those pastors who refused to preach anti-tongzhi discourses publicly were accused of being unfaithful and non-Christian. Their own sexual orientations were even deemed questionable. The horrible phenomena of the Middle Age Inquisition (Inquisitio Haereticae Pravitatis) and witch-hunting are happening in contemporary Taiwanese churches.

This trend comes with changes of the meaning of “keeping silent about tongzhi sexuality” in churches. Before the pro-family campaigns, silence about (homo)sexuality within a church was a negative sign for sexual citizenship because it left no room to talk about sexual minorities. After the pro-family mobilization mania, silence about sexuality became a relatively progressive sign, ironically, because the pastor in the church actually
had to resist great peer pressure from members to condemn sexual minorities or participate in national anti-tongzhi petitions and mobilizations. If a pastor chose not to take a clear-cut stand, he or she had better find a good reason not to participate. Otherwise, the ubiquitous surveillance of everyone’s sexual attitudes from the church and from neighboring competitors could undermine the pastor’s leadership in the church, tarnishing his/her reputation in the greater Christian community. The worse situation is to lose her/his job, lose the pastorship, and ultimately to be expelled from the church and the denomination.

The anti-tongzhi and pro-family campaigns have polarized Christians’ sexual attitudes while securing or upholding some people’s leadership. As Ven. SHIH Chao-hwei (2015) suggests, since the 2013 anti-multi-family formation campaign, “both pro-family and tongzhi groups have been held up and pulled toward the far right and the far left by the extremist discourses and actions within their own camps” (44). This eventually led to a confrontation, but this polarization created a larger space for some religious figures to compete for greater leadership within their own Christian communities. This pattern will egress to extra-Christian society, influencing pro-family activists’ motivations other than religion.

3.3 Socio-economic motivations: Politics, money, and human resources

What motivates Taiwanese Christian conservatives to oppose sexual minorities’ citizenship is not only religious. Many socio-economic factors—including politics, money, and human resources—also drive these pro-family activists to take collective action.
3.3.1 Politics

The motivation of politics is the most controversial of the socio-economic motivations during my interviews. It was one that non-Christian or liberal Christian interviewees recognized but that Christian conservatives refused to acknowledge. In Chapter 2, I show how Taiwanese Christian conservatives have accumulated their political power step-by-step through grassroots petitions, lobbying, protests, organizing their own national party, promoting their political spokespeople, recalling pro-tongzhi lawmakers, and cooperating with mainstream parties. During the peak of the culture war, religious conservatives could frequently hold official meetings in the Presidential Office and with the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan, while LGBT activists and supporters had little access to these powerful figures. It is clear that Taiwanese Christian conservatism had some extent of political power to shape the administrative agenda and policies.

However, when asked if their pro-family campaigns were partially motivated by politics, many of my conservative interviewees resisted this explanation. I kept hearing conservatives saying that “we were forced to come out [in the street],” claiming their reluctance to engage in political action. Attorney Qiu, a pro-family lawyer who questioned same-sex marriage in a national public hearing, explained the following to me during our interview: Anti-same-sex marriage is a force, a kind of resource. This force could be KMT, a third force (non-bipartisan), or Christian. While 50% of Taiwanese oppose same-sex marriage, Christians are only 10% of the population [sic.]. So, he suggested, it was just Christians who came out and integrated the anti-same-sex marriage forces (field note 2017.1.2). In attorney Qiu’s opinion, Christians are legitimized political spokespeople who integrate and organize all those who oppose marriage equality and
tongzhi education. Their bargaining power in politics partially comes from their representativeness of the moral consensus of the so-called “silent majority” (which I will examine with cross-national data in Chapter 5).

At the opposite end of the spectrum, tongzhi activists questioned the purity of Christian conservatives’ claim of non-political motivation. As Chi-Wei, a senior social worker in tongzhi activism, argued,

Isn’t what they have done in the past six years for competing for leadership? […] In this process, they kept using the name of parents and other underground tactics to make those who do not go to church to endorse the churches’ influence. For example, those hundreds of thousands of people who signed anti-gay petitions … those church people use this to pressure [the government]. Originally, the church’s influence is limited, but its members successfully employed fear to increase the influence of Chinese-speaking churches. The believer pool of only one [Daja] Jenn Lann Temple (of a Chinese sea Goddess Mazu) might be even larger than one of the churches. [However,] they use the leverage principle so well that produces an impression that Christianity is the greatest religion in Taiwan. (Interview 2016.8.11)

Chi-wei’s report shows how successfully the Taiwanese Christian conservatives have washed out their status as a religious minority and become self-portrayed as representatives of family values and children’s happiness, claiming political power that is strong enough to represent half of the Taiwanese population.

Even so, my field observations and interview data show that Taiwanese Christian conservatives dare not admit their political power or political motivation. They regard politics as polluting, smearing, and profaning the sacredness of their pro-family campaigns, which should be treated as religious action moved by sincerity and purity. These campaigns have nothing to do with politics, they claimed. However, from the perspective of social movement theory, what pro-family conservatives have done are no doubt political actions that reflect a craving for changing and dominating the political
agendas of sexual citizenship and diminishing the power and voices of the other political group (tongzhi people).

Between the two extreme positions, the position in the middle could be to acknowledge that even though politics is not the end of pro-family activists, it is their means. When I asked Wei-Jen, the first openly-gay seminary student in Taiwan, whether pro-family conservatives were motivated by politics, he responded, “This question should be reversed. Politics is the tool they use. Perhaps they can use the campaigns for seizing political interests. Politics can help them to recruit more people, more money for achieving their goal.” What is their goal? I followed. “To actualize the Christian kingdom on earth,” Wei-Jen answered, “they should only treat politics as their means” (interview 2016.7.24).

Many interviewees reported that a significant number of pro-family leaders’ and campaigners’ political goals were not limited to opposing the bills of marriage equality and tongzhi education. Their ultimate goal was to actualize God’s heavenly kingdom on earth. In many places, such as churches, conferences, and political protests, I heard pro-family activists repeatedly shouting out loud “The Lord’s Prayer” with passion, enthusiasm, and a collective spirit similar to left-wing activists singing L’Internationale.
Table 3.3  English (NIV) and Taiwanese (MUV) Versions of “The Lord’s Prayer”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English (NIV)</th>
<th>Taiwanese (MUV)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Our Father in heaven,</td>
<td>我們在天上的父：</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hallowed be Your name,</td>
<td>願人都尊你的名為聖。</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your kingdom come,</td>
<td>願你的國降臨；</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your will be done</td>
<td>願你的旨意行在地上，</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on earth as it is in heaven.</td>
<td>如同行在天上。</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give us today our daily bread.</td>
<td>我們日用的飲食，今日賜給我們。</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgive us our debts,</td>
<td>免我們的債，</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as we also have forgiven our debtors.</td>
<td>如同我們免了人的債。</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And lead us not into temptation,</td>
<td>不叫我們遇見試探；</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>but deliver us from evil one;</td>
<td>救我們脫離兇惡〔或譯：脫離惡者〕。</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for Yours is the kingdom and the power and the glory forever. Amen.</td>
<td>因為國度，</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>權柄、榮耀，全是你的，</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>直到永遠。阿們</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>〔有古卷沒有因為……阿們等字〕！</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3 shows a comparison of the English and Taiwanese (MUV) versions of The Lord’s Prayer. There are minor but important differences between the two versions. The Taiwanese Mandarin version literally sees the Kingdom as external to human minds, so it begs for “Your kingdom to fall in (to the earth)” and wishes for “your will to operate on earth as it does in the heaven” (my English reverse-translation of the Taiwanese MUV). For many Evangelical and Charismatic Christians using the Taiwanese version, the literal impression is given that they need to look for external societal changes to make the kingdom come true, while the English version leaves more room for those who pray
to believe the kingdom is working within their own spiritual worlds and daily practice. I heard thousands of Christians passionately chanting out the same prayer on their knees outside Parliament when the Judiciary and Organic Laws and Statutes Committee examined the Bill of Marriage Equality for an entire day, concluding with two more public hearings after negotiation. In contrast to quietly whispering the Prayer, as many traditional Taiwanese Presbyterian churches do, many pro-family evangelical and Charismatic Christians pray the final segment—“Because the Kingdom, the power/authority, and glory are all Yours”—with a rising and passionate tone, as though the louder they pray, the more power, authority, and glory they will regain (field note 2016.11.17). The modest Lord’s Prayer has been transformed as a shared spell calling for dominance and Christian supremacy. These pro-family activists truly wish that their Lord would govern Taiwan.

But, how? The answer comes from the Third Wave of global Pentecostalism, especially the ideas of “kingdom transformation” and “Seven Mountain Theory.” American religious leader Peter Wagner and his theological descendants use their religious enterprise to promote and disseminate these ideologies in Asia, calling for the spiritual and political transformation of Asian countries through Christianity as they define it. For pro-family Christians following a Wagner-ish approach, Taiwan’s progress in marriage equality and tongzhi education not only contradicts their Christian values, but it also stands in the way of their living out the Kingdom on earth. Attacking harshly tongzhi activism and any movements for sexual liberation is a rational strategy for these Christians.
As my interviewees reported, anti-tongzhi is not these pro-family Christians’ exclusive goal. According to “Seven Mountain Theory,” the short-term goal is to have Christians occupy leadership positions in seven social institutions (see Figure 3.4; see also in Wagner 2006; Tabernacle of David 2015). These include “mountains” titled from A to G: art, business, churches, distribution (media), education, family, and government and politics. Pro-family Christians believe that if Christians could occupy the highest positions of these institutions and let God govern in these areas, they would have greater odds of making their earthly country dominated by Christians, then allocating Christians as the leaders of all nation-states. If this becomes reality, then their God would be
manifest as King of Kings. This will be the Day when God’s Kingdom operates on earth, as the Lord’s Prayer promises and proclaims. One of the most recited slogans during my stay in Taiwanese conservative churches was, “Let’s evangelize Taiwan, spread gospels to China, to Jerusalem, and to the end of the World!” This proclamation was usually followed by manic applause, excited shouting, and unbearably moved feelings from the crowd. These Christians want to conquer the world with their faith through developing practical transnational networks. This is not their fantasy, but an ongoing process (discussed in Chapter 4).

Within their evangelical dream, obviously, there is no room for multiculturalism in the sense of tolerance for religious diversity. Only their Christian God is God; other gods are all evil spirits who deserve to be attacked and destroyed. Taiwan, as a young democracy, never experienced wars of religious conflict. The creed of separation between state and church is only an abstract idea read from an old western history textbook for these pro-family Christians. Their concerns are with securing and maintaining their own religious moral values as righteous and mainstream as they were in old times and to evangelize as many people at home and abroad as possible, proving their faith in God and for manifesting the glory of God. Following this stream of beliefs, any institutionalization of tolerance toward sexual minorities’ citizenship, such as marriage equality and tongzhi education, are signs of evil spirits’ attacks, as are liberal and radical critiques of Christian conservatives’ churches and discourses. These conflicts are trivial but important battles on their way to actualizing God’s Kingdom. Any breaches need to be stopped and blocked for the purpose of preventing greater future collapse and God’s punishment. They are not (only) fighting for victory in cultural battles over juridical cases, but also the
cosmic battles against evil spirits. Again, as Pastor Tseng told me, in the last days there is only black and white: no gray zones. If you are not standing with Jesus Christ (to attack homosexuality), you are standing with Satan.

This Seven Mountain Theory and the analogy of cosmic war are important world views for pro-family Christians in Taiwan for considering power and politics. Indeed, partisan politics is only the means for them to actualize their God’s Kingdom. In sociological jargon, politics is the intermediate variable between the influence of religion and Christian conservatives’ collective action. This new political force showed an unprecedented mobilization capacity in the 2013 “1130 Rally,” started to develop grass-roots organizations and launched local-level campaigns in 2014, and organized a national Christian-first party in 2015. During the current DPP administration era, the party formed a coalition with the defeated KMT for recalling pro-tongzhi lawmakers. After the Constitutional Court’s ruling in favor of same-sex marriage, they accumulated political force with three referenda to hold back the progress of sexual citizenship. Two of the three referenda were designed to re-define marriage as a union between one man and one woman, asking lawmakers to protect tongzhi’s sexual citizenship only by a separate special law rather than through the “heterosexual-only Civil Law.” The other referendum aimed to “root out” from schools all instructional materials mentioning sexual diversity, tongzhi, and sexual pleasure. The referenda and elections at the regional level (late 2018) and the national level (2020) become new political platforms for Taiwanese pro-family activists to re-establish their moral values against sexual minorities as righteous and hegemonic. It is important to remember that their true political
motivation in these campaigns is to win victory in an endless cosmic war and to convert everyone in all nations into Christians.

3.3.2 Money

In addition to political motivations, I kept hearing some liberal interviewees reporting that these Christian conservatives opposed same-sex marriage and tongzhi education for money and other economic resources, such as land, stock shares, and funds to build new churches. Two numbers related to money are clear. For the 2013 event, churches collectively helped to fundraise NTD $20 million (USD $676,590, based on Nov 2013 currency) for the event’s mobilization, promotion, advertisement, the stage erection, performance arrangement, and personnel. The money was donated to a bank account of the Endowment Corporation Christian Taiwan Lutheran Church (財團法人基督教台灣信義會). Donation information was widely shared online, including on the website of Taipei Glory Church (行道會台北榮耀堂)36, the Facebook page of (田中靈糧堂)37, and the weekly journal of Foundation of Hsin-Chu Zion Christian Church (新竹錫安堂)38 (Figure 3.5).

Under the table, the real number that the initiating church asked for from their underground network was NTD $50–70 million (roughly USD $1.7–2.4 million, based on Nov 2013 currency). The goal of raising 70 million New Taiwan Dollars was set for their 2015–2016 national campaign. Religious leaders cited the Old Testament (1 Kings 19:18), calling for seven thousand brave soldiers, “all those knees have not bowed to..."
Baal,” to donate ten thousand New Taiwan Dollars per person. It is not clear if they reached the 70 million goal because Christian conservative groups never publicize their full accounting records. Meanwhile, both news and pro-gay organizations (e.g., Taiwan International Tongzhi Rights Advocacy Association, 台灣國際同志權益促進會) reported that Christian conservative churches wrongly used the believers’ religious donations for political activities without the donors’ authorization (Wang 2016, Jan 23; 2016, Jan 24). It was also reported that their fundraising activities were illegal because these religious organizations failed to follow the law to apply for fundraising permission and number before doing so. Facing these criticisms, the leading mega-churches, such as Taipei Truth Lutheran Church and Bread of Life Christian Church in Taipei, denied publicly that they did anything wrong. They reiterated that their actions were “following Christianity” in order to “do the right thing.” They came to the street as “silent citizens” (not Christians) to voice that they only respected the form of marriage between “one man and one woman, one husband and one wife,” believing firmly that a family institution composed of fathers and mothers is a stable foundation for society. Thus, they opposed amending Article 972 of the Civil Law, the definition of marriage (Bread of Life Christian Church in Taipei 2016, Nov 23; Christian Daily News 2016, Nov 25). However, evidence shows that these churches did ask for donations and, based on available information, there is no record showing that they received legal permission for fundraising for political activities. According to their own definition, all the petitions, protests, mass gatherings, demonstrations, and rallies are religious activities, so they are free from the regulation of secular laws.
When asked if pro-family campaigns were driven by monetary motivations, my conservative interviewees consistently rejected this explanation. “[We] never thought of money,” a Presbyterian anti-tongzhi leader said. “If you want more money, you should choose to be inclusive [to homosexuality],” Pastor Tseng reported. A closeted interviewee working within a prominent conservative organization said, “They [anti-tongzhi conservatives] do not need to use this strategy to swindle money.” He refused to tell me the normal ways for conservative religious organizations to launder money. Nevertheless, if Christian conservatives really want to clarify that they did not make money (i.e., earn surplus value) through anti-tongzhi campaigns, the best thing they can do is to publicize the itemized receipts showing where their money came from and where it has gone. They have not done this based on the data I have been able to access.

3.3.3 Human resources

Nevertheless, money plays an implicit role in the pro-family campaigns, especially when money relates to human resources—i.e., church membership. Both liberal and conservative interviewees told me that having human heads means having money. Presbyterians’ worries about church divisions due to the General Assembly’s stance on the tongzhi issue are tied to a realistic concern: losing members means losing donations, which would doubly harm its leadership in the Taiwanese Christian community.

People in my field do not need to read classical sociologist Weber’s (2010 [1930]) *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* to understand the strong theological connections between Christian moral values and the momentum of rational, calculated, capitalist life decisions. Several senior Presbyterian Christians reported that, in their
churches that have dozens of years of history, the senior and retiring generation are the majority of members. Many of them are upper and upper-middle class people who have been successful professionals, entrepreneurs, small-business owners, and people who have secured good jobs, leaning to hear prosperity gospel teachings that recognize their own diligent efforts and self-accomplishments and that shun economic suffering and caring for social inequality. Understanding the socially and structurally caused sufferings experienced by sexual minorities is usually not included in their daily religious lives and teachings. A hidden reason for the silencing of tongzhi is that the churches need these majorities’ bodies, and their donations, in order to function. Thus, most PCT churches dare not support tongzhi’s sexual citizenship publicly due to worries of losing the majority of their membership, but they take the risk of losing the younger generation. The younger Presbyterians are usually much poorer than their well-established senior counterparts.

Non-Presbyterian churches, including the Evangelical and Charismatic ones organizing “Pray for Taiwan” (Taiwan Christian Alliance), have different concerns about human resources related to the tongzhi issue. Two conservative leaders told me that they were losing people or worrying about losing people at the peak of the anti-tongzhi campaigns. Attorney Qiu reported that if his church promoted anti-tongzhi issues actively, many believers would start leaving the church, especially general believers, or so-called “Sunday Christians.” In the peak years of the culture wars, their on-campus gospel fellowships experienced particular difficulties inviting non-Christian youth to step into the church’s Christmas activities. Both attorney Qiu and Pastor Ji told me that their churches opposed marriage equality and mobilized people to participate in campaigns at
the cost of losing people. They spoke out and took action for the sake of their “conscience.”

Compared with traditional Presbyterian churches, Evangelical and Charismatic churches in Taiwan attract a younger generation, ranging from kindergarteners to adolescents to college students to adults in their early thirties. Their lively music with rock-and-roll bands, professional-concert-level audio and visual effects, and interactive, exciting, and enthusiastic climates appeal to the younger generations’ appetite. However, as 70% of the younger generation in Taiwan supports same-sex marriage, Evangelical and Charismatic churches’ anti-tongzhi campaigns went against the youth consensus. A couple of Taiwanese sociologists told me that two decades ago, gay and lesbian college students in their departments still had to face coming-out issues, struggling with stigma and discrimination against their sexual orientations. During the recent years of the culture war, Christian students became the minority. When classmates knew Christian students’ religious identity, their immediate response would be, “Oh, you are Christian. Are you against tongzhi (fan-tong)?” Facing Tongzhi friendliness has become the dominant trend among those in their twenties and younger generations in contemporary Taiwan.

Evangelical and Charismatic churches have had to make a choice between either insisting on their heteronormative faith or embracing the change of sexual attitudes among new members. After the confrontational 2013 event, many tongzhi Christians who had gotten used to attending mega-churches “escaped” into small gay churches, standing at the back and worshiping with endless tears (interview with Esther, 2016.5.23). Those who could not bear irrational anti-tongzhi discourses included many heterosexual couples, friends,
and family who did not want themselves or their “own” children being exposed to a hateful and untruthful atmosphere.

Christian conservatives’ anti-tongzhi campaigns did stimulate a large LGBTQ-friendly exodus from heteronormative hatred and moral panic. Anti-tongzhi campaigns produced significant demographic impacts on churches. In contrast to concerns among Presbyterian churches whose leadership worried that a pro-tongzhi stance would lead to the division of the church, my ethnographic data show that it was in fact the radical anti-tongzhi campaigns that led to church separation. Two anti-tongzhi churches, one in the North and the other in the South, faced the problem of membership shrinking after the churches delved into pro-family campaigns. The northern church was one of the five northern churches vocally opposed to marriage equality and the diverse family formation bill in 2013. Soon, it lost hundreds of believers and closed cell groups, which scared the pastor and led him to publicly announce in his sermon, “Our church does not touch politics.” The southern church originally had more than 900 people and each service could gather 300-400 people. After the 2013 anti-tongzhi rally, more than one hundred people left the church; five cell groups closed. However, this response did not stop its pastor’s anti-tongzhi path. He later left the church for another, even larger church, becoming one of the drafters of an anti-tongzhi pastoral letter later issued by PCT in 2014. Although his previous church lost people, he jumped to another church with more people and boosted his leadership, my interviewee Donald explained.

After the spate of anti-tongzhi campaigns, many Christian pastors learned to stay silent during the culture wars, standing away from “politics.” Human resources, and the financial and economic assets coming with human resources, however, have become the
counter-motivations for Christian conservatives to oppose marriage equality and tongzhi education.

3.4 Summary: Beyond “religious reductionism”

In my fieldwork, I found that many pro-family and pro-tongzhi supporters tend to use what I call the “religious reductionism” to explain the motivation of pro-family and anti-tongzhi movements and their opposition to marriage equality and tongzhi education. This chapter has carefully examined the idea of “religious reductionism,” questioning the use of religion to “explain away” the complex motivations of pro-family movements. In fact, my mixed-methodological data show that the religious motivation is only a partial explanation. There exist conflicts and tensions within the religious motivation and competing motivations external to religion. As suggested in the survey’s results, conservatives’ primary motivations of pro-family movements include the priorities of religion, anti-homosexuality, and leadership in the Christian community. These are followed by politics, money, and human resources. Meanwhile, as my interviewees reminded me, there are important differences between religious leaders’ and believers’ motivations. Religious leaders are more likely to be motivated by competing for leadership in the Christian community; believers expressed less concern about money and human resources regarding their participation in anti-tongzhi campaigns.

Furthermore, I used interview and ethnographic data to explore the complexity and contradictions within each motivation. On the one hand, I found the notion of pro-family and anti-tongzhi campaigners’ motivations to be more complex rather than being purely religious. My findings also show layers of nuance and inconsistency in
Taiwanese conservatives’ use of the scripture through translation and interpretation. Evidence of spirituality also challenges the religious motivation. Interviewers’ spiritual experiences provided strong counter-claims that the Holy Spirit is accepting of sexual minorities with love. Also, competition for intra-Christian leadership serves as a partial religious and partial secular motivation for opposing sexual citizenship. The calculation of power and authority disdains the sacred motivation of religion, making “fighting for so-called cosmic wars” an impure calling. In other words, the perspective of Christian conservatives as using religion as the motivation to oppose marriage equality and tongzhi education is a partial, impure, and contradictory explanation.

Moreover, hypotheses about anti-tongzhi motivations based on politics, money, and human resources were examined. The functions of these factors highlight that the importance of non-religious, socio-economic motivations behind Christian conservatives’ oppositional movements, and further challenge the pure religion explanation. It is true that, after the anti-tongzhi campaigns, conservative churches accumulated more political power and experience, economic assets, and tools than before. However, they also produced more problems, such as intra-church dissent on political issues and partisan conflict, the public’s questioning of their financial legality, and unpredicted separation within and downsizing of churches. These troubles taught Taiwanese conservative churches an important lesson of civil society and public engagement that they had few chances to learn during Taiwan’s democratization prior to the anti-tongzhi campaigns. In the meantime, most Taiwanese do not know that their conservative fellows who advocate for family values and a harmonious society (i.e., those good and seemingly harmless goals) actually intend to convert all Taiwanese people into Christians and to evangelize
the whole world. They have been practicing the Seven Mountain Theory for achieving the goal of Kingdom Transformation. Christian conservatives well understand their situation as a religious minority group in Taiwan and Taiwanese society’s stereotypes attached to Christianity. They have developed a “playbook” to hide their religious motivations and manage a bright, sweet, well-educated, and modest middle-class public image, under the guise of concerned parents, teachers, and professionals for the purpose of justifying and expanding their pro-family values. These experiences transformed conservatives’ naïve motivations and small beginnings into a better organized conservative political plan and enterprise. The transnational infrastructure of their massive mobilization will be discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter 4

Transnational Conservative Networks and

Taiwanese Culture Wars

This chapter shifts emphasis from anti-tongzhi conservatives’ religious and politico-economic motivations to their practical mobilizations, moving from the domestic to the transnational context. The story of the ACPed letter that I discussed in the introductory chapter shows the process by which a piece of Western-produced false knowledge about sexuality was manufactured in the West, transmitted to the East through translation and local replication where it was reconstructed, and re-imported back to its birthplace. This story, however, is merely the tip of the iceberg of Christian conservatives’ transnational moral networks.

Analyzing my mixed-methods data, I found four distinct transnational pathways by which religious conservatives migrate or travel across borders to shape the pro-family movements in Taiwan and around the globe: 1) Sanitized Western flows of interconnection, 2) channeling neighbor’s currents, 3) the “Asian Cross” (regional circulation), and 4) reverse flow. To illustrate these four paths, I will use two types of evidence: anti-tongzhi discourses and knowledge and strategies of organizational development and mobilization tactics. These also represent the two major strategies that Taiwanese and American conservatives have employed to organize transnational networks.
In this chapter, I show that Christian conservatives in Taiwan, the United States, and their neighboring countries are not passive recipients of the heteronormative tradition. Instead, they are actively working in the global structures of religion and politics, organizing border-crossing activities and groups. They have also built transnational platforms from which to expand and maintain their local and international conservative enterprise while fighting against the trends of sexual emancipation. Their agency and creativity are as prominent and flexible as the agency and creativity of those who stand on the opposite side of the spectrum of sexual politics.

4.1 Sanitized Western flows of interconnection

The most prominent type of transnational linkage between Taiwanese and Euro-American conservative organizations is that of the direct importation of pro-family and homophobic signs, discourses, and commodities that were produced in Euro-American countries or by Euro-American organizations into Taiwan. Although I use the term “Euro-American” as an umbrella term to refer to the regions of Europe and the United States, I do not consider the countries in these regions to have a homogeneous influence on Taiwan. Furthermore, the term “Euro-American” does not seek to reduce the complex and heterogeneous history and ideologies of the Christian conservatisms in these countries to a single entity.

In fact, Taiwanese pro-family activists’ worldviews comprise a contingently fragmented and strategically assembled map. In this Christian conservative worldview, the countries that can help boost their anti-tongzhi ideology and bolster their pro-family campaigns—such as France, Germany, Uganda, and the United States—are
disproportionally magnified and exponentially weighted. They ignore or silence those countries that have triumphed in passing legislation for the same-sex marriage, such as Canada, the Netherlands, and most Scandinavian countries. The successful story of the U.S. marriage equality cannot be discursively blocked in Taiwan due to its international coverage and the role of the United States as an important reference group to Taiwanese. Instead, pro-family activists in Taiwan smear the United States as a morally corrupted country moving toward societal collapse because the societal foundation composed of heterosexual marriage and family values has experienced an earthquake-level upheaval, as they claim. Countries that have nationally prominent religious influences (especially Catholicism) but that have also legalized the same-sex marriage (such as Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom) are Taiwan’s pro-family activists’ and Christian conservatives’ nightmares, which they shun in public debates.

Using a distorted and thus fragmented world map, the Taiwanese pro-family movement has muted international voices that advocate marriage equality and over-emphasized the strength of select countries’ anti-gay campaigns. This is their major strategy to “sanitize” both liberal and conservative influences of Western flows of cultural imperialism on Taiwanese sexual landscape and local campaigns for equal sexual citizenship. With amplified voices opposing the same-sex marriage, they have warned Taiwanese that “many countries that legalized the same-sex marriage have stirred up enormous oppositional waves [that have] resulted in irreversible negative consequences” and that Taiwan should not “make the same mistake as these countries did” (Excerpts from Kairos News 2017, May 17).
Even within the group of countries to which Taiwanese pro-family activists frequently refer, each contributes different pieces from which they assemble their own discursive structure, symbolic system, and repertoire toolkit. France, Germany, and the United States are good examples for comparison. Most prominently, the French anti-marriage-equality campaign, initiated by extremist conservative Catholics, has become its Taiwanese counterpart’s role model for symbolic order and mobilization. Figure 4.1 presents the assimilation of these symbolic systems and collective action strategies shared between the French and Taiwanese pro-family movements. Their symbolic similarities include the use of a cool color system (fuchsia and deep sky blue) to signal a sharp binary between femininity and masculinity. Both movements also employ images of an ideal family. The ideal type of family must be white with invisible faces and composed of one father, one mother, and two children. Without exception, the two children must be one son and one daughter. To increase their visibility, anti-gay campaigns in both countries chose national monuments in the capitals to launch their protests: Arc de Triomphe in Paris and Ketagalan Boulevard Plaza in front of the Presidential Office in Taipei. Both organizations also claimed that hundreds of thousands of people joined their protests to resist same-sex marriage legislation (the organizers claimed 800,000 people in Paris and 250,000 in Taipei) (Schofield 2013, May 18).

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41 Suggestively, the colors of deep sky blue, fuchsia, and white used in France and Taiwan are also a lighter and more childlike modifications of the colors shown on both countries’ national flags: blue, red, and white.
The Taiwanese pro-family movement did not simply replicate its French counterpart’s mobilization example, however. It filtered it and added some local flavors. For example, in response to the socialist government’s same-sex marriage policy, called “Marriage for All,” the French slogan was changed to “Demonstration for All” (Pennetier et al. 2016, Oct 16). The Taiwanese pro-family movement framed its action with a slogan “To Protect Our Next Generation” and presented itself as “guardians of the next generational offspring.” The Taiwanese glocalization of Western conservative repertoires also appears in the Taiwanese pro-family movement’s logo in which children or adolescents are placed at the center under the arms of heterosexual monogamous parents,
representing the roof of a house protecting the presumably innocent and vulnerable kids.
In contrast, the French logo centered the heterosexual parents. The boy seems to be an extension of the father, and the daughter is a small version of the mother. The gendered performance of masculinity and femininity in these representations, by default, corresponds to the cis-gender man/boy and woman/girl binaries. The possibilities of transgenderism and a fluidity of identity through cross-dressing are unimaginable.

In contrast to the French mode, which provides cultural symbols and mass mobilization repertories, the German mode fuels the Taiwanese pro-family movement with a so-called constitutional mode for heteronormativity. Since Taiwan faced the tragic death of French professor Jacques Picoux and encountered many openly gay families with children demanding their civil rights to medical decision-making, inheritance, insurance, and other issues, this island society has gradually reached agreement that tongzhi couples’ rights need to be protected. Thus, the debate shifted from “whether tongzhi’s rights should be protected” to “how to protect them.” Picking among different international solutions, the Taiwan pro-family movement dismisses the American Supreme Court’s constitutional ruling as “a decision made by a small group of elites who failed to represent the voice of the majority people.” Taiwan pro-family activists criticized the parliamentary path adopted in France, England, and Wales, among other countries that legislated a new act to protect same-sex marriage. Taiwanese conservatives argued that the legislation is destroying the stability and foundation of the traditional family, arbitrarily changing the definition of marriage, and encouraging immoral promiscuity that has resulted in the AIDS epidemic and sexually transmitted diseases.
Instead, the German mode, which is based on the idea of “separate but equal,” best fits Taiwanese Christian conservatives’ taste. Before the mid-2017 amendment, Article 6 of the *German Basic Law* reads,

1. Marriage and the family shall enjoy the special protection of the state.
2. The care and upbringing of children is the natural right of parents and a duty primarily incumbent upon them. The state shall watch over them in the performance of this duty.
3. Children may be separated from their families against the will of their parents or guardians only pursuant to a law, and only if the parents or guardians fail in their duties or the children are otherwise in danger of serious neglect.
4. Every mother shall be entitled to the protection and care of the community.
5. Children born outside of marriage shall be provided by legislation with the same opportunities for physical and mental development and for their position in society as are enjoyed by those born within marriage. (Adopted from Sanders 2016:489-490)

Due to enormous institutional barriers to amending the *Basic Law*, Germany has institutionally recognized the civil union of same-sex couples by providing them equal tax benefits and allowing gay families to adopt children (Equaldex 2017). Following this paradigm, Taiwanese pro-family activists straightforwardly advocate the German mode because of its emphasis on the idea that unions of same-sex couples are fundamentally different from a sacred, orthodox, and traditional marriage. The traditional definition of marriage, they claim, is, by default, between one man and one woman who can “naturally procreate offspring.” This demonstrates God’s impeccable creation as recorded in Genesis. Taiwanese Christian conservatives argue that no one can change this definition, including *tongzhi* movement activists, the Legislative Yuan, or the Constitutional Court.

Supporters of marriage equality have critiqued conservatives’ “separate but equal” doctrine, arguing that it is biased and problematic, producing inequalities and
discriminating against *tongzhis* as second-class citizens. Pro-family activists in Taiwan, choosing not to respond to these critiques, have argued that legislating same-sex civil partnerships is sufficient to protect gay and lesbian couples’ daily needs. Meanwhile, even though Taiwanese pro-family activists carefully picked a German model upon which to base their international brand, they modified that model before introducing it to Taiwan. For example, cultural brokers in Taiwan never mentioned the legal adoption of stepchildren and anti-discrimination housing laws for LGBT that also exist in Germany (Equaldex 2017). In other words, the Western model was sanitized and modified by pro-family activists in Taiwan before its localization, although these conservative activists claimed the authenticity of their cultural translation.

In 2017, Angela Merkel signaled to Germany’s members of parliament (MPs) that they should vote freely according to their conscience; consequently, Germany legalized same-sex marriage. Subsequently, Taiwanese conservative activists who had prominently advocated for the German model suddenly muted their voice. None of these activists admitted their mistake or explained the inconsistency between the changing German model and their unchanged claim.

Alongside France and Germany, globally influential U.S. conservatism has played a different role among Taiwanese pro-family activists. Perhaps due to linguistic proximity (English is the first foreign language in Taiwan), American conservatism directly contributes to the Taiwan pro-family movement with a fully developed anti-gay discursive armory, an epistemological structure, and an ecological system that produces this armory and structure. The earlier mentioned ACPed letter illustrates how the path through which a piece of anti-gay discourse represented as scientific knowledge was
produced in the United States, selected by American international correspondents, introduced to Taiwan, translated into Traditional Chinese, and diffused into Taiwan and global Sinophonic societies.

It would be incorrect, however, to assume that American conservatism in the Taiwanese market is an oligarchic one. Rather, many American Christian organizations with various, and sometimes conflicting, evangelical and charismatic theologies are competing for their overseas markets in East Asia. In addition to gaining more influence and more believers, what is too secular for these religious leaders to discuss is the money that their believers bring in by collecting tithes/donations, purchasing their products, and paying licensing fees to import their copyrighted products for local sale. From the perspective of “religious economy” theory, what these religious leaders are doing mirrors the neoliberal logic held by most transnational corporations (this is related to the money motivation I discussed in Chapter 3).

Among these American conservative competitors, a few names and organizations have occupied Taiwanese pro-family activists’ vision of gender and sexuality. For example, the reports of the National Association for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality (NARTH) equip these activists with discourses claiming that homosexuality is unnatural and changeable. The “scientific findings” made by the ACPed are used to wash out the AAP’s official policy statement supporting gay couples’ parenthood. The same religious leaders also warn Taiwan society, with reference to information fed to them by “MassResistance,” a pro-family organization based and founded in Massachusetts (see http://www.massresistance.org/AboutUs.html), that
passing the same-sex marriage laws will lead to a 50% increase in the homosexual population and the homosexual behaviors that accompanies it.

Notably, the Taiwanese Christian conservative community has gradually evolved into an ecosystem. To secure and advocate Christian morality, foundations and think tanks were established to collect donations and transform favored research into publicly consumable articles (e.g., the Chunghua 21st Century Think Tank 中華21世紀智庫協會 and the Thoughts and Strategies National Think Tank Institute [sic.] 思與策國家智庫研究院). These organizations also support Christian scholars who conduct social research on the attitudes and demography of Christianity and gender/sexuality, organize academic conferences, and publish books and articles. A religion-friendly journal, *Journal of Life Education*, also began publishing articles in 2009. One of its controversial articles used only ten interviews of “post-gays” (those who had homoerotic experiences but eventually returned to straight life) to suggest that homosexuals are convertible.

At the level of a self-sustaining ecosystem, what the Taiwan conservatives imported from the United States is not limited to individual scholarly articles or individual researchers’ insights. They take a giant leap further, transplanting the entire business model of their successful American conservative community. This community comprises churches, foundations, research institutes, a devoted group of researchers, publishers of books and journals, political organizations, and international advocates. Table 4.1 shows a comparison between these American and Taiwanese ecosystems.
### Table 4.1 Comparison of the U.S. and Taiwanese Sexual Conservative Knowledge Ecosystems with Select Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>The United States</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Research institutes</strong></td>
<td>Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute</td>
<td>Chunghua 21st Century Think Tank</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Concerned Women for America and the Beverly LaHaye Institute</td>
<td>Thoughts and Strategies National Think Tank Institute</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Howard Center</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Family in America Studies Center</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Religion and Society Studies Center</td>
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<td></td>
<td>American College of Pediatricians</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Media</strong></td>
<td><em>The Family in America</em> (newsletter of the Family in America Studies Center)</td>
<td><em>Kairos News</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>The Religion and Society Report</em> (newsletter of The Religion and Society Studies Center)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Education organizations</strong></td>
<td>Focus on the Family</td>
<td>Champions Education Association</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rainbow Family Life Education Association</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Focus on the Family, Taiwan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conversion Therapeutic</strong></td>
<td>Exodus International</td>
<td>Rainbow-7 (Taiwan Exodus Consulting and Guidance Association)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organizations**</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Social activism</strong></td>
<td>MassResistance</td>
<td>Taiwan Family (Alliance for the Happiness of the Next Generation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political organizations</strong></td>
<td>The Family Research Council</td>
<td>Faith and Hope League (FHL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International platforms</strong></td>
<td>World Congress of Families</td>
<td>Bread of Life Global Apostolic Network</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Human Life International/The Population Research Institute</td>
<td>Chinese Homecoming Movement</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Vatican/Holy See</td>
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<td></td>
<td>World Family Policy Center, United Families International, Worldwide Organization for Women</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: The U.S. and Taiwanese organizations shown in this table were selected only for showing the comparable models of conservative ecosystems in two societies. The list is not exhaustive. The U.S. organizations in this list were selected based on Buss and Herman’s (2003) study on U.S. conservative groups with international influence.
I call these conservative communities ecosystems because each organizational actor plays a different role. Churches—the engines of evangelical, charismatic, and fundamental theologies—are the generators of this system. Donations collected from churchgoers are invested into the establishment of foundations and research institutes. The foundations and institutes fund and host Christian scholars whose mission is to produce knowledge and academic-styled research articles that provide the data, develop arguments, and/or translate foreign research to support church leaders’ moral agenda: stopping or attacking the legalization of the same-sex marriage and the implementation of gender equity education. Nevertheless, the papers that receive money from churches or carry certain moral values usually have serious methodological problems (e.g., research designs or data quality), so they cannot readily find a space in flagship academic journals. Thus, churches and foundations established pro-family media directly through some religion-friendly journals launched by a few key people who successfully found positions at prestigious universities. With the mass production of pro-family academic research and publicly-editable information, church leaders can further appropriate so-called “cutting-edge scientific knowledge” to convince their audiences that what they preach on stage has received intellectual recognition and empirical support. This strengthens the leadership and religious power of these initiators, allowing them to use their newly-produced “knowledge” to call for more donations to support the ministry of pro-family knowledge production.

Figure 4.2 shows the manufacturing line for the production of pro-family knowledge. When doing fieldwork in the largest Christian bookstore in Hong Kong, I encountered a stranger—a Baptist brother who served in his church—in the section
containing homosexuality-related books. When I told him the story of this Christian knowledge ecosystem in Taiwan and the United States, he seemed unsurprised and said, “Oh, here we (Hong Kong people) adopt the Chinese slang (a term borrowed from China) to call this ‘One Dragon Service’ (一條龍服務).” This one-dragon-service ecology is implicitly oligarchic because only a small group of church leaders has significant amounts of money, human resources, and social capital available to initiate, launch, and maintain the knowledge assembly line. In turn, their control over this “dragon” bolsters their social and spiritual status in the Christian community.

Toward the end of my ethnography, I shared my observation about this “One Dragon Service” of conservative ecosystem with pro-tongzhi interviewees. Some

Figure 4.2  The Glocalized Pro-Family Knowledge Production Eco-system in Taiwan
expressed concerns that the direct import of this entire American conservative system to Taiwan would do more damage to Taiwan’s sexual equality than would the sporadic introduction of a book or an idea. In sociological terms, the establishment of this conservative ecosystem symbolizes the *glocalization* and indigenization of Western conservative enterprise in Taiwan. It will have more structural effects on Taiwan’s gender equity and sexual liberty compared to individual conservative people or publications.

### 4.2 Channeling neighbor’s water

The second type of transnational circuits of pro-family Christian conservatism, “channeling neighbor’s water,” is a variation or extension of the first. In this type, pro-family conservatism is not directly transferred from foreign countries to Taiwan; instead, it needs to bypass a third-party country (taking a detour) before becoming accessible to and acceptable for Taiwanese conservatives’ local use. In other words, Taiwanese pro-family movements have channeled the conservative resources from their counterparts in neighboring Asian countries, who helped them complete the glocalization and make these Western strategies more acceptable to Taiwanese.

The most prominent example of this type is the mode of church growth and development that many pro-family churches in Taiwan have adopted and followed, the “Groups of 12” mode (G-12 mode) (see https://g12.co/). The G-12 mode provides an organizational development model through which Taiwanese churches from many denominations can evolve into mega-churches.42 Its theological roots came from the *New

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42 See the definition of mega-church in Chapter 2.
Testament in which Jesus organized a group of twelve apostles and trained them to accompany him and then preach:

Jesus went up on a mountainside and called to him those he wanted, and they came to him. He appointed twelve—designating them apostles—that they might be with him and that he might send them out to preach and to have authority to drive out demons. (Mark 3:13-15)

Every day they [the apostles] continued to meet together in the temple courts. They broke bread in their homes and ate together with glad and sincere hearts, praising God and enjoying the favor of all the people. And the Lord added to their number daily those who were being saved. (Acts 2:46-47)

Borrowing their genealogy from how Jesus led his apostles—the so-called first twelve Christian apostles in the world—the G-12 mode suggests that a healthy, developed church be led by a chief apostle who leads twelve other apostles. Each of these pastors, in turn, leads another twelve apostles, and so on. Every group of twelve forms a cell, meeting in someone’s home or a church space regularly to win more souls, to consolidate connections between apostles, to disciple newcomers and apostles, and, eventually, to send them to build their own group (Liu 2003:37-38). It is important to understand that, although every new member entering the G-12 cell church eventually is expected to be an apostle, he/she is not eligible for the title of “apostle” until he/she can recruit and evangelize another twelve new believers and train the twelve to be capable of teaching their own apostles. That is to say, a G-12 style Christian can become qualified as an apostle only after his/her own self-lead group grows into 144 groups. This is one of the basic church developmental models that the pro-family churches in Taiwan have followed and implemented over two decades, and it has succeeded to some extent.
The origin of the G-12 model is debatable, but many sources refer to the successful examples of Columbian charismatic minister Cesar Castellanos (Liu 2003; Martinez, n.d.) and Larry Stockstill’s Bethany World Prayer Center (see http://www.bethany.com). While many evangelical and charismatic churches in the world began to adopt or adapt this church growth enterprise style, the global trend took a detour before it influenced Taiwanese churches.

According to Liu (2003), a few transnational Chinese-speaking churches, including Gereja Bethel Indonesia (GBI), which became the second largest church in Asia (Tsai 2015, Mar 29), first used the G-12 model to attain successful growth. Another frequently-referred to example comes from the Singapore-based Faith Community Baptist Church (FCBC) established by Rev. Lawrence Khong (鄺健雄) in 1986, which transitioned to the G-12 mode in 2002 and reached 51,000 believers by 2015 (see https://www.fcbc.org.sg/about/milestones). The FCBC is part of Pastor Castellanos’s Misión Carismática Internacional (MCI), a global movement that includes more than 200,000 people in 40,000 cells (see https://www.fcbc.org.sg/about/origins-g12). After witnessing the successes of these non-Taiwan-based Chinese-heritage churches, Taiwanese pro-family churches organized tours to visit them, learned from their success stories, and then implemented the G-12 mode in Taiwan.

This channeled transnational religious flow shows that in some cases, the brokers of religious transnationalization exist outside of the national borders of the county of adoption and in churches that have diverse cultural and national backgrounds. This diversity provides them with opportunities to share new church growth models with each
other and, perhaps unconsciously, prepare to mobilize church members to participate in campaigns against marriage equality and tongzhi education.

4.3 The “Asian Cross”: A regional circulation

Western imperialist influence, either by direct import or third-party transfer, is not the only pattern that shapes Taiwanese Christian conservatives’ transnational network. The East and South Asian areas have formulated a regional network to continuously share their strategies for building more and larger churches. This regional circulation of conservatism also directly fuel Taiwanese pro-family activists with anti-tongzhi knowledge and discourses. Organizational and discursive strategies together help Christian conservatives train what I call the “spiritual reserve army” that is ready to be mobilized and fight local culture wars against LGBT-rights movements. The most influential societies and countries that shape Taiwanese pro-family activism are Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea. Together with Taiwan, these societies constitute the so-called the “Four Asian Tigers or Dragons” (亞洲四小龍), which experienced drastic industrialization and exceptionally high economic growth rates between the 1960s and 1990s.

In fact, each of the four countries contributes distinct resources to Taiwan’s pro-family activism. Hong Kong, due to its popular use (shared with Taiwan) of Traditional Chinese, provides the bulk of anti-tongzhi discourses and rhetoric. Based on my fieldwork data, before 2014 most discourses used in public to resist the campaign for the Diverse Family Formation Bill (多元成家法案) came from Hong Kong. The main source of the discourses is Hong Kong professor Swan (pseudonym) and the “trinity”
NGOs (Hong Kong Sex Culture Society Limited 香港性文化學會有限公司, True Light Organization 明光社, and New Creation Association 新造的人). As early as 2004-2005, when Taiwanese evangelical and charismatic Christians were first becoming aware of the gender mainstreaming trend and had not yet organized any anti-tongzhi groups, professor Swan and his groups were invited to Taiwan to share, “without any reservation,” their long-term accumulated data and well-developed discourses on homosexuality and sexual liberation (field note 2012).

“Hong Kong Professor Swan has been inspiring Taiwanese anti-tongzhi movements,” according to interviewee Hansen. Before the True Love Alliance (真愛聯盟) launched its campaign against the curricular implementation of comprehensive sexuality and tongzhi education in 2011, it was professor Swan who equipped the Alliance with materials and arguments to help them problematize the new implementation. Interviewee Hansen recalled a small group of concerned Christian teachers, parents, and pastors who brought the three manuals of Gender Equity Education to Hong Kong for professor Swan’s review. Swan spent an entire day and night scrutinizing the materials, red-flagging the pages that he found “problematic” and inconsistent with Christian sexual moralities, and giving the Alliance campaigners ways to problematize gender equity education in the public sphere to stop this sexual liberation trend (性解放狂潮). In late 2015, during the peak of the marriage equality debate and approaching Taiwan’s 2016 presidential election, a relatively open-minded campus-based Christian student organization decided to organize a forum that put into conversation Christian experts from two camps on homosexual issues. Dr. Swan, after receiving an invitation from the student group and acknowledging its financial shortfalls, proactively
volunteered to speak for free, sponsoring himself for the round-trip flight between Hong Kong and Taipei.

After 2014, Taiwanese pro-family movement organizations gradually established their own websites, media, and research institutes to produce local anti-tongzhi discourses, reducing their dependence on their Hong Kong brothers (rarely sisters). Nevertheless, at the level of organizational contacts, the exchange of anti-tongzhi discourses between Hong Kong and Taiwan remains strong. The continuous sharing of news and criticism on Facebook and other social media between the Taiwan and Hong Kong organizations is also seamless.

Compared with Hong Kong’s role as a provider of discursive weapons, Singapore and South Korea play a role in helping Taiwanese pro-family churches grow larger and formulate an impression of so-called “Asian value” that assumes Asians are inherently more conservative and more pro-family compared to their Western counterparts. South Korean churches teach Taiwanese pro-family churches mainly how to develop their organizations by adopting a charismatic theology that emphasizes the Holy Spirit’s work, the full gospel, and modern rituals of Worship and Praise (such as in the music style of Stream of Praise). The most prominent South Korean role model for these Taiwanese Christians is Emeritus Pastor Yonggi CHO’s Yoido Full Gospel Church (汝矣島純福音教會).

In April 2016, I attended an international Christian conference in Kaohsiung entitled “Blessing Taiwan Miracle Conference: Constructing a Healthy and Outstanding Church.” David Yonggi CHO (趙鐸基), the funding pastor of the largest mega-church in the world, was most expected to bring miracle, hope, and healing. Many religious leaders
were there to learn from his church, Yoido Full Gospel Church (Assemblies of God),
which claimed to have 830,000 members, increasing by 3,000 members every month.
Many anti-LGBTQ church leaders attended or preached at this conference, and they
shared the same belief: building more and larger churches to honor God’s glory and draw
closer to God (see my discussion of the conservative motivation regarding human
resources in Chapter 3).

Meanwhile, their role model, Pastor Yonggi CHO, was unafraid of being labeled
a spokesperson of “prosperity theology” (or the gospel of health, wealth, and success). He
loudly proclaimed, “God’s name is success!,” and continued,

my discipleship training has nothing but given him a big dream and goal. …
[Years ago,] Korean pastors gathered and prayed for 1 million Christians in Korea.
Now, not just one million, we have 12 million Christians in Korea. … I dream that
Taiwanese pastors can rise and preach around the world, becoming God’s servants”
(field note 2016.4.6).

At the conference, Pastor CHO was training and calling for an army of transnational
apostles, and he has seen enormous success.

Since the late 1970s, Taiwanese churches have been sending people to learn from
pastor CHO’s leadership about “church growth” (教會增長). In the summer of 2017, the
Asia Christian Conference in Korea (亞細亞聖徒訪韓特會)—an annual or biennial
meeting for Asian Christians to experience and learn from the Korean church’s way of
praying, fasting, and organizing— held its twenty-ninth gathering. On the conference’s
official website, pastor CHANG Mao-Song (張茂松), who led a crowd occupying the
Legislation Yuan and fervently opposing the Marriage Equality Bill, stated that he
recognized pastor CHO as his “Master” (師父). He first recognized his relationship with CHO when he was preaching at the 2014–15 conference and answering spontaneous questions from God. God inquired of him why his church only has 700-800 people rather than two or three thousand. God said, pastor CHANG recalled, “Why don’t you recognize one person and let him be your ‘spiritual Master’ to change your full spiritual life?” (Chang 2017, Jan 17, para. 28). That was the moment when CHANG recognized CHO’s mastership over him. Following this recognition, CHANG witnessed his church experiencing exponential growth, from 700–800 people to 3,000 people and more.

CHANG is not alone. On the conference’s official website, many pastors shared their experiences of being influenced by CHO Yonggi’s Yoido Full Gospel Church and The Osanri Choi Ja-Sil Prayer Mountain (崔子實紀念祈禱院), witnessing how their Korean experience helped their spirits and their churches grow. For example, a female pastor, PANLIU Yu-Xia (潘劉玉霞), reported that her visit to Korea planted a seed of love for her country in her heart. “When I was thinking of this,” she wrote, “I found myself with a face of tears. Now when I recall, [I would say] that is the moment. Right here [Korea], I began to receive the seed of transforming the whole nation [Taiwan] and other countries […] right within me” (Chang 2017, Feb 9, para. 14). Moved by this feeling, PANLIU initiated a LINE (social media) group of morning prayers from 5 to 7 a.m., which grew into a massive prayer network—another network for readily mobilizing anti-tongzhi Christians’ public rhetoric and street protests.

In addition to assimilating these religious experiences, CHO’s Korean church also has its own bloodline son and grandson churches in Taiwan. In 1991, Yoido Full Gospel Church sent its missionary, CHANG Han-Yeh, 張漢業, to Taiwan. Presently, at least six
Taiwanese churches operate under the “Full Gospel” brand. They include five that are pastored by CHANG (located in Taipei, Zhonghe/Yonghe, Hsinchu, Taichung, and Tainan respectively) and another one in an Eastern country, Taitung. The Taitung church, named City Spring of Life Full Gospel Church (城市生命泉純福音教會), is receiving pastoral assistance from a female missionary, KIM Kyung Sook 金敬淑, who had served God following CHO Yonggi for twenty years before being sent to this peripheral county in Taiwan “to reveal God’s almighty miracles and to teach local believers her perspectives on service and life” (see http://www.cslfgc.org/page/4/52).

Important, the Full Gospel church system is among the Christian denominations that are mobilizing a considerable number of people to occupy the streets during protests against marriage equality. I observed that many Han and indigenous Christians living in Taitung were zealous enough to take buses at midnight and spend more than six hours traveling to Taipei to join the protest on December 26, 2016. The infrastructure of organizational work, which these evangelical and Charismatic Christians call “church development,” contributed to this swift and massive mobilization.

In domestic and international conferences, like the Kaohsiung and Korean ones, religiosity and building a church of an unimaginable size have been constructed as mutually important requirements for Taiwanese to build a “healthy and prospering church.” Being more faithful to God is expected to lead a church to enlarge. Pastoring in a larger church, in turn, provides evidence of the pastor’s faith. It is also made clear that maintaining heteronormative marriages is necessary for building a church of wealth, health, and success. Homosexuality and transgender identities are assumed to be inherently abnormal mental illnesses. Thus, being a gender or sexual minority is not only
a sin and an abomination, but also a moral divide that these pastors can use to enlarge their churches and honor their God’s glory.

Different from the Korean model, Singapore churches teach Taiwanese conservative churches the “cellular church mode” (discussed earlier) as well as the strategy of appropriating the media and entertainment industries to evangelize a nation. The most notable Singapore case is that of pastor KONG Hee (康希) and his City Harvest Church (城市豐收教會). Pastor KONG believes that using the borderless influence of media and entertainment is one of the quickest and strongest ways to evangelize the nation. Citing this as his reason, KONG used his churchgoers’ donations and the church’s assets to invest in his wife’s, the singer Sun Ho (何耀珊), entertainment career, a notable story that went sour after KONG was charged with using $24 million dollars of church funds illegally and then misusing another $26 million to cover up the scandal.

Although not stating so directly, Taiwan’s New Life Cellular Church (新生命小組教會) followed this model closely. It has targeted famous pop artists to convert them into Christians who can then use their influence to share the gospel with their ready-made audiences. This church has also trained its own artists and media experts, sending them into the entertainment industries to conquer “the mountain of media”—one of the seven “mountains” that evangelical and charismatic Christians have devoted themselves to conquering and eventually dominating the world. On its website, the church especially emphasizes its vision of marriage and family as “two sexes, marriage, and the Christianized family,” which reinforces binary gender and heteronormative marriage and family roles (see http://www.newlife.org.tw/our-belief). This conservative message is
juxtaposed with advocacy for youth and new-generation leaders on campus, wall-free churches in the workplace, charity ministries, the creative arts, fashion culture, and the contemporary use of new media. By following the Singapore model, the New Life Cellular Church grew from eleven people in 1996 to 3,500 people in 2017. Twelve departments, 50 pastor zones, and 161 cell groups have been formed in the church (ibid.).

The New Life Cellular Church was one of the largest Taipei organizations that mobilized people to petition against the Diverse Family Formation campaign in 2013. After a significant decline in its church population and the closing of several cell groups following this mass mobilization, the church’s pastor, GU Qi-Yun (顧其芸), publicly announced that “our church does not touch politics [anymore],” as reported one interviewee.

When I pictured the global metropolitan cites of Taipei, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Seoul as nodes in a global network and link them with lines, I found that the transnational circuits of Christian conservatism in the East and South Asian region resemble “an Asian Cross” (see Figure 4.3)\(^{43}\). The symbol of the cross, from the perspective of many of the Christians encountered in my fieldwork, suggests two relationships. The vertical axis of the cross shows the relationship between God and humans. It is said that “sins disrupt the relationship between God and humans,” but through “Jesus Christ’s redemption and ultimate salvation [through his crucifixion], humans could be re-connected with God” (Kui 2004, Apr 4, para. 14). The horizontal axis of the cross represents the inter-fellow relationship among believers: “sins make people have jealousy and hatred against each other. The sacred blood of Jesus Christ

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\(^{43}\) The figure was created by the author using a map creation tool available on www.gcmap.com.
cleans our sins, makes people love each other, and, thus, tightens the relationship between Christian fellows” (ibid.). In other words, the cross’ two axes symbolize worship (God-human relationship) and fellowship (human-human connections).

Based on this interpretative approach, the “cross” symbol is an appropriate metaphor to signify the regional circulation of Christian conservatism in East and South Asia, especially with respect to its influence on Taiwan’s pro-family activism. As discussed earlier, the Hong Kong–Taiwan exchange focuses mainly on anti-tongzhi discourses and knowledge built based on their shared written language of Traditional
Chinese and their similar Chinese/Confucian cultural traditions. This imagined fellowship—a so-called “same culture and same race” (同文同種) relationship between Hong Kong and Taiwan—facilitates the circulation of conservative ideologies and resources more than do Korea, Singapore, and other Asian neighbors.

In contrast, while both Taiwan’s and Hong Kong’s churches are limited in size due to their social populations, Taiwanese conservative churches zealously desire to grow as fast and as large as their reference churches in South Korea (e.g., CHO Yonggi’s Yoido Full Gospel Church) and Singapore (e.g., KONG Hee’s City Harvest Church). Their theological ideology, meanwhile, is fundamentally shaped by prosperity theology and neoliberalist concepts of success. Although they are reluctant to admit this, these conservative Christian congregations equate the success of their religious faith with the size of the church and the new numbers whom they successfully evangelize. The more people they convert and recruit into their churches, the more zealous their spiritual life becomes and the more strongly their belief in God can be objectively shown to others. For these Christians, unconsciously or consciously, the likelihood of their entering Heaven in the afterlife is based on the strength of their faith, while the strength of their faith has been “McDonaldized” as a predicable, calculable, controllable, and standardizable key performance indicators (KPI). Imitating the success stories of mega-church growth in South Korea and Singapore has become an important pathway for Taiwanese conservative Christians to seek ultimate salvation, for themselves and for others. Ironically, Taiwan and the other three “Asian Tigers” that demonstrated booming economic development in the 1960s–1980s have been copycatting each other with neo-liberal prosperity theology in the 2010s.
Meanwhile, the two axes of the “Asian cross” serve both religious and secular functions. The vertical axis of worship has facilitated the Taiwanese conservative churches to apply developmental strategies needed to build large-scale bureaucratic organizations that work functionally and efficiently. This has created dozens of Taiwanese mega-churches that become “mobilizable” organizations containing battalions of well-trained “spiritual reserve army.” This army is ready to take action whenever its leaders feel that thousands of people need to occupy the streets or make hundreds of calls to paralyze the government and gay-friendly congress-people’s offices. These ready-to-use organizations make massive, quick mobilization possible. Along with their organizational infrastructure, the horizontal axis includes anti-tongzhi articles, news stories, and arguments prepared in friendly-to-read language that is easily digestible given the two countries’ cultural similarities.

Putting the two axes together, I argue that the “Asian Cross” suggests both the symbolic and practical strategies by which Taiwan’s pro-family movement has been forged. To Taiwanese Christian conservatives, the former economic coalition (“Asian Tigers”) has been transformed into a regional conservative coalition (“Asian Cross”). From this regional conservative network, akin to the Asian Tigers, it has received significant amounts of necessary equipment to bolster its organizational strategies and (spiritual) investments, along with a battery of discursive weapons to launch and fight local culture wars against marriage equality and tongzhi education.
4.4 Reverse Flow

Although the previous three types of transnational circuits of Christian conservatism show how Western or Asian regional forces influenced the Taiwan’s pro-family movement, I do not intend to imply that this Taiwan’s conservative movement is always a passive recipient of outside forces. Instead, I found that Taiwanese pro-family activists have been actively and creatively producing their own local anti-tongzhi discourses, especially after 2014.

The common discursive strategies that these pro-family activists use include distorting the meaning of original Western pro-gay researchers’ data (扭曲原意) and grafting excerpts of prestigious academic articles onto their own moral assertions (移花接木). They are also skilled at amplifying the problems and difficulties of some homosexuals’ lives and parenthood, using them as examples of universal and inherent problems of homosexuality that are applicable to all gays and lesbians (以偏概全). They produce moral panics by using the slippery slope fallacy (滑坡論證), such as the claim that “to legalize same-sex marriage will inevitably result in legalization of incest, promiscuity, bestiality, pedophilia, and sadomasochism.” They often argue that if we repeal the most fundamental definition of marriage—as a covenant between one man and one woman—we cannot stop the proliferation of these “equally immoral” sexualities from laying claim to the legal marriage framework. If marriage equality were legislated, “it’s possible that people would marry a Ferris wheel,” said Andrew CHANG (張守一), the chief secretary of the Taiwan Religious Groups Love and Protection of Family Big Alliance (TFBA hereafter, 台灣宗教團體愛護家庭大聯盟，簡稱護家盟) in a public hearing of Congress (Rauhala 2017, Apr 20).
In addition to these somewhat obvious discursive strategies, more subtle discourses are also constructed. Most notably, Taiwanese pro-family activists are increasingly creative in generating new words to change the meanings of their campaigns. For example, interviewee Hansen reported that he rejected using the Western-imported word “ex-gay” (前同志) to label his identity as someone who once had a homosexual desire and lifestyle but has converted to living a holy, non-perverse lifestyle. The “ex” means backward and pre-modern and is, thus, derogatory. He advocated using the term “post-gay” (後同志) to describe choice to move away from his former gay life and “progressively transcend” homoerotic desire by sublimating it to a higher level of spirit and holiness.

His local coining of the term “post-gay” intervened into a discursive vacuum in Taiwan’s public sphere, where few people knew that American critics and scholars of queer studies had been using the phrase “post-gay politics” for years. They used it, however, to transcend the identity politics set by the mainstream gay liberation movement and to expand the scope of activism and advocacy to cover more sexual diversities and minorities with the intersectional analyses of gender identity, performance, disability, class inequality, rural disparities, and so on (Orne 2017). In other contexts, “post-gay” suggests that the gay revolution had been won, and there was no longer a need for an identity like “gay” that limits the potential for analysis and political mobilization. Apparently, Taiwanese “post-gays” do not follow this American genealogy. The Taiwanese conservative use of “post-gay” was created with new local meanings that disrupted the relationship between this signifier with its own signified West, and it quickly spread to Hong Kong and Singapore for Sinophonic speakers to deploy.
Another example of Taiwanese conservatives’ local production is the invention of the theory of the “same-sex intimate friendship stage” (同性密友期). This theory holds that most adolescents will experience a stage of “same-sex intimate friendship” in high school, where they seek peer recognition and keep a distance from opposite sex friends. Therefore, they suggest, if schools start to teach tongzhi-friendly education “too early” (i.e., in elementary or middle school), this education will force children and adolescents to “fixate” on this stage and “become” homosexuals. They worry that this fixation will make their children fail to move onto the next two stages, the “opposite-sex group friendship stage” (異性群友期) and the “opposite-sex intimate friendship stage” (異性密友期), which will ultimately lead them to get married to an opposite-sex spouse. The theory of the “same-sex intimate friendship stage” serves as one of the fundamental reasons for Taiwanese conservatives to oppose LGBTIA+-friendly education.

This theory has been enormously powerful in shaping Taiwanese parents and instructors’ thinking about homoeroticism in childhood and adolescence. It is also ubiquitous in Taiwanese schools. However, when my colleagues and I tracked the theory’s genealogy (Koh, Kao, and Wu 2011), we found that all academic sources that refer to this theory are problematic. Some of them cited the 1960s psychologist Erik H. Erikson, although Erikson never mentioned these two stages in his theory of the developmental stages. At the same time, Erikson’s theory itself has been criticized for its stasis and failure to capture the dynamic flexibility of human development. Meanwhile, other authors’ references become a self-citation loop in that they cite each other and no one provides solid evidence; nevertheless, they have spawned infinitely. The theory of the “same-sex intimate friendship stage” also pervasively influences other Sinophonic
areas outside of Taiwan. Both Hong Kong social media pages and Taiwanese/Chinese immigrants to the United States have adopted this theory and quietly changed or consolidated the homophobic and heteronormative atmospheres in their local societies.

More examples of Taiwanese locally brewed conservative ideas will be provided in other works of mine. However, I believe that it is now clear that Taiwan, on the one hand, serves as a hub for the transnational effects of Christian conservatives, absorbing them, and manufacturing their materials to produce MIT (Made in Taiwan) products for export. On the other hand, Taiwanese conservatives are creatively inventing their own local conservative ideas to fight their local battles while trying to seize back leadership and hegemony over transnational sexualities. In this case, they are active players in the transnational sexual discursive market and productive generators of a Christian conservatism from the Global South that is gradually and covertly shaping the gender and sexual landscapes in the Global North through international migration and translation.

4.5 Summary: Local battles fueled by transnational conservative networks

Using mixed-methods data analysis, this chapter relocates Taiwan within the multi-layered network of transnational religious transactions. I found that although Taiwanese Christians comprise only about 5% of the national population, this island society has been powerfully influenced by and is actively shaping four types of transnational circuits of global Christian conservatism: sanitized Western flows of interconnection, channeling neighbor’s currents, the “Asian Cross” (regional circulation), and reverse flows. First, Taiwanese Christian conservatives play the role of local brokers who “directly import” many anti-tongzhi resources from their Western predecessors.
They have borrowed mobilization strategies and symbolic systems from French conservatives and transplanted the German constitutional definition of heteronormative marriage, promoting the value of “separate but equal.” They also freely appropriate the American Christian Right’s anti-gay discourses and learn from their ways of establishing a self-sustainable ecosystem for producing conservative knowledge and information that legitimizes and consolidates their own moral agendas.

Second, Taiwanese Christian conservatives have received resources from Western civilization that were transferred to another country before arriving in Taiwanese conservatives’ hands. Third, the regional circulation of Christian conservatism in East and South Asia has formulated an “Asian Cross” model, which refers to an East- and South-Asian regional circulation of strategies and discourses for developing anti-LGBTQ conservative politics. Taiwan conservatives learn from their fellows in Hong Kong how to produce moral panic by problematizing gender equity education materials and reiterating anti-
tongzhi discourses. Their brothers and sisters in or from South Korea and Singapore equip them with ways to successfully build and run bureaucratic organizations (i.e., mega-churches) and unintentionally prepare them to mobilize the masses for pro-family protests and lobbying.

Finally, instead of being simply recipients, Taiwanese conservatives actively produce sexual knowledge or blend new mixtures of sexual knowledge assembled from many sources. These elements of locally brewed or manufactured sexual morality and knowledge have fueled and ignited the local culture wars in Taiwan while successfully delaying the agenda of legislating marriage equality and implementing tongzhi and comprehensive sex education. Taiwanese Christian conservatives have created a powerful
backlash against progressive sexual institutions by combining and strategically using the products of these four above-mentioned transnational circuits.

In the meantime, the expanding and consolidating networks among transnational Christian conservative actors has amplified their heteronormative “affects”—the emotional and affective effects of fear, paranoia, anger, and homophobia. This affective looping thus has successfully delayed the marriage equality agenda in Taiwan. The existence and disproportionately powerful hegemony of Christianity’s influence in Taiwan partially explains Taiwan’s exceptionalism, as it re-situates Taiwan alongside the Global Northern and Southern countries that have experienced the effects of the Christian Right and the global culture wars.

My empirical findings regarding the typology of the transnational religious linkages in which Taiwanese Christian conservatives engage can help us explore the ontological aspect of the globalization of Christianity further, finding new relationships between the Global North and South. When this transnational trend in global Christianity becomes more prominent, religious objects begin to flow over national borders more reciprocally and quickly. Subsequently, believers and nonbelievers in the Global North become affected by the religious activities of Global Southerners whom they usually ignore or underestimate. Re-centering the power of conservative Christian social actors in the Global South encourages reconsideration of the presumed positionalities of core, semiperipheral, and peripheral countries, as suggested in Wallerstein’s (1974, 2004) world-system theory. Decades after Wallerstein’s model was proposed, the point is not to generate another systematic analysis that aims to reverse the power of hierarchical positions of the Global North and South. Doing so would lead us into another conceptual
trap that assumes a static power inequality. Rather, a more flexible, dynamic, and multi-leveled framework for understanding transnational religion and sexuality needs to be established.

The next chapter will follow this multi-level approach down a very different methodological path. I will use the quantitative technique of multi-level modeling (i.e., hierarchical linear modeling, HLM) and international data from 40-country world religious believers to examine an overarching claim shared by both Taiwanese and American anti-gay Christian conservatives, specifically, the claim that Christian conservatives’ sexual values about homosexuality demographically represent those of the “silent majority” of the world’s population.
Chapter 5

“Silent Majority”? A Cross-National Examination on the Representativeness of Christians’ Attitudes toward Homosexuality

During the course of my fieldwork, I kept hearing and reading anti-LGBTQ Christian conservatives claiming that they represent the voice of the “silent majority” (沉默多数, chenmo duoshu), who, they would claim, also opposed same-sex marriage and tongzhi education. These conservative religious leaders, believers, parents, and other supporters believed that their sexual values against homosexuality and its related policies remained the consensus in mainstream society. They argued that pro-gay activists were the minority whose voices were so loud that bullying them was necessary. The liberal media, governmental officials, and entertainment artists who supported tongzhi sexual rights are in conspiracy with tongzhi rights activism, conservatives claimed.

Comparable discourses can be heard among American conservatives who cite President Richard Nixon’s famous 1969 television and radio speech calling for support of the Vietnam War from the “great silent majority.” With this term, moral conservatives in the United States have intended to reduce the heterogeneity of social attitudes toward homosexuality into their own single standard based on fundamentalist theology, (re)constructing America as a nation dominated by White, middle class, heterosexual family values. In other words, to (re)claim the representativeness of the “silent majority”
is to (re)define or invent American nationalism (Barrett-Fox 2016; Moss and Baden 2017; Sutton 2014; Zimmerman 2002). The history of Taiwanese conservatism is much shorter than the one of U.S. conservatism, but Taiwanese conservatives’ use of “silent majority” to homogenize the variation of sexual attitudes in society is similar with the American case.

In the last chapter, I showed four routes of the transnational circulation of moral conservative discourses and strategies around the globe; the term “silent majority” is no doubt in conservative activists’ “playbook,” circulated in many countries. In this chapter, I will zoom out to the international level and use representative data collected from 40 countries by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) to examine whether these conservatives’ attitudes toward homosexuality are as widely representative as they have claimed. The answer I provide is not a simple Yes/No. Built on the literature of sociology of religion and sexualities, I developed a model with hierarchical linear modeling that considers how sexual attitudes could be shaped by three dimensions of religious involvement: religious belief, religious behavior, and religious belonging (i.e., affiliation with a world religion). Furthermore, I examine whether religious beliefs and behaviors interact with religious belonging to shape sexual attitudes (e.g., “Does the same increase in the amount of prayer and service attendance have more impact on the sexual attitudes of Christians or Buddhists?”). This chapter also tests for interactive influences between the macro and micro levels on sexual attitudes, which can only be conducted through international research with large-scale data.

My cross-national research shows that conservative Christians’ attitudes do not represent as much of the majority as they boldly claim. In fact, the world religions have
heterogeneous influences on believers’ sexual attitudes, especially compared with atheists. Even the gap in sexual attitudes within Christian populations (Protestants, Catholics, and Orthodox Christians) are significantly wide and contradictory. Moreover, believers’ attitudes toward homosexuality are shaped by the dimensions of religion, by national-level factors, and by their interactions in varied ways. Christian conservatives’ claim of representing the voice of the silent majority is not supported by an examination of cross-national data; it also ignores how much their own sexual attitudes have been structurally shaped by their religious practices and beliefs, along with their macro political and economic environments.

5.1 World religions and sexual attitudes

Sociologists have long conducted studies of how macro factors influence micro ideas or behaviors. Over the past two decades, many cross-national studies have examined the country-level predictors that influence individuals’ attitudes toward homosexuality, which is operationalized as a sexual relationship between two same-sex adults (Andersen and Fetner 2008a, 2008b; Adamczyk 2017; Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Adamczyk and Hayes 2012; Adamczyk and Cheng 2015; Hooghe and Meeusen 2013). Scholars have indicated that, nationally, economic development and democracy have strong associations with more liberal values toward homosexuality and other unconventional behaviors, echoing Inglehart’s “postmaterialist” thesis (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart 1977, 2007). Institutional protections for same-sex couples’ rights are, in turn, correlated with residents’ sexual tolerance.\textsuperscript{44} Hooghe and Meeusen’s (2013)

\textsuperscript{44} In this chapter, I use the word “tolerance” as a synonym of more positive attitudes
longitudinal study shows that countries with greater tolerance for homosexuality are more likely to pass same-sex marriage acts; in turn, legislation on same-sex marriage significantly increases citizens’ approval rates regarding homosexuality. Also, a wide range of individual characteristics—including age, gender, education, religion, and migration experience—shape sexual attitudes. Numerous research studies confirm that, on average, females, younger generations, and people who have attained higher education and experienced inter-state or international migrations have greater tolerance toward homosexuality than their male, older, less educated, and rarely migrating counterparts (Andersen & Fetner, 2008a:314; 2008b:946; Persell 2001).

The least helpful way to understand what shapes people’s sexual attitudes is to reproduce the binary between religiosity and atheism ("he is anti-gay because he is religious.") or to reduce religion into religious affiliation ("she is anti-gay because she is Christian."). In Chapter 3, I showed how nuanced and inconsistent the translation and interpretation of the same scriptures can be, generating a wide range of religious teachings in believers’ sexual attitudes and fundamentally shaping their opinions. Religion, I argue, is one of the most complex, obfuscating, debatable, yet important toward homosexuality. I recognize the limits of this concept, acknowledging the “tricks” it may bring to the movements for ultimate gender and sexual equality. My use here is to simply substitute respondents’ positive opinions about the sexual relationship between two adults of the same-sex, which was literally asked in a large-scale international survey (see my operationalization below). I agree with Walters’ radical critique that the idea of “tolerance” is not enough for radical transformation. It may present “the development of a more inclusive and powerful sexual and gender freedom” (Walters 2014:273). Unfortunately, I am limited by the international data and quantitative methods to make this extensive claim in this chapter. Please notice the “trap” of the concept “tolerance” may imply (see Walters 2014 for more critical arguments).

45 While sexual attitudes could refer to attitudes regarding various sexual issues, in this study I use “sexual attitude” as a synonym for and abbreviation of attitudes toward homosexuality.
factors that powerfully shapes attitudes toward homosexuality at both the individual and national levels. Kurtz (2012b) underscores the complexity of religion in this respect: “It is difficult to generalize about the relationship between religion and sex because the range of beliefs, rituals, and institutional regulations is so broad, from the celebratory to the celibate, from the tantric and orgiastic to ascetic renunciation” (182).

One unsettled sex-religious debate is whether or not religion decreases acceptance for homosexuality (Barringer, Gay, and Lynxiler 2013; Schwartz and Huismans 1995; Weller 1975). The conventional impression of religion’s hostility against sexual minorities has been reinforced by positions such as the Vatican’s anti-sodomy stance,46 fringe evangelical fundamentalists’ gay-hatred slogans,47 ISIS extremists who push open gays off of buildings to their deaths, and Africa and former British colonies’ implementation or exacerbation of anti-sodomy laws (Roberts and Yamane 2012b:283).

However, this negative impression is untrue in many ways. It fails to consider attitudinal variations and nuances of textual interpretation among world religions and ignores the considerable gap between official teaching and individual’s attitudes. It also presents religions and denominations as homogeneous, monolithic entities, overshadowing the degree to which world religions vary from absolutely affirming and welcoming homosexuals to strongly disapproving of and condemning their existence. For

46 Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger (1986)—later to become Pope Benedict XVI—issued the “Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons” when he served as head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. This letter clearly condemned most homosexual behaviors, and it framed the homosexual inclinations as “a more or less strong tendency ordered toward an intrinsic moral evil.” Thus, “the inclination itself must be seen as an objective disorder” (Para. 6; c.f. Siker 2007c:162–164). See Jung (2007) for a more detailed description of the Roman Catholic stance on homosexuality.
47 See the “God Hates Fags” website (http://www.godhatesfags.com/) for examples.
example, according to Siker (2007a:iv) and Roberts and Yamane (2012b:287), religions and denominations can be categorized into three groups based on their friendliness to gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people.

Group 1 contains those who firmly express hostility against homosexuality. E.g., Eastern Orthodox Christianity, Evangelical Protestantism, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Islam, Mormonism, Orthodox Judaism, and U.S. Southern Baptists.

Group 2 includes those who generally promote rejection but express tolerance partially. E.g., mainline Protestant denominations, some of which welcome LGBT believers. Some of them allow openly gay religious servants to be ordained but do not honor same-sex marriages. Reform and conservative Judaism.

Group 3 affirms and accepts homosexuality. E.g., the Metropolitan Community Church, the Unitarian Universalist Association, and the United Church of Christ (Siker 2007a:iv; Roberts and Yamane 2012b:287).

While “categorical thinking” about religious affiliation has raised a fruitful complexity, incorporating the effects of religious beliefs and behaviors into consideration of attitudes toward homosexuality further complicates the framework. It is reasonable to assume that believers’ increasing religiosity and participation in religious practices in Group 1 religions will lead to a decrease in their tolerance toward homosexuality. They may more likely agree that homosexuality is a sin or an abomination, that homosexuals should not be eligible to be ordained as pastors, rabbis, or other religious leaders, and that same-sex marriage is against sacred teachings (Kurtz 2012a; Roberts and Yamane 2012b; Siker 2007b).
Nevertheless, the effects of religious beliefs on anti-gay views are not universally strong. For those who belong to Group 3, more frequent participation in relatively LGBT-friendly services and stronger religiosity in gay-affirmative sacred creeds would increase their acceptance of homosexuality. Or, conversely, people who firmly accept LGBT people are more likely to join or convert to more inclusive religions that welcome sexual minorities. Although this is a relatively small self-selected group of adherents, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the influence of religious behavior and belief on attitudes toward homosexuality varies depending on religious affiliation; different religious affiliations hold enormously discrepant and contradictory stances toward homosexuality. Meanwhile, religious affiliation may have interactions with the religious teachings about sexualities of specific religions or denominations.

Unfortunately, little cross-national literature provides a comprehensive framework to capture these interactions within and between the three dimensions of religious belief, behavior, and belonging (what I call the “religious triple B”). Perhaps limited by data and short a degree of freedom, many previous studies that inspired this research tended to use partial measurements of religion. Some inherited what I call the categorical thinking of religion by merely measuring respondent’s self-reported religious belonging (affiliations) (Hooghe and Meeusen 2013). Others used the matrix of Catholic/Protestant/other religions and practicing/non-practicing (Andersen and Fetner 2008a, 2008b) or examined self-evaluations on the importance of religion in participants’ lives (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009). Whitehead (2010) is one of few to use the three-dimensional schema—religious belief, behavior, and affiliation—to explore how religion relates to individuals’
attributions of the causes of homosexuality, but, unfortunately, his data can only be
generalized in the U.S. context, and this research address attribution rather than attitudes.

To put these various pieces together, this research further establishes a
three-dimensional model to explain more of the complexity of religious influences on
attitudes toward homosexuality at the cross-national level. Analyzing cross-national data
from 40 countries with multilevel models, I examine whether and how religious BBBs
(beliefs, behaviors, and belongings) are associated with opinions about homosexuality at
the individual level, while testing whether and how these individual opinions are
influenced by other macro-level factors, including a country’s dominant religion, political
system, and economic development.

Furthermore, two hypothetical interactions are explored. First, I examine whether
an individual’s sexual attitudes will be influenced by whether this person’s religion is the
absolute majority in the country in which he/she lives (i.e., cross-level interactions
between the individual and country levels). In addition, I explore whether the effects of
religious beliefs and behaviors on attitudes toward homosexuality will vary based on
which religion (or no religion) to which the person belongs (i.e., inter-dimensional
interactions) (c.f., Bloom and Arikan 2013). Ultimately, this chapter employs a
three-dimensional model to demonstrate how macro religious structures formulate and
interact with micro religious and demographic characteristics to shape sexual attitudes,
offering a more comprehensive and generalizable framework for understanding the
complexity of world religions and sexualities.
5.2 Unpacking the religion mechanism

5.2.1 Religious behavior, belief, and belonging

Based on Siker’s categorization, I use Bloom and Arikan’s (2013) framework to unpack religious institutions by distinguishing among religious behaviors, beliefs, and belongings: “the three religious B’s.”48 Although these three dimensions are intertwined conceptually, they have respective relationships with believers’ sexual attitudes. The first B, behavior, reflects frequency of prayer and attendance at religious services. More frequent prayer and attendance usually indicates stronger connections with a formal religious institution and associated ideologies. Heterosexual procreation is still deemed the most legitimate expression of sexuality in many religions, and prayer guides and services are often platforms from which to distribute, reproduce, and consolidate homophobia and heteronormativity. The channels of hostility against homosexuality include peer pressure from strong social ties within religious network and institutional punishment inscribed in written rules. However, these effects of religious practice may be reversed in LGBT-friendly denominations, although these denominations remain underdeveloped than heteronormative ones. Built on this literature, two hypotheses need to be examined. Generally, more frequent prayer and attendance at religious gatherings amplifies anti-gay hostility. However, these repressive effects will only exist for certain world religions, whereas increased frequency of religious behavior may have no effect or the opposite effect in other religions.

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48 Noteworthily, although Bloom and Arikan (2013) coined this religious framework, they tested a different outcome (individual support of democracy), and they did not cover the relations between religion and homosexuality. Whitehead (2010) uses a similar schema—religious belief, behavior, and affiliation—to show that the three religious dimensions are strongly associated with individuals’ attributions of the causes of homosexuality in the U.S. context.
Avoiding being swamped with immeasurable theological debates and endless hermeneutical circuits, I define the second B, belief, to contain two socio-psychological aspects: religiosity and intolerance of religious diversity. Higher religiosity—defined as the degree of being religious, believing in God (broadly defined), and relying on God to make life meaningful—is expected to decrease tolerance of homosexuality. Compared with secularized followers, strongly religious believers may more easily follow the doctrines, allowing official theological teachings to shape their judgments on homosexual issues. On the other hand, intolerance of religious diversity includes beliefs that religious groups should not share equal rights and that not all religions deserve equal respect. Hypothetically, people who hold less egalitarian perspectives on world religions—who honor only their own God while harshly disdaining other religions—may have less knowledge and experience about cultural relativism, be less tolerant of diversity, and, thus, express more hostility against any forms of non-heterosexual, pro-creation-oriented sexuality. Putting the discussion of the two factors together, I examine the first hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 1. The increase of religious beliefs and behaviors, on average, reduces tolerance of homosexuality.*

The third religious B, belonging, represents individuals’ religious affiliation and self-identification. Built on the three-group categorization (Siker 2007b), it should be safe to hypothesize that believers’ attitudes toward homosexuality will vary across religions. Although we lack knowledge about the cross-national diversity of religious attitudes toward homosexuality, single-nation studies have hinted at considerable variation. The U.S. data show that the probability of agreeing that “homosexuality should be accepted
by society” ranges from 12% of Jehovah’s Witnesses, a denomination of Christian evangelicals, to 82% of Buddhists. Regarding marriage, Pew Research Religion and Public Life Project (2014) shows that only 21% of White evangelical Protestants and 41% of Black Protestants favor legalization of same-sex marriages, compared with higher supporting rates from Catholics (57%) and White mainline Protestants (60%).

However, such categorical thinking has limits. Adamczyk (2017) argues that the dominating religious factor that determines the degree of tolerance or disapproval against homosexuality is people’s emphasis on religious importance rather than their categorical religious affiliations and sacred texts. Specifically speaking, based on Adamczyk’s marginal estimates, Protestants and Muslims’ mean disapproval rates are very close to each other, as high as 8.4 out of 10—even though their religious texts substantially differ from, and sometimes mutually contradict, each other. Conversely, while Catholics and Protestants share more similar canons and genealogies, Catholics’ disapproval rates (lower than 8) are closer to the rates of Buddhists and people with no religion (Adamczyk 2017:19). Based on these findings, I test the second hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 2.** Tolerance toward homosexuality differs across religious affiliations with Protestantism and Islam being less tolerant than Catholicism, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and other Eastern religions.

Importantly, this hypothesis differentiates Protestants from Catholics, which may challenge their own and outsiders’ imagined solidarity of “the” Christian community and calls into question the homogeneity of the “silent majority”: Does the silent majority even exist if the people who have tended to use this term to call for solidarity and collective action have been deeply divided? I will return to this topic in the discussion section.
5.2.2 Macro factors: Major religions, democracy, and economy

Since the early stages of sociology, classical thinkers have addressed the power of religion as a structural influence shaping sexuality. In *The Sociology of Religion*, Weber (1963[1922]) states, “The relationship of religion to sexuality is extraordinarily intimate, though it is partly conscious and partly unconscious, and though it may be indirect as well as direct” (236). Structurally, contemporary findings show that economic development, democracy, and modernization have strong associations with more liberal values toward unconventional behaviors or people, including homosexuality, as suggested in Inglehart’s postmaterialist thesis (Inglehart 1977, 1987, 2007; Inglehart and Abramson 1999; Inglehart and Baker 2000). By testing the thesis in 35 democracies, Andersen and Fetner (2008b) found that gross economic development significantly increases tolerance; however, economic *inequality* decreases the degree of social trust, and this reduction, in turn, is associated with less tolerance towards homosexuality (944). Considering national regimes, Hooghe and Meeusen (2013) indicate that a longer duration of a stable democracy greatly reduces people’s prejudices against gay men and lesbians. In other words, more stable and better economic development are associated with greater tolerance toward homosexuality.

In addition to the conditions of politics and economy, the dominant religion in a country should be linked to citizens’ attitudes about homosexuality, but this factor receives little attention. Previous studies have shown incomparable findings on the effects of national major religions. A table in Andersen and Fetner’s study (2008b) suggests that, compared to countries that have mixed Protestant–Catholic bodies as religious majorities, individuals in predominantly Protestant counties have lower tolerance for homosexuality.
Unfortunately, the authors did not further explain the results or test how this factor influences residents of different religions or no religion. On the other hand, Hooghe and Meeusen (2013) suggest that, compared to Eastern Orthodox countries, European countries with predominantly Roman Catholic or mixed Protestant–Catholic traditions have slight, but significantly less disapproval, homosexuals’ freedom to choose their lifestyles. In other words, research has returned inconsistent findings about the influence of Protestantism or the mixture of Protestantism and Catholicism at the national level on individuals’ sexual attitudes. Thus, this research tests the macro influence of national religion on individuals’ sexual attitudes:

*Hypothesis 3. The nationally predominant religion significantly influences people’s attitudes about homosexuality, over and above individual religious orientation.*

In other words, I examine whether world religions have different influences on followers’ sexual tolerance unevenly through various religious belief systems that structurally shape their personal sexual attitudes.

### 5.2.3 Two interactional effects

My research re-assesses the influence of national major religions. Major religions, I argue, shape the national atmosphere of sexual morality, socialize citizens into generally shared sexual beliefs, and provide the socio-psychological foundations of public opinion related to homosexuality. The major religion in a country structurally shapes its citizens’ attitudes toward homosexuality, regardless individuals’ own religious behaviors, beliefs, and belongings. However, this structural power may have different degrees of influence on individuals’ sexual attitudes, intermediated through their own religious affiliations.
Thus, I further examine whether the association of an individual’s religious belonging with their attitudes toward homosexuality varies according to the national major religion of the country where they live.

_Hypothesis 4. Individual religious affiliations interact with the major religion in a country to shape attitudes toward homosexuality [cross-level interaction]._

This is what I call the “cross-level interaction factor,” which tests the interactive influence between the micro-level religion and macro-level religion (national major religion) as a function of shaping sexual attitudes.

Lastly, thanks to the scope and heterogeneity of my data, I can further explore whether the first two religious dimensions (religious behavior and belief) have different influences on sexual attitudes, depending on religious affiliation. For example, for those whose religious gatherings are an important platform to deliver teachings about sexual values (e.g., Protestantism and Catholicism), the increase of religious behavior (i.e., attending more services) is supposed to decrease their believers’ tolerance toward homosexuality relative to those whose religious services are often sexual value-free (e.g., Buddhism and other Eastern religions). On the other hand, for those religions with teachings that are more homophonic and hostile against non-heterosexuality, being more religious is supposed to lead to lower tolerance of homosexuality. Based on these deductions, I explore the fourth hypothesis:

_Hypothesis 5. The negative influence of religious belief and behavior on believers’ tolerance of homosexuality varies across their religious belongings [inter-dimensional interaction]._
The “inter-dimensional interaction” factor refers to interactions between the dimensions of religious behavior and belonging and between religious belief and belonging. I will not test the interaction between religious behavior and belief due to lack of a theoretical foundation suggesting an influence on sexual attitudes resulting from this interaction.

Based on the five hypotheses, I use a two-level and three-dimensional framework to examine global Christian conservatives’ bold statements about the “silent majority” and to reveal the religious and structural mechanisms that shapes individual sexual values. This two-level and three-dimensional framework is shown in Figure 5.1.
**MACRO LEVEL**

**National major religion**

The religion with which 70% of the national population and more is affiliated

**MICRO LEVEL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Behavior</th>
<th>Religious Belief</th>
<th>Religious Belonging</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The frequencies of prayer and attendance at religious services.</td>
<td>1. The degree of religiosity. 2. The degree of intolerance of religious diversity.</td>
<td>Identification with a particular religious institution or community.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attitude toward Homosexuality

Individual opinions about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex.

**Figure 5.1** The Analytic Framework of Two Levels and Three Dimensions on Attitude toward Homosexuality
5.3 Data and methods

5.3.1 Data

I integrated individual- and country-level data from various sources. My individual-level data came from the 40-country survey collected by International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) using the 2008 wave of a religion-specific survey. This ISSP dataset includes most European countries, the United States, Mexico, three Latin American countries, South Africa, Russia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. All of the data are representative of the national population, although the sampling procedures—partly simple random samples and partly multi-stage stratified random sampling—differed across the countries. After listwise deletion, the analytic sample included 49,821 respondents out of an original set of 59,986 cases (missing rate: 16.9%).

Country-level data—including data on economic development (per-capital GDP), political stability (democracy), national dominant religion, and policies that protect homosexuality-related human rights—were collected from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Center for Systematic Peace, the U.S. CIA World Factbook, and the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersexual Association (ILGA, see Itaborahy and Zhu 2013). The country-level data were merged with ISSP individual-level data to create the final dataset under study.

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49 In most countries, data were collected from samples of adults (18 years old and older), with a few exceptions that extended the sample to participants one to three years younger than 18. See the link for methodological details: http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp?object=http://zacat.gesis.org/obj/fStudy/ZA4950
5.3.2 Individual-level measurements

The first part of Table 5.1 shows the operationalizations of the dependent and independent individual-level variables. The dependent variable, attitudes toward homosexuality, was originally measured by a four-point ordinal question: “And what about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex, is it: 1) always wrong; 2) almost always wrong; 3) wrong only sometimes; 4) not wrong at all; 8) can’t choose; 9) no answer.” According to the focus of this research (tolerance of homosexuality) and my early tests showing the polarization surrounding this question, I recorded this variable as a dichotomous one: 0 (always wrong and almost always wrong) and 1 (wrong only sometimes and not wrong at all). Compared with coding only “not wrong at all” as 1 and leaving the rest as 0, my dichotomous coding better reflects the distribution of the original data because over 70% of responses are clustered around extremely negative or positive options. Moderate opinions are relatively rare. My early tests of regression (not reported here) also showed that models with a half-half binary variable have stronger explanatory power than the other way of coding.

Religious behavior, belief, and belonging are the main individual-level predictors in this research. Religious behaviors were measured with a scale combining frequency of prayer and attendance at religious services ($\alpha = .75$). Religious beliefs were conceptualized into two scales: religiosity and intolerance of religious diversity. The religiosity scale is composed of measurements of degree of belief in God, degree of agreement on “life is meaningful only because God exists,” and degree of being religious ($\alpha = .82$). The intolerance of religious diversity scale includes the degree of disagreement over equal rights for religious groups and degree of disagreement over respect for all
religions \( (\alpha = .72) \). All three scales were standardized using an average z-score. Their Cronbach’s \( \alpha \) levels are all higher than .70.

Religious belonging was measured with dummy variables for seven religious groups: Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Christian Orthodox and other Christian religions, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism or Hinduism or other Eastern religions, and other religions. The category of “no religion” is the reference group. The wide diversity of religious data in this ISSP wave allows me to explore non-Christian populations globally.

Following existing research, I controlled for respondents’ biological sex, age, education, and migration experience (Andersen & Fetner 2008a, 2008b; Persell 2001). Sex was a dummy variable, with male as the reference group. Age and education were measured in years. Migration experience was a dummy variable that recodes those who ever lived in different countries or different places in the same country as a migration-experiencing group. Those who have always lived in the same neighborhood and moved between neighborhoods in the same place were the reference group.

5.3.3 Country-level Predictors

The major country-level predictor is the dominant religion in the nation, with the controls of per-capita GDP, stability of democracy, and the legalization of protective homosexual policies. Data for national religious compositions come from the U.S. CIA (2012) World Factbook. A nation’s dominant religion is defined as that religion (Catholicism, Protestantism, or other religions) whose self-identifying believers comprise at least 70% of the population in the country. I do not include a “mixed Christian country” category because, as some scholars suggest (Barrett, Kurian and Johnson 2001[1982]), Catholicism and Protestantism have different bureaucratic systems, religious behavioral
patterns, and biblical instructions. While this research looks into the effects of religious belonging on beliefs and behaviors, it is better to conceptualize Catholicism and Protestantism as different religious enterprises rather than to lump them together. This coding also helps to test the consistency of the Christian community.

Following common practice, I used per-capita GDP to measure national economic development. The data for per-capita GDP are gathered from the World Economic and Financial Surveys of the World Economic Outlook Database (WEO), provided by the IMF (2008a). To control for the national political regime, I used the stability of a democracy (measured in years between the last substantive change in authority and the present democratic regime) in order to more sensitively measure the influence of democracy than with the conventional dummy of democracy or non-democracy. Further, following Hooghe and Meeusen’s (2013) guide, I controlled for two national protective policies for homosexual rights: acts concerning employment-related anti-discrimination based on sexual orientation and the national status of same-sex marriage legalization.

5.3.4 Models

I employed the hierarchical lineal modeling (HLM) technique to analyze how factors at multiple levels influence attitudes toward homosexuality. HLM allows me to manage cross-national variations, to discover the nuances embedded within religious

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50 Their values are represented in U.S. dollars, at current prices, as of April 2014, per person. To efficiently interpret the coefficients of the models, per-capita GDPs are recoded in thousands of dollars.
51 My earlier models, not shown here, examined the effects of other national homosexuality-related protective policies, including (1) the length of legalization of homosexual behaviors (decriminalization), (2) the legal recognition of hate crimes based on sexual orientation as an aggravating circumstance in the national Panel Code in 2008, and (3) the secondary marriage-like rights (e.g., civil unions, domestic partnerships, etc.). These three variables were not significant when the other two (employment-right protection policy and legislation of same-sex marriage) were included.
mechanisms, and to resolve the puzzle of cross-level interaction (i.e., whether the national religion interacts with individuals’ religious belonging to influence their attitudes toward homosexuality).\footnote{The HLM was used because of it three strengths. First, it nests individual observations within national contexts and specifically controls for country-level similarities among people, avoiding violating the OLS assumption that individual-level cases and their errors are independent. Second, HLM is useful for testing hypotheses regarding how country-level variables affect individual-level relations between attitudes and religious variables. Third, HLM makes it possible to test whether any cross-level interactions between a nationally-dominant religion and individual religious affiliation exist (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012).}

All HLM models include individual-level main predictors—religious behavior, belief, and belonging—as well as four individual-level control variables (sex, age, education, and migration). Model 1 (see Table 5.4) includes the individual-level variables, a random intercept, and two previously known country-level factors (per-capita GDP and stability of democracy) (Hypotheses 1 and 2). Model 2 includes country-level factors of major religion and homosexuality protective policies in order to test the effects of dominant religions (Hypothesis 3). Then, I tested two interactive hypotheses by running Models 2A–2D. As shown in Table 5.5, model 2A examines the \textit{cross-level interactions} between individuals’ religious belonging and their national major religion (Hypothesis 4). Model 2B–2D examines the \textit{inter-dimensional interactions} between religious belonging (affiliation) and religious behavior as well as two measures of religious belief (religiosity and intolerance of religious diversity) (Hypothesis 5). The results from applying Models 2A–2D are shown in Model 3 (Table 5.4).
5.4 Religious impacts under examination

5.4.1 Descriptive characteristics

Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics for all variables. Overall, 40% of respondents conveyed that sexual relations between two adults of the same sex are not wrong at all or wrong only sometimes, compared to 60% who disapproved of homosexuality in general. Regarding religious belonging, Roman Catholics (38.7%) and Protestants (20.1%), taken together, constitute the majority of the population under study (58.8%). As a result, Christians are overrepresented in this sample compared with their size in the world population (58.8% vs. 31.5%, Pew Research Center 2012:9), likely because ISSP data cover Euro-American countries more comprehensively than Asian, Middle Eastern, and African countries.

Followers of Judaism are also overrepresented (at 2%) compared with their worldwide proportion (0.2%) (ibid.). While 23.2% of world population is Muslim, Muslims are represented in only 4% of the sample, mainly from respondents in Turkey, where 99.8% of residents are Muslim (primarily Sunni) (ibid.; CIA 2012). Buddhists, Hindus, and followers of other Eastern religions are also underrepresented, together comprising only 4.4% of respondents, compared with their world share of 22.1% (ibid.). The remaining 20.8% of the sample is unaffiliated with any religion. In addition, women compose approximately 55% of the sample. The average age of participants is 46 years old, their average education is 12 years, and 45% of participants have had migration experiences.

At the country level, slightly more than one-third of respondents came from nations where Catholics dominate the population, while 8% came from Protestant nations.
Roughly 12% of respondents resided in nations dominated by non-Protestant and non-Catholic religions, including Greek Orthodox (Cyprus), Islam (Turkey), Judaism (Israel), a mixture of Shintoism and Buddhism (Japan), and a mixture of Buddhism and Taoism (Taiwan). The average per-capita GDP of the 40 countries is $31,237, and the mean duration of their democracies is slightly over 47 years. More than three quarters of the countries have passed anti-discrimination acts to protect employment rights for homosexuals. One out of seven people (15.3%) in the sample resided in a country where same-sex couples can legally get married.

5.4.2 Descriptive statistics of sexual attitudes by religions and countries

To provide a big picture of the variations in sexual attitudes under study as associated with world religions and country, I first obtained descriptive statistics results before listwise deletion and without other variables controlled. Table 5.2 shows how attitudes toward homosexuality vary according to world religions, sorted by disapproval rates. In general, 6 out of 10 people disapprove of homosexuality while 4 out of 10 people approve. Among world religions, respondents affiliated with Islam and Christian Orthodox and other Christian religions, on average, expressed the highest two approval rates (92.6% and 84.1%, respectively), followed by followers of Eastern religions (73%), other religions (68.5%), and Roman Catholics (61.6%). The groups of Protestants and Jewish adherents have the lowest two disapproval rates (55.7% and 55.6%). The disapproval rates of people with any religion are higher than those of people with no religion (38.9%).

Based on this table, we can derive two impressions. First, atheists are more tolerant toward homosexuality than believers of any religion. Secondly, Christians in
general are more tolerant, but there is heterogeneity within the Christian community (44% of Protestants and 38% of Catholics are tolerant; only 16% of Christian Orthodox and Other Christian Religion believers are tolerant). If Catholic and Protestant conservatives were to use this table, they might conclude that their sexual attitudes have been more liberal and inclusive than those of believers in other religions. However, my later analyses showed, the first impression is consistently correct, but the second is misleading. This is because the findings in this table were not controlled for wide-ranging variations in religious behaviors and beliefs, along with national level factors. The differences in sexual attitudes among different religions were confounded by social and other demographic factors that I will explain later.

Table 5.3 shows the descriptive statistical analysis of how attitudes toward homosexuality vary by country, sorted by disapproval rates. Turkey, the Philippines, and the Ukraine are the three most intolerant countries (whose rates of disapproving homosexuality are higher than 90%). Turkey, the only Muslim-dominant country in this sample, presents the highest disapproval rate (96.1%). The disapproval rates ranging from 89% to 80% include six countries: South Africa, Russia, Cyprus, South Korea, Dominican Republic, and Latvia.

Sixteen countries have disapproval rates ranging between 79% and 50%, and fifteen countries have disapproval rates lower than 50%. The most homosexual-friendly five countries (the lowest five) in the data are all located in Europe, including Norway (28.4%), Denmark (25.7%), Switzerland (22.1%), Belgium (19.5%), and the Netherlands (15.1%). Again, while Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show a rough picture of how attitudes toward homosexuality vary greatly according to world religions and countries, these correlations
were uncontrolled by other possible variables and, therefore, they need further examination, provided below.

5.4.3 Compounded effects of religious belonging

Table 5.4 shows the results from three hierarchical linear models. Model 1 displays the findings testing whether and how religious behavior, belief, and belonging influence tolerance toward homosexuality. Increases in religious behavior (frequency of praying and attending religious services) are significantly associated with decreases in tolerance. Greater self-reported religiosity and intolerance of religious diversity also reflect low tolerance of homosexuality. These results are consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 1, echoing previous research (Barringer, Gay, and Lynxiler 2013; Schwartz and Huismans 1995; Weller 1975), but my measurements of religious behavior and belief were improved by including wider variations at the cross-national level.

Religious belonging (affiliation) is the only religious dimension, among the three, that reflected inconsistent effects on sexual attitudes. Generally speaking, not all religious affiliations have a negative influence on tolerance toward homosexuality. The impression of such religious negativity only applies to those who belong to Christian Orthodox and other Christian religions and Islam (see Model 1). Belonging to Protestant groups does not have negative effects in this model; the same pattern occurs among believers in Eastern and other religions. Conversely, affiliations with Roman Catholicism and Judaism predicted significant increases of tolerance.

These findings partially support and partially reject the second hypothesis, specifying our understanding of the effects of religious belonging on attitudes toward homosexuality. On the one hand, the three Christian groups under study show drastically
different impacts of their religious belonging on sexual attitudes. Compared with people without religious affiliations, Catholics are significantly more tolerant, Protestants do not show differences, and Orthodox and other Christians conveyed strong disapproval. Thus, those Christian conservatives who have claimed to represent the voice of “silent majority” on opposing homosexuality are ignorant of the wide attitudinal variations within their own religious communities. Jews, as a group, expressed more positive attitudes toward homosexuality than unaffiliated people, which is consistent with surveys conducted in the United States (De Boer 1978; Pew Research Center Forum on Religion and Public Life 2008). This effect may come from the Jewish reform movements and a profound sexual revolution in Jewish communities after the 1970s. Although this trend of liberal reform movements also happened in some Christian denominations, their effects on Christians’ attitudes were not as significant as on Jewish believers. By comparison, those who identify with Islam are significantly less likely to convey support for homosexuality than those without a religion. The effects of belonging to Eastern religions and other religions are not statistically significant, and this pattern remains true in the rest of models.

My findings for individual-level demographic predictors echo those of previous studies. Females, younger people, those with higher levels of education, and those who have migrated are more likely to express tolerant opinions regarding homosexuality. These four correlations held true in all models I examined.

5.4.4 Politico-economic conditions matter

As shown in the last two variables in Model 1, economic development (per-capita GDP) has significant influences on increasing respondents’ approval of homosexuality. This finding echoes the postmaterialist thesis (Andersen and Fetner 2008b), but effects of
the stability of democracy is not obvious in Model 1. Model 2 further examined the aforementioned variables’ net influence on major national religion and homosexuality-related protective policies. With these macro factors controlled, the effects of religious behavior, belief, and belonging remain the same as in Model 1, as does the strong influence of economic development. However, the stability of democracy appears to have a positive and significant effect on attitudes toward homosexuality. Two protective policies—implementing employment anti-discrimination acts and legislating same-sex marriages—both have significant influence on increasing residents’ tolerance toward homosexuals.\(^{53}\) The results show that institutional protections of homosexuality-related rights to marriage and employment are positively associated with an increase of positive attitudes toward homosexuality.

Regarding national major religions, a high concentration of Catholics (when the proportion of Catholics in a country is 70% and greater) is not significantly associated with greater acceptance of homosexuals. Compared with people from countries where no religion dominates, living in a country dominated by Protestantism or other religions is not correlated with more open sexual attitudes, either. Therefore, the results found in Model 2 do not support Hypothesis 3.

Between Model 1 and Model 2, the interclass correlation (ICC) drops from 11.42% to 7.23%.\(^ {54}\) The additional three country-level variables significantly improve the fitness of model, making Model 2 explain 4.19% of the overall variation more than Model 1.

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\(^{53}\) See the clarification of my use of “tolerance” at the beginning of this chapter.

\(^{54}\) Based on my pre-modeling test, the country-level variation of the model, without controlling for any of the macro factors, was 26.7% (not shown in the table).
5.4.5 Cross-level interactions and inter-dimensional interactions

Before building Model 2, I ran Model 2A to 2D, reported in Table 5.5, to test the hypothetical interactions between national major religions and individual religious belonging (cross-level interaction) and the interactions between religious belonging, religious behavior, and two measures of religious beliefs (inter-dimensional interactions).

Testing the cross-level interactions, Model 2A suggests that Catholics who live in a Catholicism-dominated country does not show a different degree of tolerance of homosexuality compared with Catholics living in other countries. Nevertheless, the interaction between Protestants and Protestantism-dominant countries is significant: if self-identifying Protestants live in a country where their religion is dominant (where 70% or more of the population is Protestant), their tolerance toward homosexuality is significantly higher than the sexual attitudes of those Protestants living in a country where their religion does not dominate. Notably, when this cross-level interaction is controlled, the factor of religious belonging as a Protestant has a significantly negative effect on sexual tolerance. It seems that the negative effects of belonging to Protestant groups are repressed by the compounding factor of whether or not the Protestants are living in a country where their religion is the absolute majority. This pattern of cross-level interaction also applies to the following models.

I used Models 2B to 2D to explore three pairs of hypothetical inter-dimensional interactions. In Model 2B, I tested whether the effect of religious behavior on sexual attitudes would vary depending on religious belonging. Its results showed that this pattern is true of individuals in five religious affiliations. Affiliation with three Christian categories (Catholics, Protestants, and other Christians), Judaism, and other religions
increases religious behaviors (i.e., praying and attending religious meetings more frequently) and significantly decreases their tolerance toward homosexuality. However, the negative effects of religious behavior do not apply to respondents affiliated with Islam and Eastern Religions. Here, Model 2B specifies the negativity of religious behavior to sexual attitudes, and it shows that an increase of religious behavior only reduces the tolerance toward homosexuality for all three groups: Christians, Jews, and other religion believers. Christians received a negative influence from their religious practice on their level of sexual tolerance that did not apply among Muslims and Eastern religion believers.

Models 2C and 2D, respectively, examine the influence of two kinds of religious belief: religiosity and intolerance toward religious diversity. Model 2C was used to test whether or not the effects of religiosity on attitudes toward homosexuality vary based on respondents’ religious belonging. The results, again, show partial negative effects. The negative influence of religiosity on sexual attitudes only exist among groups of Catholics, Protestants, and Judaism believers. Instead, Christian Orthodox and other Christians, Muslims, and believers of Eastern religions and other religions are not significantly influenced by the degree of their religiosity.

Model 2D, analyzing the interactions between religious belonging and intolerance of religious diversity, also shows partial impacts. Only in the Protestantism and Judaism groups do attitudes toward homosexuality significantly decrease with the increase of intolerance of religious diversity. For those who belong to other religions (defined as religions other than the six major world religions in this study), an increase of intolerance
of religious diversity is associated with more tolerance toward homosexuality than among people with no religion.

5.4.6 Final model

Finally, based on the significant interactional correlations found in Models 2A to 2D, I constructed the final model to include religious factors at both the individual and country levels and their cross-level and inter-dimensional interactions. The results are shown in Model 3 in Table 5.4.

Model 3, consistent with Models 1 and 2, shows that, in general, religious behaviors and both measures of religious beliefs (religiosity and intolerance of religious diversity) are significantly and negatively associated with attitudes toward homosexuality. With two kinds of interactions and national major religion controlled for, belonging to Protestant, Orthodox and other Christian, and Islamic groups greatly decrease the likelihood of respondents expressing tolerance toward homosexuality compared to people without religions. Instead, belonging to Judaism increases the likelihood of conveying tolerance toward homosexuality. Affiliations with Catholicism, Eastern religions, and other religions do not generate significant differences in sexual attitudes from those who are unaffiliated with any religion.

At the country level, strong economic development and a stable democracy are accompanied with increases of tolerance toward homosexuality. The availability of national rights to marry and protective policies for homosexuals in employment also significantly predicts increasing sexual tolerance. Regarding the national major religion, I found that living in a Catholic-dominant country (where their proportion is 70% or higher), residents’ tolerance toward homosexuality could be significantly higher. Living
in a country dominated by Protestantism, Islam, or Eastern religions does not change residents’ sexual attitudes significantly. This means that a country being led by Catholics, as a macro factor, does change individuals’ sexual attitudes regardless of their personal religious belongings.

Examining Hypothesis 4 and 5, the last part of Model 3 explores the effects of cross-level and inter-dimensional interactions. A cross-level interaction (i.e., the interaction between individuals’ religious affiliation and national major religion) does exist, as Hypothesis 4 suggests. However, this pattern only applies to Protestants. In countries where Protestants are not dominant, being Protestant reduces tolerance \((b = -.270)\) compared with being affiliated with no religion. In sharp contrast, Protestants living in a country where Protestants absolutely dominate the religious population (occupying 70% of the national population or more) are more likely to convey tolerance toward homosexuality. Their attitudes, on average, drastically flip from negative \((b = -.270)\) to positive \((b = -.270 + .546 = .276)\). A critical mass of Protestants at the country level produces the significant effect of re-shaping individual Protestants’ considerations of homosexuality, regardless of how they individually interpret the sacred texts and how often they practice religious rituals.

In my model, the cross-level interaction is a unique phenomenon that exclusively occurs among Protestant groups and countries. This interaction does not apply to associations between a country dominated by Catholicism or other religions and those who belong to these religions. (I will elaborate this unique environmental effect applied to Protestants in the next section.)
In Model 3, the second interactional effect—inter-dimensional interaction—indicates that negative effects of religious behavior and beliefs on attitudes toward homosexuality vary substantially across religious belongings. Specifically, with all other variables controlled, an increase of religious behaviors (praying and attending services more frequently) significantly exacerbates already negative attitudes toward homosexuality for those affiliated with Catholicism, Protestantism, Christian Orthodox and other Christian Religions, and other religions. If Jews practice more religious behaviors, their robust support for homosexuality, as a group, may decrease, but this decrease is not significant in Model 3, and their attitudes remain positive. However, an interaction between religiosity and belonging to Judaism does exist. It is the only significant interaction between religiosity and religious belonging. In other words, although belonging to Judaism in general increases respondents’ tolerance toward homosexuality \((b = .614)\) compared with those belonging to no religions, yet a one-unit increase in religiosity will lead to attitudes among Jews flipping to the negative \((b = -.571 - .726 = -1.297)\).

Finally, increases in intolerance about religious diversity, along with its negative influences on all people, significantly decrease tolerant attitudes toward homosexuality among Protestants and Jews. On the one hand, this finding supports the notion that Protestants, being more intolerant toward other religions and insisting that their God is the only God, tend to express stronger hostility toward homosexuality. The stronger this religious intolerance, the greater the sexual hostility. On the other hand, this result shows that the heterogeneity of Jews’ sexual attitudes can be better explained by the degree of their religiosity and intolerance to religious diversity. These two negative effects of this
inter-dimensional interaction may also explain why Orthodox or fundamentalist Jews firmly express hostility against homosexuality, a more conservative sub-group that has been overshadowed the liberal image of Jews, who, on average, express tolerance toward sexual minorities, as has been reiterated in U.S.-based single-country surveys (De Boer 1978; Pew Research Center Forum on Religion and Public Life 2008).

To provide a better visualization, I synthesized the patterns found in Model 3 into the cross-tabulation comparison in Table 5.6. Table 5.6 shows that, while all three Christian groups’ sexual attitudes are negatively influenced by increases of religious behavior, only Protestants’ attitudes tolerance toward homosexuality are further decreased by their being more intolerant of religious diversity. Instead, Jews’ sexual attitudes tend to be decreased with increases of both religious belief measurements. Muslims and Eastern religion believers’ sexual attitudes, by contrast, do not have significant interactive effects with their religious beliefs and behaviors.

5.5 Questioning the external validity of “silent majority”

My multi-level models using cross-national data from 40 countries provide solid evidence that fundamentally questions Taiwanese and American Christian conservatives’ claim that their own sexual attitudes represent the silent majority. My evidence-based research problematizes this claim and generates three major critiques:

First, Protestants as a social group hold significantly intolerant attitudes toward homosexuality, with all important variables controlled; however, this negative effect due to their specific religious belonging does not apply to everyone (Model 3). Only Christian Orthodox and other Christians, Jews, and Muslims received similar negative influence
from their religious belonging; Catholics and Eastern religion believers were found immune to this effect. Thus, even if only the effect of religious belonging is considered, the great Christian community *per se* (i.e., the assembly of Catholics, Protestants, Christian Orthodox and all other Christians) shows enormous heterogeneity and conflicting stances on homosexuality. In fact, Protestants have the lowest heterogeneity (and highest homogeneity) among all religious groups when asked their opinions about homosexuality (SD = .055, shown in Model 3). Yet, when it comes to acceptance of homosexuality, Protestant communities are the most monolithically intolerant religious group among the world’s religions. Indeed, Christian conservatives who intend to speak for the “silent majority” do not even represent their own religious community. Protestant conservatives who claim to represent the whole population may be blinded to the fact that their own segregated religious community has the most homogeneous voices within it. The loud voice of Christian fundamentalists and traditionalists overshadows the various opinions of other Christians. Unfortunately, Protestants’ homogeneous attitudes toward homosexuality has very weak external validity that makes their taken-for-granted sexual stance barely generalizable to the world external to their churches.

Secondly, Christians conservatives, especially evangelical and Charismatic leaders, ignore or are not aware of the environmental effects that shape their heteronormative stance. Compared with their Catholic counterparts, Protestants’ sexual attitudes are very sensitive to the national religious environment in which they are living. My results show that Protestants will hold a significantly more tolerant stance toward sexual minorities when living in a country where their own religion is nationally dominant. In other words, it is reasonable to infer that when Protestants feel safe that they
are a national religious majority (i.e., 70% of the population and more), they do not need to use sexuality issues to draw boundaries between themselves and others by expressing a firmly negative attitude toward homosexuality. However, when Protestants live in a non-Protestant-dominated country, such as Taiwan or the United States, their antagonism against sexual minorities is clear, significant, and unique. Believers of other world religions, or of no religion, do not show this interactive effect between their religion and the national religious environment. Failure to recognize this climatic effect on their own sexual attitudes, Protestants, especially Christian conservatives, may falsely regard their own sexual opinions as representative of others'. However, they are clearly not.

Someone might be curious about why the United States was not operationalized as a Protestant country. Please note that in 2008, Catholics contributed to 25.1% of the U.S. population and Protestants and other Christians (such as Mormons) contributed to 50.9% (Kosmin and Keysar 2009). Therefore, the status of Protestants was not stably dominant and less than 70% of the population in 2008. In fact, the religious share of Protestants and other Christians in the United States had been declining from 60% in 1990, 52.2% in 2001, to 50.9% in 2008 (Kosmin and Keysar 2009). Although Protestants are obviously politically powerful in the United States, their power derived from the coalition with the Republican Party and the use of moral issues to mobilize voters. From the demographic perspective, the religious share of American Protestants is not as stably dominant as Protestants, Lutherans in particular, in Denmark (95%), Finland (82.5%), Norway (82.1%), and Sweden (87%) (CIA 2012). American Protestants’ borderline share around 50% and its continuous decline likely push them to target sexual minorities as enemy for the purpose of consolidating their in-group solidarity. Furthermore, the fact
that more than a quarter of American Protestants are evangelicals, rather than mainline
Protestants such as Lutherans or Presbyterians, also partially explains why American
Protestants, as a group, are so militant against homosexuality, compared with their
European counterparts.

As noted, when living in a Catholic-dominant country, individuals’ tolerance
toward homosexuality is higher compared with people living in countries with other
dominant religions. This pattern is significant and applicable to people living in Catholic
countries regardless of individuals’ own religious affiliation (while all other relevant
factors are constant). In other words, while many Catholic countries have been
secularized and there is a substantial gap between the Pope’s teachings and secular
governments’ policies, Catholic countries provide a positive social climate to foster
residents’ sexual tolerance. This finding also helps to differentiate conservative
Protestants from Catholics. Evangelical and Charismatic Protestants who intend to speak
for the silent majority are also unaware of the national density of their Catholic
counterparts would generate a drastically opposite effect on residents’ sexual attitude.
Their bold claim is untrue in part due to double environmental effects.

Thirdly, my study shows that not all religious believers’ attitudes toward
homosexuality are diminished by more religious practice, more religiosity, and more
intolerance of religious diversity. Protestants are one of the only two world religious
groups whose sexual attitudes are consistently decreased by all these three factors.55 The

55 Jews are the other religious group whose sexual attitudes are decreased by the all three
factors. However, this impact exists on top of their generally strong tolerance toward
homosexuality. Thus, if considering the compensation from various factors, only a strong
increase of religiosity will make Jews express negative attitudes, while other religious
factors do not. In addition, Jews are not only a religious group but also an ethnic group.
negative impacts from the three religious dimensions adding on top of their already significant intolerance as a religious belonging make Protestants stand out as the only religious group in my sample whose sexual attitudes are comprehensively decreased by all religious influences, including religious behavior, belief, and belonging. In other words, Protestants present a unique case that is multi-dimensionally and multi-levelly structured by religion. The claim that their own sexual attitudes are representative of others’ is untrue. They are imposing their own unique worldview over people with different religions, overshadowing others’ heterogeneous opinions.

With a few exceptions, Protestant churches and publications, especially evangelical and charismatic ones, remain major sources of disseminated heteronormative and procreation-oriented teaching. More service-attendance and prayers, meanwhile, will lead to fostering more intolerance toward sexual minorities as these sexual ideologies are repeatedly inscribed and affirmed by organizational consensus and peer pressure. Compared with the Catholic Pope’s advocacy for religious tolerance and cross-religious collaboration, Protestants’ emphasis on the oneness and unity of their God makes them more likely condemn any religion or sexual ideologies different from their own. This further reduces the likelihood of Protestants accepting religious diversity along with other kinds of diversity, including sexual diversity. Although the attitudinal variation in Protestants exists (for example, evangelicals versus mainline Protestants), Protestants, as a religious group, show a relatively monolithic attitude toward homosexuality than believers of other religions in my data.

This process of secularization may partially account for Jews’ general social liberalism.
In addition, being religious and relying on God to make their lives meaningful each has a greater negative effect on acceptance of homosexuality for Protestants than on followers of other religions. This negativity may come from the decline of liberal Protestantism and the rise and dominant stance of evangelical and charismatic churches and theologies that insist on a literal interpretation of the Bible and frequently reiterate the seven verses of the Bible that mention sexual encounters between same-sex people.\(^{56}\)

Before concluding this chapter, for those who are not familiar with quantitative modeling, my findings and explanations are not meant to homogenize all Christian beliefs as evangelical or intolerant. I recognize the existence and abundance of counter-arguments to evangelicals’ literal, heteronormative readings of the Bible. Although Protestants were the religious group with the most homogeneous opinions in my sample, there is still heterogeneity within their community. As Boswell’s (1980) investigation of Christian history suggests, for example, hostility against homosexuality is not a timeless or universal Christian tradition. Rather, the Christian creed of anti-homosexuality was invented as “tradition” by reinterpreting the Bible with an anti-gay perspective after the 12\(^{th}\) century (Kuefler 2006:2). Other queer theologians challenge the binary system of gender and heteronormativity rooted in “traditional” Christianity itself, revealing previously-silenced or oppressed diversities of sex, gender, and sexuality present throughout human history as well as in the Bible (Althaus-Reid 2001, 2003; Cheng P. 2011, 2013; Comstock and Henking 1997).

\(^{56}\) See the segments in Genesis 19:1–19:9, also parallel stories in Judge 19, Ezekiel 16:46–16:56; Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13; Romans 1:26–1:27; 1 Corinthians 6:9; 1 Timothy 1:10. I discuss the scripture in Chapter 3.
However, contextual readings of the Bible and critical knowledge of church history may not have an opportunity to enter the spiritual worlds of many reverent Protestants. Increasingly, evangelicalized Protestant leaders and followers both in Taiwan and the United States, along with other countries, believe in the inerrancy of the Bible and in anyone’s capacity to understand God’s words through a literal interpretation, regardless of the social contexts that have influenced how the texts in the canon have been written, edited, selected, and translated. There is thus little room for postmodernist or queer theological perspectives in their worldviews. Even moderately liberal ones are not welcome. Under pressure from the evangelical movement, religious Protestants seem to agree that women who “pervert the natural use of their sex by unnatural sex” are the equivalent to contemporary lesbians (Roman 1:26), while anti-gay activists frequently cite the claim that “a man [who] has sexual relations with another man” is the equivalent of what now we call a gay man (Leviticus 20:13).

Even though Foucault (1990[1976]) convincingly verified that homosexuality was not codified as a new “species,” a “medical category,” or a sexual identity until the development of psychiatry and medicine in the 19th century (43), some evangelicalized Protestants insist that what was documented and condemned in the Bible is equivalent to the modern definition of homosexuality. Lacking a critical and contextualized reading of the Bible, these Protestants tend to believe that the doctrines of unnaturalness (i.e., abominations) formulated thousands of years ago in the Middle East should be unflaggingly followed by contemporary Protestants regardless of the huge gaps of socio-historical contexts. By internalizing these beliefs, Protestants with high religiosity and religious ethnocentrism become more intolerant of homosexuality (Thumma 2007).
Religious leaders holding this theology use their leadership in churches, and model their prayers, to re-inscribe this sexual ideology on the minds of Protestant believers, in the name of God.

In this chapter, my multi-level and cross-national data showed, however, how problematic the conservatives’ claim of representing the “silent majority” is. Christian (especially Protestant) conservatives’ sexual attitudes are uniquely negative against homosexuality, highly homogenous, and incomparable with the attitudes of followers of other religions. Thus, they cannot represent the dissenting voices over sexualities within their own Christian community, including among Catholics and Orthodox believers. This sociological research finds that these Christians’ sexual attitudes are systematically structured by their religious status in their country of residence, as a reaction to national religious environments where Protestantism is not dominant. Christians’ opinions about homosexuality are also shaped by their sense of religious belonging, and by their religious practices, religiosity, and intolerance toward religious diversity.

Protestants in Taiwan are a demographically religious minority who contribute roughly 5% of the population. During the culture wars against tongzhi movements and their advocacy for marriage equality and tongzhi education, Taiwanese Protestants claimed that their anti-tongzhi attitude represents the sexual attitude of the “silent majority.” This claim is unconvincing in many ways. As I show above, their sexual attitude is collectively structured by their status as religious minority in Taiwan. Compared with people with no religions, the sexual attitudes of Buddhism, Taoism, and other East Asian religions (the religious majority in Taiwan) do not show any negative attitudes toward homosexuality as Protestants do. In addition, Protestants’ negative
attitude is shaped by their intolerance toward religious diversity and belief of monotheism. The heterosexist and homophobic teachings spread in their prayer books and religious gatherings further consolidate the negative influence of their religious behaviors on their sexual tolerance. With these negative impacts together, the complex religious mechanism makes Protestants in Taiwan fail to represent the “silent majority.”
### Table 5.1  OPERATIONALIZATIONS, MEANS, AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VARIABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variable</strong></td>
<td><strong>Attitudes toward homosexuality</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dummy; 1 = sexual relations between two adults of the same sex is considered “not wrong at all” or “wrong only sometimes; 0 = “always wrong” or “almost always wrong”</td>
<td>.409</td>
<td>.492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variable:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Religious involvement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Behavior</strong></td>
<td><strong>Religious practice</strong> (standardized) ($\alpha = .75$)</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belief</strong></td>
<td><strong>Religiosity</strong> (standardized) ($\alpha = .82$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intolerance of religious diversity (standardized) ($\alpha = .72$)</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>.892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belonging</strong></td>
<td><strong>Roman Catholicism</strong></td>
<td>.387</td>
<td>.487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dummy; 1 = Roman Catholic (otherwise = 0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Protestantism</strong></td>
<td>.201</td>
<td>.401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dummy; 1 = Protestant (otherwise = 0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Christian Orthodox and other Christian Religions</strong></td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>.286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dummy; 1 = Christian Orthodox and other Christian religions (otherwise = 0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Judaism</strong></td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dummy; 1 = Jewish (otherwise = 0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Islam</strong></td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dummy; 1 = Islam (otherwise = 0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Buddhism, Hinduism, or other Eastern religions</strong></td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dummy; 1 = Buddhism or Hinduism (otherwise = 0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dummy; 1 = other unidentified religion (otherwise = 0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>No religion (reference)</strong></td>
<td>.208</td>
<td>.406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dummy; 1 = No religious affiliation (otherwise = 0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variable</strong></td>
<td><strong>Individual level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td>.545</td>
<td>.498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dummy; 1 = Female (otherwise = 0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>45.949</td>
<td>17.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Measured in years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>11.714</td>
<td>4.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Measured in years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Migration</strong></td>
<td>.453</td>
<td>.498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dummy; 1 = ever lived in different countries or different places in the same country (0 = lived in different neighborhoods in the same place or always lived in the same neighborhood)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.1  **OPERATIONALIZATIONS, MEANS, AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VARIABLES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major religion</td>
<td>Dummy variables (no dominating religion = reference) for:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominating Catholicism</td>
<td>Proportion of Roman Catholics is larger than 70% of national population = 1, else = 0</td>
<td>.356</td>
<td>.479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominating Protestantism</td>
<td>Proportion of Protestants is larger than 70% of national population = 1, else = 0</td>
<td>.088</td>
<td>.283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominating Other Religions</td>
<td>Proportion of believers of each other religion is larger than 70% of national population = 1, else = 0</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per-capita GDP</td>
<td>Measured in 1,000 dollars</td>
<td>31.237</td>
<td>22.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability of democracy</td>
<td>Measured in years of democracy’s durability since the last substantive change in authority</td>
<td>47.136</td>
<td>44.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment anti-discrimination acts</td>
<td>Dummy; 1 = legalization of prohibition of discrimination in employment based on sexual orientation, else = 0</td>
<td>.762</td>
<td>.426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legalization of same-sex marriage</td>
<td>Dummy; 1 = legalization of Same-Sex Marriage, else = 0</td>
<td>.153</td>
<td>.360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 2008.

Note: N = 49,821, J = 40 countries. The sum of belonging is not 1 because of rounding.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religions</th>
<th>Disapproval (%)</th>
<th>Approval (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Always wrong</td>
<td>Almost always wrong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26,787</td>
<td>4,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.07</td>
<td>9.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>59.26</strong></td>
<td><strong>40.74</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,853</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>88.45</td>
<td>4.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Islam</strong></td>
<td><strong>92.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75.73</td>
<td>8.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Christian Religions</strong></td>
<td><strong>84.12</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.88</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism, Hinduism,</td>
<td>1392</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Other Eastern Religions</td>
<td>60.28</td>
<td>12.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>73.02</strong></td>
<td><strong>26.98</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>302</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60.52</td>
<td>8.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Religions</strong></td>
<td><strong>68.54</strong></td>
<td><strong>31.46</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10,414</td>
<td>2,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.88</td>
<td>10.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Roman Catholic</strong></td>
<td><strong>61.55</strong></td>
<td><strong>38.45</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Protestant</strong></td>
<td><strong>55.68</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>510</td>
<td>73</td>
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<td></td>
<td>48.66</td>
<td>6.97</td>
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<td><strong>Jewish</strong></td>
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<td><strong>No religion</strong></td>
<td><strong>38.92</strong></td>
<td><strong>61.08</strong></td>
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</table>

Source: International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 2008.

Note: N = 53,502, J = 40 countries. This sample size includes all available observations in the dataset before accounting for missing values.
### ATTITUDES TOWARD HOMOSEXUALITY BY 40 COUNTRIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Disapproval (%)</th>
<th>Approval (%)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>59.27</td>
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<td>Philippines (PH)</td>
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<td>Ukraine (UA)</td>
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<td>Netherlands (NL)</td>
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</table>

Source: International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 2008.

Note: N = 54,149, J = 40 countries. This sample size includes all available observations in the dataset before accounting for missing values.
### Table 5.4 Hierarchical Logistic Regression of Mean Attitudes Toward Homosexuality by Religious Behaviors, Beliefs, and Belonging

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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
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<th>Model 2</th>
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<th>Model 3</th>
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<td>$SE$</td>
<td>$b$</td>
<td>$SE$</td>
<td>$b$</td>
<td>$SE$</td>
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<td>-1.591***</td>
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<td>-1.399***</td>
<td>(.223)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious practice (standardized) ($\alpha = .75$)</td>
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<td>(.020)</td>
<td>-.305***</td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td>-.120**</td>
<td>(.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity (standardized) ($\alpha = .82$)</td>
<td>-.618***</td>
<td>(.023)</td>
<td>-.618***</td>
<td>(.023)</td>
<td>-.571***</td>
<td>(.035)</td>
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<td>Intolerance of religious diversity (standardized) ($\alpha = .72$)</td>
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<td>(.014)</td>
<td>-.282***</td>
<td>(.014)</td>
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<td>(.016)</td>
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<td>(.041)</td>
<td>.161***</td>
<td>(.041)</td>
<td>-.032</td>
<td>(.058)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protestantism</td>
<td>-.023</td>
<td>(.044)</td>
<td>-.022</td>
<td>(.044)</td>
<td>-.270***</td>
<td>(.055)</td>
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<td>Christian Orthodoxy and other Christian Religions</td>
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<td>(.072)</td>
<td>-.328***</td>
<td>(.071)</td>
<td>-.530***</td>
<td>(.078)</td>
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<td>.779***</td>
<td>(.166)</td>
<td>.614***</td>
<td>(.175)</td>
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<td>(.134)</td>
<td>-1.792***</td>
<td>(.137)</td>
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<td>Buddhism, Hinduism, or other Eastern religions</td>
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<td>(.084)</td>
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<td>(.135)</td>
<td>-.153</td>
<td>(.135)</td>
<td>-.188</td>
<td>(.150)</td>
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<td>Individual level Control Variable</td>
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<td>(.024)</td>
<td>.668***</td>
<td>(.024)</td>
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<td>-.027***</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>-.027***</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>(.003)</td>
<td>.073***</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>.073***</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
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<td>.196***</td>
<td>(.025)</td>
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<td>Per-capita GDP</td>
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<td>.030***</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>.029***</td>
<td>.006</td>
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<td>(.003)</td>
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<td>(.003)</td>
<td>.006*</td>
<td>.003</td>
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<td>Employment anti-discrimination acts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legalization of same-sex marriage</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Major religion</td>
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<td>(.192)</td>
<td>.386*</td>
<td>(.192)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(.268)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interactional Effects</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-level interaction</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom. Catholicism × Cath.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom. Protestantism × Prot.</td>
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<td>(.065)</td>
<td>.546***</td>
<td>(.102)</td>
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</table>
Three-dimensional interaction

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Interaction</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Behav. × Catholicism</td>
<td>-.190***</td>
<td>(.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behav. × Protestantism</td>
<td>-.260***</td>
<td>(.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behav. × Christ. Orth.</td>
<td>-.235***</td>
<td>(.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behav. × Judaism</td>
<td>-.206</td>
<td>(.122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behav. × Other Relig.</td>
<td>-.333*</td>
<td>(.157)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity × Catholicism</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>(.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity × Protestantia</td>
<td>-.088</td>
<td>(.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity × Judaism</td>
<td>-.726***</td>
<td>(.138)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Into diversity × Protestant</td>
<td>-.188***</td>
<td>(.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Into diversity × Judaism</td>
<td>-.186*</td>
<td>(.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Into diversity × Other Relig.</td>
<td>.310</td>
<td>(.167)</td>
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</table>

Interclass correlation (ICC)

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>11.42%</th>
<th>7.23%</th>
<th>7.00%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Akaike's information criterion (AIC)

|                | 46,512.71 | 46,503.08 | 46,367.65 |

N

|                | 49,821 | 49,821 | 49,821 |

Source: International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 2008.

Note: N = 49,821, J = 40 countries.

* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001
Table 5.5  CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS AND INTER-DIMENSIONAL INTERACTIONS IN THE HIERARCHICAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF MEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD HOMOSEXUALITY

| Variable | MODEL 2A | | MODEL 2B | | MODEL 2C | | MODEL 2D |
|----------|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|
|          | $b$     | SE  | $b$     | SE  | $b$     | SE  | $b$     | SE  |
| Intercept| -1.567***| (.225) | -1.425***| (.225) | -1.440***| (.226) | -1.569***| (.224) |
| Religious involvement | | | | | | | |
| Behavior | | | | | | | |
| Religious practice (standardized) | -.300***| (.020) | -.119* | (.047) | -.287***| (.021) | -.302***| (.020) |
| Belief | | | | | | | |
| Religiosity (standardized) | -.612***| (.023) | -.615***| (.023) | -.490***| (.036) | -.608***| (.023) |
| Intolerance of religious diversity (standardized) | -.284***| (.014) | -.280***| (.014) | -.277***| (.014) | -.260***| (.025) |
| Belonging | | | | | | | |
| Roman Catholicism | .152** | (.051) | .006 (0.60) | 0.035 | (.057) | 0.148** | (.052) |
| Protestantism | -.124** | (.048) | -.249***| (.057) | -.216***| (.054) | -.126** | (.048) |
| Christian Orthodox and other Christian Religions | -.351***| (.071) | -.493***| (.079) | -.483***| (.077) | -.345***| (.072) |
| Judaism | .748*** | (.166) | .563***| (.172) | .694*** | (.174) | .738*** | (.167) |
| Islam | -1.609***| (.135) | -1.767***| (.137) | -1.641***| (.152) | -1.485***| (.160) |
| Buddhism, Hinduism, or other Eastern religions | .059 (0.84) | -.072 | (.088) | -.043 | (.087) | 0.056 | (.085) |
| Other | -.147 | (.134) | -.246 | (.145) | -.212 | (.145) | -.053 | (.141) |
| Control Variable | | | | | | | |
| Individual level | | | | | | | |
| Female | .669*** | (.024) | .667*** | (.024) | .667*** | (.024) | .667*** | (.024) |
| Age | -.027*** | (.001) | -.027*** | (.001) | -.027*** | (.001) | -.027*** | (.001) |
| Education | .073*** | (.003) | .073*** | (.003) | .073*** | (.003) | .073*** | (.003) |
| Migration | .198*** | (.025) | .196*** | (.025) | .195*** | (.025) | .197*** | (.025) |
| Country level | | | | | | | |
| Per-capita GDP | .030*** | (.006) | .030*** | (.006) | .030*** | (.006) | .029*** | (.006) |
| Stability of democracy | .006* | (.003) | .006* | (.003) | .005* | (.003) | .006* | (.003) |
| Major religion | | | | | | | |
| Dom. Catholicism | .379 | (.196) | .390* | (.194) | 0.379 | (.195) | 0.370 | (.195) |
| Dom. Protestantism | -.436 | (.376) | -.431 | (.373) | -.436 | (.375) | -.441 | (.374) |
| Dom. Other Religions | -.035 | (.273) | -.072 | (.271) | -.038 | (.272) | -.033 | (.272) |
| Employment anti-discrimination acts | .522* | (.219) | .531* | (.217) | .514* | (.218) | .531* | (.218) |
| Legalization of same-sex marriage | 0.896** | (.283) | .873** | (.281) | .882** | (.283) | .881** | (.282) |
### Interactional Effects

#### Cross-level interaction

<table>
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<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholicism</td>
<td>-0.066 (.065)</td>
<td>-0.076 (.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestantism</td>
<td>0.549*** (.100)</td>
<td>0.493*** (.102)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Inter-dimensional interaction

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<tr>
<th>Interaction</th>
<th>Parameter 1</th>
<th>Parameter 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Behav. × Catholicism</td>
<td>-.177*** (.049)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behav. × Protestantism</td>
<td>-0.262*** (.054)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behav. × Christ. Orth.</td>
<td>-0.218** (.075)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behav. × Judaism</td>
<td>-0.576*** (.100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behav. × Islam</td>
<td>0.024 (.119)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behav. × Eastern Relig.</td>
<td>0.093 (.095)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behav. × Other Relig.</td>
<td>-0.326* (.158)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity × Catholicism</td>
<td>-0.108* (.046)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity × Protestant.</td>
<td>-0.210*** (.051)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity × Christ. Orth.</td>
<td>-0.060 (.078)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity × Judaism</td>
<td>-0.856*** (.113)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religiosity × Islam</td>
<td>-0.296 (.155)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity × East. Relig.</td>
<td>-0.059 (.094)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity × Other Relig.</td>
<td>-0.300 (.179)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interaction</th>
<th>Parameter 1</th>
<th>Parameter 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Into diversity × Catho.</td>
<td>0.021 (.034)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Into diversity × Protest.</td>
<td>-0.141*** (.038)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Into diversity × Christ. Orth.</td>
<td>0.050 (.064)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Into diversity × Judaism</td>
<td>-0.240** (.084)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Into diversity × Islam</td>
<td>0.211 (.163)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Into diversity × East. Relig.</td>
<td>0.076 (.065)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Into diversity × Other Relig.</td>
<td>0.335* (.166)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Interclass correlation (ICC) 7.21% 7.09% 7.17% 7.15%

Akaike's information criterion (AIC) 46,476.39 46,431.29 46,415.19 46,451.13

N 49,821 49,821 49,821 49,821

Source: International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 2008.

Note: N = 49,821, J = 40 countries.

* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001
Table 5.6  THE INTER-DIMENSIONAL EFFECTS OF PEOPLE’S RELIGIOUS BEHAVIOR AND BELIEF ON ATTITUDES TOWARD HOMOSEXUALITY VARYING BY RELIGIOUS BELONGING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belonging</th>
<th>Behavior</th>
<th>Belief</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Religiosity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholicism</td>
<td>-.310***</td>
<td>-0.571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestantism</td>
<td>-0.380***</td>
<td>-0.571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Orthodox and other Christian Religions</td>
<td>-0.355***</td>
<td>-0.571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judaism</td>
<td>-0.120</td>
<td>-1.297***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>-0.120</td>
<td>-0.571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism, Hinduism or other Eastern religions</td>
<td>-0.120</td>
<td>-0.571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other religions</td>
<td>-0.453*</td>
<td>-0.571</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 2008.
Note: N = 49,821, J = 40 countries.
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001
Chapter 6

Conclusion: Rigid Minds, Liquid Conservatism, and Transnational Sex-Religious Networks

6.1 Rigid minds

Over the years of proposing and writing this dissertation, many global flows regarding Christian conservatism and sexual citizenship have emerged, shaped, and changed global society. After I learned that my name was listed as one of Taiwanese Christian conservatives’ prayer targets in 2011, I used my bilingual skills to track the transnational flows of distorted knowledge and discourses about tongzhi (LGBTQQIAA). I was naïve enough to believe that, as long as I could reveal the sources, channels, and brokers of these heteronormative ideas and uncover their intentions, the operations of hatred, fear, anxiety, and heteronormativity would be weakened, if not entirely dismantled. I was wrong.

My Taiwanese colleagues in GEE and pro-tongzhi movements and I did not foresee how Christian conservative churches would swiftly grow from an informal assembly into a thriving ecosystem and a well-equipped political network. In 2011, “conservative” was a dismissible ghost. By 2018, the ghost had found its body — in fact, bodies. Conservative representatives sit next to pro-tongzhi and feminist scholars and activists in governmental monthly meetings. They occupy national political space to
oppose the implementation of equal sexual citizenship, including marriage equality, tongzhi education, and government-sponsored tongzhi civil movements. Their intention is to delay or permanently kill the progressive policies and movements for sexual citizenship that conservatives see as evil and sources of promiscuity, moral corruption, and societal catastrophe. They warn Taiwanese society that if these policies become enacted, society will fall into disorder and lose its foundation of heterosexual marriage and traditional family values.

Many social scientists, psychologists, medical researchers, and other scholars (including myself, as a sociologist and gender equity educator) stood up and used rigorous research to correct their false, distorted, and misquoted information. They either ignored these critiques or continued citing other studies by ACPed, NARTH, Dr. Kwan, or other morality-based “research institutes” or “researchers.” They suggested that because these studies have origins in the United States and derived from large-scale samples, or were recently published, they are true.

Only after my encounter with Taiwanese Christian conservatism did I finally understand that there are two operating kinds of “truth.” Scientific truth is evidence-based and subject to change vis-a-vis new data and new theories being developed. Christian conservatives’ truth is rather rigid, unchangeable, and resistant to empirical challenge. Many scholars subjected conservative discourses to critiques based on meticulous examinations of data and research (the approaches inspired by Marxism and critical theories). I found that critical knowledge tends to make conservatives’ minds more rigid and defensive, rather than enabling them to reach mutual understanding through dialogue. Their own truth is what they believe, what God teaches them through religious leaders’
exegesis, and what they literally interpret from the Bible. Anything other than this, to them, is evil. Contextualizing biblical texts is evil. Pointing out that what is said in the Bible differs from the modern definition of tongzhi is evil. Teaching children that forms of marriage and family are social constructs that are subject to change according to socio-historical contexts is evil.

Under their façades as parents (concerned mothers, in particular), teachers, professionals, pastors, and pure-minded politicians, pro-family Christian conservatives are fighting to protect their “TRUTH.” The “TRUTH,” in capital letters, is rigid and must be rigid. Their need to eradicate tongzhi is their imperative, their “TRUTH,” a dictate from their God. The TRUTH is not wrong and it must not be wrong. If it is wrong, the entire foundation of their beliefs will be dismantled. If tongzhi people and their marital rights and educational programs become righteous, then this would imply that all the decades-long anti-tongzhi, anti-abortion, anti-adultery, and anti-sexualities teachings have been questionable.

After having embedded myself in conservative churches and interviewing and praying with many Christians, it finally dawned upon me that anti-tongzhi conservatives’ anxieties about societal collapse derive from their deep concerns that their belief systems are under threat. Their theological systems and worldviews, and their entire socio-economic ecosystems have been built upon their churches. I observed that there are many people in need, suffering from diseases, personal losses, marital failures, divorce, loneliness, adultery, sexual harassment, sexual assaults, childhood traumas, poverty, lack of social support, parenting challenges, and the dying or death of significant others, to name a few.
To meet these needs, the churches function as centers of social life, providing everything they need: childcare, financial support, food exchanges, counseling, adult education, free housework assistance, and free tutors for schoolwork, choir singing, instrument playing, accounting, leadership, project management, and international ministry. The list goes on and on. In sociological terms, the churches open up opportunities for church-goers to accumulate and exchange economic, social, and cultural capital, which secures both their social lives and spiritual worlds. With widespread tongzhi education, marriage equality, and campaigns for equal sexual citizenship standing in the churches’ way, how can the churches be righteous? Any critiques of the churches are attacks on the ecosystems on which they depend. How can they allow an abstract truth written in some obscure journals they never heard of to radically destroy the foundation of their TRUTH on which they desperately rely? They believe that their TRUTH is truer and livelier than empirical truth. So-called scientific findings are just another modern tool that Christian conservatives have selected to justify their TRUTH as righteous and unassailable.

To Christian conservatives, the most beautiful thing is that the churches provide a symbolic system that makes those who did wrong believe that they can be redeemed and become purified and righteous. In religious terms, in God they can be born again. The mechanism of redemption makes complete sense to Christian conservatives. They believe that they are moral enough to criticize tongzhi and transgender people’s gender and sexualities as a sin and abomination, even though they themselves had experienced divorce, adultery, extra-marital sex, pre-marital sex, sexual harassment, sexual assault, drug use, homosexuality, and other sexualities they publicly condemn. I do not imply that
these sexual behaviors should necessarily be morally evaluated. My point is that the religious system of Christian conservatism allows these believers to morally and politically attack sexual minorities even though their own sexual practices failed to attain the standards that they set up. They unconsciously use the attacks on sexual minorities to help themselves maintain the completion of their self-image, reproducing their moral supremacy. This symbolic system, which is comprehensive and quite resilient, can explain away many contradictions, wiping out believers’ mistakes and debasing non-believers. This is why the collective mind of Christian conservatives can be so rigid in the face of contradictions in their arguments and actions. The mindset of Christian supremacy is rigid, and it must become all the more rigid. Maintaining a rigid mind is the best way for Christian conservatives in Taiwan (and perhaps in other countries) to face the challenges posed by local and global movements of sexual citizenship, and the challenges of liquid modernity in general.

6.2 Liquid conservatism

Despite the façade of rigidity, the Christian conservative networks I studied are, in fact, liquid, fluid, and contingent, evolving in a dynamic process which responds to the local and global tongzhi movements (see the conceptions of “liquid” modernity, fear, and evil in Bauman 2000, 2006, 2016; the application of liquidity in globalization studies can be found in Ritzer 2015). Conservative minds may be rigid, but conservatism is not. As my transnational study finds, conservatism is a historically constituted social fact at the intersection of three pairs of social relationship: (1) the convergent and divergent relations between Taiwan and the United States; (2) the discursive and institutional
competitions between the pro-tongzhi and pro-family camps; and (3) the collision and mutual influences between the social institutions of education and marriage/family (Chapter 2).

The collective action of conservative political activists were motivated by both religious and secular politico-economic factors. Their claim that their anti-tongzhi actions were of God and for God faces intra-religious challenges (such as pro-tongzhi messages from the Holy Spirit). These anti-tongzhi campaigns were also shaped by competition for intra-Christian leadership, power in traditional politics, and secular considerations about money and human resources (Chapter 3). Thus, the regime of anti-tongzhi and pro-family campaigns was forced to become lighter, more liquid, and more malleable than Christians’ minds in order to respond to the unanticipated challenges they faced once they began to mobilize.

In the era of globalization, global sex tourism, migration in search of sexual tolerance, and global flows of sexual ideas, images, videos, streaming, and commodities shape sexual values transnationally. Global forces have also shaped conservatism. As I discussed in Chapter 4 and 5, in Taiwanese Christian conservatives’ eyes, the trend of globalization gives them a greater chance to “win the victory” of their culture wars and to establish “God’s Kingdom” on earth, not just locally but also globally. In the second decade of the 21st century, conservatism has all the necessary conditions it needs to travel transnationally across borders and continents in days or even seconds. More affordable airfares, live streams of shows on social media, the Internet and communication technology, charitable donations from wealthier nations and people, and the rapid cultural
convergence of evangelical ideas have all allowed Christian conservatism to cross national borders more easily with less cost.

Scholars should recognize that Christian conservatism is no longer confined within national borders. Thus, any scholarly analysis that assumes that Christian conservatism is operating only in a national domestic scope will fail to capture how it uses globalization to transform itself into a *transnational* “moral enterprise” (Becker 1997[1963]). This transnational form helps Christian conservatives create global impact by producing and consolidating conservative politics both in their birthplaces and in their global “colonies.”

Through the lens of transnationalization, sociologists could begin to conceptualize previously unquestioned border-crossing movements. Examples include the industry of global conservative tourism (travel for the purpose of learning and/or spreading conservative values and evangelizing the world) and the global religious economy (financial flows, personnel travels, and market competition for conservatism-motivated transnational corporations). Other potential studies include the motivations of moral conservatism as an impetus for migration (e.g., pursuing a dreamland that better aligns with an individual’s fundamentalist creeds) and the particularities of the global flows of conservative ideas, products, and representations that conservative publications generate. Re-conceptualizing conservatism as liquid and fluid, has the potential to contribute new perspectives with which to analyze what we previously considered immobile, domestic, or non-conservative. In the next section, I integrate the ideas of rigid minds and liquid conservatism, along with my arguments in early chapters, to establish a new analytic
framework, the “transnational sex-religious network,” for future studies of transnational Christian conservatism.

6.3 Transnational sex-religious network

My research started with inquiries into the rise and growth of Christian conservatism in Taiwan. I observed that anti-tongzhi, pro-family movements formed a strong force in opposition to the implementation of tongzhi education and marriage equality. These church-based movements have developed into “a politico-religious complex,” organized transnational linkages, and disseminated homophobic discourses. I also examined their self-claimed attitudinal representation as the “silent majority,” at the cross-national level. Based on the data collected from my 18-month ethnography, 62 in-depth interviews, relevant content analyses, and second-hand international social surveys, this dissertation provides answers to these inquiries.

Previously, sociologists rarely explored how the “vocabulary and infrastructure” manufactured by Christian conservatism (Stein 2001:216) shaped gender and sexual institutions transnationally. To fill this gap, I placed into conversation three subfields of sociology — critical gender and sexualities studies, religion, and global and transnational sociology. I drew upon studies of sexuality and family values in globalization (Buss and Herman 2003; Oliver 2013; Wong 2013), transnational religious connections (Wuthnow and Offutt 2008), and global and transnational sociology (Bauman 2000, 2006, 2016; Ritzer 2015; Appadurai 1990). Building from these pioneering studies and based on my own findings, I suggest using a new idea, “transnational sex-religious network,” to re-conceptualize the global flows and structures of Christian conservatism and its
gender/sexual impacts on the Global South. The term “transnational sex-religious network” needs theoretical elaborations.

6.3.1 Network

First, I borrowed Latour’s (2007) idea of society as a “network” in order to reconsider transnational society as an assembled network for the purpose of emphasizing its de-centrality, de-anthropocentrism, and ongoing process of becoming, rather than being a presumed and fixed entity. In this way, I reject the essentialist view of conservatism, which frames conservatism as a traditional, backward, and unchangeable essence, for what I found was actually the opposite. Through the Latourian idea of networks (Latour 2007; Phillips 2006; Fox and Alldred 2013), transnational conservatism can be more accurately described as an assemblage in a dynamic evolving process. It is a contingently organized assemblage composed of fundamentalist’ sexual ideas, bodies of conservative leaders and supporters, and pamphlets and books that carry anti-tongzhi ideas. This transnational conservative network has been constructed by material nodes, connections, foundations, and pillars, including message generators, social groups, bureaucracies, digital technology, algorithms, and infrastructures (such as international submarine optical fiber cables). The symbolic and material nature of transnational conservative networks make it possible to live stream hate speech, homophobia, and transphobia around the world in real time. In short, the transnational sex-religious network is a contingent assemblage of conservative ideas, bodies, objects, media, and technology that continuously evolves without a centralized structure and a monopolized agenda.
It is debatable if this conservative network is dominated by a monopoly or oligarchy of a few religious people or organizations. In this network, some players (such as influential preachers) may have more power to shape how parts of the network assemble and evolve, but no one has a comprehensive overview or dominant control over the whole network. In addition, non-human elements also have agency in this network. Like the letter from the ACPed President that carried false and misleading information about homosexuality (discussed in Chapter 1), objects, ideas, or streams of electric information may evolve and distribute as widely and wildly as possible in ways that its creator has little control over. Furthermore, the creator here may not be human. In the coming era of artificial intelligence (AI), more and more computers and their “brains” (assemblages of chips, circuits, programs, and algorithms) are going to create, communicate, and disseminate ideas and elements without the engagement of human bodies. For example, during the Taiwanese culture wars, many liberal pro-tongzhi messages on Facebook were banned by automation calculations. When liberals physically clicked the “report” button on Facebook, they often received unfriendly, faceless standard responses. Conversely, information about conservatives’ heteronormative family values were promoted to people’s statuses and flowed through personal messengers in a form of virus marketing.\(^{57}\) Again, these elaborations highlight the natures of such a “network”: contingency, de-centrality, de-anthropocentrism, and non-human subjects’ agency.

By re-imagining transnational society as a network, I show in Chapter 4 that Christian conservatives in Taiwan (and their own creations) are active players in the

\(^{57}\) While the goal of current AI and program design is to imitate the general public’s thinking and replicate the social norms, it is difficult to imagine that the future AI world will not reproduce heteronormativity rather than change sexual inequality.
transnational sex-religious network. Christian conservatives intentionally adopted and re-filtered Western conservative repertoires from the United States, France, and Germany to arm local battles, while “sanitizing” parts of Western cultures that were counter to their goals. In other situations, they emulated some Western models through borrowing the already globalized cultures from their Asian neighbors. By channeling their neighbor’s water, Taiwanese Christian conservatives witnessed the evangelical seeds growing into fruits successfully. Furthermore, conservatives in East and South Asia participated in a regional circulation of anti-tongzhi discourses and church growth strategies that prepared them for their swift mass mobilization. Taiwanese Christian conservatives also produced some distorted and misleading ideas. These ideas were sent back to the network of transnational Christian conservatism, exacerbating sexual inequalities in other countries. The ideas, in turn, have assembled and converged with existing moral ideologies, surviving and spreading through this transnational network.

6.3.2 Transnational network

Secondly, it is important to address that what I observed in Taiwanese Christian conservatism is not confined to Taiwanese national borders and irrelevant to other Asian and Euro-American readers. Taiwanese Christian conservatism, the tip of the iceberg of global conservatism, is a part of transnational conservative networks. It is simultaneously learning from and contributing to the transnational conservative networks that have directly or indirectly influenced the social worlds of other Asian and Euro-American residents without their awareness.

Throughout this dissertation, I have used the word “transnational” carefully and intentionally. In my conception, transnational is related to, but different from, the global...
and the international, although other scholars may use them interchangeably. To me, the
global refers to phenomena or influences occurring at the scope of the globe. For example,
the globalization of culture refers to the cultural processes of globe-wide cultural
differentiation, hybridization, and convergence (Ritzer 2015:205–235). The “international”
refers to a societal level higher than nation-states and to the relationship among
nation-states. For example, I reserve the word “international” for established international
organizations that people have created to govern, negotiate, and/or intervene in political,
economic, and social affairs that are between two or more countries. The United Nations
(UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
and the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Association (ILGA) all
belong to this category.

Instead, the trans-national refers to a dynamic back-and-forth process which
transports, translates, transgresses, and/or transcends national borders continuously and
constantly. In this sense, my conception of the trans-national is not to be confused with
the multi-national (i.e., an assembly of two or more countries). For example,
multinational corporations refer to those giant companies that are registered and
operating in many countries. If they constantly move assets, personnel, management
repertoires, and organizational strategies across national borders, then multi-national
corporations are also trans-national corporations. Some scholars use the word
“transnational” only referring to the interconnections between two countries such as the
bilateral and reciprocal exchanges of materials, products, and remittances between the
United States and Mexico (see Ritzer 2015:30–31). I believe that this approach and
definitional usage narrows the theoretical potential of this concept.
Using my conception of the transnational, I observed that Taiwanese Christian conservatives constantly ship and buy anti-tongzhi commodities, translating, for example, contentious English-language research about homosexuality and transgenderism into the Sinophonic worlds. The transnational process also occurs when bodies of conservative preachers travel from the United States to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, bringing the moral assets and overseas money that they have accumulated in Asia back to their homeland, where moral conservatives are losing markets. Much like global currents of finance and stock shares, what transnationally moves includes the currents of prosperity gospels, Pentecostal styles of “worship and praise” music, and organizational development models. Sometimes, religious conservatives aggressively transgress borders. For example, Taiwanese Christian “post-gays” brought ideas of conversion therapy and moral values of “holy” (non-homosexual) life into mainland China, where foreign religious personnel’s entry is seriously scrutinized at customs. Conversely, to overcome the Great Firewall of China, some brave pro-tongzhi Christian Chinese use the techniques of virtual private networks (VPN) to “climb over the Firewall” (翻牆) for the purpose of learning sexually progressive knowledge from Taiwan and Hong Kong and bringing it back to resist the intrusion of Taiwanese Christian conservatism in mainland China.

At the global level, the transnational movements of conservatism can be described as multi-directional flows from various Western countries converging in Taiwan, the regional circulation of moral currents, and the reverse flows of heteronormative (re)production from Taiwan back to the United States. These manifest multiple dynamic and reciprocal processes in which the elements of the trans-national sex religious network
(e.g., conservative ideas, bodies, goods and resources, media, and technology) constantly translate, transport, and/or transgress national borders.

6.3.3 Transnational sex-religious network

My conception of transnational networks enables me to visualize what Stein (2001:216) calls the “infrastructure” of social conservatism, extensively uncovering the layers of transnational sex-religious networks. Built on the literature about transnational religious connections and global Christianity (Anderson 2011; Jenkins 2011[2002]; Wuthnow and Offutt 2008), this research takes one step forward by illustrating the seven levels of transnational sex-religious network which operate in the societal and world views of Taiwanese Christian conservatives. Figure 6.1 shows my illustration of the ways in which conservatives have organized their transnational sex-religious networks and used the networks to fight their culture wars.

The culture wars over sexual citizenship started at the national level. The national institutional processes of tongzhi education and marriage equality stimulated pro-family and anti-tongzhi Christian conservatives’ fears, anxiety, and moral conflicts that led to collective action. Many forms of national organizations were formed, including a political party, media outlets, think tanks, grass-roots guerilla groups, and educational non-governmental organizations. As the list of groups and organizations is long, Figure 6.1 only presents a select list. The American counterparts of these Taiwanese organizations, omitted here for clarity, can be found in Table 4.1 in Chapter 4.
Figure 6.1  Conservatives’ Organization of Transnational Sex-Religious Networks

Levels

International

Western-initiated
World Congress of Families
The Vatican/Holy See
Exodus International, MassResistance,
Focus on the Family, American College
of Pediatricians, etc.

Asian-initiated
Bread of Life Global Apostolic
Network
Chinese Homecoming Movement
“Asian Cross”

Transnational

Western streams channeled
Asian regional circulation
Reverse flow

Pro-family networks in Taiwan (selected)

National
Party
Faith and Hope League
Media
Kairos News, major Christian newspapers
Think tank
Chunghua 21st Century Think Tank
Advocacy
Pro-Family League, Taiwan Christian
Alliance, Taiwan Family, TLA
Education
Focus on the Family, Taiwan
Rainbow Family Life Education Association

Regional
Prayer Networks
City- and county-level prayer networks,
Southern Christian Alliance
Post-gay groups
Rainbow-7

Organizational
Mega-churches
Bread of Life Church, Taipei Truth Church,
Grace Church
Strategies
Church growth models (e.g., cellular groups,
twin-wings), peer pressure and surveillance

Inter-personal
Groups
Groups in social media and personal
messengers

Material
Internet, technology, neoliberal economy
The rise of these national pro-family and anti-tongzhi organizations received support from the levels below and above them. The support from other levels of the transnational sex-religious networks helped them to grow, evolve, and expand into powerful political enterprises in a short period. On the one hand, these national organizations are sponsored by the financial aid, human resources, and discursive weapons provided by regional (city- and county-level) prayer networks and post-gay groups. These regional platforms are constituted by many community and flagship churches in neighboring cities or counties, but a few regional mega-churches have disproportionate leadership capability and socio-economic resources to dominate politically and manipulate the agenda and community climate. Social organization at the regional and organizational level paves the way for Christian conservatives to mobilize their people rapidly in response to progressive movements for equal sexual citizenship. In other words, these anti-tongzhi Christian conservatives have been well-organized as social actors (a “spiritual army” for fighting cosmic wars, in their terms58) by their churches and regional networks. The degree of their social organization may be much higher than that of tongzhi communities and pro-tongzhi heterosexual supporters in Taiwan.

Such organizational mobilizations would not be possible without Christian conservatives’ strong and weak ties embedded in their inter-personal networks through weekly face-to-face encounters and 24/7 communications via social media and personal messenger applications. The foundations of these social connections and communications come from the Internet, analog and digital technology, and core churchgoers’ earnings in

58 Conservatives usually cite the Books of Ephesians 6 and Ezekiel 33:1–6 for justifying their militant behaviors.
global neoliberal markets. The material foundation of pro-family and anti-tongzhi movements bolsters their institutional structures and, at the same time, insures that their members stay faithful to standard heteronormative teachings. Thus, the material foundation effectively facilitates the (re)production of homophobic discourses and conservatives’ “rigid minds,” efficiently mobilizing people in a series of mass rallies.

These well-organized and fully fledged conservative Christian systems, at the domestic level, did not exist before 2013 in Taiwan. Why Taiwanese Christian conservatives were able to construct their domestic mobilization networks so rapidly has to do with a complex and ready-to-use “playbook” and influential international organizations of conservatism. This is why the international and transnational levels in the transnational sex-religious networks matter.

At the international level, my research echoes Buss and Herman’s (2003) research, showing that international conservative organizations (e.g., the World Congress of Families, the International Organization for the Family, and conservative lobbies in the United Nations) substantially shape sexual landscapes at the domestic levels in the Global South. Even in Taiwan, a country that is not a member of the United Nations, Euro-American conservatives’ actions in these international organizations strongly influence the Taiwanese culture wars. My research also dovetails with studies of Christian conservativism in Uganda (Oliver 2013) and Hong Kong (Wong 2013), confirming its negative influence on sexual minorities’ dignity, justice, equality, and sexual citizenship in non-Euro-American societies.

My research further contributes to this body of research by analyzing the relationship between Western-based international and national organizations and
Taiwanese pro-family movements. According to my findings, although international conservative organizations have been globally powerful, their ideologies, discourses, resources, and personnel had few chances to move across Taiwan’s borders without Taiwanese or Taiwanese American brokers’ invitations, translations, and transformations. The “glocalization” work conducted by Taiwanese Christian conservatives determined what kinds of Western influence would be assimilated and hybridized into Taiwan and what cultures would transform Taiwanese moral values. It also “sanitized” some Western influence for maintaining a relatively “pure” Chinese/Taiwanese tradition, as conservatives claimed (c.f., Giulianotti and Robertson 2007). In this process of hybridization and transformation, mis-citations, distortions, and misunderstanding of Western products frequently occurred.

Asian regional circulation of conservative organizational strategies and anti-tongzhi discourses shared in Sinophone worlds also played important roles in shaping Taiwanese pro-family movements. Through reverse flows, since 2014, Taiwanese conservatives have actively produced anti-tongzhi discourses and developed conservative enterprises. In the globalization era, these conservative, made-in-Taiwan discourses and strategies quickly traveled back to the transnational sex-religious networks, through which the “Taiwanized” heteronormative elements continued to influence minds and organizations in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwanese/Chinese American communities, and throughout the Taiwanese/Chinese global diaspora.

It would be unwise to underestimate Taiwanese Christian conservatives’ global influence because Taiwan is a small island country. For example, the third largest Taiwanese Christian denomination, Bread of Life Christian Church (BLCC), is a strong
leader in Taiwanese anti-tongzhi movements. Although this Taipei-based church system does not belong to any Western traditional Christian denomination, it owns 417 churches around the world (as of Nov 2017). Figure 6.2 presents the transnational network of BLCC. It has 185 churches in Taiwan, 23 in Oceania, and 105 in other Asian countries. In the Euro-American West, where Christianity dominates, this Taiwan-produced church system (cult or sect) governs 63 “son churches” in North America and 19 churches in Europe. BLCC’s son churches, especially the richest ones in California, have further transplanted 76 “grand-son churches” in Africa. Financially, BLCC’s “mother church” alone had a yearly budget as high as NTD$300,000,000 (roughly 10 million U.S. dollars) in 2016. The donations that it has collected from anti-tongzhi campaigns were not included in this number. This is decidedly a transnational sex-religious network through which Taiwanese conservatives can disseminate their Taiwanized moral conservatism and anti-tongzhi values around the globe. They do this in order to achieve their “Great Commission”: to evangelize Taiwan, China, Jerusalem, and to the end of the world.59

My visualization of the transnational religious network in Figure 6.1 and 6.2 and my discussions in Chapter 3 and 4 are meant to put sociological studies of religion and sexualities into conversation with one another. This is why I juxtapose sexualities and religion in the form of “sex-religious” and insert it into this transnational ontology. On the one hand, my study of transnational Christian conservatism shows that among the social forces that have generated and accelerated transnational religious flows are sexual values and morality. In particular, it is the heteronormative idea of local Christian

59 During my fieldwork, when I repeatedly heard Christian conservatives chanting the Great Commission with excitement, the images of ambitious villains intending to conquer the world in Hollywood-style super hero movies frequently came to my mind.
conservatives and their desire to win local culture battles over sexual liberalism that produces the circuits of transnational anti-tongzhi flows of ideas, people, and resources.

My research addresses the significance of sexualities in transnational society, bringing sexualities back into the sociology of religion, where sexualities are often ignored, marginalized, or underestimated. While sociologists of religion recognize that transnational religious connections have interwoven global landscapes through religious people’s (especially Americans’) inter-continental travels, missionaries, remittances,
commodity exchanges, and church models (Wuthnow and Offutt 2008), it is important to acknowledge how sexualities influence this network of religious connections.

Within transnational Christian conservatism, conservative moral values, heterosexist preaching, homophobic science and knowledge, and numerous donations made under the name of love, care, and sexual purity all generate religion-based transnational travels from Western countries. Conservative Christian travelers, including human and non-human actors, cross the borders of many Asian countries, influencing local culture battles, and conservatizing these societies with Western fundamentalist and Pentecostal theologies, interpretations, and vocabulary. Christian conservative people and elements in East and South Asia also travel regionally and internationally and shape the religious and sexual landscapes in the West and Western’s former colonies. The moral conservatism of Asian Americans is partially influenced by this circuit of outward and reverse flows (as shown in the case of ACPed letter), rather than directly shaped by locally produced American conservatism. In other words, sexual values and morality are both the cause and the effect of transnational religious connections. Without analyses of sexualities, our understanding of religion will never be complete.

The other parallel conversation that I introduced involves understanding how religion shapes sexualities based on my first-hand observation and engagement in the operations of religion as a social institution. Many sexualities studies provide critical examinations of conservative discourses and their impacts on queer people’s lives, experiences, and social situations, including sexual stigmatization, prejudices, discriminations, micro-aggressions, and social marginalization/ghettoization, to name a few. For decades, scholars have critically scrutinized and theorized the gendered
experiences of compulsory heterosexuality (Rich 1994) and provided insightful structural analyses of heterosexism (Herek 1990), sex/gender hierarchies (Rubin 1993[1982]), gender performativity (Butler 1990), and heteronormativity and its variations (Warner 1993; Seidman 1993; Marchia and Sommer 2017). In addition to “queering” religion with structural, discursive, and theological analyses (Taylor and Snowdon 2014), it is important to understand the social operation of conservatism inside out.

Without understanding transnational sex-religious networks, sexualities studies scholars will have limited insight into the infrastructures of religious systems through which heteronormative discourses rapidly disseminate around the world. I found in Christian conservative communities not only the transnationalization of anti-gay discourses and strategies, but also the transnationalization of anti-gay organizations, organizational growth models, anti-gay institutions, and heteronormative institutions. These previously “heavy and solid” structures are now becoming light and liquid enough to flow overseas, challenging the foundations of sexual equality and social inclusion.

Seeing conservatism from the inside out also suggests that the structure of conservatism is embodied and has a social life. Treating conservatives as faceless people and conservatism as a rigid structure leads to structural determinism and religious reductionism, and keeps critical analyses from penetrating the core of conservatism and challenging biased representations of so-called “corruptive” liberalism and radicalism.

As a tongzhi activist, I stepped into the camp of Taiwanese Christian conservatism and its transnational networks by using the moral values I had learned from feminism and queer studies, including care, love, equality, liberty, and mutual sympathetic understanding. Through these feminist and queer eyes, I observed that the
Taiwanese conservative network has paid a heavy price for expanding their domestically consolidated enterprise with strong connections to transnational sex-religious networks.

Key players and supporters in these networks are not as strong and coherent as outsiders imagine. Their motivations for participating in the anti-tongzhi campaigns are not purely religious. Secular considerations about socio-economic interests and their own authority and leadership contaminate their religious motivations, contradicting their claims of purity. Even the messages from the Holy Spirit may not stand at their side. Heterogeneity of church members’ social lives, inconsistencies of biblical translations and theological interpretations, conflicts over political participation, and divisions among nationalist and moral beliefs all divide the conservative churches. The series of massive mobilizations opposing marriage equality and tongzhi education exacerbates these intra-church contradictions, generating antagonistic factions and expanding divisions.

Some conservative leaders in my field understood this after their participation in pro-family campaigns and swiftly decided to retreat, controlling the damage on their membership and moral status. Other conservative leaders enjoy holding and using the power that they have established in society and over politics, claiming that their authority derives from God. They portray their political campaigns against sexual minorities’ civil rights as doing what Christians, God’s servants, should do. These conservatives may use anti-tongzhi moral issues to earn power and leadership in a short period. However, given that marriage equality will be legislated by May 24, 2019, and LGBTQIA movements in Taiwan are thriving in their pursuit of sexual equality and liberty, these conservative producers of heteronormativity will be facing a situation in which history may not be at their side (Sutton 2018). Leaders who experience moral conflicts in their private and
spiritual lives risk losing their reputations if their private behaviors are uncovered. All these findings help us to understand conservatives as social actors with various motivations. They take action to maintain their heteronormative privilege while managing risks and challenges.

Finally, my research examines conservatives’ claims that they constitute a “silent majority,” which has circulated in transnational sex-religious networks. In Chapter 5, I employed the technique of hierarchical linear modeling to test whether or not Christians’ sexual attitudes are representative of those of the world population. According to my results, they are not. Different from Catholics, Protestants’ sexual attitudes toward homosexuality are negatively influenced by their religious behavior, beliefs, and belonging, and structured by the major national religion of the country in which they live. These effects make them unique and thus unrepresentative of other people’s sexual attitudes, falsifying their bold claim to represent the “silent majority.” My multi-level and multi-dimensional model shows a way that future researchers can examine the claims of representativeness with other sexual opinions. Chapters 4 and 5 together suggest mixed-methodological ways of studying Christian conservatives’ transnational strategies of organizational growth and discourses in the globalization era, tracking and examining their “liquid footprints.”

6.4 Billy Graham, conservatism, and LBGTQIA in a precarious era

As my dissertation study was approaching its conclusion, newspapers covered the death of the internationally influential American evangelical preacher Billy Graham at the age of 99 on Feb 21, 2018. Rev. Graham, “America’s Pastor,” was one of the most
influential religious leaders of the 20th century, preaching through television, satellite, and the Internet (Goodstein 2019, Feb 21). He is an example of an American conservative leader who organized what I have called the “transnational sex-religious network,” translating and transmitting conservative messages to more than a hundred countries as “an ambassador of God,” preaching to 200 million people in his stadium-held “crusades” (Goodstein 2019, Feb 21).

One legacy that he left to the earthly world is intolerance of homosexuality and hostility against LGBTQIA people’s access to civil rights. After his death, the Q&A section on the website of the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association (2004a) still promoted anti-gay messages. It states that “through the transforming power of Jesus Christ freedom from sinful behavior [homosexuality] is always available,” suggesting that believers need to begin “coming out of homosexuality.” Even though the United States legalized same-sex marriage in 2015, this American pastor’s website remains firmly insistent that marriage is the “gift […]. only to be enjoyed within a marriage between a man and a woman,” a message written in 2004 (Billy Graham Evangelistic Association 2004b) that will likely persist in its eternal life in the digital world.

Clearly, Billy Graham did not support sexual liberation and social justice for people with non-conventional genders and sexualities. However, Graham is a kind of bridge between American conservatism and Taiwanese conservatism. Many American pro-gay liberals and radicals may not know that, for Taiwanese Americans supporting women and LGBTQIA people’s rights, it is very difficult to choose either the Democratic or Republican side due to the moral conflicts between social justice and national/cultural heritage. Along the social justice line, they are more likely to support the Democrats and
to fight for the civil rights and the equal status of gender and sexual minorities who have been suffering from living in insanely unequal American society, dominated by racism, sexism, heteronormativity, xenophobia, islamophobia, White supremacy, and Christian-centrism for centuries.

On the other side of their social world, as people with Taiwanese heritage, if they want to press the world hegemony, the United States, to use diplomatic tools and military strategies to help secure Taiwan’s autonomy and independence in East Asia and to keep Taiwan free from China’s economic invasion and political occupation, they are more likely to lobby and vote for Republicans given the Cold War legacy in American partisan politics. A Taiwan-based transnational LGBTQIA activist told me that, before Taiwan legislated same-sex marriage, the U.S. Democratic politicians she met in Washington D.C. had little interest in or knowledge about Taiwan. These “liberal” people very likely echo the labels of liberal media which condemns Taiwan as a “rogue” third-world country because their political opponent, the current president Donald Trump, answered a congratulatory phone call from Taiwan’s first female president TSAI Ing-Wen.

By contrasting American conservatism with the viewpoints of Taiwanese Americans and people in my field of Taiwanese Christian conservatives, I argue that Americans’ understandings of conservatism have been socially constituted by American political history, the world order during the Cold War, and the issues of the culture wars. From outsiders’ perspectives, these boundaries between the Democrats and the Republicans, under the guise of the liberal and the conservative, are more artificially arbitrary than naturally intuitive. The boundary of conservatism and liberalism produced in the United States may or may not apply to other societies.
Billy Graham’s transnational work during the 1950s–1970s witnessed the cultural process in which this boundary was formed. He was a firmly anti-communist preacher and an informal ambassador traveling between the United States and Taiwan, among other countries. The stance of anti-communism and American military aid helped secure Taiwan’s independence from communist China’s violent invasion during the Cold War. Thus, from many Taiwanese Christians’ perspectives, Graham’s public image represented a stable connection between the two countries and a sense of safety, peace, and stability at both political and spiritual levels. This bright image soured in 1979, however, when the United States terminated diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Republic of China) and switched to embracing the mainland China (People’s Republic of China) under Jimmy Carter’s Democratic administration.

Pro-liberty and pro-justice Taiwanese and Taiwanese Americans have had to face difficult choices between liberals and conservatives that are near permanent fixtures in American politics, while trying to resist the hegemony of this binary framework over their evaluations of the world.

In fact, many social, political, and economic factors, like this one, are challenging both LGBTQIA people and liberal leaders in Taiwan. Although the Taiwanese Constitutional Court has ruled that the Legislative Yuan should design the law to ensure that same-sex couples have legal protection for their permanent union, how to make this law remains a political problem. Pro-tongzhi supporters have advocated for changing the definition of marriage in the Civil Code, which legally includes all citizens regardless of their sexual orientation. In the conservative camp, anti-tongzhi and pro-family activists are undetermined about how to legalize tongzhi’s civil rights. Some insist to make no law
about tongzhi’s sexual citizenship at all. Others advocate making a new “special law” designed only for the use of tongzhi people. They claim that this approach can “protect” the fundamental values of marriage and family from changes while making laws for “protecting” tongzhi couples’ rights. Pro-tongzhi activists have suggested that the approach of a “special law” is equivalent to the idea of “separate but equal.” There also exists a proposal in the middle: a special chapter in the Civil Code. This debate is now extending to the battle field of referendums (Chapter 2).

In fact, Taiwan’s culture wars have been embedded in this state’s international and domestic networks. Internationally, the Vatican is trying to establish formal diplomatic relations with China with compromises meant to open up China’s religious market. The Vatican is the only entity in Europe with which Taiwan currently has formal diplomatic relations. The Vatican’s blatant anti-tongzhi stance will substantially stop the current administration from recognizing sexual minorities’ rights, so that they do not offend it.

Domestically, many pro-family and anti-tongzhi activists oppose same-sex marriage for the purposes of maintaining their nationalist relationship with China, whose history is falsely imagined as spanning 5,000 years of traditional (heterosexual) marriage. Legislating same-sex marriage is thus a symbolic way to show the world that Taiwan is more democratic and progressive than China, drawing a clear line between the two regimes’ cultural and political governances.

Although this approach aligns with the DPP’s pro-Taiwan path, the current DPP administration does not wish to enrage the conservatives in its core constituency, the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. It worries about its mid-election in late 2018. On the
other hand, it needs to fulfill President TSAI’s own campaign promise to support marriage equality. Pro-family activists’ alliances with the Nationalist Party, anti-pension reformers, and other economic conservatives have exacerbated the DPP administration’s struggles.

Thus, for the current administration, these international and domestic relations pose dilemmas that shape the local and transnational culture wars. These dilemmas operate in the paradoxical legacy beyond the vestigial dichotomy of liberalism and conservatism of Billy Graham.

6.5 Conclusion and implications

Sexual citizenship, such as marriage equality and tongzhi education, is truly political, economic, and cultural. Taiwan’s local moral conflicts, fueled by Euro-American Christian conservatism, are more than a proxy battle in the American culture wars. Without a “Google-Earth” overview, it is impossible to fully understand these institutional tensions centered on gender, sexuality, familism, nationalism, and international politics at the intersection of religion, state, and transnationalism.

My research on pro-family movements in Taiwan and their “transnational sex-religious networks” provides a partial explanation of the rise of conservative politics in Taiwan. It may also partially explain the return of conservative politics in the United States. On the one hand, it reminds American liberals that, while they celebrated the Obama administration’s progressive moves and agenda, it was unwise to ignore the resilience of the conservative regime and how much money and power conservatives
shored up and brought back from overseas and accumulated domestically to “win back their country.”

Few Americans believe that there has been an “Asianized conservatism” flowing from the other side of the Pacific Ocean and returning to its home in the United States. It would be untrue and unfair to blame the conservatism of Asians and Asian Americans living in the United States for this backlash. Rather, my visualization of the transnational flows of sexual conservatism suggests that many conservative ideas, beliefs, sciences, knowledge, and moralities were produced originally in the United States before gaining more strength through conservatives’ global expansion and cooperation. Through my border-crossing study of Taiwanese pro-family movements, English-speaking readers are offered a new perspective on the growth and movements of transnational conservatism, an opportunity to understand how Taiwan developed the progressive tongzhi education and multiple family formation bills, and insight into how to negotiate power and space with pro-family Christians and conservatives.

One of the most important things that I have learned by switching from being a target of Taiwanese Christian conservatives to a sociological researcher studying them is to recognize that, except for a few wealthy pastors and religious donors, many conservatives are also suffering from the same precarious conditions faced by many pro-tongzhi supporters also. They face economic inequality, poverty, low paid jobs with long work hours, educational costs, drastic social changes, and technology replacing human labor. Social issues, such as lack of childcare and long-term care resources, the threat of China, and Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation, have worried Taiwanese people, regardless of their sexual attitudes.
This common ground suggests that people with different sexual attitudes and fears can develop mutual dialogues. Scapegoating sexual minorities to resolve personal worries and uncertainties cannot solve the problems faced by anti-tongzhi conservatives. Blaming the victims will only exacerbate tongzhi people’s unjust suffering. In the future, Christian conservatism will likely continue to take advantage of their transnational sex-religious networks to develop and expand their moral enterprise, especially during the Trump administration. In the long run, pro-tongzhi activists and organizations may also gather enough resources to organize their own “transnational sex-radical networks” (my term) to alleviate conservative impacts, struggling for social justice and sexual inequality by queering globalizations, re-discovering traditions, and (re)claiming the authority to speak for “Christianity,” “conservatism,” and “social morality.”
Appendix A

A Reflexive Note on Positionality

A transgressor at the intersections

Who am I to study Christian conservatism in Taiwan? Simply speaking, I am a short Taiwan-born Asian man, openly gay/queer with a partner, a male feminist having been mocked for my femininity, a gender equity educator, a tongzhi (LGBTQIA+) activist, and a public intellectual. While these simplistic impressions of my multi-faceted identity may lead to one-dimensional categorization, my life and intellectual trajectory has transgressed many boundaries. I am a self-identified Christian who seeks spiritual sublimation due to exhaustion in the tongzhi movements. I am a son raised by pro-Taiwan parents who sent me to a pro-China private school to attain a better education. During twelve years of my youth, I spent weekdays studying with children of urban bourgeoisie families in a well-equipped clean classroom, while enjoying weekends playing with working-class siblings in games of mud and bugs. My pro-China mainlander teachers at times looked down upon my pro-Taiwan father, also a veteran union leader, a member of anti-KMT government mob who created societal chaos. My Taiwanese mother warned her son not to marry a mainlander woman due to some stereotypic ethnic reasons. However, her queer son will not marry a woman anyway.

My experiences living in and switching between both sides of a divisive society have guided me to constantly explore various segments of polarized society. Left or right, progressive or backward, liberal or radical and so on are not taken-for-granted identities,
sides, or positions that are useful to describe where I am; my subjectivity has been constantly transgressing boundaries. In Taiwan’s academic politics of gender and sexualities studies, I advocated and worked for gender equity education (a branch of state feminism), devoted my twenties to tongzhi activism, and presented my study of BDSM sexualities in a sex-emancipationist (sex-radical) conference. To me, these three approaches are various paradigms or analytic tools ready for access whenever appropriate. However, in the eyes of some Taiwanese radical scholars these three “camps” are considered mutually exclusive, and those belonging to one camp must not be the allies of another. They saw me as a “bat” or a “fence-rider” in Taiwanese gender/sexual politics.

In my eyes, nevertheless, the “camp boundaries” are arbitrary borders that separate various layers or segments of a continuum that we call society. In order to have a more holistic and subversive understanding of the larger picture of society, these borders need to be transgressed physically and intellectually. The goal of social justice, ultimate liberty, and substantive equality cannot be achieved without challenging these historically constructed borders.

These are the legacies and potential controversies that I carried with me when entering the field of Christian conservatism and pro-family movements in Taiwan. The struggles I faced from the side of sex emancipationism were often as harsh as the questioning coming from sex conservatism. I challenge the false assumption that a social sciences researcher should be a value-free, unbiased objective observer. Everyone is biased and value-laden, seeing and speaking from a perspective situated by this subject’s biography, related history, and social characteristics. The subject’s understanding of society is ultimately an inter-subjective interpretation built on his/her/zir experiences of
interacting with people, tentative senses of the “generalized others,” contingently forged social backgrounds, intellectual training, and the epistemological structures. These factors make a subject’s view biased but also distinct.

My approach is not meant to demonstrate an ultimately objective representation of conservatives’ transnational organization. Rather, I welcome readers to see the world of culture wars and Christian conservatism in Taiwan through my multiple, distinct lenses, while reflexively self-exposing my intersectionally structured positionality, which contains both limits and strengths, for readers’ examination (see the discussion of reflexivity in Bourdieu 1992 and intersectionality in Crenshaw 1991).

Two borderlands

My long-term path through the “borderlands” of ethnicity, sex politics, gender dichotomy, and nationalism, in Anzaldua’s sense (2012), have prepared me to transgress two more kinds of borders prominent in this research. First, I crossed the physical and institutional borders by migrating from the “East” to the “West” while tracking the transnational transgression of global Christian conservatism in both continents. As a “transnational Taiwanese student” pursuing his doctoral degree in the United States, my own global flow enables me to observe how conservatism, as an idea and a political regime, has been constructed in different but related social contexts and geo-political histories. Crossing the borderline also complicates my studies as different cultural values may not go hand-in-hand in the east versus in the west, and existing intellectual framework that explains the Western conservatism may not be fully applicable to the backlash against progressive movements in the east.
As I discuss in Chapter 6, American conservatism stretches three dimensions—economic, social, and defense/nationalist—though only the dimension of social conservatism is partially applicable to the case of Christian conservatism in Taiwan. My positionality as a Taiwanese queer supporting social justice and gender/sexual equality makes me torn between the U.S. Democrats’ liberal appeals and the Republicans’ diplomatic policy of defending Taiwan and opposing communist authoritarianism. The distinct combination of “pro-Taiwan” and “liberalism” substantially questions the assumed liberal/conservative boundary in U.S. politics. Taiwanese liberals like me cannot help but to live in the borderland of American bi-partisan structure, finding ways to survive during the collisions of political powers.

My stance helps me examine how Christian conservatism in Taiwan—shaped by American domestic politics, Cold War geopolitics, and the clash between the United States and China—uses conservative discourses and strategies to maintain their moral values, aiming to win the cultural wars at the domestic and international levels. The analyses and observations I offer in this dissertation would not be possible if my subjectivity per se was not a transgressor of national borders.

That said, my moving back and forth across the borders is not a risk-free, romantic story of cosmopolitanism. Risks and fears due to uncertainty and inequality are in fact the themes of transnational border-crossing. To pass through U.S. customs, I had to wait in a long line of “aliens” and receive the official’s examination about my travel document with endless anxiety in my mind. While travelling to Hong Kong for extended fieldwork, I worried about being rejected from entry due to my involvement in civil rights movements in Taiwan. Before attending an academic conference in mainland
China, I asked my advisor to call the US embassy and plan to rescue me if she did not hear from me by a certain date. China’s blacklist of Taiwanese people is unpredictable.

My constant worries while crossing various borders strike a drastic contrast to conservative leaders’ continuous movements across countries with few barriers. This is a stark example of how the hetero-normative society uses the privileges of social status and moral righteousness to determine the capacity and eligibility to transgress borders, both physically and metaphorically. My experiences in these borderlands helped me to measure how difficult sexual liberal personnel and discourses travel overseas than their conservative opponents.

The second borderland lies at the separation of pro-tongzhi and pro-family (anti-LGBTQIA) movements. Drifting between various camps/approaches of gender/sexual politics, I received questions implying “why are you here/there?” My liberal colleagues often viewed me as a “spy” who sneaked into the conservative camp, voyeuristically observed its closure secrets, and transmitted information to external society for public examination. In contrast, other liberals ghettoized me and other queer Christians into a homogenous impression of the Christian community, and blamed us for not persuading “our” Christian conservative fellows to change their hostility toward sexual minorities.

These critics ignored the fact that queer Christians, as sexual and religious minorities in Taiwan at the same time, experienced double marginalization and institutional repression from both heteronormative Christianity and anti-Christian homonormativity. While some pro-tongzhi critics regarded their antagonistic attacks on Christians, as an entire group, as a way to dismantle Christian-oriented sex hierarchy,
these critiques hurt tongzhi Christians and failed to respond to various Christian groups in different ways. Ironically, these radical critiques unintentionally made Christian conservatives united in the name of protecting religious freedom, boasting indirectly the momentum of conservative politics. By involving in both tongzhi movements and Christian faith, I was able to observe the limits and unintended consequences of liberal and radical campaigns. I was thus able to confidently address that it is untrue to state “the” tongzhi movement or “the” Christian community while the two sides were both plural, highly heterogeneous, fragmented, and conflicting.

From the perspective of my conservative respondents, on the other hand, my history of and active participation in tongzhi activism is both frightening and interesting. I always used my true identity while immersing in the conservative field because my stance is publicly accessible. I have been a senior openly gay/tongzhi activist in Taiwan since 2000. My pro-tongzhi op-eds and journal articles analyzing gender and sexual inequalities can be easily accessed by Googling and visiting my page at Academia.edu. As I began the dissertation, I had been targeted by Taiwanese Christian conservatives for my first full-time job serving as an administrative assistant of a MOE-sponsored committee for promoting gender equity education curriculum and instruction in nation-wide elementary and junior high schools (grades 1–9). In the conservative eye, it is too radical for school to introduce the culture of LGBTQIA+ people and impart basic knowledge of sexualities to students without reproducing heteronormative morality and horrible images of sexual diseases. As a tongzhi-identified educator of gender and sexualities who constantly have to clarify the distorted sexual knowledge littered in the
conservative publications, I am often portrayed by the conservatives as someone “from the opposite side.”

Conservatives’ disregard did not thwart my approach to conservative communities, although not all the attempts are equally successful. For example, after submitting my application to a training program of Christian conservative gender education, I received a phone call from the program staff. She meticulously examined whether my view on marriage matched heterosexism and whether I considered gender as either male or female. I told her that I believe that the definitions of gender and marriage depends on social contexts and may change according to socio-economic factors, addressing my respect to the perspectives that she and her program held. “Mr. Kao,” she responded, “we all know who you are. We all have read your articles.” Eventually, she determined to reject my application, reimbursing my RSVP fee of NTD$2000.

This rejection came not only from outside of the tongzhi communities but also from within. Conservative tongzhi (especially conservative gay men) did not welcome my presence despite sharing similar sexual orientation. They worried that my public prominence may bring spotlight to their private life.

In contrast, the various facets of my background sometimes made me “attractive” to conservatives, and also enabled me to enter conservative “clans” in some other instances. For example, some queer Christians actively invited me to a conservative tongzhi group on LINE (a popular personal message app) to bring dissenting voices to these conservatives’ “simple and pure” world.

To learn from the “different voices” is often the main reason that I was introduced to other conservative groups. After the “2013 Rally,” a Christian professor organized a
monthly close-door forum for creating a space for inter-denominational conversations among Christians who held a wide range of political attitudes. He interviewed and invited me to join the forum for balancing the dynamic of the group, which was dominated by moderate and conservative voices. My knowledge of tongzhi activism and my stance of a sex-radical Christian became an advantage to be eligible to participate in the non-liberal group, where conservative leaders and ex-gay activists gathered.

As a religious minority in Taiwan, Christian conservatives’ in-group/out-group boundaries are clearly drawn, protecting their vulnerable self-identity and group solidarity. They often embraced stereotypes, which included what a Christian should look like and what kind of behaviors are deviant. To build connections with them, I would share my personal faith story (my “witness” in the religious term), if appropriate.

I told some conservative respondents in my field that I am also a self-identified Christian, who frequently goes to church (usually a Presbyterian church in my neighborhood), prays daily, and studies the Bible and religious books. Admittedly, although not being baptized yet, I have been inspired by Jesus’s revolutionary leadership (Aslan 2014) and his “radical love” (Cheng 2011). In fact, to some Christian conservatives’ surprise, it was the spiritual exhaustion I experienced in struggling for sexual rights in the tongzhi movements that brought me to Christianity. Usually, my “witness” subverted Christian conservatives’ assumption that tongzhi movements are harmful to Christians, whom they stereotypically imagined as those who were raised in a Christian family. Often, first-generation Christians are religious zealots and fundamentalists; I am apparently the opposite. I tried to convince them that my embrace
of Christianity is another distinct gift and shepherdship from God, whose arrangement goes beyond human demands and thoughts.

Moreover, I told Christian conservatives that, while you view homosexuality as deviant and abnormal, in the eyes of my Buddhist/Taoist parents what is truly heretical and subversive is Christianity. To them, conversion to Christianity means the eradication of ancestor worship and the destruction of patrilineal family. At home, my parents have warmly welcomed my partner but reacted with panic to the Bible on my bookshelf and my attendance of Sunday worship. I used my family stories as a mirror to reflect the social reality to the face of these conservatives, who believed their Christian moral values representative of the “silent majority.” With my embodied sharing, I invited conservatives to think out of their boxes and re-situate their anti-tongzhi campaigns in a broader social context.

My self-exposure and reflexivity on my multiple roles in the field have deepened my conversations with conservatives and thus enriched the data I collected. I believe that my interactions with respondents were “inter-views,” through which information was not delivered one way from the speaker to the listener, but rather mutually communicated between both sides. My positionality as a long-term transgressor at the two borderlands intersected with religious, sexual, ethnic, national, and political dimensions shut my doors to access some conservative groups, but it also opened other windows for me to observe or participate in conservative conversations and gatherings. Surely, I did not shout out loud who I am when worshiping in a Sunday service of mega-churches or praying in a stadium-size international Christian conference, for it was inappropriate and against the social norms to do so. I shared the aforementioned reflexive stories with
conservative respondents in other situations, such as in-depth interviews and close-door forums. I appreciate their trust in me and their generous sharing that has enriched this research.
Appendix B

The Questionnaire for Semi-structured Interview

Main Question: How does the morality and knowledge motivated or sponsored by US Christian conservatism influence Taiwanese gender/sexual landscapes? (From globalization of sexuality to transnational sexuality)

Guiding Questions:

1. (Actors) Who or what are the main actors in the TSRN (transnational sex-religious network)?
2. (Motivations) What motivates the main actors?
3. (Goals) What is the ideal type of TSRN (comprising sexual ideas, bodies, objects, and institutions) that these actors intend to achieve?
4. (Strategies) How do local politics and transnational religion work together to shape sexual landscapes in different countries?
5. (Evaluation) To what extent do they succeed?
6. (Critiques and politics) What kinds of progressive reform, oppression, and social affection are produced throughout the epistemological transnationalization of Christian sexual entrepreneurship?

Interview Questions:

1. (Actors) Who or what are the main actors in the TSRN (transnational sex-religious network)?
   1.1. How do you define Christian (基督教徒) and Christianity (基督教)?
   1.2. Describe briefly your engagement in Christianity.
   1.3. Are Christians main actors in shaping conservative impacts on gender equity education in Taiwan?
   1.4. Who is generating and maintaining the flow of the religious and epistemological circulation?
   1.5. Why do Christians as religious minority in East Asia (e.g., only 5.5% in Taiwan and 14.3% in Hong Kong based on Pew Research Center 2012:45–50) have disproportionately determining power to dominate the sexual lives and policies of gender equity education?
2. (Motivations) What motivates the main actors?
   2.1. Why are they so devoted in their campaign? Why do Christians spend so much time and energy on participating in the development of gender equity education (e.g., 2011 True Love Alliance, 2013 Pro-family Protest, and 2015–6 Faith and 

Hope League)?

2.2. Socio-psychologically, spiritually, and financially speaking, why do these religious leaders and activists deploy so many resources on advocating against homosexuality and nonprocreative, intramarital heterosexuality?

2.3. Please use a scale (1 to 5) to evaluate the importance of the following motives that may mobilize Christian to participate in gender equity education:

2.3.1. Religion … 1 … 2 … 3 … 4 … 5
2.3.2. Spirituality … 1 … 2 … 3 … 4 … 5
2.3.3. Money … 1 … 2 … 3 … 4 … 5
2.3.4. Human resources … 1 … 2 … 3 … 4 … 5
2.3.5. Other economical factors … 1 … 2 … 3 … 4 … 5
2.3.6. Politics … 1 … 2 … 3 … 4 … 5
2.3.7. Leadership in Taiwanese Christian community … 1 … 2 … 3 … 4 … 5
2.3.8. Anti-homosexual behaviors … 1 … 2 … 3 … 4 … 5

3. (Goals) What is the ideal type of TSRN (comprising sexual ideas, bodies, objects, and institutions) that these actors intend to achieve?

3.1. With participation in gender equity education, what is the future that you (and your organization) are leading Taiwan to?

3.2. What are the “vocabulary and infrastructure” manufactured by evangelicals (Stein 2001:216) to shape gender and sexual institutions in Taiwan?

3.3. Please elaborate your understanding of the following terms:

3.3.1. Gender
3.3.2. Equity or equality
3.3.3. Education
3.3.4. Sex
3.3.5. Sexuality
3.3.6. Gender identity
3.3.7. Gender expression
3.3.8. Sexual orientation
3.3.9. Sexual identity
3.3.10. Global, international, and transnational

4. (Strategies) How do local politics and transnational religion work together to shape sexual landscapes in different countries?

4.1. How do these social actors promote their moral enterprise?

4.2. How does the transnational force modify the bodies, minds, and souls of religious leaders and sexual minorities in the Global South and North?

4.3. Do you conceive that the following terms have been contested in Christian conservatives’ campaign? Why or why not?

4.3.1. Tradition
4.3.2. Conservative/conservatism
4.3.3. Human rights
4.3.4. Freedom
4.3.5. Science
4.3.6. Western
4.3.7. Progressive
4.3.8. Asian-ness/Asian value
4.4. What kind of sexual morality and “scientific” knowledge do Taiwanese Christian conservatives use in their public discourses?

4.5. How much of the sexual morality and “scientific” knowledge that Taiwanese Christian conservatives employ in their public discourses have transnational origins?

4.6. If we visualize the border-crossing trajectories of the moralities and knowledge, what does this epistemological world map look like?

4.7. What have Taiwanese religious leaders and activists done at the gap and intermission of cross-linguistic and cross-cultural translation and migration of sexual “science” and morality?

5. (Evaluation) To what extent do they succeed?

5.1. Do Christian conservatives reach their goals in gender equity education?

5.2. How would you evaluate the relationships between Taiwanese Christian conservatives and their US counterparts (Levitt 2004)?

5.2.1. Extending (religious organizations or even governments in the sending counties fiscally or institutionally supporting immigrant organizations in the receiving countries)

5.2.2. Negotiating (organizational leaders in the sending and receiving countries flexibly negotiating what kind of personnel and resources to mutually transport)

5.2.3. Recreating (migrants using their own cultural system to change the new society)

5.3. How would you evaluate the phenomenon of glocalization in their campaign (Giulianotti and Robertson 2007)?

5.3.1. Relativization

5.3.2. Accommodation

5.3.3. Hybridization

5.3.4. Transformation

5.4. How do you conceive Taiwan’s role(s) and position(s) in the transnational network of Christian conservatism? Importer, exporter, export processing zone (加工出口區), gold corridor (黃金廊道), Free Economic Pilot Zone (自由經濟示範區), or anyone else?

6. (Critiques and politics) What kinds of progressive reform, oppression, and social affection are produced throughout the epistemological transnationalization of Christian sexual entrepreneurship?

6.1. What kinds of social connections and belongingness have their actions produced (c.f. Stein 2001)?

6.2. What kinds of social rupture and anomie have been the unintended consequences of these religious actors’ love and care?

6.3. What types of biopolitical and sexual oppression do these transnational circuits produce and reinforce?

7. (Transnational sexuality sponsored by Christian conservatism) Conclusion

7.1. What kinds of moral and epistemological discourses sponsored by US Christian conservatives have been produced and deliberately or unconsciously carried away from where they are born?

7.2. Through which channels do these discourses drift or pour out across national and
religious borders?
7.3. Who carries and spreads these entities?
7.4. How have their bodies, minds, and spirits affected and been affected by their transnational missions?
7.5. Consequently, what kinds of local and transnational sex political regimes are produced or reinforced by the interplay between the moral enterprise of these US sexual conservatives, along with their local companions and the local culture, education, and liberal sex movement?


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