The Thirteenth Amendment versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of the Post-New Deal Constitutional Order

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The Thirteenth Amendment versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of the Post-New Deal Constitutional Order, 1921-1950

James Gray Pope

Rutgers School of Law Newark

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ARTICLE

THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT VERSUS THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: LABOR AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1921–1957

James Gray Pope*

During the twentieth century, Congress’s power to regulate commerce grew sensationaly while its human rights powers atrophied. The author traces this phenomenon back to the choice, made by lawyers and politicians in the early 1930s, to base labor rights statutes like the Wagner Act on the Commerce Clause instead of the Thirteenth Amendment. Unions and workers argued that the rights to organize and strike made the difference between freedom and involuntary servitude. But a bevy of progressive lawyers who styled themselves “friends of labor” undermined labor’s Thirteenth Amendment theory. The author argues that this clash reflected not merely tactical differences among allies, but fundamentally conflicting constitutional goals. He contends that the Supreme Court upheld the Wagner Act not because of the lawyers’ Commerce Clause arguments, but because workers staged a series of sit-down strikes that confronted the swing justices with a choice between industrial peace or war. Afterward, unions and workers interpreted the Wagner Act decisions as victories for labor freedom, but the Act’s Commerce Clause foundation pointed in a different direction—one leading to fateful distortions in the jurisprudence of congressional powers.

* Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Newark, New Jersey. Versions of this Article were presented to workshops at Brooklyn, Emory, Harvard, and Yale, where I benefitted from probing questions and helpful suggestions. I am indebted to Daniel Ernst and Daniel Rodgers for detailed and instructive criticisms that went far beyond the call of duty. Ken Casebeer was generous with his compendious knowledge of the origins of the Wagner Act. Bruce Ackerman, Victor Brudney, and William Forbath pinpointed important problems in the account that I have tried to correct. Numerous lawyers at the National Labor Relations Board Headquarters Conference in October 2000 gave me insightful feedback and encouragement. Last but by no means least, I want to thank Robert Gordon, Anne Lofaso, Serena Mayeri, Richard Parker, Judith Resnik, and Reva Siegel for their criticisms, suggestions, and encouragement.
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INTRODUCTION

This Article looks at an old problem through a new lens. The old problem is the strangely disparate fate of two kinds of congressional powers: the power to regulate interstate commerce and the power to enforce human rights under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. As of the early twentieth century, both types of powers were hedged with limitations.1 Beginning in the 1930s, however, there was a vast expansion of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce—so vast, in fact, that critics could plausibly charge that the Supreme Court had eliminated any enforceable limit on the power.2 Meanwhile, Congress’s powers to enforce human rights under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments continued to be confined within nineteenth-century limits, most prominently the state action doctrine and the notion that the “involuntary servitude” clause of the Thirteenth Amendment protects only the individual

1. On the Commerce Clause, see, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895) (drawing a distinction between “manufacture” and “commerce” and holding that the Sherman Antitrust Act could not be applied to a company controlling ninety-eight percent of the nation’s sugar refining capacity because the company’s operations fell into the category of manufacturing, and its control over the industry had only an “indirect” effect on commerce). On the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, see, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69 (1873) (upholding a state sanctioned slaughterhouse monopoly against a Thirteenth Amendment challenge by independent butchers, reasoning that the amendment was intended only “to forbid all shades and conditions of African slavery”); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883) (invalidating the Civil Rights Act of 1875 on the ground that Congress lacked power to protect rights against infringement by private individuals).

2. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607–08 (1939) (upholding application of the National Labor Relations Act to garment factory employing 60–200 workers, and observing that “[t]here are not a few industries in the United States which, though conducted by relatively small units, contribute in the aggregate a vast volume of interstate commerce”); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 114, 127–28 (1942) (upholding regulation of farmer’s production of wheat for consumption by his own livestock on the ground that although the impact of the farmer’s individual activity “may be trivial,” it was “far from trivial” when combined with the activity of others covered by the law); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (upholding federal wage regulation applied to workers involved in producing goods for interstate shipment and stating that the “motive and purpose of [regulating] interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and over which the courts are given no control”); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 56–57 (1990) (describing the Court’s “permissive attitude toward congressional power” in the wake of Wickard and how this attitude may lead the Court to abandon its constitutionally ordained role).

Many of the Court’s defenders did not bother to dispute the charge; instead, they argued that there was little or no need for judicially enforceable limits because the states could protect their autonomy through the political process. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 176, 215–16 (1980) (arguing that the effective voice of the states in the national polity provides adequate protection for federalism without judicial review); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543, 558 (1954) (contending that “[f]ar from a national authority that is expansionist by nature, the inherent tendency in our system is precisely the reverse”).
right to quit one’s employment. These limitations had little practical effect, as the Court upheld human rights statutes as exercises of the commerce power. But throughout the century, a series of Supreme Court justices and political leaders worried about the “dishonest,” “artificial,” “cagey,” and “distorting” practice of grounding human rights statutes on a constitutional provision that was concerned with commercial matters.

The new lens—which is really just an old lens that was forgotten for awhile—is populist constitutionalism. Populist constitutionalism takes seriously the ideas of constitutional thinkers and activists outside the legal profession. Viewed through a populist lens, the contrast between the


5. Commenting on the Child Labor Act of 1916, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said: “In my opinion Congress may have what ulterior motives they please if the act passed in the immediate aspect is within its powers—though personally, were I a legislator I might think it dishonest to use powers in that way.” Letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, United States Supreme Court, to Judge Learned Hand, Second Circuit (Apr. 3, 1919), reprinted in Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 719, 759–60 (1975). As the commerce power began to grow, others shared this concern. In Richard Cortner’s account, Senator Robert Wagner, author of the National Labor Relations Act, believed that the “real purpose of his labor relations act was to make the American worker a ‘free man,’ and he never entirely accepted the Commerce Clause rationale of the act which emphasized the reduction of obstructions and burdens on commerce caused by strikes as the chief purpose of the act.” Richard C. Cortner, The Jones & Laughlin Case 60 (1970) [hereinafter Cortner, Jones]. Supreme Court justices criticized the Court’s decision to rest the constitutional right of interstate travel on the Commerce Clause on the grounds that the movement of persons across state lines “occupies a more protected position in our constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal” and that to measure the rights of a human being by the Commerce Clause would be “likely to result eventually either in distorting the commercial law or in denaturing human rights.” Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (Douglas, J., joined by Murphy & Black, J.J., concurring); id. at 182 (Jackson, J., concurring). In 1964, Professor Gerald Gunther and Senator John Pastore of Rhode Island, among others, argued that the Civil Rights Act of that year should be grounded not on the Commerce Clause, but on the Fourteenth Amendment. Gunther declared that he “would much prefer to see the Government channel its resources of ingenuity and advocacy into the development of a viable interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the provision with a natural linkage to the race problem” instead of constructing an “artificial commerce facade.” Gerald Gunther & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Law 201–02 (13th ed. 1997) (quoting letter from Gunther to the Justice Department). Senator Pastore explained: “[I] like to feel that what we are talking about is a moral issue. [And] that morality, it seems to me, comes under the 14th Amendment [about] equal protection of the law. [I] am saying we are being a little too careful, cagey, and cautious.” Id. at 202 (alterations in original) (quoting Senator John Pastore).

6. See, e.g., Richard D. Parker, “Here, the People Rule”: A Constitutional Populist Manifesto 54–77 (1994) (depicting and analyzing populist and elitist sensibilities and criticizing the courts for their unthinking embrace of the elitist posture); Mark Tushnet,
infinitely expandable commerce power and the permanently truncated human rights powers appears “dishonest” and “distorting” not only against the baseline of the constitutional text, but also against the baseline of the popular will. The great social movements that sought to expand congressional powers during the twentieth century framed their claims in the language of human rights, not commerce. The labor movement demanded that Congress enforce rights of self-organization and collective action that workers believed had been won in the Civil War and constitutionalized in the Thirteenth Amendment. Civil rights activists marched and staged sit-ins to realize the freedom and equality promised by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Feminists demonstrated and established underground abortion clinics to win for women fundamental rights of bodily integrity and equal treatment that many claimed were guaranteed by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Yet, in one of the great curiosities of American law, the attorneys assigned to defend the constitutionality of the resulting statutes downplayed or eschewed altogether the language of rights and freedoms. Instead, they dressed the statutes in the language of economics so that they could be justified as exercises of the commerce power. By the 1990s, human rights movements had provided the impetus for a stupendous expansion of the commerce power, while the congressional powers that the movements themselves had championed remained unrescued from nineteenth-century limitations.


7. See infra text accompanying notes 56±63.

8. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Why We Can’t Wait 25 (1963) (locating the origins of the civil rights “Revolution of 1963” in African Americans’ “rededication to the obvious fact that urgent business was at hand—the resumption of that noble journey toward the goals reflected in the Preamble to the Constitution, the Constitution itself, the Bill of Rights and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments”).


10. See Gunther & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 201–02 (Civil Rights Act of 1964); infra notes 407–418 and accompanying text (Wagner Act).
This old problem has been made newly urgent by the Supreme Court’s decisions in *United States v. Lopez*\(^{11}\) and *United States v. Morrison*.\(^{12}\) *Lopez* was the Court’s solution to the problem of the infinitely expandable Commerce Clause. In striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the majority purported to distinguish “between what is truly national and what is truly local.”\(^{13}\) *Morrison*, on the other hand, was the Court’s non-solution to what it sees as the nonproblem of the permanently truncated human rights powers. In striking down Congress’s attempt to provide a private cause of action for victims of gender motivated violence, the Court reaffirmed its determination to end the infinite expandability of the commerce power while continuing to apply the nineteenth-century limits on the human rights powers. Because crimes of violence motivated by gender “are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity,” the Court ignored Congress’s detailed findings as to their effects on interstate commerce.\(^{14}\) Assuming that the Court does not retreat from this position, human rights statutes that do not sound in the language of commerce, exchange, and economic self-interest will henceforth be relegated to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, with their old limitations.\(^{15}\)

From a federalist point of view, the Commerce Clause holding and the human rights holding of *Morrison* are consistent: Both preserve a zone for state autonomy. From a populist point of view, however, the two rulings clash badly. The Commerce Clause holding begins to correct one half of the distortion caused by the lawyers’ failure to transmit the popular movements’ human rights claims—namely the infinitely expandable Commerce Clause. But the other half of the distortion—the permanently truncated human rights powers—remains uncorrected. From a populist perspective, the result is even worse than the old, fully distorted regime. Now, human rights statutes are not merely misclassified as exercises of the commerce power; they may fall outside the scope of congres-

\(12\). 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
\(13\). *Lopez*, 514 U.S. at 567–68.
\(14\). *Morrison*, 529 U.S. at 613.
\(15\). In *Morrison*, these limitations were sufficient to dispose of the private cause of action for victims of gender motivated violence despite extensive congressional findings as to the inadequacy of state protections for women. Id. at 625–27 (holding that the Violence Against Women Act failed to satisfy state action requirement under the circumstances of the case because it neither imposed consequences on state officials nor sought to remedy specified state violations of the Fourteenth Amendment). The Thirteenth Amendment justification dropped out early in the case. The district court opined that the “fact that Congress based this in part on gender discrimination ‘prohibited under the [Thirteenth] Amendment’ illustrates the straw grasping in which Congress engaged. The Thirteenth Amendment applies to racial, not gender, discrimination.” Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 796 n.3 (W.D. Va. 1996). The Thirteenth Amendment justification did not appear in the appellate decisions. See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997); 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
sional power altogether. And the immediate prospects for revitalizing the human rights provisions are bleak. Having failed to accomplish this objective when their constituents were fully mobilized and their claims broadly supported by public opinion, the popular movements now must start from scratch.

The roots of this problem can be traced back to the choice—made by Senator Robert Wagner and a group of government lawyers in 1935—to ground the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in the Commerce Clause instead of the Thirteenth Amendment.16 At that time, labor activists rejected the notion that their fundamental rights of organization and protest could be classed as commercial matters subject to the Commerce Clause.17 Andrew Furuseth, the movement’s most profound and determined constitutional thinker, argued that the Wagner Act should rest on Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, which empowers Congress to enforce the ban on slavery and involuntary servitude.18 But Senator Wagner and his staff chose to rely exclusively on the commerce power,19 and in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp and two companion cases, the Supreme Court revolutionized Commerce Clause doctrine by upholding the Act as applied to labor relations in manufacturing companies.20 After these decisions, the Commerce Clause beckoned irresistibly as the pragmatic alternative to the more honest and natural, but also more risky, human rights provisions.21

Why did government lawyers reject labor’s constitutional ideas? Why did key legislators—who, as we shall see, publicly endorsed the substance of labor’s Thirteenth Amendment claims—go along with the lawyers’ advice? Most accounts assume that the New Deal expansion of the Commerce Clause reflected the popular will. But what if the workers, farmers, and small entrepreneurs who supported constitutional change were more concerned about dethroning “economic royalists” and establishing “industrial freedom” than they were about facilitating interstate com-

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16. Not only did the Wagner Act cases bring the commerce power across the line from commerce to manufacturing, but they also extended its application to enterprises that were both local in scope and small in relation to the industry as a whole. See NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 75 (1937) (upholding the Act as applied to a medium-sized clothing manufacturer with local operations).
17. See infra notes 71–75 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 218–222 and accompanying text.
19. See infra text accompanying note 260.
20. 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937) (upholding the Wagner Act as applied to a large steel corporation with interstate operations both on the supply and distribution ends); NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49, 57 (1937) (upholding the Wagner Act as applied to a large trailer manufacturer with an interstate distribution network); Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. at 75 (upholding the Wagner Act as applied to a medium-sized clothing manufacturer with local operations).
21. See Gunther & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 201–02 (reporting the decision—made by government lawyers against the advice of Gerald Gunther and others—to defend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 solely as an exercise of Congress’s commerce power instead of relying on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
merce?22 What if political leaders like Senator Wagner were “dishonest” and “cagey” in seeking to ground a labor rights statute on the Commerce Clause?23 And what if the government lawyers who rejected labor’s constitutional ideas were pursuing their own agenda, responding to their professional interests and perceptions rather than to those of the people? (Or what if those lawyers simply failed to understand that, as Mark Tushnet has observed, even victorious constitutional claims can impair the long-term prospects for change because of “the ideological implications of the way in which the legal claims were made”?)24 If any of these propositions are true, we might have to qualify the celebratory account of the New Deal constitutional revolution. The Court’s validation of the New Deal statutes could still be defended as an expression of popular will, but the shape of the constitutional regime that followed would be suspect.25

22. The critique of “economic royalists” and the goal of “industrial freedom” were important themes in President Roosevelt’s 1936 reelection campaign. See infra notes 354, 365–371 and accompanying text. If the New Deal constitutional revolution had been primarily about expanding government regulatory power, then Wagner’s turn to the Commerce Clause would be unremarkable. But recent scholarship suggests that, like the Reconstruction amendments, the New Deal constitutional revolution was about freedom first, and governmental power mainly as a means to realize that freedom. “Like the Civil War,” explains Eric Foner, “the New Deal recast the idea of freedom by linking it to the expanding power of the national state.” Eric Foner, The Story of American Freedom 196 (1998).

23. Cf. Lino A. Graglia, United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Commerce Clause, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 719, 739–40 (1996) (contending that the Wagner Act “was hardly less of a pretextual use of the commerce power than the Mann Act; its purpose and effect were not to facilitate trade, but to advance the welfare of the working class”). This fits Karen Orren’s startlingly original account, according to which Jones & Laughlin ended the feudal relationship of master and servant and commenced the modern regime of liberal democracy. Karen Orren, Belated Feudalism: Labor, the Law, and Liberal Development in the United States 33, 209 (1991).

24. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 142.

25. William Forbath has suggested that there was a “gulf” between the New Deal’s constitutional mandate, which included a series of “social citizenship” rights like the right to a decent job, and its actual constitutional output. Forbath, Caste, supra note 6, at 6, 64–75. Forbath explains this gulf by pointing to the success of southern Democrats at blocking key elements of proposed legislation—a success made possible by the nation’s constitutional “bad faith” in failing to enforce the Reconstruction amendments and thereby permitting the disfranchisement of southern blacks and poor whites. Id. at 76–80. The present account addresses an additional aspect of the gap between the New Deal’s constitutional mandate and output. While President Roosevelt joined popular movements in calling for effective economic freedom, the lawyers turn to the Commerce Clause ensured that their concept of freedom would be excluded from the judicial opinions that codified the New Deal constitutional revolution. Some of the same thinkers who helped to open this gap by attacking the idea of constitutional labor freedom also provided cover for the continuing constitutional “bad faith” that enabled southern conservatives to block the recognition of social citizenship rights. The two themes came together in Bailey v. Alabama, where Oliver Wendell Holmes dissented from the Court’s invalidation of Alabama’s debt peonage law on Thirteenth Amendment grounds. 219 U.S. 219, 245–51 (1911). While the majority opinion spoke of the effective right of laborers to protect themselves against “that control by which the personal service of one man is disposed of or
None of these concerns show up in the received accounts. Instead, Senator Wagner’s turn to the Commerce Clause appears natural and obvious. We see progressive lawyers developing clever strategies for steering the Act through the courts toward ultimate constitutional vindication. In this story, the main characters are lawyers and politicians, the mode of legal thought is jurisprudence (the science of law), and the process of constitutional change is monist (meaning that transformative constitutional litigation does not differ fundamentally from ordinary litigation). Attorneys and courts drive constitutional change, remaining within the limited set of possibilities generated by precedent, doctrine, and accepted modes of legal reasoning. Lawyers assigned to defend the constitutionality of statutes are concerned first and foremost with the crafting of arguments that can win judicial approval, taking the judges’ attitudes to be predictable from past behavior. Peter Irons, Richard Cortner, and James Gross all recount—with one crucial exception—the twists and turns of the Wagner Act’s drafting and constitutional defense as if these generalizations held true.

The exception comes when all three of these historians acknowledge that, however brilliant the lawyers might have been, they won because “they rode on a tide of forces for change which the Court could no longer resist,” a tide that included the “wildfire spread of labor militance across the country.” If true (as Part IV below affirms), this observation


28. Irons, supra note 26, at 289, 272; see also Cortner, Wagner Act Cases, supra note 26, at 176–77 (arguing that Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Justice Owen Roberts, the swing votes in the Wagner Act cases, “had indeed ‘taken back’ some of their earlier views,” and suggesting that it was “to both Hughes’ and Roberts’ credit . . . that, when the forces of political and social unrest beat upon the court in the spring of 1937, they did not feel bound to a rigid adherence to previous utterances in the hope of maintaining reputations for constitutional consistency”); 1 Gross, supra note 26, at 227 (concluding that “it is reasonable to discount the effect of the board’s strategy and arguments and to give major credit to environmental conditions—that is, to the ‘facts of industrial
undermines the presuppositions of the standard story and, along with them, the notion that Senator Wagner’s turn to the Commerce Clause was natural and successful. It suggests that the Wagner Act cases cannot be understood as instances of ordinary litigation, in which the important actors and ideas are to be found within the legal profession, but rather as part of a larger process centered outside the legal profession and potentially generating a wider range of possible outcomes than those acceptable to the mainstream of the profession at the time. If the Court were responding to outside pressure, then there is no a priori reason to believe that—had the justices been presented with an argument based on the Thirteenth Amendment instead of the Commerce Clause—they would not have chosen to uphold the Act on that ground.

Accordingly, the story told below features legal outsiders in leading roles. The forms of legal thought include not only the professional mode of jurisprudence, but also the popular mode of jurigenesis (the creation of legal meaning through storytelling).29 And the process of constitutional change is dualist (meaning that major constitutional change takes place not through ordinary litigation, but through widespread and intense popular mobilization leading to constitutional amendments or transformative judicial opinions).30

relations,” namely extensive employer violations of the right to organize and the strike wave precipitated by those violations).

29. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 11 (1983). As distinct from jurisprudence, the scientific development and explication of law by legal technicians, jurigenesis involves storytelling about law by ordinary people. Id. A full-fledged jurigenenerative movement includes three elements: (1) a common body of legal thought and narrative, (2) a set of rituals for initiating new members into the movement, and (3) a more or less institutionalized commitment to abide by the shared legal understandings of the movement. Id. at 12–14. In the early twentieth century, the American labor movement sustained a vigorous jurigenenerative tradition encompassing each of these elements. While employers, backed by official law, sought to enforce an order of individual competition in the labor “market,” worker activists struggled to establish a regime of solidarity. See John R. Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism 304–05 (Univ. Wis. Press 1968) (1924); Christopher L. Tomlins, The State and the Unions: Labor Relations, Law, and the Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880–1960, at 58–62 (1985). Labor unions (1) enacted constitutions and passed “laws” governing member conduct, for example, laws barring members from working under nonunion conditions; (2) conducted a variety of rituals for integrating new members, including the swearing of oaths, the “breaking in” of new members by experienced unionists, and the operation of formal apprenticeship programs; and (3) utilized constitutionally specified procedures for bringing charges against members for violating union laws, for trying those charges, and for meting out punishment. James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 Yale L.J. 941, 954–55 (1997) [hereinafter Pope, Labor’s Constitution]. For a vivid account of worker jurigenesis in action, see David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor 13–22 (1987).

30. Bruce Ackerman’s dualist model of constitutional change provides a framework for understanding externally impelled constitutional change. Ackerman suggests that there are two lawmaking tracks in the United States: a lower track characterized by interest group politics and incremental change and a higher track characterized by broad popular mobilization seeking major change on issues of principle. 1 Bruce Ackerman, We The
Thirty years ago, Clement Vose wrote a pioneering volume of case studies analyzing constitutional change as a product of political action by pressure groups and social movements. To explain why he omitted the story of labor’s crusade for constitutional rights, he opined that it presented a problem “too vast” for his volume. The length of the present Article reflects my failure to avoid this difficulty. The story that follows has a large cast of characters and a variety of settings ranging from courts and law offices to labor conventions and factory floors. Part I describes the labor movement’s Thirteenth Amendment theory of labor legislation and recounts its growing popularity among legislators and others during the early twentieth century. But labor’s ideas ran into hostile and determined opposition, not only from employers, but—far more importantly—from progressive lawyers who styled themselves “friends of labor.” Led by Harvard Law Professor Felix Frankfurter, these lawyers battled labor’s constitutionalists for decades. Part I covers the struggle up to the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act of 1932, while Part II continues the story through Senator Wagner’s uneasy decision to rely solely on the Commerce Clause. These Parts suggest that the lawyers hijacked the power of the workers’ movement to their own project of empowering government regulators and intellectuals—including progressive lawyers—at the expense of both labor and capital.

Part III describes the emergence of “two laws” in the United States. Employers declared the Wagner bill unconstitutional during initial legislative hearings, and they put their views into practice by defying the Act after President Roosevelt signed it into law. Unions and workers were united in holding the bill constitutional, but deep divisions soon arose over how to win the point. While labor’s old generation of constitutional thinkers faltered, a new generation of industrial unionists took up the challenge of making labor “its own Supreme Court.” Notwithstanding the lawyers’ turn to the Commerce Clause, these worker activists continued to mobilize under the banner of industrial freedom.

In Part IV, the gap between the popular movement for constitutional change (with its slogan “human rights over property rights”) and the professional culture of law (with its focus on the Commerce Clause) widens as the constitutional crisis reaches its resolution. The Supreme Court’s
decision in *Carter v. Carter Coal Co.* left Senator Wagner’s Commerce Clause strategy in shambles. With litigation seemingly hopeless, the proponents of constitutional change turned to electioneering and direct action. Part IV then reassesses the much-debated constitutional significance of the 1936 election, focusing on labor’s claim that it amounted to a “referendum on industrial democracy.” It recounts the sharp escalation in both frequency and militancy of sit-down strikes following the election and the onset of pitched battles between police and strikers for possession of occupied factories. At the same time, the disjuncture between popular and legal professional viewpoints is dramatized as government lawyers try to convince the Supreme Court to uphold the Wagner Act as if it were an antistrike law. Part IV concludes with an argument that the Court validated the Act not because of the lawyers’ Commerce Clause arguments but because of pressure from the sit-down strikes.

In Part V, labor’s constitutional ideas finally reach the Supreme Court. During and after World War II, many states joined Congress in passing restrictive labor laws. The labor movement condemned these as “slave labor laws,” and union lawyers advanced their claims in court. With much fanfare, unionists announced that labor would never comply with the Taft-Hartley “Slave Labor” Act. Part V recounts the resulting conflict and the incorporation of labor into the emerging post–New Deal regime of constitutional jurisprudence.

I. The Thirteenth Amendment and the Campaign for Anti-Injunction Legislation, 1921–1932

In the standard story of the New Deal constitutional revolution, two great constitutional visions contended: Employers and their lawyers fought to preserve the laissez-faire constitutionalism of the so-called *Loch-
ner era, while progressive reformers and government lawyers battled to establish what would later be known as the Carolene Products regime of constitutional law. At the congressional hearings on the Wagner labor disputes bill, however, three—not two—constitutional positions were advanced.

Two of the three fit the standard story. First, James A. Emery, General Counsel of the National Association of Manufacturers, framed the case that would justify employer opposition throughout the struggle. He contended that the bill sought to "regulate relations exclusively local" between employers and employees, thus exceeding the reach of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce and invading the zone of state autonomy protected by the Tenth Amendment. Moreover, the bill sought to abrogate the "natural" contractual relationship between individual workers and employers, thus depriving both of the liberties guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

In response, Senator Wagner—himself a lawyer and former judge—accepted Emery's framing of the issues. On the question of congressional power, Wagner argued that strikes affected interstate commerce and therefore that congressional efforts to eliminate their causes fell within the scope of the interstate Commerce Clause. Moreover, collective bargaining rights would strengthen commerce by increasing workers' purchasing power. As for the due process problem, Wagner took issue with Emery's concept of liberty, arguing that Congress was entitled to protect the right of workers to organize and act collectively and that the individual labor liberty favored by employers was nothing more than a "trade name for exploitation."

The third position—omitted from the standard story—was advanced by William Green, President of the American Federation of Labor. Green's testimony, drafted by the AFL's attorney, acknowledged the em-

39. Id. at 374, 375±76, 432±34. The charge that the bill interfered with "natural" relations ran throughout Emery's lengthy argument. See, e.g., id. at 391 (contending that the bill "would outlaw and prohibit the natural and normal intercourse between employer and employee"); id. at 415 (warning that the bill would "develop bitterness, discord, and conflict by outlawing the natural development of intercourse through conference and cooperation in other forms of collective bargaining" [i.e. company unions]).
41. Id. at 1430±31 (statement of Senator Robert F. Wagner).
42. Id. at 1422, 1429±30.
mployers’ argument that the bill exceeded the reach of Congress’s commerce power, but suggested “that the power of Congress to legislate in matters of this sort arises out of provisions of the Constitution other than the interstate commerce clause.”

Curiously, from our perspective at the turn of the millennium, the statement located the source of congressional power in Section 4 of Article IV, which provides: “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government . . . .” The statement explained:

Recent history and present conditions in many countries of the world, all of them within the knowledge of well-informed men . . . clearly show the tendency toward, either (1) the preservation of a republican form of government; or (2) creation of dictatorships.

It is also perfectly clear, from recent and present experiences, that the preservation of industrial democracy is essential to the preservation of a republican form of government.

The whole purpose and tendency of these bills are to preserve industrial democracy; and if this be admitted it is clear that the Congress has the right to enact these bills into law and that they are valid and constitutional.

The notion that labor rights legislation could be grounded on the Republican Government Clause had rarely been heard, and would soon drop from sight. But the AFL’s rejection of the Commerce Clause, and its focus on fundamental principles of democracy and freedom—as opposed to pragmatic needs for economic regulation—continued a strong tradition of labor rights thinking. Seamen’s Union President Andrew Furuseth, long the AFL’s most profound and determined constitutional thinker, urged Senator Wagner to rely on the traditional vessel for labor’s constitutional aspirations: the Thirteenth Amendment. For decades, workers and unions had resisted injunctions, nullified antistrike laws, and sought legislation under the banner of the Thirteenth Amendment. Moreover, according to Senator Wagner and his congressional allies, the Wagner bill was founded on the same theory that supported labor’s vision of the Thirteenth Amendment: In a modern industrial society, the rights to organize, bargain collectively, and engage in collective action made the difference between freedom and slavery. The factual predicate for this view was incorporated into the bill’s statement of purpose, which asserted that “[t]he tendency of modern economic life toward integration and centralized control has . . . rendered the individual, unorganized worker

43. Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 38, at 139 (statement of William Green).
44. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.
46. See infra notes 218–222 and accompanying text.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 51–63.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 223–228.
helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract, to secure a just reward for his services, and to preserve a decent standard of living.”

Why, then, was this human rights statute grounded on the Commerce Clause rather than on the Thirteenth Amendment’s guarantee of human freedom? After decades of adhering to the Thirteenth Amendment in the teeth of government and employer repression, why did the labor movement suddenly allow it to be shoved aside at the moment of success? Why did the same senators and representatives who were consecrating the Wagner Act as a guarantee of industrial freedom rely solely on the Commerce Clause to support its constitutionality? Why did government lawyers prefer the Commerce Clause over the Thirteenth Amendment? To find the answers to these questions, it will be necessary to go back to the 1920s, when labor’s Thirteenth Amendment ideas could not be ignored.

A. Labor’s Freedom Constitution and the Drive for Labor Legislation

To unionists, the rights to organize, boycott, strike, and picket were fundamental rights that predated the New Deal statutes. Their source was to be found not in ordinary legislation, but in the Constitution, especially the First and Thirteenth Amendments. Not only did unionists develop their own constitutional interpretations, but they also put them into practice. The delegates to the 1919 Convention of the American Federation of Labor resolved unanimously to “stand firmly and conscientiously on our rights as free men and treat all injunctive decrees that invade our personal liberties as . . . illegal as being in violation of our constitutional safeguards, and accept whatever consequences may follow.”

49. Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 38, at 1.
50. See, e.g., William Green, What Rights Do Workers Have?, 38 Am. Federationist 19, 20 (1931) (Workers have a legal right to union membership and collective bargaining. . . . Does one man because he owns property have the right to deny more than 4,000 the inalienable rights of free men—the right to choose what organization they shall join, the right to unite to promote their happiness and welfare?); see also infra note 57.
51. See Frank Morrison, Annual Labor Day Message, Summit County Lab. News, Sept. 3, 1937, at 1 (observing that labor’s rights to organize and protest were “inherent under guarantees of the constitution of the United States”); William E. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement 135–41 (1991) (hereinafter Forbath, Law and Labor] (describing unionists’ views of the First and Thirteenth Amendments); Pope, Labor’s Constitution, supra note 29, at 962–66 (describing unionists’ views of the Thirteenth Amendment). At times, unionists repudiated positive law and grounded their claims in natural law. See, e.g., Editorial, Have the Workers a Right to Organize?, Justice, Sept. 17, 1920, at 4 (observing that “if the workers depended on the law they would have always lost” and that the “only bit of luck is that the workers have their organization which protects their right to organize, law or no law”). But natural law themes were less prominent than reliance on the Constitution, and they were usually combined with references to constitutional themes. See Pope, Labor’s Constitution, supra note 29, at 979–80.
52. AFL, Report of Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor 361 (1919). Since 1909, the AFL had maintained that a worker confronted with an unconstitutional injunction had an “imperative duty” to “refuse
Local activists across the country defied injunctions and, as recounted by William Forbath, their resistance helped to undermine the legitimacy of the labor injunction.53 Although conservative union leaders rarely engaged in resistance themselves, they proudly backed open defiance of “unconstitutional” laws by local activists.54 In what was perhaps the single most dramatic campaign of resistance, the AFL declared the Kansas Industrial Court Act of 1920 unconstitutional, and Alexander Howat led the Kansas district of the United Mine Workers in a four-month political strike against the law.55 Conservative voluntarists like Samuel Gompers and Matthew Woll supported the notorious radical Howat in his campaign of resistance.56

To unionists, then, the statutory protections for self-organization in the Wagner Act and its predecessor, the National Industrial Recovery Act, had merely created “a new legal body” for “an old labor right.”57 The obedience and to take whatever consequences may ensue.” AFL, Report of Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor 313 (1909).

53. See Forbath, Law and Labor, supra note 51, at 159–63. However, not all unionists endorsed the policy of defiance even in theory. See, e.g., Letter from A.J. Conners, Secretary, Local 5, Machine Stone Workers Rubbers and Helpers, to Senator George W. Norris (Feb. 20, 1932), in Norris Papers, Library of Congress, box 285 (arguing that the Bedford Cut Stone doctrine “compelling a man to work against his will, is only a law that should be made for serfs and slaves,” but holding that, “as law abiding citizens,” unionists must comply).

54. For example, John Frey, a conservative craft unionist who wrote a book on the labor injunction, celebrated the resistance of Cleveland building trades workers to an injunction:

I am proud as a citizen of Ohio that the building tradesmen of Cleveland determined that their rights were set down in the constitution of the United States and not confined to the conscience of an injunction-granting judge. I stand with them, and I know the American Federation of Labor will approve of the stand of free American citizens in refusing to go to work when a judge orders them to do it.


56. Samuel Gompers and the AFL Executive Council maintained that the Kansas law was an attempt to establish involuntary servitude and that the only way to defeat it was through “action by the organized workers of Kansas.” Letter from Samuel Gompers, President, AFL, to John L. Lewis, President, United Mine Workers (Dec. 5, 1921), in Van A. Bittner Papers, West Virginia and Regional History Collections, West Virginia Univ., Morgantown, W. Va., box 6. For Woll’s views, see Matthew Woll, How the Kansas Plan Defies Fundamental American Freedom, 5 Am. Federationist 317, 319 (1922); Matthew Woll, Editorial Comment, The Am. Photo-Engraver, Dec. 1921, at 22–24 [hereinafter Woll, Editorial Comment].

57. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933); Matthew Woll, Editorial, Experience a Good Teacher, The Am. Photo-Engraver, July 1935, at 532–33; see also Len De Caux, A Right That Had To Be Won, Union News Serv., Apr. 17, 1957, at 1 (observing that in upholding the Wagner Act and “finally putting its O.K. on the right to organize, the Supreme Court has simply ratified a right which American workers have long
role of such statutes was to make possible the effective enjoyment of
rights that had previously been guaranteed in theory only.58 From this
point of view, the obvious place to look for a source of congressional
power to enact labor legislation was among the rights affirming provi-
sions of the Constitution.

Unionists turned to the Thirteenth Amendment, the constitutional
provision that most directly addressed the question of labor freedom.
They quoted the Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey v. Alabama for the
proposition that the Thirteenth Amendment was intended “to make la-
bror free by prohibiting that control by which the personal service of one
man is disposed of or coerced for another’s benefit.”59 By himself, they
argued, the individual worker was helpless in dealing with a large-scale
corporate employer.60 While the discharge of one worker meant nothing
to the company, it meant the loss of “the means of sustaining life” to the
worker and his family.61 More fundamentally, even if the cumulative
threat of losing workers through individual quits did force employers to
improve conditions, it could not give the worker the experience of free-
dom—of joining “with his fellows [to] make such conditions for him-
self.”62 Thus interpreted, the Thirteenth Amendment provided solutions

possessed theoretically, but which it took the C.I.O. to establish in actuality”). In 1933,
section 7(a) of the NIRA had been greeted in similar fashion. “President Roosevelt signed
the bill,” explained one Pennsylvania coal miner, “which restored your constitutional rights
and industrial freedom.” William F. Donovan, Local Union No. 280, Monongahela, Pa.,
District 5 Aflame, United Mine Workers J., July 15, 1933, at 7.

58. See, e.g., John L. Lewis, President Lewis’ Labor Day Message, United Mine
Workers J., Sept. 1, 1933, at 12 (observing that the NIRA had made labor “free to assert the
rights that it always possessed but never before was permitted to enjoy”); Charles P.
Howard, President’s Pages, Typographical J., July 1933, at 9 (stating that the NIRA
“extends to the workers rights which have always been theirs and which they should have
been permitted to enjoy”); Tate Defends Strike Action, Summit County Lab. News, Sept.
28, 1934, at 3 (“In theory American labor has always had the right to organize. In practice,
labor organizations have been fought by a hundred different means. . . . Clause 7-A of the
N.R.A. code is only a statement of the elementary right of labor to organize.”).

59. 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911) (invalidating Alabama’s debt peonage law).

60. Debate Between Samuel Gompers and Henry J. Allen at Carnegie Hall, New York,
N.Y., May 28, 1920, at 13 (Samuel Gompers rejecting the notion that a lone worker could
avoid employer control by quitting: “[J]ust imagine what a wonderful influence such an
individual would have, say for instance [on] the U.S. Steel Corporation . . . .”); Woll,
Editorial Comment, supra note 56, at 24 (“Common sense and experience, however,
sufficiently demonstrate that industrial justice cannot be obtained by one or even two men
quitting work. It has long been recognized that a strike justly called is an industrial
argument for securing justice.”); see also Pope, Labor’s Constitution, supra note 29, at
962–66 (describing this argument in detail, with additional quotations).

61. J. [H.] Walker, Only Worker Suffers, Workers Chron., Apr. 29, 1921, at 3; see also
Lavor’s Right To Organize Is Defended By Dalrymple, Akron Beacon J., Feb. 28, 1936, at
13 (quoting Sherman Dalrymple, President of the United Rubber Workers as stating that
“[v]ery little freedom of contract can exist between an employ[e]e who has nothing but his
labor to sell and a company which can do without the labor of any particular individual”).

at 7, 8. Similarly, Victor Olander of the Seamen’s Union wrote that “freedom is real only
for the three main constitutional problems that bedeviled labor’s legislative proposals.

1. Congressional Power. — First, Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment empowered Congress to enforce Section 1’s prohibition on slavery and involuntary servitude through “appropriate legislation.” Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, which applied only to state action, the Thirteenth made no distinction between governmental and private conduct, and thus could support legislation banning employers as well as government from interfering with labor rights. Admittedly, the results of many Supreme Court decisions conflicted with labor’s theory of collective rights, but because the Court had yet to address the Thirteenth Amendment issue, there was no adverse precedent squarely on point. Moreover, a few lower courts had held that the Thirteenth Amendment protected collective labor rights. And by the 1920s, even the justices of the Su-

64. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (stating that legislation enacted pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment is “primary and direct in its character; for the amendment is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States”). Prior to the 1930s, this feature was important mainly in regard to labor’s efforts to obtain legislative relief from yellow dog contracts. For example, Pennsylvania AFL President James Maurer proposed national legislation banning the yellow dog contract which, he maintained, “means nothing more than involuntary servitude, and comes in direct conflict with” the Thirteenth Amendment. Letter from Francis B. Sayre to John W. Edelman, Research Dep’t, Am. Fed’n of Full Fashioned Hosiery Workers (Nov. 16, 1927), microformed on The Papers of Felix Frankfurter, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, reel 94, frame 839 (1983) [hereinafter Frankfurter Papers] (quoting Maurer’s proposal); see also Limiting Scope of Injunctions in Labor Disputes: Hearings before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 70th Cong. 670±71 (1928) [hereinafter Limiting Injunctions] (testimony of John P. Frey, Secretary and Treasurer of the AFL Metal Trades Department) (arguing that yellow dog contracts could be prohibited on the authority of the Thirteenth Amendment); The Measure Proposed in Lieu of the Amended Substitute Bill: An Act for the Enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment in Relation to Injunctions in Labor Disputes and for Other Purposes, Injunctions in Labor Disputes, S. Doc. No. 71-327, at 11 (3d Sess. 1931) (bill, drafted by three lawyers in consultation with Andrew Furuseth, asserting an “inalienable right” under the Thirteenth Amendment to organize, bargain collectively, and engage in collective action).
65. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 69 (applying federal antitrust statutes to restrict collective action by labor).
66. Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310, 319–20, 327 (7th Cir. 1894) (Harlan, Circuit Justice) (overturning parts of an antistrike injunction partly on the ground that workers enjoyed the right, guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment, “to confer with each other upon the subject of the proposed reduction in wages, . . . to withdraw in a body from the service of [the employer] because of the proposed change,” and “to demand given rates of compensation as a condition of their remaining in the service”); Kemp v. Div. No. 241, Amalgamated Ass’n of St. & Elec. Ry. Employees of Am., 99 N.E. 389, 392 (Ill. 1912) (overturning an injunction that prohibited a union from calling a strike, partly on
preme Court were giving labor’s freedom theory lip service, albeit under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Thirteenth Amendment. “A single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer,” conceded Chief Justice Taft, and so “[u]nion was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on equality with their employer.”67 In Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, the Court struck down a state compulsory arbitration law partly because its ban on strikes deprived the worker of “that means of putting himself on an equality with his employer which action in concert with his fellows gives him.”68

Unionists also took heart when Justice Brandeis wrote, in dissent, that an injunction against a peaceful sympathy strike “reminds of involuntary servitude.”69

In comparison to the Thirteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause seemed an unnatural and dangerous source of power for labor rights legislation. The Sherman Antitrust Act, passed under the com-

Thirteenth Amendment grounds); cf. Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 F. 912, 937, 939 (8th Cir. 1897) (Caldwell, J., dissenting) (declaring that a denial of the right to strike and boycott amounted to wage slavery).

67. Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921) (holding that injunction should issue limiting pickets to one per gate). The entire quotation reads:

Labor unions . . . were organized out of the necessities of the situation. A single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer. He was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family. If the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment. Union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on equality with their employer. They united to exert influence upon him and to leave him in a body in order by this inconvenience to induce him to make better terms with them.

68. 262 U.S. 522, 540 (1923) (upholding employer’s constitutional challenge to a Kansas law that prohibited strikes and provided for labor disputes to be adjudicated in an industrial court).

69. Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters’ Ass’n, 274 U.S. 37, 65 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); AFL, Report of Proceedings of the Forty-Seventh Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor 293, 302 (1927) [hereinafter 1927 AFL Report of Proceedings] (statement of delegates Andrew Furuseth and Chauncy A. Weaver, president of musicians’ union) (approving of Justice Brandeis’s comparison of an injunction against a peaceful strike with involuntary servitude); AFL, Report of Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor 319 (1929) [hereinafter 1929 AFL Report of Proceedings] (statement of delegate John P. Frey) (approving of Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Bedford Cut Stone). Although union lawyers did not make the Thirteenth Amendment argument in their briefs in Bedford Cut Stone, Justice Brandeis had undoubtedly heard an earful about labor’s Thirteenth Amendment theory from Andrew Furuseth, who was an occasional dinner guest at Brandeis’s house. See Letter from Mae E. Waggaman, former private secretary to Furuseth, to Silas Axtell (Feb. 25, 1947), reprinted in A Symposium on Andrew Furuseth 35, 37 (Silas B. Axtell ed., 1948) (recalling that Furuseth “always seemed pleased to spend an evening with Justice Brandeis in his home where special dishes were prepared for him” and that she “often took the messages over the ‘phone when the invitations were extended to him”).
merce power, had spawned court injunctions and treble damage awards against strikers and boycotters on the theory that they were conspiring to restrain interstate commerce. Unionists protested that labor combinations had nothing to do with commerce because labor power could not be separated from the worker and thus could not be a commodity or article of commerce:

We protest against the use of such definitions for the purpose of bringing labor, employment and industrial relations under the power granted to Congress to regulate interstate commerce, and under guise of such definition place labor, the service of free men, under the same restraints and limitations as well as under the same classification as articles of trade to be bargained for in like principles and practices as commodities of commerce. Under such strained definition and construction both the reserved constitutional rights of all American freemen as well as powers exclusively delegated to our several state governments may be trespassed upon, limited or denied at any time and at will by those temporarily in governmental authority.

Labor’s aversion to the Commerce Clause extended only to the direct regulation of labor rights and not to regulations of the channels or instrumentalities of commerce. Unionists contended that Congress could control child labor by excluding its products from the channels of interstate commerce and did not object to Congress’s regulation of railway labor as an incident of the railroads’ status as instrumentalities of commerce. They approved the National Industrial Recovery Act, which authorized the President to approve codes of fair competition drawn up by “trade organizations,” a term construed by the AFL to include unions. They even proposed that Congress could protect the right to or-

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70. See, e.g., Bedford Cut Stone, 274 U.S. at 54 (holding that union’s strikes constituted a “course of conduct which directly and substantially curtailed, or threatened thus to curtail, the natural flow in interstate commerce” in violation of the Antitrust Act); Coronado Coal Co. v. UMW, 268 U.S. 295, 310 (1925) (describing alleged destruction of mining properties by union as an unlawful restriction of interstate commerce under the Antitrust Act); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 304–05 (1908) (finding that hatter’s union formed a “conspiracy or combination” to “directly restrain plaintiffs’ [interstate] trade”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 1880–1930, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 919, 921 (1988) (arguing that judicial opposition to the labor movement in the early 1900s derived in part from a particular view of political economy that perceived any collusion as harmful to the public interest).


ganize by imposing a federal licensing requirement on corporations engaged in interstate commerce and then revoking the licenses of corporations that interfered with worker rights.74 But when Senator Wagner unveiled his bill, which applied directly to labor relations rather than to channels or instrumentalities of commerce, unionists balked. As we have seen, the AFL countered with the Republican Government Clause while Andrew Furuseth renewed labor’s plea for legislation under the Thirteenth Amendment.75

2. Economic Due Process. — Second, the Thirteenth Amendment provided a base from which to attack the doctrine of economic due process.76 In Adair v. United States, the Supreme Court had struck down a federal statute protecting railroad workers against discrimination based on union membership, reasoning that the statute infringed the individual liberty of contract guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.77 The liberty to sign a yellow dog contract (in which the employee agreed not to join a union) was, declared the Court in a later case, “as essential to the laborer as to the capitalist.”78 Labor constitutionalists conceded that these decisions might have been justifiable when the Fifth Amendment was enacted; after all, slavery and involuntary servitude were constitutionally sanctioned in those days.79 But the Thirteenth Amendment, which declared simply that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States,”80 precluded workers from selling themselves into a condition of involuntary servitude like that rep-
resented by the yellow dog contract.81 And because the Thirteenth Amendment was enacted subsequently to the Fifth, it operated "by implication as a repeal of the fifth amendment, in so far as any property in a human being was recognized by that amendment."82

3. Class Legislation. — Labor’s most frequent and influential use of the Thirteenth Amendment came not in the areas of congressional power or economic due process—the problems subsequently highlighted by historians—but on the question whether statutes protecting labor rights constituted "class legislation" in violation of the constitutional principle of equality. This issue raised the deeper question whether there was something distinctive about labor organization and protest that justified treating it differently from other invasions of common law business rights—a question that would later become crucial in the shaping of the post-New Deal constitutional order.83 Beginning around the turn of the century, employers argued—with considerable success—that to exempt labor from antitrust laws or injunctive remedies was to grant an unjustifiable special privilege.84 In Truax v. Corrigan, the Supreme Court invalidated an Arizona statute that barred courts from enjoining peaceful striking and picketing.85 According to the Court, the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because there was no justification for distinguishing between striking workers and "other tort feasors."86 The Court suggested in Truax that federal (as opposed to state) anti-injunction legislation might survive constitutional scrutiny because the Equal Protection Clause did not apply to the national government.87 But in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, the Court

81. See Limiting Injunctions, supra note 64, at 670–71 (testimony of John P. Frey, Secretary and Treasurer of the AFL Metal Trades Department) (arguing that yellow dog contracts violate the Thirteenth Amendment); Letter from Francis B. Sayre to John W. Edelman, supra note 64, at 2 (quoting argument by James Maurer, President of the Pennsylvania State Federation of Labor, that the yellow dog contract amounted to a condition of involuntary servitude).

82. Winter S. Martin, A Memorandum on the Substitute Bill S. 2497, Injunctions In Labor Disputes, S. Doc. No. 71-327, at 2, 13 (3d Sess. 1931); Furuseth, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 79, at 3 (charging that the decisions in Adair, Adkins, Coppage, Bedford Cut Stone, Duplex, Truax, Hitchman, and American Foundries "rest upon the Fifth Amendment as if the Thirteenth Amendment had not modified the meaning of the word 'property' as construed in the Dred Scott decision").

83. See infra Part V.B.

84. Federal courts had struck down state attempts to exempt unions from antitrust lawsuits as "class legislation." Forbath, Law and Labor, supra note 51, at 151 (citing Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Cornell, 110 F. 816, 825 (D. Neb. 1901) and Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 565 (1902)).

85. 257 U.S. 312, 342 (1921).

86. Id. at 336, 339.

87. Id. at 332 (observing that "the equality clause does not appear in the Fifth Amendment and so does not apply to congressional legislation," and that although the due process clause "tends to secure equality of law in the sense that it makes a required minimum of protection for every one's right of life, liberty and property, which the Congress or the legislature may not withhold," the "framers and adopters of [the
narrowly construed the anti-injunction provisions of the Clayton Act so as to permit the enjoining of secondary boycotts on the ground that they imposed an “exceptional and extraordinary restriction . . . in the nature of a special privilege or immunity to a particular class.”

Unionists took a diametrically opposite position. Far from a constitutionally suspect “special privilege,” differential treatment of capital and labor was constitutionally compelled. Samuel Gompers contended that it was “an outrage upon our language” to treat a combination of property owners in the same category as a combination of workers, “who own nothing but themselves and undertake to control nothing but themselves and their power to work.” Unlike dominion over things, dominion over one’s own labor was essential to personal liberty. “[H]uman labor . . . grows with the growth of the child or boy or young man, it lessens in sickness and it ceases at death,” argued labor constitutionalists, “and no one inherits it, no one can buy it, no one can sell it without buying or selling the body in which that labor power is.” The Thirteenth Amendment gave this distinction constitutional sanction by prohibiting the sale of the body into a condition of slavery or involuntary servitude. “If you

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88. 254 U.S. 443, 471 (1921). Duplex was decided prior to Truax, and the narrower construction given to the Clayton Act in Duplex was cited in Truax as a reason why Truax did not effectively strike down the Clayton Act’s labor provisions. Truax, 257 U.S. at 340 (distinguishing the Clayton Act on the grounds that (1) “the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to congressional but only to state action,” and (2) the Clayton Act did not have the same effect as the Arizona Supreme Court gave the Arizona statute).

89. 51 Cong. Rec. 9166 (1914). This outrage stemmed from the fact that labor was not a commodity and could not be property; the contrary principle contravened the Thirteenth Amendment. “Governmental regulations, trust laws, may rightfully apply to the products of labor,” maintained Gompers, “but they do not rightfully apply to the labor power of a free man.” Samuel Gompers, Labor Not a Commodity, reprinted in id. at 16,340; see also Testimony of Samuel Gompers, President, American Federation of Labor, before Joint Labor and Indus. Comm. of the New York State Legislature on the Duell-Miller industrial relations (antistrike) bill, Assembly Chamber, Capitol, Albany, N.Y., Mar. 1, 1922, reprinted in 29 Am. Federationist 253, 253–54 (1922) (denying that labor and capital should have equal rights and citing Lincoln on the priority of labor over capital); Forbath, Law and Labor, supra note 51, at 137–58, 154–55 (noting arguments of Gompers, Olander, and Furuseth that labor is distinct from capital and is protected by the Thirteenth Amendment); Pope, Labor’s Constitution, supra note 29, at 964–65 (noting labor’s arguments that denying workers freedom to strike and control over their work is akin to slavery).

90. 1926 AFL Report of Proceedings, supra note 54, at 311 (statement of Andrew Furuseth); see also Olander, supra note 62, at 7 (observing that a “man may exercise his labor power in the interest of another but he cannot give or sell it to any other person without at the same time surrendering his own body”); John P. Frey, The Labor Injunction 98 (n.d.) (quoting similar statement in President Gompers’s 1922 annual report to AFL convention).
make labor into property because you construe labor as being property and the . . . right to labor a property right," concluded Andrew Furuseth, "then the Thirteenth Amendment goes into the waste basket entirely."91

Labor’s language of freedom and slavery found a receptive audience among legislators. During the debates over the Clayton bill and other early attempts at anti-injunction legislation, numerous senators and representatives echoed unionists’ claims that the labor injunction violated the Thirteenth Amendment, and that combinations of labor could not be equated to combinations of commodity owners.92 In fact, these themes were so prominent that some lawyers ended up with the impression that the labor provisions of the Clayton Act had been passed “in support of the Thirteenth Amendment rather than under the Interstate Commerce [Clause] of the United States Constitution.”93 By the early 1930s, most

91. 1929 AFL Report of Proceedings, supra note 69, at 345. Furuseth also argued this point to legislators considering anti-injunction legislation. Limiting Injunctions, supra note 64, at 146–48.

92. See, e.g., 51 Cong. Rec. 9672 (1914) (Statement of Rep. Buchanan) (noting that there was a “difference between commodities and living human beings; in other words, that . . . humanity was in a different class from a ton of coal, a bolt of cloth, or a pile of bricks, and [that he] therefore did not consider this to be class legislation of any sort, or any special privilege,” and arguing that it was time to give labor “that freedom of activity guaranteed by the Constitution”); id. at 9565 (Statement of Rep. Lewis) (“Labor is never in truth a commodity; labor can never under our institutions be property. . . . Under our Constitution, property in human beings has forever ceased. . . . The legal attribute of a commodity is property; but the legal attribute of the workingman is citizenship.”); id. at 9559 (Statement of Rep. Casey) (“Labor power or patronage can not be property, but aside from this we have the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude”); id. at 9173 (Statement of Rep. Sherwood) (“Labor demands and has the right to demand that laws be enacted making a fundamental difference between labor power and property. Labor power is not property, because it can not be separated from the laborer.”); 48 Cong. Rec. 6457 (1912) (Statement of Rep. Graham) (“Property rights are getting too much recognition at the expense of human rights, and this bill is simply an attempt to get back to where Abraham Lincoln would have us; it is simply an assertion of the rights of men as against the rights of property.”); id. at 6446 (Statement of Rep. Wilson) (“The personal relationship between man and man comes clearly within the jurisdiction of the law courts and has no place in the courts of equity, unless upon the assumption . . . that man is property, an assumption repugnant to . . . all civilized communities and specifically forbidden by the thirteenth amendment.”).

93. Letter from Harold A. Henderson, General Counsel to District 11, UMWA, to John L. Lewis, District 14 Correspondence (Apr. 11, 1922), in UMWA Records (commenting that “Congress was justified in enacting the Clayton law in support of the Thirteenth Amendment rather than under the Interstate Commerce provisions of the United States Constitution”). Similarly, Frank P. Walsh, who was involved in labor’s lobbying campaign for the enactment of the Clayton Act, claimed that labor unions were exempted from the antitrust laws because Congress “recognized the activities of these men consisted of the personal service which they rendered to the industry, and that any inhibition on their right to quit individually or in concert was an assault upon the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.” Henry J. Allen, The Party of the Third Part: The Story of the Kansas Industrial Relations Court 78 (1921).
Americans accepted labor’s claim that, in an economy dominated by giant corporations, collective organization was essential to labor freedom.94

While labor’s freedom constitution was gaining ground among legislators and the general public, however, it remained anathema to another highly influential group: legal professionals.

B. Labor’s General Staff of Progressive Lawyers

Until the 1920s, pro-labor congressmen generally deferred to the AFL in shaping legislative proposals protecting labor rights.95 During that decade, however, a cadre of elite, progressive lawyers and scholars centered in the legal academy mounted a sustained effort to displace unionists as Congress’s main source of ideas about labor legislation. Harvard Law professors Felix Frankfurter and Francis B. Sayre, Columbia Law professor Herman Oliphant, Chief Librarian Edwin Witte of the Wisconsin Legislative Library, and Donald Richberg, a railroad labor attorney and legal scholar, made up the core of the group. Their effort to win control of the campaign for labor legislation set off a bitter clash between the movement culture of labor and the professional culture of legal progressivism—a clash that would have far-reaching ramifications for constitutional politics during the New Deal period.

As these lawyers saw it, the battle resulted not from any genuine conflict of interest, but from the failure of unionists to realize that they should trust lawyers to guide the movement for labor law reform. Writing anonymously, Felix Frankfurter urged labor to accept progressive intellectuals as a “general staff” for labor.96 “Mr. Gompers will learn,” he vowed, “that ‘intellectuals’ may have as deep a social sympathy and understanding as men who work at crafts.”97 Donald Richberg wrote a thinly disguised autobiographical novel in which the protagonist, a young lawyer, goes to court and provides a brilliant defense for inarticulate workers who would have been lost without an advocate like himself.98


95. See Forbath, Law and Labor, supra note 51, at 154, 156 (describing some of AFL’s successes in persuading congressmen to sponsor labor-friendly bills); Felix Frankfurter & Nathan Greene, The Labor Injunction 142 (1930) [hereinafter Frankfurter & Greene, Injunction] (recounting the exemption of labor organizations from the Clayton Act at the request of the AFL).

96. Felix Frankfurter, The “Law” and Labor (unsigned editorial from the New Republic, Jan. 26, 1921), reprinted in Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court 68, 76 (Philip Kurland ed., 1970) (“There is need of a general staff to do continuous thinking for labor, trained writers and speakers to interpret the needs and the methods of labor to the general public, and, finally, skilled technicians dealing with special problems.”).

97. Id.

98. Donald Richberg, A Man of Purpose 295–304 (1922). Thomas Vadney aptly described this tale: “Richberg painted a romantic picture of the role of the lawyer in defending what were portrayed as the downtrodden laboring masses, voiceless without a
Sayre advised unionists to give up the idea of enacting national legislation under the Thirteenth Amendment and proposed instead that they should hire "the best legal talent available" to conduct studies and draft state legislation, an approach that would require "a considerable expenditure of money, but I believe in the end it would be money well spent."99 Less ambitiously, one union lawyer reacted to Andrew Furuseth’s theorizing by complaining: "if you have an automobile and it needs fixing you take it to an automobile mechanic . . . and if you have a legal ill you necessarily go to a lawyer."100

The progressive lawyers sincerely and wholeheartedly supported labor’s immediate objective of anti-injunction legislation. But their long-term constitutional aims contrasted starkly with those of unionists. While workers experienced labor injunctions and economic due process as threats to labor freedom on the ground, lawyers experienced them as threats to the integrity of the judicial system and obstacles to the influence of professionals, including themselves, over economic policy. They saw judges purporting to decide cases on the basis of formalistic reasoning from absolute property rights, while, in fact, they were making policy based on their own economic sympathies.101 From this point of view, the importance of labor law reform stemmed less from its impact on workers than from the opportunity it offered to attack legal formalism at a glaring weak point, where judicial doctrine was especially out of step with "the facts."102 Following Oliver Wendell Holmes, the lawyers argued that the solution to this problem was to avoid fundamental rights thinking altogether and to investigate facts and balance the interests of capital and labor instead.103 This, in turn, was a policymaking task for the legislative spokesman like Richberg." Thomas Vadney, The Wayward Liberal: A Political Biography of Donald Richberg 50 (1970).

99. Letter from Francis B. Sayre to John W. Edelman, supra note 64.
100. Letter from Joseph O. Carson, Attorney at Law, to Frank Duffy, General Secretary, United Brotherhood of Carpenters (Dec. 23, 1931), in Norris Papers, supra note 53, box 198.
101. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870–1960, at 156–67 (1992) (recounting the dismantling, by legal progressives and realists, of the formalistic concept of property, and its resulting representation as a "creature of social choice"); Ernst, Yellow-Dog, supra note 94, at 265 (noting that, for legal realist scholars, the Supreme Court’s upholding of injunctions to enforce yellow dog contracts "was one of the great horrors of legal formalism").
102. These lawyers saw labor law reform merely as one component of a broader assault on the prevailing jurisprudential regime of legal formalism. See O’Brien, supra note 72, at 30; Daniel R. Ernst, Common Laborers’ Industrial Pluralists, Legal Realists, and the Law of Industrial Disputes, 11 Law & Hist. Rev. 59, 69 (1993). Their mentor, Oliver Wendell Holmes, had targeted the law of labor disputes as a weak point in the formalist system. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7–8 (1894). “From the beginning, economic struggle was, for Holmes,” Morton Horwitz explains, “the best example of the weakness of a theory of rights.” Horwitz, supra note 101, at 135.
103. Felix Frankfurter & Nathan Greene, Congressional Power Over The Labor Injunction, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 385, 405–06 (1931) [hereinafter Frankfurter & Greene,
branch, and labor—as well as capital—would have to give up its fundamental rights claims.

Accordingly, the progressive lawyers proposed to overcome the three big constitutional obstacles to labor legislation not by strengthening labor’s rights of collective action, but by expanding the zone for policymaking by legislatures and administrative agencies.

1. Congressional Power. — To the lawyers, there was nothing wrong with relying upon the commerce power to support labor legislation. While unionists complained that human labor could not be treated as an article of commerce, the progressive lawyers relegated labor matters to the category of “economics,” not human freedom. Edwin Witte chided unionists for attacking the “abstract” concept of commodity labor when labor problems were “economic in their nature” and thus called for social scientific solutions. Felix Frankfurter criticized the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence not for classifying labor as commerce, but for failing to recognize that decisions under that clause were “at bottom acts of statesmanship” that depended “upon a judgment about practical matters and not upon a knowledge of the Constitution.”

Congressional Power] (arguing that the answer to the problem of labor injunctions “calls for something more than the rhetoric of abstractions” and claiming that the Norris bill’s statement of policy “merely reflects a belief widely entertained by economists as well as by workers, and frequently acted upon by employers themselves, that the workmen engaged in every division of a single industry are bound by a common economic bond”). Holmes, no progressive himself, but an inspiration to the progressive lawyers, opined that in cases of industrial conflict, the outcome often depended on the “economic sympathies” of the judge. Horwitz, supra note 101, at 132, 135 (quoting Holmes).

104. See, e.g., Frankfurter & Greene, Congressional Power, supra note 103, at 405 (observing that the “creation of rights is the business of legislatures; so also is the task of defining with particularity the area within which rights may be exercised”).

105. Edwin E. Witte, The Government In Labor Disputes 59–60 (1932) (arguing that labor’s claims of “absolute” constitutional rights are “no more a solution of the problems which arise in the law of labor disputes than are the theories that are employed in decisions adverse to labor,” and proposing that “[w]hat is needed is an examination of the facts and a study of how the law is actually working out, rather than a priori reasoning, nice deductions, and reversion to old doctrines and phrases”). See generally Horwitz, supra note 101, at 105, 112 (quoting Pound’s observation that there are “not ‘rights,’ but ‘interests’” and describing Holmes’s project as one of freeing law from natural rights so that it could be used instrumentally); Daniel T. Rodgers, Contested Truths: Keywords in American Politics Since Independence 177, 211 (1987) (analyzing the shift in political discourse from fundamental rights and abstract truths to contingent states of fact).

106. Edwin E. Witte, The Doctrine that Labor is a Commodity, 69 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 133, 139 (1917); see also Ernst, Yellow-Dog, supra note 94, at 265 (quoting Walter Wheeler Cook’s assertion that the yellow dog contract presented “a problem of economic and social policy, conceal it how we will” and Thomas Reed Powell’s assertion that “[w]e are not likely to get a satisfactory solution of the problem of collective bargaining through the jurisprudence of abstract conceptions”).

The progressive lawyers adopted a curious approach toward labor’s Thirteenth Amendment theory. Given their general skepticism about fundamental rights thinking, it is not surprising that everything they said about it was negative, sometimes in language dripping with contempt.\(^\text{108}\) What is surprising, however, is that these legal intellectuals—who usually liked nothing better than to explain in detail the logic of their views—studiously refrained from explaining the reasons for their opposition. In Felix Frankfurter’s voluminous writings on the injunction question, one looks in vain for any discussion of the issue.\(^\text{109}\) Edwin Witte and Donald Richberg also ignored it.\(^\text{110}\) Francis Sayre once offered a refutation of sorts, but it was oddly out of step with the progressives’ usual approach to legal issues. Responding to labor’s idea of grounding anti–yellow dog legislation on the Thirteenth Amendment, Sayre wrote that “so far as I know, no court has ever held that labor under a contract which the employee has been forced to sign through the force of circumstances or by the press of economic needs would constitute such involuntary servitude as the Constitution forbids.”\(^\text{111}\) Considering that the progressive lawyers made their reputation criticizing court decisions and calling for new interpretations, this uncritical acceptance of institutional inertia rings hollow.

Looking beyond the elite group, many legal commentators summarily rejected labor’s Thirteenth Amendment theory on the ground that the individual right to quit by itself sufficed to eliminate any question of involuntary servitude.\(^\text{112}\) But the elite lawyers did not deploy that argument. To the contrary, they agreed with unionists that “the individual

\(^{108}\) See Letter from Edwin E. Witte, Chief, Legislative Reference Dep’t, to Roger N. Baldwin, Director, ACLU (Dec. 24, 1931), in Norris Papers, supra note 53, box 285 (arguing that “there is no simple formula such as ‘involuntary servitude’ . . . which would accomplish this purpose [of ending labor injunctions]”); see also infra notes 183–187 and accompanying text.

\(^{109}\) Philip Kurland’s compendium of Frankfurter’s extrajudicial commentary on the Supreme Court and the Constitution, which contains extensive discussion of labor matters, does not mention labor’s Thirteenth Amendment theory. See Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court, supra note 96. Frankfurter’s opus on the labor injunction, co-authored with Nathan Greene, quoted one of the rare decisions overturning a strike injunction on Thirteenth Amendment grounds, but otherwise said nothing about the Amendment. See Frankfurter & Greene, Injunction, supra note 95, at 90 n.36.

\(^{110}\) Witte did not address the question in his detailed treatment of yellow dog contracts and labor injunctions. See Witte, supra note 105, at 120, 220–30. Richberg discussed compulsory arbitration without mentioning labor’s view that compulsory arbitration violated the Thirteenth Amendment. See Donald R. Richberg, Developing Ethics and Resistant Law, 32 Yale L.J. 109, 119–21 (1922).

\(^{111}\) Letter from Francis B. Sayre to John W. Edelman, supra note 64, at 3.

\(^{112}\) See, e.g. Ernest C. Carman, The Outlook from the Present Legal Status of Employers and Employees in Industrial Disputes, 6 Minn. L. Rev. 533, 557–58 (1922) (arguing that strike ban did not violate Thirteenth Amendment because the individual worker retained the right to quit); Sidney Post Simpson, Constitutional Limitations on Compulsory Industrial Arbitration, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 753, 784–85 (1925) (same); Editorial, Judicial Adjustment of Industrial Controversies, 43 Bench & Bar, New Series 151, 153 (Nov.
unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment." ¹¹³ Thus, progressive lawyers were in the odd position of endorsing the factual predicate for labor’s Thirteenth Amendment theory while rejecting the theory itself without explanation. The logic behind this puzzling approach may become clearer when we revisit it at the climax of the story.¹¹⁴

2. Economic Due Process. — The elite lawyers were not above mustering technical arguments to distinguish their legislative proposals from those that had been invalidated by the Supreme Court on due process grounds.¹¹⁵ But in their franker moments they acknowledged that they, like their labor allies, were engaged in a transformative project. The problem was “one to be tested primarily by present day conditions,” and the lawyers were confident that their perception of those conditions would prevail.¹¹⁶ Witte predicted that “now that the purposes and results of such [yellow dog] ‘contracts’ appear so clearly, it is not too much to expect the United States Supreme Court” to reverse itself and declare them void against public policy.¹¹⁷ As for Truax, it was a decision so disastrous as to warrant immediate overruling. To Frankfurter, it was “destined to become even more classic than the Lochner case—a challenge is offered to all who find intolerable authoritarian rule by five men in contested fields of social policy.”¹¹⁸

¹¹³. Frankfurter & Greene, Injunction, supra note 95, at 280–81 (reprinting proposed anti-injunction bill drafted by Frankfurter, Witte, Sayre, Richberg, & Oliphant); see also Letter from Francis B. Sayre to John W. Edelman, supra note 64, at 1 (agreeing with James Maurer that an employee “is often in the world of actual fact completely at the mercy of the large employer when it comes to arranging the terms of the contract of employment”).

¹¹⁴. Seeinfra text accompanying notes 187–204.

¹¹⁵. See Frankfurter & Greene, Injunction, supra note 95, at 213–14 (distinguishing Adair on the ground that the Norris bill, unlike the statute at issue in Adair, did not make it a crime to enter into a yellow dog contract or nullify such contracts altogether; it merely denied them force in federal courts); id. at 220 (distinguishing Truax on the ground that it “is hardly to be assumed that the application given in Truax v. Corrigan to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment will be imposed upon the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment”).

¹¹⁶. Frankfurter & Greene, Congressional Power, supra note 103, at 400 (quoting United Rys. v. West, 280 U.S. 234, 249 (1930)); see also id. (“The Adair and Coppage cases in no wise bar acceptance of a view which is consistent with the experience both of life and of law.”); Limiting Injunctions, supra note 64, at 164 (quoting ACLU counsel Morris Ernst’s testimony against the Shipstead bill and in support of the substitute bill: “Times change. It seems to me that the classification of singling out industrial disputes, so-called, might now be deemed to be a reasonable classification in connection with the question of using the injunctive process.”).

¹¹⁷. Edwin E. Witte, “Yellow Dog” Contracts, 6 Wis. L. Rev. 21, 30 (1930).

3. **Class Legislation.** — The class legislation obstacle could be attacked in two ways, with the choice having huge significance for the place of labor in the constitutional order. While unionists argued that the Constitution precluded equivalent treatment of capital and labor, progressive reformers contended that legislators should have discretion to formulate legislative classifications—favorable or unfavorable—concerning both capital and labor. Following Oliver Wendell Holmes, they insisted that the legal status of labor organization and collective protest was a matter of economic policy that should be resolved by elected legislators, not appointed judges. “[T]hat which is reasonably defensible on economic or social grounds, whether or not it accords with our individual notion of economics,” declared Felix Frankfurter, “cannot be offensive on constitutional grounds.”120 Under this approach, the constitutional status of labor rights was equivalent to that of business rights: Both could be altered through the ordinary political process subject only to deferential review by the courts.121

C. **The Laughing Stock of Washington: Andrew Furuseth and the Shipstead Bill**

The stage for conflict was set in 1921, when the Supreme Court effectively nullified the labor provisions of the Clayton Act, making it clear to unionists that new legislation would be needed to protect workers from federal court injunctions.122 At the request of the AFL, several progressive lawyers, including Francis Sayre and Edwin Witte, submitted proposals imposing various limitations on the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes.123 But Andrew Furuseth vehemently renounced these offerings, arguing that they failed to confront the underlying issue of principle:

[T]here is no half loaf on fundamental principles. If you go on in certain directions and can get a little today and a little tomorrow, that is fine, but there are some things in which that won’t apply, and that won’t apply to the question of personal liberty. Whether a man or woman shall belong to himself or herself or not is fundamental, as is the question whether or not that man or woman shall have a right to combine with others for the purpose of mutual aid, for the purpose of bearing each

119. See supra text accompanying notes 89–91.
120. Felix Frankfurter, The Zeitgeist and the Judiciary, Address at the Harvard Law Review Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Dinner (1912), in Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court, supra note 96, at 1, 5.
121. For quotations from progressive reformers to this effect, see Pope, Labor’s Constitution, supra note 29, at 961, 987.
122. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 468–71 (1921) (holding that sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act did no more than codify the existing common law); Witte, supra note 105, at 273 (noting that Duplex “disillusioned organized labor as to the value of the Clayton Act” and prompted renewed thought on promoting anti-injunction legislation).
123. O’Brien, supra note 72, at 151.
other’s burdens, for the purpose of healing each other’s wounds, for the purpose of doing collectively what you can’t do individually.124

In Furuseth, the progressive lawyers found a determined and experienced constitutional adversary. Born in Norway in 1854, Furuseth went to sea at the age of nineteen.125 At that time, a sailor could be convicted of desertion if he left his employer while under contract, no matter how intolerable conditions had become.126 In sixteen years at sea, Furuseth likely witnessed the injustices of this system, including physical beatings meted out at the whim of a master.127 He turned to trade union organizing, and by the late 1880s, he was based in San Francisco, devoting most of his time to union affairs. Convinced that sailors enjoyed a constitutional right to quit under the Thirteenth Amendment, the union organized a lawsuit to challenge the arrest of a deserter.128 But in Robertson v. Baldwin, the Supreme Court held that the Thirteenth Amendment was not intended to alter the ancient maritime law.129 Undaunted, Furuseth relentlessly campaigned for legislation permitting sailors to quit, taking his constitutional argument to legislators and audiences across the country. When Congress rewarded his efforts by passing the LaFollette Seamen’s Act of 1915, Senator LaFollette proclaimed that the Thirteenth Amendment had become “a covenant of refuge for the seamen of the world.”130 But to Furuseth, the Amendment’s promise of freedom went further. Mere individual liberty would not suffice; only the rights to organize and strike could ensure labor freedom.131

In today’s terminology, Furuseth’s constitutionalism was dualist and populist. His response to the progressive lawyers prefigured Bruce Ackerman’s bifurcation of political change into two “tracks”: a lower track of

127. Weintraub, supra note 125, at 3–4.
128. Id. at 35.
131. See Letter from Andrew Furuseth to George W. Norris, supra note 79, at 5–6 (stating that “[h]aving been made free by [the Seamen’s Act], the seamen were promptly tossed into the lap of equity and tied hand and foot by injunction,” and protesting that “[i]f we . . . undertake to combine for the presumed purpose of withholding of labor or patronage, we are met by the injunction, the violation of which means imprisonment”); see also supra note 79, infra note 135 (citing writings by Furuseth).
ordinary politics and a higher one of constitutional politics.132 For most issues, the give and take of ordinary politics—of getting “a little today and a little tomorrow”—would be fine.133 But not for questions of personal liberty, including collective labor rights. On those “fundamental” issues, there could be no compromise of principle, no “half loaf.”134 Furuseth brought his dualist vision to life by recounting human history as a series of heroic struggles for freedom, first in the field of religion, then of politics, and finally of industry.135 At the nation’s founding, the United States had embraced religious and political freedom, and the Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights had promised freedom to all.136 But the design had been flawed. “By denying the humanity of the colored man, it became possible for a time to deny him the equal freedom promised or guaranteed all men; but . . . the United States paid for that betrayal with a Civil War, after which another amendment was adopted, the Thirteenth.”137 Now, the historic mission of the labor movement and of Congress was to ensure that the Thirteenth Amendment’s promise of labor freedom was realized.138 At convention after convention of the AFL, Furuseth exhorted the delegates to keep their eyes on this prize. In his surviving photographs, Furuseth seems almost to caricature the constitutional dualist as he glares fiercely at the camera with an expression at once deeply aggrieved and resolute.

Furuseth saw popular movements, not legal elites, driving constitutional change. Religious dissidents had won religious freedom, political dissidents had won political freedom, and now it was time for industrial

132. See I Ackerman, Foundations, supra note 30, at 6–7 (proposing the concept of a “dualist democracy”).
134. Id.
135. Furuseth wrote:
The working man . . . may have a vague idea of the development of freedom in the last sixteen hundred years. [He] has a hazy idea that it was first in the religious field and that ultimately freedom won; it was then on the political field, and again the freedom won. On the religious field it was carried on by religious organizations, based upon religious discontent. On the political field it was carried on by political organizations, based upon political discontent. If the evolution is to proceed and human brotherhood attained, the struggle on the industrial field must be carried on by organizations based upon industrial discontent. . . . Men gave their labor, their sweat and their blood to attain the freedom that we have reached. As it was obtained so it must be protected and developed.
137. Id. at 3–4.
dissidents to win industrial freedom. In this struggle to realize the promise of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, legal professionals—whether of the ordinary or the robed variety—were entitled to no deference. Far from disinterested technicians, lawyers were members of a legal “cult” with an interest in preserving its power. “Very

139. See, e.g., Furuseth, Company Unions, supra note 135, at 541, 543–44 (making reference to political and religious freedom movements); Furuseth, Labor and Freedom, supra note 135, at 4–5 (making same point).
few lawyers are big enough to criticize their own profession; very few men are strong enough to resist the development of a cult, especially if they are, or hope to be members of it.” ¹⁴⁰ To rely on a professor of equity for an opinion about injunctions would be like relying on a Catholic priest for an opinion about Catholicism.¹⁴¹ Accordingly, Furuseth and his allies counted more on Congress than on the courts to move constitutional interpretation forward. They argued that Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment conferred upon Congress “a broad discretion in determining the exact scope of necessary legislation,” including “a proper discretion as to the ultimate meaning and scope of the term ‘involuntary servitude.’”¹⁴² If the courts balked at Congress’s interpretation, then it would be time for drastic measures, “to go to the country . . . just as . . . at the time of the Civil War.”¹⁴³

Furuseth warned that the progressive proposals, most of which attempted to limit federal court jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor disputes, would be held unconstitutional as “class legislation” under Truax v. Corrigan.¹⁴⁴ Both to correct this problem and to address what he saw as the fundamental issue, Furuseth drafted his own bill and had it introduced in Congress by Senator Henrik Shipstead, the Farmer-Labor Senator from Minnesota.¹⁴⁵ The Shipstead bill consisted of one sentence providing that federal courts had jurisdiction to issue injunctions “to pro-

¹⁴¹. See AFL, Report of Proceedings of the Fiftieth Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor 360 (1930) [hereinafter 1930 AFL Report of Proceedings] (“If you . . . have some question to ask . . . about the Holy Trinity or about the Immaculate Conception, would you go to a Catholic priest for it? The Catholic priest will tell you what he believes.”) (quoting Andrew Furuseth).
¹⁴². Martin, supra note 82, at 15–16; see also AFL, Report of Proceedings of the Fifty-First Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor 463 (1931) [hereinafter 1931 AFL Report of Proceedings] (quoting Andrew Furuseth as stating that “Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment gives to Congress the right to construe the amendment”).
¹⁴³. Limiting Injunctions, supra note 64, at 712 (reporting AFL Attorney Winter S. Martin’s response to Senator Norris’s request for assurance that the courts would not strike down Furuseth’s proposed anti-injunction legislation); cf. 1931 AFL Report of Proceedings, supra note 142, at 458. At the AFL’s fifty-first convention, Furuseth stated: “When Charles I of England wanted to be the state the people said, “No, you won’t do anything of the kind,” and there followed some blood letting in England, and amongst the blood that was let was that of Charles I. I am not standing here advocating any violence, but if the men who have all the rights that free men have under the Constitution of the United States they have the right to refuse to labor until the employer has talked it over and adjusted their grievances.
¹⁴⁴. 257 U.S. 312, 351–52 (1921). For a discussion of Truax see supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text. Furuseth argued that progressive lawyers were “putting us in the position, in passing that bill, of a privileged class asking for special privileges.” 1929 AFL Report of Proceedings, supra note 69, at 323; see also id. at 324 (quoting delegate Ramsey making the same point).
¹⁴⁵. Weintraub, supra note 125, at 187.
tect property when there is no remedy at law," but that "nothing shall be held to be property unless it is tangible and transferable." 146 Labor constitutionalists held that labor injunctions—whether directed at speech, assemblies, or the quitting of work—necessarily rested on the notion that the employer owned some kind of property interest in the workers’ conduct. 147 By repudiating this notion, argued Furuseth, the Shipstead bill implemented the Thirteenth Amendment’s principle that labor power could not be property. 148 At its 1927 convention, the AFL endorsed Furuseth’s bill. 149

Immediately, the bill collided head-on with one of the main items on the progressive lawyers’ agenda for legal change: the expansion of intangible property rights. As Morton Horwitz has observed, a central problem for legal thinkers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries “was how to articulate a conception of property that could accommodate the tremendous expansion in the variety of forms of ownership spawned by a dynamic industrial society.” 150 Progressive lawyers were deeply involved in this project, rejecting physicalist conceptions of property and deconstructing the very notion of property rights. 151 They argued that the Shipstead bill would “throw out the baby with the bath,” eliminating injunctive protection for all kinds of beneficial, intangible property rights including patents and copyrights—interests specifically mandated by the Constitution. 152 In response, the bill’s proponents amended their proposal to permit injunctive protection of interests that were tangible or transferable, a category that would include patents and copyrights. 153

The clash between lawyers and unionists escalated sharply in early 1928 when a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by Senator George W. Norris, held hearings on the Shipstead bill. The day before the hearings were to commence, the AFL convened a special conference to mobilize support for the bill. 154 None of the progressive lawyers were scheduled to speak, but Donald Richberg appeared unan-

146. Frankfurter & Greene, Injunction, supra note 95, at 279 (reprinting text of S. 1482).
147. Limiting Injunctions, supra note 64, at 33–35 (essay of Andrew Furuseth entitled “Equity Power and its Abuse” introduced into record); id. at 137–38 (testimony of John P. Frey); id. at 145 (testimony of William Green).
148. Id. at 19, 148. This argument is set forth in supra text accompanying notes 90–91.
150. Horwitz, supra note 101, at 145.
151. See id. at 145–46.
152. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law School, to William Green, President, AFL (July 9, 1928), in Frankfurter Papers, supra note 64, reel 36, frame 485; Frankfurter & Greene, Injunction, supra note 95, at 207–08.
153. Limiting Injunctions, supra note 64, at 697.
nounced. “It may seem that my remarks are ungracious because I have come here at the eleventh hour to take up the matter,” he acknowledged, but he proceeded nonetheless to recite the standard progressive criticisms of the bill in an attempt to derail the conference from its planned objective. Matthew Woll retorted that the Federation had “solicited many, many lawyers, including Brother Richberg, and I dare say his proposal is by far even weaker than the one submitted this time.” But the lawyers had only begun to fight. Although none of the elite lawyers were present at the hearings the next day, their colleagues in the labor-side bar did not hesitate to attack the bill. Henry Warrum and William Glasgow, both counsel to the United Mine Workers, and Joseph Padway, General Counsel of the Wisconsin Federation of Labor, all rejected the Shipstead bill in favor of other remedies. Of the many lawyers who testified, only one—Winter S. Martin, representing the AFL—defended the bill.

After this impressive display of professional unity, the subcommittee headed by Senator Norris—himself a lawyer—asked Frankfurter, Sayre, Witte, Oliphant, and Richberg to draft a substitute for the Shipstead bill. This “committee of experts” promptly caucused in Washington for three days and emerged with a new bill. Instead of redefining property, the bill imposed detailed limitations on the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes, and declared yellow dog contracts to be void against public policy and unenforceable in federal courts. It finessed the problem of congressional power by relying on Congress’s authority to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts. As an aid to interpretation, the bill included a statement of “the public policy of the United States” which appeared to endorse the labor movement’s theory of freedom:

155. Id. at 19–20.
156. Id. at 20.
157. Limiting Injunctions, supra note 64, at 587 (testimony of William Glasgow); id. at 603 (testimony of Henry Warrum, as described by T.C. Townsend). Padway argued that the Shipstead bill would fail to prevent labor injunctions and endorsed the progressive approach of eliminating federal court jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor disputes. Id. at 575–76 (testimony of Joseph Padway). Former Governor Alex J. Groesbeck of Indiana, who represented the Street Railway Employees, also bluntly criticized the bill, stating: “I do not think it ought to become law, and that if it did become law it would not change the situation in any respect from what it is at the present time.” Id. at 225 (testimony of Alex J. Groesbeck).
158. Id. at 697–732 (testimony of Winter S. Martin).
159. Witte, supra note 105, at 274.
160. Frankfurter & Greene, Injunction, supra note 95, at 280–88 (reprinting text of substitute bill).
161. Id. at 210–11 (explaining that “the underlying constitutional theory of the proposed act . . . is an application of the doctrine that the federal courts are creations of Congress and that ‘the authority of Congress, in creating courts and conferring on them all or much or little of the judicial power of the United States, is unlimited by the Constitution’” (footnote omitted)).
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. . . .

William Green sent the draft out to lawyers and reported that their reaction “generally favored the proposed bill.” Unimpressed, the delegates to the 1928 AFL convention unanimously reaffirmed the Federation’s support for the Shipstead bill. But the Norris subcommittee was not prepared to endorse the bill. Even Andrew Furuseth had to admit that it “could hardly be expected that [the senators] would favor a remedy that was rejected by every attorney who spoke for labor, save one.” With the subcommittee embracing one bill and the AFL another, anti-injunction legislation would have to await a new Congress.

To Furuseth, this setback simply called for more determination on the part of labor. Entrenched in the mindset of a long term struggle over fundamentals, he insisted that mere numbers of lawyerly opinions could “not change a principle, if it be sound.” But Furuseth’s colleagues were more sensitive to short-run concerns. Matthew Woll pointed out that the Norris subcommittee was “a most friendly one . . . perhaps the friendliest we have ever had,” and worried that continued rejection of its bill might poison relations with the senators. Thomas Kennedy of the mine workers recalled that the labor movement had been the “laughing-stock of Washington” because of its disunity over the Shipstead bill, and

162. Id. at 280–81 (reprinting text of substitute bill).
164. Id. at 252. “While we do not doubt the friendliness of the sources from which the substitute bill emanated,” explained Victor Olander, “it is our opinion that . . . the time is here when the Congress of the United States can be prevailed upon to provide a really adequate remedy for the injunction evil.” Id. at 251.
165. Letter from Andrew Furuseth to Senators George W. Norris, Thomas J. Walsh, and John J. Blaine (June 7, 1928), reprinted in Limiting Injunctions, supra note 64, at 878.
166. Witte, supra note 105, at 275.
167. Limiting Injunctions, supra note 64, at 878.
168. Letter from Matthew Woll, Vice President, AFL, to Victor Olander, Secretary-Treasurer, The Illinois State Federation of Labor (Apr. 15, 1929), in Olander Papers, supra note 154, box 25. “Is not the Sub-committee liable to feel that it has exhausted all its ability,” Woll queried, “and . . . will it not be likely to disavow our future plans and act in a more or less passive manner?” Id.
urged unity behind the Norris bill. 169 Moreover, the progressive lawyers had pointed out a serious flaw in the Shipstead bill. Although the bill banned injunctions to protect the employer’s intangible property interest in labor, it would not stop courts from enjoining activities that inflicted damage on tangible property interests, such as perishable goods stranded by striking warehouse or transportation workers. 170 After a lengthy debate, the delegates to the 1929 AFL convention endorsed the Norris Bill. 171

But the AFL’s endorsement did not bring quick success. As predicted by Furuseth, employer lawyers—who had not made the charge of “class legislation” against the Shipstead bill—made it the centerpiece of their attack on the substitute bill. 172 The American Bar Association’s Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform joined in, condemning the bill as conveying “special privileges” and constituting “class legislation” in violation of the Constitution. 173 In June of 1930, the Senate Judiciary Committee voted ten to seven against the bill, concluding that it deprived employers of their rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and invaded the states’ prerogative to set industrial policy within their boundaries. 174

As the substitute bill faltered, Furuseth found himself presented with an opportunity to seize the initiative. After a final tirade against lawyers for torpedoing the Shipstead bill on the strength of “a few days in law school,” 175 he settled down to develop a new approach.

D. Too Silly for Any Practical Lawyer’s Use: The Thirteenth Amendment and the Norris-LaGuardia Act

Furuseth turned to Winter S. Martin, the one lawyer who had defended the Shipstead bill before the Norris subcommittee. Martin drafted “[a]n Act for the Enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment in Relation to Injunctions in Labor Disputes and for Other Purposes.” 176 This bill accepted the progressives’ approach of expressly restricting the

170. See id. at 332, 344, 350.
171. Only Furuseth was recorded in opposition. Id. at 353.
172. See Limiting Injunctions, supra note 64, at 737–38 (testimony of Walter Gordon Merritt, representing the League for Industrial Rights); id. at 823–24 (testimony of Leon B. Lanfrom, representing the Wisconsin Manufacturers’ Association and the Milwaukee Employers’ Council).
173. Id. at 813–15.
174. O’Brien, supra note 72, at 162; Frankfurter & Greene, Congressional Power, supra note 103, at 390, 397–400 (quoting committee report).
jurisdiction of federal courts to issue labor injunctions. But the Martin bill departed from the Norris bill in its constitutional approach. Instead of singling out “labor disputes” for special treatment, the bill asserted the existence of affirmative, collective labor rights under the Thirteenth Amendment and prohibited the courts from interfering with those rights. In March 1931, Senator Shipstead presented the Martin bill to Congress in the form of a senate document.

Attracted by the new bill, yet unwilling to risk a breach with Senator Norris, the AFL now endorsed a version of the Norris bill that incorporated the Martin bill’s express reliance on the Thirteenth Amendment. The first paragraph of its statement of purpose, drawn verbatim from the Martin bill, provided that the interpretation of the proposed act would be guided by the following public policy:

> [E]very human being has under the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States an inalienable right to the disposal of his labor free from interference, restraint or coercion by or in behalf of employers of labor, including the right to associate with other human beings for the protection and advancement of their common interests as workers, and in such association to negotiate through representatives of their own

177. Id. at 11–12.

178. Id. The remainder of the bill withdrew jurisdiction from the federal courts to interfere with the exercise of those rights, outlawed yellow dog contracts, and prohibited boycott injunctions. Id. The principle that labor could not be “property” appeared in the bill’s statement of policy, but only in the role of constitutional justification and without any attempt to provide a comprehensive definition of property. Id. at 11 (asserting that “employers have in many cases been regarded by the courts as possessing a property right in the uninterrupted continuance of employment” which amounted to an “alleged property right in the labor of human beings”).

179. Witte, supra note 105, at 276.

180. Text of the Anti-Injunction Bill Approved by the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor 1 (1931) [hereinafter AFL Bill]. Matthew Woll, John P. Frey, and Victor Olander explained that this addition would “place the provisions upon more basic considerations than the language” drafted by Richberg. Letter from Matthew Woll, John P. Frey & Victor Olander to William Green, President, AFL 2 (Aug. 12, 1931), reprinted in Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council (AFL), Aug. 6–19, 1931, at 54, 55. At the 1931 AFL convention, Furuseth indicated his willingness to support the AFL bill, but only if certain provisions of the underlying Norris bill were deleted, most importantly section 7, which authorized courts to issue injunctions under limited circumstances. 1931 AFL Report of Proceedings, supra note 142, at 456–57. Furuseth feared that the courts would construe this provision so broadly that it would swallow the outright prohibitions on injunctions contained in other sections. Id. Always the constitutional warrior, Furuseth was worried that, so construed, it could backfire and lead to a narrower interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment. See id. at 457 (arguing that the Executive Council bill would “get the essence of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution and make it . . . subservient to the equity power”). After a spirited discussion, during which both sides claimed that their approach best implemented the Thirteenth Amendment, the delegates endorsed the Executive Council bill unchanged. Id. at 462–65. Furuseth refused to accept defeat and continued to criticize the bill. See Andrew Furuseth, Injunction Legislation Is It? An Anti-Injunction Bill or a Pro-Injunction Code 13 (n.d., c. Nov. 1931).
choosing concerning the terms of employment and conditions of labor, and to take concerted action for their own protection in labor disputes. . . .

The progressive lawyers ignored this paragraph in public, instead criticizing the Martin and AFL bills on other grounds. Meanwhile, however, Felix Frankfurter maneuvered behind the scenes. He confided to Roger Baldwin that he felt “particularly strongly” about the AFL bill’s embrace of the Thirteenth Amendment theory. “[T]he talk about the Thirteenth Amendment,” he scoffed, “is too silly for any practical lawyer’s use.” Worse, it would “nullify the aim that lay behind the formation of the ‘public policy,’” presumably to empower Congress to balance the competing interests of capital and labor. Baldwin conveyed Frankfurter’s opinion to Senator Norris with the admonition that it must, “of course,” remain confidential since Frankfurter “would not want to put himself in a position publicly of attacking the A.F. of L. bill.” Frankfurter also moved to head off the possibility that Senator Shipstead might introduce the Martin bill. “The notion that the Thirteenth Amendment can serve as an obstruction to the evils against which we are contending,” he warned the Senator, “seems to me of a simplicity that borders on the fantastic.” The professor did not pause to explain why unionists’ ideas were so “silly” or “fantastic.”

Frankfurter’s surreptitious maneuvers reflected the strengths and weaknesses of the progressive lawyers’ position. On the terrain of open, democratic debate, they found themselves at a severe disadvantage.

181. AFL Bill, supra note 180, at 1.
182. At the request of the ACLU’s Committee on Injunctions, Edwin Witte analyzed the Martin bill and the AFL bill and critiqued them on other grounds. Ignoring the fact that the Martin bill rectified most of the lawyers’ public criticisms of the Shipstead bill, Witte characterized the bill as “the latest dress” for the intangible property idea embodied in the Shipstead bill. Letter from Edwin E. Witte to Roger N. Baldwin, supra note 108; see also Witte, supra note 105, at 276 (observing darkly that, “while phrased differently,” the Martin bill was “strongly suggestive of the original Shipstead bill”). As for the AFL bill, it simply went too far (for example, by attempting to eliminate damages as well as injunctive remedies). Letter from Edwin E. Witte, Chief, Legislative Reference Dep’t, to Dr. Alexander Fleisher, Secretary, ACLU Committee on Labor Injunctions (Oct. 14, 1931), in Norris Papers, supra note 53, box 285.
184. Id.
185. Id. On the progressive lawyers’ goal of freeing up Congress see supra text accompanying notes 101–105.
187. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law School, to Senator Shipstead (Mar. 23, 1931), in Norris Papers, supra note 53, box 285. Frankfurter also charged that the Martin bill adopted the untenable notion that “the criteria of law and of policy regarding the actions of individuals are coextensive with the criteria applicable to the actions by men in concert.” Id. This letter did not plead confidentiality, perhaps because—at the time it was written—the AFL had yet to endorse the Martin bill’s language on the Thirteenth Amendment.
Their own bill’s statement of policy appeared to endorse the substance of labor’s Thirteenth Amendment theory. If the “individual unorganized worker” were “helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract” or to “protect his freedom of labor,” as their bill declared,188 then it would seem that he would be in a condition of involuntary servitude under Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment, and Congress would have the authority to protect rights of self-organization under Section 2. Labor’s freedom constitution had long enjoyed substantial support in Congress,189 and Senator Norris himself had endorsed labor’s view that antistrike injunctions amounted to slavery and involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.190

The lawyers were no better off on the terrain of legal doctrine. They asserted that courts would reject labor’s theory, but never explained why.191 Had they wished to make a case based on precedent, they might have followed the lead of Walter Gordon Merritt, a leading employer-side lawyer and strategist. Merritt acknowledged that in the Wolff Packing case,192 the Supreme Court had recognized “a constitutional right to quit work in a body for certain purposes” (a reading of Wolff that even Frankfurter endorsed, albeit not under his own name)193 but pointed out that the Court had relied on the Fourteenth, not the Thirteenth Amendment.194 Unable to find any on-point authority against the theory, Merritt relied primarily on the fact that the judiciary’s practice of affirming labor injunctions conflicted with the existence of Thirteenth Amendment rights to organize, strike, and picket.195 From Merritt’s perspective as a defender of the status quo, there was nothing wrong with relying exclu-

188. Frankfurter & Greene, Injunction, supra note 95, at 280–81 (reprinting text of substitute bill).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 92–93.
190. 75 Cong. Rec. 4502 (1932) (statement of Senator Norris) (charging that labor injunctions brought about “involuntary servitude on the part of those who must toil in order that they and their families may live”). During the congressional hearings, Norris had defended labor’s view that injunctions prohibiting workers from combining to quit work violated the Thirteenth Amendment. See Limiting Injunctions, supra note 64, at 672 (commenting, with regard to the right to persuade workers to strike that “[w]e have got to leave that liberty to the citizen or we will have slavery, it seems to me, and we can not inquire into his motive, it seems to me, if he does it peacefully”).
193. Frankfurter, Taft and the Supreme Court, supra note 107, at 141 (reprinting unsigned editorial in the New Republic, June 27, 1923, in which Frankfurter observed that “[t]he right to strike, generally, is in the Wolff Packing Company case recognized as a constitutional right”).
194. Limiting Injunctions, supra note 64, at 308–09.
195. Id. at 311–12. Thus, to prohibit workers from combining to restrain commerce was sound law and “nothing approaching involuntary servitude.” Id. at 308. As for labor’s argument that a single worker was helpless to protect himself against organized capital, Merritt retorted: “Helpless for what? Helpless to violate the law of Congress; that is all.” Id.
sively on court practice. From the progressives’ point of view as advocates of change, however, Merritt’s method of uncritical reliance on court rulings would be just as fatal to their own ambitions as to labor’s. Since the progressives sought legal change, they would have to explain why courts would be more likely to accept their transformative theories than those offered by labor. And they would have to make this explanation against the background of their own public endorsement of labor’s theory that the “individual unorganized worker” was “helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract” or to “protect his freedom of labor.”

Lacking persuasive arguments, the elite lawyers fell back on the unadorned power of their professional position. Progressive legal thinkers had already developed the habit of summarily dismissing labor’s Thirteenth Amendment theories with little or no explanation. Instead of offering substantive rebuttals, which would have conceded labor’s theory a place on the constitutional agenda, elite lawyers deployed the rhetoric of disdain. By using adjectives like “silly” and “fantastic,” they implied that labor’s ideas were too ridiculous to merit discussion and that anyone who thought otherwise must be ignorant. Moreover, their scorn conveyed an implicit threat. Unlike the AFL, which represented an important democratic constituency, the lawyers could not openly threaten to sabotage the reform effort if they did not get their way. But the intensity of the lawyers’ derision effectively conveyed the same warning, and there was little doubt that a united front of progressive lawyers and old guard legalists could effectively veto reform legislation, as they had done with the Shipstead bill.

It might be objected that this portrayal of the progressive lawyers is simply too negative and one-sided. In reaction to an earlier draft of this Article, William Forbath argued that the progressives did address the merits of labor’s Thirteenth Amendment claim, but that labor never responded in kind. The progressive response, he claimed, was that an intelligent labor policy could be developed only by assessing shifting facts and complex consequences, including the harm caused by union coercion, and not by trumpeting timeless abstract principles or claiming an “abso-

196. Frankfurter & Greene, Injunction, supra note 95, at 280–81 (reprinting text of substitute bill).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 108–114; see also Herbert Feis, Kansas Miners and the Kansas Court, 47 Surv. 822, 824–25 (1922) (asserting that the “bogey of ‘involuntary servitude’ is too well known to require comment”).
198. As we have seen, Frankfurter described labor’s Thirteenth Amendment theory as “too silly for any practical lawyer’s use” and as “of a simplicity that borders on the fantastic.” See supra notes 183, 187. Edwin Witte derided Furuseth’s proposals as “meaningless.” Letter from Edwin E. Witte to Roger N. Baldwin, supra note 108. He had so little regard for the AFL’s legal thinking that he speculated that the Federation’s failure to endorse the Norris bill unchanged “was really due to oversight.” Letter from Edwin E. Witte, Chief, Legislative Reference Dep’t, to Dr. Alexander Fleisher, Secretary, ACLU (Oct. 14, 1931), in Norris Papers, supra note 53, box 285.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 154–165.
lute” right to strike. Labor’s constitutionalists, he contended, lost in part because they could not or would not beat the progressives on their own ground of facts, consequences, and policy.\footnote{200} This critique brings to mind Thomas Kuhn’s observation that the proponents of competing paradigms cannot speak to one another because their conceptual vocabularies do not mesh.\footnote{201} Certainly, labor’s constitutionalists believed that they were talking about facts and consequences when they argued that without rights of self-organization and collective action, workers were helpless to influence their conditions of work or to protect themselves against starvation wages. But they also believed that these facts characterized the entire era of industrial capitalism, and therefore that they were durable enough to support constitutional rights of self-organization and collective action. It is no answer to say that the coercive element of union activity rendered these rights nonabsolute; there was nothing stopping the lawyers from accepting the constitutional rights to organize and strike while simultaneously denying that they were “absolute,” as many progressive thinkers did for the freedom of speech.\footnote{202} Nor is it any answer to say that the field of industrial relations was peculiarly unsuited for the exercise of judicial review; there was nothing stopping the lawyers from endorsing the constitutional rights to organize and strike while simultaneously embracing the position—advocated by Furuseth and others—that those rights should be defined and enforced primarily by the legislative and executive branches.\footnote{203} In short, the record leaves us with only one possible conclusion: The progressive lawyers set out to scuttle the constitutional rights to organize and strike without according labor’s constitutional leaders the respect of a response on the merits. If there were any reasons other than professional self-interest and elite sensibilities for this stance, none has survived in the historical record.\footnote{204}

\footnote{200. These views are amplified in William Forbath’s essay, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 Duke L.J. 165 (2001).}


\footnote{202. In one of the classic early free speech opinions, for example, Justice Brandeis observed that “although the rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental, they are not in their nature absolute.” Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).}

\footnote{203. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. As Forbath himself has made clear, it is possible to advocate for constitutional rights without intending that their scope and enforcement be controlled by courts. See William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1821, 1827–28 (2001) [hereinafter Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights].}

\footnote{204. This assertion has provoked strong reactions from readers. Two prominent historians, for whose work I have nothing but respect, instructed me that I must acknowledge that the progressive lawyers opposed the Thirteenth Amendment theory because they were worried that it would go down to defeat in the courts. However, I found no evidence for this proposition. The lawyers touted the virtues of their own approach, but maintained total silence on the legal merits or demerits of labor’s approach not only in their scholarly writings, but also in their anonymously published editorials and private letters. They were willing to take on some risks but not others, and it strains credulity to
In response to Frankfurter's missive, Senator Norris wrote that he opposed any attempt to incorporate the AFL's proposed changes in the final bill, not because of their merits, but because of the danger that opponents of the bill would then "clamour for hearings and delays." Sensing victory, Frankfurter thanked Norris for taking this stand and commended him on his "disinterested citizenship." After a series of discussions with Norris, William Green agreed—over the vigorous dissent of Victor Olander—to go along with the senator's strategy of reintroducing the old bill rather than incorporating new amendments. Not long...
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afterward, the bill passed both houses of Congress by huge margins and was enacted into law as the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act.\footnote{Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 70 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–115 (1994)). The margin in the House was 363-13, and in the Senate 75-5. O’Brien, supra note 72, at 168–69.}

The AFL’s failure to obtain specific language grounding the Norris-LaGuardia Act on the Thirteenth Amendment marked the beginning of what was to become a widening gap between the constitutional ideas of workers and unions and the constitutional ideas used by courts and lawyers to uphold the constitutionality of their legislative victories. Within the movement culture of labor, the Norris-LaGuardia Act could plausibly be viewed as a triumph for labor’s freedom constitution. By persistently defying what they considered to be unconstitutional injunctions, workers had undermined the legitimacy of the labor injunction and set the stage for legislation.\footnote{Forbath, Law and Labor, supra note 51, at 159–63.} Although their own bills had failed, the one drafted by the progressive lawyers had incorporated the substance of the movement’s theory of collective labor freedom,\footnote{See supra text accompanying note 188. “While the [Norris] bill may not have specifically mentioned the Thirteenth Amendment,” argued Woll, “a careful reading of the minority committee’s report indicates clearly that it predicated its bill and its report on the Thirteenth Amendment and that it is not a new conception.” 1931 AFL Report of Proceedings, supra note 142, at 460.} and Senator Norris had confirmed that the effect of labor injunctions was “slavery” and “involuntary servitude on the part of those who must toil in order that they and their families may live.”\footnote{See supra note 190.} Nonlabor commentators joined unionists in celebrating the emancipation of labor.\footnote{See, e.g., Editorial, Striking the Irons from Labor, 46 America 543, 543 (1932) (predicting that the Supreme Court would uphold the Norris-LaGuardia Act because “[a]fter the bitter experience of industrial warfare lasting for more than half a century, the country is ready to admit that the yellow-dog contract and the arbitrary use of the injunction have no place under the Constitution,” and quoting Pope Leo XIII’s statement that no person could “give up his soul to servitude”); Editorial, Capital versus Labor, 15 Commonweal 589, 591 (1932) (approving the Norris-LaGuardia Act’s recognition of “labor’s innate right to form associations” as a “visible, responsible and orderly means for adjudication of differences of interest between labor and capital”).}

Within the professional culture of law, however, the Norris-LaGuardia Act was a victory for the progressive tenet that the rights of capital and labor were commensurate values to be balanced by legislators. Far from constitutionalizing rights of collective labor action, the Act’s statement of policy reduced those rights to matters of “policy” subject to the shifting outcomes of ordinary politics. When, six years and one constitutional regime shift later, the Supreme Court finally upheld the law, its opinion would say nothing about labor freedom while declaring the
authority of Congress to set policy for the federal courts in sweeping terms.\textsuperscript{213} In the meantime, the constitutional fate of the Norris-LaGuardia Act would soon be caught up in a much broader struggle over the place of labor in the constitutional order.

II. The Thirteenth Amendment and the Wagner Act, 1933–1935

A mere fifteen months after President Herbert Hoover signed the Norris-LaGuardia Act, workers and unions were celebrating yet another “Magna Charta” for labor. Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) appeared to go beyond the Norris-LaGuardia Act by prohibiting employers from discriminating against union workers or requiring membership in company dominated unions.\textsuperscript{214} But the NIRA provided only weak enforcement mechanisms, and the Roosevelt administration failed even to use these vigorously, leaving it up to workers to enforce their own rights.\textsuperscript{215} In 1934, the country was shaken by four strikes that erupted into open class conflict. West Coast longshoremen, Minneapolis truckers, Toledo automobile workers, and Southern textile workers staged strikes and engaged in obstructive mass picketing to enforce their section 7(a) right to organize.\textsuperscript{216} Efforts to break their picket lines escalated into pitched battles in which thousands of workers from many trades and industries joined the strikers in fighting police, vigilantes, and soldiers.

Meanwhile, Senator Robert Wagner of New York worked to develop a new statute that would correct the failings of the NIRA. Constitutional problems loomed so large that, at one time or another, Wagner was urged to ground his bill on no fewer than five congressional powers: (1) the power to “guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government,” (2) the power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment’s

\textsuperscript{213} By 1938, when the Supreme Court finally addressed the issue, a new constitutional world had come into being and no one doubted the law’s validity. See Forbath, Law and Labor, supra note 51, at 163. Reviewing the constitutionality of section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which imposed strict procedural requirements on the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes but not other kinds of disputes, the Court simply asserted: “There can be no question of the power of Congress thus to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States.” Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938). In one of his many bitter dissents of the period, Justice Butler cited Truax and insisted that the law was unconstitutional. Id. at 340 (Butler, J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{214} National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 7(a), 48 Stat. 195, 196–97 (1933).


prohibition on slavery and involuntary servitude, (3) the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, (4) the power to “provide for . . . the general welfare of the United States,” and (5) the power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”

A. Labor’s Freedom Constitution and the Wagner Bill

In the Spring of 1935, Andrew Furuseth, President of the International Seamen’s Union and one of the AFL’s leading constitutional thinkers, wrote Robert Wagner a twelve page letter in which he urged Wagner to ground his labor disputes bill on Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. He situated Wagner’s bill in a story of freedom that stretched back to the Christian principle that “God created man in his own image,” which, in Furuseth’s view, amounted to a repudiation of slavery. This “Christian principle of evolution from slavery to freedom” was embodied in the Declaration of Independence in the clauses asserting that “all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that amongst these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” Echoing AFL President William Green’s testimony before Congress, Furuseth wrote that the Wagner Bill would preserve democracy by “incorporat[ing] the industrial workers in the polity of the United States” as a “check upon the power of ‘Big Business.’” In addition, the bill would make possible the pursuit of happiness, as decreed by the Declaration of Independence: “With some 15 to 20 million idle, living on charity with no possible chance of self-employment and with the necessity to accept any kind of employment there can be no pursuit of happiness; not even marriage.”

Judging from the rhetoric of the bill’s proponents, Furuseth might have expected his proposal to receive serious consideration. Senator Wagner invoked all of the essential elements of labor’s Thirteenth Amendment theory in defense of the bill. The individual right to quit, he argued, would not suffice to protect labor freedom because economic as well as physical duress could bring about a condition of slavery:

> The law has long refused to recognize contracts secured through physical compulsion or duress. The actualities of present-day life impel us to recognize economic duress as well. We are forced to recognize the futility of pretending that there is equality of freedom when a single workman, with only his job

217. See supra text accompanying notes 43–45 (Republican Government Clause); infra text accompanying notes 218–221 (Thirteenth Amendment), 244 (General Welfare Clause), 246–247 (Commerce Clause).


219. Id. at 3.

220. Id. at 4–5.

221. Id. at 6–7.

222. Id. at 10.
between his family and ruin, sits down to draw a contract of employment with a representative of a tremendous organization having thousands of workers at its call. Thus the right to bargain collectively, guaranteed to labor by section 7(a) of the Recovery Act, is a veritable charter of freedom of contract; without it there would be slavery by contract.  

Like Furuseth, Wagner situated his bill in the long sweep of history as “the next step in the logical unfolding of man’s eternal quest for freedom.” He repeatedly likened the nonunion workplace to feudalism and slavery, and promised that government enforcement of the right to organize would bestow upon workers “emancipation from economic slavery and . . . an opportunity to walk the streets free men in fact as well as in name.” He defended the bill’s absolute ban on company dominated unions by echoing Furuseth’s charge that workers who joined company unions were contracting into slavery. Other leading legislators also spoke in terms of slavery, freedom, and inherent rights.

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223. 78 Cong. Rec. 3679 (1934) (Address by Senator Wagner), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 38, at 20.

224. 79 Cong. Rec. (1935), reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 38, at 2321.

225. Id. at 2284 (address by Senator Wagner); see also Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 38, at 498, 501–02 (quoting Senator Wagner’s insistence that “all [the bill] does is to make the worker a free man”); id. at 47 (“[I]t is simply absurd to say that an individual . . . is on an equality with his employer in bargaining for his wages . . . . The only way that the worker will be accorded the freedom of contract to which . . . he is entitled, is by the intrusion of the Government. . . .”); 79 Cong. Rec. (1935), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 38, at 1312 (observing that the bill “seeks merely to make the worker a free man in the economic as well as the political field” and that “[c]ertainly the preservation of long-recognized fundamental rights is the only basis for frank and friendly relations in industry”).

226. Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1379, 1445–47 (1993) (quoting Wagner’s critique of company unions that “[t]here can be no freedom in an atmosphere of bondage. No organization can be free to represent the workers when it is the mere creature of the employer”); Kenneth M. Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An Interview With Leon Keyserling on Drafting the Wagner Act, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 285, 329 (1987) [hereinafter Casebeer, Holder] (quoting Keyserling’s recollection that Wagner “made fun of the company union, which he called the marionette of the employer, and the dictator of the terms of the labor agreement,” and that he “always argued, ‘All I am trying to do is make the worker a free man’”); see also Letter from Senator Robert Wagner to Daniel J. Tobin, President, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Dec. 20, 1935), in Wagner Papers, supra note 218, box 4 (observing that company unions were established “for the purpose of keeping the workers in virtual economic slavery”); cf. Furuseth, Company Unions, supra note 135, at 541–44 (“Company’ unions stand squarely in the way of the development of that industrial freedom and equality.”).

freed the blacks in the South,” summarized Representative Truax, “so the Wagner-Connery bill frees the industrial slaves of this country from the further tyranny and oppression of their overlords of wealth.”

As introduced, the bill contained the core of labor’s theory of freedom. “The tendency of modern economic life toward integration and centralized control has long since destroyed the balance of bargaining power between the individual employer and the individual employee,” declared the bill’s statement of purpose, “and has rendered the individual, unorganized worker helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract, to secure a just reward for his services, and to preserve a decent standard of living . . . .” But the terms “slavery” and “involuntary servitude” were missing, leaving the bill’s theme of labor freedom without any grounding in the constitutional text. Instead, the bill relied on the General Welfare Clause and the Commerce Clause. Labor’s subjugation was constitutionally significant not in itself, but because it led to strikes and inadequate mass purchasing power with “consequent detriment to the general welfare and the free flow of commerce.”

Wagner’s omission of Thirteenth Amendment language was not due to any lack of commitment to the goal of worker freedom. If any of the bill’s three goals—realizing worker freedom, increasing worker purchasing power, and fostering industrial peace—was primary to Wagner, it was that of worker freedom. “I would not buy peace,” he said, “at the price of slavery.” His bill had the ultimate end of achieving effective worker freedom, and the means to that end was protection for self-organization and collective action. “What he always said,” recalled Leon Keyserling, arguments that labor “must no longer be treated as a commodity” and “that men and women must be counted as persons, not as mere hands and that they must have some active part in the control of the industry to which their lives are given.” Id. at 1148–49 (statement of Rep. Beiter). Representative Carpenter of Nebraska maintained that the “worker’s right to form labor unions and to bargain collectively is as much his right as his right to participate through delegated representatives in the making of laws which regulate his civic conduct. Both are inherent rights.” Id. at 1147 (statement of Rep. Carpenter). For other quotations, see Barenberg, supra note 226, at 1446 n.297.

229. Hearings on S. 2926, 73d Cong. tit. 1 § 2 (1934), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 38, at 1.
230. Id.
231. 78 Cong. Rec. (1934) (statement of Senator Wagner), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 38, at 1224, 1241.
232. See Barenberg, supra note 226, at 1449 (suggesting that “the primary objective of the Wagner Act was to achieve workers’ ‘substantive freedom’ by eliminating duress in workers’ consent to managerial authority” and that the “means to that end was the facilitation of collective action in the labor market in order to enhance workers’ bargaining power”); see also Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 495, 502 (1993) (suggesting that the aim of democratizing the workplace was “[a]t the forefront of the goals professed by” supporters of the Wagner Act). Viewed in terms of simple content analysis, it would be difficult to ascribe a “primary” goal to the Wagner Act. As James
Wagner’s legislative assistant, “was that his purpose was to make the worker a free man, and that always went over well with the audiences.” Wagner was especially concerned that, in case of conflict, the goal of worker freedom be given priority over that of industrial peace. To ensure that courts did not interpret the Wagner Act as a mandate to suppress strikes, the drafters inserted what became section 13: “Nothing in this [Act] . . . shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike.” To Wagner, the freedom to strike was an “inalienable” right and an integral component of democracy incommensurate with the goal of industrial peace:

The spirit and purpose of the law is to create a free and dignified workingman who had the economic strength to bargain collectively with a free and dignified employer in accordance with the methods of democracy. The abolition or curtailment of the right to strike is a denial of the principles of democracy and a substitution of the methods of the authoritarian state. The design of the Labor Relations Act is to reduce the number of strikes by eliminating the main wrongs and injustices that cause strikes. The imposition of legal restrictions upon the right to strike, instead of removing these wrongs, would merely deprive the worker of his inalienable right to protest against them.

In short, proponents of the Wagner bill did not hesitate to echo labor’s language of freedom and slavery, and section 13 of the bill itself put the goal of worker freedom above that of facilitating commerce by affirming the right to strike. It remained to be seen, however, how the goal of freedom would be handled in the constitutional defense of the bill.

Brudney points out, the “economic goals of reducing strife and promoting purchasing power were highlighted in the debates before enactment,” but the “prominence of the two economic objectives may reflect strategic judgments, both as to what would persuade congressional colleagues and what would pass constitutional muster when challenged in the Supreme Court.” James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections and the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 939, 950±51 n.30 (1996).

233. Casebeer, Holder, supra note 226, at 329. Keyserling’s own recollection of the Wagner Act’s purposes gave economics a greater role:

Senator Wagner’s central argument for his bill was always on general economic and social grounds. He never valued the measure primarily as a mere weapon for negating industrial strife, but rather as an affirmative vehicle for the economic and related social progress to which his life-long efforts were devoted.


235. Hearings on National Labor Relations Act and Proposed Amendments: Before the S. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 76 Cong. 17 (1939) (statement of Senator Robert F. Wagner) (quoted in The Wagner Act: After Ten Years 31 (Louis G. Silverberg ed., 1945)); see also Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 38, at 10–11, reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 38, at 40–41 (defending the right-to-strike provision against the charge that it would encourage discord by asserting that the bill “will prevent strikes by the only feasible and just method; that is, by insuring fair treatment to all parties and by establishing a powerful and trustworthy agency for the settlement of disputes”).
B. A Great Controversy

As in the campaign for anti-injunction legislation, there was a sharp debate among the bill’s proponents over the choice of constitutional foundations. This time, however, the AFL dropped out early. By February 1935, the Federation had given up on the Republican Government Clause, tacitly accepting the General Welfare and Commerce Clause theories.\footnote{In February 1935, AFL counsel Charlton Ogburn wrote Senator Wagner to present the point of view of the American Federation of Labor on the bill. Letter from Charlton Ogburn, Attorney and Counselor at Law, to Senator Robert Wagner (Feb. 4, 1935), in Leon Keyserling Papers, Georgetown Univ. Special Collections, Washington, D.C., box 1 [hereinafter Keyserling Papers]. He presented seven proposed changes, none of which touched on the statement of purpose. Id.} The cause of this shift is not clear, but it might have had something to do with the influence of AFL counsel Charlton Ogburn. Although Ogburn had drafted the Federation’s argument in favor of the Republican Government Clause, he had no enthusiasm for the theory. The day before Green testified in its favor, Ogburn—appearing in his capacity as General Counsel for the Street and Electric Railway Employees—praised the bill uncritically without mentioning the Republican Government Clause.\footnote{Hearings on National Labor Relations Act: Before the S. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 76 Cong. 1 (1939) (statement of Charlton Ogburn, General Counsel, Street and Electric Railway Employees), in Wagner Papers, supra note 218, box 4.} Departing sharply from the AFL’s view that government sponsored arbitration threatened slavery and involuntary servitude, he envisaged the NLRB as “a great labor tribunal, a court of arbitration” that would induce the unions to forgo strikes and submit their demands to government officials for resolution.\footnote{Id.}

Still, Ogburn’s progressivism alone could not account for the AFL’s acquiescence; the Federation had often rejected lawyerly opinions in the past. But the situation had changed since the heyday of labor’s freedom constitution. Samuel Gompers had been replaced by William Green, a former progressive legislator who had always been deferential toward lawyers.\footnote{Green had long discouraged workers from exercising independent legal judgment. In 1921, when the AFL declared the Kansas Industrial Court Act unconstitutional, Green argued that the fundamental rights of labor were properly “defined by the courts,” not by “prejudiced and biased” workers. Discussion on Policy of the Recent International Convention of United Mine Workers of America and of the Kansas Situation, Twenty-ninth Consecutive and Fourth Biennial Convention (District 12, Peoria, Ill.), Nov. 1921, at 19 [hereinafter Discussion on Policy]. For the context of this statement, see Pope, Labor’s Constitution, supra note 29, at 1005–07. In sharp contrast to his predecessor, Green strove mightily to avoid criticizing the legal merits of court opinions. In responding to the Red Jacket and Bedford Cut Stone injunctions, for example, he described the views of workers from a distance: “These injunctions restrain working men from doing what they feel they have a perfect right to do.” William Green and Walter G. Merritt, Editorial, Labor Injunction Opposed and Defended, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1927, reprinted in 9 Law & Lab. 239, 239 (1927). He described the Supreme Court’s holding in Bedford Cut Stone as a “strange doctrine” that “[w]orking people cannot understand . . . or
lawyers over anti-injunction legislation had cost him much credibility. At subsequent AFL conventions, the delegates sat politely while he thundered on about labor freedom, but they gave his proposals scant consideration.240 He got little help from labor’s other constitutional leaders, who were mired in a conservative voluntarism that made them suspicious of the Wagner Act. Unlike Furuseth, who had long lobbied for affirmative regulation of seamen’s working conditions,241 Matthew Woll, John Frey, and Victor Olander had trouble adapting to the idea that government power could be used to enforce labor rights. They urged the Federation to oppose the provisions of the Wagner bill that conferred jurisdiction on federal courts to issue injunctions enforcing orders of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).242 When rebuffed by the Executive Council, they found themselves at sea. Woll mourned the sacrifice of principle for expediency, while Olander confessed that he did “not know how to successfully blow hot and cold on a given subject at the same moment.”243 With Furuseth isolated, and labor’s other constitutional leaders unenthusiastic about the bill, it is not surprising that the Federation failed to insist that the bill be based on democracy and human rights rather than the General Welfare Clause (to which unionists had no objection) or the Commerce Clause.244

Even with labor out of the picture, there ensued what Keyserling called a “great controversy about the preamble.”245 Labor Department Solicitor Charles Wyzanski, a protégé of Felix Frankfurter, wanted to reduce the statement of purpose to a single constitutional theory. The pur-
pose of the bill was to facilitate the flow of interstate commerce by putting an end to strikes.246 He and his staff pointed out that the Supreme Court had upheld the application of the commerce power to labor disputes and urged Wagner “to stick as closely as possible to the precedent already established.”247 Locked in a legalistic mindset of incremental change, they worried that the “broad language” referring to the worker’s freedom and standard of living would anger employers and undermine the industrial peace rationale.248 But Wagner and Keyserling insisted that the statement of policy retain its references to inequality of bargaining power and inadequate consumer purchasing power. Unlike the precedent-bound Labor Department lawyers, they were engaged in a forthrightly transformative project.249 They believed that if the deficient purchasing

246. Throughout this period, Frankfurter and Wyzanski maintained an active correspondence, with Frankfurter dispensing advice and praise. See, e.g., Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law School, to Charles Wyzanski, Solicitor, Labor Department (Sept. 22, 1933), in Wyzanski Papers, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass., box 1 [hereinafter Wyzanski Papers] (reporting his “deep satisfaction that you are in the stream of important affairs and that your scholarly standards and resourceful sagacity will contribute their important share in the endeavor to find light through the darkness”); Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Charles Wyzanski (June 2, 1934), in Wyzanski Papers, supra, box 1 (commending Wyzanski for “the maturity and the wisdom with which [he was] discharging [his] Solicitorship,” and advising him not to support federal incorporation legislation—the form of legislation then supported by the AFL—as a means of regulating corporations).

247. Labor Department, Section 205 (typed comments clipped to draft of Wagner bill, n.d. c. 1934), in Keyserling Papers, supra note 236, box 1 [hereinafter Section 205]; see also Casebeer, Holder, supra note 226, at 308 (reporting Keyserling’s recollection of Wyzanski’s position that the constitutional foundation should be “limited to the traditional grounds that violation of the Act caused industrial disputes and stoppages that reduced the flow of commerce”). At one point, Wyzanski proposed a draft bill that limited the NLRB’s jurisdiction to unfair labor practices that “led or tends to lead to a labor dispute that might burden commerce, or obstruct the free flow of commerce, or dissipate natural resources, or affect the general welfare.” Kenneth Casebeer, Drafting Wagner’s Act: Leon Keyserling and the Precommitte Drafts of the Labor Disputes Act and the National Labor Relations Act, 11 Indus. Rel. L.J. 73, 105–06 (1989) [hereinafter Casebeer, Precommitte Drafts] (reprinting draft proposed by Wyzanski).

248. See Section 205, supra note 247, box 1 (arguing that “the broad language used in the bill . . . weakens it from a constitutional viewpoint”); Bernstein, New Deal, supra note 215, at 64 (recounting that the Department of Labor “regarded the economic concentration argument as legally gratuitous” and “certain to arouse employer resentment”); Keyserling, supra note 233, at 218 (recalling that “[s]ome of the technicians, especially in the Labor Department, who could think along the traditional and well marked out paths of avoiding the evil of work stoppages, and never along the newer and relatively uncharted paths of promoting the general economic health,” argued that the broader language was “mere ‘gobbledy gook’” that would weaken the bill’s constitutional justification).

249. Keyserling, who drafted the bill, confessed to Kenneth Casebeer that: [A]part from the constitutional law that I had studied when I was at Harvard regarding the general question of the scope of the commerce clause and so forth, I really hadn’t consulted all the recent Court decisions on the subject. I wasn’t really reading Court opinions when writing that preamble. I was trying to make constitutional law.
power of workers “was a real factor in the burdening of commerce, then it should enter into the preamble.”\(^{250}\) After a series of battles over this and other issues in 1934, Wagner excluded the Labor Department from the drafting process when Congress reconvened in 1935.\(^{251}\)

In response to Furuseth’s missive advocating the Thirteenth Amendment, Wagner wrote simply that he had “greatly enjoyed your scholarly discourse on my Labor Relations Bill and your fine analysis of its background.”\(^{252}\) As in the anti-injunction struggle, labor’s human rights approach was rejected without any attempt at an explanation. No sooner had Wagner put off Furuseth, however, than his bill’s Commerce Clause foundation was severely shaken by the Supreme Court.

C. Senator Wagner’s Commerce Clause Bet

On May 27, 1935, the day known as “Black Monday” to supporters of the New Deal, the United States Supreme Court issued its unanimous decision in *A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States*, invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act.\(^{253}\) *Schechter* not only gutted the Roosevelt administration’s economic program, but it also placed a constitutional obstacle in the path of any attempt to legislate a replacement. Under the Court’s reasoning, any activity that had only an “indirect” effect on interstate commerce—a category that, under the Court’s previous decisions, included most manufacturing—lay outside Congress’s power to regulate.\(^{254}\) *Schechter* had a “shock effect” on the proponents of the Wagner bill, convincing many that the bill could not be sustained under the commerce power.\(^{255}\)

With the Commerce Clause theory in jeopardy, Furuseth again importuned Wagner to rely on the Thirteenth Amendment, this time citing *Bailey v. Alabama* to emphasize the breadth of the congressional power conferred.\(^{256}\) Others pointed to the Fourteenth Amendment. Professor Robert Binkley urged Wagner to proceed under the theory that the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment included the “freedom to join labor organization[s] without being sub-

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250. Id. at 309 (quoting Keyserling’s recollection of Wagner’s position).
251. Casebeer, Precommitte Drafts, supra note 247, at 95.
254. Id. at 546–47.
255. See Bernstein, New Deal, supra note 225, at 120 (quoting newspapers); Drew D. Hansen, The Sit-Down Strikes and the Switch in Time, 46 Wayne L. Rev. 49, 63–64 (2000) (quoting newspapers and congressional record); see also 1 Gross, supra note 26, at 144 (describing the “shock effect” of *Schechter* on the proponents of the Wagner Act).
jected to economic coercion.” A local union officer claiming to speak for 6,000 cemetery workers complained to Wagner that it was “doubtful if any of the work performed by cemetery employees [sic] could in any manner be legitimately classified directly or indirectly as interstate or foreign commerce” and to propose using what he called the “Life, Liberty and Pursuit [sic] of Happiness clause of the constitution” instead. The AFL was missing from this little chorus of protest, however, as the Executive Committee accepted Charlton Ogburn’s advice that the Wagner bill would pass muster under the Commerce Clause because violations “would directly affect the flow of interstate commerce in which we can show that 80% of the workers of this country are involved.”

Wagner did send his bill back to the drafters for revision in light of Schechter. But the resulting changes (which included dropping the references to the General Welfare Clause) were designed solely to buttress the Commerce Clause theory. Instead of taking Furuseth seriously, Wagner breezily replied that he had “no doubt that the bill . . . will be sustained by the courts.” Why did Wagner so confidently proclaim—contrary to the weight of public and lawyerly opinion—that the Wagner Act would be upheld under the Commerce Clause? According to Leon Keyserling, Wagner’s constitutional strategy amounted to a “bet” that the Supreme Court would depart from precedent and give the commerce power a new, expansive reading. Despite Wagner’s sanguine predictions, Keyserling’s account rings true. It is highly unlikely that the bill’s supporters adhered to their Commerce Clause theory primarily out of

257. Letter from Robert C. Binkley, Professor, Case Western Reserve University, to Senator Robert Wagner (June 1, 1935), in Wagner Papers, supra note 218, box 4.

258. Letter from H.P. Gallagher, Secretary, Cook County Cemetery Employees Union, AFL Local 19065, to Senator Robert Wagner (June 26, 1935), in Wagner Papers, supra note 218, box 4.


261. Letter from Senator Robert Wagner to Andrew Furuseth, President, International Seamen’s Union (June 7, 1935), in Wagner Papers, supra note 218, box 4. The Senator did pay Professor Binkley the compliment of a substantive response, namely that it had “been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that [the Fourteenth] Amendment operates only against the state, its officers and agents.” Letter from Senator Robert Wagner to Robert C. Binkley, Professor, Case Western Reserve University (June 19, 1935), in Wagner Papers, supra note 218, box 4. As for the cemetery union leader, Wagner predicted reassuringly “that as time goes on the courts will take a broader and broader view of what affects interstate commerce until it will embrace practically all activities on a large scale.” Letter from Senator Robert Wagner to H.P. Gallagher, Secretary, Cook County Cemetery Employees Union, Local 19065 (July 3, 1935), in Wagner Papers, supra note 218, box 4.

262. See Irons, supra note 26, at 229–30 (outlining strategy of Keyserling and others to push the bounds of both Commerce Clause and substantive due process jurisprudence).
confidence in its success in the courts. 263 Whether based on the Commerce Clause or the Thirteenth Amendment, the Wagner Act’s validation would clearly call for a major change in the Court’s jurisprudence. 264 On the other hand, Wagner was well aware that, within the legal profession, reformers strongly favored the Commerce Clause over the Thirteenth Amendment.265 Although he evidenced a strong concern with what Oliver Wendell Holmes would have called the “honesty” of the bill’s statement of purpose, insisting that his public justifications of worker freedom and increased worker purchasing power be retained despite the possibility that they might undermine the strongest constitutional defense available under the prevailing case law, he apparently saw no need to extend that honesty into constitutional law.266 He made no attempt to incorporate Thirteenth Amendment language to reflect his goal of labor freedom, and he agreed to delete the reference to the General Welfare Clause after Schechter. Judging from his actions, Wagner shared the progressives’ monist view of constitutional law as merely another zone for policymaking.267

263. It could be argued that the progressives had faith in the ultimate outcome because their view of the Commerce Clause corresponded to the reality of ever expanding interstate commerce and economic interdependence. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitutional Virtues and Vices of the New Deal, 22 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 219, 224 (1998) (“We have, in my view, broader congressional power to regulate interstate commerce after 1937, not because of some amendment-equivalent adopted as a result of a constitutional moment, but just because, in the real world, a lot more things are interstate due to improvements in transportation and communication technology.”). But it is equally arguable that the view held by both the labor movement and the progressive lawyers about the necessity of collective labor rights to make possible effective labor freedom also corresponded to objective reality. By 1935 both Congress and the Supreme Court had endorsed this view in unambiguous terms. See supra notes 67–69, 162, 188–190 and accompanying text.

264. The Supreme Court had never upheld the application of the commerce power to manufacturing operations. For the Act to fulfill its intended purpose of establishing a new system of industrial relations for the United States, it would have to be upheld not only as applied to major national manufacturers like Jones & Laughlin Steel, but also to middling, local employers like the Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Company, whose constitutional challenge would be decided the same day as Jones & Laughlin. See infra Part IV.E.

265. See supra Part I.B; see also Pope, Labor’s Constitution, supra note 29, at 1014–15 & 1015 nn.493–494 (describing the reaction of progressive legal thinkers to labor’s Thirteenth Amendment challenge to the Kansas Industrial Court Act of 1920).

266. See supra text accompanying notes 249–250.

267. Wagner was firmly situated in the progressive tradition, including its commitments to empiricism, pragmatism, professional expertise, social science, changeability, and administration. See Barenberg, supra note 226, at 1412–18 (describing and analyzing Wagner’s views on these issues); Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 Rev. Am. Hist. 113, 123–27 (1982) (analyzing progressivism as a set of discourses that privileged expertise, social science, administration, and other themes).
D. A Menace to Industrial Peace That Cannot Be Exaggerated

Immediately after Schechter, it appeared that President Roosevelt would take the lead in a direct attack on the Court. He berated the justices for adopting a "horse and buggy" view of interstate commerce, joined labor leaders in likening Schechter to Dred Scott, and called upon the members of Congress to proceed with his legislative program notwithstanding their constitutional doubts.268 At the same time, however, Felix Frankfurter—now Roosevelt's constitutional confidant—warned against an immediate constitutional confrontation.269 He proposed that Roosevelt first obtain the passage of bills then pending, including the Wagner bill and the Social Security bill, and then confront the Supreme Court over them.270 This advice must have looked increasingly attractive to Roosevelt as he endured a hail of criticism charging that his aggressive response to Schechter overstepped the presidential role and endangered the independence of the Supreme Court.271 For the next year and a half, the President would maintain near total silence on the Court and the Constitution.272 Meanwhile, on June 4, he announced that the New Deal program would go forward, and that the Wagner bill was now on his "must" list of immediate legislation.273

Roosevelt's sudden silence left the labor movement to work out its own response to the constitutional crisis. One week after Schechter, the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor met in emergency session. "It is inconceivable that in a Republic such as ours, the people, vested with the power of self-government, will [accept] that the Constitution in its present form stands as a barrier

268. 4 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 205, 218, 221 (Samuel I. Rosenman comp., 1938) [hereinafter Roosevelt Public Papers]; Charles W. Hurd, President Says End of NRA Puts Control Up to People, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1935, at 1.


270. "Put them up to the Supreme Court," Frankfurter advised. "Let the Court strike down any or all of them next winter or spring, especially by a divided Court. Then propose a Constitutional amendment giving the national Government adequate power to cope with national economic and industrial problems." Id.


272. Id. at 2082–85.

273. Bernstein, New Deal, supra note 215, at 121. Until Schechter, the Roosevelt administration had been insisting on major modifications to the Wagner bill. Roosevelt did not endorse the Wagner bill until May 24, after it had been passed by the Senate and reported favorably by the House Committee on Labor. Even then, the Department of Justice and the National Recovery Administration insisted on changes so drastic "that Wagner could not have accepted [them] without radical revision of his bill." Id. at 117–19.
to social and economic progress.” 274 To remove this barrier, the Council called upon the labor movement to “assume leadership” and “serve as a spear-head” in securing the enactment of a constitutional amendment. 275 More ominously, the Council warned that—pending new legislation—the workers would be forced to rely on “their own economic strength and united solidarity” both to protect the right to organize and to maintain NRA labor standards. 276

By the time the AFL Council spoke, unionists were already following this directive. John L. Lewis ordered a national strike of 400,000 coal miners effective midnight June 16, the terminal date of the NIRA. 277 In Philadelphia, delegates from 400 local unions met under the auspices of the Central Labor Union to prepare for a “wave of strikes” to defend NRA standards. 278 Joseph P. Ryan, President of the New York Central Trades and Labor Council, raised the specter of a nationwide general strike. 279 Thousands of workers paraded through New York’s garment district singing songs like “Nine Old Men” (to the tune of “Three Blind Mice”) and carrying banners bearing such slogans as “Congress Cannot Legislate HOURS & WAGES BUT WE CAN.” 280

Meanwhile, despite determined opposition from the National Association of Manufacturers, the Wagner bill moved rapidly through the House-Senate conference process and, on July 5, 1935, Roosevelt signed it into law. 281 Some scholars have argued that the Wagner Act was not a response to the threat of mass protest. They point out that the strike wave of 1934 subsided months before the law was enacted and conclude that the main impetus for legislation came from policy entrepreneurs within the state. 282 This argument, grounded in chronology, itself ig-

275. Id.
276. Id. at 18.
279. See Business Advised To Keep Wages Up, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1935, at 1 (“The [AFL] has a present membership of 7,500,000 people, in addition to which there are millions more who would rally to its call. The threat of a general strike is not a pleasant thought. That which happened in California can be made to happen in forty-eight States.”).
281. See Bernstein, New Deal, supra note 215, at 110 (describing National Association of Manufacturers’ mobilization).
282. See, e.g., Kenneth Finegold & Theda Skocpol, State, Party, and Industry: From Business Recovery to the Wagner Act in America’s New Deal, in Statemaking and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory 159, 181 (Charles Bright & Susan Harding eds., 1984) (“To explain the remarkable passage of the Wagner Act, we must . . . look to more
nores the timing of the *Schechter* decision. It was the combination of the threat of strikes and the judicial nullification of Roosevelt’s industrial program that ensured the Wagner bill’s smooth passage through Congress.283 True, the 1934 strike wave had ebbed, but the National Recovery Administration had played a crucial role in that process. AFL President William Green had narrowly averted major strikes in the automobile and rubber industries as recently as the spring of 1935 on the promise of government intervention pursuant to the NIRA, and the workers’ grievances in those industries remained unresolved.284 Against this backdrop, the loud chorus of union threats to replace the NRA with a regime of union enforced standards—threats endorsed even by the hitherto compliant Green—appeared to constitute “a menace to industrial peace that cannot be exaggerated.”285

III. Two Laws in the United States, 1935–1936

The constitutional regime shift of the 1930s came about partly through the familiar mechanisms of political mobilization, protest, voting, and litigation—all of which have been vividly described by historians. But there was also another engine of change, one that social scientists usually associate with revolution rather than reform. In addition to pres-

strictly intragovernmental developments that came together in 1935 to allow advocates of strong legal support for unionization finally to get their way in the legislative arena.”); see also Theda Skocpol, Political Response to Capitalist Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal, 10 Pol. & Soc’y 155, 182–99 (1980) (“[T]he labor strikes did not “provoked passage of the Wagner Act”.

283. After *Schechter*, the administration faced a possible strike wave with absolutely no industrial relations policy in place. See Thomas Ferguson, Industrial Conflict and the Coming of the New Deal: The Triumph of Multinational Liberalism in America, in The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930–1980, supra note 35, at 3, 19, 29 n.38 ; see also David Plotke, Building a Democratic Political Order: Reshaping American Liberalism in the 1930s and 1940s 104–06 (1996) (stating that “the Supreme Court’s nullification of the NIRA . . . created a void in labor relations”). Other aspects of the state centered explanation have been contradicted persuasively by a number of scholars. See Michael Goldfield, Worker Insurgency, Radical Organization, and New Deal Labor Legislation, 83 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1257, 1273–77 (1989); Theda Skocpol, Kenneth Finegold & Michael Goldfield, Explaining New Deal Labor Policy, 84 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1297, 1304–09 (1990) (Goldfield’s rebuttal to Finegold’s and Skocpol’s critiques); Frances Fox Piven & Richard A. Cloward, Poor People’s Movements 129–33 (1977); Thomas Ferguson, From Normalcy to New Deal: industrial structure, party competition, and American public policy in the Great Depression, 38 Int’l Org. 41, 86–88 (1984).

284. During the hearings, William Green recounted his efforts—then in progress—to defuse the auto strike, while President John House of the Goodyear rubber workers local recounted the danger of a strike in the rubber industry. See Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 38, at 110 (statement of William Green); Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 40, at 1941–47 (statement of John D. House).

suring authorities for action, the members of an insurgent movement may attempt to will a new order into being by establishing and operating it on their own even while the functionaries of the old order continue to claim authority. This dynamic can occur not only at the level of the nation-state, but also in any subdivision of society, be it a village, a school, or a workplace. Of course, there was no such challenge to the authority of the United States government during the 1930s. But the constitutional revolution of that period was inextricably intertwined with a regime shift in mass production industry from individual labor market competition to union solidarity. This shift included moments of dual sovereignty, with unions challenging corporations for control over working conditions, wages, and the pace of work. Within months of Schechter it would be no exaggeration to say that two laws—each with a set of principles addressing issues all the way from the constitutional powers of Congress to the conduct of individual workers on the shop floor—were contending for authority in the industrial centers of the United States.

A. The Wagner Act as Nullity

Employers wasted no time testing the constitutional commitment both of the Roosevelt administration and of the labor movement. No sooner had the President signed the Wagner Act into law than employers announced that they would defy it. United States Steel’s Vice President of Industrial Relations declared that he would “go to jail or be convicted as a felon” rather than obey the Wagner Act, whereupon the American Management Association awarded him a medal for “outstanding and creative work in the field of industrial relations.” A committee of fifty-eight prominent lawyers assembled by the American Liberty League issued a brief, 132 pages in length, declaring the law unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to its author, Earl F. Reed, this brief

286. See Cover, supra note 29, at 35–40 (observing that self-governing, jurisgenerative groups may seek to extend their regime to all of society through “redemptive” lawmaking from below); Charles Tilly, Does Modernization Breed Revolution?, 5 Comp. Pol. 425, 439 (1973) (positing the emergence of dual sovereignty as a precursor to revolution). For example, the American colonists established dual power structures long before reaching the conclusion that there was no alternative to declaring independence from the Crown. See Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765–1776, at 24–26 (1972). In this type of transformative politics, there may be little, if any, disjuncture between means and ends. See C. Edwin Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First Amendment, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 293, 295–99 (1982).

287. Bernstein, Turbulent Years, supra note 216, at 349.


was authority enough to nullify the law. “When a lawyer tells a client that a law is unconstitutional,” Reed declared, “it is then a nullity and he need no longer obey that law.” The National Association of Manufacturers, the American Newspaper Publishers Association, and the League all launched campaigns of lawsuits seeking to enjoin the newly created National Labor Relations Board from enforcing the Act.

For the next two years, employer lawyers “tied the NLRB into legal knots” with a combination of injunction suits and constitutional challenges to NLRB orders. During those crucial years, the only agent with any realistic hope of enforcing the law was the labor movement itself. The question whether the AFL would take up this challenge soon became an issue in the rapidly escalating struggle between craft and industrial unionists—a struggle that would eventually split the House of Labor in two.

B. The AFL: Spearhead to Nowhere

The AFL Executive Council that called upon the labor movement to serve as the “spearhead” of the struggle for constitutional change was dominated by craft unionists. Labor’s foremost constitutional thinkers—Samuel Gompers of the Cigar Makers, John Frey of the Molders, Matthew Woll of the Photo-Engravers, and Victor Olander and Andrew Furuseth of the Seamen—had all come from this sector of the movement. In the past, these leaders had not shied away from urging workers to defy what they considered to be unconstitutional injunctions and antistrike laws, or even from supporting radicals who engaged in resistance. By 1935, however, this once-proud cadre of craft union constitutionalists had—with the exception of Andrew Furuseth—lost the tough independence that had characterized their campaigns against antistrike laws and injunctions. William Green, who replaced Gompers as AFL chief in 1924, had long opposed constitutional resistance. Under his leadership, the AFL turned away from strike action and adopted a posture of respectability.

commerce—outside the legal profession, the report emphasized the employers’ rights claims in its popular summary, while stressing the Commerce Clause in the body of the argument. Rights claims came first and occupied more pages (four versus three) in the summary, but they followed the Commerce Clause and took up fewer pages in the body (twenty versus sixty-two). Id. at iii–xi, 44–126.


292. Bernstein, Turbulent Years, supra note 216, at 646. Although most of the injunction suits were unsuccessful, they did succeed in tying up NLRB resources. Id. at 647; Irons, supra note 26, at 247–48. The remainder of the NLRB’s resources were focused on its campaign to bring test cases to the Supreme Court. Id. at 254–71.

293. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.

294. See supra note 259.
and cooperation with employers. AFL leaders tried to sell unionism to employers as agents of enhanced efficiency. They went into the banking and insurance businesses; Matthew Woll, among others, became a business executive as well as a trade union leader. By 1929, Furuseth had lost patience with these officials: “Don’t tell me that you have the guts to go to jail, because you haven’t,” he snorted. “The best of you have refused.” Although they continued to profess militant constitutionalism, the day to day practice of concessionary bargaining and collaboration with employers ill suited them to head a confrontational campaign against the Supreme Court.

Even as the Executive Council appointed itself the spearhead of the movement to rectify Schechter, its statement adopted a deferential posture toward official law and processes. “Without criticizing the Supreme Court,” it demurred, “the Executive Council is of the opinion that it can with perfect propriety appraise the effect of the court’s decision”—namely “a most damaging blow” to social justice and economic welfare. Legal thought was the Court’s domain; unionists would restrict themselves to commenting upon justice and economic consequences. The statement was equally respectful of formal legal processes. All of the actions called for—passage of the Wagner bill, legislation to replace the NIRA codes, and a constitutional amendment to give Congress the necessary power—lay safely within official legal channels.

Even within those discrete limits, the AFL leadership vacillated. At the Federation’s 1935 Convention, delegates presented ten resolutions proposing two basic types of amendments. The first group, mostly submitted by industrial union delegates, sought to create new congressional powers to enact social legislation. The second, not attributable to any particular constituency, urged restrictions on the power of judicial re-

296. Id. at 97–98.
297. Id. at 103–04; James R. Green, The World of the Worker 123 (Eric Foner ed., 1980).
298. Weintraub, supra note 125, at 187.
300. Id. at 18–21.
301. 1935 AFL Report of Proceedings, supra note 240, at 789–92 (documenting, for example, Resolution No. 41, submitted by Delegate Wyndham Mortimer of United Automobile Workers Union No. 18463; Resolution No. 84, submitted by the top leadership of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union; Resolution No. 188, submitted by Delegate Emil Costello, Federal Labor Union No. 18456). Some endorsed this concept in general terms, but most favored the Workers’ Rights Amendment, which had been introduced in Congress by Representative Vito Marcantonio of New York. The Workers’ Rights Amendment empowered Congress to regulate child labor, maximum hours, and minimum wages; to provide relief from a variety of sources (this was designed to support the Social Security Act); and to nationalize industry “for the benefit of the people.” Id. at 790. Oddly, the Workers’ Rights Amendment contained no provision designed to support the constitutionality of the Wagner bill. This may have reflected the Communist Party's
view. But conservative craft unionists on the Council were apprehensive about constitutional change. Joined by Green, they rejected the idea of a power-creating amendment out of fear that the Supreme Court might interpret it to authorize Congress to fix wages and hours, thus invading the labor movement’s “freedom to deal with these questions in its own right.” They worried that even restrictions on the power of judicial review might return to haunt them if, as in Europe, a movement for dictatorship were to gain ground in the United States. Not until May 1936 did the Executive Council finally decide to ask the upcoming conventions of the Democratic and Republican parties to seek an amendment requiring a two-thirds vote of the Supreme Court to invalidate an act of Congress. After both parties declined to endorse any amendment, this proposal was quietly forgotten.

opposition to the bill, as Marcantonio—though not a member—listened to the Communist Party on many issues.

302. None of these resolutions proposed specific language. Some called for an end to the Supreme Court’s power to nullify legislation enacted in the interests of labor, whether by state or federal legislatures. Id. at 790–91. One recommended abolishing the power of any court to declare any law unconstitutional. Id. at 788–89. The most conservative provided that an act of Congress could be invalidated only by a seven to two majority of the Court. Id. at 791.

Labor’s menu of proposals differed from those under discussion outside the movement primarily in that it did not include any call for cutting back on protections for individual rights. According to Bruce Ackerman, the public debate centered on three kinds of proposed amendments: (1) amendments creating new federal powers; (2) amendments cutting back on constitutional safeguards for property and contract rights; and (3) amendments altering institutional arrangements. 2 Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 34, at 338–40. The second category was conspicuous by its absence among the labor proposals.


304. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee (AFL, Miami, Fla.), Jan. 22, 1936, at 132–33, 136 [hereinafter AFL-EC Minutes, Jan. 1936]; Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee (AFL, Atlantic City, N.J.), Aug. 5–16, 1935 at 49–50. Matthew Woll was the only member recorded as objecting to the amendment on federalism grounds. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee (AFL, Washington, D.C.), May 5–20, 1936, at 229–30 [hereinafter AFL-EC Minutes, May 1936].

305. AFL-EC Minutes, Jan. 1936, supra note 304, at 133. At the 1936 AFL Convention, President Weaver of the Musicians’ Union delivered a lengthy address on this theme, in which he warned that if the Supreme Court’s independence were damaged, “[t]he death knell of liberty as we have known it in this country for 150 years will have been sounded; and America will be eligible to take her place alongside of those Old World dictatorships, where democracy can no longer claim either a local habitation or a name.” AFL, Report of Proceedings of the Fifty-Sixth Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor 699 (1936) [hereinafter 1936 AFL Report of Proceedings]. Weaver went on to ask, rhetorically, “Who ever hears of the Supreme Courts of Russia, Italy, or Germany?” Id. at 707.

306. AFL-EC Minutes, May 1936, supra note 304, at 250.

307. The proposal was not submitted to the 1936 AFL Convention for approval. See 1936 AFL Report of Proceedings, supra note 305, at 695–97. By the time of the AFL’s 1936 convention, the Federation was absorbed in its dispute with the newly formed Committee
sue of injunctions—the main obstacle to self-enforcement of labor’s claimed rights—the leadership suggested lobbying for state anti-injunction laws to supplement the Norris LaGuardia Act.  

To Andrew Furuseth, this course was equivalent to suicide. The Supreme Court, he warned, was not about to uphold the Act. Always ready for a constitutional fight, Furuseth berated the delegates for forgetting fundamentals:

I think we are on the wrong track entirely on the question of labor disputes. . . . Are we going to quit the struggle for human freedom? If we are, let us say so and be through with it. If we are not, let us go on with the fight as men should.

The struggle for equality on the religious field took centuries, and more blood was shed than anybody can dream of. The struggle to get equality before the law took two hundred more years for the same kind of struggle, and now we are in the midst of a struggle to extend those fundamental Christian principles of human equality upon our industrial field, and all of a sudden we seem to stop there.

This was to be Furuseth’s last oration at an AFL convention. In the eyes of many labor activists, the octogenarian sailor was a pathetic remnant of a bygone era. During the 1934 maritime strike, his stubborn opposition to united action of seamen and longshoremen had earned him the contempt of waterfront militants, who ridiculed him as “Andy Barnacle” and “Weeping Willow Andy Feroshus.” Furuseth’s constitutional commitments had grown out of an earlier upsurge of unionism, one that spawned craft union jurisgenesis. Unlike other craft unionists, however, Furuseth retained not only the form, but also the passion,

for Industrial Organization (CIO), and the matter was once again delegated to the Executive Council for its “careful study and appropriate action.” Id. at 697.

309. Furuseth argued:
I don’t believe there is anybody here who has any recollection of the Supreme Court decisions, particularly the decision dealing with the stone cutters’ case, in which the men were forced to work against their will, who can have any doubt as to what will come from the Supreme Court on the question of the Labor Disputes Bill.
Id. at 449.
310. Id.
311. Weintraub, supra note 125, at 195; Quin, supra note 216, at 140. In the days that Furuseth earned his living in the coastal lumber trade, longshore work was performed by sailors. Furuseth never overcame his resentment at longshoremen for taking over this work. Weintraub, supra note 125, at 8. Furuseth also adhered to the tradition of white chauvinism promoted by many west coast unionists, seeking legislation to exclude Asian sailors from American ships. Id. at 112–13.
312. For an account of this period, see Weintraub, supra note 125, at 11–27 (describing Furuseth’s role in the formation and early struggles of the Sailors Union of the Pacific in the 1880s and 1890s). Although there was some collective bargaining in this period, the more typical form of union wage setting was by unilateral adoption of union laws specifying the wage under which members were permitted to work.
commitment, and independent spirit of his movement’s early days. Now, his message struck a chord in unexpected quarters. While Furuseth’s craft union compatriots were glad to hear the last of this zealot, Wyndham Mortimer, Communist automobile worker and soon to be Vice President of the United Automobile Workers Union, drew on Furuseth’s speech. “I think, as Brother Furuseth said, we are altogether on the wrong track in this business,” he declared, and called on unionists “to mass picket a place in spite of injunctions.”313 Not by his own choice, Furuseth’s constitutional torch passed to the militant industrial unionists who—in the months to come—would serve as battering rams for constitutional change.

C. The CIO: Labor’s Own Supreme Court

At the time, Furuseth’s and Mortimer’s speeches were sideshows to the main issue at the convention: the conflict between craft and industrial unionism. Most of the unions in the AFL had been formed by craft workers and organized along craft lines.314 Since 1933, however, local activists in mass production industries like rubber and automobile had organized themselves on an industrial basis. Now, craft unions like the Machinists, whose AFL-certified jurisdiction included small but significant numbers of workers in mass production shops, insisted on pulling these workers out of the new industrial formations. John L. Lewis, leader of the AFL’s largest industrial union, led the fight to grant industrial charters in the mass production industries.315 Lewis lost the key vote, but the convention is remembered for his one punch fight with Carpenters Union President William Hutcheson, which dramatized Lewis’s determination to proceed with industrial organizing notwithstanding AFL resistance. Less than one month after the convention, eight union presidents met at UMW headquarters to form the Committee for Industrial Organization.

At first glance, the CIO seemed an unlikely candidate to assist in a revival of labor’s freedom constitution. Its two most prominent leaders, John L. Lewis and Sidney Hillman, were early converts to progressive reform. Both had undercut labor’s resistance to antistrike laws and injunctions. Lewis, a progressive Republican, had drawn the wrath of labor’s constitutionalists in 1919, when a federal judge issued a nationwide in-

314. For example, machinists fell into the jurisdiction of the International Association of Machinists regardless of the industry in which they worked.
junction prohibiting the UMW from striking. Samuel Gompers and
the AFL Executive Council had publicly offered to support the miners in
defying the injunction. Not only did Lewis obey the court, but he im-
pugned Gompers’s patriotism by proclaiming that as a good American,
he could not strike against the government. Two years later, when the
AFL declared the Kansas Industrial Court Act unconstitutional and
backed Kansas UMW leader Alexander Howat in a political strike against
the law, Lewis sent operatives to break the strike and depose Howat,
whose popularity threatened Lewis’s hold on the UMW presidency.

Sidney Hillman, who came from a European socialist background,
had learned the tenets of progressivism from reformers like Jane Addams
and Clarence Darrow. As President of the Amalgamated Clothing Work-
ers, he chiseled at the foundations of labor’s independent constitutional-
ism by pushing workers to seek the goal of security rather than freedom,
to think in terms of scientific solutions rather than fundamental rights,
and to build power in electoral and legislative arenas rather than on the
shop floor. Breaking the AFL’s call for a total boycott on the use of
“unconstitutional” labor injunctions, his union accepted the advice of
progressive lawyers and experimented with injunction suits against em-
ployers. By the 1930s Hillman had painstakingly built up a reputation
as labor’s foremost “statesman.”

But Schechter shook Hillman’s faith in progressive reform. For gui-
dance in the crisis, he turned back to his pre-progressive, revolutionary
roots. He recalled that “it was my privilege when just a boy of sixteen
to go to jail fighting against tyranny in Czarist Russia,” and delivered a
blistering attack on the Supreme Court: “Whatever the . . . constitutional
experts may think of it,” he declared, “there are no two opinions about its
meaning in so far as the labor movement is concerned.”

316. See John Brophy, A Miner’s Life 142 (1964) (expressing outrage at Lewis’s
position); Dubofsky & Van Tine, supra note 315, at 57–58 (explaining AFL Executive
Council’s reaction to Lewis’s surprise announcement).
318. See Brophy, supra note 316, at 142.
319. See Pope, Labor’s Constitution, supra note 29, at 996. Lewis argued, along with
William Green (then Secretary-Treasurer of the UMW), that workers should refrain from
resistance and instead join with the government of Kansas to craft a test case. John L.
Lewis, Official Letter, United Mine Workers J., Nov. 1, 1921, at 7 (open letter from Lewis to
all UMW members in Kansas); Pope, Labor’s Constitution, supra note 29, at 1005–07,
1012.
320. See Fraser, supra note 280, at 320–22, 330; Pope, Labor’s Constitution, supra
note 29, at 1002–03.
322. Fraser, supra note 280, at 322–25.
323. Id. at 325.
324. President Hillman Calls for Membership Mobilization in Defense of
Amalgamated Standards, Advance, June 15, 1935, at 3. At the level of jurisprudence,
Hillman criticized the justices for turning to “legalistic logic versus the logic of life.”
He charged that this legalism was rooted in “[i]nterpretations of the mind of the framers
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Furuseth and other adherents of labor’s freedom constitution, Hillman located that meaning in a constitutional narrative of freedom and slavery. Although Schechter’s crucial holding rested on the Commerce Clause, Hillman portrayed it as a human rights case on a par with Dred Scott:

The issue then was, whether or not Negro slavery shall prevail in this country. . . . Congress had taken action which fixed the boundaries in which slavery was permitted to continue. Then as now those who favored the unchecked continuance of slavery took resort to the Supreme Court. The court was ready to serve.\textsuperscript{325}

To Hillman, the Commerce Clause was merely a battleground in the struggle for rights, not an independent source of constitutional law. “If you want government to fight labor,” he charged, “[the industry] is interstate; if you want the government to help labor, [the industry] is intrastate.”\textsuperscript{326} To reorder the Supreme Court’s misplaced priorities, Hillman recalled that government was established to provide for the welfare of the people, and that the Declaration of Independence “proudly proclaims our right to `life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.’”\textsuperscript{327}

Like Furuseth and Mortimer, Hillman called openly for direct action in defiance of official law. He urged workers to follow the precedent of the Amalgamated’s fight against the Philadelphia clothing injunction of 1929: “The injunction was issued on Saturday; on Monday we were on the picket line.”\textsuperscript{328} He recalled that the Philadelphia judge had been helpless to stop the picketers and opined that “Philadelphia is not the only place in the United States where a court may not know just what to do with strikers who mean to strike.”\textsuperscript{329} Joseph Schlossberg, the Amalgamated’s General Secretary, announced that the time had come for the labor movement “to declare itself its own Supreme Court, to say it is going to make its own decisions and carry them out.”\textsuperscript{330} Hillman went so far as to raise the specter of a new civil war to end wage slavery: “People in power thought that the Dred Scott decision had settled the slavery of the United States Constitution one hundred and sixty-five years ago,” and that the justices were permitting the “dead hand of the past . . . to block all traffic in social progress.” President Hillman Calls for Membership Mobilization in Defense of Amalgamated Standards, supra, at 3; see also Editorial, Labor’s Duty In The Present Crisis, Advance, June 1935, at 2 (ridiculing the notion “that any one in his mind could be expected to believe that the framers of the Constitution . . . could know about, understand, or think of what would happen one hundred and sixty years hence”).

\textsuperscript{325} Hillman Stirs Union to Action in Defense of Labor Standards, supra note 324, at 3. For more on the analogy between Schechter and Dred Scott, see New York Mobilizes For Industrial Action, Advance, June 15, 1935, at 4; Gertrude Weil Klein, Men’s Clothing Workers Ready For Big Battle, New Leader, June 8, 1935, at 1.

\textsuperscript{326} Hillman Stirs Union to Action in Defense of Labor Standards, supra note 324, at 3.

\textsuperscript{327} Id.

\textsuperscript{328} Id.

\textsuperscript{329} Id.

\textsuperscript{330} Klein, supra note 325, at 1 (quoting Schlossberg).
question, but four years later the Civil War had wiped out not only the decision, but slavery as well. We can do the same for wage slavery.º331

Other unionists joined Hillman in rejecting Green’s deferential stance and in criticizing Schechter not in the Court’s language of “commerce,” but in the labor movement’s language of human rights.332 Among them were leaders of the International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union (ILG) and the International Typographical Union (ITU), who were soon to join with Hillman and Lewis to form the Committee for Industrial Organization.333 Julius Hochman of the ILG and Woodruff Randolph of the ITU charged that Schechter was only the latest in a long line of cases that “set property rights above human rights.”334 The ILG newspaper predicted that the Supreme Court would declare the Wagner Act unconstitutional and that the amendment process would take “long and tardy years.”335 In the meantime, labor would “leave nothing undone in the defense of the Wagner Laws” and “no quarter will be asked or given.”336 Randolph concurred.337

331. New York Mobilizes For Industrial Action, supra note 325, at 4; see also Klein, supra note 325, at 1. Klein quotes Hillman as stating:
   The Supreme Court said . . . that the Constitution prohibited Congress from interfering with slavery. Those in power rejoiced. Everything was settled, they thought. But in less than four years civil war was declared in the country. And we say to the Wall Street crowd, to the speculators, the sweatshoppers, the big corporations, it is too soon to rejoice, too soon for champagne parties!
   Id.

332. In addition to sources cited infra notes 334–337, see, e.g., Demand for Constitutional Reform Grows, J. Elec. Workers & Operators, Aug. 1935, at 320, 356–58 (contending that the Supreme Court usurped the power to outlaw social legislation and comparing the current situation with that confronted by Abraham Lincoln after Dred Scott); Labor and the Constitution, supra note 244, at 4 (charging that, for working men and women, Schechter meant that “so far as protection for decent wages, hours and work conditions is concerned, they are alien to the Constitution, but that employers who wish to establish low labor standards in order to increase profits are thoroughly safeguarded by that document in the prosecution of their nefarious policy”).

333. Later, it would become significant that the ITU did not formally affiliate as an organization. But in the crucial early stages, before the newly created industrial unions in rubber, automobile, and steel grew large enough to give the CIO credibility, the ITU was regarded as being in the CIO camp. ITU President Charles Howard served as CIO Secretary-Treasurer, and ITU Secretary-Treasurer Woodruff Randolph was a vigorous proponent of the CIO. Walter Galenson, The CIO Challenge to the AFL 21±22, 27±28 (1960).

334. Union Always Held Correct NRA Policy, Justice, June 15, 1935, at 6 (quoting Hochman). Hochman was General Manager of the huge New York Joint Board of the ILG. See also Woodruff Randolph, Our Reliance On Unionism Protects Against Disappointments, 86 Typographical J. 515, 516 (1935) (observing that Schechter is another case that stretches property rights at the expense of human rights, and concluding that it "seems that a very different conception of the purpose of law must be instilled in the minds of legislators and jurists").


336. Id.

337. See Randolph, supra note 334, at 515 (observing that the Supreme Court, “in adopting an attitude of strict construction as regards interstate commerce seems to
Among the unions that would found the CIO, John L. Lewis’s United Mine Workers union was conspicuous in its early failure to question the authority of the Supreme Court. After Schechter, the *United Mine Workers Journal* lamented the demise of the NIRA, but showed the same deference to legal authority as Green’s statement for the AFL Executive Council: “[T]he Supreme Court says it was unconstitutional, and that settles it.”\(^{338}\) Lewis had one more round to play before moving to the level of constitutional politics. By threatening a nationwide coal strike, he induced Congress to pass the Guffey Coal Stabilization bill, an NIRA replacement for the coal industry.\(^{339}\) Not until the Court invalidated the Guffey Act\(^{340}\) did the UMW openly challenge its supremacy in the field of constitutional interpretation. Then, the *United Mine Workers Journal* accused the Court of reducing labor to the status of an “outcast” with “no rights” and concluded: “We do not believe in that kind of law, and we do not believe the American people believe in it, no matter what the Supreme Court may say.”\(^{341}\) John L. Lewis charged that the United States was saddled with a “corporate dictatorship” that had “made a mockery of our vaunted American democracy by reducing the industrial workers to a condition of involuntary economic servitude, by denying to them the fundamental rights of self-organization and collective bargaining.”\(^{342}\)

This new constitutional independence was not as precise in substance, as elaborate in justification, or as closely tied to the text of the Constitution as the older tradition of labor’s freedom constitution. Its sweeping narrative of emancipation was capacious enough to smooth over underlying divisions that would later become salient. Nevertheless, for the first time since the Gompers era, mainstream labor leaders of national stature not only repudiated official constitutional law but also evinced a willingness to implement their own oppositional vision. It re-

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338. Supreme Court Declares NRA Unconstitutional, United Mine Workers J., June 1, 1935, at 4.

339. Lewis set midnight June 16 as the deadline for a nationwide strike of 450,000 soft coal miners. Maier B. Fox, *United We Stand: The United Mine Workers of America 1890–1990*, at 322 (1990). Since the coal operators would not agree to extend NRA conditions, the Guffey bill represented the only hope of heading off a strike. Louis Stark, Coal Parley Fails In Final Stage, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1935, at 12; Louis Stark, Soft Coal, supra note 277, at 1. Roosevelt named it his top legislative priority. Turner Catledge, Guffey Coal Bill Is Made ‘No. 1 Must,’ N.Y. Times, June 17, 1935, at 1. The strike was postponed to give Congress time to act. Fox, supra, at 319, 322.


341. Editorial, Labor’s Only Hope, United Mine Workers J., June 15, 1936, at 8; see Editorial, The Guffey Decision, United Mine Workers J., June 1, 1936, at 8.

mained to be seen whether these verbal declarations would be backed up by action.

IV. Freedom in the Streets and Factories; Commerce in the Courts, 1936–1937

While the AFL vacillated and the CIO braced for self-enforcement, the constitutional conflict escalated in three arenas: the courts, the general election campaign, and the factories. In the courts, lawyers argued about protecting commerce and preventing strikes. But on the hustings and in the factories, the talk was of freedom and democracy first, and industrial peace only as a by-product. Thwarted in one of these three arenas, the proponents of change demonstrated the breadth of their support and the strength of their commitment in the other two.

A. An Icy Certainty

The Supreme Court’s decision in Schechter had left the constitutionality of the Wagner Act in grave doubt. The newly created National Labor Relations Board had difficulty recruiting staff because of the widespread belief that the law it had been created to enforce would soon be declared unconstitutional. The hearty lawyers who did accept employment with the NLRB anxiously awaited the Supreme Court’s ruling on the constitutionality of the Guffey Act. Because the Guffey Act’s labor provisions were modeled closely on the Wagner Act, the case was widely seen as a predictor of the Wagner Act’s constitutional fate. Government lawyers relied on the same constitutional argument that they were making in the Wagner Act cases: namely, that Congress could protect labor’s right to organize as a way to prevent the disruptive effects of labor disputes on interstate commerce.

On May 18, 1936, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Carter v. Carter Coal Co. striking down the Guffey Act. Six justices agreed that the labor provisions exceeded the reach of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce, and none dissented on this point. Justice

343. See supra notes 253–255 and accompanying text.
344. 1 Gross, supra note 26, at 149.
345. On the parallel between the labor provisions of the Guffey and Wagner Acts, see id. at 197; Irons, supra note 26, at 248.
346. See 1 Gross, supra note 26, at 197.
348. The case involved a challenge to the price fixing provisions. In an opinion by Justice Sutherland, five justices held that those provisions could not be severed from the labor provisions and went on to hold that the labor provisions—and thus the entire statute—could not be sustained under the commerce power. Id. at 312, 307. Chief Justice Hughes agreed with the majority that the labor provisions were invalid, but would have held that they were severable from the price fixing provisions. Id. at 318–19, 321 (Hughes, C.J., concurring). The three liberals would have upheld the restrictions on coal prices, but they refrained from challenging the majority’s invalidation of the labor rights provisions: “No opinion is expressed either directly or by implication as to those aspects of the case.”
Sutherland’s opinion for the Court held that coal mining was local activity, labor relations were local relations, and strikes had only an indirect effect on interstate commerce. The reasoning appeared wholly applicable to the Wagner Act:

Much stress is put upon the evils which come from the struggle between employers and employees over the matter of wages, working conditions, the right of collective bargaining, etc., and the resulting strikes, curtailment and irregularity of production and effect on prices; and it is insisted that interstate commerce is greatly affected thereby. But . . . the conclusive answer is that the evils are all local evils over which the federal government has no legislative control. The relation of employer and employee is a local relation. . . . The employees are not engaged in or about commerce, but exclusively in producing a commodity. And the controversies and evils, which it is the object of the act to regulate and minimize, are local controversies and evils affecting local work undertaken to accomplish that local result. Such effect as they may have upon commerce, however extensive it may be, is secondary and indirect.349

Confronted with this language, even strong proponents of the Wagner Act now acknowledged with “icy certainty” that the federal government was powerless to regulate labor conditions.350 John L. Lewis was convinced that “the majority of the Supreme Court do not intend to change their viewpoint, and that they intend to nullify any act of Congress which infringes upon or intrudes on the territory they have defined in their several opinions.”351 The decision had a “devastating” effect on the government lawyers charged with defending the Wagner Act in court, and the NLRB cut back sharply on its efforts to enforce the law against manufacturing concerns.352 After Carter, six out of six federal circuit courts of appeal to address the issue held unanimously that the Act was unconstitutional as applied to manufacturing concerns, and six out of six district courts did likewise.353 In all, twenty-four federal judges agreed

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349. *Carter*, 298 U.S. at 308-09.
352. Irons, supra note 26, at 252; see 1 Gross, supra note 26, at 290.
353. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbldg. Co., 88 F.2d 154, 155-56 (1st Cir. 1937), aff’d 15 F. Supp. 915 (D. Mass. 1936) (citing *Carter* for the proposition that Congress lacked the power to regulate the labor relations of manufacturing concerns); Foster Bros. Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 85 F.2d 984, 988-89 (4th Cir. 1936) (same); Frueauf Trailer Co. v. NLRB, 85 F.2d
without dissent that the Wagner Act could not be applied to manufacturing companies. In light of this unanimity, it would be pure fantasy to imagine that *Carter* hinged on the poor draftsmanship of the Guffey Act as opposed to the relatively precise crafting of the Wagner Act.

While the Commerce Clause theory foundered in the courts, the central themes of labor’s freedom constitution overflowed the mines and mills to take center stage in the national political debate. First in the electoral arena and then in industry, the Court’s opponents mobilized and prepared for confrontation.

**B. A National Referendum on Industrial Democracy**

In the summer and fall of 1936, Franklin Roosevelt campaigned for reelection against his Republican challenger, Governor Alf Landon of Kansas. Openly abandoning any pretense of forging an all-class alliance, he launched a crusade against the “economic royalists” who sought to impose a “new industrial dictatorship.”\(^{354}\) Fearing that an overt attack on the Supreme Court would distract attention from the substance of the New Deal program, Roosevelt kept a near total silence on the Court and its decisions.\(^{355}\) But Landon and his supporters made certain that both would be central issues in the campaign.\(^{356}\) The Republican platform charged that the Roosevelt administration had “usurped” the powers of Congress, “flouted” the authority of the Supreme Court, “violated” the liberties of American citizens, substituted regulated monopoly for individ-

391, 392 (6th Cir. 1936) (per curiam) (same); Pratt v. Stout, 85 F.2d 172, 180 (8th Cir. 1936), aff’d, 12 F. Supp. 864 (W.D. Mo. 1935) (same); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 85 F.2d 2, 2 (2d Cir. 1936) (per curiam) (same); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 83 F.2d 998, 999 (5th Cir. 1936), rev’d, 301 U.S. 1 (per curiam) (same); Pepper, supra note 350, at 125 n.378 (citing these six cases, and observing that “[n]o decision or judicial opinion to the contrary has been cited, and we find none”); Oberman & Co. v. Pratt, 16 F. Supp. 887, 888 (W.D. Mo. 1936), rev’d, 89 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1937) (refusing to recognize congressional regulation of a manufacturer’s labor relations); Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp. v. Meyers, 15 F. Supp. 915, 920 (D. Mass. 1936), aff’d, 88 F.2d 154 (1st Cir. 1937); Eagle-Picher Lead Co. v. Madden, 15 F. Supp. 407, 408 (N.D. Okla. 1936); El Paso Elec. Co. v. Elliott, 15 F. Supp. 81, 90 (W.D. Tex. 1936), rev’d, 89 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1937); Bendix Prods. Corp. v. Beman, 14 F. Supp. 58, 65 (N.D. Ill. 1936), rev’d, 89 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1937); Stout v. Pratt, 12 F. Supp. 864, 871 (W.D. Mo. 1935), aff’d, 85 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1936).


355. See Leuchtenburg, When the People Spoke, supra note 271, at 2084–87.

356. See 2 Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 34, at 306–09; William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, in Moral Problems in American Life 167, 187 (Karen Halttunen & Lewis Perry eds., 1998); Leuchtenburg, When the People Spoke, supra note 271, at 2091–92.
ual initiative, infringed the rights reserved to the states, and “insisted on the passage of laws contrary to the Constitution.” 357 As the campaign progressed, Landon and his supporters intensified their emphasis on these themes, closing in a crescendo of speeches attacking the New Deal administration for regimenting the individual and treating the Supreme Court with contempt. 358 While Roosevelt’s silence tended to blur the issue, his supporters tried to keep it in focus. Quietly encouraged by Roosevelt, farm groups and labor unions bitterly attacked the Court, while journalists and Congressmen debated means of curbing it. 359 In Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, home of the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, CIO supporters marched behind a banner lumping Landon with the conservative bloc of four justices: “Vote for F.D. Roosevelt; Defeat ‘The Four Horsemen’; Landon—‘Liberty League’—Hearst—‘Steeltrust.’” 360

On November 3, 1936, Roosevelt won reelection by the largest popular landslide in history. 361 Although the President could claim a general mandate to proceed with the New Deal program, his failure to propose a solution to the constitutional obstacle left the import of the election on that issue open to interpretation. 362 Workers and unions, who had pro-


358. See Landon Assails Roosevelt As Seeking ‘Planned Society’; 50,000 at Los Angeles Rally, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1936, at 1; Landon’s Speech Warning on New Deal Laws, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1936, at 21; Text of the Address Made by Gov. Landon at Los Angeles, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1936, at 22; The Text of Governor Landon’s Attack in St. Louis on the New Deal, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1936, at 45. Landon’s Democratic supporters were even more vehement than the candidate himself. See, e.g., Text of Alfred E. Smith’s Address at Albany, His Final Campaign Attack on the President, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1936, at 43 (charging Roosevelt with attacking the Constitution, linking him to Communism, and lecturing at length about separation of powers and individual rights).

359. See Leuchtenburg, When the People Spoke, supra note 271, at 2097–2103. Roosevelt’s public papers contain only two references to the Supreme Court during the period of the campaign. In a greeting to Labor’s Non-Partisan League, he observed that it “is a notable fact that it was not the wage earners who cheered” when the Court struck down economic legislation. A Greeting to Labor’s Non-Partisan League (Aug. 3, 1936), in 5 Roosevelt Public Papers, supra note 268, at 280, 280–81. He went on to predict that this “return to reactionary practices” would be short-lived because, “[h]aving tasted the benefits of liberation, men and women do not for long forego those benefits.” Id. at 281. The second reference to the Court came when Roosevelt complained about the cost of the Court’s invalidation of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. See Presidential Statement on the Summation of the 1937 Budget (Sept. 2, 1936), in 5 Roosevelt Public Papers, supra note 268, at 316, 316–17.


361. Leuchtenburg, When the People Spoke, supra note 271, at 2108.

362. See id. at 2113–14.
vided a large share both of his war chest and his votes,363 promptly celebrated Roosevelt’s victory as a popular mandate for a new regime of industrial freedom. “The people of our nation have just participated in a national referendum,” announced John L. Lewis. “By an overwhelming majority they voted for industrial democracy, and elected its champion, Franklin Delano Roosevelt.”364

Was the 1936 election in fact a “national referendum” on “industrial democracy”? Roosevelt’s campaign oratory certainly gave farmers, small business owners, and industrial workers reason to think so. Beginning with his acceptance speech, Roosevelt not only placed the concept of freedom at the center of his campaign,365 but he also wove it into a constitutional narrative that—like labor’s freedom constitution—told a story of struggle first for political and then for economic freedom. “In 1776 we sought freedom,” he declared, “from the tyranny of a political autocracy—from the eighteenth century royalists who held special privileges from the crown.”366 Since then, however, the rise of machine production, the invention of new forms of transportation and communication, and the spread of mass production and mass distribution had transformed society and spawned a new threat to freedom that could not have been anticipated by the Founding Fathers:

For out of this modern civilization economic royalists carved new dynasties. New kingdoms were built upon concentration of control over material things. Through new uses of corporations, banks and securities, new machinery of industry and agriculture, of labor and capital—all undreamed of by the fathers—the whole structure of modern life was impressed into

363. See, e.g., Bernstein, Turbulent Years, supra note 216, at 449–50 (“Roosevelt had made organized labor a decisive element in his New Deal political coalition.”).


365. As Bruce Ackerman has explained, the Supreme Court’s constitutional invalidation of the first New Deal in cases like Schechter led Roosevelt to reconsider his first administration’s emphasis on centralized planning. With the constitutionality of the Wagner Act and the rest of the second New Deal hanging in the balance, the President took a new tack. Shifting his emphasis from planning to liberty, Roosevelt set forth a new concept of freedom that would be implemented “not . . . in opposition to the state, but . . . through the democratic control of the marketplace.” 2 Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 34, at 310.

366. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acceptance of the Renomination for the Presidency (June 27, 1936), in 5 Roosevelt Public Papers, supra note 268, at 230, 231 [hereinafter Acceptance Speech].
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this royal service. . . . And as a result the average man once more confronts the problem that faced the Minute Man.367

Rejecting the classical liberal view that government-mandated economic security and equality come at the cost of liberty, Roosevelt drew instead on traditions of civic republicanism long embraced by the labor movement.368 He called for economic rights not as a paternalistic substitute for individual initiative, but as a precondition of freedom. “Necessitous men are not free men,” he observed. “Liberty requires opportunity to make a living—a living decent according to the standard of the time, a living which gives man not only enough to live by, but something to live for.”369 Freedom could be threatened not only by government, but also by private economic power; hence, a degree of economic equality was essential to effective liberty:

For too many of us the political equality we once had won was meaningless in the face of economic inequality. A small group had concentrated into their own hands an almost complete control over other people’s property, other people’s money, other people’s labor—other people’s lives. For too many of us life was no longer free; liberty no longer real; men could no longer follow the pursuit of happiness.370

To Roosevelt, the constitutional role of government was best described not in the language of interstate commerce, but in that of slavery and freedom, tyranny and democracy:

[T]he royalists of the economic order have conceded that political freedom was the business of the Government, but they have maintained that economic slavery was nobody’s business. They granted that the government could protect the citizen in his right to vote, but they denied that the Government could do anything to protect the citizen in his right to work and his right to live. . . . In their blindness they forget what the Flag and the Constitution stand for. Now, as always, they stand for democracy, not tyranny; for freedom, not subjection; and against a dictatorship by mob rule and the overprivileged alike.371

367. Id. at 232. In particular: “The hours men and women worked, the wages they received, the conditions of their labor—these had passed beyond the control of the people, and were imposed by this new industrial dictatorship.” Id. at 233.


369. Acceptance Speech, supra note 366, at 233. Roosevelt had also emphasized this theme in his 1932 campaign. See Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights, supra note 203, at 1832.

370. Acceptance Speech, supra note 366, at 233; see also Campaign Address at Chicago, Ill. (Oct. 14, 1936), in 5 Roosevelt Public Papers, supra note 268, at 480, 486 (recalling “the warning of Thomas Jefferson that ‘widespread poverty and concentrated wealth cannot long endure side by side in a democracy’”).

Outside of the acceptance speech and a few others, Roosevelt spent fewer words calling for economic freedom than detailing the economic gains made by his first administration. But references to freedom and democracy were scattered throughout. A typical stump speech might go on for paragraphs about economic recovery, and then remind the audience that the “underlying issue in every political crisis in our history has been between those who, laying emphasis on human rights, have sought to exercise the power of the Government for the many and those, on the other hand, who have sought to exercise the power of Government for the few.”

Not surprisingly, Roosevelt most consistently raised this theme in speeches to audiences in industrial cities like Chicago, but he also took it to Wilmington, Delaware, the home of the DuPonts, where he quoted Abraham Lincoln on the definition of liberty and opined that in 1936, as in Lincoln’s time, “the people . . . have been doing something to define liberty.” In short, Roosevelt’s campaign speeches gave workers, farmers, and small business owners reason to believe that he was embarked on a struggle to achieve a new kind of economic freedom: One that emphasized not formal rights to be free from government interference, but effective rights to pursue happiness; one that depicted the guarantee of minimum conditions of economic security by government not as the paternalistic antithesis of freedom, but its precondition; and one that adjudged a degree of economic equality not as an infringement of individual liberty, but as a bulwark against plutocracy.

C. The Famed Boomerang

After the election, Roosevelt’s supporters turned their attention to the problem of the Supreme Court. Unionists indicated a pragmatic willingness to support a wide variety of formal mechanisms including court packing and formal constitutional amendments. While defen-
ring to Roosevelt on this question, workers and unions quickly took the
lead in demonstrating their commitment to change, both verbally and in
action. “[T]he American people should turn their chief public attention
to smashing the autocracy of the courts,” editorialized the Butcher
Workman. “It will take some smashing; but the absolute need of it is too
clear to be denied.”

376 John L. Lewis called on Congress to “brush aside the negative autocracy of the federal judiciary, exemplified by a Supreme
Court which exalts property above human values.”

377 To the New Republic, the fact that labor leaders were now “prepared for a showdown” with the Supreme Court was “the most significant development since the
election.”

While union leaders awaited Roosevelt’s marching orders, local
union activists interpreted his victory as an authorization to step up their
level of militancy. In December 1936, workers staged eighteen sit-
down strikes idling more than 39,000 workers—doubling the previous
monthly record for sit-downs and tripling that for workers idled.

More remarkable than the surge in numbers, however, was the change in the
quality of sit-downs. Before the election, nearly all of the sit-downs had
been brief in duration and limited in scope to a department or two. Even when the protest was factory-wide, workers did not contemplate pro-
longed occupations. But beginning in mid-November, workers at
three large auto parts manufacturers staged week-long factory occupa-
tions. These strikes were settled for concessions short of exclusive rec-

378. Washington Notes, supra note 375, at 110.
379. In addition to the timing of the sharp escalation in the frequency and duration
of sit-down strikes following the election, see infra notes 380–387 and accompanying text,
there is some anecdotal evidence on the influence of Roosevelt’s victory. Asked why the
General Motors sit-downs occurred when they did, one striker responded simply
“Roosevelt, Murphy.” Joseph North, The Social Magic of the Sit-Down, New Masses, May 4,
1937, at 13, 14. Frank Murphy, a strong New Deal supporter, had been elected Governor
of Michigan on the day of Roosevelt’s landslide.

380. National Labor Relations Act and Proposed Amendments: Hearings Before the
S. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 79th Cong. 597 (1939) (reporting monthly statistics on sit-
down strikes for 1936–1938, and showing previous highs of nine strikes involving 11,522
workers in September, and two strikes involving 12,146 in June 1936).

381. See generally Daniel Nelson, American Rubber Workers & Organized Labor,
1900–1941, at 204–14 (1988) (describing sit-downs in the rubber industry); Louis Adamic,
Sitdown: II, Nation, Dec. 12, 1936, at 702, 703 (describing “quick strikes” in the auto
industry). These brief actions harked back to the IWW’s tradition of “folded-arm” strikes.

382. For example, in the Akron General Tire sit-down of 1934, one of the earliest in
the rubber industry, local leaders “had not counted on a prolonged siege and were unsure
of their next step if [management] closed the factory.” Nelson, supra note 381, at 139.
Because of this uncertainty, they were relieved to accept management’s invitation to meet
with the workers outside the plant building. Id.

ognition for the union, but by demonstrating the power of collective action, they triggered explosive gains in membership. 384

Next came General Motors, the first of the Big Three auto manufacturers to be hit with a full-blown factory occupation. At the end of December 1936, workers at the Cleveland Fisher Body plant and the Flint, Michigan Fisher Body No. 2 plant sat down over local issues. UAW President Homer Martin and First Vice President Wyndham Mortimer seized the opportunity to bring on a national confrontation with GM, and by the evening of December 30, the union had shut down the body manufacturing operations for about three-fourths of the company’s production. 385 The GM strike has been called “the ‘most critical labor conflict’ of the 1930’s and perhaps in all of American history.” 386 Before its successful conclusion six weeks later, nearly all of GM’s 200,000 workers would be idled, 387 and the sit-down tactic—hitherto a curiosity—would become a national crisis in the public mind.

With employers defying the Wagner Act and courts blocking enforcement with constitutional rulings, the sit-down strike became a form of constitutional politics. “[Employers] tell us that the Wagner bill is unconstitutional and we don’t come under the interstate commerce,” complained one local union leader, “so what else can we as workers do but apply the system that is most effective?” 388 When Governor Harold Hoffman of New Jersey threatened to order troops against sit-down strikers, UAW President Homer Martin asked “where Hoffman was during the past four years when the Supreme Court of the United States was on a sit-down strike against labor legislation!” 389 The Detroit Labor News proclaimed that “‘Now we are engaged in a great Civil War . . . ’ to see just who constitutes this nation, the men who work and pay most of the taxes, or the rich who pool all the money and try to dodge the taxes.” 389 Unfortunately, the bosses had failed to absorb the message of the 1936 election—“the warning that we gave when we marked our ballots—so we are

384. Id. at 128±29, 131±32.
385. Id. at 142±44; Galenson, supra note 333, at 136.
386. Fine, supra note 383, at 338 (quoting Galenson, supra note 333, at 134); see also Dubofsky & Van Tine, supra note 315, at 254 (opining that the GM strike made 1937 “a decisive year for United States labor history”); Edward Levinson, Labor on the March 149 (2d ed. 1938) (describing the GM strike of 1937 as “the most significant industrial battle since labor’s defeat at Homestead” in 1892).
388. Letters to the Editor, Approve the Sitdown, Letter from A.P. Lee, President, Chemical Workers Union 19019, Akron Business Journal, Feb. 18, 1936, at 4; see also Typos Reject Henry’s Open Shop Policy; Stage Sit-Down, Detroit Lab. News, Mar. 19, 1937, at 1 (reporting that workers occupied printing plant after the owner refused to recognize the union on the ground that the Wagner Act was unconstitutional).
389. Mr. Martin’s Speech at Newark, N.J. (Feb. 26, 1937), in Homer Martin Collection, Wayne State Univ. Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Detroit, Mich., box 3, at 4, 9 [hereinafter Homer Martin Collection].
telling them again,” this time “with strikes.”391 One worker-poet portrayed the sit-down as a boomerang launched by the Supreme Court:

Who furnished the clues for the sit-downers’ strike?
Who started the siege that the pikers don’t like?
The public should know how this all came about,
So credit (or blame) can be justly dealt out. . . .
The sit-downers’ tactics were first put to test,
By nine long-haired judges who needed a rest;
They locked themselves in and threw out every bill
Designed to keep folks off the road o’er the hill.
The workers they wronged even shouldered the cost,
Through taxes and wage cuts, but since they’ve been ‘crossed,’
The scheme used by them, coming back with a bang,
Sweeps all in its path, like the famed boomerang.392

In keeping with the unionists’ view that the Wagner Act was a human rights statute, activists portrayed the sit-down strikes as the latest chapter in a series of historic struggles for freedom. Echoing Andrew Furuseth, UAW President Homer Martin told strikers they were fighting for the third member of “the Holy Trinity of Democracy”—consisting of religious, political, and industrial freedom—and against the anti-union “policy of industrial servitude.”393 Strikers were fighting not only for an “American standard of living,” but also for “the breaking off of the shackles of Labor Slavery!!”394 Workers sat down “as wage slaves” but

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391. Id.
392. Harry P. Vannatter, The Boomerang, Detroit Lab. News, Mar. 5, 1937, at 8; see also Martin, in Jersey, Defends Sit-Downs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1937, at 1 (quoting Martin complaining that “the United States Supreme Court was on a sit-down strike against the rights of the workers”).
393. Homer Martin, Speech Delivered over Radio Station WRJN, Racine, Wis. (Dec. 11, 1936), in Homer Martin Collection, supra note 389, box 3, at 2; see also Mr. Martin’s Speech at Newark, N.J., supra note 389, box 3, at 5–6; Mr. Martin’s Speech at Pontiac, Mich. (May 1, 1937), in Homer Martin Collection, supra note 389, box 3, at 1. In his speech in Pontiac, Martin stated:

When I come into a place like Pontiac and find a great, thriving union with all of its various phases of activity, I feel a whole lot like Lincoln must have felt when he went into some of the places and found an emancipated group of slaves, living in the same territory as formerly, but under much different conditions.

Id.
394. Steve Babson, Building the Union: Skilled Workers and Anglo-Gaelic Immigrants in the Rise of the UAW 184 (1991) (quoting union member Fred Roe); see also DeSoto Local of UAW, Dodge Main News, Mar. 25, 1937, at 1 (“We are . . . only continuing our fight our forefathers began for social and economic freedom against the British Royalist [sic] of 1776. The only difference is that today we are fighting against [sic] the Royal Economists of 1937 who are ruthless and brutal in destruction of life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.”); Sit-Down Illegal, Detroit News, Jan. 28, 1937, at 22 (letter from “Industrial Democrat” to editor stating that “[t]hese sit-down strikers are the crusaders in the battle to obtain a magna charta for the industrial slave” and that “[n]o other men before them have fought and died in this cause, but the battle goes on”); Norman Thomas, Socialist Call, Feb. 13, 1937, at 2 (Socialist Party leader Norman Thomas stating that the issue involved in the sit-down strikes was “the end of industrial slavery through collective
“went back to their jobs as men.”395 Sit-down strikes were “as illegal as the Boston Tea-Party or the Underground Railroad.”396 A worker-poet wrote:

We are veteran Union boys
We uphold the Constitution,

. . .
We fought in 1861
To free this world from slavery

. . .
We fought in 1916 then
For Wall Streets [sic] many millions

. . .
And now we have to fight again
But this time for our Freedom
From being General Motors Slaves . . .397

By early February, the GM strike was dominating national headlines. The sit-down was becoming a major national political issue—just at the moment that President Roosevelt at last broke his long silence on the Supreme Court. On February 5, he announced the first major legislative initiative of his second term: a bill that would authorize him to appoint one additional Supreme Court justice for each sitting justice aged seventy or more who had served at least ten years.398 Since six of the sitting justices met these criteria, the bill would give the President more than enough appointments to swing the Court into the New Deal camp. In a fireside chat a month later, he offered his own reading of the Constitution. The scope of national powers should, he argued, be considered in light of the Preamble’s declaration that the purpose of the Constitution was to “form a more perfect Union and promote the general welfare.”399

As for a specific enumerated power, he mentioned the Commerce

bargaining and the winning for the workers as against absentee owners of a large share of the income and leisure that great machinery makes possible in the automobile industry”); Letter from Michael Toth, Union Representative, to Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor (Jan. 11, 1937), in Records of the Federal Mediation and Reconciliation Service (RG280), entry 14, National Archives, box 419 (“Abraham Lincoln freed the colored people from slavery, and now we are slaves. So please help the union to win. Because if we don’t win now we’ll be lost forever. Please help to keep the white people from slavery. Today in the factory’s [sic] one man does the work of five men.”).

395. Gains Marked Since Sit-Downs, United Auto Worker, Jan. 22, 1937, at 5 (referring to Kelsey-Hayes strikers); see also Flash!! Sit-Downers Stand Up!, Punch Press, No. 16, Feb. 12, 1937, at 1 (“WAVING the battle-worn and honored banner of the UAWA, sitdowners marked the birth of industrial freedom and the death of industrial slavery as they marched proudly out of the first of three occupied plants, Fisher No. 1 yesterday.”).


Clause, but gave far more emphasis to Congress’s power “to levy taxes . . . and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.”\textsuperscript{400} The Framers inserted this clause, he suggested, in order to provide Congress with the power necessary to deal with “problems then undreamed of [that] would become national problems.”\textsuperscript{401} Indicating his disdain for the Court’s constitutional views, Roosevelt’s invocation of the General Welfare Clause came less than a year after the Supreme Court had held that the Constitution granted no power “to legislate substantively for the general welfare.”\textsuperscript{402}

D. The Working People Will Never Really Understand

While workers staged sit-down strikes and FDR promoted his court-packing plan, the Supreme Court deliberated on the constitutionality of the Wagner Act. From February 9 to 11, the day the General Motors strike settled, the Court heard oral argument in the six Wagner Act cases. None of the eighteen attorneys scheduled to appear represented either workers or unions. Instead, as provided by the Act, each case pitted government lawyers representing the NLRB against corporate lawyers representing an employer that had refused to comply with a Board order.\textsuperscript{403} AFL attorney Charlton Ogburn protested the exclusion of labor’s attorneys from the defense of “this Magna Charta of labor,” but to no avail.\textsuperscript{404} Morris Ernst— noted civil libertarian and attorney for a union involved in one of the cases—pleaded that the “working people of the country will never really understand why they are denied an opportunity to be heard in the Supreme Court.”\textsuperscript{405} But the government refused to relinquish any of its time.

It is easy to imagine why. Ernst had hoped to convince the Court that the question centered not on government oppression of employers but on employer oppression of employees—a theme consistent with both Roosevelt’s vision of freedom and labor’s freedom constitution. But the NLRB’s attorneys had a very different agenda. While Roosevelt envisioned government protecting workers and farmers against economic roy-

\textsuperscript{400} Id.
\textsuperscript{401} Id.
\textsuperscript{402} Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 292 (1936) (striking down the Guffey Coal Act and rejecting the constitutional rationale, advanced in the Act’s preamble, that it was intended to promote the general welfare).
\textsuperscript{403} See Oral Arguments in the cases arising under The Railway Labor Act and The National Labor Relations Act before the Supreme Court of the United States, S. Doc. No. 75-52, at 1, 29, 53, 75, 135, 157 (1st Sess. 1937) [hereinafter Oral Arguments].
\textsuperscript{404} Ogburn had unsuccessfully proposed that unions be made parties to unfair labor practice proceedings. Letter from Charlton Ogburn, General Counsel, AFL, to Senator Robert F. Wagner (Feb. 19, 1935), in Keyserling Papers, supra note 236, box 1. The Federation later placed this provision at the top of its list of desired amendments to the Act. See Tomlins, supra note 29, at 139.
\textsuperscript{405} Irons, supra note 26, at 283.
\textsuperscript{406} Id.
alists, his administration’s lawyers sought to bootstrap the Wagner Act on what they saw as Congress’s unquestioned power to “control” and “punish” strikes under the Commerce Clause.407 To establish the existence of this power, they cited approvingly an array of the Court’s decisions that—to workers and unions—exemplified the corporate bias and moral bankruptcy of the judiciary; among them were In re Debs,408 Loewe v. Lawlor,409 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,410 and Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters’ Ass’n of North America.411 Even Judge John J. Parker’s notorious opinion in the Red Jacket Coal injunction case,412 which cost him his nomination to the Supreme Court, was cited extensively for its “considered statements” on the issues.413

Judging from the Board’s arguments, the Wagner Act might have been entitled the “Wagner Anti-Strike Law.” In order to drive home their point that strikes interfered with interstate commerce, government lawyers deployed the language of fear with the same enthusiasm exhibited by judges in injunction decisions.414 Strikes “disrupted” markets, “crippled” business, and caused “disorganization, obstruction, or even paralysis of interstate commerce.”415 Strikes to defend the right to organize or to win union recognition, which tended to be “notoriously bitter and prolonged because of the fundamental issues at stake,”416 were especially pernicious. Federal military actions against strikers—viewed by workers and unions as

407. See Oral Arguments, supra note 403, at 124 (reporting Reed’s argument that Congress has “control power” over strikes); id. at 171 (reporting Madden’s argument “that the power of Congress clearly includes the power to prevent a strike—rather, to punish a strike—called with the intent of affecting commerce”). Senator Wagner’s purchasing power theory completely dropped out of the lawyers’ case.

408. 158 U.S. 564, 599 (1895) (upholding omnibus injunction against railroad strikers); see Oral Arguments, supra note 403, at 122–23.


410. 274 U.S. 37, 55 (1927) (upholding injunction against peaceful withholding of labor unaccompanied by picketing); see Oral Arguments, supra note 403, at 122, 126; Petitioner’s Brief at 13–14, 27–28, 40–42, 78, Jones & Laughlin (No. 419).

411. 274 U.S. 37, 55 (1927) (upholding injunction against peaceful withholding of labor unaccompanied by picketing); see Oral Arguments, supra note 403, at 122, 126; Petitioner’s Brief at 13–14, 27–28, 40–44, 78, Jones & Laughlin (No. 419).


415. Petitioner’s Brief at 21–24, Jones & Laughlin (No. 419).

416. Id. at 43–44.
partisan strikebreaking—were depicted as “efforts to bring about industrial peace.” So zealous were the Board’s attorneys in their defense of government power to control strikes that they breezily dismissed any notion that workers might retain some rights of collective action. In response to a question from Justice McReynolds about the extent of Congress’s control over workers, Warren Madden repudiated labor’s freedom constitution in no uncertain terms:

I should say that if they said to a man there, “You cannot quit your job,” you would be in difficulties there with the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution. I should say that if you said to a group of men there, “You cannot enter into an agreement to quit your jobs, although individually you may quit them,” there you would face no problem of constitutional power at all, but merely a problem of the wisdom of its exercise.

Labor organizations filed four amicus briefs, only one of which claimed a congressional power to enforce labor rights. Bowing to the logic of the Commerce Clause strategy, the AFL’s two briefs largely echoed the Board’s, differing mainly in their diminished enthusiasm for the strike control theory. In line with its white collar constituency, the Newspaper Guild told a story of progressive reform advancing from violent and costly strikes, depicted as “primitive recourse to arms,” and “trial by battle,” to the “the civilized appeal to reason” provided by legal regulation. Instead of citing labor defeats like *In re Debs*, *Duplex*, or *Loewe*, the Guild brief addressed itself “to certain impelling aspects of our economic life” as revealed in academic studies and congressional reports, most written by progressive social scientists. Labor’s view of the Wagner Act as a charter of freedom made it to the Court only in a single, curious little brief submitted by Arthur Markel, Deputy President of the Commercial Telegraphers’ Union. Granting only lip service to the Commerce

417. Id. at 28 (citing, inter alia, the use of federal troops in the Pullman strike of 1894 and the steel strike of 1919 as examples of federal government “efforts to bring about industrial peace”).

418. Oral Arguments, supra note 403, at 115.

419. The AFL’s brief cited and relied upon *In re Debs*, *Loewe*, *Duplex*, and *Bedford Cut Stone*. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Federation of Labor at 13–18, NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937) (nos. 420 & 421); see also Brief of Amici Curiae American Federation of Labor and Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees of America at 7, Wash., Va., & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937) (No. 469) (taking similar approach to AFL brief in *Fruehauf*).


421. Id. at iii–iv, 3. The Constitution was portrayed not as a guarantee of rights, but as an effort to avoid the necessity for suppressing economic unrest, as in Shays rebellion, by imposing “a strong central control of commerce.” Id. at 11.

Clause theory, it contended that Congress was empowered to enforce the workers’ constitutional right to bargain collectively under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Act “gives the employees nothing to which they are not entitled under the Constitution,” claimed Markel. “It would be vain to say that the employees must be protected in their rights to collective bargaining but that Congress cannot make this protection effective.”

From a technical legal perspective, it might seem unremarkable that lawyers defended the Wagner Act not as a labor rights statute, but as an exercise of Congress’s power to suppress strikes. After all, decisions like Loewe, Duplex, and Bedford Cut Stone—though widely discredited—had yet to be overruled. On the other hand, if we consider the New Deal not as a time of technical legal adjustment, but as a period of sweeping constitutional change, then the decision to adhere to these already suspect remnants of the Lochner Era appears as a highly significant value choice.

Once Roosevelt’s court packing plan preempted efforts to enact a constitutional amendment, legal professionals were assured of control over the process of generating the authoritative legal texts—namely, Supreme Court decisions—that would specify the content of the New Deal constitutional revolution. In sharp contrast to the reconstruction period, when Congress consciously strove to insulate its newly created rights protections against erosion by ordinary politics, the New Deal lawyers renounced any attempt to constitutionalize their era’s rights protections. Instead, they carried forward the longstanding progressive project of en-

423. Id. at 3. The right to bargain collectively was described as “a necessary incident to the constitutional right of the employee to join an organization of his own choice without interference.” Id. at 5.
424. Id. at 4.
425. The last of them would eventually be overruled in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter that—in an unusually strained attempt to provide a legal justification for a political outcome—claimed that the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act terminated the application of antitrust laws to collective action by labor not only in suits seeking injunctions, but also in suits seeking damages or penalties. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 233–37 (1941).
426. Numerous constitutional amendments were presented and discussed in Congress. See 2 Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 34, at 337–40. Some created new congressional powers; others defined rights; still others qualified the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review. Id. None of the proposals that were taken seriously in Congress attempted to propound a list of economic rights, as Roosevelt would later propose in his famous “Economic Bill of Rights” of January 1944. See Message on the State of the Union (Jan. 11, 1944), in Selected Speeches, supra note 399, at 339, 347–48. However, the proposals were so many and varied, and the debate so embryonic, that it is simply impossible to predict the outcome had the Court continued its resistance long enough to force an amendment. One thing is certain: None of the serious proposals would have classified protections of labor freedom as regulations of “commerce” or hinged Congress’s power to protect labor rights on the notion that strikes constituted a disruptive evil that Congress must be empowered to regulate.
larging the government’s power to expand—or shrink—economic freedom in response to the demands of policymaking based on “facts” collected and analyzed by progressive social scientists.428 Thus, the lawyers in the Wagner Act cases did their best to confront the Supreme Court with an either/or choice between expanded government power and the old vision of individual economic freedom; the alternative concept of economic freedom held by the labor movement and trumpeted by Roosevelt was missing from the menu.

E. An Echo from the Supreme Court

By late March, reporters were jamming the courtroom each Monday morning, hoping to hear the long awaited rulings. In the meantime, the Court upheld Washington’s minimum wage law and a set of amendments to the Railway Labor Act.429 These liberal victories signaled a clear shift in the Court’s due process jurisprudence to eliminate the “no-man’s land”—decryied by Republicans and Democrats alike430—where neither state nor federal government could engage in economic regulation. The Railway Labor Act case also confirmed what many already expected: The Wagner Act would probably be upheld as applied to companies engaged in the business of interstate transportation or communication.431 But neither decision said anything about the far more controversial question of whether Congress could constitutionally regulate labor relations in the manufacturing industries—seedbed of the sit-down strikes.432


430. The year before, when the Court had invalidated New York’s minimum wage law for women in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936), Republicans had joined Democrats in criticizing the creation of a “no-man’s land” where neither the federal nor the state government could regulate. See Leuchtenburg, When the People Spoke, supra note 271, at 2101–03 (describing the storm of criticism against Tipaldo by Republicans, Democrats, and even the anti–New Deal press). Indicating its apparent contempt for Tipaldo, the Republican Party had adopted a plank in its 1936 platform calling for the enactment of state laws establishing minimum wages for women and opining: “We believe that this can be done within the Constitution as it now stands.” The Republican Platform of 1936, in 2 Documents of American History, supra note 357, at 355.

431. In the two pending cases of this type, one involving a national wire service and the other a bus line, the government’s position had prevailed below on the strength of earlier precedent upholding the Railway Labor Act. NLRB v. Associated Press, 85 F.2d 56, 59–60 (2d Cir. 1936); NLRB v. Wash., Va. & Md. Coach Co., 85 F.2d 990, 993–94 (4th Cir. 1936). Consequently, government lawyers were confident that the Supreme Court would follow suit. See Irons, supra note 26, at 254–55.

432. Thus, the New Republic opined that West Coast Hotel was an advance, but only “a slight one.” The Court Faces About, New Republic, Apr. 7, 1937, at 252. Because the Virginia Railway case involved workers employed in maintaining and operating
This question came before the Court in three cases, spanning a range of fact patterns. The arguments and opinions in these cases provide compelling evidence on the role of the sit-down strikes in their outcomes. The most promising of the cases from the Board’s point of view was against the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, which conducted integrated mining, manufacturing, and distributive operations crossing numerous state lines, and which accounted for a substantial proportion of the total output of its industry. The second case, against the Fruehauf Trailer Company, involved a much smaller enterprise that did not control its sources of supplies. The company did, however, conduct marketing operations in numerous states, led its industry in sales, and received most of its supplies and shipped most of its output in interstate commerce. Finally, the Friedman-Harry Marks case involved a medium-sized clothing manufacturer as to which, in the words of NLRB attorney Philip Levy, “the volume of interstate inflow and outflow was small in relation to the total in the industry and insignificant in relation to the whole industrial complex of industry and commerce in the United States,” but which received most of its supplies and shipped most of its products in interstate commerce.

In each of these cases, unanimous panels of the courts of appeal had ruled against the Board on the sweeping ground that the commerce power did not reach labor relations in manufacturing enterprises. In each case, the reasoning consisted simply of a terse citation to Carter v. Carter Coal Co., the Supreme Court’s recent decision striking down the labor provisions of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act. Most officials of the Roosevelt administration, including the Board lawyers themselves, expected defeat in all three cases; they hoped only that the three instrumentalities of interstate commerce, its Commerce Clause holding had little bearing on the question of whether the Wagner Act could be constitutionally applied to manufacturing enterprises. Accordingly, the Los Angeles Times observed that “the court did not so appear to widen the interstate commerce clause as to let the Wagner Act through.” Hansen, supra note 255, at 117 n.306 (quoting No Man’s Land Wiped Out, L.A. Times, Mar. 30, 1937, at B4). Most observers accordingly viewed the Wagner Act cases as the true test of the Court’s incipient liberalism and expressed “wonder and utter surprise” when the Court eventually did uphold the Act. See id. at 132 & n.359 (quoting The Court Rules on Itself, 25 Commonweal 707, 708 (1937) and citing other sources).

434. NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49, 53–54; id. at 86 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (observing that Fruehauf employed 900 workers).
435. Irons, supra note 26, at 263; NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 86 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (observing that Friedman-Harry Marks employed 800 of 150,000 workers engaged in the industry).
436. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 83 F.2d 998, 998 (5th Cir. 1936) (per curiam); Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. NLRB, 85 F.2d 391, 392 (6th Cir. 1936) (per curiam); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 85 F.2d 1, 2 (2d Cir. 1936) (per curiam).
437. 298 U.S. 238, 316–17 (1936); supra text accompanying notes 347–353.
liberal justices would dissent in at least one, thereby undermining its legitimacy.438

Accordingly, the Board’s lawyers did their best to provide the Court with a set of options that would allow each justice to extend the commerce power exactly as far as he desired, and no further.439 As to Jones & Laughlin, they argued that because the steel company owned its source of supplies, processed them into finished products, and marketed the products, its manufacturing operations constituted a “throat” in the stream of interstate commerce.440 In the alternative, they contended that the corporation’s operations involved so much interstate communication and shipment that any workers conducting a strike could be presumed to intend to disrupt interstate commerce, thus giving Congress power to prohibit the strike under the old case of Coronado Coal.441 With that established, the Court would need only to extend Coronado Coal to permit Congress to legislate preventively as well as prohibitively.442

The Board’s lawyers conceded that these arguments were less persuasive as applied to Fruehauf and Friedman-Harry Marks.443 Recognizing that these cases called not merely for incremental changes but for a break

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438. See Blair Moody, Strike Problem Adds a New Aspect to Debate on Court Proposal, Detroit News, Mar. 28, 1937, at 7 (“If the three liberals stand with Mr. Roosevelt against an adverse majority on the Government’s right to regulate labor, the White House is certain to redouble its pressure on the Senate to shuffle the court.”); William E. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn 216–17 (1995) [hereinafter Leuchtenburg, Supreme Court] (reporting evidence that commentators and government officials continued to expect a government defeat in the manufacturing cases even after the Court’s decision in West Coast Hotel). Even the government lawyers assigned to the case— with one exception—expected defeat. See 1 Gross, supra note 26, at 252–53, 280. After oral arguments, Labor Department Solicitor Wyzanski predicted that the Board would lose all of the manufacturing cases, although he nurtured hopes that the Court might be divided in Jones & Laughlin. Id. at 286.

439. See 1 Gross, supra note 26, at 194. Gross recounts: [B]ecause the board’s prospects were grim, it was decided to present the test cases to the Supreme Court in a manner which “gave the Court the opportunity to draw the line of constitutionality in various places; against all the cases; against the manufacturing cases but not against the interstate communications and transportation cases; against the small clothing manufacturing case but not against the large steel and automotive cases.”

440. Oral Arguments, supra note 403, at 172–73. The concept of a “throat” of commerce originated in Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 516 (1922) (holding that Congress could regulate the operations of a stockyard because it constituted a “throat” in the stream of commerce).

441. Oral Arguments, supra note 403, at 175–80 (citing United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922)).


443. Oral Arguments, supra note 403, at 172 (“It may be that a well defined stream of commerce exists only in those cases where a single enterprise controls the source of supplies, does the processing, and controls the outlets, so that the processing is a ‘throat’ with respect to that enterprise’s flow of commerce.”); id. at 171 (quoting Wyzanski’s observation that “on the ‘intent’ argument, [Jones & Laughlin] is the strongest case”).
with precedent, they developed two novel theories. First, they argued that the Fruehauf Trailer Company’s weight in its industry was so great that a strike there would have the “necessary effect” of interfering with commerce.444 Unfortunately, the “necessary effect” theory, as distinct from the “intent” theory, had little or no support in the case law.445 Nevertheless, the Board hopefully suggested that the principle might be extended to a case “where the effect of a dispute would be to interrupt a substantial volume of goods, although not a substantial amount of the commerce in a commodity”—a principle that would cover even Friedman-Harry Marks.446 In the alternative, the government lawyers offered another new theory, one that would eventually transform Commerce Clause doctrine. They suggested that the effects of many small events—here, recurring labor disputes—could be aggregated to determine whether the impact on interstate commerce was sufficient to support regulation.447 With these theories to choose from, the justices could extend the commerce power to some but not all of the manufacturing industry, drawing the line between Jones & Laughlin and Fruehauf, or between Fruehauf and Friedman-Harry Marks.

On April 12, 1937, the Supreme Court announced its decisions. As expected, the justices upheld the Wagner Act as applied to enterprises engaged in the interstate transportation and communications businesses, and, on the Commerce Clause issue, they did so unanimously.448 Shocking most observers, the Court also upheld the Wagner Act as applied to the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, this time by a five to four margin

444. Id. at 172 (quoting Wyzanski’s argument that Fruehauf was “a case very much in point” for the “necessary effect” theory).

445. On this point, the government lawyers indulged in a shell game. They contended that the intent and “necessary effect” theories presented two different grounds for decision. However, their only claim of support for the notion that a “necessary effect” on commerce would suffice to place an activity within the commerce power came primarily from the following language in the Coronado Coal case:

Coal mining is not interstate commerce and obstruction of coal mining, though it may prevent coal from going into interstate commerce, is not a restraint of that commerce unless the obstruction to mining is intended to restrain commerce in it or has necessarily such a direct, material and substantial effect to restrain it that the intent reasonably must be inferred.

Id. at 113 (quoting Coronado Coal, 259 U.S. at 410–11). This quotation obviously characterizes the necessary effect as evidence of intent, precisely the argument that the Board made as to Jones & Laughlin. Yet the Board claimed to derive from the quotation the idea that the “necessary effect” theory was distinct from any notion of intent. Id. (listing three theories including the “intent” and “necessary effect” theories).

446. Id. at 173 (quoting Wyzanski’s suggestion that this theory would apply to “all the cases at bar”).

447. Irons, supra note 26, at 286 (describing the NLRB’s contention that the fact that “labor disputes recur frequently” could justify regulation of smaller businesses like Friedman-Harry Marks).

with Hughes and Roberts defecting from the *Carter Coal* majority.\footnote{NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).} In a lengthy opinion, Chief Justice Hughes declined to limit himself to the stream of commerce or intent theories.\footnote{Id. at 36 (“We do not find it necessary to determine whether these features of defendant’s business dispose of the asserted analogy to the ‘stream of commerce’ cases.”); id. at 40–41 (describing the intent theory, but declining to rely on intent in explaining why labor relations at Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation had such a “close and intimate” relation to interstate commerce as to fall under the commerce power).} Instead, he concluded that in view of the steel corporation’s “far-flung activities” and the “plainest facts of our national life,” including the organization of industries “on a national scale,” Congress must have the power to regulate labor relations “when it is necessary to protect interstate commerce from the paralyzing consequences of industrial war.”\footnote{Id. at 41.} Hughes distinguished *Schechter* and *Carter Coal* on the ground that the impact of a strike at the giant steel corporation “would be immediate and might be catastrophic.”\footnote{Id.}

Given the “icy certainty” that the Court would rule against the government even in *Jones & Laughlin*, it is not surprising that *Fruehauf* and *Friedman-Harry Marks* received little attention at the time. But from our point of view today, it is these two decisions that appear truly remarkable.\footnote{As Bruce Ackerman has observed, *Friedman-Harry Marks*, far more so than *Jones & Laughlin*, involved a clear “rupture” with past doctrine. 2 Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 34, at 363. This insight put me on the track of the argument developed below.} The Court, by the same five to four margin, upheld the Act’s application to both the trailer company and the clothing factory, completing an astonishing sweep for the Board and the Act.\footnote{NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49, 57 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 75 (1937).} Still more remarkably, the Court ignored the lawyers’ abundant menu of incremental options, choosing instead to refrain from providing any rationale at all other than terse citations to *Jones & Laughlin*.\footnote{*Fruehauf*, 301 U.S. at 57; *Friedman-Harry Marks*, 301 U.S. at 75.} 455

What accounts for these decisions? Labor militants credited the workers’ creation and self-enforcement of the right to organize. “In finally putting its O.K. on the right to organize,” bragged the CIO’s publicity director, veteran labor radical Len De Caux, “the Supreme Court has simply ratified a right which American workers have long possessed theoretically, but which it took the C.I.O. to establish in actuality.”\footnote{De Caux, supra note 57, at 1.} Only after the movement had already instituted the right in practice did there come “an echo from the Supreme Court.”\footnote{Id.; see also Roy E. Burt (National Secretary of Socialist Party), Labor Puts Teeth Into Wagner Act, Socialist Call, Apr. 17, 1937, at 1 (“[W]e think it clear that the militancy of the labor movement in the past few months was undoubtedly a major reason for the action of the Supreme Court.”); Editorial, The Wagner Act, United Automobile Worker, May 8, 1937, at 4 (commenting, regarding the Wagner Act decisions, that “anyone not walled up in a tomb” could tell from the strike wave that automobile workers would no
government lawyers appeared to agree. “Yes,” went a quip circulating among the Labor Department lawyers, “after some labor pains the Court gave birth to quintuplets.”458

This story certainly meets the threshold test of narrative plausibility. Going back to 1933, when section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act placed the workers’ right to organize on the national political agenda, there had been a series of dramatic confrontations as workers exercised their newly proclaimed right in the face of determined employer resistance.459 Now, emboldened by Roosevelt’s landslide victory, worker activists had developed and refined the sit-down strike in defiance of trespass laws and judicial injunctions.460 At the time of the Court’s deliberations on the Wagner Act cases, local and state governments had failed—despite several violent eviction attempts—to end the threat.461 Meanwhile, the President refused even to comment upon the tactic while he pushed his court packing plan.462 Congress produced much noise but no legislation, as some senators and representatives demanded a favorable Supreme Court decision on the Wagner Act as a prerequisite to action against the sit-down.463 In this situation, another Schechter would, longer tolerate employer denials of collective bargaining); Editorial, The Wagner Labor Act, United Rubber Worker, Apr. 1937, at 6 (reporting the Wagner Act decisions and noting that “[l]abor demanded its rights in no uncertain terms”). These after the fact summations echoed the views expressed by the sit-down strikers themselves during the struggle. See supra text accompanying notes 393–397.


459. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.

460. See supra text accompanying notes 379–383.

461. According to John Knox, a law clerk to Justice McReynolds, the Supreme Court held its conference on the Wagner Act cases “not long after” the oral argument, and the justices divided five to four in favor of upholding the Act. John Knox, Some Comments on Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes (unpublished manuscript, 1980), in Knox Papers, supra note 458, box 1, at 8–9. As of that time, police had suffered several embarrassing defeats attempting to evict sit-downers, and they had yet to conduct a single successful eviction against a plant held by substantial numbers of workers. See James G. Pope, A Legal History of the Sit-Down Strike, 1936–1939, at 93–94 (Oct. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Pope, Legal History] (recounting the successful defense of occupied factories in Detroit, Flint, and Waukegan, and noting the first successful eviction on February 26). Although police did conduct a number of successful evictions in late February and March, sit-downers retained the upper hand in Detroit—center of the movement and focus of national attention—until after the Wagner Act decisions were announced. See id., at 94–100 (reporting the complete cessation of police evictions in Detroit after 50,000 people attended a mass rally protesting evictions and supporting the right to strike).


463. The Senate managed only a nonbinding “joint” resolution that condemned both the sit-down strike and employer violations of the Wagner Act, while the House failed to act at all. See Patterson, supra note 398, at 137, 168. Senator Hook explained:
at one stroke, vindicate employer defiance of the Wagner Act, leave CIO leaders with no choice but to continue supporting factory occupations, and corroborate Roosevelt’s claim that the Court must be packed in order to remove it as an obstacle to essential legislation. On the other hand, a decision going the other way would undercut employer resistance, call the bluff of the many unionists who had so loudly blamed the sit-down strikes on the Court’s constitutional resistance, and leave Congress with no excuse for failing to address the problem. “Industrial peace—or war,” summed up Alpheus T. Mason, “seemed to hang in the balance.”

The unionists’ story has two main competitors. The first holds that neither the sit-down strikes nor the court packing plan had any significant effect on the Court; instead, the decisions resulted from an incremental process of autonomous judicial reasoning. Whatever validity

Both labor and agriculture are national problems and nothing could illustrate this any stronger than the present sit-down strikes, that are in their nature nothing more or less than outright anarchy. I pray to our Lord that the President’s proposal to reorganize the courts will be enacted with all haste so that we here in Washington will be able to pass legislation to cope with this serious condition which threatens the very foundation of our democratic government.

81 Cong. Rec. 2379 (1937) (Statement of Senator Hook). For additional quotations and a more detailed account of congressional debates, see Pope, Legal History, supra note 461, at 104–11.

464. See, e.g., Loyal Men Claim ‘Property Rights,’ N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1937, at 18 (quoting Emil Rieve, President of the American Federation of Hosiery Workers, whose members were enthusiastic practitioners of the sit-down tactic, as stating that “[i]f the Wagner act could be put in operation and upheld by the Supreme Court, I think it would solve 80 per cent, if not more, of the present-day labor trouble”).


466. This law-centered story began with the majority justices themselves. Their opinions, of course, admitted of no outside pressures, instead depicting the decisions as flowing from precedent and the application of legal principles to the facts of the case. See supra notes 448–455 and accompanying text. This rendering has been backed by a line of legalist scholars who contend that the transformative opinions of 1937 merely capped a series of rulings that began several years earlier. See Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 571 (1930) (upholding, against Commerce Clause and due process challenges, provisions of the Railway Labor Act prohibiting railroad employers from establishing company unions); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934) (upholding, against Fourteenth Amendment due process challenge, New York statute regulating the milk industry); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447–48 (1934) (upholding, against Contracts Clause and Fourteenth Amendment due process challenge, Minnesota statute providing debtors with relief against bank foreclosures); Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution 42–43 (1998); Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1891, 1892–93 (1994); Larry Kramer, What’s a Constitution for Anyway? Of History and Theory, Bruce Ackerman and the New Deal, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 885, 918 (1996).
this explanation might have as applied to Jones & Laughlin (not much, judging from the literature), it cannot account for Fruehauf or Friedman-Harry Marks. By focusing solely on Jones & Laughlin, the legalists fail to notice that these “other” Wagner Act opinions contain what amounts to a confession that legal doctrine and reasoning had nothing to do with the results. To hear this confession, it is not necessary to give Jones & Laughlin a clever new reading; all that is required is to read that decision alongside those in Fruehauf and Friedman-Harry Marks. The Court began its analysis in Jones & Laughlin by declaring that if the NLRA had to be upheld or overturned “in its entirety,” it “would necessarily fall” because of the inherent limits of the Commerce Clause and because of the Tenth Amendment. Fortunately for the Act, however, it empowered the NLRB to sanction only unfair labor practices “affecting commerce,” thereby allowing for case-by-case determinations of constitutionality. Thus, Commerce Clause challenges to the Act would hinge on

467. To accept this story, we would have to believe that it was just a coincidence that the election landslide, the court packing plan, and the sit-down strikes intervened between Carter Coal, the last of the Court’s restrictive Commerce Clause decisions, and the Wagner Act decisions, which signaled the beginning of the new era of virtually unbounded Commerce Clause deference. It took only one decisive term for Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts to shift their overall voting patterns from allegiance with the right bloc (composed of the four horsemen—Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler) to allegiance with the left bloc (composed of the three liberals—Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo). Schubert’s statistical analysis of voting patterns (which, for some reason, has been ignored in the debate among legal scholars) shows that, in the five years prior to the decisive term, Hughes and Roberts were the swing votes on a Court with two highly cohesive blocs: one of four conservatives and one of three liberals. See Glendon A. Schubert, Constitutional Politics 160–61 (1960) (reporting that “Hughes and Roberts showed consistently high-to-moderate over-all interagreement with all four members of the right bloc, while [their] interagreement . . . with left bloc members was low”). During the decisive term, however, both Hughes and Roberts moved sharply to the left, forming a new and dominant five member, left center bloc. Id. at 168.

Moreover, at the start of the decisive term, the decisions touted in the law centered story as early harbingers of change—including Texas & New Orleans Railroad, Blaisdell, and Nebbia—appeared more dead than alive. The Court had been ignoring or narrowing them for years as it struck down economic regulations on due process and Commerce Clause grounds. See Pepper, supra note 350, at 104–27. Then, suddenly in the winter and spring of 1937, they were revived and put to work justifying the Court’s transformative opinions. Id. at 127–36. Not surprisingly, then, the judges, lawyers, and commentators who lived through the period, and who read the relevant opinions in their historical context, overwhelmingly perceived the Court to be drastically changing its position in response to outside pressure. Leuchtenburg, Supreme Court, supra note 438, at 142–43; Hansen, supra note 255, at 129–31; Peppers, supra note 350, at 137–39; see also Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 34, at 345–82 (presenting a detailed and compelling account of the transformation as a response to popular mobilization); Laura Daldy, Law, Politics, and the New Deal(s), 108 Yale L.J. 2165, 2170–85 (1999) (providing a balanced review of the debate between Ackerman and the legalists).


469. Id. at 30–31 (citing NLRB § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1994)). The Court construed this provision to extend the reach of the Act as far as the Constitution would permit, and no further. Id. at 31.
whether the “particular action does affect commerce,” an issue to be determined not in a single, sweeping decision, but “as individual cases arise.”\(^\text{470}\) This approach was familiar to all concerned, as the Court had established the limits of the Sherman Antitrust Act by the same method of case-by-case adjudication complete with detailed, fact-specific reasoning.\(^\text{471}\) In *Jones & Laughlin* itself, the Court applied the method, taking several pages to describe and assess the evidence concerning the connection between labor conditions at the steel corporation and interstate commerce.\(^\text{472}\)

No sooner had Chief Justice Hughes set up and applied the new method in *Jones & Laughlin*, however, than he proceeded to ignore it in *Fruehauf* and *Friedman-Harry Marks*. Neither opinion contained any reasoning on the Commerce Clause issue other than a terse citation to *Jones & Laughlin*.\(^\text{473}\) This omission could mean only one of two things. Either the majority justices felt that the facts of the three cases were substantially identical, or they were deliberately choosing to ignore their own, newly announced rule of law. The first explanation is not plausible in light of what the Board lawyers had conceded was “a distinct difference between the enterprises which are at bar.”\(^\text{474}\) Almost none of the many facts recited by the Court to justify its holding as to the steel corporation had any analogue in the other two cases. The trailer manufacturing industry at issue in *Fruehauf* was hardly “one of the great basic industries of the United States,” and it had no history of strikes with “far-reaching consequences” like the 1919 steel strike.\(^\text{475}\) Although the trailer company arguably did engage in “far-flung activities”\(^\text{476}\) (albeit not nearly so far-flung as the steel corporation’s, and only on the marketing end), the same could not be said of the clothing manufacturer in *Friedman-Harry Marks*, which operated only one factory and one sales office. Under no stretch of the imagination could the Court’s conclusion could the Court’s conclusion the effect on inter-

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\(^{470}\) Id. at 32. The full quotation reads:

Whether or not particular action does affect commerce in such a close and intimate fashion as to be subject to federal control, and hence to lie within the authority conferred upon the Board, is left by the statute to be determined as individual cases arise. We are thus to inquire whether in the instant case the constitutional boundary has been passed.

Id.

\(^{471}\) See Cortner, Wagner Act Cases, supra note 26, at 27–31; Frankfurter & Greene, Injunction, supra note 95, at 10–11.

\(^{472}\) *Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.*, 301 U.S. at 34–36, 41–43.

\(^{473}\) NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49, 57 (1937) (“The questions relating to the construction and validity of the Act have been fully discussed in our opinion in *Jones & Laughlin*. We hold that the principles there stated are applicable here.”); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 75 (1937) (“For the reasons stated in our opinion in *Jones & Laughlin*, we hold that the objections raised by respondent to the construction and validity of the National Labor Relations Act are without merit.”).

\(^{474}\) Oral Arguments, supra note 405, at 171 (quoting Charles Wyzanski).

\(^{475}\) *Jones & Laughlin*, 301 U.S. at 43.

\(^{476}\) Id. at 41.
state commerce of a strike at the steel corporation would be “immediate and might be catastrophic”477—the Court’s sole ground of distinction between Jones & Laughlin on the one hand and Schechter and Carter on the other—be applied to either the trailer company or the clothing manufacturer.

In short, the results in Fruehauf and Friedman-Harry Marks simply outstripped the Court’s willingness to provide any principled justification. This leaves the question: Why was the Court so anxious to rule for the Board in Fruehauf and Friedman-Harry Marks that it did so despite its own inability or unwillingness to provide a rationale? In their efforts to explain Jones & Laughlin, historians have pointed to three external factors operating on the Court: Roosevelt’s 1936 election landslide, the threat of his court packing plan, and the crisis of order brought about by the sit-down strikes.478 Although rubber workers and automobile workers were already using the sit-down tactic before November 1936, it seems clear that Roosevelt’s election victory emboldened them to escalate both the frequency and the militance of their strikes.479 It also seems highly likely that the sit-downs, in turn, had at least some positive effect on the drive for the court packing plan by confirming the urgency of a national approach to the problem of labor disputes.480 Similarly, it is hard to imagine that the justices gave no consideration whatever to the likely consequences of their decision for the sit-down crisis.481 What is more difficult to assess, however, is the weight of each of these effects as compared with

477. Id.

478. See, e.g., Melvyn Dubofsky, The State and Labor in Modern America 145 (1994) (“The sources of this constitutional revolution were clear. One was the voters’ mandate . . . [a]mother was Roosevelt’s plan to ‘reform’ the Court. And most important was the rise of the CIO, the growing assertiveness of militant workers, and the spread of industrial warfare.”); Irons, supra note 26, at 272–73, 289 (noting that “[t]hese events—the court packing plan that emerged from Roosevelt’s sessions with Cummings, the Court’s review of the minimum wage case, and the wildfire spread of labor militance across the country—obviously affected the climate in which the Wagner Act cases were argued and decided,” and concluding that although the government lawyers meticulously prepared and brilliantly argued their cases, they won because “when they came before the Supreme Court they rode on a tide of forces for change which the Court could no longer resist”); Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court 175 (1960) (listing three factors—the election, the strikes, and the court packing plan—and concluding that “[n]o one, perhaps not even Justice Roberts, could say which of these circumstances was decisive for him; but it is hard to doubt that they played a part in the new tone of judicial decision that began to be sounded in the early months of that year”).

479. See supra text accompanying notes 379–383.

480. See Gregory A. Caldeira, Public Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court: FDR’s Court-Packing Plan, 81 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1139, 1148 (1987) (observing that the Wagner Act decisions were salient to the court packing issue “because of the recent sit-down strikes”); Hansen, supra note 255, at 100–08 (noting that contemporary observers felt “the sit-downs would provide a vivid example of America’s discontent with the Supreme Court, giving President Roosevelt ammunition for his court packing plan on the assumption that only a reconstituted Court would be sympathetic to the grievances that were producing the sit-downs”).

481. See supra text accompanying notes 459–465.
the others. Because of their close proximity in time, it is hard to separate the impact of the court packing threat from that of the sit-down strikes. Both operated as pressures on the Court during the key period of deliberations on the case, and both subsided markedly immediately after the decisions were announced.\(^{482}\)

Perhaps the best way to isolate the effect of the sit-downs is to imagine what would have happened had they never occurred.\(^{483}\) Given the salience of the constitutional issue in the 1936 election campaign, the Roosevelt landslide would still have put the Court under considerable pressure.\(^{484}\) It is even possible that the Supreme Court would have upheld the Act as applied to the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation in order to defuse the court packing threat.\(^{485}\) But it seems highly improbable that the Court would have ruled as it did in \textit{Fruehauf} and \textit{Friedman-Harry Marks}. Given the widespread predictions that the Court would rule against the government in all of the manufacturing cases, Board victories in one or two out of three would have been viewed as a major concession on the Court’s part, and would have gone far to weaken the claim that the Court was stuck in a “horse and buggy” conception of interstate commerce. Having appeased public opinion, the Court could have drawn the line between \textit{Jones & Laughlin} and \textit{Fruehauf}, or \textit{Fruehauf} and \textit{Friedman-Harry Marks}, thereby defusing the dissent’s strongest argument: that upholding the Act as applied to the clothing company placed the Court on a slippery slope toward extending the commerce power “into almost every field of human industry.”\(^{486}\)

Putting the sit-downs back in, the picture changes dramatically. In the face of the strike crisis, even the dramatic, symbolic concession of crossing the line from commerce to manufacturing in \textit{Jones & Laughlin} would not suffice to defuse the court packing threat. The median sit-down strike involved about 100 workers, far fewer than the 800 employed

\(^{482}\) See Eisenberg, supra note 462, at 317 (reporting the incidence of sit-downs as a percentage of all strikes for 1937: Jan.—14.6%; Feb.—22.3%; Mar.—27.7%; Apr.—9.7%; May—11.9%; June—4.8%; July—4.2%; Aug.—5.1%; Sept.—3.6%; Oct.—3.1%; Nov.—4.6%; Dec.—3.1%); see also National Labor Relations Act and Proposed Amendments, supra note 380, at 598 (showing that sit-downs accounted for 19% of all strikes from January through April, as compared to 6% from May through December); Caldeira, supra note 480, at 1148 (“Upholding the Wagner Act, a contemporary linchpin of the New Deal and salient because of the recent sit-down strikes, helped enormously in building opposition to the president’s measure. As a result of \textit{NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel}, FDR and his allies lost more than 4% of the public . . . ”).

\(^{483}\) This method was suggested by Drew Hansen. See Hansen, supra note 255, at 131–33.

\(^{484}\) See supra text accompanying notes 357–361.

\(^{485}\) Some scholars accord the election and the court packing threat a role without mentioning the sit-downs. See Schubert, supra note 467, at 159–68. But see Hansen, supra note 255, at 131 (setting forth a plausible argument that without the sit-downs, the Court’s reliance on “common experience” in \textit{Jones & Laughlin} would have been impossible).

\(^{486}\) \textit{NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co.}, 301 U.S. 58, 94 (1937) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
by Friedman-Harry Marks.\textsuperscript{487} Moreover, most of the manufacturing workforce toiled in enterprises employing 500 or fewer wage earners.\textsuperscript{488} As NLRB General Counsel Charles Fahy recognized, the viability of the NLRB—and thus of Congress’s attempt to transform industrial relations—“would stand or fall” on this type of case.\textsuperscript{489} To the extent that the Court “upheld the Wagner Act” on April 12, 1937, then, \textit{Fruehauf} and \textit{Friedman-Harry Marks} were just as essential as \textit{Jones & Laughlin}. Anything short of a Board sweep would have defeated Congress’s attempt to resolve the labor crisis and, conversely, only a sweep could have deflated the pressure for court packing as a means of freeing Congress to resolve that crisis.

In short, the Supreme Court plainly and simply bowed to pressure from strikers. But for the sit-down strikes, it is highly unlikely that the Wagner Act would have been upheld. No doubt, this account will strike some readers as crude; surely it does not accord sufficient respect to the relative autonomy of the federal judiciary. But the principal evidence comes from the judicial opinions themselves. Only a great urgency could induce five justices to announce a new doctrine in a highly visible case, and then fail to apply it—or to provide any other reasoning—in two other cases decided the same day. The best explanation is that the justices were being forced into a paradigm shift; they could see the necessity for upholding the Wagner Act as applied to the trailer company and the clothing manufacturer, but had yet to envision the doctrinal structure that would support those results. Thus, the answer to Bruce Ackerman’s question, “Who is Hughes trying to fool?”\textsuperscript{490} is “nobody.” Instead, Hughes was obtaining the immediate results that he needed while keeping his options open for the future. Two years later, when confronted by another Wagner Act case involving a clothing factory—this one employing only 60–200 workers—the Court was finally ready to accept the aggregation theory that the Board lawyers had developed for \textit{Friedman-Harry Marks}.

\textsuperscript{487} Based on data from Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States: Hearing Before Special House Comm. on Un-American Activities, 75th Cong. 1609, 1614 (1938) (reprinting list of sit-downs in Detroit compiled by the Detroit Police Department with number of workers affected by sit-downs). Friedman-Harry Marks employed about 800 workers. \textit{Friedman-Harry Marks}, 301 U.S. at 83 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{488} See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Census of Manufactures 1939, at 120 (1942) (reporting that 64.8% of the manufacturing workforce toiled in establishments of 500 wage earners or less in 1939, while 62.9% did so in 1929).

\textsuperscript{489} Irons, supra note 26, at 263.

\textsuperscript{490} 2 Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 34, at 363.
The case that we remember today, *Wickard v. Filburn*, was merely icing on the cake.

V. CONSTITUTIONAL FARCE: THE TAFT-HARTLEY “SLAVE LABOR” ACT, 1937–1957

To the union workers of Aliquippa, Pennsylvania—home to the massive Aliquippa Works of the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation—the meaning of the Supreme Court’s decision in *Jones & Laughlin* was clear. Upon hearing the news, they piled into cars and paraded through town, horns blaring. Signs on the first two cars reported the immediate result: “We Are the Ten Men Fired for Union Activity by J. & L. We Are Ordered Back to Work by the Supreme Court.” A third sign drew enthusiastic greetings from bystanders with a broader interpretation: “The Workers of Aliquippa Are Now Free Men.” To these unionists, freedom meant the ability to exercise their “legal and constitutional rights to join an organization of their own choosing... so that working conditions and living standards can be bettered, and so that [their] employer can be made to live up to the laws of the land, and not disregard and violate them like highly publicized gangsters do.” Labor leaders and activists across the country joined the steel workers in celebrating the “new day” of industrial freedom and democracy.

491. NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 603, 607 (1939) (“There are not a few industries in the United States which, though conducted by relatively small units, contribute in the aggregate a vast volume of interstate commerce.”). The Board’s aggregation argument in *Friedman-Harry Marks* is described supra text accompanying note 447.

492. 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942) (upholding the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as applied to a farmer who grew wheat for consumption on his own farm). The *Wickard* court cited *Fainblatt* and explained: “That appellee’s own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.”


494. Id.

495. Kenneth Casebeer, Aliquippa: The Company Town and Contested Power in the Construction of Law, 43 Buff. L. Rev. 617, 666 (1995) (quoting Manifesto by discharged workers and providing a contextualized account of the effort to organize the Aliquippa mill as a struggle for freedom); see also id. at 645 (quoting Declaration By Workers, Homestead Rally (July 6, 1936)). This declaration stated:

We are free Americans. We shall exercise our inalienable rights to organize into a great industrial union, banded together with all our fellow steelworkers. Through this union we will win higher wages, shorter hours, and better standards of living... We shall make real the dreams of the pioneers who pictured America as a land where all might live in comfort and happiness.

496. Editorial, The Supreme Court Decision On The Wagner Labor Act, Detroit Lab. News, Apr. 16, 1937, at 1. Morris Watson, a union activist who was ordered reinstated in one of the other Wagner Act cases, Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 123–24, 133 (1937), reacted: “I was always sure that the fundamental human right—the right of workers to join themselves together for economic betterment—would be upheld.” Labor Here Looks to “Era of Peace,” N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1937, at 20; see also Editorial, The
The Supreme Court, of course, took a very different view of its ruling. The Court’s opinions upheld the Wagner Act not as a human rights measure, but as an effort to eliminate strikes and their attendant disruptions to interstate commerce. Nevertheless, the opinions left open the possibility that the workers’ vision might prevail. The Court had not been presented with the Thirteenth Amendment theory, and its opinions did not mention it. Moreover, in rejecting the employers’ substantive due process challenge, the Court had declared that the workers’ freedom to organize was “a fundamental right.” In the process, the Court repeated Chief Justice Taft’s admonition that “union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with their employer.” The question whether labor’s “essential” and “fundamental” right to organize would receive meaningful constitutional protection remained to be answered.

The test was not long in coming. After World War II, as after World War I, there was a postwar strike wave, an antilabor backlash, and a determined employer drive to parlay the backlash into restrictive legislation. Again, union leaders deployed the rhetoric of antislavery and talked of defiance. This time, however, labor’s claims received a very different response from the courts.

A. Thank God for the Federal Court

On the first day of the Eightieth Congress, no fewer than seventeen restrictive labor bills were submitted, and that was only the beginning. AFL and CIO leaders decried the flood of “slave labor” bills. They charged that the Hartley bill was a “flagrant violation” of the Thirteenth Amendment. Taft-Hartley would open “the door to fascism in America by impairing freedoms basic to the American way of life.” Specifically,

Wagner Labor Act, supra note 457, at 6 (proclaiming that a “new era” had begun as the “right to organize and to bargain collectively was finally recognized by the highest court in this land”).

497. See supra text accompanying notes 449–455.
499. Id. at 33 (quoting Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921)). For the full quotation, see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
500. See generally Harry A. Millis & Emily Clark Brown, From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley 311–15 (1950) (documenting the upsurge in popular support for antistrike legislation resulting from the postwar strikes); Taft, supra note 72, at 579 (noting that the “sharp rise in labor disputes . . . created a widespread public demand for remedial action”).
501. Millis & Brown, supra note 500, at 363.
504. Executive Council Launches All-Out War on Slave Bills, supra note 502, at 3; see also Nat’l Maritime Union, In the Back: NMU Analysis of the Taft-Hartley Law in Pamphlets: Our American Workers 1935–1949, at 2, 6–7 (1947) (describing Taft-Hartley as an “assault on our democratic rights” that “spells Fascism for America”); Erwin S. Mayer,
provisions banning secondary boycotts and jurisdictional strikes would enact “forced labor” and violate the fundamental right to strike.505 Proposals to outlaw the closed union shop were said to violate the involuntary servitude clause and the freedom of contract.506 Unionists contended that the sixty day cooling off period for national emergency strikes rendered the right to strike ineffective in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.507 Finally, two proposals were said to infringe First Amendment rights: one banning union political expenditures and another requiring union officers to submit anticommunist affidavits as a condition for participating in NLRB elections or filing unfair labor practice charges.508

In sharp contrast to the pre–New Deal period, when labor’s own lawyers often rejected the movement’s constitutional claims,509 union attorn-

505. See Labor Relations Program Hearings on S. 55 and S.J. Res. 22: Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 80th Cong. 1159 (1947) [hereinafter Senate Hearings on Labor] (memorandum of Lee Pressman, General Counsel, CIO) (contending that the proposed secondary boycott prohibition “has as its purpose the requirement of forced labor upon pain of fine, damages, and injunction,” that it “necessarily includes the direction of similar sanctions against not merely a strike but all the activities in support of a strike such as picketing, the distribution of leaflets, and the like,” and that “[i]n view of the fact that the activities sought to be repressed enjoy an established and time-honored status, the attempt embodied in this legislation to repress it makes it peculiarly vulnerable to constitutional challenge”); id. at 2017–18 (statement of John L. Lewis, President, UMW) (arguing that banning secondary strikes, jurisdictional strikes, and organizational strikes would violate the “fundamental right” to strike).

506. Id. at 998 (statement of William Green, President, AFL) (arguing that the closed shop “proposal constitutes an arbitrary interference with the freedom [of] contract guaranteed by our Federal Constitution, thereby undermining the very foundation of our free enterprise system”); Research Dep’t Report: The Right to Work—and the Right to Strike, Machinists Monthly J., Mar. 1947, at 104 (criticizing the closed shop prohibition and querying: “Does not one-sided power in the hands of the employer virtually mean ‘involuntary servitude’ for the worker?”).

507. Senate Hearings on Labor, supra note 505, at 974 (statement of William Green, President, AFL) (contending that the cooling off period “is an unjustified invasion of an essential liberty, the right to strike, and violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the thirteenth amendment prohibiting involuntary servitude”); id. at 1150 (statement of Lee Pressman, General Counsel, CIO) (contending that the cooling off period violated the involuntary servitude clause because it rendered the right to quit ineffective at altering employment conditions); William Green, The A.F. of L.’s Position on Anti-Labor Proposals, Am. Federationist, May 1947, at 3, 30; Labor versus Taft and the N.A.M., Am. Federationist, June 1947, at 4, 29 (remarks by William Green in debate with Taft).


509. See supra text accompanying notes 95–105; see also Pope, Labor’s Constitution, supra note 29, at 1013–22 (recounting failure of union lawyers to advance labor’s Thirteenth Amendment claims in court).
neys now embraced and promoted their clients’ legal theories.\footnote{CIO General Counsel Lee Pressman and AFL Counsel Joseph Padway advanced labor’s constitutional theories to legislators and the public. See, e.g., supra notes 505, 507-508 and accompanying text (describing the constitutional arguments of Padway and Pressman against Taft-Hartley); Joseph A. Padway, In Florida’s Footsteps, Am. Federationist, Jan. 1947, at 6 (announcing AFL plans to challenge anti-union state laws on various constitutional grounds); Taft, supra note 72, at 582 (quoting Padway’s charge that the House version of what became Taft-Hartley “effectively destroys every constitutional right of workers such as the right to organize, the right to be free from employer domination, the right to bargain collectively for improved working conditions”). In light of the “slow and cumbersome” NLRB procedures, argued Pressman, “[t]he one legal approach to labor action which may well prove useful is the growing realization and acceptance of the fact that labor action is nothing more or less than the exercise of constitutional rights.” Lee Pressman, The Norris-LaGuardia Act and the National Labor Relations Act, 1940 Nat’l Law. Guild Q. 236, 243.} Courts began to take these ideas seriously, provoking Musicians Union President James Petrillo to express a sentiment that would have been inconceivable a decade before: “Thank God for the Federal Court.”\footnote{U.S. Judge Rules ‘Anti-Petrillo’ Law Unconstitutional, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1946, at 1.} The occasion for Petrillo’s exclamation was a federal district court ruling overturning, on Thirteenth Amendment and other grounds, his criminal prosecution for calling a radio strike in violation of the Federal Communications Act.\footnote{United States v. Petrillo, 68 F. Supp. 845, 849 (N.D. Ill. 1946), rev’d on other grounds, 332 U.S. 1 (1947).} This decision was no anomaly; although many courts rejected labor’s constitutional theories, a substantial number accepted them. In the decade between \textit{jones & Laughlin} and the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, unionists obtained rulings from state and lower federal courts invalidating statutory and judge-made restrictions on strikes,\footnote{Traffic Tel. Workers’ Fed’n of N.J. v. Driscoll, 71 F. Supp. 681, 683 (D.N.J. 1947) (enjoining enforcement of New Jersey statutory prohibition on certain strikes because the equities—including the constitutional status of the right to strike—weighed in favor of the union); France Packing Co. v. Dailey, 67 F. Supp. 841, 843 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (narrowly construing War Labor Disputes Act not to prohibit workers from striking, partly because a contrary construction would impose involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment), rev’d, 166 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1948); Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51, 61 (D. Kan. 1945) (three judge panel) (striking down Kansas statute that prohibited certain strikes on the ground that the “right to peaceably strike or to participate in one” was a fundamental liberty “which the state may not condition or abridge in the absence of grave and immediate danger to the community”), appeal dismissed per stipulation sub nom, Mitchell v. McElroy, 326 U.S. 690 (1945); Hotel & Rest. Employees v. Greenwood, 30 So. 2d 679 (Ala. 1947) (overturning strike injunction on First Amendment grounds, reasoning that the right to strike is “so enmeshed with the right of free speech” that it cannot be separated out); Ala. State Fed’n of Labor v. McAdory, 18 So. 2d 810, 827 (Ala. 1944) (striking down Alabama’s statutory prohibition on strikes not authorized by a majority of employees of the struck employer, reasoning that “a strike is one manner in which labor communicates its position on certain questions to the outside world”), cert. dismissed, 325 U.S. 450 (1945); Kingston Trap Rock Co. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 19 A.2d 661, 665 (N.J. 1941) (invalidating strike injunction on the ground that it violated the strikers’ liberty and property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); State ex rel. Dairyland Power Coop. v. Wis. Employment Relations Bd., 21}
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bor boycotts, and picketing. Unfortunately for labor, these decisions rested on a grab bag of justifications unconnected to any core theory of labor freedom. In addition to the Thirteenth Amendment, courts relied on the First Amendment, the doctrine of substantive due process, and vague references to fundamental constitutional liberties. Whether these decisions signified the emergence of a durable new doctrine of constitutional labor rights or just a temporary reflection of labor’s new political and economic power remained to be seen. Ultimately, the outcome would depend on where collective labor rights fit in the Supreme Court’s emerging synthesis of the New Deal constitutional transformation.

B. The Most Important of Current Constitutional Issues

After the bruising fight over court packing, it appeared for a brief time that the Court might abandon altogether the enterprise of judicial review. But before long, the justices began to identify opportunities for judicial intervention that, in their view, had survived the New Deal onslaught. By the time of Taft-Hartley, a clear pattern had emerged. Where civil liberties are concerned, explained Cornell Law Professor

L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2508, 2510 (Wis. Ct. App. 1948) (holding that a statute prohibiting strikes by employees of public utilities violated the Thirteenth Amendment as well as the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).

514. See Ex Parte Blaney, 184 P.2d 892, 895–99 (Cal. 1947) (striking down state statutory prohibition of combinations to withhold labor from secondary employers); Henderson v. Coleman, 7 So. 2d 117, 121 (Fla. 1942) (invalidating injunction compelling union workers to unload nonunion goods as a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment).

515. See AFL v. Langley, 168 P.2d 831, 832 (Idaho 1946) (leaving standing, because not appealed, portion of trial court judgment striking down a boycott prohibition); AFL v. Mickelson, 15 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 751, 754 (S.D. Cir. Ct. 1944) (invalidating state statutory prohibition on boycotts of nonunion goods as a violation of federal and state constitutional guarantees of peaceable assembly, freedom of speech, freedom of contract, equal protection, and due process).

516. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940) (holding that state statute prohibiting all picketing violated the First Amendment); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 112 (1940) (striking down, on First Amendment grounds, city ordinance that barred picketing near a place of business for the purpose of inducing employees not to work); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 325 (1941) (overturning, on First Amendment grounds, state court injunction against picketing by nonemployees of the picketed business); AFL v. Bain, 106 P.2d 544, 547, 556 (Or. 1940) (invalidating state statutory prohibition on picketing “unless there is an . . . existing labor dispute”). As early as 1937, the Court had suggested in dictum that workers enjoyed a constitutional right to picket. See Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 478 (1937) (“Members of a union might, without special statutory authorization by a State, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.”).

517. See supra notes 513–516.

518. See Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment?: Lopez and Constitutional Theory, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 845, 867 (1996) (“Relying on their recollection of the events immediately surrounding the crisis of 1937, the justices’ first synthesis was a general theory of judicial restraint, articulated most forcefully by Felix Frankfurter.”).
Arthur Sutherland, the Court freely intervened, but where economic liberties like business property and contract rights were concerned, the Court held back, leaving legislatures free to regulate.\(^{519}\) To Sutherland, the question whether the new judicial deference in economic matters would apply to anti-union legislation was “the most important of current constitutional issues.”\(^{520}\)

This question recapitulated the old debate about class legislation. If labor rights were classified as commercial rights, then they would be entitled to no more constitutional protection than business rights—very little in the emerging *Carolene Products* regime. But if they fell into the category of human or “civil” rights, then they could rise up along with the Court’s new, expansive interpretations of the First Amendment. Once again, it appeared that—as Samuel Gompers and Andrew Furuseth had argued—the constitutional status of labor organizing and collective action hinged on their classification as commercial or noncommercial activity.\(^{521}\) And once again, the Thirteenth Amendment—which provided for labor rights but not business property rights—beckoned as the textual basis for elevating labor above business rights. But unionists now found themselves in a difficult position. Having failed to ground either the Norris-LaGuardia Act or the Wagner Act on the Thirteenth Amendment when they were in a position to exert influence, they now found themselves fighting to vitalize the amendment at a time when public opinion and political mobilization were running strongly against them. Professor Sutherland showed his disdain by noting labor’s Thirteenth Amendment claim and then ignoring it in his analysis.\(^{522}\)

Early on, it appeared that the Supreme Court might nevertheless elevate labor rights over business property rights. Newly appointed Justice Frank Murphy—who, as Governor of Michigan, had refused to deploy state troops against the Flint sit-down strikers—did his best to accomplish this end. In *Thornhill v. Alabama*, the justices voted to strike down a state statute prohibiting picketing, and Murphy was assigned to write the opin-

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> In effect the Supreme Court has said, “When business is in question we shall not set our own ideas of social policy over those of a legislature. Business must be regulated; let the legislators go to it. But individual freedom is different. Individual liberty is so important that we are going to repel every threat to it, even at the risk of being called a super-legislature.”

Id. at 6.

520. Id. at 14.

521. For the arguments put forth by Gompers and Furuseth, see supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.

522. Sutherland, supra note 519, at 17, 19.
ion of the Court. In his first draft, Murphy argued that labor rights merited a higher position on the scale of constitutional values than business rights because “satisfactory hours and wages and working conditions in industry and a bargaining position which makes these possible have an importance which transcends the interests of those in the business or industry directly concerned.” But Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Stone persuaded him to substitute “is not less than” for “transcends,” thereby placing business and labor “interests” on the same level. Murphy settled for classifying labor picketing as a civil liberty. In accord with the famous footnote 4 of Stone’s opinion for the Court in *Carolene Products,* Murphy wrote that “labor relations are not matters of mere local or private concern,” and that “[f]ree discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes [is] . . . indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society.” In addition to its protection of picketing in *Thornhill,* the Supreme Court issued decisions enforcing the right of unionists to speak in public and to advertise the advantages of union membership.

By itself, however, the First Amendment provided an insecure foundation for collective labor rights. Workers and unions staged strikes, picketed, and boycotted in order to exert collective power on employers. The workers’ need for power in the employment relationship fit comfortably with the Thirteenth Amendment, which—as stated by the Supreme Court—sought “to make labor free, by prohibiting that control by which the personal service of one man is disposed of or coerced for another’s benefit.” But in the world of “free speech,” the power aspect of collective action was troubling. “Banning the use of secondary strikes and boycotts,” observed Archibald Cox, “is primarily a prohibition against eco-

525. Id.; *Thornhill,* 310 U.S. at 103.
530. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911); see also Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17–18 (1944) (stating that the Thirteenth Amendment right to quit is a “defense against oppressive hours, pay, working conditions or treatment”). In *Pollock,* the Court explained the involuntary servitude clause in terms of worker power: “When the master can compel and the laborer cannot escape the obligation to go on, there is no power below to redress and no incentive above to relieve a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work.” Id. at 18.
nomic pressures; the interference with freedom of persuasion is relatively slight since all avenues of communication except the picket line are left open." Only two years after *Thornhill*, Murphy joined in an opinion which asserted that "[p]icketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated."532

By the time of Taft-Hartley, there were more ominous signs for labor. In *Carpenters & Joiners Union Local No. 213 v. Ritter’s Cafe*, the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to a state prohibition on stranger picketing.533 Andrew Furuseth’s old nemesis, now Justice Felix Frankfurter, wrote for the majority. Frankfurter assigned labor protest not to the category of civil liberties, but to that of self-interested, economic activity commensurate with business activity. Labor law, Frankfurter asserted, involved balancing “the effort of the employer to carry on his business free from the interference of others against the effort of labor to further its economic self-interest.”534 Not even Justice Murphy objected to this characterization of the issue.535

Worse yet, in *United States v. United Mine Workers*, the Court rejected the union’s Thirteenth Amendment challenge to a strike injunction.536 The plurality and concurring opinions followed Frankfurter’s old practice of dismissing labor’s Thirteenth Amendment claims without deigning to acknowledge their existence, much less addressing them on the merits. In opinions that took up more than 120 pages of the *U.S. Reporter*, only one sentence responded to the constitutional claims: “We have examined the other contentions advanced by the defendants but have found them to be without merit.”537 Reading these signs, legal scholars predicted that, with the exception of the political expenditure provisions and the anticommunist affidavit requirement, the Act was beyond constitutional attack.538 If unionists were to prevail on their constitutional

533. 315 U.S. 722, 726 (1942) (upholding state prohibition against picketing conducted at one facility by employees employed at another, industrially unrelated facility, owned by the same employer).
534. Id. at 724.
535. Id. at 729–30 (Black, J., joined by Douglas & Murphy, J.J., dissenting) (dissenting on the ground that the picketing did not sufficiently injure the restaurant to justify the restraint); see Cox, supra note 531, at 26 n.108 (observing that Justice Murphy had apparently abandoned his position in *Thornhill*, leaving only Justice Reed defending the view that picketing could be equated with free speech).
536. 330 U.S. 258, 307 (1947). This decision was announced on March 6, 1947, in the midst of the legislative debates over Taft-Hartley.
537. Id. (Vinson, C.J., plurality opinion).
538. See Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., The Constitutionality of the Taft-Hartley Law, 1 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 177, 183, 188–91 (1948) (suggesting that there might be viable
claims, they would have to provide the justices with reasons powerful enough to reverse an already established trend. Judging from past experience, that kind of persuasion was more likely to come from activity in the factories and on the streets than from lawyerly arguments in the courtroom.

C. A Haired-Over Neck

In the months leading up to Taft-Hartley, labor leaders threatened a campaign of constitutional resistance that would dwarf previous struggles. In April 1947, the AFL Executive Council issued a declaration of “all-out war” against Taft-Hartley and thundered that American workers would “never submit to slavery.” On April 16, the day before the House vote on the Hartley bill, 20,000 Chicago Packinghouse workers staged a one-hour work stoppage and public demonstration. A week later in Iowa, between 100,000 and 200,000 AFL and CIO members struck for one day to protest antilabor legislation pending before the state legislature. On April 24, in what has been called “the greatest outpouring of labor” in Detroit’s history, auto plants employing nearly 500,000 workers were shut down so that workers could participate in a mass demonstration. As many as 200,000 people gathered in Cadillac square to hear speakers decry anti-union legislation. The leaders of eight CIO international unions and a number of local labor councils including the New York City Building Trades Council and the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor called for a one-day general strike of all trades and industries. Twelve thousand coal miners in southwest Pennsylvania staged a protest strike. In New York, unionists claimed participation by 100,000 in the “biggest labor demonstration Manhattan ever has seen.”

challenges to the “civil liberties” provision like the political expenditure restriction, while characterizing restrictions on collective action as largely beyond constitutional attack); Cox, supra note 531, at 26, 35 (opining that there would seem to be little foundation for a serious challenge to the constitutionality of the secondary boycott prohibition because it was “primarily a prohibition against economic pressures,” while declining to express an opinion on the anticommmunist affidavit requirement). Sutherland did classify the prohibition of secondary boycott advocacy as a civil liberties issue, but concluded that “on the whole it seems unlikely” that the Court would strike it down. Sutherland, supra, at 186.

539. Executive Council Launches All-Out War on Slave Bills, supra note 502, at 4.

540. Art Preis, Labor’s Giant Step 313 (1964); 20,000 Packinghouse Workers Denounce Antilabor Bills, Mourn Roosevelt, Federated Press, E. Bureau, Apr. 17, 1947, at 3.


Nevertheless, in late June, the Taft-Hartley Act was passed over President Truman’s veto. This was the moment of truth for labor’s freedom constitution. If union leaders truly believed that the law would reduce workers to a condition approximating slavery, then they could not—consistently with self-respect—comply with the law.546 Alabama coal miners took the lead, launching a protest strike that quickly spread to more than 200,000 miners in ten states.547

What happened next recalls Karl Marx’s quip that history repeats itself, “the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.”548 The first time, in this case, was labor’s campaign of opposition to the wave of repressive legislation that followed World War I. Then, as in 1947, labor leaders had called for constitutional defiance. In the most dramatic act of resistance, the AFL had declared the Kansas Industrial Court Act unconstitutional and Alexander Howat had led the Kansas coal miners in a four-month winter strike against the law. Instead of supporting the strike, UMW President John L. Lewis seized the opportunity to expel Howat, his strongest rival for the UMW leadership, allegedly for violating the no-strike obligation of the Kansas miners’ collective bargaining agreement.549 William Green, then UMW Secretary-Treasurer, had tried to serve as Lewis’s emissary while simultaneously praising Howat.550 Meanwhile, UMW Vice President Philip Murray, newly elected to that position by a slim (and questionable) margin over Howat,551 avoided the dispute.

Now, in 1947, these three leaders found themselves at the head of the entire labor movement as it faced another test of constitutional commitment: Green as President of the AFL, Murray as President of the CIO, and Lewis as the best known and most feared labor leader in the country, as well as the President of its most prestigious union. Green took Lewis’s old role, urging exclusive reliance on ordinary political action and court challenges. He asserted that the task for organized labor was to discipline the “spontaneous surge” of worker resistance. “We must fight our enemies not with ill-considered strikes,” he argued, “but with ballots, in the peaceful, democratic and American way.”552 He urged workers to wait

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546. This was the view of Alexander Howat and his ally, John H. Walker, during the resistance to the Kansas Industrial Court. See Pope, Labor’s Constitution, supra note 29, at 970–71 (quoting Howat and Walker).
549. See Dubofsky & Van Tine, supra note 315, at 112–21.
550. See Pope, Labor’s Constitution, supra note 29, at 1005–06.
551. See Dubofsky & Van Tine, supra note 315, at 65.
552. William Green’s Labor Day Message, Am. Federationist, Sept. 1947, at 4; cf. It’s Still Legal to Vote, 59 Machinists Monthly J. 233, 267 (1947) (“Labor unions must be cool at this time and should warn all members against panic, anger, or any emotion that might result in a foolish striking back at an imagined injustice.”); Editorial, A Good Rule To Adopt, Carpenter, Aug. 1947, at 16 (“The Taft-Hartley Bill is now law. Over the President’s
for election day, when “a tidal wave of opposition will roll up against [the law] and crash down upon the head of its sponsors and supporters.” Saddled with a more militant constituency, Murray initially supported resistance, but soon fell silent on the issue.

Lewis, on the other hand, had come so far since the days of the Kansas imbroglio that he was now prepared to step into the shoes of his old rival, Howat. Excluded from the halls of power during World War II, Lewis had turned to direct action. In 1943, the man who had once held that unjust laws should be opposed by cultivating public opinion and bringing law suits now found himself boycotting the National War Labor Board and leading the miners into what may well have been the most unpopular strike in United States history. Three years later, the miners struck again despite President Truman’s seizure of the mines. This time Lewis, who in 1919 had declared that he could not strike against the government, defied a federal court injunction ordering him to end the strike. Cited for contempt of court, he appealed to the Supreme Court which, in upholding the contempt, relied heavily on its previous decision affirming Howat’s contempt citation in 1922.

veto, Congress enacted it and put it on the statute books. . . . We have to live with it, so we might as well look it squarely in the eye and make our plans accordingly.”).


554. See Murray Warns Labor Will Use Every Moral Means to Kill T-H, CIO News, Sept. 22, 1947, at 5. This article quotes Murray as saying:

Spokesmen for the CIO say without fear or trembling that there are certain phases of the Taft-Hartley law which will be resisted through noncompliance on constitutional grounds. Efforts will be made, of course, to brand us as rebels against our government. We are not in resistance to our government; we are endeavoring to make that government fill its proper function under the democratic process, and certainly its highest function is protecting the rights of the people.

Id.

Murray’s subsequent pronouncements were silent on the question of resistance to all but the political expenditures provision. See, e.g., Text of T-H Statement, CIO News, Oct. 13, 1947, at 3 (reprinting statement authored by Murray and approved by the CIO Executive Board that did not mention resistance, but called for testing the constitutionality of Taft-Hartley in court).

555. See Dubofsky & Van Tine, supra note 315, at 417 (recounting that wartime government policy “threatened to reverse [Lewis’s] life-long struggle to attain for labor an equal position with capital in the chambers of power”).

556. See Pope, Labor’s Constitution, supra note 29, at 1012 (describing Lewis’s opposition to constitutional resistance during the 1920s); Fox, supra note 339, at 387-98 (recounting the 1943 strike).


558. United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947) (citing Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 190 (1922), for the proposition that an injunction could be attacked only on appeal, and thus that a person subject to an invalid injunction could be held in contempt for violating the invalid injunction).
Whether Lewis appreciated the irony is unknown, but it did not go unnoticed in Kansas.\footnote{559}

Lewis now proposed that the labor movement conduct a boycott of the NLRB. He pointed out that the Act itself provided an easy mechanism for boycott enforcement.\footnote{560} Under section 9(h), any union whose officers failed to submit a sworn affidavit denying that they were members or supporters of the Communist Party or any other organization that promoted revolution was denied the right to participate in NLRB processes except as a defendant.\footnote{561} If the top officers refused to sign, then all subordinate bodies of the union would be legally barred from using the NLRB’s processes. Initially, the top officers of both the AFL and the CIO declared that they would not submit affidavits.\footnote{562} Neither federation, however, took an official position urging its constituent unions to do the same.

In August, the Carpenters Union announced that it would submit affidavits.\footnote{563} Teamster President Daniel Tobin went one further, threatening to take the Teamsters out of the AFL if the Federation’s officers did not follow suit.\footnote{564} The International Association of Machinists filed in late August, followed by various smaller AFL unions and a handful of CIO unions.\footnote{565} But Lewis, one of fifteen AFL vice presidents, held firm and refused to sign, thereby blocking all AFL affiliates from NLRB access.\footnote{566}

The issue came to a head at the AFL convention in October. John L. Lewis gave a scathing speech reasserting labor’s freedom constitution and opposing compliance. Not only did Taft-Hartley deprive workers of their freedom, but it placed upon them an “iron collar” that set them apart from their fellow man.\footnote{567} Lewis argued that the rank and file would lose heart for the struggle if they saw “their great leaders, with all the pomp and ceremonials of a great convention kneeling in obeisance.”\footnote{568} Had the AFL boycotted the Taft-Hartley Board from the start, he claimed, the Board would have been discredited as an employer tool.\footnote{569} Ordinary po-
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...itical action would not destroy the law; if Congress saw that labor was “on
the run,” even worse restrictions might follow.570 Lewis invoked the pre-
cedent of labor’s freedom constitution, reminding the delegates that
compliance would amount to a repeal of the 1919 injunction policy,571
namely that it was the duty of all unionists to violate unconstitutional in-
juctions. “[O]n this particular issue, I don’t think that the Federation
has a head,” he concluded. “I think its neck has just grown up and haired
over.”572

AFL Secretary George Meany delivered the administration’s re-
response. Five months before, Meany had charged that Taft-Hartley trans-
gressed the Thirteenth Amendment and warned that American workers
would inevitably resist “such a flagrant” violation of the Constitution. The
resulting “bitter strife” would, he cautioned, “torpedo” America’s interna-
tional crusade against communism.573 At that time, Meany’s support for
labor freedom dovetailed with his lifelong opposition to communism.
Now that the bill had been enacted into law, however, the imperatives of
anticommunism and labor freedom diverged. Taft-Hartley would tor-
pedo the anticomunist crusade only if workers actually resisted its “fla-
grant” constitutional violations. Meany did his best to ensure that no
such disaster would occur. Despite his public position that Taft-Hartley
was unconstitutional, Meany claimed that unionists who submitted affida-
...vits were merely “complying with the law of the land.”574 How could Taft-
Hartley be the law of the land if it were unconstitutional? Because the
labor movement had lost in a fair fight:

Whether you like it or not, whether the National Association of
Manufacturers and the representatives of the reactionary em-
ployers bought the Republican party or not, as someone seems
to think, the fact remains that they counted the votes in Wash-
ington, and the Taft-Hartley Law is on the statute books. No
one asked for a recount. Our representatives were there when
the votes were cast, and no matter what the reason, whether it is
the sinister reason attributed here today or not, the fact remains
that they did pass this law. It is now the law of the land.575

To Meany, constitutional resistance simply had no place: “We know
it is a bad law, but it was placed on the statute books by our representa-
tives under the American democratic system, and the only way it is going

571. Id. at 492.
572. Id.
573. Meany, supra note 503, at 5. Moreover, the bill would “bring more recruits into
the ranks of those opposed to the American way of life than the Communist Party of the
United States has been able to enroll in thirty years.” Id. at 6. Truman echoed Meany on
these points in his veto message. Harry S. Truman, Veto Message (H. Doc. No. 534)
[hereinafter Truman, Veto Message], reprinted in 1 NLRB, Legislative History of the
575. Id. at 495.
to be changed is by our representatives under that system." 576 Daniel Tobin of the Teamsters agreed that this "is a law that we will resent, but there is a certain legal procedure to change the law, and it isn't by revolution." 577

In the vote that followed, Meany's position prevailed by a wide margin. 578 The progressives had won; even in the House of Labor, workers had no rights of collective action that could trump the outcomes of the ordinary political process. The difference between freedom and slavery was no longer power on the job, but the right of citizens to vote. 579 Constitutional law had become the exclusive prerogative of the judiciary—a branch of government that, according to labor's freedom constitution, was a tool of business interests and a usurper of power. 580 A number of days later, the CIO declared that the decision whether to submit affidavits would be left to the discretion of the affiliated unions. 581 A few CIO unions held out until 1949, with only the AFL Typographers and the again independent Mine Workers (Lewis pulled the Miners out of the AFL over the issue) lasting beyond that year. 582

Signaling their conversion to the Carolene Products hierarchy of constitutional values, AFL and CIO leaders did recommend open disobedience of one provision of Taft-Hartley: the ban on union political expenditures. 583 Unionists described it as the "[m]ost infamous" of the act's provisions, and charged that it deprived unions of "fundamental rights under the US Constitution." 584 Immediately following the override of Truman's veto (which had argued that the expenditure provision—but

576. Id.
577. Id. at 493.
578. Id. at 505. The delegates circumvented Lewis by demoting the AFL vice presidents to Executive Council members, a classification that would remove them from the category of "officers" required to sign anticommunist affidavits under Taft-Hartley. See id. at 483.
579. Gary Gerstle links this shift to the earlier mobilization of Americanism during World War II:

The state's efforts to reappropriate Americanism in the 1940s . . . aimed at stabilizing industrial relations and at whipping up support for the war effort in ethnic communities, cost American labor a good deal of its ideological independence. In particular it undermined working-class efforts to make capital-labor relations the true test of the nation's democratic character.

581. Text of T-H Statement, supra note 554, at 3 (reaffirming policy of permitting constituent unions to decide their policy toward the anticommunist affidavit requirement).
582. See Mills & Brown, supra note 500, at 547–48; Preis, supra note 540, at 318.
583. Padway, supra note 508, at 6; Statement of CIO Executive Board, supra note 508, at 3.
584. Potofsky Says: Slave Law Violates Civil Rights, Advance, July 1, 1947, at 1; Nat'l Maritime Union, supra note 504, at 8.
no other provision—was unconstitutional\textsuperscript{585}, the CIO Executive Board resolved not to “comply with the unconstitutional limitations on political activity.”\textsuperscript{586}

D. More Echoes from the Supreme Court

By the end of October 1947, both affected Houses of Labor had rejected protest strikes or other resistance and authorized their affiliates to comply with all of the purportedly unconstitutional provisions of Taft-Hartley except the ban on political expenditures. In spite of all the “slave labor” bluster, the AFL and the CIO had, as Meany explained, accepted Taft-Hartley as a simple political defeat that would have to be reversed through the ordinary political process. Nevertheless, they went through the motions of challenging the law in the courts.

The Supreme Court’s response appeared to vary with the labor movement’s intensity of opposition. The Court upheld the ban on secondary labor boycotts and approved, without dissent, state laws banning the closed union shop, as authorized by section 14(b).\textsuperscript{587} The anticom- munist affidavit requirement passed muster over Justice Black’s blistering dissent.\textsuperscript{588} Only the political expenditure provision ran into serious trouble. The majority construed the provision narrowly—despite extensive legislative history to the contrary—not to prohibit unions from publishing political advocacy, reasoning that a contrary construction would raise “the gravest doubt” of the statute’s constitutionality.\textsuperscript{589} Four concur- ring justices castigated the Court for failing to reach the constitutional issue, and argued that the provision violated the First Amendment.\textsuperscript{590}

\textsuperscript{585} Truman, Veto Message, supra note 573, at 921.

\textsuperscript{586} Statement of CIO Executive Board, supra note 508, at 3. Not only had Congress attacked labor, but it had attempted to “commit the perfect crime” by preventing the people “from shaking off this yoke of want and repression” through the political process. Id. As the Supreme Court would have put it, Congress had tried to restrict “those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation.” United States v. Carbone, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).

\textsuperscript{587} Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705–06 (1951) (upholding secondary boycott prohibition as applied to secondary picketing urging workers to withhold services from job site over opinionless dissent of Justices Reed, Douglas, and Jackson); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 529–37 (1949) (unanimously upholding state right to work law of the type authorized by section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act).

\textsuperscript{588} Am. Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 415 (1950); id. at 445–53 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that there was not “the least vestige of support for . . . holding that the Commerce clause restricts the right to think”).

\textsuperscript{589} See United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 121 (1948) (reading the Taft-Hartley Act not to ban union from soliciting and spending funds for publication of periodical advocating congressional candidacy).

\textsuperscript{590} See id. at 139, 155 (Rutledge, J., joined by Black, Douglas & Murphy, J.J., concurring) (arguing that the majority “presumed to override the plainly and incontrovertibly stated judgment of all participants in the legislative process” in order to avoid the constitutional issue, and further contending that the provision should have been invalidated on First Amendment grounds).
All that remained of labor’s freedom constitution was the yet unadressed issue of the Thirteenth Amendment right to strike and the diminished but still surviving *Thornhill* picketing doctrine. In 1949, Justices Murphy and Rutledge declared that the question of the Thirteenth Amendment right to strike was “momentous.” But before the year was out, both justices had died. Felix Frankfurter’s approach eventually prevailed, as the Court proceeded to deflect labor’s Thirteenth Amendment claim without ever addressing it on the merits. Meanwhile, the *Thornhill* doctrine was finally laid to rest in the 1957 case of *International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc.* Frankfurter’s triumphant eulogy recounted that the Court had gradually come to realize that the picketing cases “involved not so much questions of free speech as review of the balance struck by a State between picketing that involved more than ‘publicity’ and competing interests of state policy.”

**Conclusion: The Path of Constitutional Honesty**

On the eve of the New Deal constitutional revolution, proponents of national labor legislation faced the momentous choice whether to ground their legislation on the Commerce Clause or on the Thirteenth Amendment. Since the early 1900s, the labor movement had claimed the rights to organize and strike under the Thirteenth Amendment. Labor constitutionalists argued that these rights were essential for workers to exercise actual liberty of contract in an industrial economy dominated by large corporations. By the early 1930s, this core theory had won wide acceptance, and legislators routinely echoed labor’s claim that restrictions on worker self-organization and protest amounted to slavery and involuntary servitude.

But labor’s constitutionalists encountered stubborn opposition from the movement’s own friends within the legal profession. During the cam-

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592. Aside from the *UMW* case (discussed supra notes 536–537 and accompanying text), the closest the Court came was in *UAW Local 232 v. Wis. Employment Relations Bd.*, 336 U.S. 245 (1949). The Wisconsin Employment Relations Board had barred workers from any “concerted efforts to interfere with production . . . except by leaving the premises in an orderly manner for the purpose of going on strike.” *Id.* at 250. The Court held that this order, as applied to ban the union from calling meetings at irregular times during working hours, did not violate the Thirteenth Amendment: “Our only question is . . . whether it is beyond the power of the State to prohibit the particular course of conduct described.” *Id.* at 251. The Thirteenth Amendment issue was also mentioned, but avoided on procedural grounds, in *United States v. Petrillo*, 332 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1947) (rendering no decision regarding possible violations of the Thirteenth Amendment since that issue was not appropriately presented by the record).
593. 354 U.S. 284, 289 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.) (finding that “the broad pronouncements . . . of *Thornhill* had to yield ‘to the impact of facts unforeseen’ or at least not sufficiently appreciated” (citation omitted)).
594. *Id.* at 290.
595. See supra Part I.A.
596. See supra Parts I.A, II.A.
paign for anti-injunction legislation that culminated in the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, a group of elite, progressive lawyers led by Professor Felix Frankfurter undercut labor’s constitutional claims by refusing to acknowledge their existence in public while maneuvering behind the scenes to exclude them from legislative consideration. Their determined opposition to labor’s freedom claims reflected not a tactical disagreement among allies, but a fundamental conflict over long-term, constitutional goals. While labor constitutionalists sought power for unions and workers, progressive lawyers sought power for social scientists and other professionals, including themselves. Over a period of six years, this cagey and well-connected opposition wore down labor’s constitutional leaders. In the winter of 1931–1932, when presented with what appeared to be a choice between insisting on their constitutional theory of freedom and achieving anti-injunction legislation in the here and now, labor leaders chose the latter. Two years later, when Senator Robert Wagner proposed his labor disputes bill, unionists sought a constitutional foundation sounding in democracy and human rights, but again failed to force the issue.

The result was to sever the popular demands for industrial freedom from the legal-professional campaign to validate the Wagner Act. Unionists embraced the Wagner Act as labor’s latest “Magna Charta” and declared that if the courts would not enforce it, the workers would. In his 1936 reelection drive, President Roosevelt campaigned against economic royalism and for industrial freedom, apparently endorsing the core of labor’s theory. Roosevelt’s landslide victory emboldened workers to stage full-blown factory occupations to enforce what they saw as their constitutional rights to organize and strike. The factory occupations, in turn, forced the Supreme Court to uphold the Wagner Act—a victory that workers across the country promptly celebrated as a “new era” of industrial freedom.

Meanwhile, however, government lawyers had been urging the courts to uphold the Wagner Act not as a human rights statute, but as an exercise of Congress’s power to “control” and “punish” strikes under the Commerce Clause. And it was this view, not the popular vision of the statute as a human rights measure, that the Supreme Court embraced in the Wagner Act decisions. The Court did leave open the possibility that collective labor rights might be constitutionally protected, and—for a time during the 1940s—workers and unions won a number of decisions

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597. See supra Parts I.C, I.D.
598. See supra Part I.B.
599. See supra Part II.
600. See supra Part III.C.
601. See supra Part IV.B.
602. See supra Part IV.C.
603. See supra Part IV.E; supra notes 493–496 and accompanying text.
604. See supra Part IV.D.
protecting the rights to organize, strike, boycott, and picket.\textsuperscript{605} But by the mid 1950s, labor’s constitutional victories had been appropriated by others. Under the leadership of Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Supreme Court upheld a battery of restrictive labor laws.\textsuperscript{606} By the time the Court was finished, the new civil liberties won by unions and workers had been reshaped into a doctrine that, as Robert McCloskey famously put it, had the “smell of the lamp about it.”\textsuperscript{607} The Constitution, it seemed, protected reasoned discussion about ideas, not appeals to labor solidarity.\textsuperscript{608} In class terms, then, the constitutional revolution of the 1930s represented the triumph within constitutional jurisprudence of what might be called the “knowledge class” over the previously dominant business class.\textsuperscript{609} The role of the working class was to provide the foot soldiers for change.

Why did labor’s constitutional vision lose out at the moment of the movement’s greatest triumph? Most immediately, the union leaders and pro-labor politicians who were in a position to shape legal outcomes saw no need for constitutional honesty—no need for consistency between popular goals and constitutional rationales. Following Andrew Furuseth, CIO leaders such as Sidney Hillman and John L. Lewis inveighed against industrial slavery and called upon workers to rebel against the “Dred Scott” decisions of the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{610} Unlike Furuseth, however, these leaders exploited the mobilizing rhetoric of labor’s freedom constitution without pursuing the populist project of enshrining it in official constitutional law. They left the substance of constitutional doctrine to lawyers and judges—in accord with the progressive view of law as a technical field requiring professional expertise. As for Furuseth himself, his prestige and influence had suffered such a crushing blow during the campaign for anti-injunction legislation—when progressive lawyers undercut his constitutional leadership in humiliating fashion—that his passionate pleas to ground the Wagner Act on the Thirteenth Amendment were ignored not only by Senator Wagner, but also by the AFL itself.

\textsuperscript{605} See supra Part V.A.
\textsuperscript{606} See supra Part V.D.
\textsuperscript{607} Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 34, 46. The lamp referred to was the intellectual’s late night lamp.
\textsuperscript{608} See supra Part V.D.
\textsuperscript{609} Pierre Bourdieu has noted the conflict among class fractions based on their relative holdings of economic capital and “cultural capital.” Richard Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu 139–45 (1992). Those who are rich in cultural capital and less well off in economic capital genuinely believe that their learning elevates them above the members of the business class in social status, despite the latter’s superior wealth. In constitutional theory, this analysis helps to explain the populist-sounding, but elite-protecting, anger of business class allies like Robert Bork against the liberal intellectuals who defend the main contours of the post–New Deal constitutional order. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 2, at 8 (charging that judges are “members of the intellectual class,” which is imbued with “liberal culture”).
\textsuperscript{610} See supra notes 325–337 and accompanying text.
Like Hillman and Lewis, Senator Wagner adopted a progressive approach to constitutional change. He did have a strong commitment to legal honesty—but only within the zone of statutory law. In the “great controversy” over his bill’s statement of purpose, he insisted on retaining the goals of effective labor freedom and wider distribution of wealth despite the concerns of Labor Department lawyers that these goals would dilute and endanger the Commerce Clause justification.611 But when it came to constitutional law, he made no effort to tie the goal of effective labor freedom to the Thirteenth Amendment, despite his own strong and frequent statements that the denial of the rights to organize and engage in collective action amounted to industrial slavery. Likewise, he acquiesced in the deletion of the general welfare theory even while insisting that its supporting economic theory remain. According to Richard Cortner, Senator Wagner believed that “the real purpose of his labor relations act was to make the American worker a ‘free man,’ and he never entirely accepted the Commerce Clause rationale of the act which emphasized the reduction of obstructions and burdens on commerce caused by strikes as the chief purpose of the act.”612 Unfortunately for workers, however, Wagner saw no need to rectify this inconsistency.

Did this constitutional dishonesty have any real consequences? Consider the following hypothetical travelogue of the path not taken—the path of constitutional honesty. In 1931, Senator Norris agrees to add the AFL’s Thirteenth Amendment preamble to his anti-injunction bill, which passes—perhaps with a somewhat less overwhelming margin of victory than in real life.613 Bolstered by this success, the AFL seeks to ground the Wagner labor disputes bill in the Thirteenth Amendment, not the Republican Government Clause. Wagner agrees and modifies the statement of purpose to proclaim not only that the individual, unorganized worker had become “helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract, to secure a just reward for his services, and to preserve a decent standard of living,” as in the enacted version, but also—echoing his own speeches—that the denial of the rights to organize and strike placed workers in a condition of involuntary servitude and “slavery by contract.”614 The Supreme Court

611. This paragraph summarizes the account of Wagner’s thought and action contained in supra Parts II.A., II.B., and II.C.
612. Cortner, Jones, supra note 5, at 60.
613. The margin in the House was 363-13, and in the Senate 75-5. See supra note 208.
614. See supra notes 223–226, 229 and accompanying text. Acceptance of the AFL’s preamble would have been eased by the fact that the Thirteenth Amendment theory did not conflict with or preclude the alternative ground of Congress’s authority to regulate the jurisdiction of federal courts. By contrast, the Thirteenth Amendment theory did conflict with efforts to support legislation on the commerce power because its presence in a statute’s statement of purpose would provide strong evidence that Congress actually intended to protect workers in their relations with employers, a local matter under the Court’s decisions, rather than to protect interstate commerce against disruption. Cf. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271–72 (1918) (striking prohibition on the interstate
upholds the Act on this theory not because of its legal merits but because—as in real life—President Roosevelt’s court packing plan, made urgent by the sit-down strikes, sways the swing justices. 615 Soon, the statute’s freedom foundation, along with the Supreme Court’s decision validating it, begins to generate possibilities that diverge from the path actually taken. First, there is no necessity to inflate the Commerce Clause beyond recognition. The Fair Labor Standards Act can now be upheld under the Thirteenth Amendment, on the rationale that a living wage has long distinguished freedom from slavery. 616 As a result, the Court never holds (as it did in the real life FLSA case, United States v. Darby) that Congress can use the commerce power for any motive or purpose whatsoever. 617 Then comes Wickard v. Filburn, addressing the constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as applied to a farmer growing wheat for consumption by his own livestock. In real life, the Court upheld this application, apparently signaling that there was no longer any activity so local that it lay beyond the commerce power. The opinion relied on the labor case of NLRB v. Fainblatt, in which the Court belatedly provided a rationale for Friedman-Harry Marks by adopting the NLRB’s theory that many small effects on interstate commerce could be aggregated to pass the substantial effects test. 618 But in our hypothetical story, without Friedman-Harry Marks or Fainblatt to smooth the way, it seems downright absurd to extend the interstate commerce power to a farmer growing wheat for consumption by his own livestock. Nor is there any agricultural equivalent of the sit-down strikes to force the Court to take this extreme position. The fate of most other New Deal statutes remains unchanged. There is, as in real life, a substantial expansion of the com-

615. See supra Part IV.E.

616. On this dimension of the historical distinction between freedom and slavery, see Amy Dru Stanley, From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage, and the Market in the Age of Slave Emancipation 153–57 (1998); Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 437, 499–500 (1989). The historical picture here is not entirely rosy from a human rights perspective, as the wage that distinguished freedom from slavery was often described as a family wage—a wage large enough to enable the male worker to support his family without additional income from his wife, thus enabling him to be the “master” of his wife’s labor at home. Id. at 140. The notion that the Thirteenth Amendment required minimum standards regarding wages and working conditions was actively pursued by the Department of Justice during the 1940s. See Goluboff, supra note 25, at 1661–65, 1668–80.

617. 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).

618. 306 U.S. 601, 607–08 (1939) (upholding application of the NLRA to a garment factory employing 60–200 workers, and observing that “[t]here are not a few industries in the United States which, though conducted by relatively small units, contribute in the aggregate a vast volume of interstate commerce”); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942) (citing Fainblatt and upholding regulation of farmer’s production of wheat for consumption by his own livestock on the ground that although the impact of the farmer’s individual activity “may be trivial,” it was “far from trivial” when combined with the activity of others covered by the law).
merce power; it simply does not extend to the extremes of Darby or Wickard. The Securities and Exchange Act, for example, is upheld on the rationale that the stock exchange is a “throat” of interstate commerce, like the stockyard in Stafford v. Wallace.619

In our counterfactual story, not only would the commerce power stop short of infinite expandability, but also the human rights powers might escape permanent truncation. Confronted by the post war legislative assault on unionism, courts could turn to the newly reinvigorated Thirteenth Amendment. As in real life, the Supreme Court recognizes a constitutional right to picket, but that right now rests on the Thirteenth Amendment and not on the unstable foundation of the First Amendment free speech clause. And, as in real life, a number of state and lower federal courts overturn restrictions on the rights to strike and boycott, but now more consistently on Thirteenth Amendment grounds.620 By the time members of Congress come to debate the Taft and Hartley bills, they confront a very different situation. To pass constitutional muster, labor bills must be justifiable as measures to promote labor freedom and not simply to facilitate the free flow of commerce. Not only does this change the quality of the congressional debates, but it also emboldens unionists to conduct larger and more forceful protests against the bills.621 The result is a Taft-Hartley Act that lacks some of the blunderbuss restrictions contained in the real life version. For example, section 8(b)(4) now prohibits only secondary boycotts aimed at forcing employers to recognize unions not chosen by their employees—the core purpose of the real life section 8(b)(4)—instead of secondary boycotts for all purposes. Once passed, the Taft-Hartley Act is resisted with greater determination. As in real life, the rapidly chilling Cold War foments deep divisions within the labor movement, but the incorporation of collective labor rights into the constitutional canon strengthens the resistance movement in all fora. Ultimately, many restrictive provisions are upheld, for example the general prohibition against union coercion of workers and the guarantee of employer free speech.622 But others that passed muster in real life are now overturned or narrowly construed to avoid constitutional problems, in-

619. 258 U.S. 495, 516 (1922).
620. The real life cases referred to in this paragraph are described in supra Part V.A.
cluding the anticommunist affidavit requirement and the restrictions on so-called “national emergency” strikes.\footnote{623} 

A revitalized Thirteenth Amendment might also have opened new paths of development for civil rights law. Even in real life, the Department of Justice interpreted the involuntary servitude clause to prohibit not only physically forced labor, but also more subtly coerced labor as well as peonage-like working conditions and living standards.\footnote{624} With the support of the Wagner Act cases and other Thirteenth Amendment labor precedents, we could imagine that these arguments now encounter more success. As a result, the Thirteenth Amendment plays a much greater role in the rise of civil rights. Instead of relying exclusively on the strategy of elevating black workers’ conditions to white levels, there is also an element of raising the conditions of all workers to meet the Thirteenth Amendment standard.\footnote{625} For example, the agricultural and domestic workers excluded from the FLSA are protected by direct prosecutions under the peonage laws and the Thirteenth Amendment. 

Fast forward to 1964, time for legislators to choose a constitutional foundation for the Civil Rights Act. As in real life, people like Professor Gerald Gunther and Senator John Pastore argue that the Civil Rights Act is about human rights, not commerce, and that it should be defended on the authority of the Fourteenth Amendment—“the provision with a natural linkage to the race problem”—not behind an “artificial commerce facade.”\footnote{626} Without the infinitely expandable commerce power, and with


\footnote{624. See Goluboff, supra note 25, at 1648.}

\footnote{625. Thus, the hypothetical story provides a possible happy counterfactual for William Forbath’s story about the Civil Rights Movement’s failure to complete the New Deal’s agenda of universal social citizenship, a failure which was certain to leave African Americans—in Bayard Rustin’s words—“bound to [an economic] servitude.” Forbath, supra note 6, at 86 (quoting Bayard Rustin, Address to Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, N.J. (Aug. 1964)). In real life, by contrast, the tradition of combining civil rights and labor claims has “largely disappeared.” Goluboff, supra note 25, at 1685.}

\footnote{626. See supra note 5. But see Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 Yale L.J. (Nov. 2001) (manuscript at 49–50, on file with the Columbia Law Review) (presenting a plausible argument that legislation addressing women’s rights could be sustained under the commerce power without distorting either women’s rights claims or Commerce Clause doctrine). Professor Resnik points out that the \textit{Morrison} Court’s categorization of violence against women as “noneconomic” is indefensible given both (1) the painful irony that the Court has “many times acknowledged that women can be treated as commodities,” for example in the Mann Act cases, and (2) the central importance of economic rights to women’s equality and freedom. Id. at 25–26. Despite its power as a critique of \textit{Morrison}, however, this argument does not support the choice of the Commerce Clause over the human rights powers as the foundation for women’s rights legislation. Article I gives Congress the power to regulate “commerce . . . among the several states,” not to protect economic rights. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. Read in context, this clause was meant to facilitate interstate trade. In my view, legislation to institute economic freedom and equality for women falls more appropriately under the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments, which are, both in text and historical purpose, clearly concerned with economic freedom and equality.}
the example of labor’s successful campaign to revitalize the Thirteenth Amendment, this argument prevails. As in real life, civil rights activists keep up the pressure, and the Supreme Court upholds the Act—but this time the movement’s energy is channeled into an extension of Congress’s power to enforce human rights, not to regulate interstate commerce.627 In addition to Justices Douglas, Goldberg, and Black (who, in real life, volunteered that they would have upheld the public accommodations provisions on Fourteenth Amendment grounds if Congress and government lawyers had advanced the theory), Justices William Brennan and Earl Warren now endorse the first Justice Harlan’s view that the state action requirement is “a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism” that sacrifices “the substance and spirit” of the Fourteenth Amendment.628

Nearing the present, United States v. Lopez never happens, because no self-respecting member of Congress would think of attempting to usurp the local police power on the now farfetched theory that the presence of guns near schools substantially affects interstate commerce.629 And United States v. Morrison630 never goes past the district court, which holds—uncontroversially—that the federal tort action for gender based violence falls within Congress’s power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In place of the distended commerce power and truncated human rights powers of real life, we now have a constitutional jurisprudence that respects both federalism and the hard won congressional powers to enforce human rights.

Like any counterfactual tale, this one can be challenged at numerous points. For one thing, how could the choice of a constitutional justification make such a big difference on the ground? Surely the economic, social, and political forces unleashed by economic depression and war would not have been redirected by a few words in some legal texts. My


628. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas argued that the Court should have upheld the Act’s application to a hotel and a lunch counter, both privately owned, on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 280 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg stated that Congress “clearly had authority” to regulate both enterprises under the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Commerce Clause. Id. at 293 (Goldberg, J., concurring).

In Daniel v. Paul, Justice Black dissented from the Court’s holding that a private amusement club could be regulated under the “affect[ing] commerce” rationale, but opined that he would have upheld the Act as applied to the club had it been based on the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Commerce Clause. 395 U.S. 298, 309 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting). See generally Gunther & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 205-06 (describing Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg’s views on the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment rationales for regulating private activity).


response to this objection is twofold. First, I take it that the capacity of words—especially words inscribed in legal texts—to affect social practice has been established by the explosion of scholarship on the power of legal narrative and symbolism. Words in legal texts can inspire social movement mobilization, dispense symbolic incentives, undermine the legitimacy of established social norms, and produce numerous other effects.631 The hypothetical story’s claim that the choice of the Thirteenth Amendment over the Commerce Clause would have contributed to labor movement mobilization and altered the dynamics of debate in legislative and judicial fora should not be controversial. The contrary claim—that the choice would have made little or no difference—casts not only Andrew Furuseth, but also Felix Frankfurter and his progressive legal allies, as lunatics fighting over nothing. Second, the changes in the hypothetical story as it runs up to the present—though huge to constitutional lawyers and, perhaps, to the labor movement—are not really so earth shaking overall. Aside from the narrowing of the Taft-Hartley Act, the results of past cases—as opposed to the constitutional rationales and doctrines—change mainly at the margins.632

Another objection comes from the opposite direction. If the choice of the Thirteenth Amendment would have made an important difference, it goes, then why wouldn’t the Supreme Court have resisted it more strongly than the commerce theory? And if so, then why were the progressive lawyers not justified in saving the labor movement from a doomed theory? There is, of course, no way of knowing for certain how the Court would have resolved the constitutionality of a Wagner Act grounded on the Thirteenth Amendment. It is conceivable that the combination of the sit-down strikes and the court packing plan—though forceful enough to induce a favorable holding under the Commerce


632. In the counterfactual scenario, Congress can no longer reach such local activities as a farmer producing wheat for his own dairy cows or, perhaps, an endangered species existing entirely within one state. (Most environmental regulations would be sustained on the theory that rivers, air currents, and aquifers cross state lines.) And Congress is no longer blocked from reaching gender-motivated violence or, for that matter, union violence against nonunion workers, which are already prohibited by state law. On the latter, compare the hypothetical result with United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 830, 835–36 (1983) (holding that § 1985(3), providing a federal cause of action against private conspiracies to deprive a person of civil rights, does not reach violent attacks by unionists on nonunion workers in part because the Thirteenth Amendment applied only to race, and that the nonunion workers’ First Amendment freedom to decline association with unionists was protected only against state action). In the hypothetical story, the Thirteenth Amendment would apply because labor freedom was involved, and there would be no state action requirement to limit the nonunion workers’ First Amendment claim.
Clause—would not have produced the same result under the Thirteenth Amendment. However, the available evidence suggests that the justices would not have rejected a congressional finding that rights of self-organization and collective action were essential to negate a condition of involuntary servitude. Just as the interconnectedness of the modern economy had become a commonplace, so had the idea that labor freedom necessarily included the rights to organize and strike. By 1937, this idea had been endorsed by Congress in the Norris-LaGuardia and Wagner Acts (which, in the hypothetical story, explicitly invoke the Thirteenth Amendment) and even by the Supreme Court, albeit in words rather than deeds. In contrast to the Commerce Clause theory, which had been repudiated in the recent and on point case of Carter v. Carter Coal Co., there was no explicit precedent standing in the way of the Thirteenth Amendment theory. It is true that the Thirteenth Amendment’s broad language could have raised fears of a new judicial activism akin to Lochner-era economic due process. But the Court could have calmed these fears by adopting—as in real life, it would three decades later—Andrew Furuseth’s position that the Court should defer to Congress’s rational judgment on the scope of the amendment. From our vantage point today, it is easy to forget that the majority justices of the late 1930s and early 1940s were comfortable asserting the constitutional rights of worker self-organization and collective action. In the process of upholding the Wagner Act against due process attack, they described the workers’ right to organize as “fundamental” and affirmed that “[u]nion was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with their employer.” Far from shying away from rights of collective labor action, the Court was seeking a textual home for them. In 1937, the Court asserted in dictum that workers enjoyed a First Amendment right to picket, and by 1941 it was enforcing the new right. The cause of labor rights was driving the resurgence of the First Amendment, and not the other

633. See supra Part IV.E.
634. Bernstein, New Deal, supra note 215, at 18–22 (documenting the rise of this idea and its adoption by legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies).
635. See supra text accompanying notes 67–69, 162, 188–190, 229.
636. 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (discussed supra notes 347–349); see supra text accompanying notes 195–195.
637. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968) (asserting that “[s]urely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and incidents of slavery”).
638. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937) (citing Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921)). The justices also went beyond deference to legislators to deplore the “exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position with respect to bargaining power.” West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (upholding state minimum wage law for women against due process challenge, and criticizing the “exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenceless against the denial of a living wage”).
639. See supra note 523.
way around. There is no reason to believe that—absent decades of relentless opposition from labor’s own legal allies—it could not have done the same for the Thirteenth Amendment.