

THE EVOLUTION OF INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE IN BOLIVIA

by

REYNALDO TAPIA

A Dissertation submitted to the

Graduate School-Newark

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Global Affairs

written under the direction of

Dr. Kurt Schock

and approved by:

Newark, New Jersey

May, 2019

2019

Reynaldo Tapia

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

THE EVOLUTION OF INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE IN BOLIVIA

By REYNALDO TAPIA

Dissertation Director:
Dr. Kurt Schock

This dissertation describes the development and changes of nonviolent strategies of the indigenous people of Bolivia through crucial stages of Bolivian history and the social, cultural, and political effects this process has had in the country. The study addresses the benefits and effectiveness of nonviolent resistance over violence and will detail the gradual evolutionary process of nonviolent techniques and strategies from the early implementation of simple roadblocks to a complex variety of methods ranging from numerous forms of organized strikes to massive marches and protests.

The study focuses on the changes in nonviolent strategies by utilizing Charles Tilly's concept of "repertoire of contention" (1986). Repertoires are various tools of contention shared between social actors used to oppose a public decision they consider unjust or even threatening. The objective of this dissertation is to explain the shifts and changes in Bolivia's repertoires throughout its history as violent forms of action which were primarily utilized during the initial stages of resistance had almost entirely disappeared and displaced by as a set of well-organized nonviolent campaigns.

This dissertation is a single-country study that provides a contextual description of the changes and development of nonviolent resistance through four different stages of Bolivian history and the social, cultural, and political effects this process has had in the country. The indigenous people of Bolivia utilized forms of resistance that were inherited from previous episodes as repertoires were often learned, shared and repeated. The legacy of civil resistance has contributed and shaped the Bolivian national identity.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not have been possible without the support and help of my professors, colleagues, friends, and family. I wish to thank Professor Kurt Schock for his inspirational lectures on social movements and people power which led to my interest in the area of nonviolent resistance. I also need to extend my gratitude towards my dissertation committee members: Dr. Isaac Rojas-Perez, Dr. Brian Ferguson and Dr. Fredy Cante, who took their time to guide me through this process.

I would like to express my appreciation to my classmates and friends that shared this challenging journey at Rutgers University, John Handal and Helyett Harris for motivating and assisting me with my dissertation. I also want to thank Ann Marin, Natalie Jesionka and Desiree Gordon at the Division of Global Affairs for their administrative support.

Working on this project while having a fulltime job and as a military officer reservist was quite difficult; it would not have been possible without the help of nearly everyone I know. To my supervisors at the United States Office of Personnel Management for giving me the opportunity of being a part of the elite counter-intelligence group and allowed me to travel around the world, I am forever grateful. And of course, many thanks to my United States Navy Office of Naval Intelligence work colleagues who gave me feedback and advice.

I am thankful for the ongoing encouragement of my parents, Rosario Morales and Reynaldo Tapia. Their love and unwavering support allowed me to find the determination,

focus and strength to finish this dissertation. Without their sacrifices, and hard work ethics I would not be anything near who I am today. It was an honor to write about the country they left almost half a century ago.

A special thanks you to my children, Tristan, Andrea and Joaquin, for their immeasurable patience as I wrote this dissertation, and my life companion, my wife, Paola Villamil, who has been there from the beginning, encouraging me to complete my Ph.D.

Lastly, I salute the people of Bolivia who have endured so much, and yet continue their selfless struggle against social injustices. They have inspired me to write this dissertation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-----|
| Acknowledgments..... | iv |
| Table of Content | vi |
| List of Tables and Illustrations | ix |
| Acronyms | x |
| Map of Bolivia | xii |
| Chapter 1: Introduction | 1 |
| The Topic | 1 |
| Defining the terms | 3 |
| Importance of Research | 7 |
| Chapter 2: Theory and Methodology..... | 10 |
| Theory..... | 10 |
| Nonviolent Resistance | 10 |
| Repertoires of Contention | 16 |
| Methodology | 19 |
| Chapter 3: From Colonia Resistance to The Federalist War | 26 |
| 3.1 The Legacy of Colonial Rebellions | 26 |
| 3.2 Birth of a Nation | 37 |
| 3.3 Melgarejo and the Age of the Caudillos | 43 |
| 3.4 The Agrarian Reform and “ <i>Los Conservadores</i> ” | 48 |
| 3.5 The Federalist War/Civil War | 52 |
| 3.6 The Zarate Wilka Rebellion | 57 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| 3.7 Conclusion | 60 |
| Chapter 4: The 1952 Bolivian Revolution | 70 |
| 4.1 “ <i>Los Liberales</i> ” and the Machaca/ Chayanta Indigenous Revolts | 70 |
| 4.2 The Rise of the Miner Unions and Urban Intellectuals | 76 |
| 4.3 The Chaco War, the “Socialist” Presidents and “ <i>Brazos caídos</i> ” strikes | 82 |
| 4.4 The Massacre of Catavi and the Villarroel Legacy | 89 |
| 4.5 The Pulacayo Thesis and the Indigenous Rebellion during the “ <i>Sexenio</i> ” | 96 |
| 4.6 Bolivian National Revolution | 103 |
| 4.7 The Revolution takes a Turn | 109 |
| 4.8 Conclusion | 114 |
| Chapter 5: Military Dictatorships | 123 |
| 5.1 Barrientos’ Military-Campesino Pact and the San Juan Massacre | 123 |
| 5.2 The Failures of Violence: Che Guevara and the Teoponte Guerrilla | 130 |
| 5.3 J.J. Torres and the Popular Assembly | 138 |
| 5.4 Nonviolent Action against Banzer | 144 |
| 5.5 The Land of the Coup ‘d esta, From Pereda to Meza | 153 |
| 5.6 The Fight for Democracy | 160 |
| 5.7 Conclusion | 168 |
| Chapter 6: The Fight Against Neoliberalism..... | 177 |
| 6.1 “Bolivia is Dying” and the March for Life | 177 |
| 6.2 U.S. Counter-Narcotics in Bolivia, the Eastern Indigenous and Terrorism ... | 186 |
| 6.3 The Rise of the Cocalero | 194 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| 6.4 “ <i>Plan Dignidad</i> ” and The Water Wars | 205 |
| 6.5 The Tax and Gas Revolts | 215 |
| 6.6 Conclusion | 222 |
| Chapter 7: Analysis..... | 237 |
| Chapter 8: Conclusion.. | 256 |
| Bibliography..... | 258 |
| Curriculum Vitale | 275 |

LIST OF TABLES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

| | |
|--|------|
| Map 1.1 Bolivia..... | xiii |
| Table 1.1 Methods of Resistance from Colonia Period to The Federalist War | 66 |
| Table 2.1 Methods of Resistance that led to the Bolivian National Revolution | 119 |
| Table 3.1 Methods of Resistance during the Military Dictatorships | 174 |
| Table 4.1 Methods of Resistance during the Fight Against Neoliberalism | 229 |
| Table 5.1 Factors that Caused Changes in the Repertoires of Contention..... | 248 |
| Table 5.2 Methods of Resistance Throughout Bolivian History..... | 254 |
| | |
| Box 1.1 Coca Eradicated vs. New Coca crops (1986 to 1999) | 206 |
| Box 1.2 Changes in the Compensation per Hectare of Coca (1998 to 2002) | 206 |

ACRONYMS

ADEPCOCA Asociación Departamental de Productores de Coca (Departmental Association of Coca Producers)

ADN Acción Democrática Nacional (National Democratic Action)

CIDOB Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia)

CIPCA Centro de Integración y Promoción del Campesinado (The Center of Campesino Integration and Promotion)

CNPZ Comisión Néstor Paz Zamora (Commission Nestor Paz Zamora)

CNTCB Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (National Confederation of Campesino Workers of Bolivia)

CNTCTK Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos Tupaj Katari (National Confederation of Campesino Workers Tupaj Katari)

COB Central Obrera Boliviana (Bolivian Workers' Center)

COMIBOL Corporación Minera Boliviana (Bolivian Miner Corporation)

CONADE Comité Nacional de Defensa de la Democracia (National Committee of Democratic Defense)

CSCB Confederación Sindical de Colonizadores de Bolivia (Confederation of Trade Union of Colonizers of Bolivia)

CSTB Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Bolivia (Confederation of Trade Unions of Workers of Bolivia)

CSUTCB Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (Single Trade Union Confederation of Campesino Workers of Bolivia)

DIRECO Dirección Regional de la Coca (Regional Directorate of Coca)

DNCFC Dirección Nacional del Control y Fiscalización de Coca (National Directorate for Control and Audit of Coca)

DNCSP Dirección Nacional del Control de Sustancias Peligrosas (National Directorate for the Control of Dangerous Substances)

EGTK Ejército Guerrillero Tupaj Katari (Guerrilla Army Tupaj Katari)

ELN Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army)

FAL-ZW Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Zarate Wilka (Liberation Armed Forces Zarate Wilka)

FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)

FEDECOR Federación Departamental Cochabambina de Regantes (Departmental Federation of Irrigation Farmer of Cochabamba)

FEJUVE Federación de Juntas Vecinales (Federation of Neighborhood Juntas)

FELCN Fuerza Especial de Lucha Contra el Narcotráfico (Special Forces to Fight Drug Trafficking)

FOCU Federación Obrera Central de Uncia (Central Labor Federation of Uncia)

FOL Federación Obrera Local (Local Labor Federation)

FOT Federación Obrera del Trabajo (Workers' Labor Federation)

FPN Frente Popular Nacional (National Popular Front)

FSB Falange Socialista Boliviana (Bolivian Socialist Falange)

FSTMB Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia (Trade Union Federation of Bolivian Mining Workers)

FURMO Fuerzas Unidas de Represión Móviles para el Orden y Desarrollo (The United Forces of Mobile Repression for Order and Development)

INRA Institución Nacional de Reforma Agraria (National Institute of Agrarian Reform)

JCR Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Coordinating Junta)

MAC Ministro de Asuntos Campesinos (Ministry of Campesino Affairs)

MAS Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement Towards Socialism)

MIR Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Leftist Movement)

MNR Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Nationalist Revolutionary Movement)

MNRI Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario de Izquierda (Nationalist Revolutionary Movement of the Left)

MRTA Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Amaru (Revolutionary Movement Tupaj Amaru)

PCB Partido Comunista de Bolivia (Bolivian Communist Party)

PIDYS Proyecto de Desarrollo Integral para la Sustitución de Coca (Project for the Development of Coca Substitutes)

PIR Partido de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Leftist Party)

POR Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Revolutionary Labor Party)

PRIN Partido Revolucionario de Izquierda Nacionalista (Revolutionary Party of the Nationalist Left)

PS-1 Partido Socialista-1 (Socialist Party-1)

UDP Unidad Democrática y Popular (Democratic and Popular Unity)

UMOPAR Unidad Móvil Policial para Áreas Rurales (Mobil Unit for Rural Patrol)

UNP Union Nacionalista del Pueblo (Nationalist Union of the People)

Chapter 1: Introduction

The Topic:

The history of the indigenous people of Bolivia is a history of resistance, but most importantly, it is a history that includes several episodes of nonviolent resistance. Due to the profound focus on the violent cases of repression the indigenous people of Bolivia have faced, these episodes of nonviolent resistance have been overlooked. The use of nonviolent action and civil resistance itself has been downplayed by academics, the media, and the general public even though it has had effective results in promoting social change. Moreover the historical use of violence and its outcomes to produce social or political change have overshadowed the victories achieved by using nonviolent methods. Fidel Castro, and especially Che Guevara, have been idolized by the radical left for their victory during the Cuban Revolution and Mao's quote which states "Power comes from the barrel of a gun," continues to be evoked by guerrilla groups in Latin America who believe that the only route to political and social change is through violence. The horrendous attacks orchestrated by Osama bin Laden on September 11, 2001 have attracted mass attention, and even glorification by some extremists groups for the use of violence in these acts. While violent revolutions, armed insurrections, and terrorist activities have been the center of numerous articles, books, and even movies, nonviolent resistance has not typically been the focus of attention of academics, authors, and media producers.

In the last century, nonviolent resistance has played a crucial role in achieving social-political change throughout the world. Independence movements, civil rights movements, and transitions to a democratic system have all been successful through the

implementation of nonviolent methods instead of armed or violent methods. The use of civil resistance movements have primarily occurred mainly when the traditional political channels are not accessible to the people because of an authoritarian government or the segregation of a social sector of people due to race, religion, or gender. The 1989 toppling of Pinochet in Chile and the end of the Apartheid system in South Africa in 1994 are two clear examples of successful nonviolent campaigns. In the last three decades the implementation of nonviolent resistance has increased not only to oust dictators or promote racial equality, but also to demand land reform and government transparency or to promote strong environmental policies and anti-war movements.

The use of nonviolent methods in Bolivia did not occur instantly, but went through several stages of development which could be traced to indigenous resistance against the Spanish Empire. Thus for centuries the people who now occupy Bolivia have utilized methods of nonviolent action to engage in struggles against oppressive and violent regimes. The use of protests, demonstrations, civil disobedience, and other methods of nonviolence have been proven to be very effective in obtaining social, political, and economic justice. The nonviolent resistance of the poorest people of Bolivia has been significant, but has not been the focus of any major study.

This dissertation will be a single-country study and will describe and explain (1) the development of nonviolent resistance in Bolivia and (2) the effect this process has had in the country. The nonviolent methods used by indigenous people of Bolivia have evolved from simple strategies and techniques to a variety of complex and more effective methods of resistance. The study confirms and explains the effectiveness and the benefits of nonviolent resistance over violence and will detail the gradual evolutionary process of

nonviolent resistance and how its implementation has affected the country's national identity. As explained by Todd Landman (2008, 93), single-country studies can be used as a comparison because of the detailed information they provide which can probe hypotheses that can be tested in different countries; provide a solid strategy to confirm or disconfirm existing theories of politics; and reveal discrete processes of casual mechanisms that are often left underspecified in studies that compare a larger number of countries.

The uprisings, rebellions, and revolutions in Bolivia were not simple spontaneous acts of resistance but consisted of a history of organization, life experiences, and episodes of contention. The indigenous people of Bolivia utilized forms of resistance that were inherited from previous episodes as repertoires were often learned, shared and repeated. Social movement theorists have described these strategies in which people make claims on their governments as repertoires of contention (Tilly 1986).

The study explains how changes and shifts in Bolivia's repertoire of resistance occurred throughout its history as violent forms of action which were utilized during the early stages of resistance had almost entirely disappeared as a set of nonviolent strategies had displaced them. The following questions will be discussed: First, how have the repertoires of contention of indigenous people in Bolivia changed over time. Second, what factors have contributed to these changes. Third, what are the outcomes of nonviolent movements. This study will address issues of agency and structure, repertoire of contention, strategic planning and mobilization, substance, formation and the dynamics of nonviolent movements, backfire and security divisions, and the role of third party actors.

Defining the Terms:

The Plurinational State of Bolivia is a landlocked country located in the center of South America with a population that identifies itself as indigenous or mestizo (mixed indigenous and European white). The ethnic composition of Bolivia is diverse and multiethnic since there are over three dozen indigenous groups. The two largest groups are the Quechuas and Aymaras. These Indigenous groups are about 60% of the Bolivian population while 30% claim to be mestizo and around 10% European White.¹

The focus of the study is therefore on the people of Bolivia who are mostly indigenous or have an indigenous background. The Bolivian Indio, *indigena* or “indigenous person” is also referred to as “campesino.” According to Hahn (1992, 3-4), campesino is something more than a reference of occupation or lifestyle but also refers to an ethnic designation since campesino does not easily translate to the word peasant or farmer but rather as an inhabitant of the countryside; regardless whether that inhabitant be a peasant, a crafts person, a rural merchant or a farmer. But campesino does not only refer to those that inhabit the countryside, it also refers to all those who are of the countryside as well (in terms of being ‘from’).

Another protagonist of this study will be the Bolivian miner who has played a vital role in the rebellious history of Bolivia and is also of indigenous descent. During the Spanish colonial period, indigenous people were sent to the Bolivian mines to work as slaves. After the independence of Bolivia, these indigenous people continued to work under the harsh conditions which surround a miner’s life. Over time the Bolivian miners

¹ “South America: Bolivia”. *The World Factbook Central Intelligence Agency*. Retrieved 28 January 2014.

began to organize in well-structured unions and were at the forefront of numerous uprising against the Bolivian state using both armed and nonviolent resistance.

The major focus of the research will be on the development of nonviolent resistance but the study will also described other forms of indigenous resistance to include: violent action, everyday forms of resistance, and institutional political action. Even though these forms of political contention seem to be different they appear to overlap in several episodes of Bolivian history, and therefore must be clearly defined and distinguished from nonviolent action.

Nonviolent resistance is also referred to as civil resistance and nonviolent action since they describe the same phenomenon. Nonviolent resistance is defined as organized popular challenges to authoritarian rule and/or democratic governments by the primary use of nonviolent methods rather than violent actions (Zunes 1994, Schock 2005). A key element of nonviolent resistance is that it includes a set of methods with special features that are distinct from both violent resistance and institutional politics (McCarthy 1990).

Violent action works through the use of physical and coercive force and the fear of detainment, bodily harm, or death, while nonviolent action works through social power and the human mind by use of appeals, manipulation, and nonviolent coercion (Bond 1994). Violent action is a form of political contention and a method of exerting power that operates outside normal political channels (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 12)

Conventional or institutional political action are strategies used within the boundaries of institutional political channels. Therefore the use of institutionalized techniques of political action such as: petitions, litigations, and voting would not be categorized as nonviolent action but has been one of the ongoing misconceptions about

nonviolent action since they are often accompanied by nonviolent struggles but nonviolent action can only occur outside the bounds of institutional political channels (Schock 2003, 705). A crucial characteristic of nonviolent resistance is that it is non-institutional because it operates outside the boundaries of institutional political channels (Bond 1994). Hence nonviolent resistance is fought outside the routine or conventional political channels. Nonviolent action should not be confused with other forms of political action since it consists of non-routine and extra-institutional political acts (Schock 2015, 29).

Everyday forms of resistance are techniques which require little or no co-ordination or planning; they often represent a form of individual self-help; and they typically evade any direct symbolic confrontation with authority (Scott 1986, 6). There has been other gray areas of confusion in distinguishing covert and overt forms of resistance while James C. Scott (1990) has identified several unorganized forms of peasant resistance which include character assassination, foot-dragging, clandestine tax evasion and flight, they do not fall under the category of nonviolent resistance due to their lack of collective action. But these forms of covert resistance may be transformed into overt action or rebellion if they are made public (Schock 2015, 9). The core attribute of nonviolent/civil resistance is the collective implementation of methods of nonviolent action which could be legal state sanctioned political activities or illegal acts of civil disobedience (Schock 2015, 3).

Social movements are best defined by Charles Tilly (2006) as a series of contentious performances, displays and campaigns by which ordinary people make collective claims on others. The study of nonviolent resistance overlaps with the study of social movements but it should be noted that while scholars of social movements tend to

focus on a wider array of activities, scholars of nonviolent resistance give a greater emphasis to strategy (Schock 2015, 57).

Importance of Research:

Bolivia has had a legacy of nonviolent resistance which has played a crucial role in achieving social-political change throughout its history. The indigenous population of the region has been the victim of several injustices and for this reason it has been the main actor pushing for social equality. The Bolivian population itself is a majority indigenous or of a mixed 'mestizo' race. The Bolivian peasant or campesino, miner, factory worker and farmer have all usually identified themselves with the indigenous Quechua-Aymara culture of Bolivia. These people have learned to cooperate amongst each other and created alliances by utilizing symbols, rituals, and customs to create more effective methods and tactics to obtain their political goals. The people of Bolivia have utilized several nonviolent strategies to include road blockades, marches, strikes and civil disobedience to achieve: land rights, indigenous civil rights, and ousted ruthless dictators. While engaging in civil resistance they have also created new social, cultural and political identities that have reinforced their unity.

The long history of strategic nonviolent action in Bolivia has not been evaluated sufficiently. Therefore this study will trace the roots of Bolivian nonviolent resistance which has been successful in obtaining results such as land reform, regime changes, and political participation. Accordingly, this study will analyze the distinctiveness of the movements, beginning with the indigenous struggles and insurrections during the colonial and post-colonial periods leading to the Bolivian Federalist War (also referred to as the

Civil War) of the late nineteenth century. This study will examine the development of institutional political action and nonviolent movements that led to the Bolivian National Revolution of 1952. Similar to other Latin American countries, Bolivia was also the victim of brutal military dictatorships throughout the Cold War, which were challenged using methods of nonviolent resistance and resulted in the re-democratization of the country. The rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s also created a new battleground of resistance for the people of Bolivia along with several victories that would lead to the election of Evo Morales as the first indigenous president of Bolivia.

This dissertation proposes that the nonviolent resistance movements in Bolivia have had a better outcome than violent revolts or revolutions. This study supports the arguments raised by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), and Max Abrahms (2006), that nonviolent resistance movements are more successful in promoting beneficial political change than are violent resistance movements including terrorism. The major factors that contributed to the success of nonviolent campaigns in Bolivia will be investigated as well as the reasons for the limited success of the Bolivian National Revolution and the failure of violent campaigns, like Che Guevara's guerrilla insurgency, which led to his capture and death.

Furthermore, the dissertation will address how the strategies of nonviolent action evolved over time from the colonial era to the present. The indigenous people adjusted their repertoire depending on the level of repression and violence that was used against them. Their repertoire of contention draws on a long history of resistance. The use of violent methods by the indigenous people began to decline as the country became more democratized making nonviolent resistance the more prevalent form of contention. The more recent nonviolent campaigns of the last three decades have led to regime changes and

policies that have favored the indigenous populations of Bolivia. This research will contribute to the study of indigenous nonviolent resistance as it will investigate and recognize the achievements of the Bolivian indigenous movements. Most importantly, this dissertation will highlight the bottom-up structural transformations the country was able to obtain through the actions of nonviolent resistance. Though it is the poorest country in South America, Bolivia has been able to achieve a high level of political activism among its citizens.

Chapter 2: Theory and Methodology

Theory:

Nonviolent Resistance

A basic principal of nonviolent resistance includes a serious commitment in resisting occupation, domination, and any other forms of injustice by abstention from using physical violence. Even though civil resistance rejects the use of violence it involves full engagement in resisting injustices or oppression by authorities that may use violence to maintain their power and privilege (Dudouet 2008, 4). The rejection of violence because of religious, moral, or philosophical principles inspired nonviolent methods to be adopted and advocated by notable historical figures, such as Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. But the use of nonviolent resistance by these spiritual men have also led to the misconception that nonviolent resistance is weak or related to pacifism. According to Schock (2005, 6), nonviolent resistance is not passive but active since it does not involve physical violence or threat of physical violence against human beings, but it involves activity in the collective pursuit of social and/or political objectives. To have a better understanding of the effectiveness of nonviolent action, it is crucial to understand how these strategies and tactics are used to destabilize the power of the oppressors.

Gene Sharp, a leading expert in nonviolent methods, has identified hundreds of nonviolent techniques which include protests, boycotts, and civil disobedience, all aimed at waging conflict through social, economic, and political means without the use of violence. Sharp (1990) describes nonviolent action as a way of combat because of its use of strategies and tactics, and also because it demands of its soldiers: courage, discipline,

and sacrifice when they wage battles. Additionally, the leaders of the Civil Rights movements were well disciplined in not only maintaining nonviolent order, but also in creating and adopting new strategies of nonviolent resistance. Nonviolent techniques like sit-ins and marches resulted in the mass arrest of activists, which was the goal in order to capture the attention of the national media. For instance, during Civil Rights, images of young black students being attacked by dogs and watered by fire hoses created a high peak of support from non-activists. Violent suppression of nonviolent movements sometimes increases their likelihood of success of achieving political or social objectives.

A critical element for the success of nonviolent resistance is the process of backfire. As explained by Martin (2007, 2), backfire is an action that recoils against its originators leading to a negative consequence, namely worse than having done nothing. Sharp refers to this phenomenon as “political jiu-jitsu” where the force or power of the oppressor is used against him or her. Repressing nonviolent movements violently could backfire by creating opposition to the regime, division among regime supporters, and international condemnation of the regime. However, the public must be convinced that nonviolent groups are not a threat to society itself but a threat to the oppressive institutions and that their demands are just. Media and international support of nonviolent groups, as well as loyalty shifts within security forces, are also more common in nonviolent movements since the regime’s security forces are not threatened by the nonviolent groups.

The removal, destabilization or de-legitimization of the oppressor’s power is achievable with the use of nonviolent action, since the acts of disobedience pose a threat to the status quo. The ruler’s political power comes from the society they govern, and without the consent of the people, the rulers are powerless because they depend on the

obedience and cooperation of the governed. Not only do nonviolent activists need to persuade the public, but also members of the opposed groups. The forces of nonviolent action need to match the forces of the opposition to establish a balance of power that will eventually incline towards the struggling groups if the nonviolent action is to be successful.

A clear example of the use of nonviolent resistance was the ousting of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia in 2000. Fraudulent elections and the need for social and political change resulted in the overthrow. The group, *Otpor*, used nonviolent tactics that led to the attraction of massive crowds, media coverage, and the swaying of members of the police and military. The nonviolent aspect of their strategy was the essential element of their success.

The loyalty and support of the Serbian regime was concentrated in the internal security forces, which were made better-off at the expense of the military. *Otpor* was able to convince some military personnel to remain neutral. Friends and family of the military were also contacted in order to influence and gain support of the movement by the military. Several agreements were also made with upper and middle ranks of the military to avoid violent force. The swaying of the security forces and police was achieved by undermining the regime's credibility. It soon became clear to the police that the movement's struggle was also beneficial for them. To this end, explanations of the movement's objectives were obtained through interrogations with the police when they were arrested.

The strategy of having a large number of people was an important factor, since it served as a deterrent to the police and military from acting violently due to the presence of the national and international media. The nonviolent methods used in *Otpor* have inspired other nonviolent groups that have also had successful results, such as the 2003 Rose

Revolution in Georgia and the 2004 Orange Revolution in the Ukraine. In both events, mass demonstrations were led by organizers which stressed the importance of maintaining nonviolent discipline.

During the Cold War, the strategy of labeling opposition groups as terrorists or enemies of the state prevailed. Che Guevara's "focolism" approach to social change led by revolutionary armed guerrillas failed in Colombia, Peru and several other Latin American countries because it also established greater solidarity of the regime's security forces, who were also the victims of violent insurgent attacks. The presence of these violent guerrilla groups also provided a reason for United States (U.S.) military aid, which was used to suppress not only violent campaigns, but nonviolent campaigns as well. Even though leftist guerrillas in Latin America had some type of support from their public, they were unsuccessful once the U.S. began training the regime's security forces. To prevent another Cuban Revolution, the U.S. began implementing the use of counter-insurgency tactics, and the education of pro-western values to the security forces, which made it harder for them to shift loyalties (Gill 2004). The use of violent resistance and terrorism has been counter-productive in this region as it has provided an opportunity for state leaders to have a greater control of power as seen by Fujimori in Peru against Sendero Luminoso, and Alvaro Uribe in Colombia against the FARC.

The violent acts of terrorism by these groups did not allow them to achieve their objectives even though temporarily, they were able to obtain territorial concessions. These and other acts of terrorism continue to be implemented by extremists and persist in being the center of attention of the mainstream media even though terrorist groups rarely achieve their objectives and goals. As explained by Abrahms (2006, 43), violent campaigns or acts

of terrorism are only successful in accomplishing their policy objectives 7 percent of the time. His research suggests the poor success rate is inherent to the tactic of terrorism itself.

One of the most important studies comparing the outcomes of violent and nonviolent resistance was completed by Maria Stephan and Eric Chenoweth, who explain how nonviolent campaigns have had a better rate of success at achieving political goals when compared to violent and armed campaigns. Their study examines the effectiveness of nonviolent and violent campaigns using aggregate data on major nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns from 1900 to 2006, and revealed that major nonviolent campaigns were nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success in achieving their goals as their violent counterparts (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 7). Their finding also indicate that unarmed campaigns with goals commonly perceived to be maximalist in nature (regime change, anti-occupation, and secession) were 53% successful compared to 26% of armed maximalist campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 70). Moreover, the evidence suggests that civil resistance is often successful regardless of environmental conditions that many people associate with the failure of nonviolent campaigns because: (1) nonviolent campaigns are more likely to attract higher levels of participation than violent campaigns due to lower physical barriers to participation, lower moral barriers to participation, lower commitment problems, and less information difficulties; (2) higher levels of participation can activate mechanism that improve the odds of success (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 30).

The findings of these studies challenge the common belief that violent methods are more effective than nonviolent methods in obtaining political and social goals. It is also important to note that nonviolent civil resistance has not always led to an improved and

just political and social system. As Zunes (1994, 404) explains, the use of nonviolent resistance is more successful in promoting beneficial political change, but it does not guarantee a democratic state or a process to democratization. The nonviolent Iranian Revolution of 1979 which overthrew the U.S. backed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi installed a theocratic government with limited freedoms. To this day, Iran's government continues to be control by the Mullahs. It is also important to mention that not all nonviolent campaigns have had success. The 1989 massacre at Tiananmen Square is a constant reminder of the power of the Chinese state. Nonviolent resistant movements have also failed in Burma and in Palestinian territories, but they continue to be active utilizing nonviolent techniques for basic human rights and freedoms.

Nonviolent resistance has in numerous instances contradicted the nostalgic belief that an armed revolution led by charismatic guerrilla fighters will liberate people from oppression. In sum, civil/nonviolent resistance and the dynamics of nonviolent action have been used to fight colonialism, foreign occupation, advance women's and minority rights, and has transformed authoritarian regimes to democracies. Transitions to democratic regimes through nonviolent campaigns have had better outcomes than violent campaigns. Successful nonviolent campaigns increase the probability of democratic regime type by over 50 percent compared with successful violent campaigns; and among countries that are already democratic a successful nonviolent campaign is 82 percent likely to remain a democracy after the campaign ends while if violent campaigns succeed or fail, the level of democracy five years after the end of the conflict is lower than the levels succeeding a nonviolent campaign (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 213-6). While violent campaigns produce uncertainty and less democratic regimes, successful nonviolent campaigns are

more likely to produce long term outcomes that encourages political participation. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 207), have also noted that mass participation in nonviolent political change does not only encourage the development of democratic skills but also fosters expectation of accountable governance, both of which are less likely to occur if the transitions were driven by violence.

As indicated before, research on civil resistance is often concern with the outcome of campaigns. The study of nonviolent resistance has mainly focused on the social roots of power rather than political institutions and state structures. Scholars of nonviolent resistance have traditionally emphasized on the strategic choice, and mechanisms through which nonviolent action produces social change while social movement scholars have focused on structural sources; social bases; mobilization, and political context but in recent years research on social movement has also incorporated outcomes (Schock 2013).

Repertoires of Contention

This dissertation incorporates Charles Tilly's theories of repertoires of contention in which repertoires are defined as a limited set of routines that are shared, learned, and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice (Tilly 1995, 42). Uprisings, rebellions and revolutions are not simple spontaneous actions but consist of a history of organization, life experiences, and episodes of contention which Tilly refers to as repertoires. Tilly describes the repertoires of the social movements as claim-making routines where actions can be considered, according to clustered, learned and improvisational (Tarrow 2008, 237).

People making claims against repressive regimes usually select a strategy from existing repertoire but these strategies can also be modified or transformed. Therefore repertoires change over time but also vary from place to place since they are determined by the successfulness, failure and adaptability of the acts depending on the form of regime. The more aggressive tactics utilized in the eighteenth century such as vandalism and sacking of public offices, mutinies and liberation of prisoners had almost entirely disappeared by the nineteenth century. As Tilly explains, repertoires of contention changed in Great Britain from a narrowed and divided character of eighteenth century repertoire to a more cosmopolitan and autonomous set of repertoires that included: turnouts, protests, strikes, public meetings, petition marches, planned insurrections, invasion of official assemblies and organized social movements (Tilly 2008, 44). The rise of capitalism and the state also contributed to the transformation of contentious repertoires since peasants usually do not strike while workers can.

This study will utilize the term ‘repertoires of contention’ to indicate the strategies and actions that were employed by the indigenous people of Bolivia as forms of resistance. According to Tilly (2006, 42), repertoires draws on the social ties, identities, and organizational forms that constitute everyday social life. From these identities, social ties, and organizational forms emerge both the collective claims that people make and the means they have for making them. Tilly (2006, 30) also identifies the evolution of contentious repertoires from an array of methods and strategies that are embedded in existing history, culture and from complex social networks. The history of contention in Bolivia demonstrates that people learned that certain repertoires were more effective and

throughout time were passed along from generation to generation to be modified and/or perfected.

According to Tilly, repertoires can change due to three main cases: (1) Regimes permit some performances, forbid others, and tolerate still others; that constrains actors to shy away from some performances, choose others, and innovate between the two; (2) The history of contention constrains peoples' choices. You are more likely to call an episode revolutionary if your country has experienced one in the past than if it never had one; and (3) Changes in political opportunity structure encourage some actions, discourage others, and give people the opportunity to innovate on known scripts (Tarrow 2008, 237; Tilly 2008, 5).

Contentious repertoires differ dramatically from one type of regime to another. Democratic regimes or the lack of democratic institutions can cause variation and change in repertoires of contention. According to Tilly (2006, 19) regime means repeated, strong interactions among major political actors including government. In Bolivia, regimes consist of the regular relations among governments including the military, political parties, the indigenous people, labor unions, student organizations, miners, and urban activists. The strategies these actors utilized was strongly affected by the type of regime that was present. The ways that people make collective claims and how authorities respond to these claims are strongly affected by both governmental capacity and the extent of democracy. Non-democratic regimes can differ between having high capacity and low capacity governments. He argued that less democratic and lower-capacity regimes experience more authoritarian and/or more violent forms of contentious politics (Tilly 2006, 150). Yet violent repertoires differ sharply not only from one type of regime to another but rather

between high capacity and low capacity non-democratic governments. In high-capacity non-democratic regimes arbitrary powers is given to a single tyrant while low-capacity, non-democratic regimes open the way to many small tyrants; therefore civil wars concentrate in low-capacity, non-democratic regimes, while successful revolutions concentrate in (relatively) high capacity, non-democratic regimes (Tilly 2006, 210). Tilly also added that democratic regimes with low government capacity tend to uphold a minimum of rights and liberties but the domestic sphere remains vulnerable to bouts of disorder and violence while high capacity democratic regimes endure little violence in their domestic politics, even if they make up for it by their violence in external wars (Tilly 2006, 210).

Tilly utilizes two related theatrical metaphors to capture some of the recurrent, historically embedded character of contentious politics: repertoires and performances. Presenting a petition, organizing blockades, or mounting an uprising constitutes a performance linking at least two actors, a claimant and an object of claims (Tilly 2006, 35). Performances are learned and historically grounded ways of making claims on other people with such words or actions such as attacking, expelling, defacing and cursing as well as cheering, throwing flowers, singing songs, and carrying heroes on their shoulders (Tilly, 2008: 4-5). Some performances can remain simple and predictable while other performances could evolve over time or be adapted or adopted across a wide range of conflicts (Tilly 2008, 203).

Methodology:

To explain the emergence and evolution of nonviolent resistance in Bolivia this research will incorporate the comparative-historical analysis implemented by Charles Tilly (1978) to study social movements in single-country studies. As indicated by Landman (2008, 180), these studies gather data by using a detailed event-coding protocol that includes the types of event, its main actors, the type of organizations involved in the event, its target and direction, the direct outcomes of the event, and the government's various responses. Similarly the study will focus and explain the different nonviolent groups; their emergence, expansion, accomplishments and failures throughout the political and social changes Bolivia has faced during its history. The research will not only conduct a panoramic review and analysis of works from western studies on the subject but will also include several works of Bolivian scholars, experts, journalists, and activists which may have been excluded or ignored in other researches due to language barriers.

As explained by Tilly (2008, 29), well documented historical accounts allow us to draw on historian's expertise in reconstructing the political, economic, and social contexts of contentious politics as we search for explanations of change and detect recurrent patterns. The type of comparative-historical analysis utilized is referred to as a single case analysis or within-case analysis. The strength of the within-case analysis is the use of historical narratives as a source of evidence to examine the main questions guiding this research. The benefit of applying this methodological rigorous analysis is its highly descriptive and ideographic approach. This method provides the details of what occurred in particular instances and explore the causes of one particular social phenomenon in one particular setting; therefore this insight is not meant to apply to the universe of cases but can produce insight that can be applied to additional cases (Lange 2013, 40-1). It is not

intended to find a one-size-fits-all theory but this comparative-historical analysis seeks to correct the universalism of different theories. It is typically assumed that the results of a research will be transferable to other situations but within-cases studies can lack generalizability. Therefore the limitation or weakness of this method is that the findings cannot usually be generalized to the wider population. Traditional positivist scholars have criticized this method due to their limitation of only focusing on one case and therefore not being sufficiently generalizable (Berg 2009). However much can be learned from a particular case. As noted by Tilly (1984, 88), this method is not a bungled attempt at generalization but seeks to find variations that highlights the uniqueness of social phenomena. Rather than testing a hypothesis, the purpose of this method is to find patterns that explain why certain methods of resistance failed while others were successful. Finally, it is for this reason that this method is better suited for this study since the advantage of the insight offered by a within-case analysis are the largely descriptive historical narratives which will be used to address the research questions:

1. How have the repertoires of contention of indigenous people in Bolivia changed over time?
2. What factors have contributed to these changes?
3. What are the outcomes of nonviolent movements?

The study of nonviolent resistance in Bolivia will require the employment of comparison as a means of gaining insight into causal determinants since as explained by Lange (2013, 14), they explore the characteristics and causes of particular phenomena. The study will compare how nonviolent resistance was implemented across different historical periods in the country and also across continuous units of time. This process will allow for

the identification of similarities and differences that help explain such social and political phenomena such as elections, protests, demonstrations (Landman 2008, 92). Also the use of a comparative method is better suited for this research as an alternative to a statistical method since the number of cases is too small for a statistical analysis. The choice of the comparative method in the field of social movements is often justified by its capacity to go beyond statistical measures and more towards an in-depth understanding of historical processes (Della Porta 2002, 292).

The intent of this research is to understand both the development and impact that nonviolent resistance has had in Bolivia throughout four significant periods in its history. Periodization is utilized since it allows cases to be singled out as a temporary unit to understand how a variable changes in time (Della Porta 2002, 300). In each of these significant periods the indigenous people of Bolivia made collective claims by drawing on available repertoires of contention. In order to analyze the role of nonviolent campaigns in Bolivia the dissertation is divided into these four significant periods:

1. Colonial Resistance to the Federalist War (up to 1899)
2. The Bolivian Revolution (1900 to 1963)
3. Military Dictatorships (1964 to 1982)
4. The Fight against Neoliberalism (1983 to 2003)

The dissertation tries to develop a comparative framework of the history of nonviolence by analyzing these four periods through a methodological approach which attempts to identify the changes in the repertoire of contention of the indigenous people that ultimately led to the use and mastering of nonviolent resistance. Comparative analysis has been utilized to study important historical changes on social movements and nonviolent

resistance. The comparative method used by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) identifies similarities and differences, pathways and trajectories across a wide range of contentious politics of not only armed resistance but also nonviolent resistance. Their method aims to pinpoint crucial repetitive mechanisms in a wide variety of contention that produce different outcomes depending on the initial conditions, combinations and sequences in which they occur (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, 37).

Just like most comparative-historical analysis this research will utilize causal narrative as an analytic technique to help explain the changes in indigenous resistance in Bolivia. According to Lange (2013, 43) to use this technique, the researcher compiles evidence, assesses it, and presents a sequential causal account. The study will chronologically narrate the development of nonviolent resistance in Bolivia by providing descriptive narratives of four periods and this will allow for a holistic analysis which considers context, conjuncture, and sequence. This description must consider the actual sequences and processes that drive the transformations under analysis (Lange 2013, 44).

The research also applies Tilly's theorization on repertoire of contention of social actions in order to structure and frame strategies and actions taken by the indigenous people of Bolivia. Tilly's methodological approach to describe the changes and shifts in repertoires consist on placing contentious performances in historical-comparative perspectives (Tilly 2008, 29). This research tries to emulate this approach by implementing well documented historical accounts of indigenous resistance since they allow us to explain the changes and variations of the repertoire of contention by drawing on historian's expertise in reconstructing the social, economic and political contexts of contentious politics. In historical retrospect, there is a better chance to detect recurrent patterns.

The application of this method for this research provides detailed explanations on the failures and successes of certain nonviolent resistance strategies utilized by the people of Bolivia which depended on the country's political, economic and social environment. The study searches for and illustrates the changes and shifts in the repertoire of contention during different episodes of nonviolent resistance throughout four periods. One of my arguments for this study is to demonstrate that the history of nonviolent resistance in Bolivia has followed an evolutionary process in which the indigenous people began implementing simple nonviolent strategies which later developed to more complex repertoires of nonviolent methods which have contributed to the politicization among its citizens and promoted the formation of a national identity.

The use of nonviolent resistance has been underestimated even though it has played a crucial role in achieving social-political change throughout history. Sovereignty movements, civil rights movements and transitions to a democratic system have been more successful through the implementation of nonviolent methods and not through the use of armed or violent methods. The use of protests, demonstrations, civil disobedience and other methods of nonviolence have been proven to be very effective in obtaining social, political and economic justice.

By comparing these periods it is evident that the Indigenous method of resistance changed from mass mobilization of armed indigenous to mass mobilization of unarmed ordinary Bolivian citizens to include campesinos, union works and urban residents. The use of violent tactics becomes less and less acceptable as the people begin to master the use of nonviolent methods mainly the use of roadblocks which is used in all periods.

Even though within-case comparative historical analysis is a very useful method of exploration and investigation of an event deeply and thoroughly it does encounter limitations. The method does have weaknesses since there could be a clear potential for bias as a result of researcher subjectivity which could affect the process of collecting and interpreting data (Merriam 1998). It is possible for the researcher to form a bias on the subject, data collection, and/or data interpretation. To reduce such bias, the research clearly stated the assumptions about the study upfront.

Chapter 3: From Colonial Resistance to the Bolivian Federalist War

3.1 The Legacy of Colonial Rebellions:

The history of indigenous resistance in Bolivia stretches back to small and massive anticolonial revolts and rebellions which ultimately led to the War of Independence of 1825 and the formation of the Bolivian state. A crucial factor that may have contributed to the increase in indigenous revolts during the colonial era was the reestablishment of an Inca work system called *mita*. In 1573, Viceroy Francisco de Toledo, ordered this Indian draft labor regime to meet the need for unskilled labor in the revitalized mining industry in Potosi. Since the African slaves were unable to work in the cold temperatures of the mines the native Indians were forced to provide men between the ages of 18 and 60 to work in the mines and in exchange the Spanish government would provide protection, religious doctrine and health services to the villages. According to Arze Aquirre (1979, 51) most indigenous people never returned to their village after their six year conscription but were retained for additional periods using several pretexts and when they returned to their villages they were usually broken and unable to work their land. De Mesa, Gisbert and Mesa Gisbert (2003, 210) describe the *mita* as the main symbol of Spanish oppressing in America.

Resistance to the *mita* was not violent but rather avoided since the indigenous used every available opportunity to evade the *mita* by escaping to other cities, or migrating to the valleys and work in farms and ranches. One of the most effective forms of opposing the *mita* was by abandoning their lands since they did not have to rise up against their oppressors and their opposition to the *mita* was quiet and unnoticeable (Cole 1985, 125).

Another method to avoid the *mita* was name changing and providing false information about their communities of origin; others decided to live in isolated hamlets, whose whereabouts were known only to their *kuracas* (chiefs) who demanded a payment far in excess of the normal tributes, in return for exemption from the *mita* (Bakewell 1984, 117).

The *mita* also created a colonial condition that not only exploited the labors and resources of the indigenous people, but also stimulated social stratification among the native society (Stern 1983, 28). The system was headed by Spanish and religious officials, but the revamped structure included various Indian functionaries who were usually from important chief or *kuraca* families and earned money by joining Spanish officials in mutually profitable schemes. *Kuracas* would sometimes sell the homes and lands of the indigenous people they had sent to work to the mines (Cole 1985, 26). The Spanish authorities were not the only oppressors of the indigenous people but conflict between *kuracas* and the indigenous communities was also a growing problem centered around a number of different issues such as land and animal appropriation, labor services and cash extractions, political corruption and physical abuses (Thomson 2002, 84-5). Social stratification was also prevalent among Spanish officials especially those who were native born Europeans and those who were American native-born or creoles.

Violent and spontaneous indigenous revolts against the abuses of Spanish authorities were very rare and quickly disrupted by military forces. One of the earliest revolts can be traced back to 1623 in the Valleys of Zongo and Challana close to the city of La Paz. After the killing of more than 30 Spaniards at the hands of the indigenous people of the area, the viceroy sent two hundred troops to reinforce the Spaniard neighbors of La Paz to defend their haciendas but the fight never occurred since the revolt was pacified by

a group of priests that were able to persuade the Indians to surrender (De Mesa, Gisbert and Mesa Gisbert 187, 2003). One of the first organized insurrections against Spanish authorities was the 1730 Cochabamba Rebellion which was sparked when a *revisita* (inspection of a province for preparation of lists of tax payers) was ordered for the purpose of making a census of the indigenous and mestizo population, and reorganizing the *mita* quota. The rebellion was indirectly stimulated by the provincial creoles since a creole mayor had spread the rumor that mestizos were to be classified as by the *revisitador* as indigenous people and would be compelled to pay tribute and be recruited as *mita* workers (O'Phelan Godoy 1985, 75). Even though the rebellion included indigenous participation, the rebellion itself was led by mestizos, creoles and even some priests who demanded that the town mayors should not be Spaniards but creoles and that they should be able to appoint their own *revisitador* which would of course allow them to assume political control of the towns and cities. The rebellion was over once their leadership was captured and killed, but this rebellion would be the first of many uprising eventually leading to the Great Rebellion of Tupac Amaru and Tupac Katari.

The relationship between Spaniards, creoles, mestizos and Indians was never on fair terms since their alliances mostly favored the agenda of the Spaniard or creole class that tried to manipulate the indigenous leaders for their political gain. A clear example of this was the 1739 Oruro Manifesto in which a creole, Juan Velez, claimed he was a legitimate heir to the Inca throne and had offered the cacique Jose Pachacnina the post of viceroy in his new government. The manifesto was not only against the high taxes and the *mita* but also pointed out that the Indians and creoles were both the true heirs of their land (Asebey Claire and Mamani Siñani 2015, 143). According to O'Phelan Godoy (1985, 87-

8), the manifesto was a concerted effort to give the impression of equality between creoles, mestizos and Indians since the people involved in the conspiracy were mostly creoles and mestizos with the only exception of Pachacnina.

Besides the *mita* and the high tributes Indigenous communities had to pay they also had to struggle with the forced distribution of their commodities known as “*reparto*”. Most of the time the abuses of corruption came at the hands of their own cacique which was elected by Spanish officials. Defiance toward this unjust system was met with legal petitions to high colonial courts demanding the removal of corrupt leaders. Between 1747 and 1748 this judicial strategy, which became a cornerstone of indigenous contention in the Chayanta community near Potosi, had extended to neighboring communities with successful results by replacing caciques with their own leaders (Serulnikov 2003a, 19-20). Most communities did not have the same outcome and took matters in their own hands. In 1759 a cacique from Laja brought charges against a Spanish appointed *corregidor* (mayor) due to excessive *reparto* and for not paying him his commission on sales which later led to a community suit that escalated into riots and the death of court investigators (Thomson 2002, 126). Complaints were placed by indigenous communities of Oruro in 1755, of Larecaje in 1757, and in 1761 in Chaytanta and Cochabamba, due to the violence regarding the distribution of goods; even though there was evidence of deep rooted resentment against the *reparto*, their complaints did not grow into social movements (O’Phelan Godoy 1985, 154).

The *raparto* was an economic burden on the indigenous communities but so were the tributes they had to pay to the churches which included baptism and wedding charges and *diezmos* (tithe). As explained by Serulnikov (2003a, 95), rural parishes were a

fundamental locus of colonial exploitation and rule since together with *corregidores*, the priests represented the most immediate Spanish authority figures in the rural villages but unlike the civil magistrates, the priests lived within the indigenous communities and often spoke their native language. Priests and their private institutions profited from indigenous communities who were threatened by incarceration or public flogging if they failed to pay any of the wide variety of fees or if they refused to work for the priests as their personal assistants, messengers or cooks. Single indigenous women were also victims of this scheme since they were basically incarcerated and forced to spin wool or weave for weeks or months, often with no pay and little food and other times they were held in a jail or private home, such as that of the priests or in a larger settlement of another Creole member of the community (Robins 2007, 48). Once again the indigenous people resorted to the use of the institutional channels and file suits against the abuses made by the priests and *corregidores* such was the case in 1762, when the Yamparaez curaca, Pedro Nolasco Pumacusi, filed a suit along with other community principals, in which they accused the priest Tomas Pereira and other Spaniards of seizing lands the community had owned for many years (Robins 2007, 83). Their resourceful use of institutional political action, such as pleas for justice through the judicial system were met with denials and delays as the great indigenous masses grew with impatience and frustration.

The 1771 violent uprisings in Chulumani and Machaca are clear examples that indigenous leaders believed that the only response to the ongoing abuses of the Spanish officials such as the *corregidores*, priests and even indigenous caciques, was armed insurrection. The Chulumani rebellion received support from neighboring towns and even though there wasn't a political project formulated in the movement, there was a powerful

aspiration to end the Spanish oppression which they saw was unsustainable (Thomson 2003, 57). In November of that same year, the Indians of Jesus de Machaca brutally killed their *corregidor* and cacique and also during that month the provincial capital of Pacajes, Caquiaviri, was violently taken over by Indian forces. The killings of the latter were not sudden spontaneous impulse of a rioting mob like Machaca but were a part of a radical political agenda that envisioned the elimination of significant features of colonial domination. (Thomson 2002, 128-9). The anticolonial resistance was not necessarily against the Spanish crown but defied the established political order and focused on the elimination of the Spanish colonizers and to obtain an equivalent status for the Indians (Thomson 2002, 44). These uprising were not for independence but against the abuses of the Spanish appointed authorities and the increase in tributes and taxes.

In the 1770s the custom houses or *aduanas* became the center of contention between the indigenous communities and the Spanish authorities. According to O'Phelan Godoy (1985, 161) the changes in the *alcabala* sales tax as well as the establishment of custom houses due to the Bourbon reforms created the impetus that led to the Great Rebellion of Tupac Katari and Tupac Amaru. In Cochabamba the rapid increase of the *alcabala* tax was due to the newly established Custom House which began operating in 1774 but local authorities recommended that the new taxes be suspended to bring local protests and riots to an end (O'Phelan Godoy 1985, 163-5). The erection of the Custom House at La Paz in 1777 was also met with resistance as indigenous dyers and baize weavers submitted a formal complaint against the customs officials but since their complaints were not responded rioting broke out against the custom house. The incident began with a crowd of around forty to fifty Indians that entered the custom house taking

their written petitions of injustices but by the afternoon the crowd grew to more than 500 Indians and mestizos (O'Phelan Godoy 1985, 181-2).

The indigenous people of Pocoata were involved in one of the most brutal episodes of resistance which began through the use of institutional political action since between August 1775 and February 1776, they traveling on several occasions to the courts in La Plata to demand the removal of the cacique, Florencio Lupa, and the mestizo governor, Blas Bernal (Serulnikov 2003b, 119). Collective pilgrimages to colonial tribunals were common occurrences in northern Potosi and over a period of three years the indigenous community had carried out tenacious legal struggles and judicial battles including several appeals, to the royal treasury of Potosi, the audience of Charcas and even a six hundred mile journey to Buenos Aires to take their case before the highest authorities in the land, the viceroy of the Rio de la Plata (Serulnikov 2003a, 122-3). Their initial goal was to name their representative, Tomas Catari, who was an indigenous commoner as their cacique. Throughout the years of his appointment as cacique, Lupa, had abused his position to accumulate material wealth and political influence, but once the people felt that the court would not remove him from his position, they took justice in their own hands. The residents of La Plata were terrorized by the indigenous insurrection since the head of Lupa was placed on a cross of a close locality (Serulnikov 2003a, 55). The *corregidor*, Bernal Blas, also met a violent end when an indigenous group dragged him from his house while beating him to death (Serulnikov 2003a, 145). The death of these two Spanish appointed administrators, signified that the indigenous people were willing to use violence and rebel against colonial authorities to demand the right to choose their own leaders.

The rebellion in Chayanta had the support of some church officials but this was not because of the injustices the indigenous people had suffered but because of personal financial interests. Tomas Catari was encouraged to revolt against the local officials by the priest, Gregorio Jose de Merlos, who had a known commercial rivalry with the local authorities (O'Phelan Godoy 1985, 226). Catari had the backing of most of the indigenous communities surrounding Chayanta who viewed him as their hero and savior. His movement was a gradual process of social unrest that developed from nonviolent pilgrimages and organized institutional political action using the judicial system to violent armed revolts and killings of Spanish officials. The mid-1780, marked the beginning of a historically unique period of self-rule among the Northern Potosi indigenous communities since their particular type of insurgent politics allowed them to gain almost complete control over their rural villages by naming Catari as their cacique (Serulnikov 2003a, 157).

This short period of self-rule was quickly interrupted when Catari was arrested by Spanish authorities in December 1780. A month later he was killed by another rebel group while being transported to La Plata. The incarceration and death of Tomas Catari created greater uprisings by the people in Chayanta who turned into his brothers Damaso and Nicolas Catari for guidance and leadership. Nicolas Catari had called upon indigenous communities to join him to avenge the murder of his brother. Hundreds of indigenous rebels gathered in the place where Tomas Catari was held prisoner and began a violent crusade of killing the main people responsible for their leader's death (Serulnikov 2003a, 190). In February 1781, Damasco Catari, headed an indigenous insurgent group of approximately four thousand to the city of La Plata but it took less than one week for the loyalist army to defeat the indigenous rebellion and capture their leaders. Damasco was

hanged while Nicolas Catari was sent to the gallows; more than 50 Indians were executed in La Plata and hundred suffered punishment from mutilation or sentence to forced services (Serulnikov 2003a, 214).

Tomas Catari's revolts was a local conflict aimed at challenging Spanish administrative appointments, high Indian tributes and the cruelty of the *mita* quotas. Even though he was able to attract thousands of indigenous forces he was not part of the organized regional rebellion of Tupac Amaru in Peru. The Catari movement was not an extension or product of the greater Tupac Amaru rebellion but developed independently out of the conflict with the regional political apparatus of colonial domination and out of the breakdown of community political representation and mediation (Thomson 2002, 166). The Tomas Catari uprising was not a rebellion based on expectations of social change in the language of messianic and millennial utopias but the adoption of nativist utopias and messianic expectation was the outcome and not the origin of mass insurrection (Serulnikov 2003a, 125).

Chayanta was not the only place of indigenous uprisings. There were already reports of riots in the custom house offices in La Paz and Cochabamba in 1780 and by 1781 indigenous forces headed to Oruro where they helped place a creole, Jacinto Rodriguez, as their new *corregidor*. Thousands of Indian community members converged on the city to support their comrades and all creole residents of Oruro were effectively obliged to wear Indian clothing and chew coca (Thomson 2002, 172-3). The dynamics in Oruro were profoundly influenced by the general anticipation of Inka rule and sovereignty which was the utopian project and agenda set by Tupac Amaru (Thomson 2002, 179). The creoles of Oruro grew impatient and persuaded the Indians to withdraw from the city. They offered

them payment for them to leave but the more radical Indians were offended by the offer and began looting creole stores. Rodriguez, growing desperate and fearing increasing Indian hostility towards creoles, captured and executed some Indians who had looted creole property (Robins 2007, 163). Finally the creoles and mestizos were able drive out the Indians from Oruro by making an alliance with the European who supported the royalist cause (Cornblit 122, 1995).

The symbol of colonial indigenous resistance in Bolivia was the Tupac Katari uprising. In March 1781, Julian Apaza takes the name of Tupac Katari, honoring the Rebellion of Tupac Amaru in Peru and Tomas Catari in Bolivia and therefore linking both rebellions. As an indigenous commercial trader, Katari, was aware and directly affected of the unfair taxes and abuses the indigenous communities had encountered under Spanish rule. For over a decade Katari used his experience as a trader and travelled to many indigenous villages and towns to build relations with indigenous leaders with the intention of mobilizing a rebellion. He stepped in to fill the vacant space left by traditional community representatives and used his family connections in order to recruit men for his indigenous forces and appointed his relatives to important positions (O'Phelan Godoy 1985, 245-6). Katari's leadership came from within the indigenous communities and were not imposed from above since he was not part of the indigenous or mestizo elite like Tupac Amaru who had had mestizos and creoles within his ranks. According to Campbell (1987, 127), in Peru Tupac Amaru was seen as a Redeemer, and Liberator of the Oppressed, similar to the figure of Jesus Christ while in Bolivia there was more of a virulent form of Aymara nationalism symbolized by Tupac Katari. The objectives of the movements also differed considerably depending on race and economic status, since creoles and mestizos

wanted to eliminate the custom houses and high taxes while indigenous communities wanted to end the *mita* (O'Phelan Godoy 1985, 266-7).

The armed indigenous rebellion of Tupac Katari began on March of 1781, when the city of La Paz was surrounded and closed by 80,000 indigenous people for 109 days. The roads and passageways to La Paz were blocked and neither food nor military reinforcement was able to enter the city causing the Spanish colonial army to suffer over 6,000 casualties not only due to combat but also to hunger (Rojas Ramirez 1989, 11). Katari also sent messengers to neighboring towns and villages calling for the indigenous people to rise in arms and kill all Spanish officials. Ironically, Christian beliefs were used to justify the killing of Spaniards. According to Szeminski (1987, 171), some indigenous rebels did not recognize Spaniards as true Christian and saw them as beastly demons doomed to extermination. Many Spaniards were forced to dress in native attire to save their lives since Katari forbade all Spanish customs and ordered that anyone dressed in European clothing be killed. Robins (2005, 172) describes these acts of violence as a form of retributive genocide that sought the practical elimination of the Spanish people, their culture and language, and to certain extend their belief system, which was imposed on the indigenous people. Katari did not limit himself in killing Spaniards but also killed a number of Indians, who had either spoken against him or challenged his authority. Most of the time the use of violence was to reinforce military discipline and political order within an insurgent movement that had limited organizational cohesion (Thomson 2002, 193).

The second Katari insurrection in La Paz lasted 75 days from August to October of 1781. Between 80,000 and 100,000 Indians took position in the neighboring hills to conduct daily attacks using slingshot and guns. There was a greater hostility towards the

Spanish residents of La Paz during the second siege and violence was used directly and indirectly. The Katari army flooded the rivers surrounding the creole farmlands causing the destruction of their crops and drowning their livestock (Cornblit 1995, 123). Once they arrived to La Paz, the royalist forces were able to quickly defeat the Tupac Katari army and the Tupac Amaru forces that came to support him. It was clear that Katari's indigenous army was more radical than the Tupac Amaru men who were under the command of native elites and even during their defeat they were allowed to return to Peru while Katari's men were slaughtered (Campbell 1987, 131). The defeat of the Tupac Katari Rebellion was due to the military limitations of his purely indigenous army and the lack of any type of support from the creoles or mestizos (Arze Aguirre 1979, 95). In November of 1781, the colonial army captured Katari and sentenced him to be executed by quartering. Katari's arms and legs were tied to horses and before his death he chanted, "I die but I will return as millions." Tupac Katari's head and extremities were sent to locations with significant indigenous revolts in the past. The brutal death of Katari and of the main leaders of the rebellion served as a warning of any type of indigenous insurrection against the Spanish Crown. But it did not eliminate the indigenous desire to self-rule nor did it prevent the indigenous participation during the country's War for Independence.

3.2 Birth of a Nation:

The indigenous uprisings at the end of the 18th century influenced the rise of the movements that led to the independence of South American territories in the 19th century. Under the leadership of the creole Pedro Domingo Murillo, the city of La Paz became the first place in Latin America to start an independence movement against Spain. On July 16

of 1809, Murillo's rebel group besieged a royalist army barracks and ousted the governor starting a Bolivian revolution which was famously described as a lamp nobody would be able to extinguish. Murillo proclaimed colonial independence and was named president of the Junta Tuitiva which had twelve members but also included three Indian representatives, one of Yungas, another for Omasuyos and another for Sorata (De Mesa, Gisbert and Mesa Gisbert 2003, 318). Murillo's revolution ignited uprisings in indigenous communities and were instructed not to pay any tributes to the Spanish crown. Arze Aguirre (1979, 114) explains that in the Yungas valleys of La Paz, indigenous leaders were able to organize approximately 3,000 Indians which clearly reminded the Spanish authorities of the threat of mostly unarmed masses of Indians and even the greater danger if they allied themselves with a well-equipped and well-disciplined creole army. The indigenous masses were quickly disassembled once Murillo and the rebel leaders were defeated and executed by the royalist army. Klein (2002, 92) explains that the "shout" (*grito*) of independence by the creole rebel leaders of La Paz found no immediate echo among the Indians, nor a positive response from the urban creole elites. As indicated by Larson (2004, 6) the indigenous insurrections conditioned the undulating movement of revolution and counterrevolution that allowed the creoles to be even more hesitant about independence.

According to Klein (2002, 93), while the generation of 1809 urban leadership was effectively destroyed, a host of rural guerrilla leaders emerged and were able to obtain the support from all social classes in Bolivia, including the Indian rural masses. These guerrilla groups were successful in controlling important areas in the countryside and were effective allies of the independence army. They were called "*republiquetas*" because they were guerrilla forces in control of vast territories and autonomous in their decision making with

some ties to the organized independence army. One of the most important *republiquetas* was led by Manuel Ascencio Padilla and his wife, Juana Azurduy de Padilla, because they had the support of some creoles, and several mestizos, but most importantly this guerilla force was successful in recruiting a great amount of indigenous groups (De Mesa, Gisbert and Mesa Gisbert 2003, 330).

The indigenous people had limited military skills and were mostly armed with slings and clubs but it was their massive presence and understanding of their rural territories that allowed them to become key players in the War of Independence. The recruitment of indigenous insurgents was advantageous since they utilized little military tactics but relied on their geographic advantage of being in the highlands and were able to set roadblocks and conduct some night raids (Arze Aguirre 1979, 167). Some priests who lived in rural areas and had close contact with the indigenous communities also rebelled against the Spanish Crown and were able to convince their Indian parishioners to fight against the royalist army (Arze Aguirre 1979, 175). The royalist military also tried to enlist Indians for the fighting and were able to convince some indigenous leaders which resulted in an escalated level of violence and social conflict since Indians began to obtain arms from all sides (Klein 2002, 95). The military recruitment of the Indians was not spontaneous but some were threatened and forced to participate to achieve a solidarity among the indigenous communities (Arze Aguirre 1979, 166). As the skirmishes and battles began to intensify more indigenous communities began supporting the independence army and provided them with food, water, assistance in the transportation of military supplies and artillery, and with intelligence gathering. Arze Aguirre (1979, 194) adds that during the

final stages of the War of Independence, the Spanish army was unable to find one Indian to spy for them at any price.

During the years of the War for Independence the indigenous people in Bolivia took arms and used violence as a form of resistance towards a system that had exploited them for three centuries. Juan Manuel Caceres who was not a full blooded Indian but an educated mestizo from a well-established family had contact with many indigenous leaders and orchestrated several indigenous uprisings. He was known as “Judge Coronel” and as the “Oracle of the Indians” because of his abilities as a scribe. According to Reynaga (1978, 137), Caceres was also a veteran soldier of the Tupac Katari rebellion and a key figure in the Junta Tuitiva, who was able to evade capture from the royalist army. In 1810, Caceres supported a revolt in Oruro which had initially began with unarmed Indian protests due to the removal of one of their caciques. Arze Aguirre (1979, 126) explains, that the Oruro uprising led to a series of combined indigenous revolts against the tribute and *mita* which spread to other areas of Bolivia. Another successful uprising took place in historical Tiwanaku where the indigenous leader Juan Jose Castelli proclaimed Indians to be citizens of equal rights and abolished tribute force labor and promised to distribute lands and establish schools (Walker 1999, 89). By August of 1811, the Caceres inspired insurrections expanded to indigenous communities in Ayo-ayo, Calamarca, Sicasica and ultimately culminating with the attack of the city of La Paz (De Mesa, Gisbert and Mesa Gisbert 2003, 323). Just like the Tupac Katari rebellion three decades ago, La Paz was effectively surrounded by 45,000 Indians who had placed roadblocks to prevent the Spanish authorities to communicate with the outside for 45 days but once they heard about the Spanish reinforcement they fled the city (Reynaga 1977, 139).

Several of the uprisings were not connected at all with the independence army but they were successful in destabilizing the royalist army and allowed the entrance of the more organized military forces of Simon Bolivar. Most of the indigenous forces were used to escort the independence armies and their number oscillate from 15,000 to 19,000 natives that participated in the Bolivian War of Independence many of who were assigned the rank of military officers (Arze Aguirre 1979, 165). One of the objectives of the indigenous involvement during the War of Independence was to obtain a certain level of self-rule which was the same purpose fought during the Great Rebellion. Bolivia obtained its independence on August 6th, 1825 but the struggle for indigenous autonomy would continue since the Liberator of the Americas, had created a country without citizens due to the fact that the newly formed Bolivian state denied citizenship to the majority of its inhabitants who were indigenous.

As the first president of Bolivia, Simon Bolivar, installed new laws aimed to free the indigenous people from their colonial chains by ending tributes, taxes and the ruthless practice of the *mita*. Bolivar embraced the ideals of liberty and equality and wanted to break the communal ownership of indigenous lands and promote private property among the Indians. One year after his successor, Antonio Jose de Sucre, reinstalled the discriminatory laws of the colonial era and rather than giving Indians citizenship they revived the degrading obligations of the past (Gotkowitz 2007, 18). According to Klein (2002, 105), the Bolivian government soon found that it could no longer afford the luxury of doing without the indigenous tributes and within one year it had re-imposed the colonial tributes at the same rate as the past since it now accounted for 60 percent of the government income.

The autonomy the indigenous people had fought for was quickly disappearing and being replaced with a similar and sometimes the exact systems that they had been resisting for centuries. The Bolivian state was becoming more and more like the Spanish colonial government. The moiety collectorships (*recaudadores*) were reestablished under the control of the creoles and mestizos and any Indigenous opposition or challenges to the restoration of these laws were met with severe punishments. According to Platt (1987, 295), the *recaudadores* were more abusive and even used new methods to ‘squeeze’ the tributes but this was also met with resistance by the indigenous communities that wanted to replace the alien *recaudadores* with collectors from their own ranks. The idea of indigenous self-rule and the dilemma of land rights would be the two most debated issues that highlighted the relationship between the Bolivian State and the indigenous people until the end of the 19th century.

In less than twenty years since its formation the Bolivian state already had more than a dozen presidents but it was not until 1848, with the government of Manuel Isidoro Belzu that the rural indigenous masses and urban populous found an allied. Belzu was a loud opponent of the elite establishment and declared that private property was the main source of crime in Bolivia as well as property owners (De Mesa, Gisbert and Mesa Gisbert 2003, 397). He proclaimed himself as a representative of the mestizo lower classes of the cities, and expressed himself in terms of Christian socialism by attacking the legitimacy of private property and class structure (Klein 2002, 126). Belzu was able to receive the support of the indigenous communities mainly the Aymara from the highlands who quickly responded to his call of patrolling the border preventing a possible invasion from Peru and even had mentioned that they were willing to revolt and die if anyone would try to displace

Belzu who they referred to as “*tata*” (Father) (Mendieta Prada 2006, 767). The populist Belzu faced something on the order of thirty to forty different revolts and survived even an assassination attempt in his six year term. In 1855, Belzu retired and was replaced by this son in-law, Jorge Cordova, but his government only lasted two years and reinstalled a Bolivian state that was once again repressive towards the indigenous population.

3.3 Melgarejo and the Age of the Caudillos:

During the initial stages of the Republic there weren’t any indigenous massacres but the first recorded state violence against indigenous people began with the government of Jose Maria Linares. In 1860, Linares who had already established himself as a dictator was not hesitant in dispatching his troops to slaughter a group of Indians who were protecting their land in Copacabana (Antezana Ergueta 1994, 11-12). This event would be the first of several episodes of state violence, repression, and unjust degrees to seize indigenous lands. The government continued to collect tax tributes from the indigenous communities who possessed most of the land but by 1863 the state revisited the Bolivarian ideals of Indian smallholding. Larson (2004, 2016) explains that the 1863 decree of President Jose Maria Acha also included ambitious projects of cultural reform aimed at compulsory civilization of Indians. This decree made Bolivar’s aspirations into reality since it granted the Indians as the rightful owner of their lands and it also annulled the colonial tributes and it even allowed one parcel of land for all landless Indians (De Mesa, Gisbert and Mesa Gisbert 2003, 423). Unfortunately for the indigenous communities all

of these attempts to land reform were repelled once General Mariano Melgarejo took power and initiated the Bolivian era of caudillismo.²

Melgarejo also known as the “Barbarous Caudillo” ruled the country under a brutal military dictatorship from 1864 to 1871. His tyranny began with a deliberate attack to seize Indigenous lands through legal decrees and state violence. In May of 1866 he declared that the Bolivian state was the sole proprietor of all communal land and that Indians residing on them were now required to purchase individual land titles. But these titles did not give the indigenous people full rights to their lands since the lands continued to be owned by the state and they were required to renew these titles every five years. Klein (2002, 136) adds that the decree allowed the Indians only sixty days to purchase their land and if they were unable to pay before the due date the state would sell their lands to other purchasers. Melgarejo’s government intentionally tried to keep Indians from obtaining land titles by demanding enormous size and costs for all sales while auctioneers sold the land of numerous indigenous communities to private bidders (Gotkowitz 2007, 20). Larson (2004,217) also add that besides the state confiscating and auctioning of indigenous lands there were also heavy land taxes on those who were able to keep their lands.

Oligarchic groups had complete control of the Bolivian political system and made alliances with military strongmen or caudillos like Melgarejo to protect their interests. Melgarejo worked on behalf of the oligarchic groups that had placed, supported and maintained him in power. According to Klien (2002, 132), Melgarejo in many ways gave full control of the country to the mining elites who embraced free trade. His disastrous

² Caudillismo was a period of Bolivian history where the country was under the control of a “Caudillo” or military strongman who served the interests of an oligarchic group.

dictatorship is among the most dreadful in Bolivian history, not only for his personal devious vices but also for his irrational land giveaways to Brazil and Chile. The beneficiaries of Melgarejo's policies were not only the mining elites but also members of the elite landowners, merchants and even some prosperous Indians (Larson 2004, 218). The indigenous communities were completely disenfranchised of the Bolivian political system and did not have any type of support of any political party. Antezana Ergueta (1994, 24) explains that the biggest challenge the indigenous communities had was their lack of political participation and representation which allowed Melgarejo's government to systematically kill them without any opposition.

The indigenous communities took a nonviolent approach to contention and as in colonial times they began their resistance against the land reforms through legitimate means by denouncing individuals that were involved in the extortion and abuse of the unjust land decrees. The Indigenous communities mounted everyday counterattacks which also included occupying stolen and disputed lands with their llama and sheep herds (Larson 2004, 219). In June of 1869, 5,000 Indians occupied lands in Tiquina that were taken from them and handed to the family members of Melgarejo (Antezana Ergueta 1994, 27). Melgarejo sent his most trusted and ruthless general, Leonardo Anrtzana, to lead his soldiers and violently end the indigenous uprising. According to Condarco Morales (1982, 43) almost 600 Indians were killed since the soldiers were ordered not to take any prisoners and executed all rebels. This was one the first state massacres of indigenous people which sparked a wave of violent indigenous revolts against the military dictator.

In early 1870 the indigenous people of Ancoraimas in La Paz armed themselves with knives, bows, and sticks on an 8 month struggle from January to August where the

indigenous people were able to avenge the selling of their land from the Melgarejo regime (Rojas Ramirez 1989, 14). Most of the indigenous uprising were small, unorganized and short lived since they met with greater state violence. Condarco Morales (1982, 43) adds that the armed forces of Melgarejo under the command of General Antezana killed over 2,000 Indians in military campaigns in Huacho, Taraco and Ancoraimes.

Melgarejo easily defeated and massacred the indigenous uprisings but the main threat to his dictatorship came from within his military. Members of his government grew tired of his incompetence and tried on several occasions to oust him. The subversive group was headed by General Agustin Morales who was able to unite all of Melgarejo's enemies including the indigenous masses. Morales urged the indigenous people to take arms against the president, promising to oppose the land seizures and violence they were being subjected to. Condarco Morales (1982, 51) explains that a well-known indigenous leader, Luciano Wilka, actually went to look for General Morales and offered his loyalty and the services of his men to fight against Melgarejo. Indigenous communities were called to obtain food supply and recruit men to defeat the tyrannical dictator. Another factor that may have contributed to the indigenous participation against Melgarejo was their aspiration to be viewed as Bolivian citizens by contributing to the salvation and shaping of Bolivia (Irurozqui 2000, 99).

In 1871, General Augustin Morales was able to lead a successful indigenous uprising against the tyrant, Melgarejo, who had basically transformed indigenous lands into feudal private haciendas and converted indigenous people into servants or *pongos*. More than 40,000 Indians joined the Morales army but they were not used as armed soldiers but as a massive horde that accompanied Morales' army that finally toppled Melgarejo

(Antezana Ergueta 1994, 31). The ousting of Melgarejo was the first time in post-independence Bolivia that there was an alliance between Indians and non-Indians. The victory over Melgarejo allowed the indigenous people to be incorporated in the development of the country but most importantly they were able to win public and political spaces (Irurozqui 2001, 432).

The assembly after Melgarejo's departure of 1871 named Augustin Morales president and unanimously ratified indigenous rights to all land they possessed. Morales ordered the removal of all the land decrees of the Melgarejo dictatorship. As detailed by Gotkowitz (2007, 25), the assembly restored the land largely because its members were scared of Indian uprisings and advocated smallholdings thus defending Indian land rights because they feared a rebellion like the one unleashed on Melgarejo. The Bolivian Indians had demonstrated patriotism and a willingness to obtain a level of acceptance towards Bolivian citizenship but their uprisings were mischaracterized to the public as savage, bloody and beastly; a vision of an uncivilized and dangerous Indian (Irurozqui 2001, 418). Even though the elites celebrated the indigenous bravery and assistance to remove Melgarejo, their involvement also revealed the possible political threat of the indigenous masses which could endangered their interests.

The new Morales regime desperately tried to temporarily restore the Indian lands and renegotiate some of the extravagant contracts but it actually furthered the general policies of the Melgarejo dictatorship that favored the mining elites (Kleine 2002, 137). While some indigenous communities were successful in obtaining their land back, much of the property bought by private individuals was not returned to their previous owners (Irurozqui 2000, 93). The possibility of reclaiming stolen land would end once Morales

was assassinated and replaced by Tomas Frias who demanded that all indigenous lands should be peacefully handed over to the white creoles by selling their lands (Antezana Ergueta 1994, 41).

3.4 The Agrarian Reform and “Los Conservadores”:

The state did not anticipate a massive violent reaction of the indigenous people with the land reform decrees of the 1860s. The short political history of Bolivia was already used to endemic violence between military caudillos which were dominated and manipulated by oligarchic groups. As Klein (2002, 154) explains while *golpes* (coup d’etat) were part of the political landscape, they did not necessarily represent the breakdown of powerful civilian rule. But the Melgarejo aftermath created greater political instability and weakened the Bolivian state which led to the opening of opportunities for new political players. By the 1970s, the whites and mestizos were increasing their political influence while the new urban and mining camp markets provided the economic incentive for the land elites to undertake a new full scale attack (Klein 2002, 146).

In 1874, under the presidency of Tomas Frias, the national assembly approved the decree known as *exviculacion* or law of disassociation of the lands. This law was intended to fracture the basis of the relationship indigenous communities had with their land as communal owners (De Mesa, Gisbert and Mesa Gisbert 2003, 506). This pre-Inca form of shared community was the *ayllu* and practiced by the Aymaras and Quechuas in the vast rural territories of Bolivia. The *exvinculacion* decree was seen as a direct attack to their communal way of life. Lands that were re-vindicated for the *ayllus* during the Morales

administration were once again the target of the elite establishment but because of external factors such as “the War of the Pacific” this law was not executed until the 1880s.

The internal caudillo feuding and political volatility led to the Bolivian defeat of the Chilean invasion of its Litoral Department in the “The War of the Pacific” (1879-80). Bolivia did not only lose a massive amount of territory but also its access to the Pacific Ocean. The war geographically changed Bolivia to a landlocked country but also transformed it politically by institutionalizing a bi-partisan system of Liberals and Conservatives. Both parties continued to exclude the Bolivian indigenous population by denying them of any democratic participation. The white elites were very effective in keeping the Indian masses out of politics and refusing them access to arms or any other effective means of protests since their economic expansion depended on the exploitation of the Indian, either as miner or as landed agriculturalists (Klein 2002, 148). Since the state relied heavily on indigenous labor and products as the colonial government before, the state also used indigenous leaders to acts as their agents in the extraction of those resources (Rasnake 1988, 154). But most indigenous leaders organized defensive mechanisms often in the form of a grassroots movements largely through legal means that challenged the new landholding regime. Indigenous communities sought the assistance of lawyers who were able to obtain their land titles and even travelled distances to locate the archived titles from colonial times (Mendianta Parada 2006, 773). Their use of institutional political action combined with nonviolent methods and sometime violent resistance was suppressed by the civilian regimes who proved to be even more despotic than the caudillos since they were also willing to use the military as a crucial tool to maintain Indian submissiveness.

During the 1880s the governments of Campero, Baptista, Arce, and Fernandez Alonso all pushed aggressively for the execution of the *exvicolacion* law. This was followed by an onslaught of fraudulent land sales that converted ayllu-based communities into an atomized mass of landless indigenous (Larson 2004, 227). They forced the indigenous communities a system of direct land purchase in which the titles to the land were held by individuals and not by communal groups, or *ayllus*. The result was the increased breakdown of social cohesion among the Indian, the loss of indigenous social norms, migration to cities, and an expansion in the urban and rural mestizo populations. (Klein 2002, 147). The bureaucratic process of state surveyors were basically military campaigns of occupying and seizing indigenous communal lands (Antezana Ergueta 1994, 46).

More than a third of indigenous communal land was transformed to private property thanks to the support the land elites received from local authorities and the manipulation of the legal system (Irurozqui 1994, 93). The indigenous communities were not the only ones who suffered from the new political system but so did the Liberal Party since the Conservatives had achieved a political monopoly. The quarrel between the Conservative and Liberal Parties generated a new discourse focusing on the indigenous masses and the threat of a revolution from below. Both parties sought the support of the rural and urban masses but discouraged their political participation. According to Irurozqui (1994, 64) artisan laborers represented a majority of eligible voters and were viewed as a threat to the elitist groups who described the artisan worker as an apolitical, hardworking individual who loved order and respected the law. Irurozqui (1994, 28) also adds that there were debates and promises about the quality of life and education of these popular classes but

nothing was done due the political exclusion of the popular classes which was mostly indigenous.

Tired of the appropriation of their land and the abuses they received from local authorities and landlords, the indigenous masses began a series of radical uprisings with racial overtones not seen since the Tupac Katari Rebellion a century ago. Between 1885 and 1888 there was an initiative of a coordinated inter-regional indigenous rebellion against the white race and the result was an uprising in Sacaca of 3,000 Indians armed with sling, clubs and knives demanding the head of the land commissioner (Platt 1987, 309). Potosi once again became the epicenter of indigenous uprisings. Indigenous forces took over the town of Escoma and expelled all of the white people which inspired a revolt in La Paz over new tax tributes (Irurozqui 1994, 95).

By the late 1880s, political and social conditions began to encourage some Liberals to enlist Indians in their crusade for power. According to Platt (1987, 309), the indigenous uprisings in Potosi were orchestrated by the Liberal party who had set up headquarters in rural areas. Liberals campaigned openly for the support of indigenous communities, and party slogans and propaganda circulated through rural webs of communications among large number of transients Indian traveling between their *ayllus* and the mines, markets and shires (Larson 2004, 230). The Liberal party supported the indigenous demands of abolishing a 25 percent tribute increase and the annulment of the sale of their lands which was rejected by the conservative government of Pacheco but the protests continued and the indigenous communities were able to reinstate their lands in exchange of a territorial tribute (Irurozqui 1994, 92). The Liberal party was also useful in

the gathering of over 55 indigenous leaders between the periods of 1880 and 1899 were they made numerous plans to rebel and demand justice (Mendianta Parada 2006, 770).

While the rural territories of Bolivia were the stages of state violence against the indigenous population the city capitals were the scenes of political violence which was constrained among the elite urban class. The 1888 elections became a violent affair after the Liberals abstained from participating since an electoral victory was impossible due to the fact that the Conservatives had a governmental monopoly and the only way to oppose them was through a violent military coup. The use of fraud and violence was inevitable since all subsequent governments refused to relinquish the presidency to the opposition party (Klein 2002, 154). By the early 1890s the Liberal leadership rejected rebellion and supported the re-installment of elections since the Conservatives allowed the Liberals to have representation in Congress but continued to deny them access to the presidency (Irurizqui 1994, 53). After almost two decades of Conservative power the Liberal party of La Paz-Oruro would begin an historic alliance with the indigenous people by promising them the return of their lands, a political voice and indigenous self-rule.

3.5 The Federalist War/Civil War:

While the political parties were preparing for an unavoidable civil war the Indians of the Eastern side of Bolivia were also experiencing their share of state violence. In 1892 the Chiriguano Indians of Santa Cruz revolted and defeated a small state army. This victory gave them the opportunity to recruit over 1,000 armed Indians from the surrounding area. In less than a month the resistance was defeated by the state army who slaughtered 600 indigenous rebels and captured 500 prisoners only to be later executed as an example to

other indigenous groups (Antezana Ergueta 1994, 55). The Indians of the Bolivian east who were labeled as “savages” by both the Conservatives and Liberals grew tired of the lands sacking and exploitation of their labor. They revolted and were able to occupy several locations killing the landlords, but were massacred in Santa Rosa by the state army who were not hesitant in slaughtering their women and children almost exterminating the Chiriguano Indians (De Mesa, Gisbert and Mesa Gisbert 2003, 501). The Chiriguano found it virtually impossible to strike back at the invading landlords elites who had the support of the state army. According to Langer (1989, 192), the use of violent methods of resistance was discouraged since even the most recalcitrant Chiriguano village chief realized that fighting the white man would not bring back the earlier period of autonomy and instead of joining the landlord’s labor force, many Indians chose to leave the area altogether, and immigrate to northern Argentina.

In 1895, other less organized and smaller indigenous revolts followed in the western highlands of the country. The Aymara Indians from Tiwanaku, Copacabana and Huaico began a series of violent uprisings which required the intervention of the Bolivian army. These revolts were uncoordinated, sporadic and did not have a political agenda but mainly defied the political establishment that had taken their lands (Concardo Morales 1982, 53). But by the mid-1890s, indigenous revolts were not at the center stage of domestic politics due to the increasing escalation of the political conflict between the Liberal party and the Conservative party. The Liberals wanted to move the capital to La Paz closer to their tin-mining industry located in Oruro while the Conservative government wanted the capital to remain in Sucre close to their silver mines in Potosi. According to Platt (1987, 281), the war was a conflict between the mining capitalists of La Paz and the feudal estates of Sucre

while others claim that the competition was between the northern tin miner and southern silver miners, and a third perception is the struggle between the middle classes (Liberals) of La Paz and the ruling class (Conservatives) of Sucre, but all suggest that the Indian participation in this conflict was subject to the manipulation of the Liberal politicians.

The growth of the tin industry of La Paz-Oruro provided the opportunity for the Liberals to challenge the declining silver alliance of Sucre-Potosi who had been in power for almost two decades under the Conservative party. In November of 1898, the Federalist Junta was established and headed by the leader of the Liberals, Jose Manuel Pando, and only a month later declared war against the Conservative government (De Mesa, Gisbert and Mesa Gisbert 2003, 511). Pando was aware that his small army of federal troops would be outmatched by the well-trained and equipped Bolivian military and required the participation of Indigenous masses if he wanted the Liberals to be victorious.

Even a few years before the civil war began Liberals were already using different strategies to gain the support of the indigenous communities by claiming that only the Liberal party was capable of restoring a just order that had been betrayed by the Conservatives. In the election year of 1896, Indian adherence to the Liberal cause led to the formation of a large crowd descending to La Paz to shout of 'viva Pando' (Irurizqui 2000, 96). The Indians had developed a special connection with Pando, some had attributed him as the reincarnation of the Inka who would bring them justice but another contributing factor was the fact that his wife, Carmen Guarachi Sinchi-Roca, who belonged to the indigenous elite class helped Pando recruit thousands of indigenous insurgents by using her connections with indigenous leaders all over Bolivia (Antezana Ergueta (1994, 60).

The success of the first military alliance between the indigenous communities and General Morales to oust Melgarejo in 1871 was the foundation for the second alliance between Jose Manuel Pando and the Liberals to remove in this occasion, the Conservative party. The powerful Liberal coalition was built by two men who would become historical partners in the Federalist War, Colonel Jose Manuel Pando and Pablo Zarate Wilka, the leader of the indigenous forces. For Pando, the enemy was simply the opposition party that had kept the Liberals out of power since the beginning of the civilian oligarchic rule in 1880 but for indigenous communities under siege for more than two decades, the enemy surpassed narrow party politics and implicated the whole social and moral order (Larson 2004, 231). The state's intention to abolish the *ayllu* indigenous communities and re-structure local powers forced the Indians to change their perception of the role they would have in Bolivia, and believed that their contribution to the war would allow them to create spaces they thought they deserved and which they could even change (Irurozqui 2000, 114). The indigenous leaders were aware that the treaty with the Liberals would not allow them to have full control of the indigenous lands in Bolivia but expected some form of political independence and sovereignty within their territories. According to Platt (1987, 319), the Indian movement engaged with the Liberal Party with the intention of achieving some type of autonomy similar to an Inca State which was possible at a lower level but impossible at a national level.

Tired of the injustices they had faced under the Bolivian state, the indigenous masses joined Zarate Wilka in an armed resistance not seen since the Tupac Katari Rebellion. By January of 1899, Pando named Zarate Wilka, Maximum Commander of the Indian Liberal Army of 50,000 indigenous troops equipped with a few old rifles, slings,

rocks and clubs (Reynaga 1977, 191). The Liberal army was victorious over the Conservatives in their first military campaign in late January but this victory was tainted by the violent atrocities committed by indigenous villagers. The injured Conservative soldiers of the battle of Cosimin took refuge in the village of Ayo-ayo unaware that an indigenous mob would later round them up and slaughter 27 soldiers along with some townspeople (De Mesa, Gisbert and Mesa Gisbert 2003, 512). In March, the Indians of Vila Vila and Caracollos defeated a Conservative army of Oruro but this victory also worried Pando of an imminent Indian insurrection against all creoles (Condarco Morales 1982, 315). Indigenous violence was not only aimed against the Conservative army and creole landlords but even against some Liberal troops.

Wilka's indigenous army was not trained in proper military tactics but their bravery during battle was effective in obtaining a psychological superiority and intimidation over the Conservative forces. Their strategy was a suicide charge to have close combat since the Indian militias were mostly armed with primitive weapons such as slings, clubs, and only one out of twenty Indians were armed with a rifle (Concardo Morales 1982, 207). The indigenous masses were used in a similar method implemented during the war of Independence, serving as escorts to the white creole troops. The poorly armed indigenous force were actually used as a defensive screen for the Liberal forces, suffering major casualties (Klein 2002, 156).

The final battle came in April of 1999 when the combined forces of Pando and Wilka defeated the Conservative army in Oruro. Pando entered the city with his 3,720 soldiers but they were overshadowed by Wilka and his 50,000 troops and when the creoles shout "Viva Pando!" their shouts were silenced by the Indians who screamed "Viva

Wilka!” (Reynaga 1977, 203). The alliance between the indigenous groups and the Liberal Party brought an end to Conservative political domination but also created a new hero among the indigenous people. The struggle itself was not only between the regional oligarchies of silver (Sucre) and tin (La Paz) but the war was also shaped by an autonomous indigenous movement, headed by Zarate Wilka. After their victory in Oruro, the Liberals set up a temporary junta and a few months later Jose Manuel Pando became president of Bolivia.

3.6 The Zarate Wilka Rebellion:

The Federalist War gave rise to Zarate Wilka as a national figure giving him the nickname of *El Temible* (The Fearsome) but among the indigenous groups he was already a well-known powerful leader. According to Larson (2004,231), Wilka was a widely respected, literate Aymara leader who travelled among communities mediating land conflicts, petitioning politicians on behalf of aggrieved communities, and spinning kinships and political webs across the Bolivian highlands. Even before he took arms against the Bolivian state he was involved in legal campaigns of land disputes for many indigenous communities going back to the 1880s (Mendieta Parada 2006, 759). The armies raised by Zarate Wilka were a confederation of indigenous authorities and territories from the Bolivian highlands and valleys. The indigenous communities of La Paz, Oruro, Potosi and Cochabamba began to mobilize in response to his call for armed rebellion and his alliance with the creole Liberals. Wilka was able to recruit and commanded tens of thousands of indigenous people.

The Pando-Wilka coalition was not clearly defined among the soldiers of both camps which led to series of confusions and disputes concerning leadership and status based on race. Condarco Morales (1982, 273) details that the indigenous troops under the leadership of the Indian, Lorenzo Ramirez, not only directly disobeyed the orders of Federalist officers but when a they called for cheers for Pando and the Federation, the indigenous army responded by chanting 'viva Wilka'. The most controversial episode of the war did not take place in the battlefield between the Conservatives and Liberal but between Indians rebels and the Liberal Federalist troops. The Pando army arrived to the town of Mohoza where they began a series of abuses towards the indigenous residents and the Indigenous troops of Lorenzo Ramirez. On February 28, 1899, the Federalist soldiers demanded food from the indigenous neighbors of Mohoza and they began to punish the people since they were not served fast and plentiful (Reynadga 1977, 197). Under the orders of Ramirez, the indigenous troops took the weapons of the Federalist soldiers while they slept and were later taken to a temple to be tortured and killed (De Mesa, Gisbert and Mesa Gisbert 2003, 513). Condarco Morales (1982, 316), adds that the Indian insurgents performed sacrificial rituals and even consumption of the 120 soldiers they had murdered.

The news of the Mohoza sadistic incident quickly spread throughout other indigenous communities in Bolivia igniting a series of violent uprisings. Only a day after the massacre, landowners were killed by indigenous masses in the towns closest to Mohoza (Concardo Morales 1982, 277). Wilka's Indian soldiers hunted down Conservative soldiers but they also wanted to settle old scores against the injustices committed by mestizos and creoles. During and even before the Federalist War, Indians had seen their communities sacked and their women raped and turned against the regular (white) armies

of both camp (Larson 2004, 236). It was clear that the war gave the indigenous masses an opportunity to use vengeful violence against the cruelties committed to them by the state and landlords. The Indians had their own agenda, and in communities near Mohoza, they began slaughtering white landlords and seizing disputed lands (Klein 2002, 157). Indians wanted to reincorporate squatted lands into their *ayllu* communities and took over farms and divided the harvests and lands among themselves (Platt 1987, 317). By April 1999, the Indians of Carasi, San Pedro, Toro-toro, Sacaba and Chanyanta were mobilized and awaiting orders from Wilka to rebel; even more aggressive were the Indians of Chayanta who had already planned the destruction of railroads to interrupt military transportation and supply (Condarco Morales 1982, 337). Other indigenous communities began organizing self-proclaimed governments and even staff members. In Peñas (Oruro), Juan Lero, an indigenous leader was named president of an authentic indigenous government and ordered his troops the destruction of haciendas, the re-integration of usurped land and even began a tribunal to judge the people who had committed abuses against the indigenous people (Cardenas 1988, 513).

The intentions of these indigenous uprisings were unclear but it did put the Federalist army on high alert since they were seen as an imminent threat to the incoming liberal authorities who quickly classified it as a “rebellion” ending the pact between Wilka and Pando. Even though the Liberal politicians recognized the Indians’ historic land rights and contributions in battles against their Conservative rivals they had always feared massive indigenous uprisings (Gotkowitz 2007, 41). It seems clear that even though Wilka never openly declared war on the white citizens of Bolivia, he did speak out against the repressive Bolivian state and summoned Indians to take direct action against their local

oppressors. He did not disavow partisan loyalty but envisioned a new order of social equality and mutual respect that would give real social content to the empty rhetoric of the Liberals (Larson 2004, 237). As soon as the Liberals took power, indigenous communities began demanding the promises they had made but these pleas were met with more violence since the Liberals made an alliance with the Conservatives and sent the Bolivian army to end all indigenous insurrections. The indigenous rebellion was unsuccessful because of the lack of military equipment of the Wilka's army and dissident conduct of many indigenous community due to political interests (Condarco Morales 1984, 317). Not all indigenous leaders partook in Wilka's rebellion since some of them became private landowner themselves during the Conservative governments. Some rural inhabitants opposed these transformation; occasionally some were able to use new opportunities to enrich themselves or to increase their power (Langer 1989, 188).

Zarate Wilka's bravery, leadership and guerrilla tactics were crucial for the defeat of the Conservative army. Although he was never directly in command of the indigenous uprising against the Liberals, Wilka was eventually captured and imprisoned with several indigenous leaders by the party they had helped place in power. They were incarcerated and tortured for several months under the charges of sedition. Their trial was the focus of the national press as multiple racist theories by scientists were used to explain the social and biological inferiority of the Indians. Journalists passionately engaged these legal and philosophical debates and in turn, propagated images of the savage Indians concluding that the Indian race was fit to become the nation's productive peasant, miner, and soldier but was essentially unfit to participate in public politics or culture (Larson 2014, 239). The racist sentiments towards the Bolivian Indian did not appear after the Zarate Wilka uprising

but even prior to the Federalist War, racism was prevalent among the Sucre elite as the image of the Indian ranged from pity to hatred. The Sucre press had mentioned that the Aymara Indians from La Paz and Oruro were more restless and perverse than the Quechua Indians that mostly resided in their areas (Mendieta Parada 2006, 774).

The inclusionary features of liberalism shrunk due to the indigenous insurrections which allowed the elites to unite around the racist images of Indians as backwards and barbaric animals. The “race wars” propaganda after and before 1899 was utilized to invalidate and delegitimize the Bolivian Indian from political participation (Irurozqui 1994, 95). At the end the Liberal regime was no different than the Conservatives since it continued to promote the privatization of indigenous lands. At the start of the new century the Bolivian Indian would continue face more repression from the state that had labeled them as savages and unqualified for citizenship.

3.7 Conclusion:

This chapter highlights the colonial struggles of the indigenous people of Bolivia by focusing on their legacy of implementing several methods of resistance, from every day forms of resistance, to institutional political action, nonviolent and violent strategies of resistance. The most notable episode of indigenous resistance during the colonial era was indeed the Tupac Amaru-Katari Rebellion. The mass mobilization of the indigenous people of Bolivia proved to be very successful and intimidating technique for defiance. Tupac Katari and his army was able to circle the city of La Paz using road blocks that impeded the Colonial forces’ access to their supply line. The closing of the roads also had economic effects to the city of La Paz since it prevented the movement of food, money and

other goods and in other ways it obstructed the Spanish authorities to communicate with the outside. The surrounding of La Paz by the indigenous masses was in itself nonviolent since for the most part they did not rampage or attack the citizens of La Paz but the large presence of the indigenous masses most of them unarmed intimidated the Colonial army. The effective use of unarmed mass mobilization and road blocks would continue to be on utilized and perfected in future episodes of indigenous resistance.

The indigenous community learned many valuable lessons during this period of time. The most important is clearly that indigenous violent revolts and rebellion resulted in even more violent reactions from the Spanish Colonists and the Bolivian State. Tupac Katari had his limbs tied to four horses and was dismembered, his wife was hanged and the heads and body parts of his lieutenants were spread out the indigenous communities in Bolivia. The message of these brutal executions were used to set an example to the indigenous people to never go against the Spanish Crown. But according to James C. Scott (1984, 29), these peasant rebellions, let alone peasant revolutions, are few and far between because the circumstances which favor large-scale peasant uprising are comparatively rare, and if they do appear, the revolts which develop are nearly always crushed unceremoniously but even the failed attempt would lead to some concessions and most importantly encourage other forms of resistance in the future.

The heroism and violent deaths of Katari and his wife Bartolomina Sisa made them into martyrs of the indigenous liberation cause throughout Bolivian history. But it is crucial to analyze the legacy of indigenous resistance before the independence of Bolivia since according to Stern (1987, 10) there is a preexisting pattern of resistance adaptation that transformed a politically dormant and traditionalist peasant indigenous mass to take arms

in the form of collective violence against established authority. The use of violence appears to be the result of the buildup of unsuccessful institutional political action campaigns that were not achieving their goals. Indigenous revolts had small number of participants, were short lived and sporadic while organized rebellions began nonviolently combining strategies that were through the conventional political channels such as: gathering petitions and using the judicial system and even strategies outside the boundaries of the political channel such as conducting pilgrimages to the high courts. According to Walker (1999, 69), the unwritten agreement of reciprocity between the colonial government and the indigenous communities allowed them to maintain their way of life in exchange for services and tributes but this was challenged in daily contention and were constantly negotiated and remade.

There were many forms of indigenous resistance against the *mita* recruiting and the abuse of cruel landlords such was fleeing to the cities or other rural areas and name changing. As Scott (1986, 29) explains, these actors would remain mute about their intentions since their safety depended on their silence and anonymity. But there were also other forms of resistance which could not be anonymous but need the collection of names for legal petitions through the use of the judicial system. The indigenous communities continued to follow similar patterns of complaints utilized during the colonial era by taking their grievances to local authorities and courts. The Bolivian state had established legitimate institutional channels for the indigenous communities to file their demands based on the strong traditional use of the courts in the past by removing caciques and karakas as their liaison and gave this position to the *apoderado* who was in-charged of representing the indigenous communities regarding land rights and was also their

connection to the urban elite (Mendieta Parada 2006, 762). Indigenous communities in the Bolivian highlands were more integrated into national society and often had more choices, which included a larger range of institutional and nonviolent behavior, such as: lawsuits, refusal to appear before governmental bodies, migration, labor strikes and only after these methods had failed did they resort to violence (Langer 1989, 194).

To defend their way of life the indigenous people responded by engaging in various forms of resistance, violent and nonviolent. Violent resistance with the exception of the Tupac Katari Rebellion, was usually unorganized, small, sporadic and short lived. On the other hand, organized, and well planned armed indigenous uprisings were promoted and supported by creole elites to further their political agendas. During this period the Bolivian Indio would also realize that alliances with creoles or mestizos would not result in any level of self-rule but would lead to policies that would deteriorate their way of life. The fight for Bolivia's Independence did not grant them citizenship and the ousting of military caudillos such as Melgarejo did not guarantee them the protection of their lands but promoted the political and economic interests of elite creole groups. The Bolivian Indio and his army were once again used and betrayed during the Federalist War. The Liberal Party would not have been able to achieve victory over the Conservatives without the intervention of Zarate Wilka and his indigenous army. Because of their victory in the Federalist War and their revolt against Liberal troops the Indigenous people were labeled as savages not to be trusted and counterproductive to the improvement of the Bolivian state. But the reality was that both the Liberal and Conservative parties saw the strength of the Bolivian Indio during their military campaigns and their ability to mobilize their masses as a threat to their status quo. After challenging military dictators and state oppression the

indigenous people of Bolivia would begin the new century facing new discriminatory policies of the civilian creole elite. As Irurozqui (1994, 29) explains, the fundamental change in the political evolution of the nation was that the military caudillo which existed since its independence was replaced by a republican government of the civil oligarchic kind which was maintained for decades. The indigenous people of Bolivia would encounter many more allies in their struggle for justice; new indigenous leaders would emerge, in conjunction with the radicalized union workers, miners, and intellectuals of the educated mestizo class. The development of new forms of effective resistance by these groups are taken up in the next chapter.

Table 1.1. Methods of Resistance from Colonia Period to The Federalist War

| Campaign | Participants | Method | Outcome |
|---|--|--|--|
| 1573 <i>Mita</i> begins | Indians | Everyday forms of Resistance: Abandoning land or changing their names | Indigenous people avoid the <i>mita</i> at an individual level |
| 1623 Zongo Revolt | Small and local group of indigenous people. | Violent: Killing of Spaniard townspeople | Spanish Colonial government sends 200 troops to end the revolt |
| 1730 Calatayud Revolt in Cochabamba | Small and local creoles, mestizos and indigenous leaders | Violent: Armed Revolt | Calatayud is sentenced to death but his revolt due to tax increases inspire other uprising in neighboring towns. |
| 1747-1748 Chayanta Petitions | Local Indigenous leaders | Institutional Political Action: Legal petitions to High Colonial Courts | Courts allows Colonial appointed Indigenous leaders to be replaced by community elected indigenous leaders. |
| 1755- 1761 Legal suits against <i>reparto</i> | Local Indigenous leaders from Laja, Oruro, Larecaja, Cochabamba and Chayanta | Institutional Political Action: Indigenous leaders file suits due to excessive <i>reparto</i> Violent: Riots and killing of court investigator in Laja. | Violence escalates when the courts fail to deliver in favor of the indigenous communities while growing resentment against the <i>reparto</i> and other taxes continues to spread. |

| | | | |
|--|--|--|---|
| 1762 Legal Suit against the Priest. | Indigenous leader of Yamparaéz. | Institutional Political Action: A suit is filed accusing a priest and other Spaniards of seizing indigenous lands. | Growing frustration among the Indigenous communities due to the denials and delays of the colonial judicial system. |
| 1771 Chulumani, Machaca and Pacajes uprisings | Small and local indigenous communities | Violent: Killing of Spanish appointed authorities | Inspires small uprisings against the abuse of colonial authorities and taxes. |
| 1775-1776 Pocoata | Small and local indigenous communities | Nonviolent/Institutional Political Action: Collective pilgrimages to colonial tribunals Violent: Brutal killing of colonial authority figures | Rejection of demands by the courts contribute to the escalation of violent responses by indigenous communities |
| 1777 La Paz Custom House Riot | 500 Indians and mestizos | Institutional Political Action: Formal complaints are submitted against customs officials Violent: Rioting and destruction of La Paz Custom House | Custom House is destroyed due to the ignored written complaints and petitions. |
| 1780-1781 Tomas Catari's Rebellion in Chayanta | Regional indigenous communities in Northern Potosí. Armed indigenous groups. | Institutional Political Action: Complains through the Colonial Judicial system. Violent: Skirmishes with Colonial forces. | A few months of self-rule. Tomas Catari and his brothers are killed by Spanish authorities |

| | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|---|--|
| 1781 Rodriguez Rebellion | Creoles, mestizos and Indians in Oruro | Violent: Indigenous forces place Creole, Jacinto Rodriguez, as corregidor of Oruro. | Infighting among groups lead to an alliance among creoles and Spaniards to drive out indigenous insurgents from Oruro. |
| 1781 Tupac Katari Rebellion | 80,000 – 100,000 armed and unarmed Indigenous communities from major regions of the country. | Nonviolent Action: Blockade of La Paz. Intimidation by the mass mobilization of Indians. Violent: Night raids, flooding of farms, denying access of food into city. Killing of Spaniards in surrounding communities. | Blockade of La Paz leads to the direct and indirect death of several people in the city. Spanish Colonial Army defeats the indigenous forces, captures and executes the leaders of the rebellion |
| 1809 Pedro Domingo Murillo | Creole rebels and Indigenous insurgents | Violent: Creole rebels seek Spanish Independence and inspire indigenous mobilization in the Yungas area. | Indigenous masses are displaced once the creole leadership is captured and killed. |
| 1810-1811 Juan Manuel Caceres | 45,000 Indigenous insurgents | Violent: Juan Manuel Caceres organizes a series of indigenous uprising and attacks against the royalist armies and surrounds La Paz. | The royalist army has to deal with indigenous uprising and a growing Independence Army |
| 1825 War of Independence | Colonist/Creole Independence Army Indigenous guerrilla groups. | Violent: Indigenous uprisings. Indigenous army escorted and assisted the Colonist Independence Army. | Independence of Bolivian State, temporary sovereignty of indigenous communities |
| 1871 The Ousting of Melgarejo | Local indigenous communities | Institutional Political Action: Legal suits | Ousted a Military Dictator. |

| | | | |
|--|--|---|---|
| | Bolivia Army and 40,000 armed Indigenous group from several regions. | Nonviolent Action: Occupying stolen lands. Violent: Assisted Bolivian Military in an Armed Coup | Temporary land reform. |
| 1880s Resistance against the <i>Exvinculation</i> Laws | Indigenous leaders 3,000 armed Indians from communities in Potosi | Institutional Political Action: Legal suits Violent: Forced expulsion of white residents from small towns | Liberal Party begins to advocate for indigenous land rights to obtain their support in ousting Conservative Party. |
| 1892 Chiriguano Uprising | Over 1,000 Indians from the Santa Cruz region | Violent: Armed revolt defeats a small Bolivian military post Everyday forms of Resistance: Some Chiriguano Indians opt to never use violence and instead leave their lands. | Bolivian Army retaliates by killing over 600 Indians including women and children. |
| 1899 Federalist War | An Indigenous Army of 50,000 join and Liberal Army | Violent: Civil War between Conservative Army and Federalist Army composed of Liberal and Indian troops. Indian forces slaughter Conservative soldiers and townspeople. Indian forces brutally kill over 100 Federalist troops. | Temporary alliance with Indigenous community but due to small indigenous revolts the Bolivian State arrests indigenous leaders and indigenous people become stigmatized as savages. |

Chapter 4: The Bolivian National Revolution

4.1 “Los Liberales” and the Machaca/ Chayanta Indigenous Revolts:

The end of the Federalist War resulted in the transfer of the oligarchic control of the country from the hands of the Conservatives to the Liberals which created new challenges for the indigenous people of Bolivia. The military defeat of Zarate Wilka broke the spirit of rebellion of the Bolivian Indio but small acts of sabotage and isolated uprisings continued to persist in the country at a smaller degree (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 93). In the early 1900s the Liberal party implemented aggressive land sale policies that benefited wealthy landlords which resulted in new indigenous mobilizations in the rural areas and also in the major cities of the country. A basic symbolic trait of the movement was the fact that from 1914, the indigenous leaders began to readopt the colonial titles of cacique or Indian chief, to signal their intention of restoring back to a system of autonomous Aymara government (Sanjines 2004, 26). This also meant that indigenous communities began to restructure their communities by revitalizing the system of communal authorities using the caciques and mallkus leaders as intermediaries or mediators between the *ayllus* and the state (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 95). Indigenous leaders who had fought with Zarate Wilka and others who had filed petitions and met with government officials passed along their experience with violent and nonviolent methods to a new generations of indigenous leaders in their struggle for justice.

One of the major factors that contributed to the dominant system of exploitation was the division of the indigenous campesino communities in haciendas. The hacienda system grew in the highlands areas of Bolivia mostly during the Liberal periods of Bolivia.

This system consisted of a landowner (*patron*)/servant (*campesino*) relation in which the *campesino* or *colono* was given access to small land parcel of the *patron* in exchange for work. This process is better explained by Pearse (1986, 321), in which the main male *campesino* or “first person” was required to work four days a week using his tools and animals, the “second person” usually the mother was to work three days a week, while the children were to work once a week in non-agricultural duties such as cutting wood or making abode bricks. This system of exploitation did not only require for the indigenous people to supply the seed, tools and animals but also to transport the final crops to the markets. Gonzalo Flores (1986a, 127) describes the hacienda system as autocratic since landlords were able to kick out troublemakers or even people who requested any type demand or made a complaint. Indians were forced out or moved on and off this colonial system with no restrictions, but the increasing pressures of land in the free community areas, especially after the last great liberal hacienda expansion that lasted until the 1920s, compelled the indigenous *campesino* to adapt themselves to the system (Klein 2003, 233).

The failures of massive organized armed indigenous rebellions of the past resulted in the implementation of smaller but numerous sporadic uprisings during the first two decades of the twentieth century. According to Flores (1986a, 131), there were over 50 revolts from 1901 to 1918 in small towns of La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, and Potosi. Most of these revolts were not connected to each other, lacked organization and were quickly defeated by the state. An isolated victory was that in northern Potosi in 1902 where resistance was more effective as the *ayllus* were able to mobilize their people and paralyzed state land surveyors and resulted in the state respecting the *ayllu* territories in a reciprocal pact (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 99). The 1914 uprising in the Pacajes province of La Paz

led by Martin Vasquez was one of the most important revolts during this period of small uprisings because it included a mythological element in which the Inka King would return to make the world better or “*mundo mejor*” but most importantly because of its use of nonviolent methods and institutional political action. The objective of the Pacajes rebels was to recuperate lost territories through the use of colonial land titles, and also called for dramatic changes such as, the election of indigenous representatives in congress; exemption of young men from military service, an end to forced labor and taxation. Over the course of almost two decades indigenous leaders from many regions coordinated effectively campaigns for land, education, and rights by raising awareness of their grievances throughout newspapers, and their printed bulletins but largely by utilizing the method that stretched back to the colonial era, petitions to state authorities of all levels (Gotkowitz 2007, 26). The wave of small violent uprisings, nonviolent mobilization and institutional political action culminated with two major episodes in Bolivian history, the 1921 Revolt in Jesus de Machaca and the 1927 Chayanta Rebevolt. In both cases the indigenous communities grew tired of the abuses committed by the local authorities and landlords and reacted violently by brutally killing the white creoles in these two towns.

The indigenous communities and their leaders supported and welcomed the Republican administration of Bautista Saavedra because it ended two decades of Liberal governments in Bolivia. President Saavedra and his Republican Party members ran a successful campaign and attacked the political power of the Liberal party by addressing the injustices committed against the indigenous people and their land struggles. Saavedra frequently met with indigenous leaders, who referred to him as a protective figure and in 1920 he decreed that land possessed by Indians could not be sold or transferred without the

intervention of a judge or because of debts but Saavedra soon abandoned his pro-Indian policies not only because he no longer had to curry electoral favors but also because he could not control rising social movements with ameliorative gestures alone (Gotkowitz 2007, 60). His first challenge was the violent indigenous uprising in the town of Jesus de Machaca in La Paz.

The *ayllus* of Jesus de Machaca began to mobilize themselves after several landlords began arming themselves and planning to extend their territories. The news of the indigenous mobilization quickly got to La Paz and this led the placement of Lucio Estrada as the town's *corregidor* by late 1920. Estrada was known for being a strong anti-Indian administrator who had several indigenous servants working for him. He quickly began his repression of the indigenous communities by incarcerating several Indians for insignificant reason and demanding high fines and fees for their release. Indigenous community leaders began to organize protests to demand the release of the imprisoned community members but since the protests did not appear to have an effect a mob of indigenous people climbed up the wall and broke into the prison cells where they found the prisoners dead (Rojas Ramirez 1989, 18). Estrada returned to La Paz once the indigenous people of Machaca had discovered that several Indians had died in his prisons. Wanting to take justice in their own hands a delegation of Indians went to La Paz and convinced Estrada to return to Machaca claiming that his authority was needed to place Machaca in order. Estrada fell for the trap and returned to Machaca where the indigenous leaders had planned a series of violent raids and their first target was the house of Estrada where he was dragged out, beaten and lynched (Antezana Ergueta 1994, 66). Covering their faces with bandanas, the indigenous rebels proceeded to burn the houses of the people

who had abused and usurped indigenous lands. The official report indicated that the uprising of March 12th, 1921 resulted in the death of Estrada, his family, and nine other townspeople (Antezana Ergueta 1994, 68).

The Bolivian police was immediately sent, followed by a military regiment. According to Cardenas (1988, 515), the 1,200 troops that were sent began burning the houses of the indigenous people and massacred all indigenous people of the adjacent *ayllus*, even those who did not participate in the revolts, women and children were not spared. Over 118 prisoners were lined up and executed, the bodies were thrown to the burning houses to hide the body count (Antezana Ergueta 1994, 69). The Machaca revolt was quickly thwarted by state violence and despite Saavedra's pro-Indian and anti-Liberal rhetoric his administration continued to assist and support to landowners affiliated with the Liberal party. According to Antezana Ergueta (1994, 71-2), Machaca was the epicenter of a national struggle for freedom and land that had been building up for two decades and the revolt in Machaca sparked a series of uprisings including one in Yungas where over 4,000 campesinos mobilized forcing the military to deescalate the situation. Even though the main goal was to be liberated from an oppressive system that exploited the indigenous communities the idea of land rights was not that clear and limited by the struggle for freedom (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 106).

The uprising in Chayanta was also connected to the cruel treatment of indigenous workers by landowners but it also included an element of resistance towards communal land usurpation. Rojas Ramirez (1989, 19-20) explains that in July, 1927 about 5,000 people from neighboring indigenous communities mobilized and targeted the killing of the landlord, Julio Berdeja and his family, some reports even indicate that the Indians ate the

bodies of their victims. The Bolivian press immediately classified this as a “race war” and attributed the indigenous uprising and death of the landlord to anti-patriotic groups tied to communist organizations that met early that year at the Workers Congress in Oruro (Antezana Ergueta 1994, 80). Rural indigenous leaders met with urban intellectuals as well as some labor groups to address the conflict surrounding land ownership since the elite landowners were expanding their territories to indigenous communal lands. According to Antezana Ergueta (1994, 84), the events in Chayanta was not a sporadic revolt but a well-organized uprising that may have taken months or years to prepare in clandestine since the leaders were never found.

The Bolivian military quickly set an airstrike, bombing the villages in Chayanta and the surrounding areas killing over 100 indigenous people (Cardenas 1988, 515). Troops came from La Paz, Sucre and Oruro and were able to control the rural areas by killing and imprisoning hundreds of agitators (Arze Aguirre 1987, 19). At the same time other Indigenous revolts were also occurring in small villages in La Paz as indigenous leaders began to organize their people and by August 1927 over 100,000 campesinos of Potosi, Cochabamba, Chuquisaca and Oruro, were mobilized for a series of major uprisings but most of these were quickly hindered by military force and negotiations (Antezana Ergueta 1994, 79). In October of 1927, under the regime of President Hernando Siles, the Indians implicated in the uprisings were given amnesty since their reaction was due to the abuses and exploitation they received from the landowners (Arze Aguirre 1987, 25).

These last two uprisings may have not included coordinated mass mobilization such as Zarate Wilka’s participation in the Federalist War of 1899 but they ended a period of stability that only included sporadic small revolts and also inspired a new wave of

indigenous resistance across the country. The rapid use of the Bolivian military that massacred the indigenous communities in these two revolts clearly indicated that the use of violence as a form of resistance would be met with even more violence by the state. The indigenous communities began to implement new passive forms of resistance due to the violent response of the Bolivian state which resulted in the brutal killing of hundreds of innocent Indians. In the highland town of Achacachi, between 1928 and 1931, there was a passive form of resistance towards the commercial monopoly of the *hacendados* where indigenous communities met on a weekly basis creating new routes and a rural fair to trade their goods (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 105).

4.2 The Rise of the Miner Unions and Urban Intellectuals:

During this period the Bolivian Indio would begin to make greater alliances but no longer with the creole elite but rather with the middle class mestizo, the union labor groups and Marxist intellectuals. The oligarchic state faced new challenges from the urban popular classes and their worker activisms and Socialist political parties. By the 1920s, labor federations, radical student movements and leftist political parties began to emerge in Bolivia promoting a pro-Indian agenda. According to Smale (2010, 5), analyzing the organizational developments among the working class is key to understanding the course of Bolivian politics since their ideology gave the workers a direction that embraced a radical and idiosyncratic brand of socialist thought. The urban workers and intellectuals joined the rural Indians in their resistance against the elite groups of landlords and mine owners which became the dominant pattern of confrontations leading to the National Revolution.

Organized labor began to surface in Bolivia prior to the twentieth century as way to counter more powerful segments of society. In 1876 the artisan workers from Oruro who considered themselves “revolutionaries” were one of the pioneer groups in establishing defense mechanism for the Bolivian worker by implementing the use of protests (Delgado Gonzalez 1984, 31). The Workers’ Labor Federation sought to represent more than just the artisans, but also wanted to incorporate the mine workers to address their issues. By mid-1916, the president of the workers’ federation began to file complaints to the prefect office of Oruro concerning the unsafe conditions in the mines and the seeming callousness of certain mine workers (Smale 2010, 78). The organization trend spread at a national level as association of carpenters, mutual aid societies, cobblers’ union, craft unions, and labor federations sprang up across Oruro and Northern Potosi.

The workers began to implement the use of strikes as a method of negotiations which was sometimes accompanied by the threat of violent acts of vandalism and rioting. This was the case in the Llallagua Company in Potosi where workers did not only organize a strike but also threaten to attack company stores and were successful in obtaining a 20 percent pay increase but this also led to a reduction of work hours and the presence of the military in the region (Smale 2010, 67). In 1918 the workers of the Siglo XX mine owned by the tin magnet Simon Patiño near the town of Uncia, Potosi began a protests which escalated to violence. The mine workers organized against delayed payment of their wages, but their demonstration was violently repressed by the military when workers began sacking company stores near the mine (Alexander 2005, 20). According to Nash (1979, 33), the workers used their tools of their trade, dynamite and explosives, to defend themselves from the military assault. President Jose Gutierrez ordered the military to

attack the miners, resulting in the death of several workers whose bodies were burned in the mine ovens to hide the massacre from the public (Lora 1977, 119).

The concessions workers achieve through the use of peaceful nonviolent strikes stimulated other mining towns to apply the same strategies. The Huanuni mine workers organized a successful strike to complain about their long work hours and the prices of products at the company store inspiring another strike at the Uncia Mine also owned by Simon Patiño. The Uncia strike of October 1919 led to a significant confrontation involving miners, company employees, local merchants, the police and the military when the mine workers began looting the company stores (Smale 2010, 89). The tension in the mining zones continued to escalate as the brutal repression of the mine workers by the Liberal administration was criticized by their main political adversaries, the Republican Party. In July of 1920 Republicans militants with the assistance of several military units orchestrated a coup against the Liberal Party presidency of Jose Gutierrez Guerra. The newly establish Republican government of Baustista Saavedra was welcomed with of series of strikes which began in Oruro and later spread to Potosi were workers and artisans began to mobilize in the mining towns demanding higher wages and a reduction in the company store prices. Due to the economic paralysis of country the Saavedra government legalized the right to strike in late 1920, and also sought to regulate and control strikes by establishing a system of labor arbitration to outmaneuver his political rivals (Smale 2010, 147).

Saavedra was portrayed as a “socialist” for enacting some of the country’s early labor rights but just as he was unsuccessful from deterring the influential power of the elite landlords he was also unable to stop the pressure of the mining oligarchs. Workers began

to mobilize in the Uncia region where the country's richest and most productive tin mines were located. The power these companies exercised was not only at a regional level but also had enormous influence over national policies. The Republican government enforced a strict curfew in Uncia and prohibited public meetings of workers associations but this did not stop the workers to reunite at the main plaza to create the Central Labor Federation of Uncia (FOCU- Federacion Obrera Central de Uncia), on May 1st 1923 (Delgado Gonzalez 1984, 69). Over 5,000 workers and artisans from the most important mining towns of Potosi gathered on the soccer field of the provincial capital Uncia to organize a march celebrating Labor Day and demanding legal channels for grievances proceedings and workers representation (Nash 1979, 34). The movement was organized to unify the region's working class but conflict soon arose between the new federation and the mine owners concerning union recognition. In order to obtain government recognition and support FOCU sent a delegation to La Paz with a list of demands to include the expulsion of some company policemen and the reinstatement of seven workers who had been fired (Alexander 2005, 21). The Saavedra administration was willing to support some of the demands but this did not stop FOCU from preparing a strike in case the companies did not comply with the government's decision. The mobilization of workers into anarcho-socialist unions triggered a state of siege in Uncia controlled by four army units sent by the Saavedra government and demanded by the powerful tin owners (Alexander 2005, 22).

The Uncia Massacre began when the leaders of FOCU were invited to a meeting at the Police Headquarters in Uncia but this resulted in a trap and the arrest of the FOCU members. Workers quickly mobilized and gathered in the center of Uncia demanding the release of their leaders. A growing body of men, women and children began shouting at

the soldiers patrolling the streets and barriers to control the mob, “Shameless men, you have sold-out to the companies” (Smale 2010, 135). The masses began to rally and chanted loudly, “I am a federate of May, and even if bullets run I don’t fall” (Delgado Gonzalez 1984, 70). The thunderous and provocative crowds agitated the troops who were ordered to begin shooting at the masses. Soldiers fired over two thousand warning shots into the air over the course of half-hour but some were forced to shoot at innocent protestors; whereas at one point an officer himself seized a machine gun and fired in to the crowd injuring hundreds and killing at least four people. (Alexander 2005, 22). The Uncia Massacre of June 4th, 1923, was orchestrated by the Saavedra government on behalf of the mining companies who saw the creation of labor unions as a direct threat to their capital investments. This would not be the first time the state used deadly violence to control the working class but the “Uncia Massacre” inaugurated the twentieth-century struggle between labor and forces of capital for control of Bolivia (Smale 2010, 111).

It appears that during this period, the Bolivian working class was unable to identify with the capitalist ideals of the liberal-democratic oligarchs but were more attracted to the alternate and revolutionary ideologies of Marxism. While confrontation between the Republicans and Liberals continued to dominate the political arena, an alliance between labor federations and Socialist Party militants began to produce politicized strikes that disturbed mainstream politicians (Smale 2010, 100). The government curfews, intimidation and arrests of activists from 1924 to 1926 did not stop clandestine meetings between workers, university students, socialist militants and indigenous campesinos (Delgado Gonzalez 1984, 79). These reunions addressed the similar injustices they faced by the oligarchic control Bolivian government and led to the formation of socialist political

parties, labor federations and rural campesino unions. New technological developments such as the printed press and radio raised awareness of the victimization of the Bolivian campesino and miner, creating sympathy from the urban mestizo middle class but these new forms of communication also disseminated a leftist agenda. The newly formed Federation of Workers (FOT - Federacion Obrera del Trabajo), began to run their newspaper *The Protest* which circulated among the major cities in Bolivia and were able to express their political views and demands concerning workers (Delgado Gonzalez 1984, 89).

In the early twentieth century there was a conspicuous absence of public discourse about the great insurrection of Tupac Katari and even Wilka's role during the Federalist War but it was intellectuals like Tristan Marof who were able to connect with the emergent radicals and introduce an image of past and future in terms of Indian community and political struggle (Thomsom 2003b, 132-1). Born Gustavo Navarro, but better known as his political pseudonym, Tristan Marof, an intellectual from Sucre who traveled extensively in Europe, was one of the main figures in promoting Marxist political thinking in Bolivia. His admiration for the Inca Empire convinced him to believe that the indigenous people practiced a primitive but effective form of communism. Marof radical thoughts claimed that Bolivia's enduring colonial legacies could be extinguished only by the Indians themselves, in alliance with the mineworkers, urban artisans, and university students (Gotkowitz 2007, 57). Marof invoked proletarian vanguard, and played an important role in populating the slogan "Land to the people, mines to the state" with the ideal of expropriation of large landholding and their redistribution of the rural poor and having the state manage the mines (Smale 2010, 168-9). Bolivian security forces targeted Marof and

accused him of encouraging indigenous revolts during the 1927 Third Workers' Congress in Oruro which was also the first time labor unions gathered with indigenous delegates from rural areas (Arze Aquirre 1987, 22).

The miners' federation became the most important and militant segment of organized labor and their nonviolent strategies of using strikes and rallies began to propagate in rural areas which sometimes arose to the explicit use of violence. By October of 1927, President Hernando Siles granted amnesty to all 184 individual jailed for the insurrection in Chayanta but did not release any urban activists since the workers' unions became of bigger threat to the oligarchic state (Smale 2010, 175). Leftist activists saw the development of new rural normal school as crucial for the formation of radical intellectual thought which was absent in the indigenous rural areas of the country. Between 1930 and 1940 syndicate organizations began to use rural schools as a site for education that taught relevant knowledge and that inspired a sense of cultural pride, the 'emancipation of the Indian,' 'class consciousness,' 'the restoration of the ayllu,' 'the destruction of the old feudal order' and 'the advancements of citizen rights' (Larson 2003, 193). These schools were used to foster new forms of resistance that would dominate Boliva's historical confrontations between the Indio/campesino and miner against the oppressive Bolivian state.

4.3 The Chaco War, the "Socialist" Presidents, "Brazos caídos" strike

The development of the alliance between the labor unions and indigenous communities took a standstill with the collapse of the tin mining industry in the late 1920s and the Chaco War with Paraguay (1932-1935). The labor organizations and other civil

activities entered a long and painful period of forced recess, while the Bolivian state using the pretext of the Chaco War ended individual rights and liberties. In 1933 President Daniel Salamanca decreed a ban on unions and began to gradually dismantled workers' federations in the country's major cities (Gotkowitz 2007, 105). The war also intensified tax and labor obligations, as state authorities added surcharges to the customary contribution territorial and forced labor was imposed on the Bolivian Indio for the construction of supply line roads for the war. The Bolivian state sought to suppress workers' unions and indigenous movements which forced prominent leftist intellectuals, labor leaders, and socialist politicians to exile or to hide in remote locations. The state also used this opportunity to get rid of the radical members of these groups by putting them in the front lines during the Chaco War.

Before the war with Paraguay began the Bolivian state was already fearful of indigenous uprisings by the organization Society of the Republic of Kollasuyo which promoted takeovers of usurped indigenous lands. This group was led by the cacique, Eduardo Nina Quispe, who had been lawyering for land rights and an agrarian reform that would give the *campesinos* legitimate ownership of their lands. Nina Quipse and other indigenous leaders were incarcerated and labelled as communists and agents of Paraguay but their true crime was their combined strategies of nonviolent mobilization and political activism using the judicial system to call out the abuses of local authorities and demanding the building of more rural schools (Arze Aguirre 1987, 31). There were also violent uprisings against abusive landlords in rural towns of La Paz between 1932 and 1933 and even one in Santa Cruz in 1933 which resulted in the intervention of the Bolivian military and the mass incarceration and drafting of indigenous people to the Chaco War (Arze

Aguirre 1987, 88-9). The mandatory military recruitment of the Bolivian Indio created an absence of any type of resistance in the rural areas leading to the ongoing loss of indigenous lands by elite landlords. Rather than pursuing urban draft evaders, the patrols tended to focus their round-ups in rural areas. The enrollment of Indians from rural areas was violent since the military would grab old and even young children and force them in the military ranks (Arze Aguirre 1987, 44).

The Salamanca administration had initially began forming rural civil security forces headed by landlords and their relatives to conscript indigenous people to the war. The mass recruitment of *campesinos* for the Chaco War was challenged by armed resistance in 1934 when thousands of indigenous *campesinos* of the highlands near Lake Titicaca began to mobilize towards the city of La Paz. Armed indigenous people exchanged fire with local townspeople but their struggle ended violently when the Bolivian troops arrived and tested their new military weapons destined for the Chaco War, resulting in the massacre of over 300 whose corpses were thrown in the deep waters of Lake Titicaca (Antezana Ergueta 1994, 87). The forced enlistment of indigenous people and the ongoing abuse of local authorities was also confronted with the use of extreme violence. The Indians of the locality of Pucarani, assaulted the houses of the *vecinos* (white/mestizo neighbors) and then proceeded to take the town's judge, decapitated him and hanged his headless body from the town's church, next to the body of the priest (Antezana Ergueta 1994, 91). The Bolivian state did not only face an international war with Paraguay but also an internal war due to the unrest and revolts in the rural areas of the country. Rural areas of Potosi and Chuquisaca were also exposed to indigenous uprising due to the heavy labor involved in the highway expansion to support the War (Arze Aguirre 1987, 93). Many of these revolts

were motivated by leftist intellectuals and activists that were exiled but continued to protest the war through Marxist anti-war pamphlets that would reach the hands of not only indigenous leaders but also mestizo soldiers in the battle front.

Every day forms of resistance were also implemented to avoid military conscription. Indigenous men used different types of plants to rub in their bodies resulting in skin redness which military officials believed was associated with syphilis and disqualified them for military service (Antezana Ergueta 1994, 88). Indigenous families also hid their fathers, husbands and brothers from military recruiters but most often indigenous men fled their *ayllu* communities and haciendas to avoid being sent to the war. The shortage of labor affected the agrarian industry and even the agrarian commerce began to decline since *campesinos* refused to enter the cities and sell their products in fear they might be recruited for the war (Arze Aguirre 1987, 50). The scarcity of workers due to the conflict with Paraguay expanded the scope of female employment. Women began to take over the all-male sphere of construction as well as war-related tasks, such as the production of food and clothes for the army, quickly became women's domain (Gotkowitz 2007, 108). Even though women were active participants in the Bolivian workforce the war made female labor crucial for the country and allowed women to have a political voice. In 1935, 120 rural indigenous women led by Santos Marka T'ula demonstrated in the capital to protest the mass recruiting of indigenous men and even tried to negotiate the return of their husbands and sons from the front in exchange of usurped land (Rivera Cusicanqui and THOA 1990, 165). The Chaco War permitted women to also be part of a greater debate concerning citizenship especially when the troops returned from the war with a new sense of national consciousness.

The Chaco War with Paraguay lasted three years from 1931 to 1934 and resulted in the death of over 650,000 Bolivian soldiers and the loss of massive territories. Bolivian troops were killed or died in detention, however hunger, illness, and dehydration killed more Bolivians men than did armed conflict (Gotkowitz 2007, 104). The Bolivian troops had never been exposed to the tropical heat of the Chaco jungles since most of them mainly came from the arid and cold temperatures of the highlands. The Chaco War dragged thousands of Bolivian indigenous *campesinos* into a conflict for a cause of which they knew nothing and were for the first time shoulder to shoulder with people they had discovered were their “countrymen” (Hahn 1992, 61). The indigenous participation in the war stimulated a new consciousness among the indigenous population about their relations to the Bolivian whites who often depend on them in critical situations (Huizer 1972a, 89). Bolivia’s defeat in the war reignited the social movements not seen since the 1920s as veterans from several ranks began to address the issues concerning social reform and justice. Organized labor was revitalized with the return of 40,000 prisoners of war from Paraguay and the two major labor organizations Federacion Obrera del Trabajo FOT and Federacion Obrera Local FOL of La Paz were once again active (Alexander 2005, 41). In May, 1936 a massive strike which included a veteran’s movement took place virtually affecting all industries culminating in the collapse of the Tejada Sorzano administration and paved the way for the military socialist governments (Gotkowitz 2007, 111). The loss of the Chaco War ended the oligarchic control of the state and led to the rise of new political parties expanding the ideological spectrum from: socialist, nationalist, and fascist but the veterans of the Chaco War with their populist and anti-oligarchic rhetoric were able to gain control of the state with the support of organized labor.

Once in power Coronel David Toro declared Bolivia as a “Socialist State” and quickly changed the country’s political landscape by establishing a Ministry of Labor which was headed by a union members and increased workers’ wages. Toro issued a decree that made union membership and formation obligatory, and called for a two-tiered structure of organizations, one made up of employers and another of men and women engaged in physical or intellectual labor (Gotzkowitz 2007, 113). By the end of 1936 the workers established a national labor union, *Confederacion Sindical de Trabajadores de Bolivia* (CSTB), which endorsed the Toro administration. The CSTB became a crucial player in domestic policies and pushed for the nationalization of Standard Oil which was accused of selling oil to Paraguay during the Chaco War (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 112). Colonel German Busch, of hero of the war, succeeded Toro and continued to encourage the organization of the tin miners, established a Ministry of Mines and Petroleum and issued a famous decree providing that the tin mining companies had to sell all of the foreign exchange they earned to the government’s mining bank (Alexander 2005, 37). The young president was more radical than his predecessor and the uncertain circumstance of his suicide made him a martyr of the working class who blamed his death to the mining oligarchs.

The post-war era also marked the end of the traditional party system of Conservatives, Liberals and Republicans and gave rise to a new wave of political parties from the populous to the left such as the *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* - MNR (Nationalist Revolutionary Movement), the *Partido Obrero Revolucionario* - POR (Revolutionary Labor Party) and the *Partido de Izquierda Revolucionaria* - PIR (Revolutionary Leftist Party). Even though their political ideals were different they had a

common anti-oligarchic ideology that came from the war trenches of Chaco (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 115). The period of military socialism had a direct effect in empowering the urban Bolivia worker and may have not advanced much of the rural agenda but it did inspire rural workers to confront the ongoing feudal system of exploitation they lived in. One of the first rural unions establish was in the Santa Clara hacienda located in the town of Ucareña in Cochabamba where the indigenous rural workers grew tired of the ongoing abuses of the *patrones*/landowners. The main impediment for rural organization was the historical state of subjection they were force but once Chaco veterans returned to their rural homes they challenged these ideas by organizing protests to demand their right to administrate the hacienda themselves (Antezana Ergueta 1982, 20-1). After a year of legal battles the Toro government issued a supreme resolution that authorized the newly formed union of *campesinos* to manage the hacienda of Santa Clara and to even build schools in the territories. The formation their union was quickly under attack by intimidation and even destruction of their houses but these attacks unified the Indian population. By the 1940s the union included the guidance of intellectuals and were able to purchase parts of the hacienda and about 200 indigenous rural workers became owners of one-hectare plot and gained independence from the patron (Huizer 1972a, 90).

Rural indigenous communities in Cochabamba were active since the first decades of the twentieth century and throughout the Chaco War. Indigenous leaders filed petitions with local and national authorities demanding the return of communal territory. Their movement gradually expanded across the region of Cochabamba and coordinates their campaigns with national networks of Aymara and Quechua leader such as: Eduardo Leandro Nina Quispe and Santos Marka T'ula (Gotkowitz 2007, 71). The post-Chaco

War rural protests were referred to by the government and press as the “*brazos caídos*” (arms down) strikes. Their nonviolent methods consisted in either staying in their homes and refusing to appear when the administrators called them to work the landlord’s fields, or failing to transport landlord goods to the market, or by collecting the hacienda harvest but keeping it for themselves (Gotkowitz 2007, 153). These strikes also consisted in holding rental and grazing payments and were very effective in disrupting the economy of the landlords because it had an absolute negative effect on the indigenous *campesinos* (Huizer 1972a, 169). Urban labor organizations renewed their ties with indigenous *campesino* leaders immediately following the Chaco War and the *brazos caído* strikes was supported by urban strikes which climaxed in March of 1936. According to Antezana Ergueta (1982, 43), these strikes were not political but were directly tied to economic demands and contributed to the ousting of President Tejada Sorzano. After the CSTB’s second national congress, in 1939, the labor movement began to establish direct connections with rural communities and espoused pro-Indian initiatives. The caciques Santos Marka T’ula and Antonio Alvarez Mamani were able to network with a vast variety of labor leaders and university students from the cities around Bolivia (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 116). The PIR was one of the first political parties to include a rural political agenda and pushed for the technical improvement of indigenous communities, and also called for an agrarian reform that would eliminate the feudal system and end Indian servitude, thus covert Indian communities into agricultural cooperatives (Gotkowitz 2007, 160).

4.4 The Massacre of Catavi and the Villarroel Legacy:

One of the most tragic historical events involving labor took place on December 21, 1942, the so-called “Catavi Massacre” in which the Bolivian military fired into a crowd of striking workers at the Catavi mines of the magnet Simon Patiño. The background for the incident began with a decree by President Peñaranda in December 1941, which reduced the wages of workers using the excuse that Bolivia had joined the Allied cause in World War II. In the previous years, the miner unions in Catavi and the nearby Siglo XX mines had presented demands for an increase in wages and the enforcement of the labor laws passed by President Busch. By September 1942 the workers were offered a 10 to 20 percent increase but the union did not want to compromise which led to the arrests of union leaders and the government to declare the Catavi-Siglo XX area a “Militray Zone” (Alexander 2005, 46). The presence of military troops in the area resulted in an increase in patrolling and incarceration of several union workers leading to the organization of rallies and protests by mineworkers and their wives demanding the release of their co-workers and husbands. The miners were planning a general strike for December 14th but a day before the strike the organizers were arrested which led to another protest that ended in the killing of seven workers and several injured when the military began shooting at the crowds (Delgado Gonzalez 1984, 156). In response, to the violence and death of their fellow workers, the union was able to coordinate a quick strike of over 7,000 workers who remained out of the mines from December 15th to the 20th (Nash 1979, 41).

In the morning of December 21st hundreds of more troops had arrived to protect the mines but were met with a group of protesters who were also heading to the mine’s main office. The troops welcomed the demonstrators with a firing squad resulting in the death of 35 and several wounded (Smale 2010, 194). The workers reacted by mass

gathering of over 8,000 men, women and children at La Pampa. The soldiers began firing using machine guns, rifles and mortars. The dead were quickly buried to avoid a headcount of the casualties. The government statement claims that 19 were dead but there were several sources and witnesses who claim that at least 400 people were buried (Delgado Gonzalez 1984, 157). According to Nash (1979, 41), the three major mine owners, Hochschild, Aramayo, and Patiño, met to plan a joint strategy, and with the support of President Peñaranda mounted a political front for the mine interests. The Catavi Massacre did not only have national repercussions but also international as the secretary of labor and social affairs of the Pan American Union, accused the U.S. government of complicity because of its wish to keep wages down so as to keep the price of tin down (Alexander 2005, 47).

The progressive MNR political party immediately denounced the bloodbath and gained political clout via the party's passionate defense of striking mineworkers who were murdered by the military in the 1942 Catavi Mines massacre (Gotkowitz 2007, 169). The MNR was able to gather support from labor groups to overthrow General Peñaranda's Conservative and pro-US government and place another Chaco War hero, Coronel Gualberto Villarroel. The Villarroel/MNR regime enacted a substantial amount of labor and social legislation to include an expansion of the social security system; and even provided compensation for leaders and members of the Catavi union who had been persecuted after the Catavi Massacre (Alexander 2005, 49). The regime was supported by worker's organizations because of the political agenda and encouragement of labor unions but Villarroel also wanted to incorporate the indigenous masses of the countryside. The MNR began to implement land rights and land reform in their political rhetoric but little

action was followed since it was not able to mobilize the peasantry as did the PIR and the POR (Mitchell 1977, 22-4).

Since the early 1940s indigenous campesino organizations had been secretly planning meetings with the support of the CSTB and the PIR. Two reunions were held in Sucre in 1942 and in 1943 endorsing a worker-campesino alliance, hacienda takeovers, and the abolition of uncompensated services (Gotkowitz 2007, 161). Indigenous leaders organized the Second Congress of Quechua Speaking Indians in Sucre, which called for more “*brazos caídos*” strikes and also to build better relations with the labor force in the cities but these congresses were highly influenced by political activists of the PIR (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 118). A third indigenous congress, convened in Sucre in August 1944, reiterated the platform of the first two meetings, and also had the support of the CSTB which was again fully functional with the participation of members of the PIR and the assistance of the MNR (Delgado Gonzalez 1984, 169). The indigenous meetings would culminate with the historical National Indigenous Congress organized under the auspices of the Villarroel government.

In January of 1945 a dozen indigenous leaders waited outside the President’s palace to have an audience with Villarroel who they had identified as an allied to their causes. The Minister of Governance, Coronel Edmundo Nogales, who understood Aymara and Quechua, spoke to one of the group leaders, Luis Ramos Quevedo, and allowed them a brief meeting with Villarroel. Ramos Quevedo was a long-time rural organizer who had developed an extensive network of contacts to include lawyers, politicians, indigenous leaders and union members (Dandler and Torrico 1987, 341). According to Antezana Ergueta (1994, 96), Ramos Quevedo had suggested that they should have an indigenous

congress in which Villarroel accepted not knowing of the massive response this would have in the months to come. Ramos Quevedo proceed and used a photograph he had taken with Villarroel to promote the congress and indicating that the president was willing to meet with all the indigenous leaders of Bolivia in a congress to be held in La Paz. The news spread out to all rural areas of Bolivia, thousands of indigenous leaders began a pilgrimage to the capital to attend the Indigenous congress. Some delegations walked for weeks and came from the amazon jungles of the east and from the valleys of the south.

In May 1945 Villarroel met with almost 1,5000 representatives of several indigenous communities for the first National Indigenous Congress which centered on indigenous demands that had been the focus of strikes, petitions, and revolts for decades. For the first time in history, hundreds of indigenous people walked the streets of La Paz in areas that prohibited their entrance for centuries (Rojas Ramirez 1989, 25). The congress led by Ramos Quvedo elaborated a 27-point agenda, which was reprinted in the national press and included their demands for freedom, work security, respect and that the land should be returned to those who work it (Gotkowitz 2003, 167). The National Indigenous Congress was may have been constituted under the auspices of the Villarroel government, but it was organized under the initiative of Ramos Quevedo and at least fifteen campesino representatives from around the country (Dandler and Torrico 1987, 344). The main points of the agenda were abolition of the unpaid personal services which campesinos had to render to their landlords; education, regulation of agricultural labor conditions and agrarian policies. The demands were made direct against the most abusive forms of servitude and the lack of educational facilities. Villarroel attended the first and third congress, as did various cabinet ministers and members of the diplomatic corps. In both the preliminary

events, he manifested his interest in measures to eliminate serfdom on the haciendas, to establish salaried labor and just wages, and to take steps to alleviate the campesino situation (Dandler and Torrico 1987, 345). As a result of the Congress, government decrees were issued which abolished unpaid personal services and obliged the landlords to establish schools on the large haciendas. The most important was decree 319 which abolished several forms of unpaid services to the landlords to include *pongeaje* (Huizer 1972a, 91).

The Villarroel government promoted ideals of national harmony, and made statements favoring some kind of land reform, and on social justice. His most well-known phrase was: “We are not enemies of the rich, but we are better friends of the poor.” Villarroel organized massive rallies of campesino and workers in La Paz and Oruro, these visible displays of support only heightened the association between the Indians and the president – and enraged the opposition (Gotkowitz 2007, 234). Landowners began to organize at a departmental and national level and created the Sociedad Rurales (Rural Societies) which was composed of elite landowners, and the political parties of the right and opposition groups of the Villarroel government. They used the press to campaign against Villarroel, accusing him as a demagogue, and an agitator of the indigenous masses, while reminding their readers of the Tupac Katari and Zarate Wilka rebellions (Dandler and Torrico 1987, 349). By early 1946 the Bolivian press was already denouncing Villarroel calling him “the president of the Indians” who was allegedly promoting a “war of races” (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 122). While Saavedra in the 1920s and Busch in the 1930s met privately with indigenous leaders, Villarroel addressed them publicly in a national forum. He did not just bestow rights, he made indigenous leaders bearers of his laws. In the high valley of Cochabamba and other areas of the country, the indigenous

campesinos had the image of Villarroel linked to the reincarnation of the Inka and even the designation of the title “*tata*” (Aymara and Quechua for father) which was also given to Belzu, Pando and Saavedra because of their closeness and connection to the indigenous population (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 119).

The landowners declared the Villarroel decrees nonexistent and began to brutally repress the indigenous demands to end hacienda servitude. Despite the government’s efforts to provide guarantees of the decrees, it was impossible to prevent the *patrones* from taking reprisals against the indigenous workers or denouncing what they themselves saw as “the indigenous awakening” (Dandler and Torrico 1987, 351). The negative reaction of the landlords after the Indigenous Congress provoked the call for another *brazos caído* strike this time covering large areas of Tarija, Oruro and Potosi. Over the course of the year following the May Congress, *brazos caídos* strikes became common in haciendas in many regions as indigenous people themselves tried to enforce compliance with Villarroel’s laws. Indigenous organizers, especially those who had experience as miners travelled around many areas of the country to awaken the campesinos and promoted these strikes (Huizer 1972a, 91). Much like before the Indigenous Congress, local authorities accused indigenous leaders and “outsiders” of copying and distributing fraudulent land titles (Gotkowitz 2007, 224). Landlords worked with local authorities to delay, postpone and even renegotiate the government’s decrees. Villarroel’s rivals also used the elitist press to suggest that the series of indigenous mobilizations that took place in December 1945 in the provinces of Potosi, Cochabamba, and Chuquisaca, were violent uprisings when they were actually organized *brazos caídos* strikes in response to the unwillingness of the landlords to follow government decrees and the inability of local authorities to intervene

in the making of concrete agreements (Dandler and Torrico 1987, 361). The use of the nonviolent resistance *brazos caídos* strikes were crucial for the Villarroel government to abolish the *pongueaje* system since they began to expand across the country (Antezana Ergueta 1982, 57).

The most important labor development during the Villarroel period was the successful establishment of the miner's federation, the *Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia* (FSTMB). According to Lora (1977, 234), the credit for promoting the organization of the miners must go to the Villarroel's government, and in particular, to the MNR, which was also a strategy to neutralize the Stalinist group CSTB which was controlled by the PIR. The Villarroel regime was overthrown by an uprising in La Paz in July 1946. The final crisis of the regime started with a series of student antigovernment demonstrations early in the month and later joined by market ladies. Rioting continued for three days, and in the final phase mobs stormed the presidential palace and dragged Villarroel out where he and several of his associates were lynched (Alexander 2005, 55). The brutal death of Villarroel unleashed a series of uprisings since the indigenous people had lost their benefactor and understood that his laws would not be fulfilled by the landlords. The Villarroel government had a tremendous effect on the indigenous population since it eliminated the hacienda servitude but it also inspired for a new cycle of rebellions that demanded land reform.

4.5 The Pulacayo Thesis and the Indigenous Rebellion during the “Sexenio”:

The death of Villarroel divided the country between his indigenous supporters, union workers, and political leaders on one side and the conservative elitists, mine owners

and landlords of the *rosca*³ on the other. Just after Villarroel's overthrow several union and indigenous leaders were reportedly jailed and some assassinated. Rural campesinos rose against their landlords, local authorities and tax collector because of their loyalty to Villarroel. Bolivian historians had referred to this period of "*sexenio*" because of the six year period preceding the National Revolution. In November of 1946 union workers and radical political militants met at a congress of miners to present the Thesis of Pulacayo written by the Trotskyist activist, Guillermo Lora. The doctrine would influence labor policy for the following two decades since it asserted that the national bourgeoisie was incapable of carrying out the democratic tasks of eliminating the feudal system and other pre-capitalist forms of the economy, and called for permanent revolution and violent armed struggle for the working class (Lora 1977, 250-1). The Thesis of Pulacayo added that because of the dependence on foreign capital and foreign imperialism, the dominant classes had failed to carry out the most basic of liberal-democratic and nationalist objectives and that the socialist transformation of the republic could only be completed by the working class in one decisive stroke (Smale 2010, 196). The Thesis of Pulacayo inspired a new wave of radicalism among union workers of the FSTMB and party members of the POR and MNR. The document itself would have disappeared had Patiño not had the entire thesis printed in *El Diario* as a warning to the ruling class of the radical nature of the thesis (Dunkerley 1984, 17).

The government became more and more oppressive as urban and rural organizations expressed their discontent with a series of protests. By early 1947 most of

³ The "Rosca" translated as the twist or circle, were the oligarchic group of the tin-mining industry who were able to consolidate their power by placing government officials to dictate not only economic policies but political as well.

the MNR members who had fled or gone into hiding upon the fall of Villarroel return and began plotting with other radical groups using every opportunity to foment social unrest (Hahn 1992, 67). The MNR was able to take the political space of the PIR which had lost its credibility for supporting the conservative regime and was also accused of fomenting the mob of workers that killed Villarroel. The PIR was also blamed for its complicity of the Massacre in Potosi which took place on the 28 and 29 of January 1947. According to Lora (1993,9-10), while miners were protesting the release of jailed union leaders, armed university students affiliated with the PIR began to loot the homes of miners and even killing their women and children. Lora adds that it was reported that 23 were killed but it was over 300, since the government had sent garbage trucks to dispose of the bodies and were buried in clandestine graves; sometimes they even used dynamite on dead miners to make the corpses disappear. The miners were in open rebellion against the mine's oligarchs and began a series of strikes to protests the systematic mass firing, incarceration and killing of their fellow union workers. The violence escalated when President Enrique Hertzog took power in March of 1947 and cracked down on the MNR and FSTMB who were blamed for the political agitation in the mines and the countryside (Gotkowitz 2007, 235). The FSTMB called for several sit-down strikes including a national strike of forty-nine mines but no settlement was reached and by September 1947 the mines fired 7,000 workers as part of a strategy to rehire only non-union workers in order to break the national federation (Nash 1979, 47). This event came to be known as the "White Massacre" and was orchestrated by Patiño with the assistance of the Bolivian government as a means of breaking the unions (Alexander 2005, 65). The presidential decree order permitted the arrest of fired union works if they did not leave the premise as soon as possible.

Resistance was not only concentrated in the mines but also in rural areas. The indigenous campesino uprisings for land and freedom during the “*sexenio*” were closely linked to the “white massacres” of the mines since the fired miners would return to their rural homelands with an activist and experienced attitude that pressured other for land reform (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 125). In the rural towns surrounding La Paz campesino groups were motivated to organize and mobilize by the pro-Villaruel anarchist union, Federacion Obrera Local (FOL). The FOL was crucial for the mobilization of indigenous campesinos of the highland since their members consisted of activists in rural areas such as caciques, teachers and migrant rural workers and traveled across the department promoting the organization of unions, rural schools and “*brazo caido*” strikes (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 127). The FOL began to denounce abuses perpetrated by landlords and worked with indigenous leaders to formulate a petition drafted by 200 representatives requesting the government to recognize their union and affiliate school (Gotzkowitz 2007, 249-50). In January of 1947, about 4,000 indigenous people surrounded the town of Pucarani in La Paz when the government rejected their request to unionize; moreover their mobilization was crushed when government forces were dispatched killing an unreported amount of people (Rojas Ramirez 1989, 27). Even though most of the revolts exemplified peaceful protests, the La Paz based strikes of early 1947 culminated in May and June in two highly publicized acts of violence involving the killing of an abuse administrator and landlord (Gotzkowitz 2007, 252).

These indigenous uprisings began at the end of 1946 in provinces in Cochabamba, Chuquisaca and La Paz, and in between January and March of 1947 the agitation continued and had spread to provinces in Oruro, Potosi and Tarija which president Hertzog had

referred to as “the greatest indigenous uprisings of our history” (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 124). In Ayopaya, Cochabamba, the system of servitude was more brutal because of the hegemonic dominance of the hacienda. In some haciendas *pongo* escapes were common and fugitives sought work in other haciendas, in the mines, or even enlisted in the army; they also had clandestine meetings with lawyers to file suit against the *patrones* (Dandler and Torrico 1987, 338-40). The indigenous people of Ayopaya had initially mobilized through nonviolent means using the judicial system but the death of Villarroel escalated the conflict and the movement took a violent form. By February of 1947 over 10,000 indigenous people armed themselves with rifles and dynamite killing a military officer and a landlord who forcibly tried to reintroduce the feudal obligations (Rojas Ramirez 1989, 30). Indigenous workers in Ayopaya rose against the landlords due to their close ties with Villarroel; and also because there were rumors of a government decree that ordered indigenous people to rise up against their landlords (Gotzkowitz 2007, 237). The movement was orchestrated by indigenous leaders who had close contact with miners of Oruro and were able to force out several landlords (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 125). The army and police were immediately sent to end the uprisings but President Hertzog also ordered an aerial bombing to stop the over 20,000 campesinos that were heading to other departments (Antezana Ergueta 1982, 67).

The Ayopaya revolts inspired a wave of violent uprising and looting on haciendas in the highlands of Oruro and La Paz (Dandler and Torrico 1987, 364-5). Union miners had an important leadership function in these rural movements that threatened and effectively attacked the landlord’s houses and estates (Huizer 1972a,92). The movement in various part of the country were repressed by large scale military and police intervention.

By mid-1947, the Hertzog government created a rural police which quickly became another mechanism of indigenous suppression by arresting over 500 indigenous leaders and community members (Antezana Ergueta 1994, 117). The rural police corps targeted indigenous agitators and instigators and were sent to a penal colony located in the middle of the jungle in Ichilo (Huizer 1972a, 92). Some landowners doubted the efficiency of the government's security force and opted to create private guards. The presence of these troops also became the focus of protests not only aimed at their abuse but also to the requirements of feeding them (Gotkowitz 2007, 257).

Some indigenous communities certainly used violent methods, but civil disobedience continued to be the preferred method of resistance. The Minister of Governance reported that the "*brazos caídos*" strikes began in 1939 affecting 4 haciendas in Cochabamba but by 1948 the strikes had reached over 43 haciendas all over Bolivia (Antezana Ergueta 1994, 106). Organized forms of violent resistance began to diminish during the *sexsenio* but the Bolivian press continued to promote a sense of fear and uprising. As explained by Antezana Ergueta and Romero (1973, 155), the Bolivian press had categorized a total of 44 violent actions and rumored actions from 1948 to 1952 but these also included nonviolent strikes, meetings and leafleting. The state repression affected rural leadership in all of the country and also weakened the rural-urban ties but it did not fully suppress indigenous mobilizations (Gotkowitz 2007, 261).

The climate of fear did not affect the FSTMB workers who continued to organize even though they were targeted by the Hertzog and Urriolagotia governments. On May 28, 1949, over 200 policemen armed with machine guns took into custody four union leaders of the FSTMB and in retaliation the workers kidnapped several high executives of

the mining company and killed two of them (Lora 1993, 14). The government reacted by sending troops to the Siglo XX mines where the event took place. The miners were massacred and the FSTMB leadership went on exile. The only opposition was the MNR that continued to have some political power and the support of workers. In August 1949, the MNR staged a coup in four cities of the country and declared Victor Paz Estenssoro who was in exile in Argentina as the President (De Mesa, Gisbert and Mesa Gisbert 2003, 616). The coup failed after the military retook the cities and the government reestablished control of the country. By the end of 1949, the state began to mass incarcerate urban and rural leaders but in these jail cells, political and union leaders began to closely interact with campesino leaders and start the first campesino cell of the MNR (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 127). Prisons became safe spaces for intense plotting and new alliances to takedown the repressive government. According to (Whitehead 2003, 28), they were united by the MNR, a movement with a record of verbal radicalism, combined with great tactical flexibility or even opportunism, and an impressive ability of co-opt or out maneuver its rivals by rallying on very diverse sectors of the political spectrum to include mining camps, campesino leaders, urban workers and conservative nationalist. But the MNR leadership was initially hesitant in using armed militias and had failed to support union workers with weapons as demonstrated in the 1950 La Paz factory strike. The MNR was unsuccessful in backing a factory worker strike by creating diversionary disturbances causing the military to concentrate their artillery and fighter plane bombings on the strikers and causing numerous deaths (Mitchell 1977, 30). Despite their failures and continued repression the MNR continued to gain popularity and won the democratic elections of 1951 but was unable to gain power when Urriolagotia resigned and handed over the presidency to a military junta.

The new government outlawed the MNR as a communist organization but it was evident that the MNR would now implement a violent approach to take the government that had been denied at the polls (Klein 2003, 207).

4.6 Bolivian National Revolution:

The 1952 Bolivian National Revolution was relatively bloodless and brief. It began in the morning of April 9, when MNR militants and a police forces began an uprising in La Paz engaging in small fire with the Bolivian military. According to Malloy (1970, 157), the rebellion began to lose steam the first day but by the second day its spread to Cochabamba and Oruro; while weapons were distributed to workers in La Paz and armed miners surrounded Oruro. After three days of fighting in all major cities of the country between party militants, miners, townspeople and the national police against the Bolivian military, the result was 600 dead and the collapse of the oligarchic *rosca* (Kelly and Klein 1981, 94). The alliance of the tin magnets and elite landlords who ruled the country with the help of conservative politicians and the Bolivian military was over. Victor Paz Estenssoro became president of Bolivia and the newly established MNR government created a new labor organization COB (*Central Obrera Bolivina*). With the appearance of the COB all of the other central labor bodies either disappeared or were absorbed by it. The COB did not only bring into the consolidation of labor organization but its members were given political posts at a department and national level and participated in a co-government with the MNR (Nash 1979,259). Led by Juan Lechin, the COB and FSTMB, began to replace the military with an armed militia of workers. After being pressured by the COB, the MNR government setup a semi-autonomous state enterprise COMIBOL

(Corporacion Minera Boliviana) to run the nationalized mines including the big three tin companies of Patiño, Aramayo and Hoschsild (Klein 2003, 213). The decree was signed at the mining camp of Catavi and clearly demonstrated the political power of labor. But Gotkowitz (2007, 269) also adds that while the miners were usually singled out as the radicalized forced of the revolution, this notion tends to downplay the revolution's extensive rural roots. The MNR understood the importance of the support of the rural indigenous masses and created a Ministry of Campesino Affair or MAC (*Ministro de Asuntos Campesinos*) to promote indigenous mobilization and organization. Most of the members of COB were from the POR, of a Trotskyist ideology while the MAC was headed by Ñuflo Chavez, a leftist member of the MNR; these institutions became the mechanisms that generated the worker-campesino alliance (Dangler 1986a, 218).

One of the first acts of the MNR regime was to politically incorporate the indigenous masses. Once universal suffrage was declared Bolivia's electorate increased from 205,000 to over one million (Whitehead 2003, 32). The rhetoric to address the indigenous population also changed as the MNR government pushed for use of "campesinos" rather than "*indios*." Since the revolution was partly about breaking down the caste-like barriers, there were cabinet meetings where Paz Estenssoro instructed his ministers to dance with the indigenous women from the markets (Whitehead 2003, 45). By early 1953 the MNR government called for an agrarian reform commission and by August 2nd, the promulgation of the land reform decree was presented on "The Day of the Indian," in Ucareña, Cochabamba. Paz Estenssoro signed the law while a MNR official addressed the crowd of 100,000 indigenous people in Quechua and closed the proceeding with the traditional offerings to the Pachamama Earth Goddess (Goodrich 1971, 21-2). The decree

abolished the hacienda system and expropriated extensive private territories. COB militants were the first to arrive into rural areas and helped indigenous leaders mobilize. Since the army was disbanded they also distributed weapons to the indigenous people. To counter any type of military resurgence, the MNR expanded the national police but most importantly encouraged people militias consisting of fifty thousand armed workers (Blasier 1971, 94). During the first year of the National Revolution leftist activists from the COB encouraged indigenous communities to rise up and seize lands. As explained by Malloy (1970, 202), they exhorted the campesinos to move before the “reactionaries” succeeded in stalling the revolution. Only a few months after the National Revolution there were already 1,200 active rural unions with over 200,000 indigenous members (Huizer 1972a, 93). Land takeovers spread throughout the country as indigenous communities began to destroy haciendas, seized estates and redistributed large territories of land among themselves. Similar to the “Great Fear” during the French Revolution, campesinos began burning records, harassed and killed landowners and ousted the old elite to the capital or abroad (Kelly and Klein 1981, 95). Rumors swept that campesinos were organized into rural masses and militias confiscating estates, raping women and massacring and eating people in cannibalistic orgies (Carter 1971, 236).

Even though the campesinos did not directly participate in the April insurrection, the political inclusion of the campesino masses was crucial for the development of the revolutionary government. While the older elite spoke about civilizing the Indian, the younger MNR spoke about “integrating” or “incorporating” the Indian/campesino into Bolivian society as long as it was under the direction of the MNR (Malloy 1970, 284). Also during the pre-revolutionary state policies were implemented that focused on an education

system that would bring the Indians into a docile, moral and productive workforce (Larson 2003, 187). The government began a political campaign to integrate these masses by utilizing poster and slogans such as, “Comrade and brother campesino, the time has come for your liberation, now you are free and owner of the land you work.” (Dangler 1986a, 217). The Bolivian Indian was transformed from indigenous servant to campesino land owner. The campesino was a dynamic actor of his own destiny which was crucial for the formation of the “campesino class” as an independent organization. The MNR officials promoted the formation of rural unions and even accepted the nearly autonomous indigenous leaders backed by armed campesinos, while the left was not willing to support the effective assertion of the power by the country’s campesino majority (Mitchell 1977, 48). The valleys of Cochabamba became the center of violence between local indigenous leaders in which Jose Rojas, a Chaco War veteran, came out victorious and obtained dominant control of these territories. The tutelage of the campesino unions by urban labor and miners ended as campesinos gained control of their unions and became major power players in the rural areas (Klein 2003, 215).

While national authority was contained in urban areas the rural areas were controlled by rural campesino unions. Most of the vast Bolivian territory was in the hands of prominent indigenous leaders. Toribio Salas, controlled at one point almost the whole of the department of La Paz, while Rojas commanded the bulk of the valleys and was even close to being the single most powerful campesino in the entire country (Malloy 1970, 213). Local and national officials and even the president needed the permission and protections of these local bosses to travel through these areas. These enclaves were autonomous of the national government to the point that each indigenous leader was able

to appoint civil officials up to a provincial level but their power was undemonstrated and did not take part in national politics (Mitchell 1977, 71). The expansion of campesino unions grew rapidly in rural areas of Bolivia. Satisfied with acquisition of their territorial lands, the indigenous masses became a relatively conservative political force in the nation and grew indifferent to their former urban worker colleagues (Klein 2003, 215). Besides fostering rural union formation, the worker-campesino alliance also contributed to the introduction of clientelism in the political system (Dangler 1987b, 258). Party loyalty was rewarded by financial resources and favors. In the Yungas areas local government positions, were not occupied by campesinos but by men committed to their own self-interests; therefore government policies were not mediated by the campesinos (Leons and Leons 1971, 279). The MNR promoted and practiced political patronage and clientelism in all sectors of the political spectrum. As described by Morales (2003, 227), the old oligarchy may have been insensitive and myopic but the levels of corruption were not to the extent of the MNR government in which clientelism and job patronage became permanent features of Bolivian society. The MNR was not always able to capture the hearts and minds of the campesinos. This was demonstrated in the *ayllus* in Potosi where the campesinos were not used to the clientelist nature of their newly assigned rural union leader, who was a MNR militant and former miner activists from Cochabamba. They saw it as a form of external leadership, foreign to their *ayllus* and rejected this political appointee violently by killing him and placing his head in the center of the plaza (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 156).

In 1956, Paz Estenssoro's vice-president, Hernan Siles Zuazo, was democratically elected as president of Bolivia. The Siles Zuazo government consisted of MNR party members that were loyal to him. He also reintroduced conservative figures into political

posts; therefore shifting the national political environment from center-left to center-right. Siles Zuazo wanted to secure the urban middle class base which was now aligned with the right wing party FSB (Falange Socialista Boliviana). By 1957, the political division of labor was evident as the railroad, construction and oil workers sided with Siles Zuazo while the more radical miners and teachers unions were loyal to Lechin (Mitchell 1977, 69). The radical land reform policies of the first MNR regime confirmed the loyalty and support of the indigenous masses. To establish a counter-weight to the miners and the COB, Siles Zuazo appointed Jose Rojas, the first Indian in Bolivia's history to hold a cabinet post, to head the MAC (Malloy 1971, 132). The MNR government under Siles Zuazo was under constant threats by left and right wing members of his administration. Due to the political and economic instability of the country, Siles Zuazo accepted the United States' "Stabilization Plan" under IMF auspices which required austerity measures that curtailed state revolutionary projects (Klein 2003, 220). Bolivia's weak economy allowed the United States to establish a clear guideline for the revolution (Zunes 2001, 40). The United States had direct influence in the MNR government through large scale financial support. Leftist organizations started a campaign to denounce U.S. imperialism as anti-U.S. rhetoric grew among the people. In March 1959, a *Time* article describing U.S. involvement in Bolivia, triggered a series of street protests that escalated into attacks of U.S. property in Bolivia (Lehman 1999, 114). United States aid came with U.S. control and interference on certain domestic issues. The Stabilization Plan directly affected labor and fractured the MNR solidity with the resignation of the vice-president N  clo Chavez. Violence was rarely used by the Siles Zuazo regime and even though there were several threats of massive strikes that would have impacted the national economy, he was able to negotiate

and concede to some demands. Siles Zuazo wanted to marginalize the labor left and even used the MAC, under Jose Rojas to breakout a miner strikes in Oruro; thus ending the worker-campeinso alliance established by the MNR (Dangler 1987b, 252).

4.7 The Revolution takes a Turn:

Victor Paz Estenssoro easily won the 1960 election and to alleviate the internal MNR tension he chose Juan Lechin as his vice-president with the supposed promise that Lechin would be next in line to become president. But under the second Paz administration the MNR established a coalition with such strategic groups as the medium-scale mine owners, the Pro-Santa Cruz Committee, the Catholic Church and even the conservative press (Whitehead 2003, 38). All of these groups had been the major critics of the MNR in the past and were now being incorporated in the government. The internal political dynamic of the MNR government would also be affected by international forces. The United States launched the Alliance for Progress policy aimed to provide aid to developing countries. This program engaged in land reform and economic interests but also included a counter-insurgency program targeted towards the communist and most radical elements of the government (Whitehead 2003, 37). Paz Estenssoro accepted the economic support from the United States and started to marginalize labor groups and their leadership. The rivalry between the MNR government and COB escalated with the presentation of the Triangular Plan which was an assistance program financed by USAID, the German government and other international organizations. The Triangular Plan was the initial motivating force of Bolivia's economic development plan for the 1960s but required changes in COMIBOL, greater labor discipline, and linked the MNR government closer to

the United States; thus creating greater political conflict between the MNR and the union miners (Blasier 1971, 86). The weakening of the labor was reflected on the bargaining power of the workers' union which was based on the political power of the COB.

Paz Estenssoro was more willing to fire, incarcerate and even use the military to suppress his political opponents. On February 21 1961, Paz Estenssoro responded to a nationwide teacher's strike by declaring a ninety-day state of siege which prohibited public manifestations and political meetings and rounding up dozen of rightwing opposition leaders and communists (Field 2014, 13). He used the excuse of alleged communist plots to arrested important miner union leaders. The miners countered by recruiting women and organizing visits to the capital to demand the release of their husbands. In July 1961 a delegation organized by the PCB - Partido Comunista de Bolivia staged a hunger strike and after losing one striker Paz Estenssoro agreed to release the prisoners (Field 2014, 34). Women in the mining camps began to take bigger roles in organizing rallies. In 1962, the wives of miners started hunger strikes to protest mass layoff of miners, the lack of food and the plans to rationalize the work force. A group of 70 women began a 10 day hunger strike and were able to obtain the release of their husbands and *compañeros* after they were imprisoned for demanding a salary raise; therefore after this event the women were able to organize the a House Wives Committee or *Comite de Amas de Casa de Siglo XX* (Viezzler 1978, 42). Women also participated in safeguarding hostages while the miners were negotiating with the government. Nash (1979, 114), describes that initially the miners kidnaped European technicians when their demands were not met, and the women had to organize a twenty-four hour watch to protect them since they understood that if the technicians were killed the army would massacre them. By 1963 the Bolivian government

implemented an anti-labor leftist campaign and even dropped leaflets over the mining camps imploring workers to free themselves from the union dictatorship (Field 2014, 101).

The reconstruction of the Bolivian armed forces was evident once the MNR began to receive U.S. military aid. The Paz Estenssoro regime prevented the rearming of worker militias and did everything possible to shift the balance of military power back to the army and away from the labor militias (Klein 2003, 222). The armed campesinos and workers consisted of over 16,000 men while the military barely outfitted 7,500 soldiers but according to the CIA the miner militia was the greatest threat to the country's stability since they were better organized, trained and equipped (Field 2014, 25). Once again the Catavi and Siglo XX mining centers took center stage as the first locations to oppose the Triangular Plan. Union leaders began to be fired and thousands of workers were threaten to be laid-off or relocated to work in the tropical farms of the Yungas. To control the unrest in the mining camps Paz Estenssoro sent a campesino militia armed with newly acquired American weapons to attack the mining camp of Siglo XX but they were intercepted while they slept by the miner militia capturing their weapons and executing their leader (Field 2014, 93-95). A month later in the Catavi mining camps the workers grew tired of the failures of a series of strikes and grabbed their weapons, took over the mines, and sealed the town declaring themselves in revolt (Nash 1979, 270). Paz Estenssoro called in the army which was accompanied by Rojas' larger campesino militia. The siege of the miners in Catavi marked the waning of the Bolivian labor left and established the campesino and military as critical political forces (Malloy 1970, 142). In December of 1963, The MNR government arrested two notorious union mining leaders and the miner militias of Siglo XX reacted quickly by taking thirty one hostages including four Americans that were

assigned to the area to implement the Triangular Plan. During this incident Lechin was anxious to avoid seeing his popular partisans disrupt his developing national alliances with the military and was able to convince the miners to release the hostages without any bloodshed (Mitchell 1977, 95).

The MNR was successful in rebuilding the military as a counterforce to the miner and even the campesino militias. Fortunately for the MNR, the campesino militia which was larger than the regular army, had fewer weapons that dated the Chaco War (Alexander 2005, 114). Since the early 1960s, the government insisted that the campesinos return the arms previously given to them, but at that point the campesinos had already lost much of their political leverage (Lagos 1994, 48). According to Blasier (1971, 94), the sharp increase in U.S. military assistance was quite enough to have a political impact in a small and developing country like Bolivia. The reemergence of the military as a political force was beneficial for Paz Estenssoro's government that was already in shambles. Paz Estenssoro announced his desire for reelection in 1964. The leftists party members that opposed the third Paz Estenssoro government joined Juan Lechin and formed a new political party, the PRIN (*Partido Revolucionario de Izquierda Nacionalista*). Lechin and the COB officials were stripped out of all government posts and their rural support was systematically dismantled by creating an anti-communist rhetoric associated with the campesino movements (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 148). As explained by Delgado Gonzalez (1984, 316), a decade after its creation and having a co-government with the MNR, the COB had become a bureaucratic and inoperable organization. Labor had separated completely from the MNR and gave rise to a FSTMB-PRIN-COB alliance under Lechin. On May 30th 1964, former president Siles Zuazo joined Lechin in a hunger strike at Oruro's

San Jose mining camp, demanding Paz's resignation. They were joined by eight thousand anti-government miners marching through the streets of Oruro while in La Paz leftists and right wing university students barricaded the capital's main streets and announce they would also join the hunger strike (Field 2014, 151-2). Paz Estenssoro began this third term in office but faced political opposition from the left and right, and opted to choose military general Rene Barrientos as his running mate.

A teachers strike ignited as wave of protests when the government closed the schools. Since his inauguration in August until early November, there were weekly worker's strikes, student demonstrations, street marches that sometimes erupted into violence (Mitchell 1977, 96). The country was on the brink of anarchy as civil unrest became common in the major cities of the country and the mining centers as well. In Cochabamba students sacked the Bolivian- America cultural center; in Sucre and Tarija students took the streets to protest; in Potosi students attacked a US government building and attacked the private homes of MNR party militants. By the end of September, Paz Estenssoro declared a nationwide state of siege, his fifth since 1961, while his security forces grabbed over sixty opposition leaders and labor leaders from their beds, thirty of them including Siles Zuazo and members of Lechin's PRIN were taken to Paraguay (Field 2014, 167). The unrest would culminate in early November, when a group of university students, members of the COB and PRIN carried Lechin in their shoulder and wanting to force him inside the Government Palace. The group began to shoot their guns in the air to celebrate but this allowed for the security forces to begin shooting at the crowd resulting in the death of at least 40 and several injured (Delgado Gonzalez 1984, 344). The third term of Paz Estenssoro would only last a few months since his vice-president General Rene

Barrientos would stage of coup d'état placing the country under authoritarian military dictatorships that would last almost two decades.

4.8 Conclusion:

The struggle of the Bolivian campesino during the first two decades of the twentieth century was not against the political system or to improve the political participation of the campesino but was aimed mostly at the abuses committed by the local authorities and landlords. Under Liberal control most of the population was engaged in agriculture and most people were outside the small wage economy; only 6% of landowners controlled 92% of the agricultural land and they had few incentives to use their land productively (Klein 2003, 232). There was no significant difference between the Conservative, Liberal and Republican administrations, each claimed sensitivity to the Indian cause as long as it could gather the needed support from the subordinated sectors of society. As soon as a party came to power, however, it would do nothing to improve the Indian's situation because, from a structural point of view, it continued to be tied to the same landowning and mining oligarchy as every other administration (Sanjines 2004, 26). Even though most of the resistance was through the combined use of nonviolent and institutional political action by mobilizing people and signing petitions, the violent uprising in Jesus de Machaca in 1921 and Chayanta in 1927, demonstrated the growing frustration within the indigenous population due to the failures of the institutional channels to deliver justice. If anything, the rapid response of the Bolivian military that massacred the indigenous communities in these two revolts clearly indicated that the use of violence as a form of resistance would be met with even more violence by the state.

The mobilization of workers mainly in the mines and their use of nonviolent methods to demand justice was crucial in demonstrating the power of worker's protests. The tragic event of the 1923 Uncia Massacre orchestrated by the oligarchic mine owners would mark the beginning of several episodes of violent state repression against the miners and their unions. During this period there was an effort to organize labor between miners and railroad workers at the mining centers while indigenous leaders also began to organized in rural hacienda centers and even though these groups were not closely linked to each other there was a common theme of organizing due to the exploitation of the Bolivian Indian (Calderon and Dandler 1986, 31). These two groups were not only victims of violent state repression but also shared similar cultures, customs and demands since most miners came from indigenous rural communities. The emergence of union labor groups and intellectual leftist figures created new battle grounds as state oppression shifted from rural to urban but the presence of these groups also led to the cooperation of the campesinos and workers making it one of the most important alliances in Bolivian history.

The post-Chaco War era changed the political landscape with the introduction of new political parties headed by nationalists and leftists intellectuals and military strongmen that were against the oligarchic system. Despite the ongoing control of the *rosca* over state policy various political groups, each with the goal of fundamental change, formed in the late 1930s and 1940s but they also represented the growing contradiction in Bolivian society that was fueled by the increasingly strong urban-based petty bourgeoisie, the radicalized miners, and a discontented indigenous population (Hahn 1992, 65). The rise of the so-called military socialist governments of Coronel David Toro and Coronel German Busch was favorable for urban workers because of their encouragement of workers' union

formation. Under Coronel Villarroel the indigenous masses were also awoken and were given a political voice. These presidents inspired future political leaders and created stronger alliances between the military, labor unions, and the indigenous communities. Their combined efforts and mobilization were crucial for social reforms before and during the Revolution. They had learned that even small acts of violence against mine administrators or landlords and their management would result in massacres. Their best results were obtained when they utilized new forms of resistance such as work stoppages, nonviolent land occupations, and most importantly the strikes labelled as “*brazos caídos*.”

The state’s persecution of indigenous leaders, union members, and leftist political activists after the death of Villarroel led to the radical program of the Pulacayo Thesis in November 1946. The document authored by Lora demanded basic workers’ rights such as fair wages and safe working conditions but this thesis which was based on the Trotskyite conception of permanent revolution also called for an urban worker’s revolution backed by the indigenous masses of the countryside to form a democratic state controlled by the proletariat. The Thesis of Pulacayo was a revolutionary document that encouraged the use of violence by the arming of the workers rather than implementation of nonviolent methods such as strikes. The release of the Pulacayo Thesis was a contributing factor to the cycle of revolts during the oligarchic *rosca* control of the state also known as the *sexenio*. There were several nonviolent movements and institutional political action campaigns but they were clouded by two highly publicized acts of violence in which campesinos grew tired of the abuses and killed their landlords and other local authorities. Of all the many nonviolent protests the press could have covered, it centered its attention on these exceptional moments of outright aggression. The social and political instability

of the country created a widespread social discontent not only within the workers but also the middle class.

The National Revolution was an unexpected event and surprised the Bolivian state that was under the control of the *rosca*. As detailed by Dunkerley (2003, 157), in December of 1951 the Bolivian army had over 15,000 new army recruits but rather than training to shoot their weapons they were drilling marches and none of the six regiments stationed in La Paz were ready to fight the uprising of April 9th. The Bolivian Armed Forces was defeated and quickly dismantled. Overnight an electorate of 200,000 was expanded to over one million through the introduction of universal suffrage. Their experience with the Villarroel government allowed them to understand that a reformist approach to the system would not permit them to govern and instead adopted a complete radical view of destroying the critically important components of the old order such as the military, the landowners and the big mining companies (Whitehead 2003, 31). The MNR created a civilian army by arming workers and campesinos to protect the revolution. The development of the labor and campesino movement, was not unilateral or parallel, but the opposite, they were plagued by oppositions and ruptures, and when they intertwined with each other it was because of the third party actors such as political parties, the military or the state (Calderon and Dandler 1986, 49-50).

According to Thomson (2003b, 119), because of its middle-class or petty bourgeois and mestizo or creole intelligentsia, the National Revolution of 1952 had more in common with the insurgent movement of 1825. It may not have been an intra-elite conflict, but the vast majority of indigenous people were sidelined during the Revolution itself. If anything the National Revolution created a sense of national unity and identity by integrating a

disenfranchised indigenous population through its radical reforms and policies such as universal suffrage and land reform. By the mid-1950s the MNR was no longer capable of managing and implementing new reforms and appealed to the U.S. embassy for economic support. The revolution was unable to construct a modern economy due to the implementation of bad policies, a low quality of bureaucracy in the aftermath of the revolution, and high levels of corruption, political patronage and clientelism (Morales 2003, 214). This period of indigenous resistance culminated with the military takeover of the Bolivian state and triggering a counter-revolutionary process. The Bolivian Revolution of 1952 dismantled the military which was the main instrument of state repression after three days of armed fighting. Urban workers, miners, campesinos and political leaders united and took arms to claim the country as their own. But the Bolivian National Revolution was not a brief exchange of fire that began on from April 9th and ended on April 11th, 1952, it was a processes that began decades before the armed struggle. The origins of the Bolivian National Revolution were nonviolent in nature since it included episodes of campesino institutional political action campaigns of land right petitions and workers strikes which marked the decades leading up to the 1952 Revolution.

Table 2.1. Methods of Resistance that led to the Bolivian National Revolution

| Campaign | Participants | Method | Outcome |
|--|--|--|---|
| 1901 – 1918 Indigenous Resistance | Local Indigenous leaders and small indigenous communities | Nonviolent/Institutional Political Action: Use of colonial land titles, petitions, and printed material: newspapers and bulletins to raise awareness of their struggles. Violent: Numerous sporadic uprisings in small towns around the country. | Most legal complaint are ignored by Bolivian authorities. 1902 indigenous communities in Potosi are able to negotiate State land seizures. Quick defeat of small indigenous revolts by the Bolivian military. |
| 1918-1919 Miners' strikes | Miners | Nonviolent Action: Strikes Violent: Looting and destruction of | Some concessions are made by the Mine owners but troops are sent to guard the mines. |
| 1921 Jesus de Machaca | Local indigenous community | Violent: Murdered government official, some townspeople and targeted arson of abusive landlords' properties. | Over 1,000 Military troops are deployed and begin to burn the homes of the surrounding indigenous communities killing over 100 Indians. |
| 1923 Uncia Massacre and the its aftermath | Union leaders, miners and urban intellectuals | Nonviolent Action: Union formation, strikes, street protests, and the use of radio and newspapers to express grievances | Bolivian Security forces arrest several union leader and begin shooting at unarmed protesters. Government stage curfews and outlaw public meetings. |
| 1927 Chayanta uprisings | 5,000 Indian from Northern Potosi | Violent: Brutal killing of an abusive landlord. | Bolivian military uses airstrike bombings resulting in the death of over 100 indigenous people. |

| | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|---|---|
| 1932-5 Anti – Chaco War protests | Indigenous communities from all regions, indigenous women, intellectual writers in exile | <p>Institutional Political Action: Lawsuits and petitions</p> <p>Every day forms of resistance: Military draft evasion.</p> <p>Nonviolent Action: Land occupation, marchers, road blocks Protests organized by indigenous women. Distribution of ant-War pamphlets. “Brazos Caidos” strikes.</p> <p>Violent: Violent indigenous uprisings in La Paz, Potosi, Chuquisaca and Santa Cruz. Brutal killing of government officials.</p> | State repression and massive force conscription of the indigenous population. Union leaders, political activists, and indigenous leaders. Use of military weapons to suppress indigenous uprisings. Protests have little impact on the War but the post-Chaco War era revitalizes unions, strengthens Bolivian identity and leads to Military Socialist State. |
| 1942 Catavi Massacre | Union leaders and miners | Nonviolent Action: 7,000 workers go on strike. Protest and marches of over 8,000. | State acts violently by killing hundreds of protesters leading to the rise of the MNR party and the Villarroel government. |
| 1945 National Indigenous Congress | Indigenous leaders, Local indigenous communities and union workers | Nonviolent Action: 1,500 Indigenous leaders and representatives from all regions of Bolivia meet with President Villarroel and “ <i>Brazos Caido</i> ” strikes | Villarroel ends the all types of indigenous forced servitude, including “ <i>pongueje</i> .” Miner form their union FSTMB |

| | | | |
|----------------------------------|--|--|---|
| <p>1946-1952 Sexenio Revolts</p> | <p>Union workers, political parties, indigenous communities.</p> | <p>Violent: Mob lynch Villarroel and other government officials. 10,000 armed Indians in Cochabamba kill a military officer and landlord.</p> <p>Institutional Political Action: Union groups sign numerous petitions to courts to have their groups officially recognized by the government. Supported by union and campesino groups MNR wins the elections but unable to take control of the government.</p> <p>Nonviolent Action: Strikes and protest after miners were killed by PIR militants. “<i>Brazos Caído</i>” strikes to enforce Villarroel laws. Union workers begin to assist indigenous communities in the organization of rural unions.</p> | <p>The return of political control of the government by oligarchic mine owners and elitist landlords, leads to the call for an armed revolution as described in the Thesis of Pulacayo. Political activists, union militants, leftist intellectuals, and indigenous leaders begin to work together against the oppressive Bolivian state.</p> |
|----------------------------------|--|--|---|

| | | | |
|--|--|---|---|
| 1952 The Bolivian National Revolution | Political Parties, union works, miners, State Police, and indigenous communities | Violent: Brief exchanges of fire between MNR militants and their allies against the Bolivian military. Destruction of haciendas and killing of landlords. | Instalment of a Labor co-government that would declare universal suffrage, nationalization of mines, and land reform. Creation of the COB, MAC and COMIBOL. Symbolic labeling of Indios to campesinos. Formation of over 1,000 campesino unions. |
| 1957 – 1962 IMF Stabilization and Triangular Plan Protests | Union workers, miners, political party members, wives of miners, and teachers' union, and university students. | Nonviolent Action: Workers strikes and protests. Hunger strikes. Numerous street marches in major cities. Violent: Kidnapping of western mine technicians. Mining center takeovers. Miner skirmishes with the Bolivian military and campesino militants. | Incarceration and exile of union militants and opposition leaders. Bolivian government begins to expand the military and uses campesino militants to repress labor forces. The political instability and social unrest results in the military takeover of the Bolivian government. |

Chapter 5: Military Dictatorships

5.1 Barrientos' Military-Campesino Pact and the San Juan Massacre:

The November 1964 coup that ousted Paz Estenssoro ended the MNR controlled state obtained back in April 1952, thus ending the period of the National Revolution and establishing an era of military dictatorships that would last until 1982. The military vice-president, General Rene Barrientos, orchestrated the coup with the support of anti-Paz Estenssoro politicians, and initiated a military junta alongside the Commander in Chief of the Bolivian Armed Forces, General Alfredo Ovando. As described by Dunkerley (1984, 120-1), Barrientos made the regime his own rather than that of the military, but needed the institutionalist sector of the armed forces aligned with Ovando who did not appeal to the masses as demonstrated on the second day of the military junta when Ovando was booed off the balcony of the presidential palace. Under Barrientos, the military became an armed political party as the military leaders assumed important political posts at a local, provincial and national level (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 21). The military was slowly becoming a dominant political force as Barrientos started to rupture his political alliances with the major political parties and appoint mostly military officers in his cabinet.

The civilian opposition that helped overthrow Paz Estenssoro believed that the Barrientos regime was going to be a temporary transition, not realizing that young military officers had already created a complex of alliance with campesinos that were hostile to democratic politics and organized labor (Klein 2002, 222). Right wing and leftist militants, including Lechin conspired with Barrientos against Paz Estenssoro but once in power Barrientos excluded most civilian militants mainly those aligned with the left and focused

on empowering the armed forces. Only after a month he assumed the presidency, the leftist militants that supported Barrientos were fired or resigned thus allowing the United States to finally recognize the coup as Barrientos began a pro-U.S. line (Field 2015, 190). Barrientos continued with the anti-communist rhetoric initiated by Paz Estenssoro and just as his predecessor continued to receive U.S. military assistance which he used to enlarge the Bolivian Armed Forces and equipped them with modern weapons.

The military regime was able to gain the support of the majority of the campesinos living in vast rural areas, but also sought the urban support of the middle class by establishing coalitions with conservative and right wing elements such as the Cristian Democrats and the FSB. Within the first few months of his administration, Barrientos began to demonstrate implacable hostility towards leftist politicians and unions. The miners armed themselves and declared key mining camps “free territories” after Barrientos claimed that the FSTMB led by Lechin was planning a communist rebellion (Mitchell 1977, 100). By May of 1965, the Barrientos administration removed the leaders of the COB, FSTMB and forced all unions to reorganize under an apolitical labor movement controlled by the government. The FSTMB tried to recover its position by declaring a general strike in the mines but in response, the army invaded the encampments of several mining centers and began arresting the labor leaders (Nash 1979, 276). The May general strike was called by an ad hoc committee of miners, factory and construction workers, teachers and cooks but it failed badly after mining centers were bombed from the air and hundreds of activists were sacked (Roddick and van Niekerk 1989, 155). Lechin was sent to exile in Paraguay as several union leaders were either fired, arrested, tortured or killed while the army took over most of the mining camps. By September the FSTMB organized

a meeting of clandestine unions which led to a three day revolt once the miner's militia took over a barracks in Catavi but were defeated by the military resulting in over two hundred dead (Dunkerley 1984, 124-5). Morality among the miners was low since it was evident that their influence was declining to pre-National Revolution status. Their leadership was persecuted and their wages were either cut or stagnate.

The approach of Barrientos towards urban labor and miner unions in general was markedly different from his handling of the country's rural unions and towards the campesinos. Barrientos was a native of Cochabamba who spoke Quechua and understood the culture of drinking alcoholic *chicha* drinking, and dancing folk music with the indigenous people. His charisma attracted the loyalty of the various indigenous sectors mainly those who spoke Quechua in Cochabamba and the surrounding valleys. Barrientos was able to unify the campesinos of Cochabamba by imposing a peace treaty between rival campesino unions while alienating them from the leftist influence of the political parties (Dandler 1986b, 273). Communism was considered the culprit behind all those fratricidal struggles between unions whose leaders had been reduced to political clients of the MNR and it was then, with the MNR still in power, that an anti-communist military-campesino alliance was sealed in Ucureña (Albo 1987, 386). During the coup it was the campesino militias that quickly responded the call and mobilized to support Barrientos. Armed campesinos of Ucareña who were described as being the most savages fighters and deeply devoted to Barrientos began to march towards Cochabamba (Field 2014, 184). Barrientos worked hard to extend his strategy of political clientelism in the rural areas by offering monetary compensation, sporting and school materials to the heads of campesino organizations (Gallardo Lozada 1984, 430). Patronage and corruption were the main tools

he used to gain control of the campeino masses. By offering some public work projects, such as roads and schools, the Barrientos government was able to secure the campesino cooperation. In La Paz, for example, when faced with opposition or attempted coups, the government would invite thousands of armed campesinos into the city in a few hours' notice (Kelly and Klein 1981, 101-2).

Indeed, Barrientos had invested a lot of time gaining the trust and support of the Bolivian campesino by travelling in helicopter to rural communities, partaking in parties, delivering speeches in Quechua and giving away lavish gifts to campesino leaders. He first met in private with the heads of the campesino unions and then came out to greet the crowds alongside the campesino leaders, in what appeared to be a handover of a whole mass of people to Barrientos (Kohl, Farthing and Maruchi 2011, 54). Cochabamba became the center of operations, where he was able to establish an alliance between the campesinos and the military by manipulating and undermining the campesino leadership (Dandler 1986b, 255). In the background he was weakening campesino organizations and discouraged popular election of campesino leaders at all levels while directly financing campesino support for the *Pacto Militar-Campesino* (Mitchell 1977, 98). Finally in 1966 Barrientos and the campeisno leaders signed the infamous Military-Campesino Pact. This agreement reassured the Bolivian Armed Forces' commitment to the defense of the agrarian reform of the National Revolution as long as the campesinos supported the military institution and put themselves under military orders, against the subversive maneuvers of the left. The Military-Campesino Pact was designed as an institutional structure to connect the military and the state-union rural leaders and substitute the union-political leaders of state of the MNR (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 170). Barrientos also

understood the potential threat of the armed campesinos and set up the Armed Forces Civic Action and Community Development Program with his motto of exchanging rifles for ploughs (Albo 1987, 386).

Barrientos won the 1966 elections by a landslide using the campesino vote and aligning himself with conservative politicians, and small and middle-size mine owners. The economic development favored Barrientos and allowed him to push for further liberalization policies. During his regime Gulf Oil Company became the biggest foreign investor of the country. He provided subsidies and other assistance to promote the growing private mining sector. Mines that were previously managed by COMIBOL were rented out to United States Steel (Klein 2002, 224). The plan was to weaken the miner union and militias by dismantling the mining organizations.

The union leaders went on with their plans for a meeting of the miners' federation on June 24, 1967 the day of the religious festival of San Juan, a traditional celebration accompanied by drinking, dancing, and bon fire. The union meeting was targeted by the ranger regiment and the miner police which had already surrounded the district of the Catavi and Siglo XX mines before dawn (Delgado Gonzalez 1984, 353). The event that would occur that morning would be known in the history pages as the "San Juan Massacre." The military came with machine guns, mortars and hand grenades, and began shooting at people who were still dancing on the streets; they fired at houses while their occupants were sleeping, and even fired at dogs, with the intention to break resistance and demoralize any revolutionary spirit (Nash 1979, 278-9). The state terrorist tactic was destructive as it installed fear at the biggest critics and opposition to the Barrientos regime. The military was ruthless and did not discriminate in targeting women and children, resulting in the

death of 87 people (Roddick and van Niekerk 1989, 156). Soldiers were force to shoot at the innocent miners and even their relatives who were among the residents. More than ten soldiers were executed for disobeying firing orders since they were from that area and their family members were in the crowds (Viezzzer 1978, 211). According to Gallardo Lozada (1984, 439), the massacre was order by General Ovando the head of the Bolivian Armed Forces under the direct instruction of President Barrientos. The message was clear and precise; enemies of the regime would be severely punished.

The military took advantage of the situation and officially declaring the Siglo XX mining camps and surrounding areas as military zones (Alexander 2006, 130). It was the first time for many young miners to live in military controlled mining areas. A general strike was called in to protest against the San Juan Massacre events. It lasted sixteen days, but the strike committee finally decided to negotiate with the government, accepting an extremely humiliating agreement to end the conflict (Alexander 2006, 350). Campesino organizations blamed the miners' agitation and international communist organization for the Massacre of San Juan and declared their full moral support to the Barrientos regime producing an even bigger separation between the mining class and the campesinos (Delgado Gonzales 1984, 358-359).

Not all campesino organizations were blindly loyal to Barrientos or agreed to the terms of the Militray-Campesino Pact. The military was able to take direct control of the campesino union formation apparatus and influence its leadership mainly in rural Cochabamba where Barrientos was originally from but encountered several difficulties in Potosi where union formation was closely tied to external forces and clientelism (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 170). The rejection of these campesino communities towards the

Barrientos regime grew due to the fiscal project called “*impuesto unico*” or “only tax.” Under the advisement of USAID and the University of Wisconsin, Barrientos tried to impose this fiscal reform requiring campesinos to pay a tax on their land but was postpone indefinitely due to the numerous campesino protests (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 171). There were demonstrations everywhere followed by rural conflicts as campesino unions were divided between those who rejected the tax and those who remained loyal to Barrientos and supported the *impuesto unico* decree (Lavaud 1986, 300). Barrientos was able to convince the campesinos of Cochabamba who spoke Quechua but was not convincing in Aymara speaking areas. Aymara campesinos of the Altiplano also contested the Military-Campesino Pact and formed an Independent Block of Campesinos to resist the imposed tax (Cardenas 1988, 523). The protests climaxed in the Altiplano of La Paz and Oruro, where perhaps the greatest land surface was possessed by campesinos (Albo 1987, 388). In a last attempt to persuade the Altiplano campesinos, Barrientos went to the locality of Achacachi in December 1968 where he encountered 2,000 to 3,000 campesinos who began to boo and heckle his speech forcing this security to shoot tear gas at the crowds (Lavaud 1986, 291). The town had to be place under military control once the campesino residents began throwing rocks at the president and his entourage (Rojas Ramirez 1989, 41). The mobilization of these protests were promoted by the *Bloque Independiente Campesino* which was headed by the leftist and Pro-Lechin members of the MNR (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 175). By the end of December the Independent Block of Campesinos of La Paz signed an alliance with the workers and university students to oppose the Military-Campesino alliance (Lavaud 1986, 291). Four months later in April of 1969, General Barrientos died when his helicopter crashed while inaugurating a school in a small town in

Cochabamba. His death created a political vacuum as militants of the right and left tried to create alliances with top military officials.

5.2 The Failures of Violence: Che Guevara and the Teoponte Guerrilla:

The National Revolution of April 1952, did not only terminate the oligarchic control of the country but tremendously weakened the Bolivian Armed Forces. The military institutions were demoralized due to their defeat at the hand of some workers and MNR militants. During the celebration of May Day that year over 40,000 COB militants called for the total abolition of the army (Garcia Arganas 1992, 58). Paz Estenssoro understood that armed workers would jeopardize his political stability and began to slowly reorganize the Bolivian Armed Forces and re-opened the military academy. Paz Estenssoro mistrusted the labor-left's armed power and after the 1956 MNR Convention which was dominated by leftist militants, he went with Siles Zuazo to the U.S. embassy to ask for assistance in rebuilding the Bolivian military as a counter to the militias (Lehman 1999, 148). A new security force was also created, called "*control politico*," which was a paramilitary group design for the protection and security of Paz Estenssoro. This paramilitary group was behind a series of kidnappings, tortures and killing of MNR opposition militants from the left and right. During Paz Estenssoro's 1964 presidential inauguration, Juan Lechin entered the Presidential Palace to protest his presidency but was beaten out by *Control Politico* agents. Control Politico was professionalized and highly active and for over a decade it became the country's main repressive organ (Dunkerley 1984, 81).

By early 1964 the United States government had placed unquestioned support towards the Paz Estenssoro reelection since he was seen as a sufficiently authoritarian to secure

U.S. political interests and willing to use violence against the miners (Field 2014, 133). A year prior to the military coup, the entire senior class of the military academy was trained at the infamous School of the Americas in Panama focusing on anti-communist counter-insurgency strategies. The U.S. Army's Special Warfare School had more graduates from Bolivia than any other Latin American country (Malloy and Gamarra 1984, 42). The instruction also included the indoctrination of American values, the role of the Bolivian military for national security and as allies in the Cold War (Gill 2004, 66).

The popularity of the Cuban Revolution and its heroes, Fidel Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, was of great concern to the Bolivian government which was now irrefutably under the influence of the United States. In March 1963, it was partially revealed that Cuba was using the embassy in La Paz to organize regional subversion, when a Bolivia airliner crashed in the Andean mountains of Chile on its way to La Paz. The documents found in the rubble were handed over to the U.S. embassy in La Paz which indicate plans of a large-scale Cuban sponsored operation called "Operation Matraca", aimed at spreading Castro-communist propaganda among the Bolivian working class (Field 2014, 71-3). Che Guevara mastermind the preparation and mentored the guerrilla groups of "Operacion Matraca" composed of three Peruvian guerrillas groups trained in Cuba and with the support of the Peruvian and Bolivian Communist parties (Kruijit 2017, 79). The guerrilla was short lived and quickly annihilated by the Peruvian military.

Guerrilla threats were not only coming from the left but there were also right-wing guerrillas groups being formed in the Bolivian east. The Alto Paragua River region became the center of a nationalist guerrilla group headed by members of the FSB and financed by wealth cattle ranchers. The armed forces did not feel intimidated by this group because of

the friendly relationship between the FSB and the military and the participants were allowed to disband taking refuge in neighboring Brazil (Prado Salmon 1990, 14). A few months before the Barrientos regime the group resurfaced but their installations were bombed and the torched by the police. The one hundred strong guerrilla band fled northward in to the jungles of Santa Cruz but the main purpose of the right-wing guerrillas was the increase militarization of the counterinsurgent campaign and the uprising of junior officers (Field 2014, 157). During the last month of the Paz Estenssoro regime the FSB militant also allied themselves with leftist university students and took arms in La Paz. Planned by the FSB, they began to confront the police and *Control Politico* in the streets (Mitchell 1977, 119). The student militias were eventually pushed back to a fourteen-story university building by the government forces, leading them to surrender and file out of the university one by one, leaving their weapons by the door (Field 2014, 178). General Ovando carried out the operation and arrested about one thousand people at the university meanwhile the miner militias in Oruro were also being defeated (Lora 1977, 330). Ironically, the fall of Paz Estenssoro was not at the hands of workers or student militias but by the military that he had helped rebuild. Once in power the military regime used fear tactics and intimidation to arrest anyone under the suspicion of subversion. By 1965, the Bolivian Armed Forces adopted an anti-communist policy and maintained watchful attitude toward leftist political forces, who at the time were not interested or capable of confronting the military through and armed struggle (Prado Salmon 1990, 24).

For union and student militias the idea of an armed revolution may have not been a viable option since they were still recovering from a repressive Paz Estenssoro administration and were now trying to cope with an even more oppressive military

government. But for Che Guevara, Bolivia was a perfect location to start an armed revolution that would serve as a spark to set up a series of revolutions in Latin America. Bolivia's geographical situation located in the center of South America, land-locked and bordering other countries was seen as a strategic point to establish a guerrilla training camp for revolutionaries from all over the continent (Prado Salmon 1990, 43).

The theory of Che's focolism revolution was that a guerrilla force could function as the nucleus of armed insurrection – or foco insurreccional- creating the conditions for a revolution. Guerrilla warfare had to be carried out in suitably chosen rural zone by a mobile strategic force that would inspire a people's army and this would ultimately lead to a future socialist state (Debray 1967, 25). The Cuban Revolution demonstrated that social change could be achieved through armed struggle by gaining popular support of the masses; therefore growing in numbers and strength of the guerrillas which would be more than capable of defeating a national army.

As early as 1962, Cuban officers were sent to Bolivia on several occasions to gather information and make practical arrangements to ignite an armed struggle (Lamberg 1970, 28). Che began to plan his move to Bolivia once Barrientos' military regime overtook the government. In November 3, 1966, Guevara came to Bolivia disguised as a Uruguayan businessman. Five days later he set up his camp in Ñancahuazu to form the National Liberation Army - *Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional* (ELN) consisting of 29 Bolivians, 18 Cubans, and 3 Peruvians (Guevara 1994, 77-8). The Bolivians that joined the guerrillas were mostly unemployed mine workers and some university students. Among the Bolivian insurgents were the brothers Inti and Coco Peredo, two young members of the PCB, that were disappointed in the factionalism that had paralyzed the Bolivian left and with its

hesitance of guerrilla warfare (Lopez 2016, 119). By March 1967 the guerrilla group initiated its first confrontation with the Bolivian army by ambushing two military posts. Soon after, Che send out a message to the Bolivian people through the press asking the workers, campesinos, and intellectuals to join him since “it was time to respond violence with violence” (Peredo 1971, 69-70). The guerrillas was unable to gain significant support from any opposition group as Che’s call to arms was ignored by urban workers, university students, miners, and campesinos. In exile Paz Estenssoro had expressed sympathy for the guerrillas, while Lechin also promised to endorse the group; while Guillermo Lora’s POR expressed solidarity but none committed and directly supported the guerrilla forces (Lamberg 1970, 33). Initially the PCB had asserted their participation in the ELN but demanded a more pivotal role over the political and military operations of the guerrillas. But Dunkerley (1984, 137) reveals that the deep-seated reason for that PCB hesitant commitment to Che’s campaign was that it was extremely wary of guerrilla tactics. The ELN failed to establish links with any force of political significance and at no time did the guerrilla campaign seriously threaten the political power of Barrientos if anything it gave Barrientos a motive to outlaw communist groups and curtail the activity of the MNR, PRIN and POR (Lanberg 1970, 34).

The Bolivian military was able to obtain valuable information about the *foco*, the leaders, and the Ñancahuazu camp when they intercepted two guerrilla fighters that deserted. Once it was revealed that Che Guevara himself was the head of the guerrilla group Barrientos requested more U.S. military aid. Washington responded by sending two CIA operatives, two U.S. Army officers and twenty-two Green Berets to advise and train the Bolivian military in counter-insurgency warfare (Lehman 1999, 154). By mid-1967

the Barrientos security forces was cracking down on groups that had any plans to even communicate with the guerrilla insurgency. The government declared a state of siege in the mining areas as a response to a national miners' meeting in Huanuni to address if they should aid Che Guevara's guerrillas with food and medicine (Alexander 2006, 130). The ELN guerrilla was losing momentum and even a bigger blow was delivered when the Bolivian Security Forces were able to arrest and interrogate their urban liaison ending what remained of the structure that had provided the guerrilla with some backing in the cities (Prado Salmon 1990, 165). By August Che's insurgency lost several guerrilla fighters in a skirmish with the Bolivian army. The ELN was on the run, demoralized and without any food. As detailed in his diary in Bolivia, Guevara was frustrated that he was unable to recruit any campesino to join his guerrilla: "The characteristics of the month are the same as those of the previous one, except that the army is now showing more effectiveness in action. In addition, the mass of peasants (campesinos) are not helping us as all and are being turned into informants" (Guevara 1994, 289). By early October Guevara's small guerrilla was defeated by the Bolivian army with the assistance of the CIA and U.S. Special Forces. The injured Che was captured and later executed in a school in the small town of La Higuera. The attempt to initiate an armed revolution in Bolivia failed partly because the campesino masses did not join or cooperate with the ELN guerrilla since most of them owned their land and were not dissatisfied with the state but actually supported Barrientos. When Che Guevara's guerrillas appeared in Ñancahuazu the "Barrientos Regiment" formed by Cochabamba campesinos was the first to answer the call to fight against the communists (Albo 1987, 386). The campesinos did not limit their loyalty only to Barrientos but were also very supportive of the military institution itself and had no anti-

American sentiment. The military was very benevolent to the campesinos by building schools and health centers that were inaugurated by Barrientos who emphasized that the funds came from the United States (Field 2014, 82). At no stage during the guerrilla campaign did a local campesino join as a combatant, although many were willing to sell them food at a high cost and most of them sold them out to the military (Dunkerley 1984, 140).

After the death of Che, the Bolivian army quickly defeated what was left of the ELN. A small number of guerrilla survivors escaped from Bolivia and sought refuge in Chile. Inti Peredo, who had remained in La Paz, took over the leadership of the ELN reaffirming their commitment to continue the armed struggle (Peredo 1971, 123). In order to recruit militants from all over the country and abroad, Inti Peredo, published a document entitled "*Volveremos a las montañas*" (we will return to the mountains) which had broad dissemination in Bolivia and the rest of Latin America (Assmann 1971, 21). It was a call to arms and a recommitment to Che Guevara's foco strategy. Che believed that urban insurgency was inappropriate for revolutionary change but rather the rural countryside where most of the people lived was the ideal area for guerrilla warfare (Guevara 1961, 162). By mid-1969 the ELN was ready to resume operations with 80 ELN militants trained in Cuba but the CIA had already infiltrated the organization and an informant passed valuable intelligence to the Bolivian military (Lara 1971, 120-3). The Bolivian security forces arrested several members of the ELN, seized numerous weapons and important documents containing the organization safe houses. In September 1969, 150 Bolivian security forces surrounded, Peredo's hiding place, and after an intense battle the injured Peredo was arrested and tortured to death (Lara 1971, 128).

Following the assassination of Inti, the ELN reorganized under the leadership of Inti Peredo's younger brother, Chato Peredo. In May 1970, the Bolivian police enter the San Andres University of La Paz and confiscated a substantial amount of recruiting material and pamphlets urging students to join the ELN (Malloy and Gamarra 1984, 53). While taking refuge in Chile the ELN developed close ties with several guerrilla groups from South American and became part of the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta – Junta de Coordinacion Revolutionaria JCR which was a network guerrilla groups committed to continue to the armed struggle initiated by Che (Lopez 2016, 104). The financial situation of the group improved when the Tupamaros guerrillas from Uruguay gave them several thousand dollars and weapons allowing them to reinstate their armed activities (Lopez 2016, 124). Chato Peredo expressed his gratitude in a letter to the Tupamaru leadership and as an homage to his late brother he published a document entitled “*Volvimos a la Montañas*” (We returned to the mountains) (Lopez 2016, 105).

In July, the ELN, composed of mostly university students initiated their guerrilla operation in the Teoponte region located in the Yungas tropical jungles. Their intention was to capture American employees of a U.S. owned mine but kidnapped three German workers instead who were used to negotiate the release of 10 of their imprisoned ELN members (Lopez 2016, 125). The campaign appeared to be initially successful but by September the guerrillas were almost obliterated by the Bolivian military. In the short span of activities the amateur guerrillas was able to recruit some campesinos and miners but were completely outmatched by the experienced ranger battalion (Dunkerley 1984, 172-3). Many deserted, several guerrilleros starved to death, others died as a consequence of numerous illnesses caught in the jungle (Assmman 1971, 68). The ELN was in retreat and

by late October President Ovando publically offered them amnesty if they turned themselves in but while the insurgents surrendered local military officers ordered them to be shot, killing 64 of the 70 rebels (Mitchell 1977, 113). While the groups received some degree of cooperation from the miners and campesino, the organization lacked cadres able to carry out a political work agenda and effectively gain public support (Lopez 2016, 126). However, the guerilla of Teoponte did have the moral support and admiration of some leftist militants but their use of violence was not supported, not even by the radical miners. As described in by Vierzzer (1978, 167) a female miner activist Domitila Chungara, mentioned that the miners were aware they need the backing of the people to create revolutionary change and that this change would not happen overnight and it would never occur with the use of weapons.

5.3 J.J. Torres and the Popular Assembly

The death of Barrientos left a political void that his vice-president, Adolfo Siles Salinas, was unable to fill since he did not have the political influence or popularity of Barrientos or even of his half-brother, Hernan Siles Zuazo. One of his first mandates was to eliminate all political persecutions and release political prisoners and also removed all violent and repressive organization including the FURMOD (De Mesa, Gisbert, and Mesa 2003,687). The United Forces of Mobile Repression for Order and development - Fuerzas Unidas de Represion Moviles para el Orden y Desallo (FURMOD) was initiated by Barrientos as a counter-insurgency organization composed of military special forces. It was highly criticized and rejected by numerous political groups due to its violent nature and abuse of human rights. As much as Siles Salinas wanted to have a legitimate and

constitutional mandate his administration did not have any political backing or military support. The military officers that were loyal to Barrientos were unable to maintain his political position since the military was corrupt and widely divided ideologically (Klein 2003, 225). Finally and as expected the government of Siles Salinas that lasted less than five months was overtaken by the military. General Ovando ousted Siles Salinas in a bloodless military coup, even though Ovando had initially began to openly run for presidency his electoral chances decreased due to his lack luster public persona (Malloy Gamarra 1988, 44).

Ovando did not want to wait for the announced elections of 1970 and by September 1969 took the presidency but surprisingly formed a cabinet of young progressive technocrats. In many occasions Ovando had expressed admiration and praised the intellectual capacity of his Minister of Energy and Hydrocarbons, Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz, who pushed for the nationalization of the Gulf Oil (Gallardo Lozada 1984, 457). In October of that year, the Bolivian government took over the operations of Gulf Oil located in the vast eastern lowland areas of Bolivia, in an event labelled “Day of Dignity.” The Nationalization of the Bolivian Gulf, generated a U.S. backlash reflected in aid cuts and also provoked some resentment from Santa Cruz since the department had financially benefited from the U.S. company (Mitchell 1977, 112). The nationalization was received with great approval from the left which was now quickly reorganizing. By early 1970, Ovando allowed the COB and FSTMB to operate and permitted Lechin to return to power, and withdrew troops from the mining camps for the first time since 1964 (Klein 2003, 226). Even though Ovando had restored mining wages to 1965 levels, the COB would not become subservient to him and continued to push for more autonomy (Mitchell 1977, 111).

The COB used the FSTMB Congress in April and in May of 1970 to develop a new radical political agenda called Political Thesis. The document was not contested but several paragraphs were edited and added by the PCB and POR militants which emphasized working-class independence and that the security of democracy could only be held by armed workers (Dunkerley 1984, 169). Ovando publicly denounced the *Tesis Politico*, as anti-imperialistic and nationalist ideals were resurfacing in some popular sectors. Ovando's mishandling of the Teopente Guerrillas also contributed to the low public approval of his military administration. Because of the Military-Campesino Pact, Ovando did not have to make any efforts to gain the support of the campesino masses but never to the point that Barrientos did. In October General Miranda with the support of conservative groups began to move against Ovando. The Ovando government was losing control over Bolivian society at one point he was out, and then he was back in; then both him and Miranda were out of the junta (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 54-5). Since the labor movement was still emerging from the dark era of repression of Barrientos, it was unclear if their old militancy would take the streets to defend Ovando (Lora 1977, 361). But after much internal debate, the COB called for a general strike and declared themselves in rebellion against any new military government. In October 7th, the head of the Bolivian Armed Forces, General Juan Jose Torres took control of the government.

Torres would prove to be the most radical and left-leaning military ever to have govern Bolivia by extending the mobilization of militant workers and leftist politicians while carrying an extremely pro-worker and anti-imperialist agenda (Klein 2003, 226). The delegates of the labor-left met at the University of San Andres in La Paz to form, *Comando Politico*, an alliance of party militants and union works. *Comando Politico*

became a popular parliament establish to steer the government to a leftist position that would favor the masses (Lora 1972, 45). The labor-left declared their support of General Torres as the new president sought to get the union leaders to take part of the government. Initially Torres offered, *Comando Politico*, four posts in his cabinets and then increased the number to eight, that is, half of the government positions but after extensive discussion among themselves, the labor leaders turned down the offer apparently being unwilling to share responsibility in a regime that they would almost certainly not control (Alexander 2005, 135). The COB wanted independent autonomy over more than half of the government, a level not even reached at the height of the 1952 National Revolution.

There were strong pressures from the left and extreme left and Torres was able to please some demands such as, giving amnesty to Regis Debray and others guerrilla fighters; ousted all fascist militants from the country; nationalized some mines, and even expelled the U.S. Peace Corps delegation (De Mesa, Gisbert and Mesa 2003, 694). Torres also opened diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union and accepted their financial assistance to COMIBOL of almost a quarter of a billion dollars (Klein 2003, 227). Most local groups sought to take advantage of Torres's weakness simply to extract government concessions rather than to overthrow him, by using strikes, but surprisingly the basic force of the new participation came from the middle class in cities and towns outside the capital; Tarija wanted financing for local irrigation and threaten a town closed down in a "total strike" until its demands were met; Sucre wanted tariff cuts on machinery needed by local industry, and threaten to block the highways (Mitchell 1977, 117).

It was confirmed by the *Comando Politico* in the May 1970 meeting that the Asamblea Popular (Popular Assembly) would begin its session in June. The Legislative

Palace would host the Assembly under the approval and observation of the Torres regime. This experiment represented a conscious and practical attempt to build on the experience of the National Revolution of 1952 which could not be a form of bourgeois parliament but rather as an organ of popular power belonging to the working class (Dunkerley 1984, 192). To assure workers participation *Comando Politico* chose delegates of the Asamblea using a series of local-level elections and appointive procedures set up by unions. Of the 222 delegates, 60% were trade unions members; 24% came from middle-class organization; 10% campesinos and 6% were leftist parties (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 61). The campesino groups that represented more than half of the country were tremendously underrepresented, while the MNR which was excluded from the Assembly was overrepresented through its trade unions. The Popular Assembly demonstrated that the left was fragmented. On one side there was Lechin's PRIN who were the old members of the MNR left and supported by the miners and middle class. The POR was headed by Guillermo Lora and also popular among miners and university students while the PCB was divided by a pro-Moscow and pro-Chinese offshoot. According to Lora (1972, 14-5) the *Asamblea Popular* was highly criticized by the violent ultra-left that saw it as an institution that wanted to cooperate with the Torres government instead of organizing an immediate armed insurrection to take-over the government. The Assembly frightened the right and centered but was unable to obtain the full cooperation of the relatively unstable Torres government that refused to supply weapons to the workers or challenge the power of the military (Klein 2003, 228).

The low participation of the campesinos in the *Asamblea Popular* brought some bitterness towards the Torres regime. In August 2, 1971, the VI National Congress of

Campesino Workers took place in Potosi with over 600 delegates and the leadership also met with the MAC concerning the campesino occupation of lands in the east and the military-campesino alliance which was already being questioned and rejected by independent campesino organizations (Flores 1986b, 459). Without any close allies, the weakened Torres was at the brink of collapsing. Torres had survived a coup in January which was executed by Coronel Hugo Banzer and a group of conservative militants. Workers responded quickly as miners, armed with dynamite and a few guns, entered La Paz and met with a clamoring mass in front of the Presidential Palace chanting; 'Arms to the people,' 'workers' government,' "Long live socialism and disarm the army' (Lora 1977, 364). Banzer returned from exile in Argentina and backed by the MNR, FSB and wealthy businessmen, he began his second attempt to oust Torres.

In Santa Cruz a group of people began a march demanding the release of far-right political prisoners belonging to the FSB. Once they obtained their freedom, they gathered their weapons and took over the Gabriel Rene Moreno University which was defended by some leftist students (Gallardo Lozada 1972, 458). By the next day August 20th, Santa Cruz was in the hands of the FSB, MNR, and military Coronel Andres Selich. After a brief exchange of firing at the prefecture what wounded the city consul who also participated in the fighting, Selich went on the radio to announce their victory (Dunkerley 1984,199). In a tragic turn of events, a bomb exploded in the Santa Cruz Prefect Palace, Selich quickly blamed the university students and over thirty were lined up to be executed, killing seventeen (Gallardo Lozada 1972, 461). That same day crowds of people began to march in La Paz in support of President Torres. The rallies were headed by students and workers and by the late afternoon over 50,000 people met at the Presidential Palace where Torres

waved at the crowds while they chanted “vivas” and “hurrahs” (Gallardo Lozada 1972, 448). The next day Beni, Pando, Cochabamba, and Oruro fell to the control of the military rebels while in La Paz the military began to plot against Torres. The Laikakota Park in La Paz became the center stage of a bloody battle. A pro-Torres militia composed of over 30 well trained militants of the POR, PCB, and MNR exchanged fire for almost the whole day and after several deaths on both sides the militia was victorious but defeated nationally (Gallardo Lozada 1972, 490). Banzer overtook the government in a one of the bloodiest coups in Bolivian history.

5.4 Nonviolent Resistance against Banzer

In August 22nd 1971, Coronel Hugo Banzer Suarez native of Santa Cruz, would rise to power and began one of the darkest episodes in Bolivian history. In contrast to Barrientos, Banzer was more willing to use repressive violence, more skilled in political manipulation, and better able to buy off his opponents; thus created a government that was virtually unchallengeable (Mitchell 1977, 122). His political backing came from the MNR, FSB and other right-wing parties while his financial support came from wealthy Santa Cruz plantation owners and businessman. It was in Santa Cruz that the military junta of Hugo Banzer Suarez, Andres Selich and other military men began to plot against Torres. Once Banzer was sworn in he formed the National Popular Front or FPN (*Frente Popular Nacional*). This power bloc intended to conceal the dictatorship by creating this bogus political organization, FPN, composed of the armed forces, the MNR, the FSB, and the CEPB (Confederation of Private Enterprise of Bolivia), which later began a corporatist social-political order project (Mayorga 1978, 110). The MNR and FSB held three or four

ministries and several bureaucratic posts but the influence their leaders had, Paz Estenssoro and Gutierrez, was very limited (Mitchell 1977, 125). Paz Estenssoro's argument of joining the FSB and military alliance was that in this way the MNR would at least be part of the government, which they truly believed would be able to get rid-off the generals and colonels by using the elections (Lora 1972, 113). But their strategy failed since it was clear that the United States would favor the Banzer administration. From 1942 to 1970 Bolivia had only received from the U.S. \$6.7 million in aid for administration and government; during Banzer's first year the U.S. had already sent \$32 million (Dunkerley 1984, 205). According to Gallardo Lozada (1972, 401-2), the architects of the coup met in Buenos Aires and were advised by a high Pentagon officials, the U.S. military adjunct in Buenos Aires and the CIA; the conspirators also counted with the support of the Brazilian government which facilitated them with money, weapons, planes and mercenaries who were trained under the supervision of the U.S. Department of Defense and the CIA.

The Banzer dictatorship, characterized for its violent coup, was able to remove easily his leftist predecessor, General Torres. The miners, union leaders, students and leftist parties were unprepared for Banzer's right wing uprising. According to Zavaleta (1972, 65) the coup clearly showed the consequences when masses are mobilized but not armed. The tone was set when Banzer ordered an assault at the San Andres University where pro-Torres students had taken refuge. Air force fighter planes flew around the building as infantry troops entered killing several students while the rest were immediately arrested and interrogated (Mitchell 1977, 125). Banzer shut down the universities and suspended all COB and FSTBM activities. He denied any political participation of leftist parties and organizations sending their leaders to include: Lechin and Lora to exile

(Delgado Gonzalez 1984, 392). Freedom of press was strictly censored during his regime, and in the absence of any formal or informal control he was able to persecute, imprison, exile and kill all opposition to his government, who were mostly leftist party members and supporters. Quiroga Santa Cruz (1973, 134) points out that the Banzer regime's goal was the elimination of the revolutionary left, the extermination of its vanguard and the suppression of the university student movement. His government even went to the point of censoring symbols of counterculture protest such as long hair and beards (Lehman 1999, 165). There was no independent union activity, no political participation, and a strictly censored press. Hahn (1992, 75) adds that at least 200 people were killed, not including the ones that died during his coup; some 14,750 were jailed for state offenders, 19,140 were forced to exile and some 780,00 people became economic refugees.

After several campesino meetings during the second half of 1971 and in January 1972, the Military-Campesino pact was ratified and Banzer became the national leader of the campesinos who had vowed to cling to their rifles if the National Revolution was threatened by the extreme left (Flores 1986b, 469). The support was not reciprocal since Banzer did not spend too much focus on the campesinos who ruled rural areas of the highlands and valleys, but instead wanted to expand the agricultural sector of Bolivia by parceling out hectares of land to his fellow military men and supporters who were mainly from the Santa Cruz and the Beni regions of the country. According to Bascope Aspiazu (1982, 52), Banzer's priority was to strengthen Eastern Bolivian bourgeoisie groups that consisted of landowners and cattle ranchers; that among other virtues had been the main gestures of his political ascension. The agricultural and petroleum boom shifted the economic power to the eastern lowlands. The Banzer "Economic Miracle" was not of his

doing but a myth based on mainly fortuitous events in the international oil industry and mining markets both of which were not under his control (Ladman 1982a, 322). In a very short term Santa Cruz achieved a political influence and prominence that it had never before enjoyed. This also contributed to a growing level of regionalism and segregations based on class and race. During the Banzer regime, the main line of division was between the 'Kolla' from the Andean highlands centered in La Paz, and the 'Camba' from the eastern lowlands centered in Santa Cruz (Malloy and Gamarra 1987, 74). The increased role played by the state marginalized the campesino benefiting the urban middle/upper classes and the Camba commercial farmer mainly because government policies favored urban areas relative to rural ones (Romero Pittari 1982, 315).

After a long period of economic stability, the Banzer government devalued the currency by 67% which led to an increase on the prices of consumer products (Antezana Ergueta 1994, 135). In January 1974, another austerity package was proposed that would have double most food prices but this time it was challenged by massive demonstrations. The protest movements began on January 22nd in Quillacollo at the Manaco shoe factory located at the regional market. That morning the workers accompanied by their families, began to organize marches and barricades and that afternoon the campesinos joined the workers due to the increase of taxes the government had proposed (Lavaud 1986, 293). The campesinos of the outskirt villages began to massively mobilize. Between January 24th and 30th about 20,000 campesinos blocked the major highways leading to the commercial areas of Chapare and Santa Cruz (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 185). The campesinos also occupied and blocked the highways that linked Cochabamba with Oruro, and Sucre. The center of the movement was located in the villages of Tolata and Epizana

on the highways to Santa Cruz. Used to the patronizing actions of Barrientos, the campesinos demanded and expected to meet Banzer in person but instead they encountered military artillery fire (Hahn 1992, 75). This tragic event would be known as “La Mascre de Tolata.”

The build-up prior to the massacre took place at the Upper Valley of Tolata which was the center of the campesino mobilization. The revolt was staged by more than 100 rural unions, including those that had military experience such as Ucureña, Cliza and Punata (Mitchell 1977, 127). While members of the CNTCB and the Cochabamba Federation of Campesinos were negotiating with government officials the leaders of the protests continued to reiterate that those organizations were not representing the interests of the campesino (Flores 1986b, 491). They also demanded the firing of Coronel Natush Busch who headed the MAC which they believed should have been headed by a campesino leader (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 186). Ministers and military officers were sent to negotiate with the campesinos while the military began to plan their attacks. There was an assumption that the campesinos had kidnapped one of the military mediators which justified a military attack consisting of three T-33 combat planes used to destroy the campesino blockade (Antezana Ergueta 1994, 136). The military assault also included a combination of automatic weapons, tanks, helicopters and fighter planes. A Rangers platoon was used for the military raid that resulted in the killing of thirteen campesinos but the Justice and Peace Commission had estimated over seventy and five missing, most likely the deaths overpass the hundreds, but the numbers do not include the hundreds of injured, incarcerated and people who were forced to exile (Lavaud 1986, 295). Some reports revealed a more brutal description of mounds of corpses and of dead campesinos

stacked up like wood (Dunkerley 1984, 212). According to Rojas Ramirez (1989, 50), municipal trucks were used to pick up the dead bodies taking them to unknown graves. The army also moved on the road blockades in La Paz and Oruro since during those days, the workers of La Paz and the miners also began to protest and strike demanding higher wages and opposing the new decrees. The initiative came from campesino students from La Paz who mobilized the Aymara campesinos and joined forces with the national blockade of the La Paz-Oruro-Cochabamba routes (Albo 1987, 396). The massacre was a turning point for the Militray-Campesino Pact, since it divided the campesinos between those who continued to support Banzer and those who wanted to establish new organization and relations. One faction, defining itself as “nationalist,” remained in the CNTCB which still supported the Pacto Militar-Campesino while another dissident factions supported the campesino-worker-student alliance and members of the COB (Lagos 1994, 63).

By early 1974, Paz Estenssoro was exiled due to his harsh criticism of the violence used by the Banzer government. That same year, the Banzer regime survived two coups organized by young military officers. The failed coups demonstrated a generational split in the military concerning a bigger role of the military in politics. The officers wanted a complete military government that would take precedence over civilian political parties (Mallor and Gamarra 1988, 88). The FPN was at its near end as the Banzer regime faced legitimacy problem and the economic difficulties. The regime experience a sharp reduction of military aid from the US’ Office of Public Safety (OPS) due to the fact that this organization was link to human rights violation (Lopez 2016, 60). By November another coup was mounted in Santa Cruz forcing Banzer to an auto-coup and turned to the military to put down the rebellion. The auto-coup dismissed all union officers, forced all

political parties, alliances and fronts to recess and gave the military full political and administrative responsibility, and total control of the government until 1980 (Mitchell 1977, 128). Banzer pushed out several leaders of the MNR and FSB but maintained the young militants of these parties with the intention of forming his own political party (Gallarzo Lozada 1984, 469). Banzer saw the FPN as an annoyance since he enjoyed strong military support and did not need the political backing of the MNR and FSB but rather chose to recruit some of their militants to his autocratic government. The political factors that led to this coup were, the internal contradictions between the MNR and FSB regarding the corporatist project, the resistance of the popular classes and the incapability of the dominant classes of legitimizing the military regime through elections (Mayorga 1978, 113). Besides the COB and FSTMB that were banned from government activities and under close surveillance, university student organizations began to mobilize and form alliances with other opposition groups.

In January 1975, the government shut down four church-run radio stations located in the Siglo XX mining center. The act was quickly condemned by all opposition groups including some members of the Catholic Church. The dispute was brought to a solution when the government reopened the universities and the radios but this occurred after the arrest and exiling of many priests and political figures, including Hernan Siles Zuazo (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 93). The Banzer regime faced a more dramatic challenge in May during the campesino union elections. Conflict arose in the rural provinces of La Paz where violence had escalated and clashes between the paramilitary groups and campesinos that were aligned to the new group of young progressive indigenous leaders calling themselves 'Kataristas' (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 189). In 1976 the miners resurfaced after

several clandestine meetings. The government's attempt to repress a revitalized FSTMB provoked a series of strikes for over four weeks between May and June. The miner's success was dependent on the level of support they received from the urban university students and factory workers and the notice of Torres' assassination while in exile in Argentina boosted their mobilization as protests began to escalate in urban areas (Roddick and Van Nierkerk, 1989, 159).

By 1977, Banzer called for election as his regime was experiencing several challenges from all directions including internationally. According to de Mesa, Gisbert and Mesa Gisbert (2003, 710), one of the major factors for Banzer announcing the elections was the involvement of the Carter administration who was a strong human rights supporter. Malloy and Gamarra (1987, 95) also describe that the new focus on human rights of the Carter administration quickly came to loom large in Bolivia as the U.S. State Department listed the Banzer government as one that had regularly violated human rights. Domestically, the Katarista movements was crucial in mobilizing opposition against the Banzer regime. Kataristas become a link between the urban leaders living in clandestine and rural Aymaras, bridging ideas of identity and culture from both directions (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 180). During this period it was Kataristas who were among the first to defy openly the decadent military government. In November 15th, 4,000 delegates and union leaders from different departments gathered in Ayoayo to commemorate the death of Tupac Katari which occurred over two centuries ago and established the CNTCTK (Confederacion National de Trabajadores Campesinos Tupaj Katari) (Cardenas 1988, 526). During the conference, the Katarista leader, Genaro Flores, addressed the masses by stating: "today Tupac Katari has returned in millions of people." They began the

distribution of a pamphlet entitled “What Every Campesino Movement in Bolivia Should Know,” which in twelve concrete points attacked head-on Banzer’s government (Albo 1987, 394).

The fall of the Banzer era began in December when four women accompanied by their children began a hunger strike in the La Paz Cathedral alongside the Presidential Palace. They were the wives of imprisoned miners who demanded the unrestricted amnesty, resumption of trade union activity, the returned of fired workers, and the withdrawal of the troops from the mines. On December 31, a second group formed by university students and the Union de Mujeres de Bolivia (UMBO) began to fast at the offices of the newspaper *Presencia*, replacing the wives’ children who had become ill and from that point on the strike spread rapidly in all the countries’ major cities Dunkerley (1984, 240). Initially the hunger strike appeared to be no different from the ones in the pass but due to the political turmoil the hunger strike grabbed the center of national attention and became into a mass movement. After 10 days there were no longer four women and fourteen children but over one thousand workers and students that were part of the hunger strike (Galeano 1971, 444). The regime put the armed forces on a state of emergency and demanded all public employees to participate in a mandatory demonstration to counter the hunger strike. By the first weeks of January the group expanded as the family members of political prisoners, exiled activist, and clandestine union organizations joined in (Kohl, Farthing and Muruchi 2011, 141). Ex-president, Adolfo Siles Salinas, became the strikers’ main mediator as the strikers used hospitals, union headquarters and the offices of the archdiocesan newspaper, *Presencia*, but mostly churches were used to give a religious dimension to the cause (Klaiber 1998, 130). On the 16th the government issued a

lockout and the police forbade the movement of vehicles in the major cities of the country. The next day police raided a number of sites occupied by the strikers including the offices of *Presencia*. As a response the protesters and their allies began singing “Viva mi patria Bolivia” and in shame faced the police left while ambulances took the prisoner to the clinics (Dunkerly 1984, 241). In January 18th, Banzer gave in to the demands with the exception of removing his troops from the mines but the momentum did not stop as all of the frustrations held in by the Banzerato burst out and literally overwhelmed the regime (Marlloy and Gamarra 1988, 124). After seven years in power, Banzer was out of office by June of that year. The hunger strike was the most important form of resistance that contributed to the end of the Banzerato.

5.5 The Land of the Coup ‘d esta, From Pereda to Meza:

At the time of the cold war, the military in Latin America was an instrumental tool to suppress any socialist or communist movement and Bolivia was not the exception. U.S. aid jumped 600 percent during Banzer’s first year in power and Bolivia received more military assistance than any other country in Latin America (Lehman 1999, 165). During the Banzer regime or Banzerato, repression was aimed not only to discipline and control labor but to fracture specifically the leftist ideology by targeting students and shutting down universities (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 75). Throughout this violent period there was no independent union activity or freedom to participate in politics. From 1971 until 1978, at least 200 people were killed, some 14,750 people were jailed, 19,140 were forced to political exile, and some 780,000 people became economic refugees (Dunkerley 1984, 238). The state became so repressive that even members of the Banzer’ FPN alliance and

close military associates were jailed and tortured. The unexplained deaths of military figures such as, Selich, Torres and Zenteno during Banzer's regime and the exclusion of the "generational group" clearly demonstrated the military fractionalization and rejection of the Banzerato (Gamarra 1988, 60). Jimmy Carter himself had pressured Banzer to democratize during the Panama Canal Treaty in Washington and in May 1977 sent his Under Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs to Bolivia to deliver the U.S. government's condemnation of Bolivia's repressive regime (Gamarra 1988, 63). In 1977 after international criticism and domestic pressures Banzer called for democratic elections scheduled for mid-1978. He had planned to have his Minister of Interior, General Juan Pereda, a Camba with poor speaking skills, as his candidate while he continued to rule in the back. To give the Pereda candidacy some legitimacy they created a political party called the Nationalist Union of the People or Union Nacionalista del Pueblo (UNP).

The elections of July 9th 1978 included the returned of Victor Paz' MNR as well as Hernan Siles Zuazo's MNRI (MNR Left) which united with other leftist parties such as the Revolutionary Leftist Movement or *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (MIR) and PCB forming the Democratic and Popular Unity or *Unidad Democratica y Popular* (UDP). Other radical parties also emerged such as Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz' Socialist Party 1 or *Partido Socialista 1* (PS-1). General Perada was declared the winner even though there were several accusations of fraud. International monitors also found irregularities and determined that the elections were rigged. The FSTMB threatened to strike if the results were not investigated, the UDP agreed not to recognize the results, and Siles embarked on his traditional hunger strike (Dunkerley 1984, 247). Not wanting to concede to the demands of the democratic process, General Pereda, decided to take power by force and

staged a coup clamping the threat of an international communist plot. As soon as the Pereda government was installed more than 100 people were arrested and the military was sent to the Yungas killing several campesinos that were protesting the coup (Ladman 1982b, 346). The U.S. Department of State condemned the coup and suspended all aid until Pereda reestablished the democratic development.

In August he announced that democratic elections would be held in 1980. He also released all those jailed after his coup and lifted the stage of siege which enable the resumption of economic and diplomatic relation with the U.S. (Dunkerley 1984, 253). Public condemnations continued demanding free elections and for Pereda to step down. Civil resistance was widespread on all fronts from labor, to the hungry patronage political parties and even certain sectors of the military were in all but open rebellion (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 127). In November, the UDP called for a mass mobilization in demand of fair elections which gave General David Padilla the opportunity to stage a well-planned coup (Dunkerley 1984, 254). The fear of a growing and organized civilian militancy pushed the military to take action. General Padilla topple Pereda with the support of the young group of military officer calling themselves “*grupo generacional*” members of the “institutionalist” faction of the military who viewed the armed forces’ role as defensive and not governmental (Ladman 1982b, 347-348). Padilla immediately called for election for July 1st of 1979.

General Padilla inherited the massive financial burden accumulated during the Banzer regime. Rising oil prices and Bolivia’s debt obligations was leading the country closer and closer to economy crisis (Lehman 1999, 171). Padilla was hesitant in implementing IMF austerity recommendation due to the growing mobilization of people

from diverse sectors. In May 1979 the COB was able to organize a national meeting, the first since 1971 in which they had planned to sponsor a Congress of Campesino Unity scheduled for June. With the participation of more than 2,000 delegates from all over the country, the congress established the Confederacion Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) which absorbed all of the small rural unions and became the biggest union in the country (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 203). The CSUTCB gave the campesinos a more important role within the COB but more importantly it allowed the campesinos to participate in the fight for democracy as an independent block in its own right. The July elections had no majority winner and even though Paz Estenssoro won by a slight margin there were claims of MNR fraud. There was also a sense of hostility in Congress to elect a president since no other party wanted to ally itself with Banzer's new political party National Democratic Action or Accion Democratica Nacional (ADN). The votes were concentrated on two candidates, Victor Paz Estenssoro and Hernan Siles Zuazo, and for four days Congress could not agree on a majority vote resulting with the intermediate presidency of the Senate President Walter Guevara Arze (Gallardo Lozada 1984, 497). Guevara Arze was the first civilian president after almost 15 years of military governments but his government was short lived. The Guevara Arze administration had no authority to govern due to the fact that it was extremely fragile because it had no control over Congress and could not deal effectively with the military conspiracies (Gamarra 1988, 67). His administration was on high alert waiting for a military coup. Guevara Arze began to adapt some measures against certain top official of the armed forces creating enemies that would later conspire against him (Gallardo Lozada 1984, 501).

In October there was a failed military coup which served as a wake-up call for the civilian government. The political parties that opposed Guevara understood that if they did not form an alliance with the military, then Congress as well as the government would fall with Guevara Arze at the hands of the Bolivian Armed Forces (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 134). The military coup that ousted Guevara Arze was supported by members of Guevara's own MNR and other political parties. The military rebellion occurred a few hours after the closing ceremonies of the OAS meeting held in La Paz on November 1st while the country was celebrating the holiday of All Saints. The coup was expected and Coronel Natusch was even questioned three days before the coup lying to Guevara Arze and Paz Estenssoro that he would not have a coup (Selser 1982, 35). The coup would be known as "The Massacre of All Saints Day" because of number of deaths and injured during a short period. Tanker commands and heavy armed military vehicles began occupying the streets of La Paz while civilians constructed barricades using cobblestones. The COB headquarters was attacked and a helicopter rented from an American construction company was used to silence the masses in the working-class neighborhood of the capital (Lehman 1999, 173). Natusch declared Congress illegal as demonstrators surrounded parliament to protect it from any military attacks. As a response to the violent coup the COB in alliance with the CSTUCB paralyzed the entire country, urban and rural, in a succession of strikes in 24-hour intervals (Roddick and Van Niekerk 1989, 162). Using their efficient method of resistance the CSTUCB called for a massive national road block movement that lasted two weeks and resulting in the fall of Natusch' sixteen day regime (Rivera Cusicanqui 1982, 205). Most of the violence took place in La Paz and at the end

of the Natusch regime there were over 200 deaths, 125 people were declared 'disappeared' and over 200 injured (Dunkeley 1984, 267).

Congress choose Lidia Gueiler Tejada, the president of the Chamber of Deputies, to head the interim government and place the country back on the path to democracy. Gueiler, initiated what General Padilla couldn't and implemented a package of economic measures suggested for some time by the IMF. The modifying or nullifying of the austerity package was demanded in the form of civil resistance. Massive protests were staged by a series of organizations of civil society such as unions, civic groups, and professional associations, which all bypassed Congress to directly pressure the president (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 140). Another group that would be financially affected by the new economic policies were the campesinos. The newly formed CSUTCB decided to demonstrate their people power and called for a blockade. At first the situation sparked friction between the CSUTCB and the COB's labor leaders. The latter were against the blockade, because there was an economic conflict of interest between wage workers and campesinos but also they believed that a massive demonstration would lead to another military coup (Albo 1987, 404). The Kataristas who were the most militant members of the CSUTCB were able to convince the COB leadership and together they began the nationwide protest. On 4 December, Lechin, addressed a crowd of 50,000 demonstrators claiming that the economic measures should be reconsidered and negotiated but this was not accepted by CSUTCB (Dunkerley 1984, 274). By the second week of December the country was paralyzed due to the successful blockade of the major highways by campesino groups from all regions (Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 205). The blockade was historic since it also included the massive participation of campesino women who were pushed by the

increased growth of women's organizations and promoted by the CSUTCB (Muñoz 1986, 386). The mobilization of La Paz revived perhaps unconsciously the collective memory of the Tupac Katari blockade that has isolated La Paz over two centuries ago (Albo 1987, 379). Middle and upper class residents of La Paz grew wary and formed armed defense groups thinking that there would be a campesino takeover of the city. Finally by May 1980 the COB and the Gueiler government were able to reach a formal agreement on wages and compensation for inflation (Roddick and Van Niekerk 1989:162).

Like the brief civilian Guevara Arze government, Gueiler was also concerned of being overthrown by the military. There was also a rise of terrorist activity by paramilitary groups against human right advocates and lefts activists. The weak Gueiler government was unable to control the country's climate of social protests and constant violence. Military generals and colonels began to issue warnings through the press: "The country lives in a state of chaos and anarchy and if the situation does not change the military will be obligated to take concrete attitudes to reestablish order" (Aguilo 1993, 247). Even though there was social and political instability, the day of the elections finally came on June 29th. The plethora of political parties included taxi parties, name given to parties that were so small they could have their national conventions in a taxi (Gamarra and Malloy 1995, 412). According to Gamarra (1997b, 366), at least 30 of these belonged to the MNR that had split in many fractions but the original MNR was still one the three most important parties in the elections. Siles Zuazo and his leftist UDP coalition was declared the solid winner but before he could take office, the country would face one of the most notorious coups in Bolivian history - the "Cocaine Coup." The ruthless military coup of General Luis Garcia Meza was reported to being financed by *narcotraficantes* and orchestrated by

European mercenaries recruited by Klaus Barbie a former ex-Nazi SS officer who was placed in Bolivia with the aid of the CIA (Cockburn and St. Clair 1999, 183).

5.6 The Fight for Democracy:

A few months before the coup the country was already in a state of terror as military and paramilitary groups linked to the *golpistas* initiated a wave of violence that intimidated and took the lives of prominent human right advocates, leftist intellectuals and innocent civilians. On February 8, 1980 the offices of the left-wing weekly paper *Aqui* was bombed by what seemed to be the work of Colonel Arce Gomez, one of the main architects of the upcoming coup (Dunkeley 1984, 279). The bombing was to serve as a warning to the Jesuit priest, Luis Espinal, who was a renowned journalist and the director of weekly paper *Aqui*. Bedregal Gutierrez and Viscarra Pando (1989, 117-18) reveal that at the beginning of 1980, Espinal publicly announced that he would expose a list of prominent civilians involved in drug trafficking. Father Espinal was kidnapped while leaving the 16 de Julio movie theater, later to be tortured and brutally murdered by paramilitaries (Aguilo 1993, 251). His body was found at a municipal slaughterhouse with clear signs of the involvement of the Argentine military, which was believed to have several advisors working with Arce Gomez's group (Dunkerley 1984, 280). Father Espinal who participated in the hunger strike that contributed to the ousting of Banzer was a harsh critic of militarism and fearlessly open to defy any coup attempt. On the day of his funeral 70,000 people turned out on the streets of La Paz to protests against the unjust and brutal target assassination of the Father Espinal (Ladman 1982b, 359).

There were several reports that linked the terrorist activities of the paramilitary groups to Coronel Luis Arze Gomez and extreme-right militants of the FSB. Before renouncing as Gueiler's Minister of Interior, Selum Vaca Diez, revealed that there were more than 20 acts of terrorism which he blamed to ultraconservative paramilitary groups allied with the FSB (Selser 1982, 45). On the first days of March the COB denounced a plan that would kill 300 union and political leaders among the people in the list were Marcelo Quirga Santa Cruz, Juan Lechin and Hernan Siles Zuazo (Selser 1982, 44). To assure an uninterrupted election the COB organized the formation of the National Committee of Democratic Defense or *Comite Nacional de Defensa de la Democracia* (CONADE) but this did not deter the paramilitary attacks. In June 1st 1980, the house of Jaime Paz Zamora, the vice-presidential candidate of the UDP, was bombed while he was away (Ladman 1982b, 360). The next day a plane that was carrying Paz Zamora and four members of the UDP political party crashed killing all its passengers except Paz Zamora who suffered from severe burns. This plane belonged to Arce Gomez who many suspected him as the author of the tragedy (de Mesa, Gisbert, Mesa Gisbert 2003, 725). Prominent intellectuals were being targeted by paramilitary forces who did not limit themselves in using extreme forms of terrorist violence. In La Paz a popular café where leftists met was bombed killing 2, and grenades were thrown at a UDP meeting resulting in 4 deaths and 63 wounded (Dunkerley 1984, 287). Meanwhile in Santa Cruz where was a growing anti-American sentiment promoted by the FSB presidential candidate Carlos Valverde Barbery due to the U.S. warnings of any attempted coup. As a protest against the involvement of the U.S. ambassador in Bolivian national affairs, Valverde Barbery, began a hunger strike

that lasted a week when a reporter caught the FSB militant eating chicken sandwiches (Selser 1982, 204).

Later that month the Bolivian Permanent Assembly of Human Rights published a list of over two dozen top military and political figures involved in narcotráfico; among the ones that were indirectly involved were generals Banzer and Pereda as well as the FSB's Valverde Barbery and Alfonso Dalence (Morales 1992, 357). The paramilitaries once again attacked, this time the Santa Cruz City Hall and the U.S. Consulate wounding the mayor and demanding the expulsion of the U.S. Ambassador and a postponement of elections (Ladman 1982b, 361). The June 19th takeover of the Santa Cruz public building was orchestrated by a paramilitary group affiliated with the FSB who seized and burned files and documents pertaining drug cartels (Selser 1982, 52). It was clear at this point that the powerful drug cartels were involved in these activities and were financially supporting the golpistas. Members of the booming cocaine industry were able to hire German, French and Italian terrorists, neo-Nazis, and also counted on the experience and advisement of former Argentinean military men (LAB 1982, 55). The stage was being set for the "Cocaine Coup" which would include the participation of several foreign figures and mercenaries that formed a part of the paramilitary groups.

The July 1980 violent upheaval was conducted by a paramilitary force calling itself Los Novios de la Muerte ("The Fiancés of Death") who were recruited by Klaus Barbie and also included the infamous Italian neo-fascist terrorist Stephano Delle (Cockburn and St. Clair 1999, 179). The group wore hooded masks to psychologically scare the Bolivian citizens and discourage any form of mass protest to the regime. Ambulances were heavily used as camouflage to capture their main targets: union organizers, student leaders,

progressive clergy, journalists, and especially, leftist political activists. According to some reports, the Argentinean government had sent these ambulances loaded with weapons (Corn 1991). The selective targeting of these individuals demonstrates that the golpistas understood the power these activists had to gather the masses in civil resistance. Besides targeting civilians the Novios also liberated all of the narcotraficantes who had been incarcerated by the previous governments and destroyed all of their police records. General Garcia Meza seized power and made the Bolivian government an active partner in drug trafficking activities by protecting drug cartels and allowing them to operate freely without restraint (Carpenter 2003, 15). According to Hargreaves (1992, 108), the Bolivian drug cartels offered Garcia Meza \$1.3 million to launch a coup, promising him even more money afterwards but their only condition was to make Arce Gomez, with whom they had dealt with for years, the Minister of Interior. Coronel Arce Gomez was the cousin of the notorious drug kingpin, Roberto Suarez, and was the main organizer of the paramilitary terrorist acts in Bolivia. LAB (1982, 66) describes that Arce Gomez's paramilitary army incorporated the lines of a vast amalgam of common criminals, narcotraficantes, anti-socials and anti-communists, foreign mercenaries recruited by his "teacher" Barbie-Altmann.

General Garcia Meza initialed the coup in the morning of July 17th 1980, with the uprising of the Army's 6th division headquartered in the jungle city of Trinidad in Beni. The purpose of the coup was supposedly to save the country from communist extremists and to dissolve the June elections. According to Gamarra (1988, 69-70), the coup had two objectives: to protect Banzer from a congressional indictment and a full-fledged impeachment trial in the Supreme court; second, was the fear of civilian investigations of

Garcia Meza and close military official's ties to narcotraficantes and paramilitaries involvement in kidnappings and murders. Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz began a trial against Bolivia's ex-president Banzer for economic crimes and for violation of human rights. His twelve hour exposition established a dense accusation against not only the Banzer dictatorship but against the Bolivian Armed Forces as well (de Mesa, Gisbert, Mesa Gisbert 2003, 720).

The news of the uprising called for an immediate meeting of CONADE at the COB headquarters in La Paz. Leftist political party members, church representatives, human rights activists and union leaders were among the attendants. The headquarters was quickly taken over by the paramilitary group. Their orders from Arce Gomez were simple, surround the headquarters using ambulances and take control of the people inside. About twenty masked men began shooting killing Gualbert Vega leader of the FSTMB and Carlos Flores of the POR, the rest of the occupants surrendered once the firing stopped (Dunkerley 1984, 288). According to LAB (1982, 66), the paramilitary group managed to capture the enemy that Colonel Arce Gomez hated the most, Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz. The paramilitaries shot Quiroga in the head and dragged him to the Military headquarters where the torture experts imported from Argentina's dreaded Mechanic School of the Navy kept him alive and tortured him for days (Levine and Kavanau-Levine 1994, 58). His castrated and beaten body was found almost a week later in southern La Paz in a place called "The Valley of the Moon."

The violence enacted by the paramilitary forces did not deter mass protests against the coup. Just like during the Natusch coup, civilian groups erected barricades to prevent tanks from entering certain neighborhoods but the popular resistance was quickly broken.

On July 22nd, Lechin, who had been captured at the COB, was forced to go before the television cameras and to plead with the people not to oppose the new military government (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 145). As had so often happened in the past the miners were the last to surrender to the Garcia coup. Once the cities were under military controlled, paramilitary and regular army unit moved into the mines to crush the miner's resistance. Because the CSUTCB had affiliated with the COB the miners were joined by campesinos who lived in the nearby communities and began to organize roadblocks (Kohl, Farthing and Muruchi 2011, 157). The miners were battle tested and sent their scouts to the mountaintops to see where the military was heading. For over two weeks the mining centers of Siglo XX, Catavi, and Llallagua were the main areas of resistance. The miners used their old rifles and dynamite to push back the military. There were reports of soldiers being shot by their officers for refusing to fire since most of them were from that region while in other areas soldiers deserting and even killing their officers before fleeing (Dunkerley 1984, 296). Finally after the use of planes, helicopters, tanks and a ranger regiment the mines fell into the hands of the military at the cost a many lives on both sides (Garcia Linera, Chavez Leon and Costas Monje 2004, 66).

The violence continued as union leaders and leftist politicians were either jailed, exiled, or force to keep in hiding. The ones who were freed and remained in Bolivia continued to meet in clandestine. In January 1981 the military targeted a MIR meeting being held in a house located in the prominent Sopocachi district of La Paz. The security forces led by Arce Gomez burst into the reunion killing eight of their leaders which sent out a cold chill through well-off families since the victims were from the middle-class and the event took place in a residential neighborhood (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 145). To

add more fear to the event, Arce Gomez, had previously warned the people to literally walk with their wills under their arm and that there would be no mercy for those who opposed the regime (De Mesa, Guisbert and Meza 2003, 728). Later that month after news that Garcia Meza would cut state expenditures the urban unions and the mines declared a 48-hour strike which reignited mass protests (Roddick and Van Niekerk 1989, 163). There were major strikes in the following months as western human rights organization began to pressure Garcia Meza to step down.

It was on March 1st of 1981 that more than 80 million Americans were shocked as they watched Mike Wallace's special news report in his program "60 Minutes" titled "The Minister of Cocaine" (Bascope Aspiazu 1982, 83). The report revealed the names of the major players of Bolivian's cocaine empire. This information was based on the investigations provided by Senator Dennis DeConcini's Subcommittee of Foreign Operations (LAB 1982, 65). The scandalous reports and the constant infighting among the Bolivian military weakened the regime. To save face, Garcia Meza fired Arce Gomez and other military officers connected to the drug cartels. The Garcia Meza regime was crumbling due to the international and domestic pressures. In May there was another 24-hour general strike in most of the important mines and in July there was a general strike in Santa Cruz followed by a 24-hour strike in the Huanuni mines (Alexander 2005, 155). The growing unrest of the masses and the fear of a civil revolution pushed the military to expel Garcia Meza. After surviving several coup attempts from within the military, it was a combination of internal military politics and regionalism that gave Garcia Meza the final blow and his ousting was a result of a negotiated settlement among the military officer

corps (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 14). The military junta that replaced Garcia Meza lasted only a month and by September, General Celso Torrelio Villa, took the presidency.

The ruthlessness, extreme corruption and international isolation of the Garcia Meza government completely demoralized and discredited the military. However, many officers wanted to return to democracy. Torrelio Villa who had emerged as a compromise candidate of the military after Garcia Meza's resignation, was reluctant to call for elections. Between November 1981 and February 1982, unions were able to mobilize in a series of strikes which had initialed in the Huanuni mines, but by December had reached to urban centers gathering thousands of hunger strikers (Roddick and Van Niekerk 1989, 163). Torrelio Villa was pushed by the IMF to implement austerity packages that included currency devaluation and labor subsidies. Labor resistance continued in March as the COB again called for a general strike gathering an estimated crowd of 10,000 in Cochabamba alone but the demonstration was attacked by paramilitary groups killing six people (Alexander 2005, 156). On May Day over 40,000 people marched in the streets as a clear sign of the restoration of the COB's position but the military government continued to reject any type of negotiation (Dunkerley 1984, 341). The massive rally was not interrupted by the military government but on the contrary it led to the reestablishment of autonomy in the universities. Amnesty was given to exiled union and political leaders who returned with caution. In July the COB organized a series of "hunger marches" in the country's major cities, in protest against the government's economic policies and called for the reestablishment of a civilian regime on the basis of the elections of 1980 (Alexander 2005, 156). In July 21st, Torrelio Villa was replaced by General Guido Vildoso Calderon, who was named by the high command to return the country to democratic rule. In the first

week of September students began to block the streets of La Paz on a daily basis; the MIR held a hunger march that attracted tens of thousands and the COB was able to mobilize over 100,000 people demanding political change and an end of military rule (Dunkerley 1984, 343). The massive protests brought the country close to civil war, the military decided to step down, to convene the 1980 Congress, and to accept its choice as president. Subsequently, Siles Zuazo assumed the presidency on October 10, 1982 ending Bolivia's dark era of military rule.

5.7 Conclusion:

This period highlights the Bolivian people's struggle against military dictatorships. Once in power, the military regime of General Barrientos began to target union leaders, COB officials, and leftist politicians driving them underground and into exile. Barrientos was able to charm the indigenous population with his ability to speak the native Quechua language and by visiting rural communities for school openings, and meetings with campesino leaders. In 1966, Barrientos and the campesino leadership signed "the Military-Campesino Pact," which guaranteed the Military's commitment to the Agrarian Reform, and in exchange for not only the campesino's loyalty to the military, but also to put themselves under their orders against the left. The first incident of military state violence occurred in June 1967 during the winter festival of San Juan, when the military surrounded the Siglo XX mines of Potosi taking advantage of the celebration that was occurring. The military acted viciously and began shooting at the miners and their families. Miners, women and children were not the only victims of the assaults, but even soldiers were executed because they elected not to shoot at the crowds since they were from that area

and their family members were in the crowds. Barrientos' strategy to separate the mining class from the campesino had worked since campesino organizations blamed the miners' agitation and communist support for the Massacre of San Juan. The San Juan Massacre was indeed a preemptive attack of the Barrientos' regime against the miner's militia who were organizing themselves as guerilla groups to overthrow the military junta. Also the miners were meeting to resolve how to aid Che Guervara's guerrillas with food and medicine. There were many factors that led to the demise of Che's revolutionary plans in Bolivia, among them was the lack of local support and division within the PCB which was extremely wary of the guerrilla tactics. Also the split between the miners and the campesinos was essential for the defeat of Che Guevara and his rebels.

The death of President Barrientos in 1969 by a helicopter crash opened the political arena to new and old thoughts that would guide the country back to its revolutionary path. Inspired by the Military Socialist Regime of Toro-Busch, the military began the nationalization of its oil fields. The labor movement declared their support to the new president General Juan Jose Torres, who sought to get the union leaders to take part of the government. The brief regime of JJ Torres was highlighted by promoting the creation of a Popular Assembly which aimed to replace the political parliament. The Popular Assembly was composed of union workers and leftist politicians but did not have a major presence of the campesino leadership since most union leaders continued to distrust the campesino communities because of their loyalty to Barrientos. The threat of a communist takeover and the expansion of the agrarian reform to the lowlands of the east gave rise to the support of General Hugo Banzer who was backed by elite landlords and rightwing political parties. Torres had promised numerous times that he would arm the people but was unable because

he believed that unarming his soldiers to give these weapons to the laborers would force the officers to rebel against him (Lora 1973, 98). Even though Torres had the support of the workers, students, and some members of the military, they were unable to stop the Banzer coup.

The Banzer dictatorship also called Banzerato (1971-8) began by targeting his main opposition which led to the collapse of the COB and workers' unions. Banzer also went after the press and many journalists were imprisoned or exiled. No other country in Latin America, not even Chile nor Argentina, had repressed journalists in the way Bolivia had; more than fifty journalist were exiled from the country during the Banzerato (Quiroga Santa Cruz 1982, 34). Radios stations were targeted and closed by the military forces. In the beginning of 1975 the facilities and equipment of Radio Pio XII de Siglo XX were destroyed by Ranger soldiers and government agents; other Radio stations that suffered the similar, attacks or censorship were, Radio la Voz del Minero, Radio 21 de Diciembre of Catavi, Radio Llallagua of Llallagua, Radio Continental de La Paz, Radio Nacional of Huanuni, Radio Independencia of Quillacollo, and Radio Progreso of La Paz (Quiroga Santa Cruz 1982, 50). The Banzer regime faced opposition with road blockades from the rural sector and the urban sector with strikes from the workers of La Paz and miners who demanded higher wages and were against the price increases. All these groups were repressed brutally and the Massacre of Tolata ended the Militray-Campesino Pact. The final strike that took down the Banzar regime was the successful 1977 hunger strike organized by the wives of imprisoned miners. As explained by Nash (1975, 216), resistance towards an authority that had lost its basis for legitimacy usually takes nonviolent forms because it is the action of people who lack the technological influence or warfare capability

and who have only informal channels with which to realize their collective action. Their commitment to this nonviolent protest inspired other groups to join the hunger strikes, which grew to over one thousand. By early 1978, facing pressure from the indigenous masses and even the U.S. Government under the presidency of Jimmy Carter, Banzer declared a general amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles and announced that he would step down after the elections of July.

The return of the exiles, union leaders, and activists that were underground had an immediate impact on the Bolivian political arena. Intermediate military government were unstable and civilian governments were weak. The country faced a series of violent military coups and state repression such as the “All Saints Day Massacre,” when Colonel Natusch Busch, ordered a tank corps into the streets of La Paz and sought to coerce cooperation with military force. After sixteen days in office, Natusch was convinced to withdraw and Lidia Gueiler Tejada, head of the Chamber of Deputies and a veteran politician, became the first woman president of Bolivia. The Gueiler government was unable to control the country’s climate of constant violence and terror. Paramilitary groups began a wave of terrorist acts by bombing press offices, throwing grenades at marching protesters and targeting the assassination of leftist political figures and military opponents. Gueiler also inherited a country in financial crisis and social unrest from the rural population headed by the newly formed Union of Campesino Workers of Bolivia better known as CSUTCB. The reemergence of rural mass mobilization reached a high point not seen during any post- revolution military regime, but the development of the CSUTCB would face challenges under the repressive regime of General Garcia Meza. Genaro Flores a prominent campesino leader was captured and tortured by the paramilitary with ten other

campesino militants and while trying to flee he was shot in the back and forced to the dependency of a wheel chair for life (Aguilo 1993, 312). The mining centers were also brutalized by the Garcia Meza regime. Uncia, Siglo XXI and Caracoles were ruthlessly attacked by military forces leaving numerous injured and over 50 dead miners who tried to resist (Mercado N. 1993, 55). The Center of Campesino Integration and Promotion (CIPCA) was severely under attack by the paramilitaries. The director of CIPCA La Paz, father Hugo Fernandez, was captured and sent to a concentration camp after the organization's money was stolen by the paramilitaries. Catholic priests and institutions were also repressed. On the day of the Garcia Meza coup, paramilitaries entered the prestigious Jesuit San Calixto School to destroy the *Radio Fides* installation located inside the school and also detained the director of the establishment, father Eduardo Perez a critic of the military dictatorships (Selser 1982, 162). Another critic of military repression was the socialist leader, Quiroga Santa Cruz, who led a civilian investigation into human rights violations committed during the Banzer regime. He was one of the first victims of the Garcia Meza regime.

The military violence inflicted on the population created a wave of military desertions as officers ended-up shooting soldiers that refused to fire at unarmed protesters. Because of the level of brutality even within its own ranks the Garcia Meza regime was increasingly isolated both nationally and internationally. The U.S. pressured the IMF and World Bank to cut-off Bolivia from any financial support. Finally under pressure from the generals of the decaying armed forces and their concern over the unrest, Garcia Meza, left office and was replaced by a military junta. The last years of the military regime were affected by its connection to drug cartels, excessive use of violence and corruption. Mass

protests from all sectors contributed to the fall of the military government and the reinstallation of a democratic state in Bolivia. The struggle for democracy would finally come after years of delaying the democratization process.

Table 3.1. Methods of Resistance during the Military Dictatorships

| Campaign | Participants | Method | Outcome |
|---|---|---|--|
| 1965- 1967 Catavi Barracks takeover and the San Juan Massacre | Union workers, Miners, and leftist political members. | Violent: Skirmishes between miners and military in Catavi. Nonviolent Action: Clandestine union meetings, strikes. | The 3 day miner's militia to take the Catavi barracks results in the killing of over 200 miners by the military. State sends military to kill miners and their families while they celebrated the San Juan holiday. |
| 1968 Rejection of the "Impuesto Unico" tax | Campesino unions from the Highlands (Altiplano) and university students | Nonviolent Action: Campesinos form the Independent Block of Campesinos to oppose the Military-Campesino Pact and the " <i>impuesto unico</i> " tax. | Barrientos signs the Military-Campesino Pact creating a bigger breach between rural and workers' unions. |
| 1966-1967 Che Guevara Guerrillas | Cuban guerillas fighters, some Bolivian miners and university students | Violent: Guerrilla tactics | Che Guevara is unable to recruit people from the Bolivia countryside or gather support from union miner militants, or from members of the Bolivian Communist party. |
| 1969 - 1970 ELN Guerrilla campaigns | University students some campesinos and miners. | Violent: Guerrilla tactics. | U.S trained Bolivian counterinsurgent military forces easily defeat guerrilla operations in Teoponte executing most of the rebels. |

| | | | |
|---|---|--|--|
| 1970 – 1971 | Bolivian military, union member, leftist intellectuals, political party militants. | <p>Nonviolent Action: Threat of organized labor strikes to prevent military coups. Numerous marches and protests throughout the country demanding local infrastructure. 50,000 people march towards the Presidential Palace to demonstrate their support for Torres.</p> <p>Institutional Political Action: Formation of the Asamblea Popular.</p> <p>Violent: FSB and MNR militants takeover Santa Cruz in support of the military coup of Banzer. Skirmishes between union and political militants loyal to Torres and the rebel military forces.</p> | General JJ Torres ends political persecution of the left. Reestablishes union rights and promotes the Asamblea Popular. The progressive Torres government is short lived and ousted by Coronel Banzer. |
| 1974 Massacre of Tolata | 20,000 campesinos and union factory workers from Cochabamba | <p>Nonviolent Action: Roadblock of the major commercial highways connecting the cities of Bolivia.</p> | Military use of combat planes, helicopters, tanks and infantry soldiers to remove the blockade killing hundreds of campesinos. |
| 1977 Hunger Strikes Against the Banzerato | Wives of imprisoned miners, union workers, university students, family members of political exiles. | <p>Nonviolent Action: Hunger strike initiated by 4 women expands to thousands and receives national and international public support.</p> | Military Dictator Banzer declares amnesty to all political prisoners, promises to stepdown and allow free elections. |

| | | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|--|--|
| 1978 – 1982 The Fight for Democracy | Members of most sectors of Bolivian society | <p>Violent: Miners use their old rifles and dynamics to defend the mining center from the military.</p> <p>Nonviolent Action: Marches, protest, organized national strikes, and roadblocks. Erection of barricades. Demonstrations of 50,000 denouncing IMF package. 70,000 attend the street funeral procession of father Espinal. COB mobilizes over 100,000 people demanding the end of military dictatorships.</p> | <p>Formation of the CSUTCB which was crucial in paralyzing the country by using roadblocks.</p> <p>Even though the military used state terrorism and targeted killing of opposition and civil rights leaders it did not deter the Bolivian public to participate massive protest and marches to demand free elections.</p> |
|-------------------------------------|---|--|--|

Chapter 6: The Fight against Neoliberalism

6.1 “Bolivia is Dying” and the March for Life:

Once in power the Siles Zuazo' UDP government met several social, political but most seriously economic challenges. Siles Zuazo was economically affected by the foreign debt inherited by the forgoing military governments. It also suffered from international isolation because of Bolivia's previous involvement in the cocaine industry. The Siles Zuazo administration was on a mission to regain international trust, especially from the United States, and to clean Bolivian's image which was tainted by the Garcia Meza government. The government began removing the military men that collaborated with the Garcia Meza' narco-regime, by capturing and even killing numerous prominent neo-fascists that were associated with the paramilitary squads (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 161-162). The capture and extradition of Arce Gomez's right hand man, Klaus Barbie, also gained Bolivia international support, especially when Siles Zuazo allowed him to be extradited to France where he was sentence to life in prison for war crimes (De Mesa, Gisbert, Mesa Gisbert 2003, 743). Siles Zuazo knew that Bolivia continued to be an extremely dependent country and just as his previous government, he understood the U.S.'s position towards leftist governments. During the early 60s he saw how U.S. policy in Bolivia had favored the MNR center and right and was completely against the left creating disagreements between the middle class and organized labor (Blasier 1970, 102). Even though Bolivia was reestablishing itself as an independent and democratic country, it was in desperate need of economic aid and support. Export earnings fell from \$912.4 million in 1981 to \$724.4 million in 1984, and slid below \$500 million the following year (Lehman

1999, 193-194). Also in 1983, Bolivia's agricultural sector was affected with drought in the highland and floods in the eastern plains due to ecological changes of 'El Niño'. The drought had devastating effects on farm animals and agricultural production dropped an average of 50 to 70 percent (Sanabria 1993, 70). Cattle, sheep, llamas and alpacas were dying by the thousand in the highlands. Siles Zuazo was placed in a particular situation dealing with social, economic and political pressures at a national and international level. The UDP government would initiate an era that would dominate Bolivian politics concerning two major issues: (1) U.S. aid tied to drug policies and (2) neoliberal reforms. Nonviolence resistance was crucial for the reestablishment of democracy and the victory over military dictatorships, and now it would also be critical in challenging these two issues.

Bolivia was going through social, political and economic crisis, this last one being the most severe. Willing to accept any form of financial assistance the Siles Zuazo government was the first government that allowed the United States to be directly involved in counter-narcotics enforcement in Bolivian terrain. After the visit of U.S. Attorney General William French Smith in April of 1983, Siles Zuazo signed a series of secret agreements that called for the control and reduction of the production of coca. U.S. Ambassador Corr announced an aid of \$146 million and also reminded the people of the 65 thousand tons of wheat the U.S. donated the previous year and of the 114 tons it already donated at the beginning of the year, and also of the \$60 million in projects through the World Bank and IMF (Aguilo 1985, 95). Siles Zuazo committed the Bolivian government to an eradication target of 4,000 hectares of coca by 1985 in exchange for U.S. conditional aid of \$80 million in development assistance and narcotics control (Riley 1996, 115). In

return the United States provided \$14 million in aid, \$4 million in donation and a \$10 million loan for the modification and improvement of the agro-industrial and agricultural systems in the Chapare region where coca was being grown (Bedregal Gutierrez, Viscarra Pando 1989, 234-25). The numerous accords and treaties the United States and Bolivia had entered into required the creation of numerous enforcement agencies. The Directorate for Control and Fiscalization of Coca (DNCFC) was established for the control of the production, purchase, transportation and sale of coca; other agencies that were created were the National Directorate for the Control of Dangerous Substances (DNCSP), a thirty-man elite group devoted to the investigation and capture of major drug violators and a rural police task force design for the Chapare (Henkel 1986, 69). The DIRECO (Direccion Regional de la Coca) agency was also founded under this agreement with the objective of eradicating coca fields (Malamud-Goti 1992, 28).

The narcotic police force, called UMOPAR (Mobil Unit for Rural Patrol), would have the strongest impact in the Chapare region and also received harsh criticism from the Bolivian public because of its human rights violations. Its mission included the destruction of coca processing pits and laboratories, the seizure of cocaine paste, cocaine base, and cocaine, the interception of chemicals used for the fabrication of cocaine and the arrest of narcotraficantes (Painter 1994, 80-81). Additionally the U.S. continued to demand for more militarized operations to suppress narcotrafico. Ironically, high ranking members of the U.S. financed UMOPAR kidnapped Siles Zuazo in an attempted coup which failed and ended with their exile to Spain (Prado Salmon and Claire Paz 1990). The U.S. criticized Siles Zuazo for his negligence in the drug war and shortly after his release and U.S. Senator Hawkins warned that the U.S. would withhold \$58 million unless the Bolivian government

showed improvements in combating narcotrafico (Malamud-Goti 1992, 29). But the UDP administration was not characterized for its involvement in the American's War on Drugs but because of its political and economic instability due to the challenges coming from the COB.

The COB's political power made it difficult for the Siles Zuazo administration to implement any economic reform escalating to the point where vetoing policy changed to aggressive confrontations with the government (Ibañez Rojo 2000, 176). The COB created political instability by organize numerous protests, marches and acts of civil disobedience. The Silez Zuazo government began with political opposition and social pressures in the form of strikes of which there were 204 during his first three months (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 165). Conflict between the UDP government and the COB was initially centered on the demand for co-management in COMIBOL and other state enterprises. In April 1983 the FSTMB, backed by the COB, took control of the COMIBOL offices including their headquarters. The miners were able to effectively seize control of seven mines and six processing plants in a pre-empted strike by white collar-workers and technicians they regarded as irresponsible and as a threat to the new government's position (Roddick and Van Nierkerk 1989, 164). The dispute over co-management continued during the months of May until July as the UDP government was being pressured by the IMF due to the increasing foreign debt. By August the COB called for a complete break from Western financial systems, and a move towards state control of the private sector since neither Lechin nor the COB had forgotten the social and economic effects of Siles Zuazo's acceptance of the IMF stabilization program during the 1950s (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 173). Knowing the social and political loss, the UDP opted for an IMF style solution in

the hope of getting funding from abroad. In desperate mode, by September the UDP began to negotiate with the IMF on a flexible accord and implementing new austerity measures. Later that month with inflation over the previous two years at 1,000 percent, the government faced a spontaneous strike wave which culminated in an unofficial nationwide general strike (Roddick and Van Nierkerk 1989, 165). Strikes and worker stoppages continued in October until November when several concessions were given to the COB. By the end of 1983, different groups of workers were competing with each other to secure above-average wage rises, and confronting the COB (Ibañez Rojo 2000, 190).

In January 1984 a group of union workers began a hunger strike against the proposed economic policies and low salaries. The COB backed the hunger strike and launched a series of strikes and protests which resulted in the government expected response in complying with the COB's demands and increased the salaries but also warned the COB that the proliferation of strikes and work stoppages were undermining the democratic process (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 170). The UDP government was constantly under attack by the demands of numerous civil action groups. More than 80 strikes took place between February and March which confirmed the union's success concerning wage increase but it also intensified conflict with their inflationary effects and government's inability to satisfy all the different group of workers (Ibañez Rojo 2000, 191). Bolivia was on the verge of economic collapse and by April announced a new austerity package. The Central Bank's employees' union refused to implement the measures and the COB declared another strike. The police kicked out bank employees who had begun sit-ins in protest of the new reforms and by May the COB called another 72-hour protest strike but some unions refused to join feeling the dangerous effects this might have on the

fragile state of the democratic regime (Roddick and Van Nierkerk 1989, 166). June, July and August were difficult months for Siles Zuazo as the country's economy continued to deteriorate while his government sustained ongoing protests. The proposed economic packages that came forward were not radical at all but were actually logical since they all included a much needed currency devaluation which would unfortunately have an impact on price increases on gas and food items. The COB rejected all the proposed economic packages and called for labor mobilizations. Public sector workers, industrial and oil workers, along with nearly all the local mining unions, embarked on a massive wave of protests by deploying their full repertoire of collective action: road blocks, marches, occupation of offices, sabotage and hunger strikes. In October, Siles Zuazo declared himself on a hunger strike claiming that the COB did not allow him to govern. The Catholic Church called off the four day hunger strike which did not have any favorable political effects but actually resulted in Siles Zuazo's acceptance of an early termination of his presidency and scheduled election for 1985 (De Mesa, Gisbert, Mesa 2003, 744). In November the UDP government pushed again to enact the austerity package which was met with social resistance. The strike was planned for only two days but lasted nine days after it was called off because of the increasingly bitter conflict with the middle-class which allowed the government to devalue the peso by 78 percent and raised food prices by 450 percent (Roddick and Van Nierkerk 1989, 166).

The UDP's incapability to revolve the economic and social crisis was extremely criticized. In January 1985 miners from the San Jose mining camp occupied the main square in Oruro and set off dynamite explosions demanding secure and livable wages (Roddick and Van Nierkerk 1989, 167). Siles Zuazo's UDP government would face its

hardest social challenge in March when the COB organized a march that brought in over 10,000 miners to La Paz who were later accompanied by other union workers and civil servants in the “March against Hunger” (Malloy and Gamarra 1998, 185). Mile long columns of marching miners arrived to La Paz from all districts and were welcome by organizations that provided them food and moral support (Garcia Linera, Chavez Leon and Costas Monje 2004, 68). The 20 day siege was referred to as the *jornadas de marzo* (journeys of March) since miners literally surrounded the Presidential Palace, completely paralyzed it and demanded the immediate resignation of Siles Zuazo (De Mesa, Gisbert and Mesa 2003, 742).

Hyperinflation had begun in May of 1984; by the first half of 1985 it averaged 11,750 percent and by the end of Siles Zuazo government it escalated to an astonishing 25,000 percent (Lehman 1999, 194). During a twelve month period, August 1984 to August 1985, prices increased by 20,000 percent, and during the final months, from May 1985 to August 1985, the inflation rose to an annualized rate of 60,000 percent (Sachs 1987). In August of 1985, the eighty one year old Paz Estenssoro began his presidency facing the biggest economic crisis in Bolivian history. Paz Estenssoro secretly formed a selected group to devise an economic plan that was based on Banzer’s ADN-Harvard plan which consisted of an austerity program focusing on free market logic and it included a prominent role for the private sector (Malloy and Gamarra 1988, 194-95). Its primary architect was a young Harvard professor, Jeffrey Sachs, who the *Los Angeles Times* called “the Indiana Jones of economics” (Lehman 1999, 196). The weakness of the MNR forced Paz Estenssoro to include independents, entrepreneurs, technocrats and experts from the IMF and World Bank who were given access to the government decision making process

(Morales 1994, 131). Malloy (1997, 405) believes that Paz Estenssoro's approach to these international technocrats was not based on their theoretical abilities and skills but rather as a mean to legitimize his policy to other governments and international institutions, mainly the U.S., the World Bank and the IMF. The New Economic Policy- NEP was based on three objectives: liberalization of the economy; an increased role of the private sector; and control over the main state enterprises that were controlled by labor groups and other fractional groups (Gamarra 1994b, 105). Victor Paz Estenssoro quickly adopted this plan via Decree 21060. According to Gamarra (1994b, 106), the approval of the NEP was possible due to the political pact (Pacto por la Democracia) between the ruling MNR and Banzer's ADN which allowed them to control most of the decision making in congress by undermining the smaller political parties and labor groups who opposed them. In one of the most celebrated speeches in Bolivia's history, Paz Estenssoro stated that "Bolivia was dying" and it's only path to salvation laid in the drastic economic plan of Decree 21060. A new political-economic era would begin by ending the nationalist state Paz Estenssoro had help create in the revolution of 1952. Decree 21060 drastically cut the public sector wage bill and public spending on health and education. It also removed all price controls and state subsidies in order to stimulate the economy. The Neoliberal policies were successful in bringing inflation under control and stabilizing the economy but the social effect were immediacy visible as unemployment grew and food prices continued to be high.

Paz Estenssoro knew that the NEP would face several challenges in the form of nonviolent resistance. Learning from the UDP's past experience with the COB sabotaging austerity packages, the MNR government launched a stage of siege, banishing hundreds of labor leaders including Juan Lechin (Gamarra 1994b, 107). Another external factor that

weakened the economic and political stability of the COMIBOL was the collapse of the tin industry in October 1985. By mid-1986, university students and professors of Potosi and Oruro began to protest the government's plan to de-centralize the mining operations which had been the backbone of the economy of these two cities (Nash 1992, 277). The Paz Estenssoro government did not give in the pressures and ignored the demands and petitions of the COB, FSTMB, and student organizations. It was revealed that the government was planning on shutting down most, if not all COMIBOL operated mines. Miners from the mining centers of San Jose, Huanuni, Siglo XX, Llallagua, Catavi and Uncia gathered in Oruro to begin a pilgrimage to the capital and prevent the shut-down (Garcia Linera, Chavez Leon and Costas Monje 2004, 69).

The miners embarked the "March for Life" but once they reach the halfway point of Patacamaya they were confronted by tanks and troops and after negotiations with the government they were allowed to continue their journey to La Paz (Nash 1992, 278). The pilgrimage itself was to serve as a symbol of defiance because of the massive amount of miners, accompanied by their wives and children. They were joined by campesinos of the CSUTCB and university students as they walked towards La Paz to confront Paz Estenssoro and his neoliberal policies. The march received more momentum and media coverage as they got closer to the capital for which Paz Estenssoro responded with a state of siege. Soldiers began to dig trenches on the sides of the highways, detained Red Cross trucks and newspapers reporters (Nash 1992, 280). It became a battle field as soldier prevented the marchers to enter the city. After walking in vain almost 350 miles the march was aborted and shortly after over 23,000 COMIBOL workers lost their jobs (Kohl, Farthing and Muruchi 2011, 182).

By September the miners began a hunger strike in the same terms as the march, referring to it as the “Hunger Strike for Life” which was a collective act to reinforce their determination to resist any compromise solution (Nash 1992, 286). It did not have any social or political support and failed to achieve any of its objectives. The FSTMB hardliners and backbone of the COB was dismantled and became powerless to the effects of the NEP. Elderly miners were forced to retire or were simply dismissed, some were given enticement including cash bonuses if they voluntarily resigned and promised of being relocated to other parts of the country for better job opportunities (Sanabria 2000, 66). The Catavi mining center that hosted the most militant members of the FSTMB was shut down. The only mine that was not immediately closed and was still under COMIBOL control was Huanuni which until 1988 continued ineffectively to resist by implementing strikes that failed to prevent the workers decimation (Sanabria 2000, 69). The workers’ inability to mount any further resistance was a result of the collapse of the mining industry in Bolivia which undermined the miner’s most important economic and political leverage. Neoliberal reforms became the dominant political-economic policies in Bolivia and the rest of Latin America.

6.2 U.S. Counter-Narcotics in Bolivia, the Eastern Indigenous and Terrorism:

The fall of the Berlin Wall followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union gave rise to the global expansion of U.S. backed neoliberal policies. For Bolivia the end of the Cold War also meant an increased involvement of the United States now in the War on Drugs. In 1989 the new Bolivian president, Jaime Paz Zamora, played a crucial role during this period of worldly adjustments. It was clear that the U.S. would not be too sympathetic to

Paz Zamora's leftist party. Even during his presidential campaign he sought to defy the U.S. Embassy by hanging a garland of coca leaves around his neck and promising to defend traditional coca usage (Lehman 1999, 205). But just as his uncle, Paz Estenssoro, the new president was aware that his administration would be openly pressured by the U.S. concerning counter-narcotics policies while indirectly pushing for the implementation of more aggressive neoliberal economic reforms. From the beginning of his inauguration, no other issues but coca eradication and cocaine suppression mattered in the relationship between Paz Zamora and U.S. Ambassador Gelbard. The United States began to request a stronger participation of the Bolivian military in the fight against narcotráfico. Paz Zamora agreed to accept \$32.2 million in military aid in exchange for militarizing its anti-drug efforts, and intensifying UMOPAR, the anti-drug police (Mabry 1996, 49). This was a huge increase in military aid, from \$5.8 million in 1990, to almost \$33 million in 1991 (Painter 1994, 93). This agreement also included the training of Bolivian military personnel by American troops and federal law enforcement agencies. The role of the Bolivian Armed Forces in the fight against narcotráfico quickly adapted U.S. military strategies. The Air Force "Diablos Rojos" (Red Devils) mobilized police troops while the Navy's "Diablos Azules" (Blue Devils) patrolled the Bolivian Amazonian rivers (Barrios 1993). The Paz Zamora administration also allowed for a series of U.S. led operations in Bolivia such as the 1991 Operation Safe Haven which started in March and culminated in June with the deployment of 640 UMOPAR troops, supported by the Bolivian Air Force and Navy, to surround the town of Santa Ana in Beni (Gamarra 1994a, 122; Gamarra 1996, 233).

The Paz Zamora government was strongly criticized by the Bolivian public for permitting U.S. preponderance over national policies. According to Gamarra (1994a, 80), U.S. direct involvement was so prevalent that Ambassador Gelbard himself engaged in Bolivia's internal politics including, party disputes, recommended policies and publicly accused former and actual government officials of narcotráfico involvement. The militarization of the "War on Drugs" was not the only demand the U.S. was pushing for but also the controversial policy of coca eradication. Arce Gomez, the Minister of Interior during the narco-dictatorship of Garcia Meza, was captured on December of 1989 in a Santa Cruz operative. To divert attention from the U.S. imposed coca eradication sanctions, Bolivia agreed to extradite Luis Arce Gomez, who was later convicted to a sentence of 30 years in a federal prison in Miami (Gamarra 1996, 226). Although there was not any formal extradition treaty, Paz Zamora allowed DEA agents to seize Luis Arce Gomez and take him to the United States. This act was seen as an insult to Bolivia's Legislative and Judicial branches creating many problems for Paz Zamora especially with the Supreme Court which was still trying Arce Gomez (Aguilo 1992, 37). This uneven relationship created a national image that Paz Zamora was cooperative to every U.S. demand but Bolivian-U.S. relations were contentious as U.S. aid was dependent on coca eradication targets. By the end of 1990 the Paz Zamora government informed Washington that it had met its eradication target of five thousand hectares and surpassed it by nearly a thousand (Gamarra 1996, 230). The following year tension and anti-American sentiment would arise with the arrival of the new U.S. ambassador. In September of 1991, with eradication targets far from met, the newly appointed U.S. ambassador, Richard Bowers,

announced to the press that the Bolivian army would begin forced eradication and that he himself was ready to wield a machete to help them eradicate coca (Gamarra 1994a, 140).

Rather than pushing for coca eradication which was costing him social and political support, Paz Zamora wanted to promote coca substitution programs and the legal commercialization of coca products such as toothpaste and toners. He presented his “Coca for Development” thesis during the United Nations meeting emphasizing the use of prevention programs for consumer countries, interdiction for intermediate countries, and alternative development and voluntary crop substitution for producer countries (Gamarra 1994a, 89-90). Throughout his administration, Paz Zamora increasingly celebrated the positive virtues of coca, and “Coca no es cocaína” (Coca is not cocaine) became his slogan (Lehman 1999, 209). But the U.S. Embassy felt that Paz Zamora’s “Coca Diplomacy” violated every coca-cocaine agreement signed making eradication attempts futile (Gamarra 1997a, 250-1). As described by Albo (1994b, 65), Paz Zamora was able to obtain support of the Bolivian people by raising the coca issue in several international forums in which he spoke about the cultural value of the leaf and also strengthened indigenous institutes that promoted indigenous intercultural education, even promising that the Wipala (native flag) would be adopted as an alternate national symbol. As much political effort Paz Zamora placed, he was unsuccessful in convincing the U.S. government into redirecting military aid into funding alternative crops and projects that would deter campesinos from planting coca. By the end of 1991 the plan to militarize the drug war was officially laid to rest revealing that when it came to money, U.S. officials found it easier to trust militaries than coca farmers (Lehman 1999, 208). U.S. military aid was substantially more than what the coca farmers received for alternative crops. At the end the Paz Zamora administration was

characterized by its unreliable statistics on coca hectareage eradication, tonnage of cocaine seized, narcotraficantes arrested, airplanes confiscated, and by providing legitimacy to the actions of U.S. agencies and Bolivian civilian, police, and military involvement in the fight against narcotrafico (Gamarra 1996, 247).

From the beginning of his administration, Paz Zamora, faced numerous social challenges. Unlike the MNR- ADN's Pacto por la Democracia, the MIR-ADN's Acuerdo Patriotico coalition was unsuccessful in congressionally approving states of siege. This did not stop the November 1989 arrest of hundreds of union leaders who were banished to remote jungle locations (Gamarra 1994b, 112). Their purpose was to weaken labor and any political and social opposition to neoliberal reforms and U.S. anti-drug policies. Coca farmers o cocaleros and opposition party members who disagreed with the militarization policy were quickly label as protectors of narcotraficantes by the Bolivian government (Gamarra 1994a, 113). Counter-narcotic agencies, and the military were accused of being extremely abusive toward the cocaleros. During Operation Safe Haven in Beni, many campesino homes were ransacked, private property was destroyed, and tear gas was used on the two hundred residents of Santa Ana who were protesting against the raid (Menzel 1988, 58). In August 1990 the indigenous people of the Bolivian East gathered in Trinidad, Beni to initiate a pilgrimage to the capital called "The March for Territory and Dignity." Their main concerns revolved around two issues: (1) environmental degradation and (2) the governments' recognition of their territorial sovereignty. The march consisted of hundreds of people but as they began their journey other groups joined and were supported by the COB, CSUTCB and university students. The 34 day march was backed by several groups and was successful in raising awareness of the struggles facing the indigenous

people of the Bolivian East (Laserna, Camacho and Cordova 1999, 13). In September, hundreds of indigenous people arrived to La Paz to protect the deforestation of their Amazon basin homes by private companies, Paz Zamora signed a decree forbidding further logging activities (Gamarra 1994b, 113). The march also demonstrated the indigenous diversity within Bolivia since the marchers were not the typical Aymara or Quechua campesinos from the highland and valleys but Mojeños and Chimanes from the East. The “March for Territory and Dignity” was followed by a series of campesinos strikes, protests and most importantly road blocks throughout July and August culminating in November when Paz Zamora signed an agreement that promised not to militarize the war on drugs but instead to use the military to monitor and prevent ecological damages caused by the manufacture of cocaine paste (Gamarra 1999a, 193).

Despite being considered a leftist politician, Paz Zamora, continued with the neoliberal agenda and privatized several well-known state companies. He worked to attract foreign investment in the declining mining industry, and also initiated the selling of the national phone company, national airline company, and other small industries. To counter the further plans to privatize publically owned industries the COB began to organize protests and demonstrations. High levels of unemployment and stagnant wages also contributed to the social distress. In February 1992 the teacher’s union, university students and professors supported the public workers and gathered at the San Francisco Plaza of La Paz. There were already ruptures within the COB and union representatives and this was clearly demonstrated when the leaders of these organization started fighting over the speakerphone to address the crowds (Garcia Linera, Chavez Leon and Costas Monje 2004, 73).

The government announced that it would begin to privatize the last mining centers controlled by COMIBOL. In March of 1993 the COB was able to get the support of the CSUTCB and began a series of national protests. In Oruro and Sucre, protesters were gasified and arrested. Santa Cruz was under police and military control but in Potosi almost 30,000 people came out to march (Garcia Linera, Chavez Leon and Costas Monje 2004, 76). Even though there was a massive participation of civil resistance rejecting further neoliberal policies, the government refused to budge.

The implementation of neoliberal policies and the U.S. demand for coca eradication contributed to the resurface of Anti-imperialist sentiment which was demonstrated nonviolently and also through acts of terrorism. By the end of 1989 the short-lived FAL-Zarate Wilka group was demolished by Bolivian Security Forces when the terrorist cell killed two American Mormon missionaries and attempted to kidnap U.S. Secretary of State, George Shultz, while he visited La Paz (Barrios 1993, 177). The Bolivian Security Forces were also placed in high alert due to the active presence of the Peruvian terrorist group, Sendero Luminoso, close to the Peruvian border. The presence of Sendero Luminoso in Bolivian territory was confirmed when an operative had killed a Peruvian Naval attaché in the busy streets of La Paz. Another Peruvian terrorist group that was operating in Bolivia was the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Amaru (MRTA). The MRTA allied themselves with the newly established Comision Nestor Paz Zamora (CNPZ), a Marxist organization that was named after the president's brother who was killed during the Teoponte guerrilla campaign in the 1970. In mid-1990 a wealthy businessman was kidnapped by the CNPZ demanding a high monetary reward for his return. The CNPZ was composed mostly of university students who were driven by an anti-imperialistic and anti-oligarchic agenda. In

October they bombed the U.S. Marine barracks in La Paz killing a security guard (Barrios 1993, 179). By the end of 1990 Bolivian intelligence was able to capture and torture a Peruvian member of the group which led to a raid of their headquarters where the Bolivian Security Forces executed the leaders of the cell and also erroneously killed the kidnapped businessman (Soruco 1993, 240-1). In 1991, another group that surfaced was the Ejercito Guerrillero Tupaj Katari (EGTK) that included members of Bolivia's middle-class and campesino militants. The EGTK was responsible for half a dozen terrorist acts which resulted in some deaths, injured and damages to public and private properties, but the government was able to dismantle the organization without any violence (De Mesa, Gisbert, Mesa 2003, 757). The justification of their violent acts was based on strong anti-American discourse due to the American led neoliberal reform and intervention in counter-narcotic operations. The group tried to inspire a wave of guerillas movements but just like Che Guevara and the Teoponte guerrilla they were unable to obtain any type of support. Even though there was civil discontent and poverty the use of violence was not backed or even imagined by any worker, campesino or political opposition group. Their violent strategies and Marxist ideologies in a post-Cold War era were seen out of touch with reality and did not received any significant social support but public condemnation.

The Paz Zamora administration was not highlighted for its involvement in stopping violent terrorist cells or expanding neoliberal policies but because of its high levels of corruption. There were also several controversies in dealing with the coca-cocaine issues surrounding U.S. and Bolivian relations. According to Gamarra (1996, 217-19), Bolivian policy makers had little autonomy when it came to counter-narcotics policies since these were based on external forces and pressures from the United States, which created

numerous problems, misunderstandings and contradictions, mainly because of the lack of coordination and bureaucratic infighting within both governments. Since 1987 Bolivia had signed more bilateral anti-drug agreements than any other country in South America; moreover the government had agreed to allow overt and covert U.S. military and law enforcement activities on its territory, despite social protests (Gamarra 1997a, 244). The Paz Zamora administration was coming to an end as was the U.S. involvement in Bolivian narcotrafico. The new Clinton administration announced that it would reduce the size of the DEA in Bolivia, cut aid linked to eradication from \$66 million in 1992 to \$40 million in 1993, and turn its focus to curbing U.S. demand for cocaine (Lehman 1999, 209).

6.3 The Rise of the Cocalero

The Chapare located in the northern jungles of Cochabamba was known for its main crop, coca, but by the early 1980s it was also the focus of the international press when it was discovered to be the center of the cocaine industry in Bolivia. In 1984 the town of Zinahota, located in the Chapare, became the center of the militarization debate because it was basically controlled by powerful drug cartels (Bedregal Gutierrez, Viscarra Pando 1989, 130). Siles Zuazo, under U.S. pressure, ordered Bolivian security forces to enter the Chapare area but first needed to persuade the campesinos to remove all road blockades to allow the Bolivian Armed Forces in the Chapare. These negotiations concluded in the dual participation of the military and campesinos in the fight against drug cartels, it also included the donation of fifty tractors to the Cochabamba campesinos, stabilizing a more favorable price for wheat, authorizing the commercialization of coca, and an economic compensation for the two dead campesinos during the raid (Aguilo 1985, 168). The

operation also involved the use of the newly created and U.S. financed UMOPAR. Eventually the UMOPAR and the DEA began to not only target drug cartels but also coca growers and miners that had settled in the Chapare when the mining industry collapsed (Lehman 1999, 195). The UMOPAR started to show a resemblance to the Bolivian military by suppressing, harassing and violating the human rights of several coca growers (Hargreaves 1992). But the biggest impact in the area would come under the Paz Estenssoro government with Law 1008 which became the center of national criticism by coca growers' unions, workers' unions, political parties and several other sectors. After months of debates and discussions, Law 1008 was finally approved by the end of 1988 leading to the criminalization of coca growing, but also focusing on the voluntary and forced eradication of coca in the Chapare region (Mesa, Gisbert, Mesa Gisbert 2003, 746).

The Chapare was subjected to voluntary eradication with a \$2,000 per hectare compensation and crop substitution assistance, as long as the coca was planted before the law. All new cultivations were marked for eradication without compensation and these coca crops were located within or surrounding the Chapare (Sanabria 1997, 175). Law 1008 targeted the annual eradication of 5,000 to 8,000 hectares of coca, an eradication program financed by national and international support which included international technical assistance (Salm, Liberman 1997, 222). Law 1008 infuriated the Bolivian public because it illegalized the coca leaf which was and continues to be a huge part of the Bolivian culture. It also included strong narcotics sanctions which were something new to the Bolivian public. According to Herrera Añez (1996, 40), Law 1008 was fundamentally oriented to the repression and indictment of not only the coca leaf, but also the coca farmers who, once considered suspects, are now seen as drug dealers. The implementation of Law

1008 created an unfair justice system in the pyramid structure of narcotrafico where the bottom group is victimized, abused, and imprisoned without due process, sometimes for crimes they have not committed, while the intended targets, top narcotraficantes, remain untouched (Farthing 1997, 255). Gamarra (1996, 220) describes Law 1008 as a more stringent version of America's 1980s Zero Tolerance ordinances. De Olmo (1992, 129) characterized the law as unfeasible since there is no judicial system that can repress an activity that involves whole societies and is a part of a nation's economy. The approval of Law 1008 initiated a series of violent confrontations between the cocaleros and the UMOPAR troops.

Coca growers and the COB began to mobilize their people once rumors of forced eradication laws began to surface. The cocaleros received support from the CSTUCB and protested against the government's coca eradication control by setting roadblocks in Cochabamba that isolated the cities of La Paz and Oruro. The May 1987 roadblock was met with state violence when negotiations failed, forcing military intervention that resulted in the death of four campesinos and many injured (Aguilo 1992, 70-1). The level of brutality inflicted on the campesinos intensified the popular protests and the government started to renegotiate with the COB. The protests were successful and in June of 1987 the Bolivian government, the COB, the CSUTCB, and the cocaleros' Campesino Union of the Chapare signed the "Proyecto de Desarrollo Integral para la Substitucion de Coca" or PIDYS (Project for the Development of Coca Substitutes). The agreement emphasized the active participation of campesino organizations from the planning to the execution of these projects, but most importantly it recognized that coca was not a narcotic itself (Alcaraz Del Castillo 1989, 226). But not all forms of resistance were nonviolent, and due to the growing

frustration of the excessive abuses by Bolivian Security Forces in the Chapare, the cocaleros retaliated with violence. In July of the same year, 25 DEA agents had to evacuate their camp in Chapare when it came under attack by disgruntle cocaleros (Menzel 1998, 25). According to Lee (1988, 94) hundreds of cocaleros had broken into this DEA camp located in the Chapare and forced the DEA agents to temporally withdrawal from the region. Also in June of 1988, cocaleros took over Bolivian government offices in Cochabamba with twelve hostages, including two American advisors; that same month 10 to 15 cocaleros and one policeman died when 4,000 to 5,000 cocaleros broke into DIRECO offices looking for proof that herbicides were being tested by the DEA and DIRECO (Lee 1988, 95). In June 1989, confrontation began to escalate resulting in the death of five cocaleros when UMOPAR members began shooting at cocaleros who were supposedly attacking the central offices of the police in Villa Tunari (Gamarra 1994a, 47).

Coca production in the Chapare surpassed the historical coca plantations in the Yungas area. As described by Marconi (1994, 6), coca cultivation in the Chapare began to expand in the 1970s, increasing from 4,450 hectares in 1970 to 60,710 hectares in 1987. In 1980 the official unemployment went from 5.8 percent to 21 percent in 1985 and it was reported that an estimated 60,000 people lost their jobs in the manufacturing and mining sectors with the collapse of the international tin market and neoliberal reforms (Painter 1992, 7). Many of the former tin miners relocated to Bolivia's urban centers but an undetermined number fled to Cochabamba's Chapare zone to open coca leaf farms (Healy 1998, 229). Campesinos who farmed food products for the collapsed mining centers of Oruro and Potosi also relocated to the Chapare to grow coca. According to Sanabria (1997, 172), campesinos, primary from Cochabamba's highlands and valleys,

were also flocking to the Chapare to farm coca specifically for the processing of cocaine paste which is refined to cocaine. The population of the Chapare increased from 24,000 inhabitants in 1967 to 84,000 people in 1981 and by 1987 the population was approximately 200,000 which included both residents and transients (Painter 1994, 4).

The increase of coca production sustained Bolivia's decaying economy as well as reducing the country's unemployment due to the massive layoffs in the public sector. The coca-cocaine industry provided a cushion when the legal economy collapsed. Coca production became a stable economy since the cocaine market appeared to be Bolivia's only growing industry. According to Lehman (1999, 198-99), between 1983 and 1987 the coca-cocaine industry provided a safety net for some forty to sixty thousand Bolivians that lost their jobs in the state sector alone; only coca-cocaine and the burgeoning informal sector, often linked to unofficial dollar sources, could absorb them at a time when official unemployment rates hovered near 25 percent.

It was difficult to convince the campesinos to stop growing coca since working for the coca-cocaine industry seemed to be the only secure option in a country with an unstable economy. Also coca was and remains to be an essential part of the Bolivian culture and society. It has been harvested and consumed for centuries by the indigenous people of Bolivia. Coca affirms the campesino identity and it serves as a nexus to their ancestors. Spedding (1997a, 68-9) explains, that chewing coca protects one from evil spirits, witchcrafts, and mountain demons, and for miners it helps them to filter dust and unclean air. However for the most indigenous communities, coca is not only used for religious reasons, but it is also used for social events. You cannot buy a cow or other animals without offering the seller a fist of coca, once established the coca chewing, then they can discuss

the prices (LAB 1982, 25). The coca tea is another popular way of consuming the leaf. It is used to treat the common cold, diarrhea and especially to acclimate tourists to the Andean altitude. It is offered in hotels to treat the unpleasant effects of altitude sickness. But the main market for the Chapare coca was for the manufacture of cocaine. The increase western demand for cocaine torn coca from its social and cultural context of production and consumption linking its producers to the contemporary methods of the global economy (Sanabria 1993).

The coca farmers argued for a more reasonable \$6,000 per hectare compensation for voluntary eradication, but both governments maintained the \$2,000 compensation (Painter 1994, 85). Few campesinos were willing to sell their land or put it at risk as collateral since the land is considered sacred and referred to as the Pachamama (mother earth) (Hahn 1992, 97). Since both Bolivian and U.S. governments could not agree on a reasonable compensation plan, campesinos continued to grow coca either for traditional usage or for the production of cocaine. Coca growers, who previously were of no concern to drug enforcement, were now connected with the processing and trafficking of cocaine paste (Malamud-Goti 1992, 39). Cocaleros did not only suffer from police and military repression but were also victims of physical abuses, intimidations and threats, arbitrary arrests, and the confiscation of personal belongings by members of DINACO and DIRECO (Sanabria 1993, 177).

In 1993 the MNR returned to power with the presidency of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada. His administration tried to put the coca-cocaine issues aside and concentrate more on the country's economy. Victor Hugo Cardenas, an Aymara native, became the first indigenous to rise to a high level of power by becoming Bolivia's vice-president. Albo

(1994b, 67) sustains that many indigenous politicians called him a traitor, and several urban leftists referred to him as an opportunist or personalist. The reality was that he served as a political instrument for the MNR's Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, an American educated Bolivian who spoke Spanish with a "gringo" accent. The Sanchez de Lozada government initiated their neoliberal agenda by selling most of the country's main enterprises to foreign corporations, in a process referred to as capitalization. A recognizable achievement under his administration was his Popular Participation agenda which decentralized municipal government and also recognized campesino communities. Critics saw the enactment of this reform specifically aimed to marginalize campesinos from their rural unions. But the decentralized reforms strengthened local and regional governments, providing greater funding, and extending direct fiscal administration and self-rule to hundreds of new municipalities and indigenous communities (Morales 2012, 53). Even though the Sanchez de Lozada administration pushed for laws that would recognize the unique multi-ethnic composition of Bolivia's population and even guaranteed the rights of the indigenous people, it was not possible to have a domestic debate concerning social, political and economic matters without addressing the coca issue.

By the end of 1993, the Yungas of Bolivia, considered a traditional and legal coca zone under Law 1008, was slowly starting to be targeted for eradication by Bolivian and U.S. officials claiming that the excess coca cultivated was being used to manufacture cocaine paste. Trucks of Yungas coca began to be confiscated by government authorities as they entered La Paz affecting the direct economy of the Yungas cocaleros. Founded in 1983 ADEPCOCA (*Asociacion Departamental de Productores de Coca*/Departmental Association of Coca Producers) quickly mobilized over 20,000 men, women, and children

from all areas of the Yungas region and proceeded on their march towards La Paz to demand an internal regulation of commercializing the coca leaf (Carranza Polo 2001, 64-65). The march was stopped before entering the city by police barricades but the massive mobilization had already persuaded the government in adopting some policy changes. The following year the government authorized U.S. troops to enter the Yungas with the pretext that they were doctors on a humanitarian mission. The Yungas cocaleros with the support of the CSUTCB were able to mobilize over 6,000 people in the main plaza of the Yungas capital chanting “Coca or death, we will win” and “Where are the gringos? Yungas stands tall,” causing the supposed American doctors to leave the area (Carranza Polo 2001, 66). The Sanchez de Lozada government was now facing two groups of cocaleros, one from Yungas and one from the Chapare.

In early 1994 the cocaleros were already in negotiations with the government concerning force eradication. In April the cocaleros’ “auto defense committees” with the support of the COB, CSUTCB and the CSCB (*Confederacion Sindical de Colonizadores de Bolivia*) began a nationwide road blockade and hunger strikes which placed the government in the negotiation table (Lasarte, Camacho and Cordova 1999, 29). Sporadic roadblocks continued throughout May and June but culminated in July with “Operacion Nuevo Amanecer” resulting with the arrest of hundreds of cocaleros. The raid involved over 700 FELCN troops, 240 police and DEA advisors (Atkins 1998, 110).

As a reaction to the repression and abuses implemented in “Operation Nuevo Amanecer”, the cocaleros planned a pilgrimage of over 600 kilometers from Villa Tunari in Chapare to the capital La Paz. The march was called “Por la vida, la coca, y la soberanía nacional” (For Live, coca, and national sovereignty) it was aimed to address the injustices

surrounding force eradication and U.S. involvement in Bolivian domestic policies. More than 3,000 people began the 22 day pilgrimage from August to September but even before the march started the government arrested the cocalero leader, Evo Morales (Contreras Baspineiro 1995, 45). According to Zambrana Roman (1996, 135) the three week pilgrimage was supported by the Bolivian public and the media because it symbolized a national protest against the Sanchez de Lozada presidency and U.S. imperialism. The marchers were welcomed by the residents of La Paz and soon after their arrival, Evo Morales, was released and new negotiations were held.

In November of 1994, Sanchez de Lozada proposed his “Zero Option” policy to the international community. This policy consisted of the complete eradication of the Chapare region for a \$2 billion compensation to relocate the Chapare residents (Lehman 1999, 211). His plan would remove all of the population of the Chapare to regions in the Departments of Santa Cruz, Tarija and Chuquisaca, providing them with land grants, capital and technical assistance while the Chapare became into an industrial park for tourism or converting it into a powerful private agro-business area (Leons, Sanabria 1997, 32; Sanabria 1995, 87)). Zambrana Roman (1996, 140) clarifies that under this program all coca farmers would be given the monetary compensation of \$2,500 per hectare of eradicated coca, while the non-coca farmer would have received economic incentives such as: conditional credit, free market access, social-sanitary services, advisement on development programs, etc.

In January 1995, Sanchez de Lozada announced a new eradication plan dubbed “Master Plan for the Development of the Cochabamba Tropics” which led to cocalero street protests in Cochabamba (Sanabria 1995, 97). Civil unrest rose during the meeting of the

Andean Council of Coca Growers resulting in the arrest of many coca leaders and a total a six dead in the struggle against the police (Leons, Sanabria 1997, 32). Both the Bolivian and U.S. human rights organizations charged the UMOPAR with human rights violations, including unlawful arrest, illegal searches, arbitrary confiscations, and excessive force (Epstein, 1996). According to Spedding (1997b, 136), the encounter coincided with a lengthy general strike which obligated the Bolivian government to declare a state siege and detained 500 cocaleros, including Evo Morales. After the raid Sanchez de Lozada declared a 90 day siege which was extended to 90 more days in July (Gamarra 1997b, 391).

In December 1995 women from the Chapare began another pilgrimage denominated “March for Life, Coca, Human Rights and National Sovereignty.” The march started with 200 women but only after a few days over one thousand people were a part of the 31 day journey (Lasarte, Camacho and Cordova 1999, 49). The march was disturbed on several occasions by the Bolivian police and military who on some occasion used resorted to violent force. The marchers arrived the first week of January 1996 and asked for the first lady and the vice-president’s wife to be the mediators. After harsh negotiations with the COB and other cocalero union leaders, the government signed an agreement confirming that they would respect human rights, released several cocalero marchers that were incarcerated but ultimately nothing was agreed on coca eradication (Lasarte, Camacho and Cordova 1999, 55).

In August the CIDOB (Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia), an organization of East lowland Indians, embarked on the “March for Territory, Land, Political Participation and Development.” Over 2,000 marchers in Santa Cruz were joined by members of the CSUTCB and CSCB demanding that indigenous land rights be

protected as indigenous territories, with elements of sovereignty and local jurisdiction (Fabricant 2012, 207). The CIDOB marchers stopped in Samaipata, Santa Cruz after obtaining government concessions but the CSUTCB and CSCB continued the march to La Paz, where some 13,000 marchers grew to 24,000 protesters, rejecting the newly established National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) Law (Van Cott 200, 198-9). INRA assured the protection of campesino and indigenous landholdings but the critics viewed the new provisions as a form of protecting wealthy absentee landowners by allowing them to pay annual taxes of 1 percent of their estimated value of the land (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 92).

Sanchez de Lozada received bitter criticisms from the Bolivian public since the INRA Law itself focused on the expansion of private landholdings and promoted land markets. Cocaleros, campesinos, union workers and other militant groups began to resurface and join the opposition against the neoliberal policies of the government. The year of 1996 would culminate with a tragic turn of events when miners took over Potosi mines that were privately own by international corporations. Sanchez de Lozada did not hesitate in deploying troops causing the death of 11 people (De Meza, Mesa Gisbert, Gisbert 2003, 775). After this event the Sanchez de Lozada's public support was all but lost. By mid-1997, the Sanchez de Lozada government was coming to an end. Clawson and Lee (1998, 196), explain that counter-narcotics was not Sanchez de Lozada's priority but instead, he focused on the selling off state enterprises with the recipients being slowly invested in a pension plan. Sanchez de Lozada's main focus was his "*Plan de Todos*" policy or "Plan for Everybody," which consisted of the capitalization, popular participation and educational reform in Bolivia (de Meza, Mesa Gisbert, Gisbert 2003, 764). According


to Shultz (2003a, 34), the Sanchez de Lozada fully complied with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund's neo-liberalism policies of cutting labor rights and public spending, but most importantly selling or leasing public enterprises to private investors. At the end the Sanchez de Lozada administration neoliberal agenda was successful in privatizing the five largest state enterprises: oil, telephone, airline, railroad and the electric company.

6.4 “*Plan Dignidad*” and The Water Wars:

After two decades of attempting to democratically win the presidency, Hugo Banzer's ADN party came third in the national election but with the support of smaller political parties he was able to become the Bolivian president. Banzer won the elections with the lowest percentage of votes obtained by any presidential candidate in Bolivian history (de Meza, Mesa Gisbert, Gisbert 2003, 777). The MNR party had lost its significantly historic popular support due to the departing Sanchez de Lozada administration and Jaime Paz Zamora's MIR was tainted because of the narco-trafficking accusations. Bolivian democracy was facing several challenges concerning its credibility, especially by having a former military dictator once again running the country. Banzer had run a campaign to target political corruption but coca eradication, as always, was also on the priority list. Banzer requested additional U.S. aid when coca eradication targets were met in the beginning of late 1997, but the Clinton administration could not promise anything and insisted to continue with the coca eradication agenda (Kohl, Farthing 2001, 40). On December of 1997, the Banzer government presented the polemic “*Plan Dignidad*” which consisted of the total eradication of 38,000 hectares of coca by the year

2002. The five year (1997-2002) strategy was estimated to cost \$954 million of which more than half would be directed to the main pillar of the program, alternative development (Gamarra 2004, 27). Alternative development consisted in relocating and promoting cocalero campesinos to other cash crops. The aggressive Plan Dignity was successful in meeting its targets for many reasons to include the phasing out and termination of the monetary compensation for voluntary crop eradication since this payment was usually used and reinvested to plant even more coca rather than eradication (Gamarra 2004, 42). One of the major flaws of coca eradication was that even though coca crops were being eradicated, they were quickly replaced as new coca crops were planted. The following graph emphasizes this effect.

Box 1.1 Coca Eradicated vs. New Coca crops (1986 to 1999)



Source, Medinaceli Soza, Sergio and Jebner Zambrana Roman. 2000. Coca – Cocaina, Mas alla de las cifras 1985-1999.

Box 1.2 Changes in the Compensation per Hectare of Coca (1998 to 2002)

| Year | Periods of Programs | Individual Compensation per hectare of coca | Community Compensation per hectare of coca |
|-------------|--|--|---|
| 1998 | Until March 31 st | \$2,500 | \$0 |
| | From April 1 st until June 30 th | \$1,650 | \$850 |
| | From July 1 st until September 30 th | \$850 | \$1,700 |
| | From October 1 st until December 31 st | \$0 | \$2,500 |
| 1999 | From January 1 st until September 30 th | \$0 | \$2,000 |
| 1999-2000 | From October 1 st of 1999 until June 30 th of 2000 | \$0 | \$1,500 |
| 2000-2001 | From July 1 st of 2000 until March of 2001 | \$0 | \$1,000 |
| 2001 | From April 1 st until December 31 st of 2001 | \$0 | \$500 |
| 2002 | From January 1 st | \$0 | \$0 |

Source, ¡Por la Dignidad! Estrategia Boliviana de la Lucha Contra el Narcotráfico, 1998-2002

As demonstrated in the chart above compensation per hectare of coca was transferred from an individual basis to a community one but the chart also reveals that the monetary compensation declined every year. The successful eradication campaign can also be credited to the role played by the Bolivian military. Banzer seeing cocaleros as a political threat began to intensify the conflict in the Chapare by increasing the amount and security personnel dedicated to the fight against drugs and coca eradication (Sanabria 2004, 159). Taking a page from his repressive military regime of the 1970s, Banzer expanded the military and police. Under the Banzer administration (1997-2000) 287 Bolivian soldiers and police were trained at the School of the Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia (Gill 2004, 169). The U.S. funded the creation of a special Joint Task Force (JTF) consisting of military and police forces. This combined force initiated violent confrontations with the cocaleros that lasted three months in mid-1998 and resulted in the death of thirteen cocaleros and three members of the security force (Ledebur 2002, 6). But the campesinos of the Chapare region were not the only indigenous group resisting the

government's repression. The historical struggles of the indigenous people of the highlands and valleys inspired a wave of indigenous movements in the Bolivian eastern lowlands as well.

Not used being politically active, the indigenous Guarani of the town of Camiri in Santa Cruz began to quickly adopt the nonviolent methods of the indigenous from the highlands. In January 1998 they began a series of protests to demand a bilingual and intercultural educational curriculum. Several hundred Guarani women, men and young people marched into the main plaza of Camiri in front of the church in military-style and those in the front row of each section held handmade signs with place names of their villages (Gustafson 2009, 222-3). The group was waving Bolivian flags to remind the people that they were also part of the country. After their demands were ignored, a group of eleven walked into the Catholic Church in Camiri and staged a hunger strike asking the government for an increase in teachers' salaries and funding for Guarani teacher training program with Guarani autonomy (Gustafson 2009, 231). The strike was not effective since the state yielded little but the mobilization did demonstrate that the government educational reforms was affecting other indigenous communities in Bolivia. In the Andean highlands the neoliberal policies restricting and outsourcing of normal schools provoked a series of marches and strikes in 1999 and 2000. School budget cuts, the implementation of new curriculums and standardized testing fueled the already state of contention in Bolivia. Since 1999 the highland town of Warisata linked to the Trotskyist teacher union leadership waged several marches against the government which were promoted by the new head of the CSUTCB, Felipe Quispe.

Felipe Quipe referred to as “El Mallku” began his political career as one of the founders of the Movimiento Indigena Tupac Katari in the 1970s. In the early 1990s he was imprisoned for his terrorist activities with the EGTK. Quipe advocated a violent and radical change in society by implementing extremist Indian ideology with class struggle and had also unambiguously stated that he wanted the formation of an Indigenous Nation, “Union of Socialist Nations of the Qullasuyu,” under the dominance of collectivism and communitarianism (Sanjines 2004, 164). In early 2000 Felipe Quispe was pushing for campesino leadership of the COB but the mining sector rejected the proposal believing that the campesinos would not stand up for wage workers. The COB infighting would increase when the COB accepted the sponsorship of Coca-Cola for their annual congress generating a backlash from their members who decided that it was better to create another organizations to combat neoliberalism; thus the Frente Anti-neoliberal was formed (Garcia Linera, Chavez Leon, Costas Monje 2004, 78).

Neoliberal policies push for deregulation of state institutions, liberalization of trade and the privatization of public enterprises. Countries around the world were forced to privatize their water and deregulate their water industry as a common leading condition to qualify for a loan from the World Bank and IMF. In 2000 more than one quarter of the IMF loans disbursed through the International Finance Corporation had requirements for partial or full privatization of water supply and insisted on policy creation to stimulate "full cost recovery" and eliminate subsidies (Shiva 2002, 91). Bolivia was one of these countries where water privatization was in full effect and orchestrated by the World Bank. Resistance towards water privatization was initially started by a campesino organization from the countryside of Cochabamba, called FEDECOR (Departmental Federation of

Irrigation Farmers of Cochabamba). As a part of the water privatization plan to turn control over to multinational, Bechtel, the Bolivian government set up small trenches around the irrigation canals built by campesinos to bring water to their crops from nearby rivers (Shultz 2008, 16). The construction of these small trenches denied the campesinos access to water even though they had used these irrigation canals for years for their daily needs. In mid-1998 over 20,000 irrigators allied with cocaleros protested by presenting a legal proposal for regulating water according to their customs and once again they were supported by central valley residents and stopped workers from drilling a series of wells (Gutierrez Aguilar 2014, 7). In June 1999, the World Bank and the International Development Bank made privatization a condition for loans and recommended that there be no public subsidies to hold down the increasing price of water (Olivera 2004, 8). In November 1999, roads were blocked for twenty four hours in Cochabamba which led for military intervention but meeting resistance from the irrigators. A few weeks later the irrigators went to the city of Cochabamba to meet with Oscar Olivera the president of the Cochabamba Federation of Factory Workers to discuss about the growing concerns over the seizure of the rural irrigation canals and about rising water rates in the city and together they formed the Coalition for Defense of Water and Life also known as the *Coordinadora*.

The *Coordinadora*, was composed of rural and urban elements with strong roots in the farming communities, labor unions, and neighborhoods. They began a campaign across Cochabamba to inform the people about the threats of privatization (Shultz 2008, 17). The rural campesinos of Cochabamba strongly supported the efforts of the *Coordinadora* since they were the first victims of the privatization process. City residents were not so enthusiastic of joining the protests but this would take a turn of events. In January 2000

just weeks after taking over the city's water, Bechtel sent out the monthly water bills to the people of Cochabamba with the new Aguas de Tunari logo and a rate increase that averaged more than 50 percent (Shultz 2009, 18). In some cases water bills skyrocketed as much as 300 percent which meant that Bolivians earning \$80 per month were paying a monthly rate of \$25 for water and it also reached the point that people had to obtain licenses just to collect rainwater from their roofs (Olivera 2004, 10). The *Coordinadora*'s first protest was a roadblock placed from January 10th to the 14th while negotiation began with hundreds of neighborhood residents and campesino irrigators, who acted as delegates representing their roadblock points (Gutierrez Aguilar 2014, 13).

These events alarmed the people of Cochabamba uniting them to join the *Coordinadora* in street protests. Thousands of people took to the streets to oppose the takeover of their city's water system by Aguas de Tunari a subsidiary of the U.S. corporate giant, Bechtel. Days later the *Coordinadora* launched a full road blockade of the city and for three days Cochabamba was shut down from the rest of the country (Shultz 2009, 18). In February the Chapare cocaleros and their leader, Evo Morales, joined the water revolts. The cocaleros brought their years of experience in resistance tactics showing protesters how to use bandanas and vinegar to fight the effects of the tear gas (Shultz 2009, 21).

Protests were not only centered in Cochabamba. At the same time, Felipe Quispe led the CSUTCB to the standstill of five departments by blocking the main highways in protests against the land tenure and ownership laws that were unfavorable to the indigenous majority in Bolivia (Orias Arredondo 2005, 51). Even Chuquisaca which prided itself as being a department of great social order was involved in the blockades conducted by their rural inhabitants (Gutierrez Aguilar 2014, 28). In April the revolt had taken national

precedence forcing the government to call a stage of siege. By the end of the month government officials of Cochabamba agreed to meet with the leaders of the revolts to negotiate an end to the roadblocks and protests. The reunion took place at the regional governor's offices but the meeting was interrupted by the national police that burst in and arrested the *Coordinadora* leaders under the orders of President Banzer (Schultz 2009, 23). The Cochabamba governor was forced to release Olivera and the other leaders due to the growing number of street protestors outside his offices since the crowds intensified with numerous delegations coming from all over the country. Knowing of the violent history of the Banzer dictatorship from the 1970s governor Galindo announce his resignation on live TV, adding that he did not want to be responsible for a "blood bath" (Schultz 2009, 24). The next morning as expected Banzer declared another state of siege and sent in the national police and military forces which caused numerous injuries due to the use of tear gas and beatings. Constitutional rights were suspended; a curfew and ban on meetings were imposed; and soldiers shut down television and radio broadcasts (Shultz 2009, 25). The confrontations between the unarmed protesters and the Bolivian security forces resulted in the death of an innocent bystander who was shot in the face by a military sniper (Olivera 2004, 43). This event infuriated the protestors since the government continued to hold its position of non-negotiation. The hard line stand was taken by the western educated politicians: Vice-President Quiroga and the Information Minister Ronald McLean who had claimed that the mobilization was being financed by narco-traffickers (Olivera 2004, 43). At the end, after the general public's condemnation of the brutal force used by the military causing numerous deaths and injured, the Bolivian government was forced to end the contract with Bechtel.

Even though the situation in Cochabamba was resolved there were still massive protests in La Paz by university students and street merchants who clashed with the police. Using the momentum of these protests, the COB called upon the union of teachers, workers, and neighborhood juntas to reject the government's new customs laws and school curriculums (Garcia Linera, Chavez Leon, Costas Monje 2004, 80). But the COB did not have the capacity to mobilize people like the CSUTCB, the cocaleros or the Coordinadora. The small highland rural towns of Achacachi, Patacamaya and others under the leadership of Felipe Quispe were able to erect impenetrable road blocks shutting down La Paz. The weakened government was also dealing with a belligerent national police concerning low wages and opted for military intervention to resolve the crisis in the highlands (De Mesa, Gisbert and Mesa 2003, 785). Army war tanks, crossed the barricades lifted by the community members injuring several campesinos who were standing guard and arrested Quispe (Gutierrez Aguilar 2014, 54). Civil contention arose again in September in the highlands. The teachers' union began a march from Oruro to La Paz and were joined by other groups such as university students, pensioners and campesinos. The entire country was paralyzed for over three weeks; private industry lost millions; schools were closed; cities were crippled as supplies steadily diminished due to the road blocks forcing Banzer to make concessions (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 168).

In March 2001, the COB in Cochabamba began another march called "Por el Rescate a la Patria" (For the Rescue of our Homeland) which was supported by the cocaleros and *La Coordinadora*. Departmental and national security forces were sent to disrupt the protest but some marchers were able to evade them by using back country roads. By April some protesters arrived midway in Oruro and they began to negotiate with the

government concerning public and private downsizing and layoffs but the government's offer was rejected by the protesters (Garcia Linera, Chavez Leon, Costas Monje 2004, 85). The momentum of indigenous contention gave way to the formation of the Movimiento Sin Tierra in 2000 in Pananti, Tarija. The group took the headlines when 200 migrant campesino families occupied properties but by 2001 they were met with violent resistance from wealthy cattle rancher and their men who ended-up killing six campesinos and injuring several others (Fabricant 2012, 41). New campesino groups were emerging and were among the most active and most rebellious. The government was also facing several campesino uprisings in the Yungas area. In June 19 2001, the cocaleros movement in the Yungas was victorious not only in preventing the JTF from entering the region but also in negotiating with the Bolivian government the suspension of forced eradication (Ledebur 2002, 6). By mid-November, the Chapare cocaleros once again began to block highways initiating a violent confrontation with the JTF who killed three protesters and wounded five (Ledebur 2005, 159).

The year 2002 began with the Bolivian government declaring the sale of Chapare coca as illegal and closing many coca markets in the region. The cocaleros quickly responded by mobilizing several thousand people who attempted to enter the coca markets by force. This upheaval began on mid-January of 2002 and resulted in the brutal torture and deaths of four security officers which was quickly retaliated by the arrest of sixty cocaleros and their union leaders, some of whom were also tortured (Ledebur 2002, 9-10). The cocaleros and their struggles were supported not only by campesinos of the countryside but by urban residents as well. The popularity of the cocaleros leader, Evo Morales, had risen at a national level. Morales began his political career in 1988 when he was elected

to head the FCT (Federacion de Cocaleros del Tropico) and by the late 1990s, he created the Amsablea por la Soberania del Pueblo – ASP (The Assembly for the Country's Sovereignty), which later became the political party Movimiento al Socialismo - MAS. Morales' political party MAS (Movement Towards Socialism), consisting of leftist intellectuals, became a powerful political force, losing the 2002 presidential election by only two points (De Meza, Mesa Gisbert, Gisbert 2003, 786). The surprising votes of support for the MAS came after the U.S. Ambassador had threatened the Bolivian people that if they voted for Morales the U.S. would suspend their financial support.

6.5 The Tax and Gas Revolts:

In August of 2002, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada once again, using his running mate as a political tool, was elected president and Carlos D. Mesa Gisbert, a renowned journalist who stood against corruption was voted as the vice-president of Bolivia. Sanchez de Lozada's MNR government began with several internal problems and conflicts due to its alliance with the MIR. His government was also facing opposition that came from the right and from the left. Even though Morales' MAS lost the elections, his party became the second largest party in congress and was willing to challenge Sanchez de Lozada's neoliberal agenda and his policies concerning coca and U.S. intervention in domestic issues. According to Gamarra (2003, 298), Sanchez de Lozada received a first-hand message from George W. Bush assuring that U.S. backed alternative development depended on coca eradication at the same rate as Plan Dignidad's. Road blocks were mounted by mid-January of 2003, as campesinos from Potosi and Chuquisaca, 30,000 of whom marched to Sucre, joined the cocaleros from Chapare and Yungas in protest of the

new government (Hylton and Thomson 207, 108). The march did not receive the support of the CSTCB since their leader, Quispe, wanted to separately negotiate with the government. The COB was also organizing a march of retirees which was quickly interrupted by the military forcing the elderly protestors to board buses back to Oruro (Garcia Linera, Chavez Leon and Costas Monje 2004, 88). Within the first months of his government, Sanchez de Lozada was not only being pressured by domestic demands but also by international financial institutions. The World Bank wanted guarantees for investors' property rights and the IMF was requesting fiscal responsibility due to the country's growing deficit.

In February of 2003, the IMF demanded that the Sanchez de Lozada government reduce the national deficit from 8.5 to 5.5 percent of GDP by implementing a series of tax hikes including a 1.5 percent flat income tax (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 172). For the Bolivian people this meant that the government was trying to balance the budget on the backs of the working poor. Bolivia's struggle against neoliberalism erupted again due to the attempt to impose this austerity package on the country. The opposition leader, Evo Morales, called for national protests, including marches and acts of civil disobedience which was quickly supported by the COB, labor and civic groups and the even the national police who had recently been rejected of a salary increase from the Bolivian government (Shultz 2009, 132). But riots and looting erupted before the opposition organizations were able to mobilize. The incident was sparked when high school students began to throw rocks at the Presidential Palace and instead of being detained the police began to applaud them. The armed confrontation between the national police and military began when the military guards began shooting tear gases at the protesters located near a group of

policemen who took it as a sign of provocation and retaliated by firing their own tear gases which later escalating in the trading of live ammunition (Shultz 2008, 135). Street protesters surrounded the Presidential Palace where Sanchez de Lozada was having a meeting with his cabinet to address the growing crisis. The national police who had not yet received their January salary was already on strike demanding livable wages when the tax hike was announced (Dangl 2007, 85). Hundreds of police officers joined the demonstrations and were also chanting their demands. The tension and hostility between the Bolivian military and police was due to the historic rivalry dating back to the 1952 National Revolution. The War on Drugs also contributed to this animosity as both institutions competed for U.S. aide and funding.

The proposed tax hikes of the IMF plan sparked nationwide demonstrations. The Bolivian press had labeled it as “el impuestazo.” At the end the “Tax Revolt” resulted in the death of thirty-two people due to the confrontations between the national police and army units that were dispatched by Sanchez de Lozada (Shultz 2003b, 9). This tragic affair took the lives of several innocent protestors and bystanders that were caught in the middle of a shooting battle between the police and military. This event is also referred to as “Febrero Rojo” (Red February) because of the level of violence that was displayed and the massive destruction of private property. Since the police was on strike some people began looting stores in downtown La Paz and even the Vice-President’s office was attacked by the people who began to burn documents and furniture. Crowds headed by young people torched the headquarters of the neoliberal political parties, government offices were destroyed, and in El Alto business and symbols of neoliberalism like Bancosol (micro-credit Bank) and Coca-Cola bottling plant were targeted (Hylton and Thomson 2007, 108).

The government's response was so brutal that the residents of El Alto began erecting barricades and bonfires on the streets to prevent the police and military from entering their neighborhoods. They also organized neighborhood watches to protect their communities from rioters and looters who were taking advantage of the chaos (Dangl 2007, 86). The following day La Paz was under military control. The military placed snipers on the rooftops to prevent protesters from entering the Plaza Murillo next to the Presidential Palace which was also protected by war tanks. The national police was reinstalled and arrested 180 suspects mostly minors but the main accusation came in the aftermath of the Tax Revolt when Sanchez de Lozada blamed Evo Morales' MAS for the violence claiming it was part of an attempted coup (Hylton and Thomson 2007, 109). The mayhem reached a national stage as demonstrations in Cochabamba, Potosi and Santa Cruz demanded the president's resignation. Later that afternoon, Sanchez de Lozada announced that he was withdrawing his tax plan but the timing was too late as the combination of public rage and the killings in the Plaza Murillo and the absence of police throughout the city had already triggered waves of rioting and vandalism (Shultz 2009, 135). The middle and upper class were terrified since the media mainly focused on the looting of stores by juvenile delinquents. A few months after the Tax Revolt, the government passed a law of "Citizen Security" which criminalized certain forms of protests including road blocks but this did not deter the people who were already organizing marches and protests.

The Gas Revolt began later that year when the Sanchez de Lozada government decided to allow a private international group led by British Gas and Spanish oil company Repsol to export Bolivian natural gas to the United States and Mexico through a pipeline which would stretch across Chile paying \$300 million in taxes to Chile (Conger 2003, 14).

The Bolivian public was outraged of the fact that this pipeline would go across Chile on what was once Bolivian territory. Bolivians saw that they were paying for something that was rightfully theirs. The press had also issued numerous articles concerning the high expected return rate that benefitted the foreign companies which infuriated the public due to the historic exploitation of Bolivia's natural resources by foreign entities. Similar to the Water *Coordinadora* in Cochabamba, a National Coordinator for the Defense and Recovery of Gas was created in July which consisted of 21 organizations including some local anti-globalization activists, unions, cocaleros and campesinos (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 173). Because of its location and demographics the city of El Alto had taken a prominent role in welcoming marchers from all over the country and also in organizing protests heading towards La Paz. Not only having the second largest population in the country but also priding itself for having the biggest indigenous population, El Alto became the center of the national resistance. The FEJUVE (Federacion de Juntas Vecinales) of El Alto was one of the first organizations to quickly mobilize during the Gas Revolt. Lazar (2008, 63) describes the FEJUVE as a local-level residents' committee that channels *alteño* citizenship by taking a structural position between the *alteños* and the state. On 8 September, 10,000 campesinos joined with the FEJUVE of El Alto, El Alto university students and inter-provincial truckers and began to march towards La Paz demanding communal justice, public university autonomy, rejecting new property taxes and the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) but the threat that united most people was the planned export of Bolivian gas (Hylton and Sinclair 2007, 111).

The protests coincided with another event that had taken place early that month in the highland town of Warisata. Felipe Quispe was demanding the release of an indigenous

leader and organized a roadblock which stranded foreign tourists. A military mission was sent to clear the area which resulted in the death of five people and several wounded (Gordon and Luoma 2009, 91). The event sparked the indigenous masses to join the thousands of men and women from all sectors to march to La Paz to protest and demand the president's resignation. The leaders of this social movement used radio and TV stations to rally support against the unpopular neoliberal economic policies of the Bolivian president. Nearly all routes to La Paz were blocked as demonstrations spread to El Alto, Oruro, Sucre, Potosi and other major cities in Bolivia. By the end of September the government released the indigenous leader, Edwin Huampu, but the CSUTCB was not satisfied and pushed for further government concessions. El Alto began to receive more campesino groups including the cocaleros led by Evo Morales. The massiveness of the indigenous mobilization which had surpassed half of million people between September and October did not have a main leader but was composed of several groups and leadership was shared and rotated (Zibechi 2010, 44).

By the second week of October the failed negotiations with the government led to the Sanchez de Lozada government's decision to send the military and clear out the masses in El Alto. What followed was the insurrection by the residents of El Alto who started to knockdown pedestrian bridges to block the streets, moved old train cars to reinforce certain roadblocks, dug ditches on the main avenues, kept guard of their neighborhood while attending the wounded (Gutierrez Aguilar 2014, 120). In October 16, the protesters began to descend from el Alto to the capital in a historical confrontation with state enforcement authorities to start the episode known as "Red October". Over three hundred thousand people marched to La Paz, hundreds joined in hunger strikes, solidarity protests were held

outside Bolivian embassies in Europe, the U.S., and Latin America as representatives of the Argentine and Brazilian embassies urged Sanchez de Lozada to resign (Gordon and Luoma 2009, 93). The masses got bigger as they met with other groups in the La Paz and marched towards the Presidential Palace. Sanchez de Lozada ordered his enforcement authorities to protect the Presidential Palace by any means necessary. The brutality and violence used against the unarmed protesters was well covered by the Bolivian media and viewed by millions. The Sanchez de Lozada administration began to destabilize as the opposition began to gain support of the public and even the vice-president had publicly stated that he was also against the policies of the president. By the time it ended Bolivians from all sectors, indigenous, middle and even upper class began to demand the president's resignation. Finally in October 17, 2003 Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada resigned and boarded a plane to Miami while Bolivia remained in chaos (Shultz 2009, 94). The person who had introduced neoliberalism to Bolivia and strongly promoted the ideals of market globalism in Bolivia was gone. The popular rebellion left more than 70 dead and hundreds injured, but the uprising accomplished the president's departure and placement of Carlos Mesa Gisbert as the new President. Mesa Gisbert joined the masses in the victory rally held in La Paz and presided over by the government's fiercest adversary, Aymara leader Felipe Quispe, the chief architect of the blockage of La Paz (Shultz 2009, 94).

The Gas Revolt was a mass coordination of several indigenous leaders and activist groups from different sectors and areas of Bolivia and should not be labeled as mass riots or sporadic acts of vandalism. Rural and urban organizations were all present but the CSUTCB played a crucial role in organizing roadblocks that paralyzed La Paz for almost one week (Garcia Linera 2004, 61). While the massive popular force were unarmed, the

state responded with violent force crushing the slum revolt in El Alto and killing at least sixty people and injuring hundreds (Webber 2011, 48). Several days later, Sanchez de Lozada claimed that narco-traffickers were heavily involved in the riots and also suggested that most of these organizations might have been financed by Venezuela's president, Hugo Chavez (Falcoff 2003, 3). Days prior to the revolt in a CNN interview, Sanchez de Lozada, stated that Peru's Shining Path and Colombian guerrilla groups were training coccaleros and even suggested that the Libyan government was involved in his toppling and even some U.S. official believed that narco-traffickers were involved, erroneously calling it a "narco-coup" even though the coca issue was in the very bottom of the peoples complaints (Kurtz-Phelan 2004, 110). President Mesa gained popular and political support when the national referendum on Bolivia's oil and gas industries was approved in expanding the role of the state and elevating taxes on multinational corporations (Shifter 2004, 135). The popularity of the indigenous leaders Evo Morales and Felipe Quispe grew among the Bolivia people who had regarded them as national heroes. After almost two hundred years of resistance the indigenous people of Bolivia achieved their greatest victory through nonviolent methods. By 2005 Evo Morales was elected president becoming the country's first indigenous president.

6.6 Conclusion:

After almost two decades of military regime, the people of Bolivia were ready to begin a new era as an independently democratic government with the freedom of speech to question any state authority. Bolivia's newly elected president, Hernan Siles Zuazo, did everything he could to maintain stability in a country that was social, political and

economically broken. He was unable to adopt any major economic reform due to the nonviolent rejection in the forms of marches and strikes. But these protests organized by the COB eroded the effective use of people power and the legitimacy of nonviolent resistance since they did not include any type of reasonable solutions to the economic problems the country was facing. Siles Zuazo attempted to avoid U.S. interference, but because of the country's economic crisis and with Reagan's aggressive agenda of reducing the flow of cocaine in America, it was inevitable to stop the U.S. involvement. It seemed that no other Bolivian president but Victor Paz Estenssoro knew how to benefit the most from this involvement. Paz Estenssoro played an impartial role that favored and displeased both countries. While the Bolivian public condemned his western solutions that eventually changed the Bolivian economic and judicial system, the Americans thought that he was too soft and non-cooperative. But the reality was that Paz Estenssoro's MNR party was not responsible for the content of the New Economic Policy - NEP but rather served as a vehicle for reformists with a distinctive view of Bolivia's future (Gridle 2003, 318). His "Bolivia is Dying" speech was aimed at convincing the country that the only way to save Bolivia was through the NEP based on Neoliberal principals of cutting government spending, trade liberalization and encouraging privatization of state enterprises.

The collapse of the international tin market and the implementation of neoliberal policies contributed to the downfall of the Bolivian miner's economic and political influence. Tens of thousands of miners lost their jobs working for the Bolivian state mines. As a last effort of resistance against the NEP, several thousand miners, their wives and children began marching from Oruro to La Paz in the "March for Life" protest but the COB was unable to negotiate with the government. The marchers were forced to stop thus

ending an era where the worker's unions were able to influence the state political and economic policies. The high levels of unemployment weakened the miners unions of COMIBOL and COB as jobless miners dispersed into shanty towns in El Alto, La Paz, or went to the Chapare region in Cochabamba to grow coca. The growing demand for cocaine from the U.S. and Europe made the cultivation of coca a viable option for the unemployed miners that migrated to the Chapare where the coca leaf had been grown for the consumption of the indigenous people of Bolivia for centuries.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union increased the United States' involvement in the War on Drugs. Bolivian president, Jaime Paz Zamora, played a crucial role during this period of worldly adjustment. Paz Zamora's policies would sometimes offend U.S. officials which created tension between both governments in an environment that was surrounded by misunderstandings and confusions. But ultimately, regardless of his leftist sympathies, Paz Zamora implemented aggressive neoliberal economic policies. These policies were quickly associated with the U.S. creating an anti-American environment in the Bolivian left and mainly in the university campuses. Guerrilla and terrorist groups were formed opposing what they saw as a U.S. cultural invasion of Bolivian values. In the late 1980s and early 1990s Bolivia faced small and isolated incidents of organized terrorist groups beginning with the FAL-Zarate Wilka cell which attempted to kidnap U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz during a visit to Bolivia. The notorious terrorist group, Sendero Lumino, was also trying to operate in La Paz but the major Peruvian guerrilla group in Bolivia was the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Amaru (MRTA) which formed an alliance with the newly formed Comando Nestor Paz Zamora (CNPZ). Their alliance was

quickly terminated when the group was gunned down by security forces who also killed the business who was being held ransom. Another armed group was the Ejercito Guerrillero Tupac Katari (EGTK) who had taken down power towers and blown up pipelines. Their leaders were captured and incarcerated. Two of them would eventually become influential leaders of the Bolivian resistance movement, Felipe Quispe as the General Secretary of the CSTUCB, and Alvaro Garcia Linera, the current vice-president of Bolivia.

During the 1990s the coca-cocaine issue was the center of all U.S. and Bolivian relations focusing mainly on the eradication of coca. Implementing the experience of former miners against oppression and defiance against the state, the cocaleros began to organize themselves in unions which grew stronger and bigger each year. The cocaleros transformed the coca leaf into a powerful symbol that united the people of Bolivia against the demands of the U.S. government and the Bolivian state that supported them. The cocaleros mastered the use of roadblocks not only to oppose coca eradication but also to challenge the wave of neoliberal policies being implemented by the state. The government confronted an opposing public opinion which was strongly influenced by the cocaleros led by Evo Morales, who organized marches to La Paz creating tense and sometimes violent situations which resulted in the death of several protesters.

The global expansion of neoliberal policies promoted the deregulation of state institutions, liberalization of trade and the privatization of public enterprises. Bolivia was one of these countries where water privatization was in full effect and orchestrated by the World Bank. In June 1999, the World Bank and the International Development Bank made water privatization a condition for loans and recommended that there be no public subsidies

to hold down the increasing price. The water revolt in Bolivia began in the countryside of the department of Cochabamba. As a strategy to turn control over to corporate giant Bechtel, the Bolivian government set up small trenches around the irrigation canals built by campesinos to bring water to their crops from nearby rivers. Based on previous experiences the campesinos met with activists groups in the city of Cochabamba and were able to form a Coalition for Defense of Water and Life also known as the *Coordinadora*. In January 2000 just weeks after taking over the city's water, Bechtel send out the monthly water bills to the people of Cochabamba with an enormous rate increase in some cases water bills skyrocketed as much as 300 percent. The *Coordinadora* launched a full road blockade of the city and for three days Cochabamba was shut down. By February, the Chapare cocaleros and their leader Evo Morales joined the water revolts the also help organized roadblocks in various points of the country. The government declared a state of siege and sent in the national police and military forces which caused numerous injuries due to the use of tear gas and beatings but the road blocks and unarmed protests persisted. By the beginning of April after numerous deaths and injured due to confrontations between the government security forces and the protestors the Bolivian government was forced to end the contract with Bechtel. The poorest people of South America were able to oust one of the richest multinational corporations without the use of violence.

In February of 2003 Bolivia's fight against neoliberalism erupted again when the IMF attempted to impose a national austerity package on the country. The tragic Tax Revolt was a two day event referred to as "Febrero Negro" (Black February) and resulted in the death of 34 people and almost two hundred injured. The violence began when President Sanchez de Lozada decided to back the proposed tax hikes demanded by the IMF

as a means to reduce the country's deficit. Opposition leaders called for national protests, including marches and acts of civil disobedience which was quickly supported by the COB, labor and civic groups and even the national police who had recently been rejected of a salary increase from the Bolivian government. But before these groups were able to organize the national police and military had begun a shooting spree killing innocent bystanders. The public rage and the absence of police throughout the city triggered a wave of rioting, looting and vandalism. Due to public pressure, Sanchez de Lozada announced that he was withdrawing his tax plan.

A few months later the Sanchez de Lozada government signed a series of decrees allowing foreign companies to export Bolivian natural gas through a pipeline across Chile paying millions in taxes to Chile. What followed was a national outraged since the pipeline was on Bolivian territory lost in the War of the Pacific. The momentum of the February anti-IMF uprisings fueled the resistance. Campesinos, miners and cocaleros were welcomed in the tens of thousands by the residents of El Alto demanding the president's resignation as they descended to the capital. Nearly all routes to La Paz were blocked as demonstrations spread to El Alto, Oruro, Sucre, Potosi and other major cities in Bolivia. In October 16 over three hundred thousand people from all sectors and all walks of life marched to La Paz urging the president to resign. Finally in October 17, 2003 after more than 70 dead and hundreds injured, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada resigned and boarded a plane to Miami. The Gas Revolt demonstrated the power of organized nonviolent resistance. There was no main protagonist but a collective force that included several indigenous groups, workers' unions, student organizations, neighborhood associations, and civil activists.

Table 4.1. Methods of Resistance during the Fight Against Neoliberalism

| Campaign | Participants | Method | Outcome |
|-------------------------------|---|--|---|
| 1982-1984 UDP Protests | Union workers, miners, civil servants, and campesinos | Nonviolent Action: 204 strikes in 3 months Occupation of mining government offices. Hunger strikes Roadblocks 10,000 miners march to La Paz | Due to massive social pressure, Silez Zuazo calls for early elections. The UDP government was unable to implement any type of IMF proposed austerity package leading the country to hyperinflation. |
| 1986 March for Life | Miners, campesinos and university students | Nonviolent Action: Protest pilgrimage/march from Oruro to La Paz. Hunger strike | MNR government convinces the public that Bolivia's salvation depends on the neoliberal NEP. Even though the march received some public support the government was able to use military force to prevent the marchers from entering the capital. |
| 1987-1990 Cocalero Resistance | Cocaleros, CSUTCB, and COB | Nonviolent Action: Roadblocks, marches, government offices takeovers. Violent: Taking 12 hostages from government office. Killing 1 police officer. | The coordinated roadblocks at a national level have some success and government signs a decree that would fund crops substitutes. Small sporadic acts of unarmed occupation of government offices are met with military/police |

| | | | |
|---|--|--|---|
| | | | violence: arrests, beatings, and sometime the killing of protesters. |
| 1990 March for Territory and Dignity | Campesinos from the Eastern lowlands joined by COB, CSUTCB and university students | Nonviolent Action: 34 day pilgrimage/march from Trinidad to La Paz. Roadblocks. | Paz Zamora signs environmental policies for the protection of Eastern indigenous lands. March is followed by a series of protests against the militarization of the War on Drugs |
| Early 1990s Terrorism | University students, Peruvian Terrorist groups (Sendero Luminoso and MRTA) | Violent: Bombings and kidnapping | With no public support, terrorist groups are neutralized by State security forces by killing and/or imprisoning the leadership |
| 1993 Protest against Neoliberal reforms | COB, CSUTCB, workers from around the country | Nonviolent Action: Organized street protests in major cities. 30,000 in Potosi | Government does not budge and continues with neoliberal policies. |

| | | | |
|---|--|--|---|
| 1993 Yungas Coca Marches | 20,000 men, women and children from Yungas area. 6,000 Yungas cocaleros and CSUTCB | Nonviolent Action: ADEPCOCA massive march to La Paz Mass mobilization at town plaza | Government concedes and changes coca commercialization laws for Yungas cocaleros. American doctors accused of being US military leave Yungas. |
| 1994 March for Life, Coca and National Sovereignty | Cocaleros, residents of La Paz | Nonviolent Action: Over 3,000 embark a 3 week pilgrimage from Cochabamba to La Paz are a joined by residents of La Paz. | Cocales receive media coverage and public support during their march protesting repressive military operations in Chapare. March brings government into new negotiations with cocaleros and releases their leader, Evo Morales, from prison. |
| 1995-1996 March For Life, Coca, Human Rights and National Sovereignty | 200 women from Chapare and over 800 cocaleros and supporters | Nonviolent Action: Women initiate a pilgrimage from Cochabamba to La Paz to talk to the first lady and wife of vice-president. | Government security forces fail in disrupting the march. Cocaleros and COB negotiate a government agreement emphasizing human rights, the release of cocaleros are not able to prevent forced coca eradication. |

| | | | |
|--|--|--|--|
| 1996 March for Territory, Land, Political Participation and Development. | 2,000 CIDOB, CSUTCB and CSCB grows to 24,000 protester | Nonviolent: Eastern lowland campesinos are supported by Highland campesinos in a pilgrimage from Santa Cruz to La Paz. | Government negotiates with Eastern lowland campesinos CIDOB but rejects the demands of the CSUTCB and CSCB creating a divide between campesino unions. Government passes INRA Law |
| 1996 Potosi Mines | Miners | Violent: Armed miners takeover privately owned mines. | Police is sent killing 11 people. |
| 1998 JTF and Cocalero confrontations | Cocaleros | Violent: Nonviolent protests escalate to violent resulting in the death of 3 policemen. | After several months of protests against Plan Dignity's coca eradication efforts and JTF abuses, some cocaleros resort to violence resulting in the death of 13 cocaleros. |
| 1998 – 2000 Education Reform Protest | Guarani communities, teachers' union, student organizations and CSUTCB | Nonviolent Action: Protests, marches, hunger strikes, pilgrimages, roadblocks. | Guarani's demands for bilingual program and autonomy is ignored. After rejecting numerous demands to increase school budgets and teachers' salaries government makes some concessions. |

| | | | |
|---|--|--|--|
| 1999 Water War | Coordinadora, FEDECOR, CSUTCB, Cocaleros, neighborhood organizations | Nonviolent Action: Mass Mobilization marches and roadblocks | Bolivian State ends water privatization contract with multinational corporation |
| 2001 March for the Rescue of our Homeland | COB, Coordinadora, and cocaleros | Nonviolent Action: March from Cochabamba to La Paz | Protest against public and private downsizing. Government's offer is rejected by protestors. |
| 2000-2001 Movimiento Sin Tierra | 200 MST families | Nonviolent Action: Landless campesinos occupy private lands | Wealthy landlords hire private security forces killing 6 MST campesinos. |
| 2001 Yungas Defense | Yungas cocaleros | Nonviolent Action: Roadblocks | Yungas cocaleros prevent JFT from entering the region and negotiate with the suspension of forced eradication Yungas coca. |
| 2002 Chapare Violence | Cocaleros | Nonviolent Action: Occupying coca markets Violent: Torture and killing of 4 police officers | Thousands of cocaleros mobilize after government declares Chapare coca illegal. Some cocaleros engage in violence by killing police officers. Government immediately arrests and tortures several cocaleros. |

| | | | |
|----------------------------------|--|--|--|
| 2003 Potosi and Chuquisaca March | 30,000 campesinos from Potosi and Chuquisaca, Chapare and Yungas cocaleros | Nonviolent Action: March to Sucre Roadblocks | March does not achieve its goals due to the lack of support of the CSUTCB which was negotiating separately with the government. |
| 2003 Tax Revolt | Neighborhood organizations, COB, CSUTCB, Cocaleros, students, National Police. | Nonviolent Action: Mass mobilizations, marches, roadblocks Violent: Riots and looting | After the massive demonstration of civil unrest resulting in the death of 32 people and several injured at the hands of the military. The government decides not to implement tax hike |
| 2003 Gas Revolt | 300,000 people, FEJUVE, CSUTCB, COB, Cocaleros, | Nonviolent Action: Mass Mobilization marches and roadblocks | Ousting of President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada. |

Chapter 7: Analysis

To begin the analysis of the development of indigenous resistance in Bolivia, it is crucial to address the first proposed research questions: (1) How have the repertoires of contention of indigenous people in Bolivia changed over time?

The study describes the development of indigenous resistance in Bolivia as an evolutionary process of contentious repertoires. The study focuses on the causal mechanisms that have transformed the repertoires of contention of the people in Bolivia. As explained by Tilly (2006; 2008) repertoires of contention draw on the social ties, identities, and organizational forms that constitute everyday social life; therefore these strategies and methods evolve from complex social networks and previous experiences and differ dramatically from one type of regime to another. Tilly's analysis on repertoires of contention in Western European can be applicable to the study of indigenous resistance in Bolivia. Tilly found that earlier repertoires of contention were more violent, direct and performed in a local settings while later repertoires tended to be nonviolent, indirect and national in scope (Tilly 1995; 2006). While the history of resistance in Bolivia follows these patterns from local, direct and violent to national, indirect and nonviolent, it also includes some episodes in which violent, nonviolent and institutional political action overlap with each other.

Chapter 3 focuses on one of the earliest forms of indigenous resistance in Bolivia. The Colonial Period to the Federalist War describes these unstructured forms of resistance that were implemented by the indigenous people during the colonial and initial stages of the Bolivian Republic. Indigenous people were forced into the harsh labor conditions of

the *mita* and to avoid being drafted they implemented several strategies such as: fleeing or abandoning their *ayllu* communities, bribing authorities, and name changing. Violence is absent from these forms of resistance but they should not be confused with nonviolent action since they do not include any type of collective action nor any open challenges to the system of exploitation and domination. As explained by James C. Scott (1986, 6), these are “everyday forms of resistance,” the ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups which require little or no co-ordination or planning; they often represent a form of individual self-help; and they typically evade any direct symbolic confrontation with authority. Because they lack any type of structural organization they present no symbolic defiance to the legitimacy of the systems of oppression (Scott 1986, 22).

This type of resistance would resurface again during the Chaco War (1932-1935) because of the massive forced recruitment of indigenous people which left the rural communities leaderless and weakened. While some indigenous communities organized through nonviolent action and violently to oppose the military drafts others opted to avoid conflict and began fleeing, hiding and even used herbs to appear sick and unfit for service. As explained by Scott (1985, 36), everyday forms of resistance don’t make any headlines since there is rarely any dramatic confrontations. They are incidental activities, unsystematic, and have no revolutionary consequences while overt resistance is organized, systematic, and co-operative (Scott 1986, 24).

In this sense, indigenous resistance in Bolivia developed from initially being opportunistic, unorganized and individual to well-organized and structured nonviolent action campaigns capable of mobilizing almost half a million people. The changes in the repertoires of contention did not happen overnight but is a product of the history of

resistance of the Bolivian people. Campesinos, miners, unions, university students, and other groups utilized forms of resistance that were inherited from previous episodes of contention as repertoires were often learned, shared, repeated, modified and/or perfected.

Authoritarian repression was not only conducted by Spanish administrators but by some indigenous leaders as well. Indigenous leaders who resisted Spanish domination were removed from their positions while those who gave their loyalty to the Spanish authorities were rewarded financially and given Spanish-derived authority which they exercised violently against their own people (Hahn 1992, 43). During the colonial period indigenous communities were involved in small and unplanned violent revolts targeted to a specific group of people or a particular individual who may have been directly involved in committing cruel acts of abuse. They can be categorized as community revenge killings, which was also called for by Tupac Katari. The killing of white residents of small villages was justified as they were viewed as complicit in maintaining the colonial system of indigenous oppression.

The lynching a Bolivian authority figures in Machaca 1921 and Chayanta in 1927 was also the result of a buildup frustration by the indigenous population in which their claims for justice through institutional political action were not met and decided to collectively take matters in their own hands. The murders of some landowners after the Bolivian National Revolution was perhaps the last episodes of violence directed towards white Bolivians but the use of extralegal violence has continued to be implemented by indigenous communities in rural and even urban areas. Migrants from rural communities moved to the impoverished outskirts of Bolivia's major cities in search of some type of social mobility and opportunities. They have continued to perform their indigenous

cultural rituals reflected in street festivals and in vigilante lynching of criminals when the state is unable to protect their security or due to the inadequacies of the state's official legal order (Goldstein 2004).

The colonial and post-colonial period included several episodes of violent indigenous revolts and uprisings. These sporadic and weakly organized forms of violence were quickly defeated by military forces. They were unsuccessful because they did not achieve any long term political goal or obtain government concessions. They lacked organization, planning but most importantly the support of other indigenous communities. As indicated by Scott (1985, 22), these small skirmishes between the rich and poor have important shared interests that would be jeopardized in an all-out confrontation because one side, the poor, is under no illusions about the outcome of a direct assaults. Indigenous communities were aware of the brutal strength of the security forces and did not participate in large scale violent campaigns with the exception of the Tupac Katari Rebellion. There was an element of confidence among the indigenous people during Tupac Katari's rebellion due to the massive mobilization of Indians but the ruthless slaughtering of their leaders affected their hope for liberation. If anything, Katari's rebellion, inspired creoles and mestizos to initiate their own independence movements.

Indigenous armies were present during the War of Independence and Federalist War but these consisted of military pacts that favored the political agenda of the white armies. As explained by Scott (1986, 31), some of the objectives of the elite group compared to indigenous groups may include a collectivized agricultural while the latter clings to its smallholdings; centralized political structure while the indigenous groups want to maintain local autonomy; elite groups pushed for tax increases in the countryside in

order to industrialize, and they almost certainly wished to strengthen the state. Once in power the elite groups were able to attain most of these goals. Their victories and rise to power would have not been possible without the participation and support of the indigenous forces. The massive indigenous armies were used to escort the creole/white troops and were also sent to the front lines for suicide charges. The betrayal of the indigenous leaders and their people was tied to the fear of these elitist groups of losing their status quo to the indigenous masses who quickly mobilized and fought courageously during these wars.

After the Federalist War the repertoires of contention of the indigenous people shifted since organized forms of violence was less common. The indigenous experience of using violence against abusive authorities or to seek some type of liberation or autonomy was ineffective and usually met with more violent suppression from state authorities. As predicted by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 202), successful violent campaigns are likely to lead to recurring civil wars within ten years of the end of the campaign. This was clearly the case with the Great Rebellion leading to the Independence Wars of the early nineteenth century; the ousting of Melgarejo and the Civil/Federalist War; and the violence of the Sexenio that led to the Bolivian National Revolution.

Besides everyday forms of resistance and violence one of the oldest forms of effective resistance was the use institutional political action: legal petitions and lawsuits. As described by Huizer (1972b, 121), peasants generally rely on legal actions to bring demands across and only under extreme circumstances does the peasants' reaction become outright violence and/or include revolutionary activities. Institutional political action through the form of collective petitions did have some favorable outcomes and victories in which judges allowed indigenous people to elect their own representatives. Claims and

grievances were filed to colonial courts and continued to be implemented during the Bolivian state. The chapter on the Bolivian National Revolution details how during the first half of the twentieth century land disputes were fought in courts by rural indigenous communities who led the way to the land reform policies of the Bolivian National Revolution (Gotkowitz 2007).

Indigenous institutional political action began very moderately, using petitions and lawsuits leading to some level of successes but when these legal strategies began to be ignored by the state and their officials it led to shifts and changes in repertoires. More radical methods began to be implemented as a means of achieving social pressure. Another approach was nonviolent action which became a frequently used method that included land invasions, generally explicitly peaceful and nonviolent, and several forms of civil disobedience (Huizer 1972b, 131). Using private lands to graze their livestock or occupying lands that rightfully belonged to indigenous communities, was an instrumental form of resistance used against the Spanish authorities during the colonial period and even during the twenty-first century as demonstrated by the MST. It would be a mistake, however, to consider peasant 'invasions' as acts of violence but on the contrary, most acts of violence related to the agrarian reform issues have come from the landlords, and violent action by the peasants has generally come as a reaction to the former (Huizer 1972b, 129). Another form of nonviolent action that was successful were the *brazos caído* strikes of the indigenous communities which had a direct economic effect on the elite landlords. The well-organized use of the *brazos caído* strikes throughout the countryside resulted in the ousting of president Tejada Sorzano, and contributed to Villarroel's abolishment of the *pongueaje* system.

The analysis demonstrates how repertoires of contention changed in Bolivia but it is also necessary to address the second question of the research: (2) What factors contributed to these changes?

According to Tilly repertoires of contention can change due to the regime and political opportunity structure which can encourage some actions, discourage others, and give people the opportunity to innovate on known scripts (Tarrow 2008, 237; Tilly 2008, 5). The chapter on the Bolivian National Revolution focuses on the low-capacity democratic regimes during the twentieth-century which caused changes, variations and new forms of repertoires of contention. The small and brief episodes of democracy during the twentieth-century was a crucial factor for the growing influence of organized labor, specifically miner's unions, which created new opportunities that changed the dynamics in the fight against injustices. As described by Nash (1979, 2) the Bolivian tin miners have the reputation of being the most revolutionary segment of the working class; they share life experience that has given them a strong identity as a community and as a class. The miners have accumulated a vast variety of repertoires of contention that includes: strikes, sit-ins, street protests, rallies, hunger strikes, etc. The imported ideologies of revolutionary action directed towards socialism have found receptive ground in the mines because of their history of massacres, the murder and exile of their leaders which has raised their consciousness of the need for institutional political action in defense of their class interest (Nash 1979, 5-6). Their culture of resistance is formed by their indigenous rural past and their status as a proletariat. It is from these mining centers that the one of the first revolutionary calls for change was written in the form of the Thesis of Pulacayo which contributed to the Bolivian National Revolution. With the assistance of political activists,

the labor movement was able to create the FSTMB in 1944 which gave the miners a political platform. But the MNR in particular acted to capture the political support of union workers and organize labor at the national level (Hahn 1992, 66). The result was the arming of the workers and the Bolivian National Revolution which included radical Marxists policies of empowering the working class.

From early Marxist intellectuals like Tristan Marof, to contemporary political theorists such as: Alvaro Garcia Linera, Victor Hugo Cardenas and Luis Tapia, the relationship between social movements, indigenous demands and public policies has been possible due to the participation of certain intellectuals, of both indigenous and nonindigenous origin in state positions at various levels who have provided advice and support to indigenous leaders of social movements including becoming activists themselves (Barragan 2008, 33). According to Clawson and Lee (1998, 222), Bolivia continues to have a vigorous Trotskyist movement which enabled Evo Morales to effectively mobilize resistance against counternarcotic programs tapping into strong leftist and anti-American strain in Bolivia.

As historically demonstrated structured and well-organized nonviolent action campaigns that were able to attract massive and diverse participation of the Bolivian public have proven to be successful in achieving their objectives while smaller spontaneous violent and even nonviolent campaigns were easily thwarted. Another factor that contributed to the changes in repertoires of contention was the Bolivian National Revolution government that pushed for high levels of political participation of disenfranchised groups. The formation of the COB in 1952, a centralized union apparatus, became instrumental in mobilizing the working masses. With over half of century of

resistance the COB played a crucial part in organizing strikes and marches. It was the COB and not so much as political parties that represented the Left; the COB's role in staging strikes and mass protests was an important factor in forcing the military out of the government (Dunkerley 1993, 122).

During the military dictatorships the COB and FSTMB were the biggest threats because of their ability to mobilize the nonviolent masses and protest the legitimacy of the military state. Bolivian labor forces were able to paralyze the country's economy, reject IMF austerity packages and even demand the presidents' resignation. Changes in repertoires would occur after the country re-democratized and become a part of the global market economy. By the mid-1980s the political power of union groups nearly disappeared after the enactment of neoliberal economic policies. The political influence of the miner's union, FSTMB, ended with the closure of the mines, the reputation of the COB was devastated for supporting failing leftist governments, and the political Left was in retreat after the economic crisis (Dunkerley 1993, 123).

The chapter on the period of military dictatorships focuses on how nondemocratic and authoritarian regimes shaped new forms of repertoires. One of the vast repertoires of nonviolent action strategies used by the people of Bolivia has been the hunger strike which was crucial in the dictatorship period. To emphasize the unethical injustices of the state and the persecution of activists, Catholic churches hosted several hunger strikes for the protection of the strikers and to include a religious element to their cause. The intention of the hunger strike is to gather public support and awareness of their struggle by provoking feelings of guilt or complacency. Implemented primarily by the wives of imprisoned miners, the hunger strike is a pervasive sign of contention. The 1977-78 hunger strike that

took down the Banzer dictatorship was successful because of the unexpected enormous public support of Bolivians from all sectors who also participated in the strikes. Hunger strikes were not only used by the less powerful but utilized by acting and former presidents to demand specific goals. In Bolivia the hunger strike is referred to as an “extreme measure” since all other channels have been exhausted, including public denunciations to the press, temporary work stoppages, prolonged labor strikes, marches or road blocks (Gustafson 2009, 234).

One of the most effective forms of nonviolent resistance has been the roadblocks/blockades. Indeed, this has been a form of repertoire that has been used since the colonial period and continues to be an effective way of collective claim-making. Because of its geographical location of being surrounded by mountainous terrains and with limited road access, the capital of Bolivia, La Paz, has suffered from numerous roadblocks. In 1781 Tupac Katari was able to surround the city for several months impeding the entrance of food supplies and other necessities. As part of their strategy to incite panic the indigenous people also made a lots of noises using bells and other instruments; they screamed and yelled and also blew on their wind instruments “pututus” to summons more people (Albo 1986a, 112). Roadblocks would persist during the formation of the Bolivian state and used to protest against unfair land reforms. Some roadblocks were so effective in paralyzing the country’s economy that military intervention was needed. The Cochabamba roadblock of 1974 resulted in the death of several campesinos when the military was called damaging the Military-Campesino Pact.

The growth of indigenous organizations such as the CSUTCB and the cocaleros’ experience of fighting oppression led to more organized and effective repertoires of

contention during the democratic neoliberal era in Bolivia. The formation of the CSUTCB in 1979 enabled the indigenous masses to organize more effectively and erect impenetrable road blockades around the country. The CSUTCB came to dominance in the 1980s as the main labor and political force representing the Bolivian Indian and even though its main strongholds of support were on the Altiplano departments of La Paz and Potosi, it also spoke for and united campesinos unions from the valleys (Hahn 1992, 78). Under the leadership of Felipe Quispe, the CSUTCB became an ad hoc organization pushing for a radical anti-neoliberal and pro-indigenous agenda. The CSUTCB was able to quickly organize well-coordinated national roadblocks to reject neoliberal economic policies and/or demand the release of imprisoned activists.

The cocaleros of the Chapare have also been able to protest by using marches, demonstrations, hunger strikes and the most importantly roadblocks that have brought the country to a standstill since a single road could be the only access through mountains and valleys (Leons, Sanabria 1997, 28). The privatization of state industries and mass layoffs of the mid-1980s weaken the workers' union ability to negotiate with the state but their rebellious spirit was passed along to their new environment, the Chapare jungle. It is in the Chapare where the unemployed miners and factory workers reintegrated with other indigenous communities in the campesino way of life to grow coca. Their experience in organized resistance after decades of oppression was quickly applied to defend their right to grow coca. The range of the strategies, methods and symbols of nonviolent action that have been elaborated can be transmitted between campaigns (Carter 2012, 9). According to Sanabria (1995, 84) cocaleros have transformed the coca leaf into a powerful symbol of counter-hegemonic action and discourse, one which they have forged and articulate a

renewed sense of common identity that incorporates an oppositional ideology, the construction of new cultural forms, and the pursuit of collective goals that run counter to those espoused by the state. The popularity of this movement was used by the cocalero leader, Evo Morales, to form the political party MAS which did not only address U.S. counternarcotic issues but moved to other areas such as anti-neoliberal movements and political corruption. The Bolivian public support of the MAS is seen as a rejection of the traditionally and exclusionary political system that has economically failed to integrate the most marginalized social groups (Orias Arredondo 2005, 46).

Collective pilgrimages to government offices and court courts have been used by indigenous communities even before the formation of the Bolivian state. But in the last three decades they have become more popular and developed into a strategic method by gathering the support of other activist groups while calling the attention of the public. As explained by Nash (1975, 262), resistance moves from the individual moral reaction to collective action, by rejecting a given model of how society should operate and forces the attention of the public on to the need for alternative models and thus become the first step towards innovation. The use of pilgrimages from rural areas to the capital by these indigenous communities in Bolivia did not only generate support by the urban mestizo but also created a unity within the population. The support towards these social movements has encouraged a rise of ethnic consciousness that does not represent a return to the past but rather a phenomenon directly linked to globalization which has opened new opportunities follow by much criticism forming an ethnic identity (Albo 2004, 36). It is in these marches/pilgrimages that indigenous symbols, rituals, Bolivian flags alongside the *wipala* are displayed producing national identity and pride by establishing an acceptance

of the indigenous image as the national image. The massive marches of the Gas Revolt of 2003 were initiated by pilgrimages of several groups meeting in El Alto and marching towards the capital where they were joined by other activist groups and regular residents of the city.

As argued by Tilly (2006, 210), less democratic and lower-capacity regimes experience more authoritarian and/or more violent forms of contentious politics while democratic regimes with low government capacity tend to uphold a minimum of rights and liberties but the domestic sphere remains vulnerable to bouts of disorder and violence while high capacity democratic regimes endure little violence in their domestic politics. Regimes changes from non-democratic to democratic with low and high government capacity were the major factors that contributed to the changes in the repertoires of contention. The following table summarizes the factors that caused the changes in repertoires of contention.

Table 5.1 Factors that Caused Changes in the Repertoires of Contention.

| Event/Period | Indigenous Methods of Resistance | Factors that Caused Changes in Repertoires of Contention |
|-----------------------------------|--|--|
| Colonial to Federalist War 1899 | From everyday forms of resistance against the <i>mita</i> (abandoning lands, name changing) to institutional political action (law suits and petitions) against high taxes and abusive colonial authorities. | Organized institutional action is sometimes effective and courts rule in favor of replacing colonial appointed authorities to community elected community leaders. |
| Colonial to Federalist War 1899 | Institutional political action (law suits and petitions) against high taxes and abusive colonial authorities to collective violence | Delays in the legal system and court rejection of petitions and law suits. |
| Colonial to Federalist War 1899 | Indigenous armies to assisting Creole Independence Army | Indigenous communities failed to achieve Colonial independence but are recruited by the wealthier and better equipped Creole Independence Army. |
| Colonial to Federalist War 1899 | Institutional political action (law suits and petitions) against <i>Exvinculation</i> Laws to alliance with Creole/Liberal Army. | Delay in the legal system and Liberal Party advocates for indigenous land right. |
| Bolivian National Revolution 1952 | Miners begin to use nonviolent resistance methods: strikes, street protests. | Harsh working conditions and exploitation in the mines leads to the emergence of political activists and workers' unions. |
| Bolivian National Revolution 1952 | Combination of institutional political action and nonviolent actions to small violent uprisings. | Alliance between union miners and indigenous campesinos against state repression and massive force conscription of union and campesino leaders for the Chaco War. |
| Bolivian National Revolution 1952 | Combination of institutional political action and nonviolent action (<i>brazos caído</i> strike) to alliance of political, union and | Post War political climate allow for the reemergence of union workers and alliance with political and campesino |

| | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|--|
| | campesino leaders in armed revolution. | leaders. Even though political and nonviolent action is used and successful in some cases, state violence and repression persists and leads to the mass arrest, exile and killing of indigenous advocates, including one sitting president. |
| Bolivian National Revolution 1952 | Nonviolent action: Strikes and street demonstrations to violent takeover of mines and kidnaping. | Bolivian National Revolution allows the creation of a national workers' union COB and miner union FSTMB but unions lose political power due to the strengthening of the military and the Military-Campesino Pact. |
| Military Dictatorships | Union militias/guerrillas to nonviolent action | After the failures of Che Guevara's guerrilla and the ELN guerrilla campaign, miners resort to clandestine meetings and support the brief administration of JJ Torres. |
| Military Dictatorships | Nonviolent action to well-organized nonviolent action campaigns. | The Military-Campesino Pact ended with the Massacre of Tolata of 1974 which led to the formation of the campesino union CSUTCB. Campesinos and miners coordinate: protests, road blocks, hunger strikes, massive demonstrations and support of the general population. |
| Fight Against Neoliberalism | Nonviolent action: strikes and protests to campesino led pilgrimages, road blocks, and massive street demonstrations. | The implementation of the NEP weakened the COB and FSTMB and their methods of resistance. Unemployed miners become coca farmers (cocaleros) and organize into unions. Democratic governments allow for the political participation of campesinos. |

To conclude the analysis, the third question will be addressed: (3) What are the outcomes of nonviolent movements?

The outcomes of nonviolent movements in Bolivia have been positive and successful. The Bolivian social movements that employed nonviolent action gained popular support of the country and were able to access Bolivia's political system democratically. As Bond explains, social groups involved in nonviolent action tend to become democratic, decentralized political structure all uses of nonviolent direct action may encourage popular empowerment (1994, 60). The methods of nonviolent action have had an impact in the development of a more democratic and pluralistic state in Bolivia which recognizes, incorporates and values the once marginalized indigenous communities.

Even though Bolivia is the least developed country in South America, it has higher levels of democracy than would be expected given its level of development because of the history of nonviolent struggle in the country. The legacy of Bolivia's repertoire of nonviolence action throughout its history has demonstrated the incredible fact that the poorest people of the poorest country in South America have been capable of obtaining land reform, political rights, overthrown military dictatorships, and have influence the government's economic agenda. The nonviolent movements paved the way to the democratically election and re-election of Evo Morales the first Bolivian indigenous president. The members of his cabinet and political party are mainly composed of indigenous intellectuals and indigenous leaders who stood by him in the past during numerous acts of nonviolent resistance to defy government administrations that ignored the majority of Bolivians.

The successful nonviolent campaigns led to positive long-term outcomes. As explained by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 10), transitions that occur due the successful nonviolent resistance campaigns create much more durable and internally peaceful democracies than transitions provoked by violent insurgencies. Since the nonviolent re-installment of democracy in 1982 there has been a consistent use and increase of diverse and inclusive methods on nonviolent resistance. Nonviolent action has had a crucial role in promoting social justice and creating safe and peaceful spaces for negotiations with state authorities. None of the social progress would have been possible if violent campaigns or terrorist methods were used.

As emphasized by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 207), mass participation in nonviolent political change can lead to the development and improvement of democratic skills and also foster government accountability. The study of Bolivia also falls into this category since the transitions that were driven mainly by nonviolent action have led to more democratic regimes which have been challenged nonviolently when political, economic or social injustices appeared. The chapter on the fight against neoliberalism emphasizes how nonviolent action was consistently and sometimes aggressively used to challenge the neoliberal economic agenda of these democratic regimes.

The people of Bolivia have utilized several nonviolent strategies to include road blockades, marches, strikes and civil disobedience to achieve: land rights, indigenous civil rights, and ousted ruthless dictators. As explained by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 208), nonviolent movements can strengthen citizen expectations that the post conflict political regime will also be nonviolent. Nonviolent action has contributed to the reduction of repressive regimes, mainly democratic regimes, since the use of state violence has had

political costs during election periods. The excessive use of security forces against nonviolent demonstrators has been condemned by the general public, media and other political leader. Through the use of the ballot, the Bolivian people have demonstrated their disapproval of the unnecessary force of the military and police against nonviolent protestors.

It is also crucial to note that nonviolent campaigns tend to encourage political participation and activism. Political activists have inspired and promoted the use of nonviolent and political institutional action because of the successful outcomes compared to the failures of violent methods. Bolivia has also been able to achieve a high level of political activism among its citizens. The people in Bolivia have learned to cooperate amongst each other by creating alliances and engaging in civil resistance utilizing indigenous symbols, rituals, and customs to create more effective methods and tactics to obtain their political goals. Political participation is a product of Bolivia's nonviolent past. It has led to the creation of new social, cultural and political identities that have reinforced their unity.

Nonviolent action has united Bolivians from all walks of life. Campesinos, miners, urban workers, community organizers, student activists, and political leaders have all marched together to claim their country as their own. Indigenous resistance evolved to a form of nonviolent resistance that includes Bolivian of all social sectors but continue to embrace their indigenous roots. The patterns of indigenous resistance in Bolivia also demonstrate that while there was a large number of participants in violent insurrections in earlier periods their numbers declined to very small groups as nonviolent action became the major strategy of resistance during the later periods. This observation also coincides

with Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 192) finding that nonviolent campaigns have succeeded in generating mass mobilization while violent campaigns have relied on smaller number of participants.

As indicated earlier and demonstrated by Table 5.2 repertoires of contention are passed along social networks and tend to change as regimes become more democratic. They start from insolated and personal forms of resistance performed at a local setting to organized collective actions at a national level. Repertoires evolve from a range of methods and strategies that are embedded in existing cultures and history (Tilly 2006, 30). The four periods reveal how nonviolent repertoires were maintained, perfected and repeated due to their effectiveness while violent repertoires were replaced.

Table 5.2 Methods of Resistance Throughout Bolivian History

| | <u>Period 1</u> Colonial to Federalist War | <u>Period 2</u> Bolivian Revolution | <u>Period 3</u> Military Dictatorship | <u>Period 4</u> Neoliberalism |
|-------------------------------------|--|--|--|---|
| Violent Methods of Resistance | Killing of abuse Colonial authorities. Small and sporadic indigenous revolts. Indigenous Armies. Indigenous guerrillas Force expulsion of white residents Killing of soldiers | Killing of abusive landlords. Killing of government officials. Small and sporadic indigenous revolts. Arson and destruction of haciendas. Armed workers/miners and campesinos. Kidnapping Use of dynamite Armed occupation of mining centers Taking hostages | Armed workers/miners Guerrilla tactics Armed occupation of government offices | Terrorism tactics (bombing and kidnapping) Killing of policemen Armed occupation of mining centers Taking hostages |
| Everyday Forms of Resistance | Abandoning land or name changing. | Draft evasion | | |

| | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|--|---|--|--|
| Institutional Political Action | Legal petitions to high colonial Courts and Bolivian court Legal suits | Legal petitions to Bolivian court Legal suits | | |
| Nonviolent Action | Pilgrimage to colonial tribunals. Land occupation Mass mobilization of people Blockades/Road blocks | Formation of workers' unions Rallies and marches Workers' strikes Street protests Use of radio, newspapers and pamphlets to express grievances. Land occupation "Brazos Caído" strikes Hunger strikes Mass mobilization of people Blockades/Roadbl ocks | Formation of rural unions Rallies and marches Workers' strikes Clandestine union meetings Street protests Use of radio, newspapers and pamphlets to express grievances. Funeral marches Hunger strikes Mass mobilization of people Erection of barricades. Blockades/Ro adblocks | Formation of cocalero unions Rallies and marches Workers' strikes Street protests Land occupations Mining center occupations Hunger strikes Mass mobilization of people Long distance pilgrimages Erection of barricades. Blockades/Roadblocks |

Chapter 8: Conclusion

The history of civil resistance has contributed and shaped the Bolivian national identity. Resistance is strengthened by self-determination of people who have not yet lost their identity, therefore their experience of protests has incorporated cultural rituals that drives their sentiment of rebellion (Nash 2001, 201-2). The general public joined the wider collective struggle against unpopular and unjust governmental policies encompassing economic neoliberalism, rampant globalization, the militarized Andean drug war, and chronic environmental and human rights abuses. The Bolivian government which was run by elite politicians educated in western universities politically excluded the necessities and demands of the indigenous communities that represent most of the country. In the process, popular social movements sought to amplify the meaning of citizenship, to redefine the basis and content of national identity, and to restructure the intimate relationship between culture and power in Bolivia's multi-ethnic and multicultural state and society (Morales 2012, 49).

In closing this dissertation, it should be noted that political contention continues to be present in the everyday lives of Bolivians. After the adaptation of a new constitution in 2009 which allows a president to serve only two terms, Evo Morales called for a referendum in 2016 to permit him to run again in 2019. This would be his fourth presidential run since his initial election in 2005. Political scandals tied to high levels of government corruption and love affairs have discredited Evo Morales and his political party, MAS. The slowing of the economy and government incompetence has also added to a deepening distrust of his administration. On February 21, 2016, Bolivian voters

rejected the constitutional amendment that would have allowed Evo Morales to be re-elected in 2019 but Morales has insisted that he will run since the constitutional court of the country has ruled his candidacy as legal. People have mobilized nonviolently and in some instances with acts of vandalism to demonstrate their discontent towards Morales but there has also been nonviolent mobilization in his support. The opposition has pushed for candidates that represent Bolivia's past, like former president Carlos Mesa, who has had difficulties engaging with the country's large indigenous population. A recommendation for a future study would address the current situation in Bolivia since there appears to be nonviolent groups against and in support of Evo Morales.

Bibliography

Abrahms, Max. 2006. Why Terrorism Does Not Work. *International Security* 31 (2): 42-78.

Achtenberg, Emily P. 2009. "Community Organizing, Rebellion, and the Progressive State: Neighborhood Councils in El Alto, Bolivia." Pp. 275-288 in *Engaging Social Justice: Critical Studies of 21st Century Social Transformation*, ed. by David Fasenfest. Leiden: Brill.

Aguilo, Federico. 1985. *Narcotráfico y política II: Bolivia 1982-1985*. Cochabamba: Poligraf.

Aguilo, Federico. 1993. "*Nunca mas*" para Bolivia. Cochabamba: APDHB/IESE-UMSS.

Albo, Xavier. 1988. "El mundo Aymara: Introducción." Pp. 21-47 in *Raíces de América: El mundo Aymara*, ed. Albo, Xavier. Madrid: UNESCO/Alianza Editorial.

Albo, Xavier. 1986a. "Etnicidad y clase en a gran rebelión Aymara/Quchua: Kataris, Amarus y Bases. 1780-1781." Pp. 51-120 in *Bolivia: La fuerza historica del campesinado*, eds. Fernando Calderon and Jorge Dadler. La Paz: CERES.

Albo, Xavier. 1986b. "Bases étnicas y sociales para la participación Aymara." Pp. 401-442 in *Bolivia: La fuerza historica del campesinado*, eds. Fernando Calderon and Jorge Dadler. La Paz: CERES.

Albo, Xavier. 1987. "From MNRista to Kataristas to Katari." Pp. 379- 419 in *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries*. ed. by Stern, Steve J. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Albo, Xavier. 1994b. "And from Katarista to MNRistas? The Surprising and Bold Alliance between Aymaras and Neoliberals in Bolivia." Pp. 55-81 in *Indigenous Peoples and Democracy in Latin America*. ed. Van Cott, Donna Lee. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Alexander, Robert J. 2005. *A History of Organized Labor in Bolivia*. Westport: Praeger Publishers.

Antezana Ergueta, Luis and Hugo B. Romero. 1973. *Los sindicatos campesinos. Un proceso de integración nacional en Bolivia*. La Paz: CIDA.

Antezana Ergueta, Luis. 1982. *La Revolución Campesina en Bolivia: Historia del Sindicalismo Campesino*. La Paz: Editora Siglos.

Antezana Ergueta, Luis. 1994. *Las Grandes Masacres y Levantamientos Indigenas en la Historia de Bolivia (1850-1975)*. La Paz: Editora Juventud.

Arnold Y. Denise and Alison Spedding. 2005. *Mujeres en los Movimientos Sociales en Bolivia 2000-2003*. La Paz: CIDEM.

Arze Aguirre, Rene D. 1979. *Participacion Popular en la Independencia de Bolivia*. La Paz: Inprenta Don Bosco

Arze Aguirre, Rene D. 1987. *Guerra y Conflictos Sociales: El caso rural boliviano durante la campana del Chaco*. La Paz: CERES

Asebey Claire, Ricardo C y Roger L. Mamani Siñani. 2015. "Violencia y conflicto en la historia de Bolivia" T'inkazos numero 37 139-150

Assmann, Hugo. 1971. *Teoponte: Una Experiencia Guerrillera*. Oruro: CEDI.

Atack, Iain. 2012. *Nonviolence in Political Theory*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Bascope Aspiazu, Rene. 1982. *La veta blanca: Coca y cocaína en Bolivia*. La Paz: Ediciones Aquí.

Bakewell, Peter. 1984. *Miners of the Red Mountain: Indian Labor in Potosi, 1545-1650*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.

Barrios Moron, Raul. 1993. "La Elusiva Paz de la Democracia en Bolivia" Pp. 143-200 in *Violencias encubiertas en Bolivia*, ed. Albo, Xavier and Raul Barrios. La Paz: CIPCA.

Bedregal Gutiérrez, Guillermo and Ruddy Viscarra Pando. 1989. *La lucha boliviana contra la agresión del narcotráfico*. La Paz: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro.

Blasier, Cole. 1971. "The United States and the Revolution." Pp. 53-109 in *Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia Since 1952*, eds. Malloy, James and Richard Thorn. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press.

Bond, Dough. 1994. "Nonviolent Action and the Diffusion of Power." Pp. 59-79 in *Justice Without Violence*. eds. Wehr, Paul, Heidi Burgess, and Guy Burgess. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishing.

Calderon, Fernando and Jorge Dandler. 1986. "Movimientos Campesinos y Estado en Bolivia." Pp. 15-50 in *Bolivia: La fuerza historica del campesinado*, ed. Fernando Calderon and Jorge Dadler. La Paz: CERES.

Campbell, Leon G. 1987. "Ideology and Factionalism during the Great Rebellion, 1780-1782." Pp. 110- 139 in *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries*. ed. by Stern, Steve J. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Cárdenas, Víctor Hugo. 1988. "La lucha de un pueblo." Pp. 495-534 in *Raíces de América: El mundo Aymara*, ed. Albo, Xavier. Madrid: UNESCO/Alianza Editorial.

Carpenter, Ted Galen. 2003. *Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington's Futile War on Drugs in Latin America*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Carter, April. 2012. *People Power and Political Change: Key issues and concepts*. London: Routledge Press.

Carter, Williams E. 1971. "Revolution and the Agrarian Sector." Pp. 233-268 in *Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia Since 1952*, eds. Malloy, James and Richard Thorn. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press.

Chenoweth, Erica and Stephan, Maria J. 2011. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Cockburn, Alexander and Jeffrey St. Clair. 1999. *Whiteout: The CIA, Drugs and the Press*. New York: Verso.

Cole, Jeffrey C. 1985. *The Potosi Mita, 1573-1700: Compulsory Indian Labor in the Andes*. Stanford, Stanford University Press.

Condarco Morales, Ramiro. 1982. *Zarate el "Terrible" Wilka: Historia de la Rebelión Indígena de 1899 en la Republica de Bolivia*. La Paz: Renovacion.

Contreras Baspineiro, Alexander. 1995. *La marcha historica: "Por la vida, la coca, y la dignidad nacional."* Cochabamba: CEDIB.

Corn, David. 1991. "The CIA and The Cocaine Coup." *The Nation*, October 7.

Cornblit, Oscar. 1995. *Power and Violence in the Colonial City: Oruro from the Mining Renaissance to the Rebellion of Tupac Amaru (1740-1982)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dandler, Jorge. 1986a. "Campesinado y Reforma Agraria en Cochabamaba (1952-3): Dinamica de un movimiento campesino en Bolivia." Pp. 205-244 in *Bolivia: La fuerza historica del campesinado*, ed. Fernando Calderon and Jorge Dadler. La Paz: CERES.

Dandler, Jorge. 1986b. "La 'Cha'apa Guerra' de Cochbamba: Un proceso de disgregación política." Pp. 245-276 in *Bolivia: La fuerza historica del campesinado*, ed. Fernando Calderon and Jorge Dadler. La Paz: CERES.

Dandler, Jorge and Juan Torrico A. 1987. "From the National Indigenous Congress to the Ayopaya Rebellion: Bolivia, 1945-1947." Pp. 334- 378 in *Resistance, Rebellion, and*

Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries. ed. by Stern, Steve J. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Dangl, Benjamin. 2007. *The Price of Fire: Resource Wars and Social Movements in Bolivia.* Edinburgh: AK Press.

Delgado Gonzalez, Trifonio. 1984. *100 años de lucha obrera en Bolivia.* La Paz: Ediciones ISLA.

De Mesa, Jose, Teresa Gisbert, and Carlos D. Mesa Gisbert. 2003. *Historia de Bolivia.* 5th ed. La Paz: Editorial Gisbert.

Debray, Regis. 1967. *From Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America.* New York: Monthly Review Press.

Della Porta, Donatella. 2002. "Comparative Politics and Social Movements." Pp. 286-313 in *Methods of Social Movement Research*, eds. Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

Domingo, Pilar. 2003. "Revolution and the Unfinished Business of Nation and State-Building." Pp. 364-379 in *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective*, eds. Merilee S. Grindle and Pilar Domingo. London: University of London.

Dudouet, Veronique. 2008. "Nonviolent Resistance and Conflict Transformations in Power Asymmetries." In *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

Dunkerley, James. 1984. *Rebellion in the Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952-1982.* London: Verso.

Dunkerley, James and Rolando Morales. 1986. "The Crisis in Bolivia." *New Left Review* 155, January-February 86-106.

Dunkerley, James. 2003. "Origins of the Bolivian Revolution in the Twentieth Century: Some Reflections." Pp. 135-163 in *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective*, eds. Merilee S. Grindle and Pilar Domingo. London: University of London.

Fabricant, Nicole. 2012. *Mobilizing Bolivia's Displaced: Indigenous Politics and the Struggle Over Land.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Flores, Gonzalo. 1986a. "Levantamientos Campesinos durante el periodo liberal (1900-1920)." Pp. 121-134 in *Bolivia: La fuerza historica del campesinado*, ed. Fernando Calderon and Jorge Dadler. La Paz: CERES.

Flores, Gonzalo. 1986b. "Estado, políticas agrarias y luchas campesinas: revisión de una década en Bolivia." Pp. 443-543 in *Bolivia: La fuerza histórica del campesinado*, ed. Fernando Calderon and Jorge Dadler. La Paz: CERES.

Field, Thomas C. 2014. *From Development to Dictatorship: Bolivia and the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy Era*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Galeano, Eduardo. 1971. *Las venas abiertas de América Latina*. Habana: La casa de las Americas.

Gallardo Lozada, Jorge. 1972. *De Torres a Banzer: Diez meses de emergencia en Bolivia*. Buenos Aires: Periferia.

Gallardo Lozada, Jorge. 1984. *La Nación Postergada*. La Paz: Los Amigos del Libro.

Gamarra, Eduardo A. 1988. 'Bolivia: Disengagement and Democratisation.' In Danopoulos, Constantine P., ed. *Military Disengagement from Politics*. pp. 47-78. New York: Routledge.

Gamarra, Eduardo A. 1994a. *Entre la droga y la democracia: La cooperación entre Estados Unidos-Bolivia y la lucha contra el narcotráfico*. La Paz: CEBIAE.

Gamarra, Eduardo A. 1994b. 'Crafting Political Support for Stabilization: Political Pacts and the New Economic Policy in Bolivia.' In Smith, William C., Carlos H. Acuña and Eduardo A. Gamarra, eds. *Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Mexico*. pp. 105-127. Miami: North-South Center Press.

Gamarra, Eduardo A. 1997a. 'Fighting Drugs in Bolivia: United States and Bolivian Perceptions at Odds.' In Leons, M. Barbara, and Harry Sanabria, eds., *Coca, Cocaine, and the Bolivian Reality*, pp. 243-252. Albany: State University of New York.

Gamarra, Eduardo A. 1997b. 'Hybrid Presidentialism and Democratization: The Case of Bolivia.' In Mainwaring, Scott and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds. *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. pp. 363-393. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gamarra, Eduardo A. 2003. "The Construction of Bolivia's Multiparty System." Pp. 289-317 in *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective*, eds. Merilee S. Grindle and Pilar Domingo. London: University of London.

Garcia Arganaras, Fernando. 1992. Bolivia's Transformist Revolution. *Latin American Perspectives* 19 (2) 44-71.

García Linera, Álvaro. 2004. "La crisis del estado y las sublevaciones indígena-plebeyas." Pp. 27-86 in *Memorias de Octubre*, ed. García Linera, Álvaro, Raúl Prada and Luis Tapia. La Paz: Muela del Diablo Editores.

García Linera, Álvaro, Marxa Chavez Leon and Patricia Costas Monje. 2004. *Sociología de los Movimientos Sociales en Bolivia: Estructura de movilización, repertorios culturales y acción política*. La Paz: Plural Editores.

Gerooge, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Gill, Lesley. 2004. *The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Goodrich, Carter. 1971. "Bolivia in Tme of Revolution." Pp. 3-24 in *Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia Since 1952*, eds. Malloy, James and Richard Thorn. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press.

Gordon, Gretchen and Aaron Luoma. 2008. "Oil and Gas: The Elusive Wealth beneath Their Feet." Pp. 77-114 in *Dignity and Defiance: Stories from Bolivia's Challenge to Globalization*, ed. by Jim Shultz and Melissa Crane Draper. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Gotkowitz, Laura. 2003. "Revisiting the Rural Roots of the Revolution." Pp. 164-182 in *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective*, eds. Merilee S. Grindle and Pilar Domingo. London: University of London.

Gotkowitz, Laura. 2007. *A Revolution For Our Rights: Indigenous Struggle for Land and Justice in Bolivia, 1880-1952*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Gray Molina, George. 2003. "The Offspring of 1952: Poverty, exclusion and the Promise of Popular Participation." Pp. 345-379 in *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective*, eds. Merilee S. Grindle and Pilar Domingo. London: University of London.

Grindle, Merilee S. 2003. "Shadowing the Past? Policy Reform in Boliva, 1985-2002." Pp. 318-344 in *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective*, eds. Merilee S. Grindle and Pilar Domingo. London: University of London.

Guevara, Ernesto "Che." 1961. *Guerrilla Warfare*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Guevara, Ernesto "Che." 1994. *The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara*. New York: Pathfinder Press.

Gustafson, Bret. 2009. *New Language of the State: Indigenous Resurgence and the Politics of Knowledge in Bolivia*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Gutierrez Aguilar, Raquel. 2014. *Rhythms of the Pachakuti: Indigenous Uprising and State Power in Bolivia*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Hahn, Dwight R. 1992. *The Divided Word of the Bolivian Andes: A Structural View of Domination and Resistance*. New York: Crane Russak.

Henkel, Ray. 1982. 'The Move to the Oriente: Colonization and Environmental Impact.' In Ladman, Jerry R., ed. *Modern-Day Bolivia: Legacy of the Revolution and the Prospects for the Future*. pp. 277-299. Tempe: Center for Latin American Studies Arizona State University.

Henkel, Ray. 1986. 'The Bolivian Cocaine Industry.' In Morales, Edmundo, ed. *Drugs in Latin America*. pp. 53-80. Williamsburg: Studies in Third World Societies, Department of Anthropology College of William and Mary.

Huizer, Gerritt. 1972a. *The Revolutionary Potential of Peasants in Latin America*. Lexington: Lexington Books.

Huizer, Gerritt. 1972b. "Land Invasion as a Non-Violent Strategy of Peasant Rebellion." *Journal of Peace Research* 9 (2) 121-132.

Hylton, Forrest and Sinclair Thomson. 2007. *Revolutionary Horizons: Past and Present in Bolivian Politics*. New York: Verso.

Ibañez Rojo, Enrique. 2000. "The UDP Government and the Crisis of the Bolivian Left." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 32(1):175-205.

Irurozqui, Marta. 1994. *La armonia de las desigualdades: Elites y conflictos de poder en Bolivia 1880-1920*. Madrid: CSIC

Irurozqui, Marta. 2000. "The Sounds of Puputos: Politicisation and Indigenous Rebellions in Bolivia 1826-1921." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 32 (1): 85-114

Irurozqui, Marta. 2001. "La guerra de civiliacion: La participación indígena en la revolución de 1870 en Bolivia." *Revista de Indias* 61 (222): 407-432.

Klaiber, Jeffrey SJ. 1998. *The Church, Dictatorships and Democracy in Latin America*. Eugene: Wipf & Stock Publishers.

Kelly, Jonathan and Herbert S. Klein. 1981. *Revolution and the Rebirth of Inequality: A Theory Applied to the National Revolution in Bolivia*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Klein, Hubert S. 2002. *A Concise History of Bolivia*. Revised Edition of *Bolivia, the Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University.

Klein, Hubert. 2003, "Social Change in Bolivia since 1952." Pp. 232-258 in *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective*, eds. Merilee S. Grindle and Pilar Domingo. London: University of London.

Kohl, Benjamin and Linda Farthing. 2006. *Impasse in Bolivia: Neoliberal Hegemony & Popular Resistance*. London: Zed Books.

Kohl, Benjamin, Linda Farthing and Felix Muruchi. 2011. *From the Mines to the Street: A Bolivian Activist's Life*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Kuijijit, Dirk. 2017. "The Cuban Connection: The Departamento America and the Latin American Revolutions." Pp. 67-88 in *Revolutionary Violence and the New Left: Transnational Perspectives*, eds. Alvarez, Alberto Matin and Eduardo Rey Tristan. New York: Routledge.

Lagos, Maria L. 1994. *Economy and Power: Dynamics of Class and Culture in Rural Bolivia*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Lamberg, Robert F. 1970. "Che in Bolivia: The Revolution that Failed." *Problems of Communism* 19 (4): 25-37.

Ladman, Jerry R. 1982a. 'The Political Economy of the "Economic Miracle" of the Banzer Regime.' Ppp. 321-343 in Ladman, Jerry R., ed. *Modern-Day Bolivia: Legacy of the Revolution and the Prospects for the Future*. Temple: Center for Latin American Studies Arizona State University.

Ladman, Jerry R. 1982b. "The Failure to Redemocratize." In Ladman, Jerry R., ed. *Modern-Day Bolivia: Legacy of the Revolution and the Prospects for the Future*. Pp. 345-370. Temple: Center for Latin American Studies Arizona State University.

Landman, Todd. 2008. *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction*. Routledge: New York

Lange, Matthew. 2013. *Comparative – Historical Methods*. Sage: Los Angeles

Langer, Erick D. 1989. *Economic Change and Rural Resistance in Southern Bolivia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Lara, Jesus. 1971. *Guerrillero Inti Peredo*. La Paz: Los Amigos del Libro.

Larson, Brooke. 2003. "Capturing Indian Bodies, Hearths and Minds: The Gendered Politics of Rural School Reform in Bolivia, 1910-52" Pp. 183-209 in *Proclaiming*

Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective, eds. Merilee S. Grindle and Pilar Domingo. London: University of London.

Larson, Brooke. 2004. *Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810-1910*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Laserna, Roberto. 2010. *La democracia en el Ch'enko*. La Paz: Fundacion Milenio.

Latin American Bureau (LAB). 1982. *Narcotráfico y política: Militarismo y mafia en Bolivia*. Madrid: IEPALA.

Lazar, Sian. 2008. *El Alto, Rebel City: Self and Citizenship in Andean Bolivia*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Lavaud, Jean Pierre. 1986. "Los campesinos frente al Estado" Pp. 277-312 in *Bolivia: La fuerza historica del campesinado*, eds. Fernando Calderon and Jorge Dadler. La Paz: CERES.

Lehman, Kenneth D. 1999. *Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.

Leons, Madeline Barbara and William Leons. 1971. "Land Reform and Economic Change in the Yungas." Pp. 269-299 in *Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia Since 1952*, eds. Malloy, James and Richard Thorn. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press.

Levine, Michael and Laura Kavanau-Levine. 1994. *The Big White Lie: The Deep Cover Operation that Exposed the CIA Sabotage of the War on Drugs*. New York: Thunder Mouth Press.

Lopez, Fernando. 2016. *The Feathers of the Condor: Transnational State Terrorism, Exiles and Civilian Anticommunist in South America*. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Lora, Guillermo. 1977. *A History of Bolivian Labour Movement: 1848-1971*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lora, Guillermo. 1972. *Bolivia: De la Asamblea Popular al Golpe Facista*. Buenos Aires: El Yunque Editorial.

Lora, Guillermo. 1993. *Tres Masacres*. La Paz: Muela del Diablo

Laserna, Roberto, Natalie Camacho and Eduardo Cordova. 1999. *Empujando la Concertación: Marchas Campesinas, Opinión Publica y Coca*. La Paz: PIEB

Mabry, Donald J. 1996. "The U.S. Military and the War on Drug." Pp. 43-60 in *Drug Trafficking in the Americas*. eds. Bagley, Bruce M., and William O. Walker III, . Miami: North-South Center Press.

Malamud-Goti, Jaime. 1992. *Smoke and Mirrors: The Paradox of the Drug Wars*. San Francisco: Westview Press.

Malloy, James M. 1970. *Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution*. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press.

Malloy, James M. 1971. "Revolutionary Politics." Pp. 111-156 in *Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia Since 1952*, eds. Malloy, James and Richard Thorn. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press.

Malloy, James M. 1997. "Markets and Democracy in Latin America: Some Reflections on the New Economic Policy of Bolivia." in *Political Culture, Social Movements and Democratic Transitions in South America in the XXth Century*, Pp.395-409 eds. Devoto, Fernando J. and Torcuato S. Di Tella. Milan: Feltrinelli Editore Milano.

Malloy James M. and Eduardo Gamarra. 1988. *Revolution and Reaction: Bolivia, 1964-1985*. New Brunswick: Transaction Book.

Martin, Brian. 2007. *Justice Ignited: The Dynamics of Backfire*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Martin, Brian. 2015. "From Political Jiu-jitsu to the Backfire Dynamic: How Repression Can Promote Mobilization." in *Civil Resistance: Comparative Perspectives on Nonviolent Struggle*, Pp. 145-167 ed. Kurt Schock. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Mamami, Julio and Rafael Archondo. 2010. *La accion colectiva en El Alto: Hacia una etnografia de las organizaciones sociales*. El Alto: CPMGA.

Mayorga, Antonio Rene. 1978. "National-Popular State, State Capitalism and Military Dictatorship in Bolivia: 1952-1975." *Latin American Perspectives* 5(2):89-119.

McAdam, Dough, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly. 2001. *Dynamics of Contention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McCarthy, Ronald M. 1990. "The Techniques of Nonviolent Action: Some Principles of Its Nature, Use, and Effects." Pp. 107-120 in *Arab Nonviolent Struggle in the Middle East*. eds. Ralph E. Crow, Philip Grant, and Saad E. Ibrahim. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishing.

Mendieta Parada, Pilar. 2006. "Caminantes entre dos mundos: Los apoderados indígenas en Bolivia (SigloXIX)." *Revista de Indias* 66 (238): 761-782.

Mitchell, Christopher. 1977. *The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia: From MNR to Military Rule*. New York: Praeger.

Moghadam, Valentine M. 2009. *Globalization & Social Movements: Islamism, Feminism, & the Global Justice Movement*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Morales, Waltraud Q. 1992. "Militarising the Drug War in Bolivia." *Third World Quarterly* 12 (2):353-370.

Morales, Waltraud Q. 2012. "Social Movements and revolutionary change in Bolivia." Pp. 49- 87 in *Social Movements and Leftist Governments in Latin America. Confrontation or Cooption?* eds. Carlos Oliva Campos, Gary Prevost and Harry Vanden. New York: Zed Books.

Morales, Juan Antonio. 2003. "The National Revolution and its Legacy." Pp. 213-231 in *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective*, eds. Merilee S. Grindle and Pilar Domingo. London: University of London.

Muñoz, Blanca. 1986 "La participación de la mujer campesina en Bolivia: un estudio del Altiplano." Pp. 363-400 in *Bolivia: La fuerza historica del campesinado*, eds. Fernando Calderon and Jorge Dadler. La Paz: CERES.

Nicolas, Vincent, Marcelo Fernandez and Elba Flores. 2007. *Modos Originarios de Resolución de Conflictos en Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia*. La Paz: PIEB.

Nash, June. 1975. "Resistance as Protests: Women in the Struggle of Bolivia Tin-Mining Communities." Pp. 261-272 in *Women Cross-Culturally: Change and Challenge*. Ed. by Rohrlich-Leavitt, Ruby. The Hague: Mouton Publishers.

Nash, June. 1979. *We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat US: Dependency and Exploitation in Bolivian Tin Mines*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Nash, June. 1992. "Interpreting Social Movements: Bolivian Resistance to Economic Conditions Imposed by the International Monetary Fund." *American Ethnologist* 19 (2):275-293.

Nash, June. 2001. "Cultural Resistance and Class Consciousness in Bolivian Tin-Mining Communities." Pp. 182-202 in *Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements*, ed. Eckstein, Susan. Berkeley: University of California.

Olivera, Oscar. 2004. *¡Cochabamba! Water War in Bolivia*. Cambridge: South End Press.

O'Phelan Godoy, Scarlett. 1985. *Rebellions and Revolts in Eighteen Century Peru and Upper Peru*. Cologne: Bohlau Verlag GmbH & Cie.

Painter, James. 1994. *Bolivia & Coca: A Study in Dependency*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

Pearse, Andrew. 1986. "Campesinado y Revolución: el caso de Bolivia." Pp. 313-362 in *Bolivia: La fuerza historica del campesinado*, ed. Fernando Calderon and Jorge Dadler. La Paz: CERES.

Peredo, Inti. 1971. *Mi campaña con el Che*. Buenos Aires: Edibol.

Petras, James. 1971. "Bolivia Between Revolutions." *Monthly Review* 23 (2): 11-24.

Petras, James and Henry Veltmeyer. 2001. *Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21st Century*. Halifax, Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing.

Petras, James and Henry Veltmeyer. 2005. *Social Movements and State Power: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador*. London: Pluto Press.

Platt, Tristan. 1987. "The Andean Experience of Bolivian Liberalism, 1825-1900: Roots if Rebellion in 19th-Century Chayanta (Potosi)." Pp. 280-325 in *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant Word, 18th to 20th Centuries*, ed. Steve Stern. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Prado Salmon, Gary. 1990. *The Defeat of Che Guevara: Military Challenge in Bolivia*. New York: Praeger.

Quiroga Santa Cruz, Marcelo. 1973. *El Saqueo de Bolivia*. La Paz: Puerta del Sol.

Quiroga Santa Cruz, Marcelo. 1982. *Bolivia Recupera la Palabra: Juicio a la Dictadura*. La Paz: Deposito Legal.

Quiroga Santa Cruz, Marcelo. 1984. *Hablemos de los que mueren*. Mexico D.F.: Tierra de Fuego

Rasnake, Roger N. 1988. *Domination and Cultural Resistance: Authority and Power among an Andean People*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Reynaga, Ramiro. 1977. *Twawantinsuyu: Cinco siglos de guerra india*. La Paz: Centro de Coordinacion y Prmocion Campesna Mink'a.

Riley, Kevin J. 1996. *Snow Job?: The War Against International Cocaine Trafficking*. New Brunswick: Rutgers-The State University.

Rivera Cusicanqui, Silvia. 1984. *Oprimidos pero no vencidos*. La Paz: Hisbol – CSUTCB.

Rivera Cusicanqui, Silvia and THOA, 1990. "Indigenous Women and Community Resistance: History and Memory." Pp. 151-83 in *Women and Social Change in Latin America*, ed. Elizabeth Jelin. London: Ded.

Robins, Nicholas A. 2005. *Native Insurgencies and the Genocidal Impulse in the America*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Robins, Nicholas A. 2007. *Priest-Indian Conflict in Upper Peru: The Generation of Rebellion, 1750-1780*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Roddick, Jacqueline and Nico van Niekerk. 1989. "The Bolivian Labour Movement." Pp. 128-77 in *The State, Industrial Relations and the Labour Movement in Latin America: Volume 1*, eds. Carriere, Jean, Nigel Haworth and Jacqueline Roddick. New York: St Martin's Press.

Rojas Ramirez, Policarpio. 1989. *Historia de Levantamientos Indígenas en Bolivia 1781-1985*. La Paz: Editorial IDEAS UNIDAS.

Romero Pittari, Salvadore. 1982. "The Role of the State in the Rural-Urban Configuration." Pp. 301-317 In Ladman, Jerry R., ed. *Modern-Day Bolivia: Legacy of the Revolution and the Prospects for the Future*. Temple: Center for Latin American Studies Arizona State University.

Sanabria, Harry. 1993. *The Coca Boom and Rural Social Change in Bolivia*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Sanjines, Javier C. 2004. *Mestizaje: Upside-Down*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Schock, Kurt. 2003. "Nonviolent Action and Its Misconceptions: Insight for Social Scientists." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 36(4): 705-712.

Schock, Kurt. 2005. *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Schock, Kurt. 2013. "The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance." *Journal of Peace Research* 50 (3) 277-90.

Schock, Kurt. 2015. *Civil Resistance Today*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Scott, James C. 1985. *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

- Scott, James C. 1986. "Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance." Pp. 5-35 in *Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance in South-East Asia*. Ed. by Scott, James C. and Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet. London: Frank Cass.
- Selser, Gregorio. 1982. *Bolivia: El Cuartelazo de los Cocadolares*. México D.F.: Mex-Sur Editorial S.A.
- Serulnikov, Sergio. 2003a. *Subverting Colonial Authority: Challenges to Spanish Rule in Eighteenth-Century Southern Andes*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Serulnikov, Sergio. 2003b. "Costumbres y reglas: Racionalización y conflictos sociales durante la era borbónica (Provincia de Chayanta, Siglo XVIII)." Pp. 78- 133 in *Ya es otro el presente: Cuatro momentos de insurgencia indígena*, ed. by Forrest Hylon, Felix Patzi, Sergio Serulnikov and Sinclair Thomson. La Paz: Muela del Diablo editores.
- Shiva, Vandana. 2002. *Water Wars: Privatization, Pollution, & Profit*. Cambridge: South End Press.
- Schultz, Jim. 2003a. "Bolivia: The Water War Widens." *NACLA Report on the Americas* 36(4): 34-7.
- Schultz, Jim. 2003b. "A New Day for Bolivia." *NACLA Report on the Americas* 37(3): 8-10.
- Shultz, Jim. 2008a. "The Cochabamba Water Revolt and Its Aftermath." Pp. 9-42 in *Dignity and Defiance: Stories from Bolivia's Challenge to Globalization*, ed. by Jim Shultz and Melissa Crane. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Shultz, Jim. 2008b. "Lessons in Blood and Fire: The Deadly Consequences of IMF Economics." Pp. 117-143 in *Dignity and Defiance: Stories from Bolivia's Challenge to Globalization*, ed. by Jim Shultz and Melissa Crane. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Smale, Robert L. 2010. *"I Sweat the Flavor of Tin" Labor Activism in Early Twentieth-Century Bolivia*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Soruco, Juan C. 1993. "La Incomunicación de los medios de comunicación." Pp. 193-278 in *Violencias encubiertas en Bolivia 2*, ed. Xavier Albo and raul Barrios. La Paz: CIPCA.
- Steger, Manfred B. 2009. *Globalisms: The Great Ideological Struggle of the Twenty-First Century*. 3er ed. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Stephan, Maria J. and Erica Chenoweth. 2008. "Why civil resistance works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict." *International Security* 33 (1): 7-44.

Stern, Steve J. 1983. "The Struggle for Solidarity: Class, Culture, and Community in Highland Indian America." *Radical Historical Review* 27: 21-25.

Stern, Steve J. 1987a. "New Approaches to the Study of Peasant Rebellion and Consciousness: Implications of the Andean Experience." Pp 3-25 in *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries*. ed. by Stern, Steve J. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Stern, Steve J. 1987b. "The Age of Andean Insurrection, 1742-1782: A Reappraisal." Pp 34-93 in *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries*. ed. by Stern, Steve J. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Szeminski, Jan. 1987. "Why Kill the Spaniard? New Perspectives on Andean Insurrectionary Ideology in the 18th Century." Pp. 166- 192 in *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries*. ed. by Stern, Steve J. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Tarrow, Sidney. 2008. "Charles Tilly and the Practice of Contentious Politics." *Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest* 7 (3): 225-246

Ticona, Esteban, Gonzalo Rojas and Xavier Albo. 1995. *Votos y Wiphalas: Campesinos y Pueblos Originarios en Democracia*. La Paz: CIPCA.

Tilly, Charles. 1995. *Popular Contention in Great Britain*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Tilly, Charles. 2006. *Regimes and Repertoires*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Tilly, Charles. 2008. *Contentious Performances*. Cambridge: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, Charles and Sidney Tarrow. 2007. *Contentious Politics*. Boulder: Paradigm Publications.

Thomson, Sinclair. 2002. *We Alone Will Rule: Native Andean Politics in the Age of Insurgency*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Thomson, Sinclair. 2003a. "Cuando solo reinasen los Indios: Recuperando la variedad de proyectos anticoloniales entre los comunarios andinos (1740-1781)." Pp. 39-77 in *Ya es otro el presente: Cuatro momentos de insurgencia indigena*.,ed. by Forrest Hylon, Felix Patzi, Sergio Serulnikov and Sinclair Thomson. La Paz: Muela del Diablo editores.

Thomson, Sinclair. 2003b. "Revolutionary Memory in Bolivia: Anticolonial and National Project from 1781 to 1952." Pp. 117-134 in *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in*

Comparative Perspective, eds. Merilee S. Grindle and Pilar Domingo. London: University of London.

Van Cott, Donna Lee. 2000. *The Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of Diversity in Latin America*. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Viezzer, Moema. 1978. “*Si me permiten hablar...*” *Testimonio de Domitila una mujer de las minas de Bolivia*. Mexico: Siglo XXI editores.

Walker, Charles F. 1999. *Smoldering Ashes: Cuzco and the Creation of Republican Peru, 1780-1840*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Webber, Jeffery R. 2011. *From Rebellion to Reform in Bolivia: Class Struggle, Indigenous Liberation, and the Politics of Evo Morales*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.

Whitehead, Laurence. 2003. “The Bolivian National Revolution: A Comparison.” Pp. 25-53 in *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective*, eds. Merilee S. Grindle and Pilar Domingo. London: University of London.

Zavaleta, Rene. 1972. “Bolivia – Military Nationalism and the Popular Assembly.” *New Left Review* May/June 73: 63-82.

Zavaleta Mercado, Rene. 1977. “Consideraciones generales sobre la historia de Bolivia.” Pp. 219-240 in *America Latina: Historia de medio siglo*. Ed. Gonzales, Pablo. Mexico: Siglo XXI editores.

Zavaleta Mercado, Rene. 1986. *Lo nacional-popular en Bolivia*. Mexico: Siglo XXI editores

Zibechi, Raul. 2010. *Dispersing Power: Social Movements as Anti-State Forces*. Oakland: AK Press.

Zunes, Stephen. 2001. “The United States and Bolivia: The Taming of a Revolution, 1952-1957.” *Latin American Perspectives* 28 (5):33-49.