Destructive Collectivism: Dodd-Frank Coordination and Clearinghouses

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DESTRUCTIVE COLLECTIVISM: DODD-FRANK COORDINATION AND CLEARINGHOUSES

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The recent financial crises have generated strenuous academic debates on the fundamental premises of market regulation. The interaction between the state and the market is at the core of this discourse. A plethora of postcrisis reforms threaten to undermine the historical monopoly of centralized regulators through more coordinated, “collectivist” approaches to capital market regulation. The dangers of this new collectivism are not fully explored in the current scholarship.

This Article questions the Dodd-Frank coordination mechanisms by demonstrating that crucial benefits may result from the predictability of a linear market-regulator interaction in a cooperative environment. An example of such a successful multiparty interaction is the traditional sector-specific regulatory regime in the clearing and settlement industry.

In clearing, the linear interaction between centralized regulators, such as the SEC, and clearinghouses was associated with market efficiencies, lower regulatory costs, and transaction cost reduction. The relationship was premised on several fundamental postulates, including principles-based regulations, a low frequency of enforcement actions, participatory corporate governance mechanisms that strengthened market self-regulation, a contestable monopoly organization of the industry, and the continuous judicial support of clearing and settlement utilities. To examine these postulates, this Article reviews the history of clearing regulations and forty years of pertinent case law and enforcement actions.

This Article suggests that Dodd-Frank has put forth a questionable approach to reforming—at the very least—successful industries, such as clearing, which were not

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directly implicated in the crisis. In clearing, Dodd-Frank coordination mechanisms should be invoked rarely, and only in cases where specific inefficiencies in the traditional sector-specific model explicitly undermine its benefits, including regulatory flexibility and cooperation between expert regulators and regulated industries.

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INTRODUCTION

Oh, no! Not another paper on the postcrisis swelling of an increasingly inefficient regulatory apparatus! Unfortunately, the topic has not been entirely exhausted yet as new regulations are still in the works and the consequences of the recently finalized ones will call for continuous research for years to come. Moreover, to the extent that the postcrisis reforms instill a new fundamental element into the regulatory fabric—cross-agency coordination that may erode the traditional interaction between individual agencies and the regulated markets—these issues must be addressed.

The post-2008 regulatory coordination evolved in response to the financial crisis and the crisis-driven ad hoc actions of the regulators, which have led to statutory changes and now inhere in the ensuing rules. The fundamental premise of the new rules is the presumptive
failure of individual functional regulators to grasp and evaluate the complexity of the modern financial markets. In this sense, coordination was viewed as the sine qua non of modern financial regulation.

Postcrisis policymaking has been equally informed by longstanding policy debates about not only improving interagency coordination, but also consolidating all or some regulators. In the end, however, statutes like Dodd-Frank stopped short of establishing a fully consolidated structure. Instead, Dodd-Frank promotes group decision making and increases the authority of the Federal Reserve, thus creating an underconsolidated but overcoordinated interagency structure.

In the now underconsolidated regulatory system, sector-specific, functional regulators remain the primary supervisory agencies of certain entities and industries. At the same time, their decisions and policies

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6 Id.
may be altered by other public players or groups of peer regulators. Generally, this may happen whenever a serious disagreement arises between the primary supervisory agency and other regulatory “parties in interest.” In fact, we are currently faced with a decision-making process involving several regulators with different, potentially mismatched, political and regulatory influences and expertise.

The principal example is the authority of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and the Federal Reserve (the Fed) vis-à-vis the jurisdiction of such sector-specific regulators as the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Fed or the FSOC, by definition a collegial edifice, in certain circumstances may influence and overrule the decisions of such expert regulators.

Another example is the European Union (EU), where the most extreme species of coordination have been thriving for some time. In the EU, various domestic entities are now operating on very uncertain jurisdictional turf. A number of large financial institutions are overseen by a concoction of national regulators, “colleges” of regulators, various stakeholders, and, at the top of the hierarchy, the EU authorities, including the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) or the European Central Bank.

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9 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 5462(1), 5462(8), 5463(a), 5463(c), 5464 (2012).

These new approaches will necessarily implicate the vast scholarship on group dynamics, “the influential actions, processes, and changes that occur within and between groups,” as stronger regulators or interagency coalitions influence weaker regulators. The new regulatory underconsolidation approach, which effectively goes beyond basic interagency coordination, and the mismatch between the actual power and expertise of the regulators within the groups may result in a number of disturbing outcomes. Cumulatively, this Article refers to those possible decision-making corollaries of the postcrisis coordination reforms as collectivism.

This Article discusses various aspects of collectivism in detail in Part II. In a nutshell, as a distinct regulatory risk, collectivism is predicated on group decision making, and simultaneously implicates regulatory coordination and accompanying rule harmonization, concepts thoroughly dissected by scholars and policy groups. For instance, the


It is debatable whether regulatory coordination and harmonization are always appropriate and fundamentally positive. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Coping in a Global Marketplace: Survival Strategies for a 75-Year-Old SEC, 95 VA. L. REV. 941, 978–85 (2009) (discussing the nature of the SEC’s responses to global trends and generally advocating a slower approach to some harmonization reforms such as accounting standards); Sean J. Griffith, Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk: How to Make a Global Market in Derivatives Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1291 (2014) (discussing alternative approaches, regulatory competition, and diversity arguments); Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2014) (emphasizing key downsides of harmonization); Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 327, 329–30, 346–47 (2011) (discussing the benefits and dangers of coordination, observing that coordination may “become a systemic risk,” and emphasizing with respect to the mandate of “the Oversight Council to assess the systemic
negative collectivist repercussions may manifest themselves through the unnecessarily amplified regulatory apparatus and through exacerbated regulatory procrastination. Likewise, the new interagency decision-making structure may compel the formerly more independent sector-specific agencies to avoid potential confrontation with the Fed and the Treasury—the strong members of the group. This may occur even if the “peers” of the sector-specific regulators do not have the same expertise in regulating an industry in question or equal political independence, viz., the congenital traits of independent agencies. In short, the obvious examples of the risk of collectivism are interagency friction and jawboning maneuvers of the stronger agencies.

The other natural outcomes are regressing toward the “regulatory mean,” even when more individual approaches to specific industries generate better outcomes, and, ultimately, inefficient regulations. An important aspect of this potential problem is limiting productive cooperation and information exchange between the market and the weakened expert regulators. In drafting regulations, the weaker regulators may pay less attention to the specific market’s needs and the consequences (and costs) of financial regulation and market standards that promote coordination that “[a] key question is whether, in line with the Act, regulators will balance coordination’s benefits against its costs in developing new systemic risk regulation”); see also COMM. ON THE GLOB. FIN. SYS., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, CGFS PAPERS NO 41: LONG-TERM ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING 31 (2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs41.pdf (cautioning that in banking, although “regulation has an important role to play in fostering cross-border knowledge transfer[,] the end result . . . should not be the convergence to a single risk assessment or risk management framework, which would encourage herd behaviour and weaken financial stability. Since any given framework is inevitably imperfect, diversity of approaches would carry large benefits”).

Sometimes, however, national regulators must either respond to coordination and harmonization or risk putting domestic entities at a disadvantage. See, e.g., Letter from Larry E. Thompson, Managing Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., to Kevin M. O’Neill, Deputy Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1–2 (May 27, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-14/s70314-16.pdf (providing comments on the proposed rules on covered clearinghouses).

There is at least a possibility of such prospective compliance in salient political matters. See, e.g., Bressman & Thompson, supra note 7, at 645–46 (“To date, the Secretary of the Treasury has not intervened in SEC decisions often enough to establish a pattern. . . . Even a one-time occurrence demonstrates a possibility that in theory may have seemed incompatible with agency independence.”).

Indeed, expertise sets independent sector-specific agencies apart from more generalist entities or the executive branch. See, e.g., id. at 612–15; Fisch, supra note 4, at 823 (“Despite the SEC’s recent shortcomings, its history as Wall Street’s most effective enforcer, coupled with its expertise at designing and enforcing disclosure requirements, make it the most plausible candidate for the job.”); Jonathan S. Masar & Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition Relief, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 448–49 (2010) (discussing the pertinent pros and cons); Seligman, supra note 4, at 674–79 (discussing the importance of agency expertise); see also Fabrizio Gilardi, The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Capitalism: The Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Mar. 2005, at 84, 84–85 (discussing, generally, political uncertainty issues and the related justifications for the establishment of independent agencies).
information input from those specific industries, and instead, promulgate average rules and regulations.

Self-evidently, when a regulatory reform creates additional risks, including the risk of collectivism, the reform must be justified by offsetting economic and regulatory benefits. A regulation triggered by a financial crisis and concomitant regulatory failures seems like a straightforward example—a policymaker may rationally expect that the costs of similar regulatory and economic failures in the future, ex hypothesi, are likely to exceed the price tag and risks associated with the new regulations. However, if the regulations overturn a previously successful and efficient market-regulator arrangement (i.e., when a regulated industry and its supervising agency have not failed), it should be much harder to make a case for the new rules. Changing the regulatory status quo in that case does not intuitively generate conclusive net benefits.

This Article examines such a scenario. To demonstrate the collectivist risks and potential redundancy of Dodd-Frank overcoordination, the Article juxtaposes it with an effective approach applied in a specific financial industry—the clearing and settlement (C&S) industry. C&S institutions are the crucial and indispensable infrastructure undergirding all modern financial markets. Clearinghouses operate as central conduits transferring assets and securities among trading parties, to wit, they perform post-trade operations when two counterparties have entered into an agreement. This critical industry is deeply affected by the new coordinative decision making and, hence, potentially exposed to collectivism. The new rules tie together the jurisdiction and philosophy of several regulators, including, inter alia, the SEC, the CFTC, and the Fed. The Article demonstrates that such “innovation” may be suboptimal.

The principal reason is that, as I show in this Article, the SEC, acting as a centralized, functional regulator, was able to forge a remarkably successful cooperation with the clearing industry in the securities and options markets. In doing so, it followed the industry’s lead and promoted the best practices suggested by the industry in the

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16 See Standards for Covered Clearing Agencies, 79 Fed. Reg. at 29511–13 (discussing coordination policies); Omarova, supra note 8, at 151–57.

17 See discussion infra Section II.B, Parts III–IV.
first place. The relationship between the regulator and the regulated was
unidirectional (i.e., it was primarily between the SEC and the clearing
agencies). In other words, it was linear.

The Article will identify the four postulates and principles of this
successful linear interaction model. Within this unidirectional model,
the sector-specific regulator relied heavily on clearinghouses’ initiatives
and provided constructive support to the ongoing market evolution.

Such cooperative interaction between one regulator, the SEC, and one
regulated market not only targeted regulatory inefficiencies but also
contributed to the clearing industry progress, low costs, and dynamic
efficiency.

Various studies confirm the comparative cost efficiency of U.S.
C&S facilities vis-à-vis those in other jurisdictions, including European
markets, where regulations are much more fragmented and at the

18 In a nutshell, the first postulate was the efficiency-maximizing regulatory flexibility and
principles-based regulations, strengthening the operational discretion and freedom granted to
clearing agencies in shaping their internal policies. Over the course of almost forty years, the
SEC operated as a relatively predictable umbrella regulator. Its principles-based policies focused
on the standards that generally complied with what the market itself demanded of
clearinghouses. As such, the regulations were framed within the market-regulator, impetus-
reform pattern. The second supporting postulate was the noninterventionist enforcement
policies of the SEC. Third, the regulator-market interaction relied on the predictability of
litigation outcomes and dispute resolution. The assembled database of all cases involving C&S
facilities illustrates an unequivocal and almost invariable judicial support of clearinghouses and
significant deference to the pertinent SEC regulations. Finally, the market-regulator
equilibrium was reached through continuous market self-monitoring through the participatory

corporate governance mechanisms. Its structural support beam was the contestable monopoly
pressures within the industry. See infra Section II.B.

19 In this sense, I agree with Manne and Zywicki who build on Alchian’s evolutionary
model and distinguish between absolute inefficiency and relative efficiency of market
arrangements. The difference is, of course, that the equilibrium discussed in this Article
incorporates the SEC as an additional evolutionary actor. Geoffrey A. Manne & Todd J.
Zywicki, Uncertainty, Evolution and Behavioral Economic Theory, 10 J.L. ECON. & POLY 555,
557 n.7, 560 (2014).

20 See discussion infra Part II.

21 See e.g., EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE 55–57 (2010),
(mentioning higher C&S costs within the EU); NERA ECON. CONSULTING, THE DIRECT COSTS
www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/business/economic-research-and-information/research-publications/
Serifsoy & Marco Weiß, Settling for Efficiency—A Framework for the European Securities
Transaction Industry, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 3034, 3035 (2007) (mentioning that the European
market was at a relative disadvantage because of higher costs); Patrick van Cayseele & Raad
voor de Mededinging, Competition and the Organisation of the Clearing and Settlement
Industry 8–9 (Ctr. for Econ. Studies, Discussions Paper Series No. 04.13, 2004), http://

In the past several years, the costs in the EU have been steadily decreasing. See, e.g., OXERA
CONSULTING, MONITORING PRICES, COSTS AND VOLUMES OF TRADING AND POST-TRADING
2011_oxera_study_en.pdf. However, a number of structural problems remain and it is
same time more collectivist than in the United States. European researchers naturally look to the U.S. experience for guidance in policymaking. Similarly, while several clearinghouses around the world fell at different points in time, the U.S. clearing industry has shown strong survival skills and, most importantly, performed well during the recent crisis.

Considering these arguments and the dangers of collectivism, this Article will suggest that Dodd-Frank put forth a questionable approach to reforming—at the very least—successful industries, which were not implicated in the crisis. Unnecessary reforms make industry success stories transitory as compliance costs go up. There are already reasons to believe that clearing costs may be increasing due to the new


22 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.


The European regulators and C&S facilities replicated some SEC reforms, including, for instance, clearinghouse interoperability and transparency, as a direct result of which, post-trading fees have decreased, almost reaching U.S. levels. See, e.g., MIKE REECE, J.P. MORGAN, COMPETITION OR CONSOLIDATION? THE OUTLOOK FOR INTEROPERABILITY AMONG EUROPEAN CCPs (2012), https://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/BlobServer/Competition_or_Consolidation__The_Outlook_for_Interoperability_Among_European_CCps.pdf?blobkey=id&blobwhere=132059706572&blobheader=application/pdf&blobheadername1=Cache-Control&blobheadervalue1=private&blobcol=urldata&blottable=MungoBlobs; Albanese, supra note 21, at 69–70.

Higher costs and the expanding palette of global markets may break the already faltering leadership of U.S. trading venues. These are the crucial reasons to caution postcrisis regulators against unnecessary tempering with the long-term status quo in cases where a cooperative market-regulator relationship existed before the crisis.

This Article proceeds as follows: Parts I and II outline potential problems associated with collectivism and set forth the four postulates (i.e., the fundamental principles) of the traditional cooperative model in the clearing and settlement industry. Part III provides illustrations of the model’s postulates and reviews the C&S industry’s structure, risks, and the existing risk-mitigation arrangements. Part IV discusses ex post “regulatory reaction” (i.e., enforcement actions and pertinent case law). It reviews major SEC actions and all cases involving clearing institutions. Part V contrasts the new reforms with the traditional four-postulate equilibrium.

I. COORDINATION AND COLLECTIVISM

Regulatory systems may be classified along various dimensions. In summary, the major taxonomies of regulatory approaches are as follows: (1) mandatory and monopolistic or competitive; (2) harmonized or uniquely divergent, an ever more unusual characteristic; and (3) diffused along industry functions (i.e., sector-specific and institutional) or integrated under the umbrella of a single regulator or two regulators. The mechanics and pros and cons of these approaches have been extensively explored in the literature.

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25 Some of these processes in clearing may already be happening. See, e.g., 2014 OCC Letter, supra note 24, at 13 (mentioning that the OCC eliminated certain fee discounts to increase its liquid net assets under the new rules).


The risk of collectivism is a derivative of several approaches. Recall that this Article generally defines collectivism as a destructive outgrowth of rule harmonization, excessive regulatory coordination, and the power of a third regulator or a number of regulators to intervene and change that need regulation the most—will make the choices that are not socially desirable”); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992) (discussing the race for the top and the race for the bottom arguments, as well as managers’ opportunistism); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Essay, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002) (discussing why state competition can lead to inefficient results); James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200 (1999) (criticizing regulatory competition arguments and advocating a more coordinated approach with the leadership of the SEC); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999) (discussing the bias towards underdisclosure and generally making a case for mandatory, centralized regulations to provide disclosure at the optimal level); Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775 (2006) (focusing on the reputational constraints of the capital market gatekeepers and the need for a strong regulatory agency); Frederick Tung, From Monopolists to Markets?: A Political Economy of Issuer Choice in International Securities Regulation, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 1363, 1384–92, 1431 (discussing the race to the top and the race to the bottom arguments, as well as providing harmonization supporting arguments); Frederick Tung, Lost in Translation: From U.S. Corporate Charter Competition to Issuer Choice in International Securities Regulation, 39 GA. L. REV. 525 (2005) (distinguishing the charter competition from other areas of law on the grounds of, inter alia, the adaptation of the regulators and the regulated to a monopoly environment, expertise of the local interest groups).


The final dimension of this debate is regulatory consolidation versus the “legacy approach” to regulation, i.e., institutional, functional, and sector-specific regulation. See generally GRP. OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION, supra note 3, at 33–39 (assessing the four structural approaches to financial supervision); Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum—Out of Many, One: Why the United States Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1 (2005); Elizabeth F. Brown, A Comparison of the Handling of the Financial Crisis in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, 55 VILL. L. REV. 509 (2010); Cunningham & Zaring, supra note 1, at 42, 51, 112–13 (mentioning that there are traditional benefits associated with fragmentation); David T. Llewellyn, Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The Basic Issues, in ALIGNING FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY STRUCTURES WITH COUNTRY NEEDS 17 (Jeffrey Carmichael et al. eds., 2004) (suggesting more consolidated approaches in light of the expanding nature of the financial industry); Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 36 (2010) (arguing against the functional approach and advocating for a more holistic one).
the policies of an expert regulator. As discussed, *collectivism* may be
described as a regulatory risk of a decision-making system where a more
powerful agency or a group of agencies may impel a less influential
regulator to unnecessarily modify its rules and regress to the mean (i.e.,
to average and generic rules). *Collectivism* thus may result in
unnecessary regulations, which are not based on either the better
expertise of individual regulators or the industry needs.

Arguably, without destructive collectivist consequences,
coordination and harmonization may be defended on the grounds of
reducing information losses, regulators’ “myopia,” and regulatory
arbitrage. For one, a reduction in information asymmetry may ensure a
smooth and well-informed regulatory intervention, particularly, during
or before a crisis. 28 Indeed, fragmented agencies, such as the SEC, were
blindsided by the systemic risk posed by the multifaceted operations of
some financial institutions in 2007–2008. The crisis also highlighted the
fact that market actors simply do not always act in a manner consistent
with social welfare maximization and are prone to avoid regulations in
order to reduce associated costs. 29

Sometimes, mistakes happen regardless of the specific firms’
incentives, as multiple individual—but interconnected—financial firms
adroitly misprice negative externalities in selecting optimal risk
levels. 30 Thus, due to information losses, the interconnected nature of
modern financial institutions, and their misbehavior, enhanced systemic
supervision and some sort of interagency coordination or consolidation
may be warranted. 31

28 See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, *Must Financial Crisis Be this Frequent and this Painful*, in
the lack of information in the market and justification for some form of government
intervention).

29 See, e.g., Coffee & Sale, *supra* note 4, at 731–40 (discussing the crisis, investment banks’
preference for the relaxed SEC supervision under the Consolidated Supervised Entity Program,
and inadequate oversight issues); Cunningham & Zaring, *supra* note 1, at 59–69 (discussing
market failures and ex post regulatory responses); Gadinis, *supra* note 7, at 346–48 (reviewing
some examples of market failures); Patricia A. McCoy et al., *Systemic Risk Through
Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure*, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1343–
63 (2009) (emphasizing the continuous origination of risky mortgages against insufficient
regulatory supervision).

30 See, e.g., Whitehead, *supra* note 12, at 358.

31 See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT, *supra* note 3; Coffee & Sale, *supra* note 4,
 at 738–49, 774–79 (discussing the Consolidated Supervised Entity Program, the SEC’s
insufficient expertise to oversee major investment banks, and regulatory consolidation
arguments); Cunningham & Zaring, *supra* note 1, at 51 (“A fragmented structure may enable
authorities to respond to discrete institutional failures using tailored tools, but it may also blind
senior regulators to important systemic risks that lead to widespread crisis. The question
becomes the net value of disaggregation, an industry-by-industry focus, and redundancy with
gaps, or whether consolidation is likely to result in better regulatory performance in crises, as
by reducing their magnitude or duration.”). Acknowledging these structural issues, many
Yet one must acknowledge that having a more consolidated or coordinated regulatory system is not a supervisory panacea for reducing information losses. Consider, for instance, that the Fed’s authority had been expanded already in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley-Act era.32 Yet it missed the impending crisis, just like the sector-specific SEC. Similarly, the EU experience has demonstrated that integrated and twin peaks approaches to financial supervision do founder. The integrated regulators in Europe failed to insulate their financial markets from being engulfed by the crisis and to detect systemic risk before the crisis hit. Later on, they did not fare better than the more fragmented U.S. regulators in their response to the financial calamity.33

Perhaps a more important theoretical concern is that coordination, consolidation, and harmonization are not bound to reduce information losses or to improve regulatory oversight. Obviously, all regulatory agencies, consolidated or fragmented, may be castigated as imperfect and occasionally myopic.34 More importantly, if a regulatory system is monopolistic, coordinated, and harmonized, and at the same time lacks continuous market input, it may be inferior to regulatory competition and diversity of approaches, become a source of deadweight losses, or propagate systemic mistakes among subscribers to a centralized or harmonized regime.35 In addition, in the words of Charles Whitehead, harmonized approaches may channel disastrous market behaviors through “destructive coordination.”36 The information loss explanation and the better-coordinated oversight story, therefore, are not


32 See, e.g., McCoy et al., supra note 29, at 1344–51 (discussing the two-sided effect of the statutory reform on the authority and functions of the Fed, as well as related ideological blinders).

33 One may doubt whether regulatory consolidation equals systemic risk “prescience.” See, e.g., GRP. OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION, supra note 3, at 49 (mentioning the problems experienced by the United Kingdom, a country with a more consolidated oversight structure, and observing that that “notwithstanding its somewhat dated and complex regulatory structure, U.S. regulators have been viewed by some as responding in a timely and aggressive manner to recent conditions”); Cunningham & Zaring, supra note 1, at 108–09 (“[E]xperience does not demonstrate superiority of the two-peaks model compared to alternatives, including the battle-tested traditional fragmented U.S. approach.”).

34 For instance, regulators may, inter alia, ignore or miss the red flags raised by researchers, the propensity emphasized in a study by Macey and O’Hara. See Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Essay, Regulation and Scholarship: Constant Companions or Occasional Bedfellows?, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 89 (2009).

35 See generally Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 27; Whitehead, supra note 12; Romano, Iron Law of Financial Regulation, supra note 2.

36 See generally Whitehead, supra note 12.
irrefragable. Yet, after Dodd-Frank, regulators seem to have presumed these benefits of harmonization and coordination without question, as nearly axiomatic.37

As mentioned above, the second key argument in defense of consolidation and harmonization is the race to the bottom and regulatory arbitrage concerns.38 For the purposes of this analysis, that scholarship may be distinguished. The historical stability of the model presented in this Article and the limited role of clearinghouses as financial market utilities, serving predominantly domestic trading, suggest that these processes may be controlled by internal mechanisms. Thus, the arbitrage and race to the bottom phenomena are less likely than in some other industries.39

Now, let us turn to the potential collectivist dangers of Dodd-Frank overcoordination. Consider first that in attempting to mitigate the flaws of sector-based regulations, Dodd-Frank stops short of consolidating the regulatory system. Leaving aside for the moment the innate pros and cons of consolidation, it should follow naturally that a less consolidated organizational structure may reduce information losses less than a fully consolidated one. What if instead of battling myopia, the new decision-making rules entail regulatory procrastination due to the sequential involvement of several agencies and increased coordination costs?40 On balance, this result is also possible.

Second, in the extreme scenario, the multiactor regulatory edifice may fall prey to the “regulatory commons problem,” a “political economic incentive[]...to leave social ills unaddressed” in a multilayered legal system.41 Dodd-Frank’s mandate to work together on curing social ills may not entirely remove the regulators’ natural propensity to shirk for political and other reasons in a multilayered,


38 See, e.g., id. at 29577–29590; Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2012) (discussing, generally, the notion of regulatory arbitrage and how arbitrage may in certain cases reduce social welfare); Johnson, Regulatory Arbitrage, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, and Dodd-Frank, supra note 27; 2013 CFTC Press Release, supra note 27.

39 See, e.g., Yadav & Turing, supra note 10, at 38 (suggesting similarly that the differences in regulations are more likely to lead to market choices than a true race to the bottom).

40 For a review of the prohibitive coordination costs, and integrated regulation benefits and downsides arguments, see, for example, Dan Awrey, The FSA, Integrated Regulation, and the Curious Case of OTC Derivatives, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1, 9–17 (2010); see also Bressman & Thompson, supra note 7, at 615 (“Political pressure might cause the SEC to steer securities policy away from the SROs toward federal intervention. Or it might cause the SEC to delay when federal intervention is necessary to prod the SROs.”); William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 36 (2003) (discussing the coordination costs).

41 Buzbee, supra note 40, at 5.
underconsolidated system. Consequently, on the one hand, experience demonstrates that consolidation is no panacea. On the other hand, underconsolidation poses dangers of its own.

In addition to the foregoing dangers, the reforms do not fully address a host of behavioral and structural issues highlighted by previous research. Those problems range from the cognitive limitations and behavioral biases of the regulators, their propensity to preserve the status quo and potential industry capture, to their lack of resources and expertise contrasted with the market self-regulatory and institutional mechanisms.

For instance, as I further show in this Article, the pressures of Dodd-Frank collectivism are forcing the SEC to reduce the clearing industry’s discretion. Alas, less discretion may be correlated with a reduced self-regulatory potential and may stifle market experimentation. Similarly, the regulatory capture risk may be aggravated by the involvement of the Treasury and politicians in the actions of the formerly independent agencies. Namely, while “a regime that puts politicians at the helm creates greater incentives for financial firms to strengthen their relationships with future regulators,”

42 Id. at 49–51.


independent agencies, by contrast, are bound by explicit rules of administrative law. They, ex hypothesi, may be less susceptible to selective favoritism.46

If stronger and more politically influential agencies within a group are “captured,” two scenarios are plausible: The leaders may not promote regulations objectively needed by the weaker members. Namely, if the strong members are captured by wrong private constituencies, the outsiders will have to live with the rules tailored to and by those constituencies. The second issue is that the information input from the outsiders will be either lost or improperly integrated within the “captured” regulations.

Finally, the group dynamics of Dodd-Frank overcoordination may theoretically open the door to possible jawboning and maneuvering by the more politically influential agencies, such as the Treasury and the Fed. The mirror image of this problem is the SEC’s regulatory concessions and political strategizing in an attempt to avoid confrontation. Previous research suggests these possible complications.47 As I explore in Part V, the SEC is already making such concessions and modifying its rules in accordance with the policies of third-party regulators, often without providing cogent explanations of the need for the changes.

The other facet of the same trend is possible coalition building within the FSOC itself and its effect on individual agencies, which are weaker group members. Different sector-based regulators, in theory, may engage in lobbying efforts in order to promote their individual philosophies and agendas.48

By way of example, as discussed further in this Article, the CFTC’s and the SEC’s approaches to regulating clearinghouses differ in the level of their rigidity and prescriptiveness. The SEC remains more principles based, which the major clearinghouses acknowledge and welcome.49 In case of an extreme disagreement, the specter of regulatory turf wars and

46 See, e.g., Cunningham & Zaring, supra note 1, at 50; Gadinis, supra note 7, at 386 (discussing the Wall Street bailouts and mentioning that “[b]ureaucrats, whether public-interest-minded civil servants striving to implement technical orthodoxies or biased sheriffs fresh out of the industry’s revolving door, are supposed to follow rules and procedures and to apply them uniformly to all participants in the industry,” while politicians are more prone to building “diverse alliances”); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559; 561–570a (2012).

47 See, e.g., Bressman & Thompson, supra note 7, at 643–46 (reviewing instances of political influence); Gadinis, supra note 7, at 370 (discussing the pivotal role of the Treasury Secretary in the FSOC).

48 See, e.g., Bressman & Thompson, supra note 7, at 643 (expressing similar concerns regarding the first proposals by the Obama Administration and noting that “[w]hen agencies like the SEC and the CFTC split on an issue, each will seek to persuade others on the council to support its position. It seems likely that the Secretary will be first among equals in this setting”).

49 See discussion infra Part V.
coalition building may loom on the horizon, urging a rational policymaker to promote peace.

To this end, an agency may purposely regress to the mean and promulgate generic rules that are acceptable to all regulators. In this process, the agency may perforce or inadvertently disregard the crucial information input provided by the regulated market. Part V will provide examples of such first “average” regulations.

Current overcoordination coupled with the effective veto power of the Fed and the FSOC over the decisions of sector-specific regulators seem to invite all of these problems. Hence, the Dodd-Frank decision making may produce collectivist repercussions undermining the Act’s intended value as a coordination and information device, solidifying “average” and unnecessary regulations, and curtailing market discretion. The costs of these repercussions may exceed the expected economic benefits of the new rules, particularly in cases where a precrisis regulatory approach did not explicitly call for reform in the first place.

Although developing a solution is beyond the scope of this Article, a brief sketch of some ideas may be instructive. Namely, it would be better if the reformers promoted less intrusive coordination and information-sharing devices. For instance, the President’s Working Group had been in existence long before Dodd-Frank,50 and indeed helped sector-specific regulators and the Fed improve communication during the crisis.51 Building on these information exchange mechanisms among various sector-based independent agencies and the Fed, and promoting basic cooperation, may be preferable to more intrusive overcoordinated decision making.

Unfortunately, these changes require statutory action, which is currently unlikely. A simpler way to address the problem is through policy signaling. The Fed—and by extension the FSOC—may deliberately signal that it would exercise its statutory authority and intervene in sector-specific rulemaking only in extreme circumstances.

Similarly, expert agencies, such as the SEC, must ensure that the post–Dodd-Frank changes do not spill over into the regulation of successful financial industries that were not the root causes of the crisis. Those precrisis regulations that were traditionally based on an efficient interaction between the SEC, as an individual functional regulator, and the regulated industries have to be preserved and guarded against either

51 Cunningham & Zaring, supra note 1, at 77–79 (discussing the input of the Group and its coordinating activities during the 2008 crisis).
the influence of other sector-specific regulators, such as the CFTC, or the Fed. An example of such an industry is clearinghouses.

II. THE FOUR POSTULATES OF A SUCCESSFUL LINEAR MARKET-REGULATOR COOPERATION

A. Clearing and Settlement

The C&S industry is uniquely situated in the postcrisis era: It was not among the underlying causes of the crisis and yet it is affected by the resultant regulations. Therefore, the industry represents a perfect natural experiment where the logic of pre- and postcrisis regulations can be evaluated impartially. To put it plainly, choosing clearing and settlement as an example allowed me to focus on the actual dynamics of the pre- and postcrisis interactions between the regulators and the clearinghouses. Accordingly, we may disregard the political sentiment and inefficiencies associated with the typical crisis culprits like credit default swaps, failed investment banks, or mortgage-backed securities.52

Despite their somewhat low profile during the crisis, clearinghouses are among the major and most important market participants. Indeed, when traders enter into transactions, each transaction must be cleared and settled. “Clearing” of securities and derivatives trades is a complicated process, which involves trade processing, comparison, matching, confirmation, registration, netting, and risk management, including collateralization and margining.53

Many clearing institutions are “central counterparties” (CCPs), which offer a variety of services that streamline the clearing process.54 CCPs’ principal services include, inter alia, contractual novation,55 multilateral netting services,56 and risk management through collateral

52 See, e.g., Coffee & Sale, supra note 4, at 731–48; Gadinis, supra note 7, at 345–51 (discussing various failed institutions and related policy concerns).
55 CPSS-IOSCO, PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES, supra note 12, at 9.
and margin requirements, participation standards, and guarantee funds. Importantly, a CCP acts as a buyer and seller in each trade and substitutes itself for the original counterparties.

Another side of C&S is "settlement," "the process whereby parties discharge their contractual obligations to pay cash or deliver securities" or other assets. In the securities markets, settlement and depository services are facilitated by central securities depositories (CSDs), which interface with CCPs.

All these financial market infrastructures are "clearing agencies." The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) defines a clearing agency as "any person who acts as an intermediary . . . in connection with transactions in securities or who provides facilities for comparison . . . , to reduce the number of settlements . . . or for the allocation of securities settlement responsibilities." 60

The current policy consensus is that centralized clearing infrastructures are more efficient risk bearers and more transparent and cost-efficient conduits than contracting parties settling their trades. To recap, the pertinent risk-management mechanisms range from setting membership standards, collecting collateral, establishing default funds, netting, and reducing payment demands on members, to monitoring their conduct.62


58 Pirrong, supra note 57, at 8.


61 See, e.g., Standards for Covered Clearing Agencies, 79 Fed. Reg. at 29510–11, 29511–13, 29522–23, 29585; BAGLIONI & HAMAU, supra note 23, at 7 (discussing the benefits of a single clearinghouse); CPSS-IOSCO, PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES, supra note 12, at 8–9; Knott & Mills, supra note 57 (generally discussing risk management procedures
At the same time, centralized clearing poses a number of profound risks. Whenever C&S services are concentrated or interconnected, the risks of CCPs and related depositories are potentially massive. For instance, recall that a CCP provides a guarantee of trade completion to buyers and sellers. Hence, while CCPs mitigate the counterparty risk, they also mutualize and concentrate risks and may expose nondefaulting participants to other members’ defaults. Considerable market disruptions may follow if risks are improperly managed, particularly, by sizeable clearinghouses. Consider, for instance, what might happen in the case of the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC), a large holding company for clearing agencies, which “reported processing $1.6 quadrillion in transactions in 2012.”

Mismanagement of risk may result from typical endogenous causes, such as moral hazard or flawed corporate governance, and from exogenous events, including court decisions or regulatory reforms. By way of example, as emphasized in a CCP’s affidavit submitted in a 1987...
Delaware case, unwinding $1.6 billion of trades in the securities of a
tender offer target could result in a massive market disruption and
losses to unrelated third parties participating in the largest CCP in the
United States.66

Liquidity problems and potential contagion of defaults are other
concomitant concerns.67 Another powerful argument is that centralized
clearing may fail to ensure proper risk monitoring, while external
market monitoring may be potentially weakened by moral hazard and
adverse selection.68

These and other germane concerns, such as systemic risk
accumulation, have long been recognized by scholars and regulators.69
Most importantly, clearinghouses traditionally have adequately dealt
with these perils. Even the SEC itself acknowledges that the industry is
functioning well.70

In fact, international policymakers, the drafters of Dodd-Frank,
and the EU are betting on the clearinghouse expansion as a panacea of
sorts. The way international and national regulators seem to grapple
with the clearing-related issues in the wake of the 2008 debacle is

2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 1987). The case involved the National Securities Clearing Corporation
(NSCC).


68 See, e.g., Bernanke, supra note 62, at 141–44 (discussing various risks and comparing
clearinghouse monitoring and safety nets in light of idiosyncratic and systematic risks); Griffith, supra note 12, at 1344–62 (reviewing, generally, regulatory issues, moral hazard, and
regulatory and institutional alternatives); Johnson, supra note 24, at 225–28; Craig Pirrong, The
1695 (discussing risk monitoring and transparency concerns).

69 It was acknowledged already in the 1980s that “[t]he integrity and efficiency of the U.S.
clearing and settlement systems [are] important to both its internal financial and economic
stability and its ability to compete with other nations.” OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-
example, remarked that his “experience with financial crises has convinced [him] that the
greatest threat to the liquidity of our financial markets is the potential for disturbances to the
clearance and settlement processes for financial transactions.” Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Financial Markets Conference of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (Mar. 3, 1995); see also Clearing Agency Standards, Exchange
C.F.R. pt. 240); Johnson, supra note 24, at 218.

twofold. First, international policymakers and Congress have mandated the clearing of some over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, such as swaps, through centralized clearinghouses.\footnote{Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 701–774, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641–1803 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). For an overview of the regulations, see, for example, Yadav & Turing, supra note 10, at 1–2, 16–17.} Second, Dodd-Frank has also created ”systemically important” financial market utilities (FMUs) and has authorized the Federal Reserve to oversee risk management standards of such institutions, including large C&S entities.\footnote{See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 5464–5465 (2012); Standards for Covered Clearing Agencies, 79 Fed. Reg. at 29512–13.}

The SEC and the CFTC must now create a common framework for clearing, in consultation with the Fed.\footnote{See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 5464–5468, 5470–5472 (providing for a common framework for designated clearing entity risk management and consultations with the Board of Governors); see also Risk Management Supervision of Designated Clearing Entities, supra note 8, at 3, 9.} Moreover, should the Fed and the SEC differ on certain requirements, and if the Fed believes that such requirements “are insufficient to prevent or mitigate significant liquidity, credit, operational, or other risks to the financial markets or to the financial stability of the United States,”\footnote{12 U.S.C. § 5464(a)(2)(B).} the disagreements between the prudential requirements of the Fed and the SEC may ultimately be resolved by an affirmative vote of the Financial Stability Oversight Council.\footnote{See, e.g., id. § 5464(a); see also Risk Management Supervision of Designated Clearing Entities, supra note 8; Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act, Board Governors Fed. Res. Sys., http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/title-viii-dfa.htm (last updated Jan. 29, 2015).} The regulatory turf and authority of the SEC, the CFTC, and the Fed have thus become more closely entwined.


Both of the new regulatory approaches (i.e., the centralized clearing of OTC derivatives and regulatory overcoordination) may be unduly overrated. Scholars, such as Roe\footnote{Roe, supra note 54.} and Griffith,\footnote{Griffith, supra note 12.} have already addressed
the potential ramifications of the new derivatives clearing regime. This
Article will review the issue from a different vantage point, focusing on
the second prong of the reforms: the relationship of the modern
overcoordination and potential collectivism to sector-specific regulatory
arrangements in the traditional, non-OTC-derivatives clearing.

B. The Four Postulates of an Efficient Market-Regulator Interaction

In C&S, the interaction between the SEC and clearing agencies
before Dodd-Frank was inherently cooperative and principles based.
This Section begins with a brief outline of the indispensable postulates
of this cooperative model. The analysis in Part III below will provide
eamples of the application of this successful market-regulator model.

1. Postulate I

The sector-specific regulator should require the industry to
promote the standards that more or less closely mirror the preferences
of multiple stakeholders in the financial industry, including broker-
dealers, exchanges, investors, clearinghouses themselves, and others. As
discussed further in Part III, the SEC has done just that. Germane
examples include requirements such as the fair representation of
participants in the management of C&S entities and the establishment
of nondiscriminatory clearing standards for all members of the
clearinghouses.81 Most requirements were embedded in generalized
principles derived from earlier industry experiments. In a somewhat
Hayekian way, the mandatory requirements were sufficiently general
and principles-based in order to allow room for maneuvering and
industry experimentation. Under these conditions, the pre-2008 reforms
avoided the crisis-driven overregulation problems82 and merely
motivated the legislature to entrust the regulators with the necessary
supervisory authority.

2. Postulate II

The regulator should abstain from frequent and trivial
encroachments on the industry’s structure and operations. To

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82 See generally Romano, Iron Law of Financial Regulation, supra note 2 (discussing,
generally, overregulation concerns).
demonstrate this trend, this Article will review the enforcement actions brought by the SEC against clearinghouses in the past forty years.

3. Postulate III

Market entities must signal to the market and the regulator that they are adequately self-regulated. One way to do that is through participatory corporate governance mechanisms. Clearing agencies operate within a multistakeholder model of corporate governance, fermenting collective decision making through participation of various interest groups, such as broker-dealers, exchanges, self-regulatory organizations, and others.

This, in theory, sends a strong signal to the market. It allows the industry to obviate the Berle and Means dilemmas (i.e., dispersed ownership, control, and oversight issues typically associated with large corporations), or the problems attributed to vertical silos, viz., scenarios when exchanges directly own clearing subsidiaries and may influence or control their decisions to the detriment of the market and clearing participants.83

An example of a multistakeholder model is the DTCC, whose board of directors includes representatives of various types of users of the DTCC’s services, exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), an independent securities regulator.84

This participatory structure also must have had a direct effect on the interaction between the regulator and C&S facilities. Based on the positive and reliable signals produced by corporate governance mechanisms, the regulator could rest assured that those who bear the risks of C&S operations (i.e., clearinghouse participants) and FINRA had both incentives and an opportunity to closely supervise the entities, ward off potential misbehavior, and demand product and policy improvements.

A positive externality of such multistakeholder corporate signaling is the minimization of the potential risk of monopoly in clearing where a high level of market concentration is often an optimal solution. Namely, the economics of networks and resultant positive network externalities dictate that post-trading services be more consolidated rather than more dispersed.85 Market entities, in pursuit of economies of

83 Even though vertical silos are not necessarily inferior to other ownership models, the major enforcement actions discussed in this Article were brought against silos. See infra Part IV.

84 See infra Section III.C.

85 See, e.g., BAGLIONI & HAMAUI, supra note 23, at 8.
scale, often converge into one single player or into a concentrated group of players. A corollary is the need to control for monopoly risks, which in turn partially depends on the reliability of the foregoing corporate governance mechanisms.

The second prong of this Postulate is potential competitive pressures. Competition in C&S is not entirely foreclosed. Other entities have an opportunity to join the C&S industry (i.e., the market is contestable). It is highly concentrated and all entities are reputable long-term players closely monitored by both the SEC and their own participants. Historically, in this regulated quasi monopoly, the barriers to entry, or, to be more precise, the economic costs associated with the entry as distinguished from the regulatory costs of entry, were high. Yet other entities could still join the market.

An example is the pressure exerted by the Nasdaq’s plan to develop a clearing facility rival to that of the DTCC, and the DTCC’s resultant response in the form of better service and price terms. This incident exemplifies, inter alia, how dynamic efficiency was achieved within the currently highly concentrated C&S market.

In a sense, natural market selection has created a highly concentrated industry model. Even though perfect competition is usually a first-best outcome, strong economies of scale in C&S dictated a different industry structure. Using the formula of Alchian, built upon by Manne and Zywicki, the clearing market is still subject to potential “evolutionary market pressures,” undermining “sustained monopoly power.”

In summary, from a purely statutory and economic perspective, the SEC-regulated clearinghouses operate in an imperfectly contestable monopoly environment, are monitored by a variety of constituencies through a participatory corporate governance model, and ultimately,

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87 See, e.g., van Cayseele & voor de Mededinging, supra note 21, at 14–15 (discussing the contestable market theory, related studies, and their application in C&S); Serifsoy & Weiß, supra note 21, at 24–29 (reviewing market contestability in application to securities markets).
88 See Standards for Covered Clearing Agencies, 79 Fed. Reg. at 29576, 29578; infra Section III.C.
89 See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
90 See, e.g., van Cayseele & voor de Mededinging, supra note 21, at 4–6 (observing also that “[t]he trade-off . . . is between competitive prices with a fragmented industry structure that does not succeed in fully exploiting scale and scope economies, versus a concentrated industry structure with the possibility of monopoly pricing”).
91 Manne & Zywicki, supra note 19, at 18.
92 In reality, as illustrated infra Section III.C, smaller facilities have been steadily exiting the industry. The true competitors are yet to materialize.
charge the trading community lower C&S costs compared to those in other jurisdictions. The model scores high in terms of the dynamic efficiency, economies of scale and scope, network effects, and systemic efficiency.

4. Postulate IV

If a centralized regulator and market entities abide by Postulates I, II, and III, courts should be deferential to their policy choices. A review of the forty years of case law involving clearinghouses confirms this observation. U.S. courts repeatedly and predictably supported the monopolistic regulator and the clearing agencies whose rules the regulator approves.

The key exception was private, opportunistic actions of clearinghouses. As demonstrated in Section IV.B, courts bifurcate clearinghouse actions into (a) private actions, which can be motivated by opportunism and self-interest, and (b) preapproved public functions, where the potentially opportunistic behavior at issue is either controlled by the regulator or captured by the internal corporate mechanisms discussed above.

This dichotomy stems from the dual nature of C&S facilities. On the one hand, they operate in a semipublic capacity, as SROs assuring stable and low-cost trade execution in the national markets. On the other hand, they function as private entities and may interact with the outside world as such. This is outside of their core public functions.

Their private negotiations and contracts may equally be outside the ambit of the SEC-approved programs. Similarly, the foregoing internal corporate governance mechanisms (i.e., Postulate III) may not capture such misbehavior since they are designed mainly for monitoring the safety of the public functions. Monitoring market participants-shareholders may be more interested in overseeing the public functions, the risks of which they collectively share.

Just like any other private company, a clearinghouse may be motivated by opportunism. Hence, it is logical that courts scrutinize the clearinghouses’ private decisions and ordinary contracts more closely, while deferring to the SEC and clearinghouses in other matters.

93 See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text.
94 See discussion infra Section IV.B.2.
95 A word of caution is in order. It would be a logical fallacy to present these results as normative implications of the exiting model. Part IV of this Article merely emphasizes the positive premises of the current arrangement. However, the cumulative impact of the majority of the sample cases may be suggestive of deeper, more normative implications.
Pictorially, the Postulates may be presented as follows:

This approach entails a predictable regulatory framework for transactional exchanges. The benefits of linear regulatory interaction and market concentration also should outweigh monopoly costs in an equilibrium involving one sector-specific regulator, a concentrated industry, and one set of courts.

In equilibrium, the market’s and the regulator’s “foresight” of the intent of clearinghouses to perform is improved. The relationships are stable and “based on the expectation of the same set of external facts, so that under certain conditions nobody [including the regulators, clearinghouses, and market participants] will have any reason to change his plans.” 96

The facility, closely monitored by its shareholders and members, cannot switch to a socially harmful suboptimal strategy without public and private parties or potential market competitors observing the problem and changing their strategies accordingly. In turn, courts, protecting the rights of an allegedly aggrieved private litigant, have nothing to gain from not deferring to the regulator and the facility-SRO, perhaps, in fear of inadvertently upsetting the economic and regulatory balance. 97 Finally, the regulator continues its policies of arm’s length monitoring and principles-based rulemaking.

In this sense, such decision makers as the SEC and the courts effectively adopted the Hayekian view, acting within the preexisting boundaries of regulatory and market norms and allowing individuals (i.e., the clearing industry) to “have maximum freedom to act on local information as it arises.” 98

That linear sector-specific model has proven cost efficient and well-functioning through the vicissitudes of market crises over the course of several decades. Unfortunately, it is inherently at odds with

97 See infra Section IV.B.1.
the coordinating posture of the post–Dodd-Frank reforms. In the following Sections, I will first support the postulates with case studies and will then conclude with a discussion of the specific Dodd-Frank rules.

III. POSTULATES I AND III: EX ANTE REGULATORY PREMISES AND MARKET SIGNALING

A. Introduction

This Part examines Postulates I and III. The analysis will demonstrate several trends, which were typical of the period between 1975 and 2010 (i.e., covering the 1975 Exchange Act amendments and the subsequent major regulations preceding Dodd-Frank). The reforms created a sector-specific regulatory monopoly and were crisis driven. Nevertheless, they proved to improve efficiency in terms of reducing transaction costs in C&S. The possible reasons are as follows.

At an abstract level, the regulatory initiatives followed a familiar pattern—when ex ante industry programs were insufficient to prevent a market wide disruption or inefficiencies, regulatory reforms ensued. In contrast to the reforms of today, however, the regulators de facto expedited the processes that the market itself had already demanded of the clearing industry. The regulations tracked earlier industry experiments, converted the prior private practices into generalized standards, and thus followed the impetus supplied by the market.99

In theory, such a fluid arrangement required preserving a modicum of discretion for both the market and the regulators. Both must have sufficient flexibility to act and cooperatively shape the best practices. This Section will demonstrate that the SEC indeed pursued a generalized principles-based approach to the first clearinghouse rules and registration, as captured by Postulate I.100

In turn, clearinghouses sent adequate signals to the market regarding their self-regulatory capacity. A unique corporate governance structure inviting direct participation of the clearing members, who by virtue of their financial exposure shared clearing risks (i.e., Postulate III), served as an internal verification mechanism. Consequently, the


100 Indeed, the statutory reforms did not "require the SEC to examine every registration application in light of the broader national goals in section 17A(a), [and] they only require[d] the application to meet the requirements for registration set forth in section 17A(b)." Bradford Nat’l Clearing Corp. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 590 F.2d 1085, 1093 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citations omitted).
risk-incentive structures, monitoring objectives, and self-regulatory mechanisms were optimized. This Part will also examine these mechanisms in light of the monopoly concerns and market concentration.

B. Postulate I: Market-Regulator Cooperation

1. The Back Office Crisis and Postcrisis Reforms

a. Market Realities

The first regulations were promulgated in response to a crisis and to underlying structural market inefficiencies. At first, clearing was fragmented as stock exchanges operated their own clearings. Brokers cleared trades through a clearing subsidiary affiliated with the market on which execution occurred. This structure and the facilities quickly became outdated. A more interconnected, efficient, and automated system of C&S was objectively needed in order to cope with rapid changes in trading practices.

For example, the volume and size of institutional trades increased dramatically. “The velocity and volume of... trading [by large institutions] strained an exchange market accustomed to a continuous flow of relatively homogenous transactions.” Simultaneously, the army of individual shareholders grew almost threefold. As a result, the processing facilities of exchanges had to evolve rapidly.

The parallel growth of the OTC market hindered the operations of transfer agents and clearing operations in general. As a matter of practice, broker-dealers cleared and settled trades directly with their

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101 I have already discussed these trends in my earlier work. See Guseva, supra note 53, at 548–49. In this Article, the analysis addresses them from a different perspective—linearity and market-regulator cooperation.

102 See, e.g., Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 15, at 316.

103 Bradford Nat'l Clearing Corp., 590 F.2d at 1096 n.13.

104 See, e.g., Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 15, at 317–18.


counterparties, which led to “frequent disagreement over the terms of a trade on settlement [resulting] from the practice of executing trades over the telephone”109 and physical delivery of trade documents.110

Slowly, “[d]eliveries and transfers of securities became inexorably mired.”111 Ballooning overhead expenses of brokerages112 and the growth of “fails to deliver” and “fails to receive”113 against a heavy trading volume114 precipitated the back office crisis and liquidation of some brokerages.115 In part, the mayhem was an example of the negative externalities produced by uncoordinated brokerages’ policies and underinvestment in back office operations. Unable to fully and immediately internalize the benefits and costs of improved back office operations, individual brokerages overinvested in sales, ignoring their own clearing and processing facilities.116

Even though trading venues were not oblivious to the problems, their programs were incremental. For example, some exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) improved their technology and operations,117 helped brokerages immobilize stock certificates, and introduced more advanced holding systems.118 By the

109 Simon & Colby, supra note 108, at 89.
111 H.R. DOC. NO. 92-231, at 19.
114 H.R. DOC. NO. 92-231, at 18.
116 See, e.g., Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 15, at 320.
117 For instance, the NYSE and several custodian banks launched a one-year “Pilot Operation for Central Handling of Securities,” through which some “deliveries were made between members via book-entry and without the physical movement of certificates.” DTCC, THE US MODEL FOR CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT, supra note 110, at 12. Already in the early 1960s, the NASD created the National OTC Clearing Corporation, although direct deliveries continued. Simon & Colby, supra note 108, at 73 & n.349, 74, 89.
118 See, e.g., Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 15, at 323 (discussing depository initiatives); see also S. REP. NO. 93-13, at 28 (1973) (also discussing processing and equipment problems of brokerages); Bergmann, supra note 110. The NYSE introduced more advanced holding systems in 1968. The NYSE improved C&S and developed the Central Certificate Service, which “act[ed] as a clearinghouse for transactions involving stocks held in ‘Street name.’” Wall Street: Attack on the Snarl, TIME, May 24, 1968, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/ 0,9171,844480,00.html. Unfortunately, operational problems remained and many new order
early 1970s, the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the NYSE owned the Securities Industry Automation Corporation,119 operating their clearinghouses and clearing transactions in AMEX-listed and NYSE-listed securities, respectively.120 In 1969, the NASD also created a new CCP-type subsidiary,121 and soon entered into a management contract with Bradford National Corporation.122

However, brokers were still incurring unnecessary operational expenses by reconciling trades through separate facilities.123 In fact, many clearing entities did not “provide [their] participants with the ability to compare through the clearing corporation transactions other than those effected in the marketplaces for which the clearing corporation perform[ed] the comparison function.”124

b. Postulate I: In the Footsteps of the Market

Congress responded not only to the crisis per se, but also to the demands expressed by market participants, and to the need for a safer and more interlinked C&S system. In 1975, the Exchange Act was amended and the SEC finally received statutory oversight authority over clearing agencies and transfer agents.125

Unless exempted by the SEC, all clearinghouses operating in the securities market were (and still are) required to register with the SEC.126 Some clearinghouses are required to register with both the SEC and the CFTC if they also fall under the statutory definition of “derivatives clearing organizations” and clear transactions in securities and derivatives.127 The law also demarcated the regulatory jurisdiction of the SEC and other “appropriate regulatory agencies,” such as the

. 120 Id. at 3929; see also Donald L. Calvin, The National Market System: A Successful Adventure in Industry Self-Improvement, 70 VA. L. REV. 785, 808 (1984) (detailing the progress made by the NYSE); Simon & Colby, supra note 108, at 89.
. 122 Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 15, at 321.
. 124 Id. at 3930. In addition, having three New York-based clearinghouses was redundant. Bradford Nat’l Clearing Corp. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 590 F.2d 1085, 1097, 1098 & n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
. 127 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(a) (2012). A traditional example of such a clearinghouse is the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC).
giving the SEC the primary oversight and rulemaking authority over securities clearing.

As the primary securities market regulator, the Commission was directed to establish uniform procedures for C&S and facilitate development of a national C&S system. In this respect, the SEC apparently proceeded in agreement with what the major trading venues attempted to achieve, as all New York-based heavyweights availed themselves of the new opportunities. They filed a joint application for registration of a single clearinghouse, the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC). By that time, their facilities already had been responsible for the majority of clearing operations, while the share of regional exchanges comprised about fifteen percent. The leaders, facing only some antimonopoly opposition from SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, pursued deeper market concentration.

The proposed entity “was conceived as the central element in an integrated nationwide effort to eliminate unnecessary duplication of post-trade activities and to permit single-account clearing and settlement for broker-dealers in the clearing organization of their choice.” The new Depository Trust Company (DTC) was to serve as a single securities depository for the NSCC. The applicants and the Commission clearly expected that one locus for comparison and settlement of transactions executed on the major exchanges and OTC markets would produce economies of scale and operational savings.

On the flipside, however, joining the forces of the NYSE, the AMEX, and the NASD might stifle market competition. Thus, the SEC was effectively required to make a first economic judgment call on clearing. The Commission seemed to have approached this task

129 Id. § 78q-1(a)(2)(A); see also Bradford Nat’l Clearing Corp., 590 F.2d at 1100–01.
130 Bradford Nat’l Clearing Corp., 590 F.2d at 1097–98, 1113; see also Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 15, at 326.
132 Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 15, at 320–22 (suggesting that the SEC was supportive of centralization).
134 Calvin, supra note 120, at 800.
136 Id.; Bradford Nat’l Clearing Corp., 590 F.2d at 1100–01, 1107.
carefully, tracking the demands of the market. It observed, inter alia, that “[t]he importance of NSCC’s establishment to [the] progress [in clearing] and the significance of the accords and compromises on which NSCC’s establishment is based can be gauged only against the backdrop of a decade of industry effort.”

The antitrust arguments did not sway the SEC or its promerger policy stance, as it sided with the naturally merging large applicants over objections of smaller clearinghouses. At the same time, however, the Commission refused to foreclose the competition entirely. Instead, it facilitated the contestable monopoly environment and focused on competition in trading and on restrictions on vertical silos.

It is plausible that the SEC de facto endorsed the trend towards consolidation, bypassing antitrust objections and effectively channeling the market towards a monopoly equilibrium, to ensure a more robust national clearing infrastructure. Furthermore, in implementing the National Market System and clearing reforms, “the SEC took its cues from the legislation . . . and worked with the industry to create a climate of intraindustry cooperation.” Cumulatively, this approach was in line with Postulate I.

Another example in support of Postulate I is granting the C&S facilities the status of SROs. Congress, obviously, took a leaf from the exchange regulation book. Clearing agencies, for instance, were required

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137 Nat’l Sec. Clearing Corp., 1977 WL 173551, at *12 (“The Commission’s review of NSCC’s application has been made in the context of the progress in clearing and settlement achieved during the last decade and the efforts of entities engaged in securities processing—brokers and dealers, clearing corporations, securities depositaries, transfer agents, institutional investors, securities exchanges and the [NASD]—to establish clearing and settlement systems and to integrate them into a national system.”).

138 Bradford Nat’l Clearing Corp., 590 F.2d at 1106–13. Analogous processes of market concentration also occurred in the depository business. Already by the 1980s, DTC was a major depository. See infra Section III.C.

139 Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 15, 328–32, 370 (discussing the rule changes and their effect on competition, as well as how the SEC disentangled clearing and trading). Under certain conditions, an oligopoly may be a more efficient outcome, and excessive regulations of such a market-driven structure become unnecessary from the welfare economics perspective. See, e.g., van Cayseele & voor de Mededinging, supra note 21, at 12-14.

140 The improvements entailing a monopoly approval could have been incremental. As the court in Bradford observed, the SEC’s “decision passes statutory muster so long as the former achievements by whatever margin outweigh the latter impacts.” Bradford Nat’l Clearing Corp., 590 F.2d at 1107. On the central role of regulators in shaping competition and monopoly equilibria in post-trading services, see, for example, Baglioni & Hamaui, supra note 23, at 9–11, 15.

141 Calvin, supra note 120, at 795. Even the critics of the SEC at the time mentioned that “Congress and the regulatory agency had . . . done their homework well.” Werner, supra note 105, at 1234 (focusing primarily on NMS). Generally, however, Professor Werner was critical of the SEC and the implementation of the statutory mandate. Id. at 1296.

to report any proposed rule changes to the SEC.143 As SROs, the agencies also were enabled and required, inter alia, to monitor their participants, exercise disciplinary authority over the participants, and deny participation to disqualified or incompetent applicants.144 Variations among agencies could persist, but the generalized principles were uniform for all.

On the one hand, this authority assisted the agencies in risk assessment and detecting “bad apples,” which is a crucial avowed benefit of a centralized and transparent clearing infrastructure. On the other hand, to prevent abuse by individual agencies, the integrity of such rules was ensured through structural transparency, antidiscrimination, and due process requirements. Those spanned equal access and similar requirements for all participants, fair representation of members in management,145 and impartial hearings and disciplinary policies.146 Logically, both the trading community and the clearinghouses should be supportive of such regulatory standards.

Another crucial argument supporting the historical trends embedded in Postulate I is that, following in the footsteps of the earlier industry initiatives, the SEC was directed to facilitate certain market trends. The first was the immobilization of securities in order to “end the physical movement of securities certificates in connection with the settlement among brokers and dealers of transactions in securities consummated by means of the mails.”147 Recall that exchanges and custodian banks had tried to reduce physical deliveries around the time of the paperwork crisis. After the first reforms, decades of concerted market-regulator efforts ensued.148

In a similar vein, the SEC also supported certain securities holding practices. Among others, it was in favor of holding securities in “street

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143 Id. § 78s(b).
144 Id. § 78q-1(b).
145 Id.
name,” a “major step towards having in effect a certificateless system,”149 replacing the practice of holding physical securities certificates with indirect holding systems through centralized depositories,150 and the more recent direct registration system (DRS), which ultimately allowed individual investors to establish direct positions with an issuer.151 In this supportive regulator-market environment, the industry was able to reduce the formerly enormous costs and risks associated with handling security certificates152 and to immobilize most listed equity securities.153

Concomitant antitrust concerns were, again, not prominent on the list of objections. For instance, since the DTC operated the sole functional DRS program, issuers and exchanges had no choice but to subscribe to that service. The major exchanges and the SEC nevertheless welcomed these clearing innovations.154 Even though—as DRS and


152 For a historical description and cost data, see, for example, Securities Transactions Settlement, 69 Fed. Reg. at 12934 & n.134.

153 Already ten years ago, more than eighty-five percent of the equity securities listed on the NYSE and eighty percent on Nasdaq and the AMEX were immobilized. See Letter from Jill M. Considine, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 9 (June 23, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s71304/s71304-26.pdf.

other DTC’s programs were evolving\textsuperscript{155}—some transfer agents accused the DTC of abusing its monopoly,\textsuperscript{156} such claims did not alter the general picture—so long as the de facto monopolistic programs were generating tangible benefits, antitrust concerns seemed subordinate.

Another example of a cautious and circumspect SEC is the introduction of a more uniform settlement cycle,\textsuperscript{157} and clarification of settlement timing and finality, which only occurred following \emph{clearly expressed} market concerns and consensus.\textsuperscript{158} The temporal connection between time and risk is clear: Parties may become insolvent and fail to pay for or deliver securities when prices change.\textsuperscript{159} In the worst-case scenario, a “systemic disturbance to financial markets and to the economy” may follow.\textsuperscript{160} The SEC’s decision to reduce the settlement cycle to three days (T+3)\textsuperscript{161} and the accompanying industry efforts entailed a reduction in fails to deliver, demonstrating the efficaciousness of that regulation.\textsuperscript{162}


\textsuperscript{158} See Rogers, supra note 150, at 1446–73 (providing a general overview); see also Guttman, \textit{supra} note 113 (discussing Article 8 of the UCC).


By contrast, when the SEC revisited the same issue a decade later, market actors were demonstrably uncertain whether the benefits of a shorter cycle would outweigh the costs of implementation. The SEC did not choose sides in the face of uncertainty, but allowed the industry to move naturally to operational improvements, straight-through processing, and other programs, until modern technology prompted clearinghouses to reopen the debate.

As a sidebar, the SEC did not act alone; the topic was communicated to the President’s Working Group, a precrisis interagency coordination mechanism. To summarize, this short analysis lays out a remarkable policy algorithm—the functional, sector-specific regulator operated within the impetus-reform, market-regulator framework, mimicking the industry initiatives.

2. Another Crash and Another Crisis-Driven Regulatory Response

This short discussion of Postulate I depicts a different SEC—a Commission following the industry’s lead. It is, of course, possible that

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163 The uncertainty concerned conflicting industry findings: some studies advocated shortening the settlement cycle as a means of reducing settlement exposure by as much as $250 billion, or sixty-seven percent, while other reports highlighted potential offsetting costs related to cross-border market activity and technical upgrades. Securities Transactions Settlement, 69 Fed. Reg. at 12929–30.

164 The industry-wide “straight-through processing,” including automation of trade execution and other operational advances, such as “delivery versus payment” and better trade matching, were the new market initiatives approved by the Commission. See, e.g., id. at 12923–25; COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYS., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, DELIVERY VERSUS PAYMENT IN SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS 4 (1992), http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d06.pdf; CPSS-JIOSCO, PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES, supra note 12, at 8, 22, 40, 141–56 (discussing DVP, receive versus payment (RVP), and other settlement risk reduction models); DEPOSITORY TR. CO., RULES, BY-LAWS AND ORGANIZATION CERTIFICATE, supra note 59, at 51–52 (discussing delivery versus payment (DVP) settlement).


166 GAO, FINANCIAL REGULATORY COORDINATION, supra note 50; see also Cunningham & Zaring, supra note 1, at 77–79 (discussing the added value of the Group and observing that “[d]uring the 2008 crisis, according to Volcker’s Group of Thirty Report, the PWG ‘provided the backdrop for U.S. financial supervisors to respond quickly and decisively’ by fostering ‘ongoing and fluid communication among regulators’” (quoting GRP. OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 49 (2008))).
since the C&S industry exhibited superlative cost efficiency, the SEC could reasonably “afford” to abstain from excessive interventions. Yet this hands-off approach proved durable and survived through market crashes when the C&S system—although without any direct failures—was in peril.

One germane example is the 1987 crash. The crash has been well studied in the literature. It suffices, therefore, to mention such problems as the increasing interconnectivity of financial markets, portfolio-insurance-triggered sales, serious liquidity concerns, and failures of some brokers and futures commission merchants to make payments to clearing organizations. Just like with the recent bailouts of financial institutions, although at an incomparably smaller scale, the Fed had to intervene by supporting liquidity. Overall, even though clearing entities interrupted services and liquidated positions of a few brokers, the national C&S system withstood the 1987 crash.

As mentioned in the Introduction, clearing agencies demonstrated similar resilience in 2008. Indeed, some of the problems are recurrent—as collateral deteriorates, counterparties, clearinghouses, and lenders may demand more collateral, causing financially distressed borrowers to sell at already low prices. To some extent, that happened in 1987, and on a larger scale more recently in 2008.

In addition, the interconnectivity of clearinghouses, and financial markets in general, has its downsides, including more complicated
participant cross monitoring, risk management, and interconnected, shared financial exposure. First, defaults may accumulate and affect several interlinked clearinghouses. Second, in a crisis, clearing also may be in peril if information losses are considerable. The information loss problem may be compounded by large trading volumes and price volatility, circumstances that were emblematic of the 1987 crash, or low asset prices and "information contagion" regarding individual parties' exposure to various assets, an issue also characteristic of the 2008 financial crisis.

Clearing utilities, self-evidently, are generally aware of such risks and pertinent operational concerns. To tackle these issues in the past, for instance, they set up incremental information sharing programs, such as the Monitoring Coordination Group established in 1984. The limited objective of the Group was improving transparency and risk assessment through mutual information disclosure regarding common participants. Such initiatives were partial and incomplete, although they did contribute to default identification and loss mitigation during the 1987 market crash.

The resultant postcrash game strategy was in line with the previous reforms. In keeping with the U.S. tradition of postcrisis diagnostics, a plethora of postcrash studies detailed its causes. The identified set of

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172 Clearing agencies in 1987 also faced difficulties related to assessing the exposure of their clearing members to other markets and asset classes. BRADY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 67, at 55 (on clearinghouse interconnectedness); GAO, CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT REFORM, supra note 67, at 17–19.

173 If there are multiple CCPs, some structural problems become endemic. Risk management in certain cases might be easier if there were just one single CCP serving various asset markets and participants. See, e.g., Manmohan Singh, Collateral, Netting and Systemic Risk in the OTC Derivatives Market 3–4, 8–9, 12 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 10/99, 2010), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp1099.pdf; see also Duffie & Zhu, supra note 64. In addition, if multiple markets for derivatives and securities are interlinked, clearing participants may operate in two or more markets, complicating risk assessments. GAO, CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT REFORM, supra note 67, at 17–19; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, 1989 WL 550672, at *4 n.26; discussion supra note 172.


176 Roe, supra note 54, at 1653, 1688.

177 Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, 1989 WL 550672, at *6 (mentioning that the group’s communication "procedures appl[ied] whenever a common participant’s financial condition [was] deemed to threaten the financial or operational condition of clearing members, clearing agencies, or marketplaces").

178 Id.

179 The studies covered, inter alia, further centralization and interconnectedness of C&S services in different markets, the need for better information exchange among registered agencies, wider immobilization of securities, improvements in the guarantee, margin, and fees policies, and other issues. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(f) (2012); The Market Reform Act of
issues and private sector solutions dominated further regulatory developments. For instance, the President’s Working Group was urged to consider private courses of action,\textsuperscript{180} while the SEC was directed to improve coordination in clearing of various assets classes, which was a specific and targeted response to the crash.\textsuperscript{181}

The Commission also received the emergency authority to suspend registration or impose additional requirements to prevent market disruptions and to ensure “safe clearance and settlement.”\textsuperscript{182} That new statutory mandate was broad. Nevertheless, the SEC, acting in consonance with Postulate I, preserved the generalized 1980 risk management standards, which thus generally survived until the major post–Dodd-Frank overhaul in 2012.\textsuperscript{183}

Most post-1987 proposals effectively translated into incremental, targeted initiatives. Those spanned the introduction of a shorter settlement cycle; better industry programs, such as the Securities Clearing Group, an organization working on improving information exchange on financial positions of clearing members and ensuring, inter alia, better member monitoring and timetable synchronization; information and cross-guaranty programs spearheaded by the leading clearinghouses; and other initiatives.\textsuperscript{184}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{180} The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets was mandated to consider this option. Exec. Order No. 12631, 53 Fed. Reg. 9421 (Mar. 18, 1988).
\item \textsuperscript{182} 15 U.S.C. § 78l(k)(2).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
3. Rule Generality

This traditional reform cycle and market-regulator cooperation were complemented by another important observable trend—the generality of the regulatory language completing Postulate I. Consider that securities law sets forth such SEC guideposts as the safety and efficiency of the national C&S system in very broad strokes. The SEC’s authority is, as is typical, extensive. The Commission registers the clearinghouses and has broad discretion in regard to approval of SRO rules and proposed rule changes. The overarching statutory objectives are investor protection, promotion of market efficiency, possible effects on competition, and capital formation concerns.

This language, ex hypothesi, enables the SEC to monitor and control the direction and developments within the C&S industry very closely, had the SEC decided to do that, it could have exercised much closer oversight, minutely dissecting all clearinghouse rules and procedures. After all, as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals observed, while “Congress enacted Section 17A precisely for the purpose of replacing an inefficient and outmoded system of clearing agencies with a more modern and efficient system[,] . . . [it] did not impose any specific standards of efficiency,” emphasizing the reliance on the SEC in regulating clearinghouses.

Despite such statutory generality, the SEC almost ab initio chose to issue somewhat low-key C&S “standards to be used by the Division of Market Regulation.” Similarly, in its original registration rule, registration orders, and later initiatives, the SEC set forth more

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185 See, e.g., LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 802–05 (5th ed. 2004); Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 15, at 324–26 (discussing the statutory language).
188 A good supporting example is the antitrust arguments related to the formation of the NSCC. Recall that the court in Bradford was very generous to the SEC in this respect. Bradford Nat’l Clearing Corp. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 590 F.2d 1085, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
189 Whistler Invs., Inc. v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 539 F.3d 1159, 1167 (9th Cir. 2008).
190 Regulation of Clearing Agencies, Exchange Act Release No. 16900, 45 Fed. Reg. 41920 (June 23, 1980) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 241). This is also consistent with the original exchange regulation. See, e.g., Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 352 (1963) (“The pattern of governmental entry, however, was by no means one of total displacement of the exchanges' traditional process of self-regulation. The intention was rather, as Mr. Justice Douglas said, while Chairman of the S.E.C., one of ‘letting the exchanges take the leadership with Government playing a residual role. Government would keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would never have to be used.’” (quoting DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE: THE ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS AS MEMBER AND CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 82 (James Allen ed., 1940))).
generalized overarching principles focusing on the creation of a truly national interlinked C&S system and on facilitating both interconnectedness and horizontal integration within the industry. The first standards were short and may be characterized as principles based. These guidelines included, inter alia, the previously discussed nondiscriminatory participation standards, permitting “discrimination” only on the grounds of objective criteria; fair representation policies; and an assortment of supporting requirements ranging from governance procedures to transparency rules. The major clearing agencies did not encounter significant compliance problems in this respect.

C. The Interplay of Postulates I and III: Industry Concentration and Corporate Governance

1. Industry Consolidation and New Entrants

a. The Industry Structure

The existence and durability of Postulate I is further demonstrated by minimal regulatory intervention into industry concentration processes. This noninterventionism was a recursive method since the virtual monopoly in C&S was already in existence in the 1970s and deepened in the following decades. Namely, the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC) became the key options clearinghouse and, as of 1997, the NSCC was already clearing and settling ninety-eight percent of all equity, corporate, and municipal bond transactions, with the DTC transferring securities and serving as a custodian for most broker-
deals and banks. The DTCC’s subsidiaries, including the NSCC and the DTC, still “clear and settle nearly all US market trades in equities, corporate and municipal bonds, government securities and mortgage-backed securities, money market instruments and OTC derivatives.”

By contrast, smaller clearing agencies and depositories gradually perished. In 2008, Nasdaq OMX acquired the last remaining facilities, the Boston Stock Exchange Clearing Corporation and the Securities Clearing Corporation of Philadelphia, thus effectively making the NSCC the only securities CCP. The DTC, obviously, is the sole CSD in the United States. Both of them and the OCC have been designated under Title VIII of Dodd-Frank as systemically important “[f]inancial market utilities . . . [, i.e.,] multilateral systems that provide the [essential] infrastructure for transferring, clearing, and settling payments, securities, and other financial transactions among financial institutions or between financial institutions and the system.”

Any basic textbook in economics warns that market concentration may add a layer of risk associated with the lack of competition. Notwithstanding this risk, the SEC by and large refrained from intervening in the market organization throughout the post-paperwork-crisis history of the C&S industry. The explanations of this abstention bring Postulate III to the fore. In short, the market was efficiently self-regulated.

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198 GAO, PAYMENTS, CLEARANCE, AND SETTLEMENT, supra note 64, at 48. Already in the 1980s–1990s, the NSCC was a major clearinghouse, while only three clearinghouses worked with several securities exchanges and with OTC equity markets. GAO, CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT REFORM, supra note 67, at 11; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, Exchange Act Release No. 27044, 1989 WL 550672, at *5–6 (July 18, 1989); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK, supra note 57, at 10-2 n.2; Bernanke, supra note 62, at 135. The NSCC was ab initio the principal clearing agency, which had the necessary capacity for continuous net settlement and served as a public utility. Bradford Nat’l Clearing Corp. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 590 F.2d 1085, 1101, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

199 DTCC, THE US MODEL FOR CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT, supra note 110, at 2; see also Pet Quarters, Inc., v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 559 F.3d 772, 776–77 (8th Cir. 2009).

200 There technically are only four active securities and options clearing agencies. Proposed Collection, 76 Fed. Reg. 16018-01, 16018 (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Mar. 22, 2011).


202 The list of the registered clearing agencies is available online. Self-Regulatory Organization Rulemaking, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml (last updated Apr. 4, 2016). The very development of modern securities clearing became “inseparably linked to the establishment of a centralized national clearing agency, the [NSCC], operating in tandem with a centralized securities depository, the [DTC].” Minnerop, supra note 99, at 932 n.67.

To recap, the summary of Postulate III is as follows: First, within the existing imperfectly contestable monopoly environment, other entities have an opportunity and right—even if theoretical—to join the industry. Second, the regulated market entities are efficiently monitored by key market constituencies through participatory corporate governance mechanisms.

b. A Contestable Monopoly

The 2008 Nasdaq acquisition of the Philadelphia and Boston clearinghouses typifies examples of the first prong of Postulate III. The acquisition represents a crucial and unmistakable antimonopoly backstop targeting inefficient pricing and lack of innovations. It challenged the DTCC’s monopoly insofar as Nasdaq could and did intend to set up a new CCP using its newly acquired subsidiaries as a launching pad. In 2009, however, Nasdaq abandoned the plans. Its stated reasons were fully consistent with the contestable monopoly arguments: the DTCC had taken into consideration the threat of potential competition and sufficiently improved clearing pricing and services. Thus, product and service improvements were achieved without Nasdaq actually engaging in competition.

This incident demonstrates a market structure with some features of a contestable monopoly. Even though the barriers to entry are admittedly high, market entry is feasible. Such potential competition should produce a positive impact on underlying industry practices and products.

The law and SEC’s regulations do not preclude competition among clearing facilities. In fact,

[section 23(a) of the Exchange Act requires the Commission, when making rules and regulations under the Exchange Act, to consider the impact a new rule would have on competition. Section 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act prohibits the Commission from adopting any rule


205 Nasdaq OMX Abandons US CCP Plans, TRADE (Oct. 30, 2009), http://www.thetradenews.com/news/Regions/Americas/Nasdaq_OMX_abandons_US_CCP_plans.aspx (“Nasdaq OMX said it had rethought its approach because it believes the threat of competition to the DTCC had achieved the exchange’s intended aims of lowering the cost of US equities trading, improving service and efficiencies and promoting innovation.”).

that would impose a burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act.\textsuperscript{207}

Consequently, in its rule making, the Commission does pay attention to the effect on barriers to entry, while some commissioners have underscored the value of competition in clearing.\textsuperscript{208} From a regulatory perspective, the clearing market thus may appear contestable.

At the same time, the SEC balances antitrust arguments against industry costs and benefits. It argued, for instance, that it “is not required to achieve its regulatory objectives in the least anticompetitive manner and is at most required to decide that any anticompetitive effects of its actions are necessary or appropriate to the achievement of its [general] objectives.”\textsuperscript{209}

The resultant policy outcome is the described market-driven monopoly. This outcome derives in part from a pure economic analysis, and in part from the practicalities. For one, the SEC evidently took into account the contestable markets theory, focused on entry and exit costs, and attempted to combine centralized clearing with competitive trading rules.\textsuperscript{210} In a similar vein, the practicalities dictated that positive network externalities and economies of scale and scope would lead to a reduction in duplicate customer fees, lower per unit transaction costs, greater transaction volume, and considerable cost savings, all accruing to the benefit of investors and the financial industry.\textsuperscript{211} The growth of the


\textsuperscript{208} See, e.g., id. at 21054 (“[T]his rule does not increase barriers for new clearing agencies.”); see also Standards for Covered Clearing Agencies, Exchange Act Release No. 71699, 79 Fed. Reg. at 29514 (mentioning providing “a more flexible regime for new entrants”). As discussed above, SEC Chairman Garrett originally expressed concerns about the lack of competition among CCPs. This issue, albeit dormant, was not completely ignored by the Commission. See Wolkoff & Warren, supra note 15, at 322.


\textsuperscript{210} Some SEC studies reveal that the Commission was aware of and relied on the contestable markets theory, stating that competition depends primarily on the feasibility and ease of market entry and exit. See, e.g., Multiple Trading of Standardized Options, Exchange Act Release No. 26870, 1989 WL 550695, at *3 (May 26, 1989) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 15, at 374 (reviewing competitive trading in conjunction with interlinked and centralized clearing).

\textsuperscript{211} See, e.g., Baglioni & Hamaui, supra note 23, at 7–9 (discussing the benefits of a single clearinghouse and CSD, network externalities, and supply side arguments). The monopolies also emphasized that increasing the number of qualified agency participants amplifies “transaction volumes [and] reduce[s] per-unit service costs that must be recovered through participant service fees.” Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change Relating to a Decision by CSE to Withdraw from the Clearance and Settlement, Securities Depository, and Branch Receive Businesses, Exchange Act Release No. 36547, 1995 WL 733308 (Dec. 1, 1995); see also
monopolies also eliminated redundant interagency interfaces, reduced maintenance costs, and improved communication networks. Perhaps for these reasons, smaller CCPs and CSDs voluntarily withdrew from the market. Following their withdrawal, the surviving monopolies forthwith extended C&S services to the members of the exiting clearinghouses.212

From this perspective, it is understandable why the SEC might find the ongoing consolidation appropriate and the foregoing reasons persuasive—the actual effects of a contestable monopoly in clearing comported with the interests and objectives of the securities regulator. As a result, the SEC, on occasion, expressed its belief that “the . . . regulatory scheme and the particular structure and nature of the clearing and depository industries provide ample means of avoiding the potential negative effects of a monopoly,”213 allowing the C&S industry to provide high quality and low cost services.

2. Market Self-Monitoring and Corporate Governance

Unfortunately, contestable monopolies can be fragile organizational structures.214 The ensuing concern is that the regulator should believe that the essentially monopolistic clearing facilities would not extract monopoly rents, charge the trading community high fees, or,
for instance, impose inadequate margins and other risk management standards in the long term. What then made the SEC view the mergers and resultant monopolies favorably for more than several decades? This brings us to the second prong of Postulate III—the signals sent through the self-regulatory and governance structure of the clearing monopolies.

Let us consider them in turn. The first is the OCC. When it was created in the 1970s, it became a de facto industry utility financed through clearing fees shared by its constituent exchanges. Today, it “clears all standardized options listed on the twelve U.S. national securities exchanges . . . and . . . CFTC-regulated futures products for four U.S. futures exchanges.”

Even though it is not a typical vertical silo, several exchanges still own OCC shares. And yet, its board of directors is dominated by clearing and independent members. The current board of directors of the OCC is comprised of twenty-one members, nine of whom represent clearing members (i.e., the users of its own services), and five are public directors.

The second example is the DTCC, whose corporate governance is similarly predicated on the foundational principles of the fair representation of participants and on serving broad stakeholder constituencies. The constituencies of the DTCC include not only shareholders, but also “its financial institution participants, their issuer and investor clients and the governmental and supervisory authorities responsible for the global clearance and settlement systems.”

These overarching principles are incorporated into the Board’s Charter and bylaws. Pursuant to section III of the Board’s Charter, between fifteen and twenty-five directors are elected annually. The majority of the directors, currently eleven out of eighteen, represent

215 See, e.g., Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 15, at 340–43 (discussing the creation of centralized options clearing in the 1970s and the central role of the SEC, which after public hearings in 1974 urged all interested exchanges to work together toward creating a unified and standardized options clearing infrastructure). Instead of clearing, there were antitrust concerns regarding options exchanges, which were resolved only in 2000, leading to a decrease in clearing and trading fees, and increased trading volume in the following years. Id. at 371–73.


219 BD. OF DIRS., DEPOSITORY TR. & CLEARING CORP., CHARTER 6 (2015) [hereinafter DTCC CHARTER].

220 Id. at 4.

clearing participants, while two directors are nominated by the NYSE and FINRA, the independent securities regulator. This structure, ex hypothesi, optimizes the risk and monitoring incentives inasmuch as “participant shareholders . . . by virtue of making deposits to a clearing fund or otherwise, share the risk of loss associated with settlement defaults or other clearing agency losses” and take part in the management.

Thus, the multistakeholder corporate governance model should help, at least in theory, the market and the regulator verify the quality of the signals sent by the clearinghouses. It also lends support to the avowed objectives of clearinghouses. The DTCC, for instance, points out that it “serves a broad range of constituencies” and ensures “user-pays” transparency and transparent customer ownership.

These governance signals were naturally bolstered on the revenue side by a supplementary signaling device—the “at-cost basis [revenue model], returning excess revenue from transaction fees to its member firms.” Similar to the DTCC, the OCC routinely set its fees “to cover its operating expenses and to maintain such reserves as [were] deemed reasonably necessary by OCC’s Board of Directors to . . . [serve] its exchanges, its clearing members and the general public” and refunded excessive fees to the members.

D. Conclusion

When one examines the C&S industry, the sector-specific financial regulation seems devoid of its negative modern connotation. On the one hand, the information loss and regulatory oversight problems were mitigated through market-regulator cooperation. On the other hand, the regulator’s behavior followed a familiar pattern: after a crisis, generalized regulations merely gave impetus to already emerging best industry practices. There was a consensus, at least in principle, on what those best practices should be, and the regulator threw its support behind the market consensus.

The second trend was structural. First, the industry gradually evolved into a contestable monopoly, kept in check by a potential threat of future competition. Second, the multistakeholder model of corporate governance forged more efficient and reliable market self-monitoring

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222 DTCC CHARTER, supra note 219, at 6.
223 Id.
225 Id. at 6.
226 2014 OCC Letter, supra note 24, at 13 (also discussing fee refund changes in response to new regulations).
arrangements and, hypothetically, allowed the sector-specific regulator to economize on the oversight costs and preserve principles-based regulations.

IV. POSTULATES II AND IV: EX POST ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PREDICTABILITY

A. Postulate II: SEC Enforcement

Similar to the SEC's principles-based industry-mimicking policies, the same restraint was evident in its post-1975 enforcement strategies. There were merely two major actions against clearinghouses, illustrating that the SEC did not exercise its regulatory authority frivolously and instead focused its attention on blatant transgressions. The two actions discussed below were the primary examples of regulatory noncompliance. Both could undermine the integrity of the national C&S system, its commitment to providing cheaper post-trading services, and the confidence of market participants in the interconnected clearinghouses.

First, recall that the regulations established, inter alia, general requirements for clearing fund safety and adequate margining. In the order granting registration to the Stock Clearing Corporation of Philadelphia (SCCP), the SEC expressed concerns that the SCCP offered loans and margin-financing services to participants and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX) specialists. The SCCP's loan policies might exacerbate the financial exposure of the SCCP itself and of its participants. However, after careful evaluation, the SEC did approve the loan program in light of the associated benefits to the SCCP, its participants, the trading community in general, and, in particular,

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227 The third action was less relevant to this analysis. It concerned trading and margin call manipulations by Boston Stock Exchange specialists and the resulting violations of margin, net capital, and bookkeeping requirements. For these activities, "the Clearing Corp [as a subsidiary of BSE] issued margin calls, but did not adequately monitor margin compliance despite frequent margin calls which were generally outstanding for the maximum five-day period. . . . [T]he parking could have been detected by reviewing documents in the Clearing Corp's possession." Bos. Stock Exch., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 17183, 1980 WL 25454, at *3 (Oct. 1, 1980) (order). The violations were in fact discovered by the internal auditor of the clearinghouse and reported to the Exchange, which commenced an internal investigation. Id. at *4.


230 Id. at 45176.
As a precaution, the Commission requested the SCCP to improve its rules with respect to participants’ financial stability and to establish stricter financial safety procedures.232

Yet, analogous concerns resurfaced fifteen years later in the 1997 cease-and-desist proceedings instituted against the SCCP and its sister depository, Philadep.233 In part, the violations stemmed from the direct ownership of the C&S entities by the PHLX. By 1997, the Exchange was routinely covering temporary cash deficits using funds from the clearing subsidiaries. The agencies also failed to comply with pertinent rules regarding contributions, participants’ fund deposits, collateral, and margin requirements.234

In the second major action, the SEC brought suit against Midwest Clearing Corporation (MCC) and Midwest Securities Trust Company (MSTC).235 The defendants created two interlinked accounts, the second of which effectively was a computer entry representing false securities positions that the defendants merely “anticipated receiving from their participants and which were, in turn, due to be delivered to [other clearinghouses] for settlement of sales transactions executed by such participants.”236 The contra clearing corporations, informed that timely deliveries had been made, would make payments prior to the actual receipt of the securities by MCC and MSTC and before MCC had to pay the sellers. The defendants invested the resulting cash float, “eventually amount[ing] to as much as $35 million a day,” and also used it as a source of low interest loans to MSTC.237

This brief overview demonstrates the fundamental dormancy of the regulator, awakening mainly to prosecute more serious violations that undermined the structure and organization of the C&S model. This low regulatory frequency may seem even unusual considering that the SEC is generally recognized as an exceptionally active securities market

231 Id.
232 Id. at 45176–77.
236 Id. para. 11.
237 Id. para. 13.
regulator in the world.\textsuperscript{238} In clearing, the SEC equally had an opportunity to tighten the regulatory valves relying on its broad statutory mandate and construing it as a form of carte blanche.

Possible explanations for the low enforcement activity and for the SEC’s refraining from clearinghouse micromanagement are consistent with the conclusions of Part II of this Article. Namely, clearing agencies and, in particular, the leading facilities, performed relatively well \textit{and} their potential transgressions were adequately controlled through internal corporate governance mechanisms. A successful market-regulator equilibrium was formed.

The violators were operating as peripheral clearing institutions at the time of the enforcement actions. Moreover, after the enforcement actions, the culprits gradually exited the industry, having first merged their operations into other clearinghouses.\textsuperscript{239} By contrast, not only did the NSCC and the DTC dwarf the size and operations of the violators, but also both of these larger entities successfully avoided becoming the epicenter of major enforcement efforts. This, again, implies their stability, successful market self-monitoring, and proper market-regulator interaction. Theoretically, such arrangements allowed the SEC to economize on the regulatory oversight resources.

B. \textit{Postulate IV: Courts and Clearing Agencies}

1. Introduction: Judicial Noninterventionism and Its Factual Premises

To confirm this pre–2008-crisis market-regulator equilibrium, I reviewed all cases involving clearing agencies.\textsuperscript{240} Recall that courts comprise Postulate IV of the market-regulator arrangement involving one sector-specific expert regulator and stakeholder-controlled market entities (i.e., Postulates I, II and III). The only prong that may disturb the extant equilibrium is courts. This Section exemplifies how this third side of the arrangement props up the market-regulator interaction. Even though this support is not a normative predicate of judicial philosophy, it has been nontrivial.

From a positivist perspective, the constitutive elements of the existing trends may be taxonomized within a structure effectively representing a confluence of factors. Those factors touch upon both C&S economics and regulatory predicates. Specifically, so long as a


\textsuperscript{239} See, e.g., Stock Clearing Corp. of Phila., 1997 WL 457495, at *8.

\textsuperscript{240} The few suits brought by clearinghouses were excluded from the sample.
clearinghouse stays within the preapproved boundaries of SRO and SEC programs and rules, and exercises its discretion in good faith, courts seem reluctant to interfere with the established market-regulator arrangements. Instead, they rely on the implied integrity of the clearing rules using the SEC’s approvals as a proxy.

Accordingly, as I briefly mentioned in Section II.B, there is a clear dichotomy between court decisions concerning such preapproved public programs and clearing functions on the one hand, and self-interested actions of a clearinghouse as a private corporation on the other. This effective bifurcation is elegant in its simplicity—judicial analysis flawlessly comports with the dichotomous nature of the industry.

To elucidate the idea, it is appropriate to distinguish actions falling within the ambit of some regulator-approved rules and programs, viz., Postulate I, from opportunistic private actions of any private entity, including a clearinghouse. An example of the former would be the actual clearing services and programs. The latter might be a license agreement, a basic sales contract, or even a conference call with certain market participants in which parties discuss projections or internal operations.

This latter set of minor operations and management decisions fall outside the preapproved range of behavior. Nor are they fully controlled by the parallel corporate governance and market monitoring backstops (i.e., Postulate III). Indeed, market participants primarily share the risks of clearing services and consequently are more concerned about the integrity of clearing qua clearing.

Hence, there is always a window of opportunity for opportunism in day-to-day management, which elides both the cooperative market-regulator interaction and market self-monitoring. In an attempt to receive short-term gains, a private entity, tempted by opportunism, imposes negative externalities on the rest of the market. It is necessary for either courts or regulators to act in such circumstances.

This dual understanding of the clearing agencies is implicitly embedded in case law; that is, the cases in the next Section distinguish the “equilibrium cases” from opportunist actions. The pertinent policy arguments may be classified as follows:

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<tr>
<th>Equilibrium Cases</th>
<th>Contiguous Operations</th>
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<tr>
<td>Public Functions:</td>
<td>Transactional &amp; Private:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Efficiency and integrity of the national C&amp;S system</td>
<td>1. Contractual breach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Federal Preemption Arguments</td>
<td>2. Opportunism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Centrality of the SEC’s role as a securities market regulator</td>
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</table>

The research conducted for this Article covered all clearing agencies that were registered with the SEC in the past, as well as the currently registered facilities. Correspondingly, the timeframe was from 1975, the year of the major statutory reform following the back office crisis, to August 2014. Many cases were excluded from the sample as unrelated to the primary functions and structure of the securities clearinghouses. The irrelevant subject matter included, inter alia, employment-related and sexual harassment claims, and futures market manipulation.

Decisions where the Intercontinental Exchange’s (ICE’s) and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s (CME’s) clearinghouses were a party were also excluded. Both clearinghouses are derivatives clearing organizations primarily within the jurisdiction of the CFTC. Including these two agencies would have distorted the analysis of the traditional cooperative arrangements among the SEC, courts, and the securities clearinghouses.

The analysis below also purposely omits five other cases. One court focused on the first-filed rule analysis, and ultimately, another court granted DTC’s motion to dismiss, meaning that both were de facto related to the same dispute. The other two suits involved (a) the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) and the CME, on one side, and the International Securities Exchange (ISE) and the OCC, on the other; and (b) Dow Jones and, again, the ISE and the OCC. In those cases, the primary parties were exchanges and Dow Jones, sparring for the right to trade and profit from ETF and index options, not the clearinghouse. In the first case, the court did not reach the merits of the OCC injunction to clear such options. In both decisions, the clearinghouse-related part depended, to a large extent, on the outcome of the underlying misappropriation, unfair competition, and intellectual property claims with respect to the new options.

The fourth case was dismissed purely on procedural grounds, and therefore, had to be excluded from the analysis. In that case, claims against Midwest Clearing Corporation were dismissed due to the
plaintiff’s failure to serve MCC. In the fifth case, the NSCC was involved in a dispute between the Philadelphia Stock Exchange and one of its members, effectively as an agent holding the member’s funds. Neither the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania nor the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit devoted much of the precious judicial resources to discussing the NSCC’s role in the dispute.

Arguably, the last-mentioned two cases and the option indices cases might be indicative of the judicial understanding of C&S economics and the often ministerial role of a clearing conduit in a transaction. That is why one plaintiff “forgot” to serve MCC, while in the other cases courts were more preoccupied with the financial instruments traded on the ISE than with the OCC-related claims. Since this suggestion is conjectural, the foregoing cases were removed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Procedural and Ministerial</th>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
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Table 1: Sample Cases Summary

3. Positive Outcomes

The majority of the cases in the sample were related to public clearinghouse functions and generated positive outcomes for the clearing agencies involved. They also evince the confluence of procedural and substantive factors underpinning judicial noninterventionism.

Leaving aside general securities law claims and germane pleading standards, a hurdle for some plaintiffs particularly in Rule 10b-5 cases, I would like to concentrate on the substantive analysis...
specifically relevant to the clearing industry. The first cohort of such suits spanned the spectrum of market consolidation, antitrust claims, and the dangers of the lack of competition, as well as the counterbalancing benefits of centralization in C&S.251

Consider the first pertinent case, Bradford, where the District of Columbia Circuit Court affirmed the registration of the NSCC (i.e., a market leader in the making) in part, and remanded in part to the SEC for further consideration of some potentially anticompetitive NSCC programs.252 It seems that the like-minded court and the SEC were in agreement and somewhat downgraded antitrust considerations vis-à-vis the benefits of the national C&S system and expert regulatory oversight. Incidentally, the court observed, albeit merely in a footnote, that although the statute “endorses the enhancement of competition[,] . . . it does so not in listing its ‘objectives,’ but instead in listing the factors for which the Commission is to have ‘due regard’ in achieving those objectives.”253

Some later antitrust complaints targeted specific programs of centralized clearinghouses. In Olde Monmouth, for instance, the plaintiff averred “that DTC enjoy[ed] a monopoly over the entire securities depository industry.”254 When the plaintiff’s application for participation in one DTC program was rejected, the plaintiff, a transfer agent, attempted to exert financial pressure on the DTC and raised various fees.255 In response, the DTC reached out to the plaintiff’s clients, complained about the fee increases, and considered “chilling” the issues for companies using that particular transfer agent.256 The court, applying the Supreme Court test from Grinnell,257 found that the DTC and transfer agents competed in different markets. Therefore, as a matter of law, the complaint failed to state a claim for monopolization of an “irrelevant” market,258 regardless of the simple fact that

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251 See, e.g., Bradford Nat’l Clearing Corp. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 590 F.2d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Olde Monmouth Stock Transfer Co. v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 485 F. Supp. 2d 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (dismissing antitrust claims); Cathedral Trading, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 858–62 (same); see also infra Section IV.B.4 (discussing Chapdelaine Corp. Sec. & Co. v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., No. 05 Civ. 10711(SAS), 2006 WL 2020950 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2006)).

252 The court acknowledged that “NSCC is essentially a public utility that is afforded a monopoly but must offer its services to all qualified customers.” Bradford Nat’l Clearing Corp., 590 F.2d at 1101.

253 Id. at 1095 n.11 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(a)(2) (2012)).


255 Id. at 390.

256 Id. at 390 n.4 (“A stop on physical processing is known in the industry as ‘chilling’ the issue.”).

257 Id. at 392 (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966)).

258 The essential facility doctrine also failed as a matter of law. Id. at 395.
participation in the monopolistic programs of the DTC naturally was crucial to all market participants, including the plaintiff.\footnote{The tortious interference with prospective economic advantage claim, however, survived the motion to dismiss. \textit{Id.} at 397–99. The court observed that “[w]hether plaintiff can prove all the elements of a tortious interference claim is, of course, a different question, which will no doubt be explored in discovery.” \textit{Id.} at 398.}

Consider next that, as discussed in Section III.B.3, clearinghouses are SROs serving the national market and are registered with the SEC. Throughout case law, that market-regulator arrangement and endorsement of all clearinghouses’ programs by the SEC have carried considerable weight with courts. One germane example is negligence claims and cases related to clearing agency operations, including the duty "to properly monitor" clearinghouse programs.\footnote{See, e.g., \textit{Brawer} v. Options Clearing Corp., 807 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1986); \textit{Capece} v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., No. 05-80498 CIV RYSKAMP, 2005 WL 4050118 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 11, 2005); \textit{Dexter} v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 406 F. Supp. 2d 260, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).}

These species of claims often fail as a matter of law. For instance, state negligence law standards might “interfere with the federally-approved” programs, and clearinghouses would be required “to tailor their practices . . . to satisfy each state’s formulation of the standard of care in a negligence action. Such a result would destroy the Congressionally-mandated uniform system governing securities trading.”\footnote{\textit{Capece}, 2005 WL 4050118, at *9.} Similarly, transactional state law requirements may pose an obstacle to clearinghouses’ “accomplishment of congressional objectives,” while concurrent compliance with divergent securities transactions rules is clearly impossible.\footnote{\textit{Nanopierce Techs., Inc.} v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 168 P.3d 73, 76–77, 83 (Nev. 2007).}

And what of discretionary actions effectively involving the exercise of business judgment within preapproved programs’ parameters? Negligence should remain an inappropriate standard, as the Second Circuit has pointed out.\footnote{\textit{Brawer}, 807 F.2d at 302 (“There are good reasons why a negligence standard has not been and should not be applied to SRO decisionmaking.”).} From an economic perspective, an SRO like a clearinghouse is an expert body, which needs \textit{both} its discretion and the freedom to exercise it. Hence, to the market, the danger is not only that negligence analysis “would force a court to substitute its judgment for that of the experts” in an “after-the-fact litigation,” but also that “such an intrusion would conflict with the Congressional scheme of exchange self-regulation,” and most importantly, “increase market uncertainty.”\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 302–03.} In that case, both the court and the SEC, as expressed in its amicus brief, reaffirmed the value of procedural fairness and the finality of
clearinghouse decisions, and effectively refused to muddy the transparency of clearing operations by impromptu judicial quirks. Instead, clearinghouses are expected to have internal procedural safeguards, such as various committees, which examine market circumstances and make appropriate adjustments ensuring fairness of operational decisions.

By the same token, in cases where a party believes that a clearinghouse’s action is arbitrary and capricious, the complaint may be more “properly addressed to the SEC, which oversees [clearing agency] activities.” The benefit of kicking some alleged instances of misbehavior back to the regulator is that it draws on the safety valves of Postulates I, II, and III. For instance, the SEC unquestionably would have better expertise in evaluating a rule and its application than generalist courts, the benefit expressly acknowledged by some judges.

In addition to this common advantage of administrative review, the SEC may prompt a culprit to reconsider the practices at issue ahead of unnecessary and wasteful litigation. Finally, in the clearinghouses case, the misfortunes of an aggrieved party may resonate with the members of a clearinghouse, which, because of the participatory corporate governance mechanisms embedded in Postulate III, may cause a direct change in a rule or its administration.

Consider third that the preeminence of congressional approval of the national clearing market and deference to the SEC and its mandate to implement C&S reforms necessarily bring into action the doctrine of federal preemption. This doctrine helps clearinghouses secure dismissal of lawsuits and cuts off many state law causes of action. Examples of such commonly brought state law causes of action vary from the abovementioned negligence claims, to challenges to the administration of clearinghouse programs or to the programs per se, misrepresentation, market manipulation, intentional interference with contractual relations, and many others. In most cases, various circuit courts, district courts, and state courts are in agreement on the subject of preemption.

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265 Id. at 303.
266 Id. at 300–01 (reviewing OCC bylaws).
268 See, e.g., PennMont Sec. v. Frucher, 586 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 2009) (observing, generally, in respect to an exchange rule that the court “would be far better positioned to consider the propriety of the application of Rule 651 had PennMont given the SEC the opportunity to apply its expertise to this matter in the first place”).
269 See, e.g., Pet Quarters, Inc. v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 559 F.3d 772, 778, 782 (8th Cir. 2009) (affirming a district court decision dismissing the claims of market manipulation, illegal tying, conversion, and conspiracy, as “amount[ing] to direct, facial attacks on the operation of the Commission approved program,” and misrepresentation claims
The underlying rationale may be simplified and expounded as follows: Imagine that a state court decides to side with a plaintiff and finds that a transaction performed under a clearinghouse loan program, officially designated the “Stock Borrow Program,” is nothing but a sale. Such a finding certainly “would conflict directly with the Commission approved rules” on the Stock Borrow Program, as well as “with the Commission’s control of the national securities clearing and settlement system and pose an obstacle to the congressional objectives in Section 17A.”

Hence, preemption should follow naturally.

In this Article, I leave the pertinent discussions on the distinctions between conflict preemption and field preemption in C&S statutes for another day. They are less important to this research than the actual results (i.e., the dismissals). As an aside, the research conducted for this Article found only one case where a clearinghouse, specifically, the OCC, was named as a defendant and where the court was somewhat hesitant to endorse preemption. The fulcrum of that Ninth Circuit case, however, was not the statutory provisions on clearing per se, but section 9 of the Exchange Act—a security price manipulation provision. In the end, the court upheld the grant of summary judgment and found the state law claims meritless.

“preempted because they attacked elements of that program”); Whistler Invs., Inc. v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 539 F.3d 1159, 1166–68 (9th Cir. 2008) (deciding on an assortment of misrepresentation, unfair trade practices, market manipulation, and other claims, and finding that all of them are preempted “under the doctrine of conflict preemption”); Capece v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., No. 05–80498 CIV RYSKAMP, 2005 WL 4050118, at *8–9 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 11, 2005) (finding that “[p]ervasive Congressional regulation of the securities trading industry requires that this matter be heard in federal court. The same regulation also mandates dismissal of state law challenges to the operation of the securities market,” and also reviewing “[t]he ‘substantial federal interest’ doctrine[,] which] requires removal of a putative state law complaint when the resolution thereof requires inquiry into areas in which the federal government has a substantial and comprehensive interest,” and finding that “any resolution of Plaintiffs’ claim is dependent upon the scope and requirement of federal law”); Nanopierce Techs., Inc. v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 168 P.3d 73, 79–85 (Nev. 2007) (reviewing a complaint alleging various misrepresentation, unfair trade practices, market manipulation, conversion, intentional interference with contractual relations, and other claims; providing a comprehensive analysis of the preemption doctrine, including express and implied preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption; and finding that the claims conflicted with the congressional regulatory scheme). These cases mainly challenged the Stock Borrow Program (SBP), created by DTCC subsidiaries to mitigate the risks of short-term fails to delivery. Complaints also alleged, inter alia, “that the naked short selling was facilitated by . . . defects in a [NSCC] program,” Whistler Invs., 539 F.3d at 1163, that NSCC and DTC “failed to monitor the SBP” properly, Capece, 2005 WL 4050118, at *3, or that the value of plaintiff’s stock was diluted by such “loaning,” Pet Quarters, 559 F.3d at 777–78.

270 Pet Quarters, 559 F.3d at 781–82.

271 See, e.g., Whistler Invs., 539 F.3d at 1165–67 (focusing on conflict preemption); cf. Capece, 2005 WL 4050118, at *6 (hinting at complete preemption).


273 Id. at 590–91 (noting that “[u]nder the circumstances, we are hesitant to affirm the district court on the basis that state common law would necessarily conflict with the federal
Another cognate doctrine in cases concerning SEC-approved rules and SROs is regulatory immunity. Recall from the discussion in Section III.B.1 that the early statutory reforms converted clearinghouses into SROs to whom the SEC delegated significant market oversight functions. By extension, an SRO may stand in the SEC’s shoes as immune from suits so long as its conduct is within the ambit of its regulatory purposes, programs, and functions under federal securities law.274

Furthermore, following a program backed by a regulatory imprimatur, or even failing to comply with the program, does not easily lend itself to a successful private suit, nor does it imply the existence of a private right of action, particularly absent a showing of bad faith.275 Think about the reality and economics of SRO operations and clearing. Clearinghouses need to exercise discretion in discharging some of their SEC-approved duties. Thus, reality dictates that in certain cases “the implication of a private cause of action could undermine the ability of [clearinghouses] to perform their functions.”276

Finally, courts exhibited a profound understanding of C&S functions by being careful not to impose additional presumptive duties on a clearinghouse, a large entity with attractively deep pockets. Consider that the objectives of clearing and clearinghouses’ duties to their members are (a) predetermined by their functions as economical and reliable conduits assuring safe exchange of assets among counterparties, and (b) carefully spelled out in the participant agreements and bylaws. This twofold arrangement calls for limited liability.

In some cases, clearing conduits perform only simple ministerial operations.277 For instance, C&S facilities may act as disbursing agents

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275 See, e.g., Brawer v. Options Clearing Corp., 807 F.2d 297, 299 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[W]e affirm and hold that a private cause of action against an exchange or a clearinghouse for failure to comply with one of its rules which requires an exercise of discretion . . . may be brought only if it is premised upon allegations of fraud or bad faith.”); In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp., No. 95-08203 (JLG), 1998 WL 551972, at *27–30 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 1998) (discussing similar supporting arguments and case law); see also Olde Monmouth Stock Transfer Co. v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 485 F. Supp. 2d 387, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Capece, 2005 WL 4050118, at *3, *6–8; Dexter, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 262–63.


277 See, e.g., Dexter, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 264 (referring to DTC’s actions as “ministerial”); Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Liechtensteinische Landesbank, 866 F. Supp. 114, 117
in bankruptcies or corporate reorganizations (i.e., they are not a party to the underlying agreements, distributions, or transactions). In other cases, a clearinghouse may undertake to clear and settle transactions with participants’ securities, but limit other obligations and, for instance, omit the duty to apprise the participants of reorganizations and exchanges of the securities.

The standardized fees and low-cost nature of C&S services underlie and indeed presuppose their limited duties. Accordingly, clearing agencies normally are not compensated for extra risks that they would have incurred had they undertaken additional contractual obligations. Inasmuch as they perform limited obligations, their potential liability should equally be limited. Hence, this general approach to liability corresponds to the industry’s objective of providing cost efficient C&S services.

4. Negative Decisions as Proof of Postulate IV

Out of the twenty-four decisions in the sample, only two were “against” clearinghouses. Both confirm the foregoing “confluence of circumstances” and judicial noninterventionism (i.e., Postulate IV). In both cases, the clearinghouses were outside of the market-regulator

(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“[T]he nature and object of the Agreement . . . is that DTC would provide transfer depository services of a ministerial nature to Smith Barney . . . .”).

278 See, e.g., Onco Inv. Co. v. Nw. Bank Minn., 222 F. App’x 100, 102 (3d Cir. 2007) (“DTC was not a party to the Senior Noteholder Agreement, however, and its responsibility under the Plan was limited to making distribution in accordance with the final, court-approved Plan, a task which it concededly performed.”).

279 See, e.g., Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. v. Gofen & Glossberg, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 713, 719 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (analyzing pertinent provisions of MSTC/MCC’s Handbook and stating that “the rule merely apprises participants of the procedures MSTC follows when clients wish to act on reorganization activities,” but “it does not require that MSTC give this notice”).

280 See, e.g., Smith Barney, 866 F. Supp. at 118 (observing “that the parties did not intend that DTC insure Smith Barney’s deposits” and citing as evidence that DTC “sets fees irrespective of the value of the securities deposited”).

281 Such cases often call for simple contractual analysis. See, e.g., id. at 118 (analyzing DTC’s contractual obligations and finding “there is not evidence upon which a jury could determine an absence of good faith on the part of DTC in carrying out its contractual duty”); Pompano-Windy City Partners, Ltd. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 794 F. Supp. 1265, 1290–91 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).

282 Chapdelaine Corp. Sec. & Co. v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., No. 05 Civ. 10711(SAS), 2006 WL 2029950 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2006); Platinum Partners Value Arbitrage Fund, LP v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., 976 N.E.2d 415 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). The third seminegative one was Olde Monmouth Stock Transfer Co. v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 485 F. Supp. 2d 387, 397–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (directing the parties to draft a discovery plan with respect to the claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, but dismissing all other claims). The “outside the equilibrium,” private nature of DTC’s actions in this case, such as contacting plaintiff’s customers, id. at 388–89, was similar to the key decisions discussed in this Section.
equilibrium. Namely, they transacted as private entities acting out of self-interest.

Their tactical decisions were not captured by the aforementioned corporate self-monitoring mechanisms. As participant-monitors did not have a specific interest in the outcome of the clearinghouses’ actions in question, the existing risk-incentive backstops became irrelevant. Nor did the regulations touch upon those actions, since the actions at issue were only marginally related to the stability of the national C&S system.

In the first case, *Platinum Partners*, the decision of a clearinghouse was not within the purview of a preapproved program. In sum, the OCC and the CBOE adjusted a strike price of certain options and disclosed that decision *privately* to certain market participants prior to the *public* announcement of the adjustment. The court, as is common, first focused on the doctrine of regulatory immunity and the agencies’ duties as SROs. After that junction, *Platinum Partners* and the typical “positive” decisions diverge.

The *Platinum Partners* court demarcated two separate actions, including (1) the price adjustment, which “itself may have been a regulatory decision, [and (2)] the manner in which it was disclosed—privately and prematurely—...[which] was not.” The private manner of disclosure was unrelated to any identified regulatory purposes and benefited the OCC and the CBOE as *private* entities “acting in their private capacity and for their own corporate benefit.”

The second case also addressed the manner of clearinghouse operations and additional contractual issues. In short, the plaintiff attempted to license its software to the DTCC. In the course of the negotiations, the parties signed a nondisclosure agreement and discussed certain functional specifications of the software. When the negotiations broke down, the DTCC “announced its plans to develop its own software system,” allegedly “caus[ing] potential...licensees to cease negotiations with [the plaintiff],” which precipitated the lawsuit.

The plaintiff brought antitrust claims, among others. As discussed in Section III.C, the DTCC’s subsidiaries are and were for a long time a de facto monopoly. The defendant asseverated that, being a clearing agency, it was merely “a utility...provid[ing] automated centralized clearing and settlement services,” while the plaintiff was “an interdealer broker and software developer.” At first glance, such different businesses did not share a “relevant market” that could be monopolized

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283 *Platinum Partners*, 976 N.E.2d at 419 (reversing the trial court decision, which was “based on defendants' conduct as self-regulatory organizations” and regulatory immunity).

284 *Id.* at 422.

285 *Id.*

286 *Chapdelaine Corp. Sec.*, 2006 WL 2020950, at *2.

287 *Id.* at *5.
by the DTCC. The court, however, was hesitant to grant DTCC’s motion to dismiss without a fact-intensive inquiry.\textsuperscript{288}

As a final remark, there could be other auxiliary reasons for the court’s decision. Structurally, the odds were stacked against a small licensor whose product possibly was misappropriated by a monopoly, enabling the latter to offer the same service within a larger package. Perhaps that was one of the additional reasons for the judicial reluctance, which helps explain why this case stands in contrast to \textit{Olde Monmouth}, another Southern District of New York decision, where the court sided with the DTC, a monopoly, finding that the DTC and a transfer agent operated in different markets.\textsuperscript{289}

5. Conclusion

One would not want to substitute normative premises for positive implications of the regulator-market-court arrangement discussed in this Section. Indeed, courts are not a harmonious and single-minded body. Nor are the facts in the disputes discussed all alike. However, this does not refute the suggestion that a de facto cooperative equilibrium involving courts, regulators, and clearinghouses existed for almost four decades. The sample cases demonstrate that even though that cooperation has been based on such positive premises as federal preemption or the regulatory approval of clearinghouse rules, Postulate IV does seem to exist and does reinforce the linear market-regulator interaction.

V. \textbf{THE TRADITIONAL MODEL AND POSTCRISIS REGULATIONS}

A. \textit{Introduction}

Post–Dodd-Frank regulations comply with none of the characteristics of the model described in this Article. Recall that the \textit{raison d’être} of the reforms is not that clearinghouses were or are in dire straits or that the SEC failed to properly supervise the C&S businesses. Instead, the reforms resulted from across-the-board regulatory changes and the perceived general failure of sector-specific regulators during the

\textsuperscript{288} \textit{Id. at *3, *5} (finding that the “stated market is sufficiently plausible to withstand the motion to dismiss”).

\textsuperscript{289} See \textit{Olde Monmouth Stock Transfer Co. v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp.}, 485 F. Supp. 2d 387, 397–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Recall, however, that the motion to dismiss the claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage was denied. \textit{Id.}
crisis, which originated in other sectors of the financial industry. This Part examines how—at the risk of upsetting the preexisting balance—the SEC is bending its policies in response to post–Dodd-Frank coordination and whether the new rules may disturb the key postulates of the traditional arrangement (i.e., the cooperative market-regulator interaction and sector-specific expert decision making).

B. Postulates I, II, and III: Dodd-Frank and Derivatives Clearinghouses

The first issue to review is the expansion of the SEC’s jurisdiction over additional “supervisees.” Currently, seven entities are active registered clearing agencies. Four of them have derivatives, futures, and swaps clearing businesses and are dually registered with the SEC and the CFTC. Some of the entities have been added due to their clearing of security-based swaps pursuant to the “Deemed Registered Provision” under Title VII of Dodd-Frank. The primary supervisory agency for those derivatives clearinghouses is often the CFTC, although the SEC also has a say in their regulation.

The corporate governance structures of the newly added clearinghouses and of the traditional clearinghouses are divergent. Namely, the antitrust and monitoring backstops, as well as the market organization, cumulatively comprising Postulate III, differ. Historically, regulators were more concerned with fragmentation in the derivatives clearing market, particularly futures C&S, and the lack of competition, than in the case of the securities clearing industry. Such issues as clearing fragmentation, vertical integration, and inadequate interexchange clearing resurfaced every so often in various studies and

290 See discussion supra Part I. In contrast, “[p]ast reforms tended, overall, to be roughly proportional to precipitating events.” See, e.g., Cunningham & Zaring, supra note 1, at 72.
292 Id. at 21048; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c-3, 78q-1 (2012).
293 See, e.g., Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 15, at 345, 355, 359 (discussing the policy evolution from the 1970s through the 1999 reforms). Today, there is no central clearing venue for futures. Instead, the industry operates within vertical silos. Id. at 374–75.
public statements, including the post-1987 market crash studies,\textsuperscript{294} as well as in more recent Justice Department letters.\textsuperscript{295}

That fragmentation was deeper than in securities markets and persisted side by side with increased industry consolidation. By the mid-1990s, most trading in futures occurred and was settled through Chicago’s markets.\textsuperscript{296} Today, within the CME Group, there is CME Clearing, a registered clearing agency and derivatives clearing organization registered with both the CFTC and the SEC under Dodd-Frank.\textsuperscript{297} CME Clearing clears transactions effected on the CBOT, CME, COMEX, and NYMEX exchanges, as well as OTC transactions.\textsuperscript{298} Another market is the ICE, which after a series of acquisitions—including a spectacular foray on NYSE Euronext in 2013\textsuperscript{299}—also became one of the largest exchanges. It is the second-largest futures market in the world and is also involved in credit default swaps (CDS) clearing.\textsuperscript{300} The Exchange has its own clearinghouses, some of which are dually registered with both commissions.\textsuperscript{301}

Both CME and ICE clearinghouses provide services for multiple derivatives products. Obviously, both entities fall under the definition of

\textsuperscript{294} GAO, \textit{CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT REFORM}, supra note 67, at 11, 65 n.4 (mentioning that the Chicago markets dominate clearing and that contracts are not fungible between exchanges); see also Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 15, at 313–14, 374–75 (discussing the dominant position of CME in futures trading and the vertical integration model of clearing, and observing that in contrast to the securities market, regulators were unable to develop market competition in the futures industry).

\textsuperscript{295} In a 2008 letter to the Treasury, the Justice Department emphasized “that the control exercised by futures exchanges over clearing services . . . has made it difficult for exchanges to enter and compete in the trading of financial futures contracts.” Will Acworth, \textit{Justice Department Urges Treasury to Examine Clearing Arrangements in U.S. Futures Industry}, \textit{FUTURES INDUS.}, Mar.–Apr. 2008, at 42, http://www.futuresindustry.org/downloads/Mar-Apr_Wash_Watch.pdf.

\textsuperscript{296} GAO, \textit{PAYMENTS, CLEARANCE, AND SETTLEMENT}, supra note 64, at 68–75; GAO, \textit{CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT REFORM}, supra note 67, at 11.


\textsuperscript{301} See \textit{Overview}, supra note 300.
“systemically important” FMUs under Title VIII of Dodd-Frank.\footnote{Designated Financial Market Utilities, supra note 203.} Monitoring these entities is bound to create new challenges for the Commission, which is less accustomed to dealing with the new supervisees because of their different businesses and industry organization.

The second related concern is the a priori disparate corporate governance structure and the lack of customary monitoring backstops characteristic of the traditional securities clearinghouses. In a nutshell, CME Clearing is a division of CME Inc., which “is a wholly-owned subsidiary of CME Group.”\footnote{See, e.g., CME GRP., CME CLEARING: PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES DISCLOSURE 2, 18 (2015), http://www.cmegroup.com/clearing/risk-management/files/cme-clearing-principles-for-financial-market-infrastructure-disclosure.pdf.} “The Board of Directors of CME Inc. is comprised of the same individuals as the Board of Directors [of] CME Group . . . .”\footnote{Id. at 18.} Although international standards would require governance arrangements to recognize broad interests of various stakeholders, as the Group acknowledges, CME also explicitly underscores that “the Board represents the shareholders’ interests.”\footnote{Id. at 18.} There are, of course, procedural safeguards, such as the presence of a majority of independent directors on the Board, an independent Nominating Committee, a separate Clearing House Risk Committee in charge of financial surveillance, and member monitoring and disciplinary policies, among other protections.\footnote{See id. at 22–24, 30–31.} Nevertheless, the corporate ownership and governance structure differs from the DTCC’s broader stakeholder approach.

The same applies to, for example, ICE Clear Credit (ICECC), a clearinghouse registered with the SEC under Dodd-Frank. ICECC is a subsidiary of Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. Just like in the case of CME, several independent directors (at least six out of eleven) on ICECC’s Board of Managers are intended to serve as a corporate safety valve.\footnote{ICE CLEAR CREDIT, REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE: FACT SHEET 2 (2016), https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/clear_credit/ICE_Clear_Credit_Regulation_and_Governance.pdf.} Similar to CME, the layout of the Board implies a substantial representation of the parent exchange. The Board, of course, is advised by the Risk Committee, Advisory Committee, and Risk Management Subcommittee, tasked with risk-related assessments and recommendations, and member eligibility standards, among other responsibilities.\footnote{Id. at 3.} Even though all risk committees include clearing participants, which “is necessary because of the risk mutualization
function of a clearing house—non-defaulting members are responsible for covering losses in the event of a default of another clearing member—309—as well as broader risk monitoring concerns, such committees issue mainly advisory opinions. The Board is not obligated to accept their proposals.310 Once again, similar to the CME’s management, the ICE clearinghouse ownership and governance structure may not allow a similarly strong representation of the participants and other stakeholders’ interests as the ownership and governance mechanisms of the DTCC or the OCC.

In theory, the SEC will need to recalibrate its traditional approach (i.e., Postulates I and II) in order to properly evaluate such different entities. Their shareholders may not have the same monitoring incentives, while other stakeholders do not have the same oversight opportunities as those enjoyed by the “traditional” clearinghouses’ stakeholders.311 In other words, the recalibration should reflect the fact that Postulate III of the market-regulator interaction must be different—or even weaker.

The Commission has exhibited a somewhat surprising eagerness to review the proposed rules of such new entities and thereby has committed to monitoring them more closely. In the rule filing requirements, the Commission suggested, in pertinent part, that:

The Exchange Act imposes upon the Commission an independent statutory responsibility to oversee the operations of Registered Clearing Agencies as a whole, and not solely in regard to specific products. . . . Accordingly, the Commission believes that its continued review of rule filings that primarily affect a Dually-Registered Clearing Agency’s operations involving futures that are not securities futures, swaps that are not securities swaps or mixed swaps . . . and other non-securities products is a necessary and appropriate part of the Commission’s statutory mandate.312

These peremptory statements are problematic in several respects. Even though the need to effect adequate supervision indeed may dictate placing the new businesses in context, it also leads to wasting public

309 Id. at 2.
310 Id. at 3; see also ICE CLEAR CREDIT, CLEARING RULES 52, 62 (2016), https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/clear_credit/ICE_Clear_Credit_Rules.pdf (discussing rules 501 and 509).
311 See, e.g., Yadav & Turing, supra note 10, at 12–13 (discussing the pros and cons of different ownership structures of CME and ICE Clearing).
resources, acquiring duplicate supervisory expertise,\textsuperscript{313} and to pertinent coordinating with the CFTC. The accompanying risk of \textit{collectivism} may manifest itself through jurisdic-tional uncertainty or by triggering group dynamics and coalition building within the newly overcoordinated regulatory network. It may also occasion ex post regulatory turf wars among regulators with inherently different philosophies and expertise.\textsuperscript{314}

The Commission certainly deserves credit for being demonstrably cautious about this issue in other rules. In a 2014 release proposing a new rule related to standards for systemically important clearing agencies, the Commission correctly sought to cede its authority to the CFTC where, for instance, a CCP clears security-based swaps and the CFTC is its primary supervisory agency.\textsuperscript{315} The proposed rule is a step in the right anticollectivist direction.

Yet the release conflicts with the statements that the SEC needs to evaluate the derivatives market clearing and place it “in proper context.”\textsuperscript{316} Hence, the “totality” of the statements demonstrates inadequate jurisdictional clarity. Self-evidently, such ambiguities may ricochet, bring about uncertainty in industry practices, and increase derivatives clearinghouses’ compliance costs.

\textbf{C. Blunders and Regressing Toward the Mean}

The problem of increased compliance costs and uncertainty is bidirectional: not only will the derivatives clearinghouses be affected by the SEC’s actions, but also the new recalibration may impact the traditional clearing supervisees (i.e., securities clearinghouses) in unpredictable ways. The major germane risk is the superfluous spillover of the rules designed for one set of entities into the regulation of substantially different institutions.

\textsuperscript{313} The SEC has already spent disproportionate resources on developing some marginal Dodd-Frank rules. For instance, security-based swaps were an infinitesimal part of swaps as an asset class. See Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the 15th Annual A.A. Sommer Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities and Financial Law: The Securities and Exchange Commission—The Next 80 Years (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543190122#.VN7GRPnF_iU. A far-reaching commitment to future monitoring of “nontraditional” clearinghouses within the primary jurisdiction of the CFTC may further overstretch the scarce resources of the SEC.

\textsuperscript{314} See discussion \textit{supra} Part II.


\textsuperscript{316} Amendment to Rule Filing Requirements for Dually-Registered Clearing Agencies, 78 Fed. Reg. at 21053.
An example of this spillover is what this Article refers to as the “regression toward the regulatory mean.” This regression may be both natural and intuitive. Specifically, it is simpler for a regulatory body to apply the same set of harmonized rules to all entities within a regulated industry. More individualized approaches consume more public resources and may cause friction among regulators with overlapping jurisdictions. In addition, due to the associated economies of scale, the more entities an agency regulates, the easier it is to apply a single set of average regulations.

Another possible cause of the regression is the lack of ex ante market input. Perhaps for the first time in the history of the U.S. C&S industry, a statute has mandatorily extended centralized clearing and the SEC’s authority to new financial instruments and additional entities, absent meaningful industry experiments. There were some early industry initiatives, such as new trade repositories, but swap clearing centralization does not appear to be principally market driven.

In one of the major articles on clearinghouses, Mark Roe has aptly described how the regulators seized on the idea of clearing centralization and then suggested and advertised it to the financial markets. Similarly, there seemed to be no consensus on the best way to approach swaps clearing. Professor Griffith, for instance, discussed meaningful alternative solutions proposed by industry groups and academics. Without market-supplied templates, the regulators may be enticed to borrow from one another. Regulatory averages and accompanying harmonization are thus a natural outcome. On the policy side, Dodd-Frank overcoordination, and the accompanying risk of collectivism, spur this imitation.

For example, under Title VIII, clearing agencies that are systemically important FMUs are subject to enhanced supervision by not only the SEC, but also by other regulators, such as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, with whom the SEC must consult on certain aspects of rulemaking. The CFTC and the SEC logically cannot apply completely divergent requirements to FMUs.
Today, the final and proposed rules of both commissions in part are tailored to the specifics of their respective markets. Yet, in part they also already apply “average” rules across various sectors. One example of the self-evident outgrowth of any generic rulemaking is the danger that an expert regulator, such as the SEC, may occasionally blunder and succumb to a “view [that] derives principally from the default management practices of derivatives CCPs . . . . [and] is in marked contrast to the U.S. cash markets.”

Consider another example where the new SEC release on covered clearing agencies fails to account for the specifics of the U.S. C&S industry. In sum, recall that there are only a handful of sole providers of C&S services in the securities and options markets. Hence, the competition is, as the SEC acknowledges in other parts of the release, nonexistent. Against this backdrop, such standard and average requirements as, for instance, establishing “orderly wind-down” plans may appear questionable—a “wind-down [plan] is not necessarily a workable option for critical [and monopolistic] market infrastructure providers” in the United States.

Finally, averages may create unnecessary challenges for the traditional clearing agencies. A case in point is the capital and funding requirements and the possible related modifications of corporate ownership. This, for instance, puzzled the OCC, which pointed out the difficulties of “raising equity capital through the issuance of common stock” due to its peculiar corporate ownership structure and called for more regulatory flexibility in this respect.


324 Letter from Larry E. Thompson, supra note 12, at 8 (commenting on the proposed participant default rules and procedures); see also Clearing Agency Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. at 66233 (discussing DTCC’s comments on the absence of cost-benefit analysis for financial resources requirement); id. at 66233 n.151 (discussing OCC’s comments on the greater challenges associated with risk management tasks in options compared to some security-based swaps).
326 See, e.g., Letter from Larry E. Thompson, supra note 12, at 6 (commenting on wind down and recovery planning); see also id. at 7–8 (commenting on depository rules).
327 See, e.g., 2014 OCC Letter, supra note 24, at 13–14 (commenting on the OCC’s equity structure, revenues, and funding strategies).
The final issue is the impending paradigmatic changes in the overall philosophy of the Commission (i.e., Postulates I and II). The SEC apparently struggles to reconcile the old, more flexible approach with the new, more rule-based philosophy of other regulators and of Dodd-Frank. The initial postcrisis rule established “minimum requirements for registered clearing agency risk management practices and operations with due consideration given to equivalent standards of other regulators in the United States and to international standards.” The rule applied to the clearing agencies registered with the SEC.

The general tone of these 2012 standards paid homage to the SEC’s traditional principles-based approach. The Commission exhibited some deference to the discretion and expertise of clearinghouses, using words like “flexibility” as frequent descriptive terms explaining the provisions’ raison d’être.

It seems the SEC was also striving to strike an appropriate balance between the new requirements, prescriptive rigidity, and principles-based traditions. For instance, it acknowledged that some risk management and other standards require business judgment, particularly important in light of ever-changing market conditions. The Commission also seemed responsive to the comments and, in case of disagreement, provided more or less cogent arguments in support of its position. It also promised a continuous open dialogue should questions arise due to “the dynamic nature of clearing agency risk management practices [and] changing market practices.”

The Commission, in keeping with its tradition, converted many preexisting business practices into minimum standards and

328 Clearing Agency Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. at 66224 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 66229 (summarizing the content of the rule).
329 Id. at 66258.
330 Terms like “flexibility” and “flexible” are found thirty-four times in the text of the 2012 Release, and in most cases they refer to the clearinghouses’ discretion. For instance, with respect to credit exposure management, the SEC stated that it “believes that a less prescriptive and more flexible rule sets a more appropriate baseline standard.” Id. at 66231; see also id. at 66231–33, 66235, 66242–43, 66247 (generally underscoring the value of clearinghouses’ expertise, regulatory flexibility, and the necessity to enable CCPs to determine the most effective approaches to mitigating various risks).
331 See, e.g., id. at 66224–25 (taking into account implementation requests); id. at 66229–30 (addressing definitional concerns involving normal market conditions, participant family, and others); id. at 66237–38 (conceding on some model validation requirements); id. at 66249–50 (mentioning the discretion needed in establishing tailored settlement bank practice rules).
332 See, e.g., id. at 66234–35 (citing research on CDS and standards affording appropriate flexibility); id. at 66240–43 (discussing the access, net capital restrictions, and other rules).
333 Id. at 66226.
One example is the standards with respect to measurement and management of credit exposure, margin requirements, and financial resources. The standards are described as “targets for clearing agencies to meet without prescribing a particular method.” Similarly, in line with the longstanding regulatory trend of promoting existing best practices through codification, the SEC underscored the “commonly accepted [margining] practice as the minimum benchmark for measuring credit exposures and setting margin requirements.” By extension, CCPs are free to implement more conservative standards.

The Commission even admitted that in certain areas, such as risk management, “a less prescriptive approach can help promote efficient practices and encourage regulated entities to consider how to manage their regulatory obligations and risk management practices in a way that complies with Commission rules while accounting for the particular characteristics of their business.” Even though clearing agencies were not entirely supportive of the rule, they acknowledged the SEC’s efforts to preserve this principles-based mindset.

This philosophy recently suffered a setback. A couple of years after the systemically important FMUs had been designated and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) came up with the new standards, the SEC’s tone somewhat sharpened and the discretion afforded to systemically important clearinghouses was further curtailed in some areas. The resulting logical conundrum the SEC currently faces is evident, as is the potentially profound and ill-explained shift in its traditional philosophy and the manifest and almost

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334 See, e.g., id. at 66226–28, 66230 (establishing risk management targets “without prescribing a particular method”); id. at 66231 (establishing a baseline standard and underscoring individual risk characteristics of CCPs); id. at 66232 (underscoring the value of flexibility in initial margin setting policies); id. at 66253–54 (mentioning the importance of collaboration between regulators and the ongoing efforts in some industry programs such as dematerialization); id. at 66272–73 (observing the consistency of the rule with industry practices and their codification).

335 Id. at 66230 (emphasis added).

336 Id. at 66226.

337 Id. at 66226–27.

338 Id. at 66226.

339 See discussion infra Section V.F.

340 See, e.g., CPSS-IOSCO, PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES, supra note 12; see also discussion supra Section II.A.

axiomatic acceptance of the need for harmonization and coordination.342

In a nutshell, in 2014, the Commission proposed amending Rule 17Ad-22 to enhance mandatory requirements for general organization, financial risk management, default management, collateral, access, efficiency, transparency, operations, and governance of clearinghouses. The proposed rule places greater emphasis on more specific provisions, including, inter alia, reporting, auditing, stress testing, and statistical modeling.343

The proposed requirements are designed specifically for “covered” clearinghouses. This category generally includes clearing agencies designated as systemically important, unless their primary regulator is the CFTC.344 Technically, all major traditional clearinghouses are now “covered.”345 The list also includes complex risk profile agencies providing CCP services for swaps.

The proposed rule, although still acknowledging the value of clearinghouse discretion, imposes more prescriptive standards.346 The proffered explanations for the new rules and greater specificity abound. They vary from the traditional rationale of providing an impetus to certain business practices, to the need for “policies and procedures more closely tailored to the risks that are posed by covered clearing agencies, which the Commission preliminarily identified as appropriate in connection with its experience in supervising registered clearing agencies.”347 What is left unexplained, however, is which existing and serious clearing inefficiencies per se called for these new regulations.

It is thus understandable that the SEC struggles to fit the rule into the new context (i.e., greater prescriptiveness, policy harmonization, and coordination) while continuing to underscore the need for some flexibility. For instance, liquidity considerations were always part of

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344 Id. at 29514–16 (describing the types of covered agencies, such as designated clearing agencies (i.e., systemically important FMUs for which the Commission is the supervisory agency), complex risk profile clearing agencies, and others).

345 Id. at 29515–16 (“For instance, because DTC, FICC, NSCC, and OCC are registered clearing agencies . . . , they would be covered clearing agencies under [the] proposed Rule . . . .”).

346 Id. at 29588–89 (discussing the differences between the SEC’s proposals, on the one hand, and the CFTC’s and the Fed’s rules, on the other).

347 Id. at 29515.
C&S regulatory standards. The new rule makes them more specific and, inter alia, adds “qualifying liquid resources” and at least annual testing with liquidity providers.\textsuperscript{348} However, the Commission highlights, as it has in the past, the value of flexibility in using funding arrangements.\textsuperscript{349} Similarly, it did not invent the testing requirements—comparable tests are “performed currently by certain registered clearing agencies but are subject to variation due, in part, to the absence of a regulatory requirement.”\textsuperscript{350} The SEC thus attempts, on the one hand, to adhere to the same market impetus-reform pattern and principles-based philosophy and, on the other hand, to promote more prescriptive and more coordinated policies.

Unfortunately, the Commission seems to flounder in its explanations of the underlying rationale for modifying the rules. For example, the SEC constantly references its regulatory experience, the value of which is weakened by concurrent countervailing references to the new international standards, and it accepts as a given the alleged “benefits that would accrue through maintaining consistency with regulations adopted by the Board and the CFTC.”\textsuperscript{351} Without additional research, this reasoning may seem unconvincing in light of the arguments against excessive regulatory uniformity and coordination discussed in Part II.\textsuperscript{352}

Another example of the SEC’s arguments that also appear somewhat unpersuasive concerns the dangers of “ambiguity,” discussed in the section of the 2014 Release devoted to examining the value of discretion. Even disregarding the fact that, when referring to “[r]ecent academic research,” the 2014 Release briefly cites a 1989 paper by Gilboa and Schmeidler,\textsuperscript{353} a seminal theoretical paper per se, a more recent and more substantively relevant reference is questionable. The SEC relies on Easley and O’Hara’s model, whose application is primarily relevant to the differences in the level of specificity of exchange rules and their pertinent listing and clearing standards, and the effect of such

\textsuperscript{348} See id. at 29531, 29534, 29569.
\textsuperscript{349} Id. at 29532; see also id. at 29534 (“Clearing agencies should have the flexibility to use stress scenarios that are appropriately calibrated to the markets in which they operate.” (emphasis added)).
\textsuperscript{350} Id. at 29534 (“The Commission preliminarily anticipates the effect of the proposed rule will be to require the development of more uniform liquidity testing practices by covered clearing agencies, and has accordingly proposed to allow covered clearing agencies to assess the practicability of such testing to provide them with reasonable flexibility to design the tests to suit the circumstances of the covered clearing agency and its particular liquidity arrangements.”); see also id. at 29588 (expanding the definition of qualifying liquid resources).
\textsuperscript{351} Id. at 29577.
\textsuperscript{352} See discussion supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
specificity on ambiguity averse investors and traders.354 The model does not suggest that U.S. regulators must step in to bolster specificity in the rules of all clearinghouses, particularly the traditional clearinghouses, but only that traders may gravitate toward exchanges with less ambiguous rules and that microstructure may increase participation by firms and issuers.355

There is no evidence that U.S. C&S rules suffered from the maladies of ambiguity as reflected, for instance, in the unmatched cost efficiency of the clearing industry. A more correct approach, therefore, would be to conduct separate studies to examine the effect of specificity in C&S rules.

Other somewhat inchoate arguments refer to the 2008 financial crisis. A good example, again, is the more specific rules on testing the sufficiency of financial resources, estimation of credit and liquidity exposures, and rules on pertinent analyses. A supporting point is the SEC’s supervisory experience, which convinced the Commission

that certain, but not all, covered clearing agencies adjusted their stress testing scenarios following the 2008 financial crisis to incorporate larger debt, equity, and credit market shocks similar to those experienced during the crisis. Accordingly, the Commission preliminarily believes that specific policies and procedures contemplating actions to be taken by all covered clearing agencies in such circumstances are necessary to ensure the safe functioning of the covered clearing agencies.356

Consider also, however, that, for instance, the DTCC’s subsidiaries performed remarkably well despite significant market volatility and trade volume during the crisis.357 Similarly, the “OCC never needed help during the financial crisis,”358 and has already been working for at least two years on improving its risk management capabilities.359

354 Id. at 29587 n.657 (citing David Easley & Maureen O’Hara, Microstructure and Ambiguity, 65 J. FIN. 1817 (2010)).
Admittedly, the very fact that the traditional agencies did not even raise serious objections to this new provision implies that they already had done their homework and had not expected to incur substantial future compliance costs in this area.\textsuperscript{360} Nevertheless, as the SEC itself acknowledges, some new requirements would “impose additional costs” on the agencies.\textsuperscript{361} Hence, the primary concern here is that the SEC’s explanation of the need for a formal rule, and the preliminary assessment of the costs, seem deficient.

It is, of course, understandable why some regulators may tend to invoke a political default formula (i.e., “let us blame the crisis”) that is in vogue in the postrecession era. At the same time, a deeper reason for the regulatory changes could be that a sector-specific regulator, such the SEC, was acting under pressure from fellow regulators, triggered by the post–Dodd-Frank designations of clearing agencies as systemically important. In taking into consideration the philosophies of other agencies, such smaller sector-specific regulator may become more conformist and regress to the “regulatory mean.” As there are reasons to caution against excessive, extraneously imposed, uniformity in certain risk management practices,\textsuperscript{362} these issues ultimately need to be addressed by the Commission on a case-by-case basis.

It is also unclear why the SEC, in explicating the shift toward more prescriptive regulations, emphasizes that the covered clearinghouses are systemically important and “may transmit financial shocks,” or that competition is limited and barriers to entry are high.\textsuperscript{363} Indeed, they were so five, ten, and, to some extent, even thirty years ago. Market consolidation, for instance, is almost a rule of thumb in clearing. Have the repeated references to systemic importance become something of a fad echoing Dodd-Frank and international standards?

Similarly, somewhat baffling is the concern that, despite reputational repercussions and market monitoring, “clearing agencies’ incentives for sound risk management may be tempered by pressures to reduce costs and maximize profits that are distinct from the public interest goals,” the moral hazard problem, or incentive misalignments.\textsuperscript{364} First, as discussed in Part III, that is why the

\textsuperscript{360} See, e.g., 2014 OCC Letter, \textit{supra} note 24, at 9; Letter from Larry E. Thompson, \textit{supra} note 12, at Annex I.

\textsuperscript{361} Standards for Covered Clearing Agencies, 79 Fed. Reg. at 29597.

\textsuperscript{362} Channeling industry standards has been criticized as part of the “destructive coordination” of regulations, resulting in “the uniform application of a risk measure that presumes independence and randomness.” Whitehead, \textit{Destructive Coordination}, \textit{supra} note 12, at 346. In light of the new rules, the risks of coordination in the C&S risk management and stress-testing requirements may be elevated to a more prominent risk in the future.

\textsuperscript{363} Standards for Covered Clearing Agencies, 79 Fed. Reg. at 29587, 29576, 29578–79.

\textsuperscript{364} \textit{Id.} at 29576.
traditional clearing agencies have a more open, multistakeholder corporate governance structure. Second, in terms of revenue maximization, the DTCC described itself as "a user-owned cooperative," operating on an at-cost basis, while the OCC had refund and fee discount policies.

Another relevant example deals with the discretion of clearinghouses that the SEC seemed to hold in high regard in the past. Consider that although the SEC acknowledges that an agency may incur additional costs associated with more limited discretion, it also suggests that clearing agencies may not fully internalize the social costs of poor internal controls and thus, given additional discretion, may not craft appropriate risk management policies and procedures. For example, even if existing regulation provides clearing agencies with the incentives necessary to manage risks appropriately in a static sense, they may not provide clearing agencies with incentives to update their risk management programs in response to dynamic market conditions. . . . By reducing covered clearing agencies’ discretion over their policies and procedures, the proposed amendments . . . may reduce the likelihood that risk management practices lag behind changing market conditions.

The argument clearly disregards the historically robust Postulate III backstops. At the very least, since the major traditional agencies are built on a more inclusive, participatory corporate governance model and did demonstrate uninterrupted performance prior to and during the crisis, additional data and research on the matter are needed.

Another example of a supporting argument of the Commission is that clearinghouses “may fail to internalize the consequences of their risk management decisions . . . [and that such a failure represents a financial network externality imposed by clearing agencies on the broader financial markets and suggests that financial stability, as a public good, may be under-produced in equilibrium].” Unfortunately, the solution (i.e., imposition of more demanding regulations) does not follow from the premise. Is this approach the most apposite way to reduce the identified potential externalities? Recall also that such potential externalities did not suddenly materialize after the 2008 crisis and have been an innate feature of centralized C&S for decades.
Commission, as a sector-specific regulator, was able to successfully mitigate this risk through cooperation with the industry, principles-based philosophy, and through rule review and approval processes. By contrast, a less individualized approach in risk management may produce externalities of its own through the destructive effects of regulatory coordination or harmonization on which collectivism thrives.369

F. Clearinghouses’ Comments

In conclusion, this Section briefly examines how the industry reacted to the rules. This reaction gives us a paradox. On the one hand, the traditional clearinghouses supported the more generalized approach of the SEC vis-à-vis that of the CFTC. For instance, the OCC, a dually-registered agency, naturally compared the CFTC’s and the SEC’s approaches, observing in its 2011 letter that it “strongly believe[d] that the degree of micro-management reflected in the CFTC’s requirements should be eschewed in favor of case-by-case review of clearing organizations’ proposed rule changes.”370

The major traditional covered agencies, such as the DTCC’s subsidiaries and the OCC, also generally support the SEC rule proposed in the 2014 Release. The DTCC, for example, observed “that the Commission has generally struck the appropriate balance between the principle and level of detailed requirements.”371

Yet the rules are only comparatively flexible. The traditional supervisees were not fully satisfied with the 2012 SEC Rule, and in line with the historical regulatory equilibrium, called for preserving less prescriptive standards, more clearinghouse discretion, and principles-based practices.372

369 See, e.g., Whitehead, supra note 12, at 351–52.
371 Letter from Larry E. Thompson, supra note 12, at 3. The OCC, also agreeing with the Commission’s approach, welcomed the avowed policy premise “that CCAs should be allowed ‘flexibility to use their market experience and understanding of their institutions to shape the rules, policies, and procedures implementing proposed Rule.....’” 2014 OCC Letter, supra note 24, at 3 (quoting Standards for Covered Clearing Agencies, 79 Fed. Reg. at 29517).
based regulations. The supporting undertones were requesting consultations with the Commission, preserving the traditional case-by-case Commission review and even waiting until an industry consensus is reached (i.e., the crucial characteristics of the precrisis cooperative equilibrium circumscribed by Postulate I). Even in their comments on the recently proposed regulations, the clearing agencies continued to insist on greater flexibility in some areas.

The comments must be put in perspective. Namely, while the first round of comments still built on the previously cooperative regulatory model, the new proposed regulations and comment letters came on the heels of the IOSCO Principles, Dodd-Frank, and the designations of the clearing agencies as systemically important. Hence, by 2014, the clearing agencies, like all other market actors, were well aware of the new prescriptive and overcoordinated policies. Their comments should imply a new framework on the SEC. It is, therefore, possible that the market believes that, absent either statutory reforms or the Fed and FSOC’s policy signals, discussed in Part II, we may have reached the point of no return for the Commission.

G. Conclusion

To sum up, the new regulations have turned the old reform pattern (i.e., responding to fragmentary market initiatives and a crisis revealing their insufficiency through uniform regulations promoting best practices) on its head. With respect to the generality and flexibility of the regulations, the SEC appears to oscillate between the two

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373 See, e.g., id. at 66234, 66227, 66228–29, 66241–42, 66249, 66251 (discussing comments on various sections of the rule).

374 See, e.g., id. at 66233 (“[Commenters] also urged the Commission not to require any CCP to increase its liquidity resources or otherwise re-engineer its risk management controls unless and until there is industry and regulatory consensus on the changes that should be made.”); id. at 66235, 66255.

375 See, e.g., Letter from Larry E. Thompson, supra note 12, at 9 (“DTCC acknowledges the importance of educating participants as to how the clearing agency approaches default management, and participants’ role in such process; nevertheless, DTCC believes that this can be achieved by methods other than mandating they participate in annual closeout tests. We believe this is one area where covered clearing agencies should be afforded the discretion and flexibility to develop mechanisms to foster such education on the one hand, while separately being able to develop testing scenarios—with inclusion of those ‘stakeholders’ (including those of its participants) it deems appropriate and practicable—in its annual testing process.”).

376 See, e.g., id. at 2.
philosophies—the Commission seeks to remain true to its original policies while attempting to strike a balance between the traditional approach and Dodd-Frank. Unfortunately, the highlighted deficiencies and inconsistencies suggest the generic nature of the rules and their underdeveloped explanations.

Practically, the new policies mean that virtually every discussed clearing agency, including the DTC, the NSCC, and the OCC, will be subject to additional regulations.\(^\text{377}\) Those regulations are no longer based on the cooperative one-regulator-one-market interaction as the Federal Reserve, the CFTC, and the SEC are now all threads of an interconnected web of FMU regulators.

**CONCLUSION**

This Article examines the new risks of the postcrisis regulatory overcoordination (i.e., collectivism) and contrasts them with a successful linear sector-specific regulatory model. The research underscores the historical importance of cooperative market-regulator interactions.

In particular, in clearing and settlement, a rapid introduction of the new rules for clearinghouses designated as “systemically important” under Dodd-Frank, and the risk of collectivism, may disturb the traditionally cooperative regulatory philosophy. The new policies already force the SEC to reduce clearing agencies’ discretion and impose more prescriptive rules.

In developing these new standards, the SEC bears a heightened burden of ensuring that changes to the traditionally successful model do not undermine the status quo, but improve it. Most importantly, the SEC should not entirely abnegate its historical philosophy, the exacting task of avoiding “average” regulations, and the traditionally cooperative relationship with the C&S industry.

Similarly, the Fed and the FSOC should tread carefully in exercising their de facto veto authority. The Dodd-Frank coordination mechanisms should be invoked rarely, and only in cases where inefficiencies in the sector-specific model explicitly undermine its benefits built on regulatory flexibility, linearity, and cooperation between expert regulators and regulated industries.