BEYOND POLICY:
GOVERNMENTS, NGOS AND THE PROVISION OF EDUCATIONAL SERVICES
TO REFUGEE CHILDREN IN TURKEY, JORDAN, AND LEBANON

by

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Professor Simon Reich
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Professor Martin Schain

Newark, New Jersey
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Beyond Policy:
Governments, NGOs and the Provision of Educational Services to Refugee Children in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon

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Dr. Simon Reich

The Syrian Civil War displaced millions. Many Syrians have taken refuge in the surrounding countries of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. These host countries made promises to provide education services to Syrian refugees. Yet, the gross enrollment ratios of Syrian refugee children in the three host countries varied significantly between 2013 and 2017. In August 2016, for example, 40.4% or 341,689 of the 845,364 of Syrian refugee children in Turkey, 55.2% or 209,689 of the 379,299 of children in Lebanon, and 82.2% or 191,161 of 232,470 of Syrian refugee children in Jordan were enrolled in formal and non-formal education programs. This dissertation addressed the question of what accounts for these national differences in the gross enrollment ratios of Syrian refugees. I explored four alternative explanations in answering this question. They related to security concerns, economic interests and constraints, elements of the host government’s historical relationship with Syria, and the host government’s relationship with international entities that provide refugee services – namely non-governmental organizations (NGOs). My goal was to identify which factors were the key determinants in explaining the variation in Syrian refugee enrollment rates. I utilized a mixed methods approach in this study. I conducted semi-structured interviews and Q-sort exercises with host government officials,
United Nations officials, and NGO representatives within the host countries. I analyzed the results of Q-sort exercises by conducting ANOVA tests and post hoc T-tests with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. My findings suggest that the opportunities, strategies and capabilities of the NGOs to overcome obstacles to their provision of refugee education services explain the variance in Syrian refugee enrollment rates. I argue that the higher enrollment rates are also attributable to the relative willingness of a host government to cooperate with NGOs. Furthermore, my findings suggest that there were three key factors that impacted the relationship between the host governments and NGOs: a good prior relationship between the state and NGOs, the NGOs’ financial capacity relative to the state, and the NGOs’ deliberate decision to aid both the domestic population and refugees.
Acknowledgements

The phrase, “It takes a village” applies in the context of writing a dissertation. While I have certainly conducted the research and written the dissertation, I did so under the guidance of thoughtful, academic mentors and with the support of family and friends.

I would like to thank my husband, Eric, for enduring this process. Obtaining a doctorate requires spending thousands of dollars and working thousands of hours. I know that this was a great sacrifice that required immense patience and understanding on his part. Eric, you are my best friend, and I love you.

I would like to thank my family for providing love, support and encouragement throughout this process. I would also like to thank my friends. They provided the much needed mental breaks during the writing of my dissertation.

I have been a student in some capacity for over thirty years. Being an educator myself, I often think of the characteristics that define an excellent educator from preschool to postgraduate. An excellent educator prepares interesting and engaging lectures, establishes a rapport with students, holds students accountable and to a high standard, sacrifices time to meet with them, and inspires them to expand their personal learning horizons. Dr. Simon Reich, the chair of my dissertation, embodies all of these attributes and more. I appreciate Dr. Reich’s hard work and dedication. I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to a professor who goes above and beyond for his students. I am often amazed at his workload and that he chooses to work with many students in pursuit of their doctorates. I am indebted to him for his guidance, and I respect him for his dedication to students like me.
I am thankful to my committee members Professors Jean-Marc Coicaud, Gregg Van Ryzin, and Martin Schain for their advice and guidance. I am grateful to them for providing me connections to people at the United Nations and in non-governmental organizations. I chose these professors to be on my dissertation committee because I recognized that they too embody the attributes of good educators. I appreciate them for serving on my committee.

My gratitude also extends to the representatives of host governments, the United Nations, and NGOs who gave their time to speak with me. In particular, I would like to thank Dr. Ahmad Rababa’a who provided assistance, Arabic translation and support while I conducted my field research in the Middle East. Furthermore, Dr. Rababa’a was a key person who connected me to important stakeholders in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon.

I would also like to thank Shifa Almaqatesh, her family, and especially her mother for providing me housing during the time I conducted field research in Jordan. I was immediately welcomed and cared for during my two stays in Jordan. I cannot say enough about the love and support I was given. I have gained a lasting friendship.

Additionally, I would like to thank Elif, my translator, and her family in Turkey. They ensured that I was safe and comfortable during my stay in Ankara. This was no small feat. On July 15, 2016, there was an attempted coup d’état against President Recip Tayyip Erdoğan and the government of Turkey. I was staying at a hotel three streets away from where the Turkish Parliament building was being destroyed by bombs. Elif and her family courageously offered several times to drive me to their home during the bombing and the
initial aftermath. I declined their offer due to the obvious risks of traveling during a coup. Yet, I am grateful that they put my needs in front of theirs.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>3RP</td>
<td>Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan</td>
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<td>AFAD</td>
<td>Disaster and Emergency Management Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIREFCA</td>
<td>International Conference on Refugees in Central America</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DGMM</td>
<td>Directorate General of Migration Management</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>INEE</td>
<td>Interagency Network on Education in Emergencies</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>ISIS</td>
<td>The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<td>KNOMAD</td>
<td>General Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development</td>
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<td>LFIP</td>
<td>Law on Foreigners and International Protection</td>
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<td>MEHE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Higher Education (Lebanon)</td>
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<td>MGK</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>MONE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education (Turkey)</td>
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<td>MOPIC</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation</td>
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<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
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<td>RACE</td>
<td>Reaching All Children with Education</td>
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<td>Relief International</td>
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<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goal</td>
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<td>SPRAA</td>
<td>Special Programme for Refugee Affected Areas</td>
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<td>Syrian Refugee Affairs Department</td>
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<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Observation

In March 2011, protesters in Syria demanded the release of political prisoners, sparking an uprising and subsequent civil war in Syria.\(^1\) By December 2016, there were approximately 6.5 million internally displaced persons in Syria.\(^2\) There were an additional 4,837,731 registered Syrian refugees who fled Syria, primarily seeking refuge in the surrounding countries of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon.\(^3\) By December 2016, there were approximately 655,314 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan, 1,011,366 registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon, and 2,814,631 registered Syrian refugees in Turkey.\(^4\) These numbers included hundreds of thousands of school-aged children.

A March 2016 press release from the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reported that a large proportion of Syrian refugee children - 700,000 - were unable to attend school in the neighboring countries because of limited access.\(^5\) A Syrian refugee child named Hassan living in Lebanon’s Beka’a Valley was quoted in a March 2014 UNICEF

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report, “I used to want to be a teacher. But where are the schools to learn or teach in now?”

Other Syrian children, like 15-year-old Salah, also then living in the Beka’a Valley, were forced to work to survive. Salah, who then worked in a mine stated, “I didn’t used to work in Syria, but I am working here because I need to help with expenses. My brother is working too. We can’t go to school, so it’s better if we work.”

A June 2015 United Nations 3RP Regional Progress Report indicated that gross enrollment ratios of school-aged refugee children (ages 6-18) in the host countries of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon varied. Sarah Dryden-Peterson defines gross enrollment ratios as:

> the total enrolment [sic] in a specific level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population in the official age group corresponding to that level of education. GERs can exceed 100% due to early or late entry into school or to repetition. It is not to be confused with the Net Enrolment Ratio (NER), which expresses the enrolment of the official age group for a given level of education, expressed as a percentage of the population in that age group.

In August 2016, at the time when research for this dissertation was conducted, Jordan was host to approximately 232,470 school-aged Syrian refugees of which 191,161

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7 Ibid., p. 5.
or 82.2% were enrolled in formal and non-formal education programs.\textsuperscript{10} Lebanon was host to approximately 379,299 school-aged Syrian refugees of which 209,086 or 55.1% were enrolled in formal and non-formal education programs.\textsuperscript{11} Turkey hosted approximately 845,364 school-aged Syrian refugees, of which only 341,689 or 40.4% were enrolled in formal and non-formal education programs.\textsuperscript{12} Graph 1.1 illustrates the Syrian refugee children enrollment rates in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon from 2013 to 2017.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{Graph 1.1} indicates that there is a consistent discrepancy between the enrollment rates. Jordan consistently had the highest refugee enrollment rate in comparison to Lebanon and Turkey.

\textsuperscript{10} I conducted my research from June 2016 to August 2016. The terms non-formal education and informal education have distinct meanings, yet I found that both participants who were interviewed for this research and several reports utilized for this research used these terms interchangeably. For the purpose of this research, I will utilize the INEE’s definition of non-formal education for both non-formal and informal education. The Interagency Network on Education in Emergencies (INEE) defines non-formal education as, “takes place both within and outside education institutions and caters to people of all ages. It does not always lead to certification. Non-formal education programs are characterized by their variety, flexibility and ability to respond quickly to new education needs of children or adults. They are often designed for specific groups of learners such as those who are too old for their grade level, those who do not attend formal school, or adults.” From: Interagency Network on Education in Emergencies, "Terms," INEE Toolkit, last modified 2010, \url{https://toolkit.ineesite.org/term-bank/en/terms/non-formal_education}. The INEE defines informal education as, “Forms of learning that are intentional or deliberate but are not institutionalized are known as informal learning. It is consequently less organized and structured than either formal or non-formal education. Informal learning may include learning activities that occur in the family, workplace, local community, and daily life, on a self-directed, family-directed, or socially-directed basis. From: Interagency Network on Education in Emergencies, "INEE Terms - Informal Learning," INEE Toolkit, last modified 2019, \url{https://toolkit.ineesite.org/term-bank/en/terms/informal_learning}. United Nations Development Programme and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, \textit{Regional Strategic Overview Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2017-2018}, by United Nations Development Programme and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2016, \url{http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/3RP-Regional-Strategic-Overview-2017-2018.pdf}, p. 35.

\textsuperscript{11} United Nations Development Programme and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, \textit{Regional Strategic}, [Page 35].

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{13} While I have reported refugee enrollment rates to 2017, I am examining Syrian refugee enrollment rates from the inception of the Syrian civil war to December 2016. There is little or no data regarding the Syrian refugee enrollment rates in the three host countries for 2011 and 2012. Fighting was minimal in 2011. It escalated in 2012. This caused internal displacement in Syria and mass migration of refugees into neighboring countries. From: Brookings Institute, \textit{Syrian Crisis: Massive Displacement, Dire Needs and a Shortage of Solutions}, by Elizabeth Ferris, Kemal Kirisci, and Salman Shaikh, [Page xii], September 18, 2013, \url{https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Syrian-CrisisMassive-Displacement-Dire-Needs-and-Shortage-of-Solutions-September-18-2013.pdf}. 
The data indicates that the largest discrepancy between the enrollment rates occurred in 2015, when Jordan’s enrollment rate was over 40% higher than Lebanon’s or Turkey’s.

Graph 1.1 Syrian Refugee Children Enrollment Rates in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon from 2013-2017

Puzzle and Research Question

This variance in enrollment rates is puzzling. The governments of these three countries have guaranteed access to education under the terms of international conventions that protect children, have participated in global education forums like the World Education Forum, and have a national refugee education policy. Furthermore, all three countries view education as a requisite of national security. I discuss these factors below.

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14 There is no percentage given for 2013 in Turkey except that it was estimated that 60% were enrolled in camps and 30% were enrolled in self-settled areas. From: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Syria Response Plan 5 2013 Final Report (UNHCR, 2013), [Page 34], http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php

International Agreements and Regulation. All three countries have guaranteed access to education through international agreements. All three are signatories to the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child that endorses a “universal rights-based framework for education.”\textsuperscript{16} The 1989 Convention, which was ratified by 193 countries and entered into force in September 1990, provides specific guidelines on education and led to the development of refugee education as a field of policy. Three articles - 2, 28, and 29 - focus specifically on the right to an education.\textsuperscript{17} In particular, Article 28, Number 1 declares that,

States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular (a) Make primary education compulsory and available free to all…(e) Take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools and the reduction of drop-out rates.\textsuperscript{18}

Article 28, Number 3 proclaims that “States Parties shall promote and encourage international cooperation in matters relating to education.”\textsuperscript{19}

All three countries participated in global movements and forums that addressed education needs and in particular, refugee education.\textsuperscript{20} The World Conference on


\textsuperscript{18}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid.

Education for All, held in Jomtien, Thailand in 1990, advocated for “universal adequate basic education” and conference participants adopted the *World Declaration on Education for All and the Framework for Action: Meeting Basic Learning Needs* that specifically emphasized increasing school enrollment. Moreover, the three countries participated in the April 2000 *World Education Forum* in Dakar. This forum is considered the most important global event for education because governments pledged to meet the six *Education for All* goals, including universal primary education enrollment. Furthermore, the World Education Forum emphasized the need to fund and support refugee education.


chronicling their progress to meet the goals.\textsuperscript{26} These host countries are signatories to the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals, adopted by 193 countries in 2015.\textsuperscript{27} Sustainable Development Goal Four (SDG) requires signatories to provide quality education for all children.\textsuperscript{28} There are seven education targets listed under this goal including equal access to all types of education programs, designing education to teach skills relevant to employment, universal literacy, and global citizenship.\textsuperscript{29} One of the main targets of SDG 4 specifically references equal access to education for “children in vulnerable situations.”\textsuperscript{30} A 2017 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) report stated, 

The launch of SDG 4 for education for all by 2030 represents a critical window of opportunity to ensure that refugees and stateless children and youth are visible and accounted for in the next 15 years of education sector planning, development and monitoring at national and sub-national levels.\textsuperscript{31} 

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{31} United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Education Brief, [Page 1].
Generally, these three countries have guaranteed access to education under the terms of international conventions that protect children and their participation in global education forums.

**Domestic Legislation.** In principle, Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon have created open-door policies that included access to public services for Syrian refugees between 2011 and 2016.\(^32\) All three have adopted refugee education state policies.\(^33\)

Prior to 2014, all Syrian refugees possessing a residence permit in Turkey were legally able to send their children to Turkish schools, where classes followed a Turkish curriculum taught in Turkish.\(^34\) Those without a residence permit were permitted to attend schools established for Syrian refugees where there were no registration restrictions on education access. These children were separated from Turkish students and were instructed using a modified Syrian curriculum in Arabic.\(^35\) In October 2014, Turkey adopted a Temporary Protection Regulation. It provided the “legal and administrative framework for the protection and assistance to persons in need of international protection” and gave Syrian refugees rights and duties, with access to health care, education, labor markets and social

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\(^33\) Ibid.

\(^34\) Kemal Kirisci, *Syrian Refugees and Turkey’s Challenges: Going Beyond Hospitality* (2014), [http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2014/05/12%20turkey%20syrian%20refugees%20kirisci/syrian%20refugees%20and%20turkeys%20challenges%20may%202014%202014.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2014/05/12%20turkey%20syrian%20refugees%20kirisci/syrian%20refugees%20and%20turkeys%20challenges%20may%202014%202014.pdf); p. 24.

assistance. Refugees applied for a “Temporary Protection Identification” document. In Jordan, the Ministry of Education with the support of UNICEF provided assurances “that Syrian children benefit from free access to public schools across the country, regardless of their status.” Syrian refugees had to register with the Ministry of Interior to attend Jordanian public schools. Syrian refugees were integrated with Jordanian children and were instructed using the Jordanian curriculum. Finally, in Lebanon, Syrian refugees had the right to attend both public and private schools. Syrian refugees did not need registration cards to attend school. Syrian refugees were integrated with Lebanese children and were instructed in the Lebanese curriculum.

*Education and Security.* From the human capital perspective, education has historically been linked to “economic growth, individual advancement, and

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43 Ibid. There is an exception in the case of Nabatieh City that has agreed through a negotiation with the United Nations Development Program to provide the Syrian curriculum.
competitiveness in the global market." Since the 1990s, education became associated with the national security strategies of both industrialized and developing states. This linkage has become a norm - policymakers and international donor agencies often “describe economic growth and opportunities for individual advancement as requisites to social and political stability.”

There is a literature that examines the relationship between education and security. Francis Stewart, in his studies of violence in multi-ethnic and multi-religious countries cites cultural, political and social inequalities as a factor that increases the risk of violent conflict in a domestic setting. He states that inequality within the social realm of education is a source of conflict.

Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler argue that the disruption in the provision and attainment of education is one factor that triggers unrest, prolongs intrastate war, and opens countries to conflict traps. In their studies of civil war, Collier and Hoeffler examined the secondary education enrollment ratios of males and observed: “If the enrolment [sic] rate for secondary schooling is ten percentage points higher than the average, the risk of war is

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45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
reduced by about two percentage points (a decline in the risk from 10.5% to 8.6%).”

Collier and Hoeffler find that lower enrollment ratios decrease the costs of rebel recruitment because there is a larger supply of “idle young men with little hope for a bright future.” They argue that there is a 20% chance that a country will return to civil war within five years of the first war ending. Collier, Hoeffler, and Mads Sodobom also find that “the implied likelihood of failure (i.e. reversion to war) in the first decade of post-conflict peace is 40%.” This is known as a ‘conflict trap’ and it occurs when the “same factors that caused the initial war are usually still present,” development gains are reversed by war, and the civil war results in a weakened economy - allowing for the creation of organizations and leaders that have developed “skills and equipment that are only useful for violence.” Clayton Thyne finds that increased attainment of education reduces a country’s risk of armed conflict. He observed that an increase in secondary school enrollment from 30% to 81% reduces the probability of entering civil war by 66%. Rebecca Winthrop and Corrine Graff, in a 2010 Brookings Institute report, stated that offering education reduces the length of armed conflicts.

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54 Thyne, "ABC's, 123's," [Page 743].

During the 1990s, the relationship between international development, education and security became a policy agenda priority of bilateral agencies, NGOs and major international organizations like the United Nations.\textsuperscript{56} International education policy was created to address the concerns that half of the world’s “out of school” children were located in conflict-affected states.\textsuperscript{57} After the September 11, 2001 attacks, assistance in the form of international development to countries affected by or vulnerable to conflict became “enmeshed with the strategic security concerns of the major western powers in the face of new post-Cold War geopolitical challenges.”\textsuperscript{58} The lack of access to schooling became a priority of Western donors and part of the discourse on the “war on terror.”\textsuperscript{59} The United States, through policy and - more importantly – funding, led the initiative to include education and international development as part of their counterinsurgency plan.\textsuperscript{60} Major donor countries’ like the United States, the United Kingdom, The Netherlands and Australia developed the “3D” approach – a “diplomacy, defense and development” program that integrated development with security and diplomatic priorities.\textsuperscript{61} The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) education strategy for the years 2010 to 2015, for example, pledged to allocate 50\% of their basic education funding to conflict-affected and fragile states.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{56} Novelli, “The Merging,” [Page 346].
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., p. 345.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., p. 346.
\textsuperscript{62} Department for International Development, \textit{Learning For All: DFID's Education Strategy 2010-2015}, [Page 8], March 1, 2010,
The security agenda of major state actors converged with the interests of international organizations like the United Nations that pursued a human-rights driven policy agenda. As the United Nations Development Program stated in the *Human Development Report 2005*,

> While there is no automatic link between poverty and civil conflict, violent outcomes are more likely in societies marked by deep polarization, weak institutions and chronic poverty. The threats posed by terrorism demand a global response. So do the threats posed by human insecurity in the broader sense. Indeed, the “war against terror” will never be won unless human security is extended and strengthened.63

Education became a priority of human development and a necessary component of the humanitarian response to emergencies.64 Direct interventions increased in conflict-affected countries or fragile states.65 The U.S. State Department’s *Country Report on Terrorism 2007* noted that,

> The Department of State, USAID, and other U.S. agencies continued to support an increased focus on education in predominantly Muslim countries and those with significant Muslim populations. The United States’ approach stresses mobilizing public and private resources as partners to improve access, quality, and the relevance of education, with a specific emphasis on developing civic-mindedness in young people.66

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65 Ibid.

Jordan and Lebanon are two Muslim countries that as per the above stated strategy receive aid from major donors like USAID and DFID to expand and enhance their public school education programs. I now discuss the linkages between education, national security, and international development assistance in Jordan and Lebanon. Then, I address the linkage between education and national security in Turkey.

*Jordan.* Jordan considers schooling a matter of national security.67 Jordan is a constitutional monarchy ruled by King Abdullah.68 At the time of research, it faced significant threats from the Islamic State (ISIS) and a weak economy.69 These conditions were the catalyst that linked education reform to their national security strategy.70 In a speech at Oxford University in 2008, King Abdullah stated,

Our region is in the firing line of extremist ideologies that seek to divide and control. Their strategy is to promote confrontation, break down moderation, and sever cooperation with the West. It is moderation, not extremism that opens the way to that future – through co-existence, cooperation, and all the benefits they entail. I believe this path is essential for my region. But to achieve it, we must work together – boldly, effectively – to create the strategic space for peace and progress to grow.71

In response to Islamic extremism, Jordan’s education reform included instilling “global sociocultural values,” rejecting extremism, encouraging participation in civic duties, and providing youth with employment to prevent discontent.72 In a 2004 Jordanian Ministry of

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67 Hantzopoulos and Shirazi, "Securing the State," [Page 373].
70 Hantzopoulos and Shirazi, "Securing the State," [Page 377].
72 Hantzopoulos and Shirazi, "Securing the State," [Page 377].
Education (MOE) report to the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the MOE recognized that education was “the basis for our national security in its wide context.” Jordan’s strategy of connecting national security with education empowered the state to define how children should be educated and enabled it to dismiss “challenges to their curricular and education policies as threatening to national interests.”

Jordan receives significant international funding from Western donors such as the United States. The United States considers Jordan a strong ally and invests in strengthening Jordan’s national security and social stability by supporting social services like education. In a 2017 U.S. State Department report, it listed that Jordan received over $1.4 billion in aid from 2015 to 2017. From 2010 to 2014, Jordan received approximately $960 million in economic and development assistance that included building and expanding the public school system and teacher training.

**Lebanon.** Lebanon also historically associates education with national security. Lebanon endured a civil war from 1975 to 1990, during which the government was unable to provide social services such as education. Instead, private institutions based along

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74 Hantzopoulos and Shirazi, "Securing the State," [Page 377].


77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.


religious sectarian and secular lines provided education when the public school system collapsed.\textsuperscript{81} After the civil war, the Lebanese government regained authority over the education system, initiated regulation over both private and public schools, and instituted significant curricular reforms.\textsuperscript{82} Mario Novelli and Alan Smith observed in a 2011 report to UNICEF on the state of education and security in Lebanon, Sierra Leone and Nepal that,

This immediate post-conflict period clearly then provides education with a number of important entry points and challenges: the resumption of education as a key public service, which signals the return and legitimacy of the state; represents a peace dividend for recipient populations; and can provide a welcome indicator of a return to normalcy. As a key institution and process for socialization, education during this period can also, when well developed, provide a vehicle for post-war reconciliation, social cohesion and national unity.\textsuperscript{83}

Social stability within Lebanon is in the interest of the United States and the European Union. According to USAID, it is “committed to a sovereign, stable, independent and prosperous Lebanon at peace with its neighbors. Our support provides quality and reliable services to Lebanon’s citizens in the sectors of education, water and sanitation and governance.”\textsuperscript{84} It coordinates with the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) “to improve the quality of basic and higher education in Lebanon.”\textsuperscript{85} USAID provides teacher training, equipment, school repairs, and merit-based scholarships for

\textsuperscript{81} United Nations Children's Fund, \textit{The Role in Peacebuilding}, [Page 30].
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
higher education.\textsuperscript{86} It has rehabilitated 183 schools since 2011.\textsuperscript{87} The U.S. government invested over $80 million in Lebanon’s education sector prior to the Syrian refugee crisis.\textsuperscript{88}

The European Union enacted the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003. The broad initiative is to strengthen “the prosperity, stability and security of all.”\textsuperscript{89} Its specific mission in this case “is Lebanon’s development as a stable, democratic, politically open and economically strong neighbour [sic] of the EU.”\textsuperscript{90} Education in Lebanon has been a priority of the ENP since its inception. The education system received ENP funding since the end of the military conflict with Israel in 2006, and that funding continues at the time of writing.\textsuperscript{91} Funding has been utilized to reform the primary, secondary and vocational education programs.\textsuperscript{92} The ENP reports that 46\% of €187 million was distributed to social and economic reforms of which education is a component from 2007 to 2010.\textsuperscript{93} The same report indicated that 60.7\% of €150 million were distributed for the same initiative from

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{87} United States Agency for International Development, "Our Work," USAID from the American People..
2011 to 2013.\textsuperscript{94} It is projected to distribute €186.5 million to €227.9 million for the 2017-2020 program.\textsuperscript{95}

Education has gained importance in the realm of national security. According to Mario Novelli,

\begin{quote}
International development assistance to education has become caught up in all of these changes and its rationales and justifications have incorporated both human rights concerns, security objectives, counterinsurgency utility as well as a mechanism through which to build and buy government support in conflict affected states.\textsuperscript{96}
\end{quote}

Both Jordan and Lebanon’s governments linked education to their national security strategies and created policy and regulations to strengthen their public education systems. Additionally, both countries’ education systems have benefitted from the distribution of funds from Western donors like the United States and the European Union, whose mission is to prevent Islamic radicalism and anti-Western sentiment.

\textit{Turkey.} Turkey has also historically valued education and its reform as a means to strengthen national security. But it does so with little international financial support, in contrast to Jordan and Lebanon. Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1923, each subsequent military coup and political crisis changed the education system.\textsuperscript{97} A military coup in 1980 resulted in a comprehensive restructuring of the education system.\textsuperscript{98} The military deliberately linked the armed forces and the education system by instituting control over school personnel and the curriculum to

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{94} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{95} European Commission, "Lebanon," European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations.
\item \textsuperscript{96} Novelli, "The Merging," [Page 367]
\item \textsuperscript{97} Kevin Kamal, "Education in Turkey," World Education News and Review, last modified April 4, 2017, \url{https://wenr.wes.org/2017/04/education-in-turkey}.
\item \textsuperscript{98} Ibid.
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promote national unity.\footnote{Sam Kaplan, \textit{The Pedagogical State: Education and the Politics of National Culture in Post-1980 Turkey} (Redwood, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), [P. 173].} In the 1990s, the National Security Council (MGK) was the liaison between the military and the civilian leaders and recommended education reforms and a reorganization of religious education after a perceived growth of Islamism.\footnote{Hakan Akpınar, \textit{Postmodern Darbenin Oykusu} (Ankara, TR: Umit Yayincilik, 2001), [Pp. 208-209]; and Shaban Iba, \textit{Milli Guvenlik Devleti} (Istanbul, TR: Civiyazilari, 1999), [Pp. 228-229].} President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) enacted several education reforms beginning in 2002.\footnote{Kamal, "Education in Turkey," World Education News and Review.} These reforms increased tertiary gross enrollment from 26 percent to 79 percent and extended the mandatory years to attend school from eight years to twelve years.\footnote{Ibid.; and UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "School Enrollment, Tertiary (% Gross)," The World Bank, last modified 2018, \url{https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR?locations=TR}.} In 2013, enrollment levels for children aged 5 to 14 averaged 95% in comparison to 98% in OECD countries.\footnote{Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, "Country Note Education at a Glance: Turkey," OECD, last modified 2014, \url{http://www.oecd.org/education/Turkey-EAG2014-Country-Note.pdf}.} Julide Yıldırım and Selami Sezgin’s study of trade-offs between security and welfare spending found “that defense spending is positively correlated with education expenditure. This result suggests that there is a positive trade-off between defense and education, and defense does not crowd out education.”\footnote{Julide Yildirim and Selami Sezgin, "Defense, Education and Health Expenditures in Turkey, 1924-96," \textit{Journal of Peace Research} 39, no. 5 (September 2002): [Page 576].}

Since all three countries value education as a requisite of national security, it could be assumed that they would have similar gross enrollment ratios for Syrian refugees. Yet, the evidence indicates that the access of refugee children to education varied significantly. Simple explanations such as national access to resources might in principle explain the variation between Turkey and the two smaller countries. However, the fact that the proportion of refugees attending school in Jordan, a country with limited resources, is so
much greater than in Lebanon and Turkey adds to this puzzle. This puzzle therefore, generates a research question: In countries that value education as a factor that impacts national security, have signed international conventions giving access to education for all children, have participated in international education forums, and have opened access to education to Syrian refugees at the local level, what accounts for the national differences in the gross enrollment ratios of Syrian refugees?

**Significance**

The purpose of my research is to explain why there is variance in the Syrian refugee enrollment rates in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. I hope to contribute to both the scholarly and the policy understanding of the nexus between refugees and their ability to access basic social services like education. I attempt to do so through a mixed method study that seeks to account for the gap between nation-states’ legal promises to educate Syrian refugees and the enrollment levels of their children in each country.

There are case studies that focus upon refugees’ access to education in a single host country. Jill Rutter and Crispin Jones’ study of refugees in the United Kingdom, contends that “policies regarding refugee benefits and housing had a negative impact on [refugee] children’s access to education.”

There are case studies that focus upon refugees’ access to education across multiple host countries. Mary Mendenhall and her colleagues examined “policies and practices in urban refugee education to identify gaps,

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opportunities, and promising practices” by conducting a global survey of 16 countries and three case studies in Quito, Beirut, and Nairobi. They conclude that there is a “gap between policy and practice” that is attributed to “a lack of capacity in government schools, low levels of capacity among civil servants, autonomy of local and school administrators, and discrimination and xenophobia by the host communities.”

Sarah Dryden-Peterson conducted a comparative case study of refugees’ rates of access to schooling across “14 countries of first asylum.” She notes that refugee children experienced “language barriers, teacher-centered pedagogy, and discrimination in school settings.”

Maurice Crul and his colleagues conducted a comparative case study in Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands and Turkey that focused upon “institutional factors that influence the opportunities that refugee children have in education at the macro, meso and micro levels.” These studies compare refugees’ access to education services across dissimilar host countries with significantly different refugee populations.

Indeed, I have found no comparative case studies explaining refugee’s access to education in host countries with similar characteristics that receive refugees from the same country. Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon are geopolitically bordered around the country of

108 Ibid., p. 8.
110 Ibid.
Syria. \(^{112}\) The primary religion in each country is Islam.\(^ {113}\) The majority of refugees settling in the three countries are Sunni.\(^ {114}\) Each hosts over one million refugees, both registered and unregistered.\(^ {115}\) Examining refugees’ access to education in these three countries may reveal contingent conditions in a way that a single case study or comparative case studies with disparate host countries and refugee populations might not. I therefore hope to identify the conditions and factors that explain the variance in refugee enrollment rates by conducting a most similar research design, keeping constant the variables such as those discussed above.

My research into the variance of Syrian refugee enrollment rates pertains to issues discussed in three research programs. The first research program examines the domestic and international factors that potentially influence refugee policy in a host country. The second research program assesses refugee education programs and identifies the conditions that impact the delivery of education. The third research program identifies the key determinants of government-NGO cooperation and their implications on the delivery of social services, such as education. This dissertation identifies the linkages between these research programs. Specifically, this study aims to connect the research program on the factors influencing refugee policy - a top-down approach - to the program that identifies the conditions on the ground that impact the provision of refugee education services - a


bottom-up approach. The establishment and delivery of these refugee education services is dependent on the involvement of two key actors: host governments and NGOs. The level of interaction between these entities and how they interact may shape refugee education programs. In the following sections, I discuss each research program, noting how my findings may contribute to each.

Factors that Influence Refugee Policy. There is a research literature that examines the factors that influence a host government’s refugee policy. A significant proportion of this literature examines factors such as international influences that shape local refugee policy. Karen Jacobsen observes that international institutions like the UNHCR, and other entities like “international relief and refugee organizations, donor countries, voluntary agencies, the media, and individuals such as lawyers and academics involved in refugee work” influence local refugee policy. J. A. Sandy Irvine argues that “global government networks” consists of “bureaucrats across jurisdictions” with similar norms that guide domestic refugee policy. Aristide Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo


maintain that the host government’s relation with the sending country is another factor that impacts refugee policy decisions.¹²⁰

There is a subset of the literature that examines security and economic factors that shape local refugee policy.¹²¹ Alan Dowty cites national security as a primary factor driving refugee policy choices.¹²² Michael Teitelbaum finds that “strategic and security interests” influence refugee policy.¹²³ Gil Loescher and John Scanlan contend that a nation’s “social and economic health” are important conditions.¹²⁴ Karen Jacobsen, in her studies of less developed host countries, argues that bureaucratic choices, “national security considerations,” and local absorption capacity shape domestic refugee policy.¹²⁵

My work may contribute to this research because it also focuses on the influences on local refugee policy. I measure the effects of these influences on the outcomes of refugee policies, namely varied refugee enrollment ratios, in the specific countries of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. I primarily examine the possible domestic and international determinants of the variation in the treatment of refugees in three countries. My intent is that this study will therefore add to the existing work on refugees by enhancing the understanding of how domestic and/or international factors respectively influence policy outcomes in the realm of refugee education. I discuss four specific options as the alternative explanations in greater detail in Chapter Two. They are the following: national security

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concerns, economic interests and constraints, elements of the host government’s relationship with Syria, and coordination between the three host governments and international entities that support refugees – in this case NGOs. I examine these four alternative explanations and how they may contribute to the overall understanding of refugee enrollment variance.

Policy and Advocacy Refugee Education Research Program. There is a second literature, a relevant body of policy- and advocacy-oriented refugee education literature published by the United Nations and NGOs, to which my research may contribute.126 Generally, this literature describes and examines current refugee conditions, offers research-based recommendations to improve access to education services, and is designed to encourage donors to support refugee services like education. The existing research regarding refugees and education has included studies on gender inequality in refugee education (“education for who?”), the purpose for refugee education (“education for

what?"), and the question of how education for refugees should be delivered. Additionally, these reports identify factors that impede the delivery of refugee education. Mary Mendenhall and her colleagues’ 2017 report, for example, *Urban Refugee Education: Strengthening Policies and Practices for Access, Quality, and Inclusion*, cites numerous barriers to refugees’ access to education in urban settings including: refugees’ lack of legal status or documentation, overcrowded schools, lack of transportation and distance to school, and discrimination and xenophobia from the host community. Sarah Dryden-Peterson’s report to the UNHCR, *Refugee Education: A Global Review*, outlines several challenges to providing refugee education which include: the provision of education to refugees in urban situations, the limited refugee access to higher education, the shortages of teachers, the inability to obtain certification, the lack of financial resources, and the lack of coordination efforts. UNESCO reports such as the *EFA Global Monitoring Report 2011: The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, provides essential global statistics regarding refugee enrollment ratios, the problems associated with providing

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education during conflicts, and the lack of financing of refugee services.\textsuperscript{130} Reports specific to particular emergencies - like UNICEF’s report, \textit{Under Siege The Devastating Impact on Children of Three Years of Conflict in Syria} - contain local statistics regarding refugee enrollment ratios and the barriers associated with the provision of education such as the lack of funding and capacity.\textsuperscript{131}

These reports are important because they provide a foundation for studying local conditions. Some of these reports conclude that funding and capacity are the main roadblocks to refugees’ access to education.\textsuperscript{132} Capacity, in this case, is an all-encompassing term that refers to a school system’s ability to accept refugee children. It can include the physical space to accommodate refugee children, the number of children that can be taught in a class, the materials needed for instruction, and the ability of the teaching staff to meet the psycho-social needs of refugee children.\textsuperscript{133} While funding and capacity affect enrollment ratios, I question whether or not they explain why there is variance in refugee enrollment ratios. There are a number of other factors that drive the delivery of refugee services, like education, that need consideration. They include national security concerns and cultural, religious, historical and political factors. Additionally, there are numerous conditions to be considered like the size and scope of the crisis, the management

\textsuperscript{130} United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization, “\textit{EFA Global Monitoring Report}.”
\textsuperscript{131} United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund, “\textit{Under Siege: The Devastating}.”
\textsuperscript{132} On average, refugee education receives approximately 2% of humanitarian aid, the lowest of all sectors, and only 38% of aid requests for education are met, half the average of all other sectors. Sinclair, “\textit{Education in Emergencies}”; United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization, “\textit{EFA Global Monitoring Report}”, p. 3; and United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization, \textit{EFA Global Monitoring Report}, p. i of foreword and p. 3.
\textsuperscript{133} The term, capacity, is mentioned in several refugee education reports, yet at the time of writing, I was unable to find an official definition of capacity. I provided clarification for the term by researching how the term is used by using this resource: Susan Nicolai, \textit{Education in Emergencies: A Tool Kit for Starting and Managing Education in Emergencies}, 2003,
and coordination efforts at the international, national and local levels, preparedness, and safety and security. I address these factors in the study that follows. My intent is to identify the conditions specific to the three countries that potentially impact refugee enrollment ratios. I hope to contribute to this research program by identifying factors that explain why some refugees have access to education while others do not.

*Government-NGO Relations.* There is a third research program that identifies the key determinants of government-NGO cooperation and their implications on the delivery of social services such as education. Specific to this dissertation, government-NGO relations is a subcategory of one of the four alternative explanations that will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two as a potential influence on refugee policy and refugee enrollment rates, namely coordination between the three host governments and international entities that support refugees.

My work may contribute to this research program by identifying a factor that potentially impacts this relationship – providing assistance to large, unwanted, refugee populations. Most of the literature within the government-NGO relations research program focuses upon NGOs providing services to domestic populations. Yet, there is an important distinction between providing for a domestic population and a refugee population. Governments should, in theory - although not always in practice - serve their domestic population by providing protection, a rule of law and social services. Refugees do not fall under the purview of a government unless it has signed international conventions that

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protect and provide for them.\textsuperscript{135} Even in instances in which governments have done so, there are numerous examples in which they do not implement requisite measures.\textsuperscript{136} Governments do not want to host refugees in most cases.\textsuperscript{137} Refugees can overwhelm the basic infrastructure of host communities and strain access to resources.\textsuperscript{138} They have the potential to politically destabilize regions.\textsuperscript{139} When NGOs provide services to an unwanted population, the relationship between the host governments and NGOs may be negatively impacted because refugees are a burden on the host government. Thus, host governments may perceive NGOs that assist unwelcome refugees as contributing to the problem. I address the willingness of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon to host Syrian refugees and discuss whether that is one of the conditions that potentially impacts the level of cooperation between the host governments and NGOs. I do so by conducting semi-structured interviews with key actors who provide support to Syrian refugees - namely host government officials, U.N. officials, and NGO representatives - to determine if this is a factor.

Governments and NGOs interact through formal agreements such as contracts and policies, and through informal relationships such as alliances, networks and personal relationships. According to Melissa Stone, government-NGO interactions are both hierarchical, such as when governments create policies and regulations and informal - as expressed by interpersonal relationships. Paul Pettigrew asserts that the combination of formal and informal interactions include complex levels of interaction that are maintained through channels of communication. He emphasizes the importance of “back-staging” - the interactions that occur privately and informally between government officials and NGO representatives. John Farrington, Anthony Babbington, Nicola Banks, David Hulme and Michael Edwards also contend that collaboration between NGOs and governments are negatively impacted if informal relationships are not established. In this dissertation I explore how NGOs and host governments engage with each other through both formal agreements and informal means, in order to determine how and whether these interactions

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142 Pettigrew, "Power, Conflicts," [Page 381].

143 Ibid.

144 International Institute for Environment and Development, *From Research to Innovation: Getting the Most from Interaction with NGOs in Farming Systems Research and Extension*, by John Farrington and Anthony Babbington, Gate Keeper Series no. 43, [Page 2]; and Nicola Banks, David Hulme, and Michael Edwards, "NGOs, States, and Donors Revisited: Still Too Close for Comfort?," *World Development* 66 (2015): [Page 715], [https://ac.els-cdn.com/S0305750X14002939/1-s2.0-S0305750X14002939-main.pdf?_tid=8145699a-0449-4139-b845-a1e9899e74e0&acdnat=1531575659_6b06ab28f9dee64f4af82f02ab8739c5](https://ac.els-cdn.com/S0305750X14002939/1-s2.0-S0305750X14002939-main.pdf?_tid=8145699a-0449-4139-b845-a1e9899e74e0&acdnat=1531575659_6b06ab28f9dee64f4af82f02ab8739c5).
impact refugee enrollment rates. Specifically, I apply the theoretical factors discussed in the literature to determine the key factor(s) that influence both the relationship between the two entities and the relative importance of that relationship on the education outcomes. I also provide empirical evidence regarding NGO attempts to establish informal relationships with government officials, as well as their ability to navigate official government channels to gain support for their refugee education services. I conduct an in-depth case study on one NGO’s interaction with government officials in each of the host countries to assess their level of success in gaining support.

The literature highlights that governments and NGOs have different types of leverage and use a myriad of strategies to achieve their goals, to overcome obstructions or to gain compliance from each other. As Derick Brinkerhoff observes, there is a “power differential among the various actors, which arises as a function of differences in resource levels, operational capacity, and political clout.”145 The government’s power is that it is recognized as the “legitimate authority:” it represents the majority’s interests, and “operates in the realm of the political system.”146 Governments establish the laws and their enforcement.147 Adil Najam and Julie Fisher observe that some governments use coercive powers to repress and harass NGOs.148 In 1995, for example, Kenya’s government fire-

147 Ibid.
148 Ibid., p. 386; and Julie Fisher, Nongovernments: NGOs and the Political Development of the Third World (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998).
bombed a local NGO for making a documentary about urban squatters. In 1998, the government of Pakistan targeted the activities of NGOs and revoked 2,000 licenses.

Jennifer Brinkerhoff and Dominique Moran indicate that it is the government’s decision to cooperate with NGOs that represents the most influential power mechanism in government-NGO relations. A government’s decision to cooperate is evident through the passage of NGO-friendly legislation and the subsequent government action. NGOs will be unable to perform services if governments withhold support. Jennifer Brinkerhoff contends that a stable legal framework is a key condition that enables NGOs to work within a country and to create an effective partnership with the government. A. N. Zafar Ullah and his colleagues list several conditions for an effective government-NGO partnership: trust, respect, fair policies, laws and regulatory frameworks, the involvement of all stakeholders at all levels from local to international, and commitment from all parties. In Susannah Mayhew’s study of NGOs in Asia she describes the three basic criteria needed for government-NGO relations to be effective: a strong government, capable of creating and enforcing policies that regulate NGO actions and accountability; an independent and proficient NGO sector that represents civil society; and the political will to engage in productive dialogue between the two entities. William Postma states that reciprocal


In certain cases, governments withhold cooperation from NGOs. Richard Batley, in his studies of government-NGO relations in Africa and South Asia, finds that governments created NGO-friendly policies, but government “practice is more often unsupportive and relationships are surrounded by mistrust.”\footnote{Richard Batley, "Engaged or Divorced? Cross-service Findings on Government Relations with Nonstate Service Providers," \textit{Public Administration and Development} 26, no. 3 (August 2006): [Page 241].} NGOs were denied the chance to conduct open dialogues with these governments despite the fact that regulations were in place.\footnote{Ibid.} Siddhartha Sen asserts that governments may withhold support when NGOs are perceived as entities that provide opportunities to promote political discontent and act as conduits for opposition to the state regime.\footnote{Siddhartha Sen, "Some Aspects of State-NGO Relationships in India in the Post-Independence Era," \textit{Development and Change} 30, no. 2 (April 1999): [Page 327].} Nicola Banks, Michael Edwards, and David Hulme contend that, “Where governments equate civil society with political opposition and create regulations to dampen or repress civil society, NGOs face severe limitations on their ability to act as agents of progressive social change.”\footnote{Banks, Hulme, and Edwards, "NGOs, States," [Pp. 711-712].} These studies highlight that while governments may enact NGO-friendly policies, it is their subsequent actions and interactions with NGOs that indicate the level of cooperation.

Yet, NGOs have a repertoire of mechanisms at their disposal to overcome government obstruction. As John Clark, author of \textit{Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organizations} concludes, NGOs have three choices in their dealings with
governments, “They can oppose the state, complement it, or reform it—but they cannot ignore it.”

David Lewis and Derick Brinkerhoff argue that NGOs are able to question government practices and to exert their influence on policy. Peter Dobkin Hall, Barbara Bramble, Gareth Porter and Philippe Sands note instances of NGOs influencing (coopting) government policies to “reflect their interests.”

Elizabeth Reid states that NGOs are capable of “building strong organizations...with enough resources to exercise power in politics.”

Yaffa Moskovich and Adi Binhas in their studies of NGOs that supported illegal immigrants in Israel find that NGOs were successful in overcoming government obstacles by petitioning the High Court of Israel, appealing to the public through the use of mass media and forming coalitions with other NGOs.

Ramya Ramanath and Alnoor Ebrahim, in their studies of government-NGO relations in India, find that NGOs organized protests and built alliances with community-based organizations and government officials to gain cooperation for their programs that support the people living in the slums of Mumbai.

Adil Najam observes that NGOs also defy policy through opposition. He

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160 John Clark, *Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organizations* (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1991), [Page 75].
166 Najam, "The Four-C's," [Page 386].
cites Greenpeace’s mandate to oppose Norway and Japan’s legislation that permits the killing of whales.\textsuperscript{167} The literature also highlights numerous cases of NGOs using “naming and shaming” tactics to gain government compliance.\textsuperscript{168}

The literature notes that NGOs have leverage because they are often funded by international donors, forcing governments to cooperate with them if they are in need of financial assistance.\textsuperscript{169} A. N. Zafar Ullah et. al. observe that a major factor that determines the level of collaboration between NGOs and governments are the donor organizations.\textsuperscript{170} Jennifer Brinkerhoff asserts that “it is unlikely that partnerships would have been achieved without the incentives of donor funding … the initial terms of the partnerships between government, NGOs and citizen groups pre-determined by donors.”\textsuperscript{171} Susannah Mayhew’s study of government-NGO relations in Bangladesh, Vietnam and Cambodia reveals that donors put pressure on governments to establish partnerships with NGOs by funding the NGOs directly rather than the government itself, resulting in NGOs gaining leverage over these governments.\textsuperscript{172} Yet, she finds that the government of Bangladesh regarded the NGO

\begin{enumerate}[\item]
\item[Ibid.]
\item[170] Ullah et al., "Government-NGO Collaboration," [Page 143].
\item[172] Mayhew, "Hegemony, Politics," [Pp. 729, 753].
\end{enumerate}
sector as a threat to its authority, and thus created policy to mitigate NGO power. In contrast, the government of Nepal allowed NGOs to become more involved and permitted them to share crucial insights into development activities.

These studies conclude that both governments and NGOs utilize a number of strategies to gain influence over and compliance from each other. My research may be of significance to this research program because I identify the mechanisms used by both the host governments and the NGOs to gain cooperation in the specific case studies of Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. I may contribute to this research program by identifying whether NGOs in the specific host countries successfully employed mechanisms to overcome government obstructions to the provision of refugee education services in order to explain why some refugees have access to education while others do not. My research may also make a contribution to this literature by identifying the key determinants of host government-NGO cooperation in the specific cases of Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. As I discuss in the case study chapters, each country engaged with NGOs with varying levels of cooperation.

**Dissertation Outline**

Chapter 2 describes the four alternative explanations that may influence host governments’ refugee policies which in turn impact refugee enrollment rates: national security concerns, economic interests and constraints, elements of the host government’s historical relationship with Syria, and coordination between the three host governments and NGOs. The purpose of the chapter is to explain the arguments leading to each

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173 Ibid., p. 731.
174 Ibid.
alternative explanation by providing a contextual basis for what influences refugee policy. I describe each argument's theoretical basis from which to draw findings as part of this explanation. I briefly describe the methodology (a mixed method approach consisting of interviews, Q sorts, ANOVAs, and post hoc tests) and the research framework with which the dissertation examines each alternative explanation. I also justify why Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon were chosen amongst the countries that host Syrian refugees.

I provide an in-depth review of the data collected for this dissertation in Chapter 3. This chapter includes an overview of the methodology, an analysis of the semi-structured interviews, an examination of the Q-sort exercise results, and an examination of the ANOVA and post hoc test results conducted to compare the results of the Q-sort exercise across the host countries. I conclude with a discussion of the four factors that impact Syrian refugee enrollment rates: the domestic and international NGOs’ opportunities to collaborate with the host government; their advantage if established in the host country prior to the Syrian refugee crisis; their utilization of fiscal aid as a negotiating tool, and their strategy of providing for both refugees and the domestic population.

I examine the individual case studies of Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey chapters 4, 5, and 6. Each chapter begins with the evolution of refugee policies prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, noting which international refugee conventions have been signed by the three countries and which domestic refugee laws have been created to manage prior refugee crises. Second, I explore the NGOs’ relationship with the host government and whether NGOs provided any services within the host country prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, in order to determine if the relationship served as an obstacle or was advantageous to providing refugee education services in the current crisis. Third, I analyze the role
at the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis in each host country. Fourth, I examine the strategies, opportunities, and advantages of NGOs in their efforts to overcome the host government’s long-term refugee policy decisions in their quest to provide Syrian refugee education services from the beginning of the crisis up to August 2016. Finally, I examine one particular INGO’s experience in each of the host countries to determine whether and how it was able to overcome obstructions to their provision of refugee education services.

Chapter 7 consists of four parts. First, I provide a summation of the purpose of my research and the key findings across each case study. Second, I examine how the findings of my dissertation may contribute to three distinct research programs: the research program that identifies the key determinants of NGO-host government cooperation, the research program that examines domestic and international factors that influence refugee policy, and the research program that assesses refugee education programs and identifies the conditions that impact the delivery of education. Third, I discuss the policy implications of my study. Fourth, I conclude with possible areas for future research.
CHAPTER 2
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

The Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) outlines the government’s role in providing education for children displaced by conflict:

Governments—whether at the central, provincial, or district level—are the key to the development of a strong education system. Beyond service delivery, national authorities are responsible for developing and implementing education policy, establishing standards and curricula, developing education institutions, setting priorities and objectives, and monitoring progress toward those goals.175

Host government refugee policies are a key determinant in whether refugees have access to schooling. According to UNESCO, “A national education policy sets the major objectives and orientations while defining the government’s priorities and strategies to achieve its goals.”176 Les Bell and Howard Stevenson define policymaking as “a dynamic process in which the nation state exerts power and deploys resources in conjunction with regional, local, and even institutional agencies.”177

All three countries have declared “open-door” refugee policies that protect and support Syrian refugees.178 All have promised, through the passage of laws, to educate Syrian refugees.179 Yet there is an enormous variation in refugee enrollment in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. I posit that there are international and domestic factors that influence local refugee policy which in turn

176 Memorandum by Bureau of Public Information, BPI United Nations Education Scientific, and Cultural Organization, "National Education."
177 Bell and Stevenson, Education Policy: Process, Themes, p. 4.
179 Ibid.
explain this variance. As Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher contend, "the formulation of refugee policy involves a complex interplay of domestic and international factors at the policy-making level."\(^{180}\)

The literature recognizes that refugee crises often start suddenly, obligating host governments to make quick decisions.\(^{181}\) A host government responsively reacts to mitigate potential problems: security risks, strains to existing infrastructure, and the potential negative impact to the economy.\(^{182}\) Its refugee policies are based on national considerations and interests.\(^{183}\) Refugees are perceived as a potential threat because they often live within host communities, compete for resources, raise security concerns or are perceived as receiving preferential treatment in the form of aid.\(^{184}\) As Alan Dowty and Gil Loescher observe, “The impact of a refugee flow on countries of refuge can be measured in direct and

\(^{180}\) Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher, eds., *Refugees in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), [Page 8].\


\(^{184}\) Ibid.
indirect economic costs, in negative social and cultural consequences, in threats to security both internally and externally, and in its broader impact on the fabric of global stability.”

The decisions these countries make determine refugee restrictions and rights, the level of protection offered, and which institutions within the country provide this protection. Governments can act in accordance with international refugee laws or disregard them completely and initiate restrictive refugee policies. Additionally, the host country's domestic situation at the time of the influx influences refugee policies and whether they will be more restrictive or more permissive. The literature identifies several factors – both domestic and international - that influence the policy actions of governments as each country responds to mass refugee influxes differently.

This dissertation identifies refugee enrollment rates as dependent on which key factor or factors influence refugee policy. In this chapter, I consider four alternative explanations that may explain the variance in refugee enrollment: national security concerns, economic interests and constraints, elements of the host government’s historical relationship with Syria, and coordination between the three host governments and NGOs. Although all may play a role, my goal is to identify which is the most significant. I conclude

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188 Ibid., p. 2.
with a brief discussion of the methodology and research design used to evaluate the four alternative explanations.

**Security Concerns as the Primary Cause for Variance in Refugee Enrollment Ratios**

A host government’s security concerns is the first possible explanation as the cause for variance in refugee enrollment ratios. This alternative explanation focuses on the security conditions in the three countries in order to evaluate their relative influence on refugee policies. Government policymakers are concerned about their national and local security and the impact of refugees on both. I discuss the research program that supports this claim below. I then discuss how the findings in the literature may be applied to each host country.

Karen Jacobsen specifically identifies three types of security concerns that influence host government policy decisions: the traditional – “the ability of the state to defend itself militarily from external aggression;” the regime – “the capacity of the government to protect itself from internal threats arising from domestic disorder and conflict” and the structural – “the balance between a state's population and its resource endowments (food, water, [and] living space).”  

She argues that refugees are a potential threat to all three types of security concerns due to their capacity to aggravate existing threats or to create new ones. Edward Moguire observes that host governments that believe refugees represent a humanitarian crisis adopt policies to protect and support refugees, while host governments that perceive refugees as a threat adopt policies to protect national security. Vaughan Robinson contends that at the end of the Cold War in the

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191 Ibid.
1990s, many developing nations with large refugee populations perceived refugees as a threat to national security and implemented a policy of repatriation, with 2.4 million refugees repatriated in 1992 alone.¹⁹³ Gaim Kibreab also finds that host governments create restrictive or negative refugee policies to minimize “perceived risks to national and societal security.”¹⁹⁴

Studies have been conducted regarding security concerns and their impact on refugee policy.¹⁹⁵ Hiram A. Ruiz describes the Pakistan government’s changes to its Afghan refugee policy. Two million Afghan refugees were welcomed into Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s during the Afghan/Soviet War and the wars between the mujahedin factions.¹⁹⁶ Initially, Pakistan established refugee villages and permitted Afghan refugees to travel outside them, to establish businesses and to seek employment.¹⁹⁷ In 2000, Pakistan changed its refugee policy to become more restrictive because Afghan refugees were blamed “for Peshawar’s and other cities’ growing social ills, including crime, the widespread availability of weapons, drug abuse, prostitution, and the decline in the Pakistan economy.”¹⁹⁸ Government officials also contended that Afghan refugees were

¹⁹⁶ Ruiz, "Afghan Refugees," [Page 1].
¹⁹⁷ Colville, "The Biggest," [Page 4].
responsible for the introduction of small arms weaponry and illegal smuggling between the two countries. Consequently, Pakistan closed its border with Afghanistan in November 2000 and barred entry to Afghan refugees unless they had a valid visa, which the majority seeking asylum did not.

Adam Dowty and Gill Loescher explain that, “Security concerns for the host state begin with the question of whether it can physically control the refugee population, which frequently includes armed combatants.” They cite examples such as Zaire-hosted Hutu refugees, some of whom were perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide and Thailand-hosted Cambodian refugees who threatened the sovereignty of the host government. The government of Kuwait expelled Palestinian refugees after a group attempted to undermine the government. These studies suggest that host governments react by creating restrictive refugee policies when they are perceived as threats.

In Anna Lindley’s study of the Kenyan government’s management of the Somali refugee crisis she observes that national security concerns were a “major driver” of refugee policy. Refugee policy became more restrictive due to security fears that the terrorist group al-Shabaab was entering Kenya through refugee migration. Consequently, Kenya created the Refugees Bill in 2010 that tightened “bureaucratic control of the refugee

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201 Dowty and Loescher, "Refugee Flows," [Page 49].
202 Ibid.
203 Ibid.
204 Lindley, "Between a Protracted," [Page 22].
205 Ibid.
population, requiring immediate registration and increasing penalties for non-compliance, as well as elaborating offences and penalties relating to identification document fraud.”

Susanne Schmeidel contends that the Taliban’s invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent 9/11 attacks on the United States permanently impacted how host governments perceive refugees. She posits that security concerns and migration became linked after these events because governments feared what she calls “Talibanisation” or the “creeping radicalisation of Islam.” As she explains, “Despite existing humanitarian concerns, the terrorist attack on 11 September gave traditional security thinking an edge, making alternative arguments and explanations increasingly difficult. This makes refugees, and their security, of little concern now.” She also observes that, “feelings of threat by the receiving society can translate into hostility against the refugees and practices that in turn may threaten the migrants (forced repatriation, confinement to small areas, etc.).”

Brad Blitz also argues that refugee policies became more restrictive after the 9/11 attacks. He states, “post-9/11 there has been a reconfiguration of refugee policy and a reconnecting of humanitarian and security interests which has enabled a discourse antithetical to the universal right to asylum.” Volker Turk and Francis Nicholson find that since the 9/11 attacks on the United States, host governments worldwide have become more concerned with domestic security than the rights and interests of refugees.

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206 Ibid., p. 21.
208 Ibid., p. 17.
209 Ibid., p. 18.
210 Blitz, "Another Story," [Page 379].
211 Please note that this statement is 16 years old, and that this perception may have changed since then. Volker Turk and Frances Nicholson, "Refugee Protection in International Law: An Overall Perspective," introduction to *Refugee Protection in International Law*, ed. Erika Feller, Volker Turk, and Frances
The rise of ISIS - the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria - has also caused much concern, especially in the Middle East and North Africa where the majority of the population is Muslim. Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait were reluctant to accept refugees due to the possibility that Islamist terrorists may migrate among the refugees. Jamsheed K. Choksy and Carol Choksy argue that these countries were “less amenable to accepting refugees due to fear of militants and violent ideologies destabilizing those monarchies.” In 2015, Zogby conducted 7,400 face-to-face interviews with citizens in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and found that the majority viewed ISIS as a serious security threat. A September 2015 Washington Institute for Near East Policy study of a representative sample of 1,000 adults from each of the countries of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait found that more than nine-in-ten of those surveyed held a negative view of ISIS. Most participants stated that the number one policy priority was the conflict


214 Ibid.


with ISIS. There were fears that members of ISIS have migrated with Syrian refugees into the countries of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon.

The literature suggests that host government policymakers make choices based on concerns about their national security. We may expect that host governments faced with threats such as Islamic terrorist groups like the Taliban and ISIS would emphasize policy preferences that would ensure the security of their domestic population in a post 9/11-world. As I discussed above, there are claims that large migrations of displaced peoples have created insecurity in host countries during previous refugee crises. Likewise, the literature suggests that host governments mitigate these security concerns and threats to its citizenry by amending refugee policies. Hence, host governments like the three studied in this dissertation might consider security concerns as a driver of refugee policy. One option is to posit that security issues may explain the refugee policy choices of each host government that may in turn impact variance in refugee enrollment ratios. If host governments perceive refugees to be a threat to the security of its domestic population, then it may impose restrictions on refugees that limit access to social services like education.

A host government may impose restrictions on refugees’ freedom of movement, which would limit refugee children’s access to schooling. A host government could impose

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217 Ibid.
restrictions such that education services are provided only to those who meet the criteria to register as refugees, a mandate that is difficult for some who lack the proper identification or paperwork to register. Hence, the variance in refugee enrollment rates in each host country may result from restrictive policies created from the perceived threats that refugees potentially pose in both the short and the long term.

**Economic Interests and Constraints as the Primary Causes for Variance in Refugee Enrollment Ratios**

A host government’s economic interests and constraints is a possible second explanation for the variance in refugee enrollment ratios. In this alternative explanation, I examine the economic conditions in the three countries to evaluate their relative influence on refugee policies, which in turn impact refugee enrollment rates. Host countries are concerned about economic stability. I next discuss the research program that proposes this claim. I then examine how the findings in the literature may be applied to each host country and how refugee enrollment rates may be impacted.

A large influx of refugees can certainly impact the limited amount of resources a host country can provide. Often, it is lower and middle-income countries, like the three countries studied here, that receive refugees. In 2010, 80% or 8.3 million refugees were hosted by developing countries. A 2011 UNHCR report indicated that countries hosting a significant number of refugees “incur substantial financial costs.” At a minimum, costs

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221 Sarah Dryden-Peterson, *The Education Experiences of Refugee Children in Countries of First Asylum* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2015), [Pp. 1, 7].
224 Ibid., p. 2.
225 Ibid.
include paying salaries to those who work with refugees, building refugee camps and facilities, and funding refugee services like health and education.\textsuperscript{226} At the local level, laborers may experience increased competition for jobs, rents may increase due to higher housing demands, and there is a similar impact on the prices of goods.\textsuperscript{227}

There is a research program that substantiates the claim that the host country’s domestic economy is a driver of refugee policy.\textsuperscript{228} Tanya Basok contends that economic considerations directly impact the refugee policies adopted by host countries.\textsuperscript{229} Likewise, Karen Jacobsen observes that the economic “absorption capacity of the local host community” impacts host government policy.\textsuperscript{230} Jeremy Hein notes that the host state’s refugee policies directly impact the “economic adaptation of refugees.”\textsuperscript{231} Alexander Betts and Paul Collier find that host countries created more restrictive refugee policies in the 1980s and 1990s in response to economic constraints. They state,

With democratization, debt crises, and the ‘Structural Adjustment’ programmes [sic] of the 1980s and 1990s through which the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank imposed economic liberalization and cuts in government spending across much of the developing world, host governments became increasingly constrained in their ability to allocate scarce resources to non-citizens.\textsuperscript{232}

\textsuperscript{226} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{227} Berti, "The Syrian Refugee Crisis," p. 44.
\textsuperscript{229} Basok, "Welcome Some," [Page 725].
\textsuperscript{231} Hein, “Refugees, Immigrants,” [Page 43].
\textsuperscript{232} Betts and Collier, Refuge: Rethinking, [Page 41].
Betts and Collier note that countries hosting refugees in the developing world still lack the resources to support them. They contend that, “Today, the world spends approximately $75bn a year on the 10 per cent of refugees who moved to developed regions and only around $5bn a year on the 90 per cent who remain in developing regions.”

Refugees are perceived as economic burdens on host communities. Under these circumstances, host governments may impose restrictions on refugees and permit them to stay only temporarily. Gaim Kibreab, in his studies of African host countries, finds that African governments created refugee policies to lessen the economic burden of refugees. Kibreab explains that African countries hosting refugees in the 1990s “were almost all adversely affected by severe economic…conditions,” and were unable to offer “essential goods and services to their own citizens let alone to accept hundreds of thousands of refugees.” He finds that most developing countries that hosted refugees created policies that separated refugees from host communities and justified these decisions to avoid or minimize “competition over scarce resources such as land, pasture, water, forest produce, housing, schools, transportation, and employment opportunities.”

Countries such as the Sudan and Uganda created local settlements - segregated agricultural refugee villages - in reaction to protracted refugee situations. These settlements were created to prevent economic integration with local communities.

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233 Ibid., p. 129.
235 Ibid.
236 Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Tufts University, Integration of Refugees, [Page 24].
238 Kibreab, "Displacement, Host," [Page 60].
239 Kibreab, "Local Settlements," [Page 470].
240 Ibid.
observe that host governments create restrictive refugee and asylum policies during economic downturns. They found that Western Europe created restrictive refugee policies during the economic downturn in the 1980s.

Host communities perceive refugees as a drain on resources. As Alan Dowty and Gil Loescher contend, “They require social services beyond those provided by international agencies, putting further strain on domestic structures that may already have been inadequate.” The Afghan refugee influx into Pakistan caused confrontations between the host communities and refugees due to the competition for scarce resources in the 1980s.

One such resource is employment opportunities. Many host countries restrict the refugees’ right to work. A 2016 KNOMAD (General Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development) study of 20 countries hosting 70% of the world’s refugees, found that, “A restrictive approach to the right to work prevails, and most states are reluctant to ease these restrictions.” A 2014 Asylum Access report that examined refugees’ right to work policies in 15 countries that host 30% of the worldwide refugee population found that:

242 Yoo and Koo, ”Love Thy Neighbor,” [Page 52].
243 Dowty and Loescher, ”Refugee Flows,” [Page 47].
45% of the 15 countries examined in this report have a complete legal bar to employment for refugees. In the countries where a legal right exists, significant de-facto barriers to employment, like strict encampment and exorbitant permit fees, undermined refugees’ ability to access sustainable employment.246

A 2012 Human Rights Watch report found that Thailand did not permit Burmese refugees to work, and consequently, refugees have been dependent on aid for survival for decades.247 A January 2019 AsiaNews.It report indicates that Burmese refugees continue to be denied the opportunity to work.248 The government of Kenya had forbidden Somali refugees’ the opportunity to work despite the fact that they have been settled in this host country since the 1990s.249 The government of Ethiopia does not grant work permits to refugees.250 El Salvadoran refugees were barred from entering the labor market in Costa Rica and were only permitted to work in “self-administered businesses financed by UNHCR.”251 Gaim Kibreab concludes that “the basic entitlement to rights is nationality, not residency” in developing countries.252

Yet, there is a literature that finds that aid and economic development opportunities are given to host governments who accept and grant more rights to

250 NOMAD General Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development, Refugees' Right, [Page 34].
252 Kibreab, "Displacement, Host," [Page 58].
refugees, and this benefits not only refugees but the host communities as well. Alexander Betts chronicles the history of targeted development assistance programs in refugee-hosting countries. Targeted development assistance programs require donor states to provide funding aid to “host countries of first asylum as a means to enhance refugees’ access to protection and durable solutions.” The development aid is used to assist both host communities and refugees through the provision of livelihood opportunities, social services or infrastructure in exchange for “refugees’ access to rights, self-sufficiency, and, where possible, local integration.”

The literature offers examples of successful targeted developmental assistance programs. An influx of refugees presented the government of Belize with an opportunity to develop land-for-farming, some of which was allocated to refugees for cultivation. The government of Tanzania established the Special Programme for Refugee Affected Areas (SPRAA). The European Commission funded the program in Tanzania from 1997 to 2003. Local host communities benefited from the sponsorship of road construction, environmental education programs and farming in exchange for hosting refugees and giving them livelihood rights. The International Conference on Refugees in Central America (CIREFCA) of 1989 promoted development projects that benefitted host communities and refugees. CIREFCA gave targeted development

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254 Ibid.
255 Ibid.
256 Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Feinstein International Famine Center, The Forgotten, [Page 16].
257 University of Manchester, Leveraging Change, [Page 7].
258 Ibid.
259 University of Oxford Refugees Study Centre, Development Assistance, [Page 7].
assistance to the Mexican states of Campeche and Quintana Roo in exchange for giving Guatemalan refugees the right to freedom of movement, as well as livelihood opportunities.\textsuperscript{260} The World Bank and the UNHCR funded income-generating projects with the cooperation of the government of Pakistan that benefitted both local host communities and the Afghan refugees they hosted.\textsuperscript{261} This program provided millions of Pakistanis and Afghans with employment through reforestation programs, watershed management, road repair and construction and flood protection projects.\textsuperscript{262} Three quarters of those employed were Afghan refugees and one-quarter were impoverished Pakistanis.\textsuperscript{263}

These scholars argue that host government policymakers are concerned about both national and local economic stability. How each host country reacts to the economic impact of a refugee influx should be considered because this factor may influence the initial creation of refugee policies, and any amendments thereafter that may help to explain refugees’ access to schooling. If a host government perceives refugees to be a threat to economic stability, then it may create more restrictive refugee policies. The scholars of this literature cite cases in which host governments protect their domestic population by restricting or prohibiting refugees’ right to work.\textsuperscript{264} A host government may impose fines,

\textsuperscript{260} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{262} Ibid.
arrests or refoulement upon refugees who defy this policy.\textsuperscript{265} Refugee families desperate for income may push their children into informal employment to support their households in order to avoid punishment.\textsuperscript{266} Consequently, these refugee children cannot go to school and this could explain a lower enrollment rate. Yet, if a host government receives incentives through significant international funding and development assistance that benefit both refugees and the host communities, then it may create policy that permits livelihood opportunities for refugees such as the right to work and the right to open businesses.\textsuperscript{267} By doing so, refugee families would not have to rely on their children for income and thus the children can attend school. This may explain a host country’s higher enrollment rate.

As I will discuss in greater detail in the case study chapters, there is evidence that the three countries have incurred substantial costs for hosting large Syrian refugee populations. As Benedetta Berti notes, “the humanitarian cost of the crisis has been paid mainly by Syria’s neighbors,” specifically Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon.\textsuperscript{268} In the context of domestic economic conditions, each host country may choose diverging policy responses in reaction to the Syrian refugee crisis. The policy response may be the result of the costs incurred by the influx of hundreds of thousands of Syrians, the availability of

\textsuperscript{265} Asylum Access, \textit{Global Refugee}, [Page 31].
\textsuperscript{267} Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Feinstein International Famine Center, \textit{The Forgotten}, [Page 16]; University of Oxford Refugees Study Centre, \textit{Development Assistance}, [Page 7]; and Crisp, "Mind the Gap!", [Page 171].
\textsuperscript{268} Benedetta Berti, "The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Regional and Human Security Implications," \textit{Strategic Assessment} 17, no. 4 (January 2015): [Page 41].
\url{http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/adkan17_4ENG_7_Berti.pdf}. 
assistance that benefits host communities as well as refugees, or both factors in concert. I investigate whether economic constraints and interests possibly explain the refugee policy choices of each host government, which may in turn impact variance in refugee enrollment ratios.

**Elements of Host Government’s Historical Relationship with Syria as the Primary Cause for Variance in Refugee Enrollment Ratios**

Elements of the host government’s historical relationship with Syria form the basis for a third possible explanation for variance in refugee enrollment ratios. Elements in this case are defined as the shared political influences, histories and events between the sending and the host country, as well as shared religious or kinship groups across borders. In this alternative explanation, I examine these elements in the three countries to evaluate their relative influence on refugee policies, which in turn may impact refugee enrollment rates. Host countries are influenced by political relationships with sending countries as well as cultural and religious factors. I discuss the research program that makes these claims below. Then, I explain how the findings in the literature may be applied to each host country and how refugee enrollment rates may be impacted.

Karen Jacobsen observes that foreign relations directly shape the refugee policy of the host country. She suggests that the historical relationship between the host and sending country may influence host government policy choices. Several examples from the last four decades illustrate this point. Aristide Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo explain that the United States classified exiled Cubans as refugees - despite the lack of proof of persecution - due to its contentious relationship with communist Cuba.

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270 Ibid.
In contrast, the Zimbabwean government refused to identify displaced Mozambicans as refugees because it did not want to embarrass or implicate its political ally.\textsuperscript{272} Pakistan’s contentious relationship with Iran led to the harsh treatment of Iranian refugees in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{273} Simultaneously, Pakistan’s friendly relationship with Afghanistan led to better treatment of Afghan refugees.\textsuperscript{274} Tanya Basok contends that Costa Rica – due to its amicable relationship with Nicaragua - created refugee-friendly policies in the 1980s such as granting work permits to Nicaraguan refugees.\textsuperscript{275}

There is a literature regarding shared ethnic and religious kinship between refugees and host populations. Several scholars have examined how ethnic and cultural ties influence refugee migration.\textsuperscript{276} Jeff Crisp observes that transnational social networks effect migration patterns of refugees.\textsuperscript{277} In the 1990s, approximately 150,000 Sri Lankan Tamils sought asylum in the United States and Western Europe during their civil war.\textsuperscript{278} They requested asylum in countries where the Tamil diaspora settled previously in the 1970s and early 1980s.\textsuperscript{279} The Tamil “diaspora provided the social infrastructure required to arrange the departure of asylum seekers following the outbreak of the civil war.”\textsuperscript{280} Thus, many refugees initially travel to host countries with the same or similar ethnic kin groups under

\textsuperscript{273} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{274} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{275} Basok, "Welcome Some," p. 745.
\textsuperscript{278} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{279} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{280} Ibid.
the assumption that these groups will provide support and acceptance.\textsuperscript{281} There are other instances of refugees settling in areas with previously established diasporas: Vietnamese refugees in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, Iranian refugees in the United States, Canada, and Western European countries after the 1978 revolution, and Somali refugees in Norway, Switzerland and the United States in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{282}

Stephen Saideman finds that within host countries “the ethnic ties of politically relevant individuals and groups are likely to influence policy” and that “constituents will care most about those with whom they share ethnic ties.”\textsuperscript{283} He states that religious ties have the most influence and suggests that “events in Jerusalem matter to Jews in the United States, Muslims in Indonesia, and Catholics in Latin America.”\textsuperscript{284} Eunhye Yoo and Jeong-Woo Koo find that refugees consider social ties when they decide to leave their home country and where to migrate.\textsuperscript{285} Refugees associate social ties with “cost-reduction mechanisms rooted in networks – economic assistance, employment advice, and emotional support.”\textsuperscript{286}

The literature also demonstrates that large migrations of refugees from religious or cultural backgrounds that differ from host communities may exacerbate tensions. As Alan

\textsuperscript{284} Ibid., p. 33.
\textsuperscript{285} Yoo and Koo, "Love Thy Neighbor." [Page 52].
\textsuperscript{286} Ibid.
Dowty and Gil Loescher contend, “As for the social and cultural impact, refugee movements often threaten inter-communal harmony and undermine major societal values by altering the ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic composition of host populations.”287 The large influx of mostly Sunni Afghan refugees into the Shia dominant Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan led to violent confrontations between the two groups.288 Likewise, the large influx of Pashtuns in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan led to similar tensions between the host communities and Pashtuns.289

The literature indicates that elements of the host government’s historical relationship with Syria - their shared political influences, histories, and religious or kinship groups across borders potentially influence the host government’s policy decisions. Thus, I examine the argument that these elements may influence refugee policy in the countries of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. Each country borders and has had direct political dealings with Syria. Both Jordan and Lebanon have had contentious relationships with Syria in the past, with Syria being the aggressor.290 In contrast, Turkey has been the aggressor in its political dealings with Syria in both the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.291 As Karen

Jacobsen argues, “Refugees fleeing a country which has traditionally been an enemy of the receiving country may be treated with the hostility directed towards all natives of that country.”

I therefore examine the possibility that the prior political history between the three countries and Syria may explain the refugee policy choices of each host government, which may in turn impact variance in refugee enrollment ratios. If a host government considers the sending country to be an ally or has had a good political relationship prior to the refugee influx, then the host government may create more favorable refugee policies that open access to more education opportunities. Yet, if the opposite is true, then a host government may create more restrictive policies that hinder access to education services. Furthermore, the shared religious and kinship groups across their borders may also be a driver of refugee policy choices that may impact refugee enrollment. A host government may create more permissive refugee policies such as the freedom of movement and the right to work – two factors that impact access to education - when its domestic population and refugees share religious or kinship groups.

If a country hosts a large influx of refugees from different religious or cultural backgrounds, and that is perceived as a threat to social cohesion, then refugee policy may reflect this concern and refugees’ access to education could be limited.

The UNHCR states that almost 90% of registered Syrian refugees within the host countries are of Sunni descent. Both Jordan and Turkey have a majority Sunni Muslim

293 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Rights at Risk, [Page 12]; and Asylum Access, Global Refugee, [Page 31].
population. In contrast, the government of Lebanon reports that approximately 54% of the population identifies as Muslim and that Sunnis and Shiites are evenly divided with each sect representing almost 27%. Lebanon has had a history of religious cleavages. Hundreds of thousands of mostly Sunni Palestinian refugees migrated into Lebanon after the partition of Palestine in the late 1940s and have been denied Lebanese citizenship due to concerns that doing so would impact the sectarian balance of the Sunnis, Shias and Christians. The influx of mostly Sunni refugees from Syria has further disturbed the tenuous sectarian balance in Lebanon and may be a factor that influences Lebanese refugee policy towards Syrian refugees. The literature indicates that the prior political history and shared religious and kinship groups between the host country and sending country have been persuasive factors in previous refugee crises. Thus, these elements may be drivers in the three countries studied here. I examine each element separately to determine which of them, if any, is influential.

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296 These are the reported figures, but a government census has not been conducted since 1932. Figures for both Shia and Sunni Muslims are predicted to be much higher than 27.5% Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Lebanon," CIA World Factbook, last modified February 11, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html.


Host Government Coordination with Non-governmental Organization as the Primary Cause for Variance in Refugee Enrollment Ratios

Host government coordination with NGOs is the fourth possible explanation for variance in refugee enrollment ratios. In this alternative explanation, I examine the relationship between governments and NGOs to evaluate its relative influence on refugee policies, which in turn impact refugee enrollment rates. The relationship between the host government and NGOs impacts refugee policy. I discuss the literature that makes this claim below. Then, I explain how the findings in the literature may be applied to each host country and how refugee enrollment rates may be impacted.

Karen Jacobsen observes that,

> Few other domestic policy issues are as transnational in their subject matter as refugee policies. Refugees are manifestations of the problems of another country which suddenly become the problems of one’s own. International organizations also become involved, both with the refugees and in relations between the concerned governments.\(^{299}\)

She defines international entities that support refugees as “institutions and individuals in the international community which are concerned with the welfare of refugees.”\(^{300}\) Laura Barnett notes that these international entities provide a systemic response to the refugee crisis as it evolves and changes over time.\(^{301}\) Gil Loescher argues that these entities “promote regional and international stability and…support functions which serve the interests of governments -- namely, burden sharing and coordinating policies regarding the treatment of refugees.”\(^{302}\) Today, various branches of the United Nations, international

\(^{300}\) Ibid., p. 567.
donors, NGOs and international and domestic civic and religious groups comprise these entities.\textsuperscript{303} The role of these actors is to provide sources of aid during a refugee crisis.\textsuperscript{304}

The UNHCR is the primary United Nations organ that assists refugees.\textsuperscript{305} It is charged with “monitoring states’ compliance with the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees.”\textsuperscript{306} Once the host government requests assistance, the UNHCR establishes the standard operating procedures and undertakes a supervisory role.\textsuperscript{307} It is "mandated to lead and coordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide."\textsuperscript{308} Most germane to this research, the UNHCR “recognizes that international cooperation and support are needed to complement the efforts of the host country, which bears the primary responsibility for meeting the needs of refugees.”\textsuperscript{309} It then establishes relationships with both international and domestic NGOs to provide local services.\textsuperscript{310} It has partnered with NGOs to assist refugees during emergencies since the 1950s, and currently works with over 900 NGOs across the globe.\textsuperscript{311}

According to the UNHCR, it relies “heavily on NGOs to implement a wide range of projects, including aid distribution, protection, logistics, shelter, health, water,
sanitation, nutrition and education projects.” Most germane to this research, the UNHCR and other UN organs such as UNICEF rely on NGOs to provide education services to refugees. NGOs are often the first entities to organize refugee education. International NGOs establish schools for refugees with the cooperation of the host government and the UNHCR, and they utilize funding provided by international donors. INGOs provide both financial and technical resources to implement refugee education services. Often they follow the education guidelines established under the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies.

While there has been a long established relationship between the UNHCR and NGOs, interactions between host governments and NGOs have increased since the 1990s. Both governments and donors have acknowledged the importance of the work of NGOs in the realm of social services with the understanding that governments alone cannot

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312 Ibid.
314 Sinclair, Education in Emergencies, [Page 53].
315 Ibid.
316 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Learning for a Future: Refugee Education in Developing Countries, ed. Jeff Crisp, Christopher Talbot, and Diane B. Cipillone (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2001), [Page 15].
318 NGOs were established prior to the 1990s, but were not formally recognized as a key actor in the provision of social services. Claire McLoughlin, "Factors Affecting State-Non-Governmental Organization Relations in Service Provision: Key Themes from the Literature," Public Administration & Development 31, no. 4 (October 2011); Steven Smith and Michael Lipsky, Nonprofits for Hire: The Welfare State in the Age of Contracting (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), [Page 4]; and Lester M. Salamon and Helmut K. Anheier, "Civil Society in Comparative Perspective," in Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector, by Lester M. Salamon, et al. (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, 1999), [Page 3].
solve social problems without the assistance of “public, private and voluntary sectors.”

Stuart Macdonald and Tom Chrisp argue that while both governments and NGO institutions have strengths and capabilities, neither entity is solely able to provide all of the services a society needs. Richard Batley and Claire McLoughlin find that NGOs “fill the gaps” in the delivery of social services when conflict-affected states and fragile states cannot or will not.

Governments permit NGOs to provide social welfare and to administer development projects through “inter-organizational arrangements.” These arrangements are driven by politics and their institutional priorities and interests that ultimately shape government-NGO relationships and, most germane to this study - their levels of cooperation. Adil Najam posits a “theory of strategic institutional interests” that identifies types of interactions between these entities in terms of the “four Cs”: cooperative, complementary, confrontational, and co-optation. Table 2.1 is a visual representation of Adil Najam’s Four C’s of NGO-Government Relations and each type of relationship is discussed briefly below.

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320 Stuart Macdonald and Tom Chrisp, "Acknowledging the Purpose of Partnership," *Journal of Business Ethics* 59, no. 4: [Page 307].


324 Najam, "The Four-C's," [Page 375].
Table 2.1 Adil Najam’s Four C’s of NGO-Government Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred Strategies (Means)</th>
<th>Goals (Ends)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Similar</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dissimilar</td>
<td>Complementary</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Confrontation</td>
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Adil Najam defines a cooperative relationship as both governments and NGOs sharing similar policy goals and the tactics to realize them. He states that, “There is a convergence of preferred ends as well as means.” Katharina Welle, in her study of NGO-government relationships in Ghana, finds that relationships were most successful if each institution shared common values and objectives. Adil Najam cites Profamilia in Colombia and BENFAM in Brazil as two NGOs that managed successful national family planning programs because their goals and strategies aligned with their respective governments. A. N. Zafar Ullah et al., in their analysis of a partnership between the Bangladesh and NGOs to implement a tuberculosis control program, find that the collaborative efforts of both the government and NGOs “enhanced…treatment success, supervision and community participation.”

Najam defines a complementary relationship as governments and NGOs having similar goals but using different strategies to achieve them. He explains that in these situations, “Where the goals of government and NGOs are similar, they are likely to gravitate toward an arrangement in which they complement each other in the achievement of the desired outcomes.”

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325 Ibid., p. 384.
326 Ibid.
330 Ibid., p. 387.
of shared ends, even through dissimilar means.” He states that “complementarity” commonly occurs when NGOs “move in to fill a function that might otherwise be expected of government but that government is unable or unwilling to perform.” NGOs have strengths that complement the work of governments in social welfare and development or replace the government in these realms. In contrast to governments, NGOs have the flexibility to employ innovative solutions to problems in response to the needs of a community. John Farrington and Anthony Babbington compared 70 cases of governments working with NGOs and find that NGOs providing agricultural services were more innovative than the governments in the study. Najam cites T. Hussain’s study of the Pakistani government and two NGOs that provided clean water, housing and employment in Karachi and the mountains in the north. NGOs employed a “bottom-up participatory community development” program while the government preferred “top-down engineering and managerial mechanisms.” The result was that these entities worked separately but not “antagonistically” to implement a successful program.

Najam identifies instances when the goals of NGOs and host governments conflict with each other. He defines a confrontational relationship as “when governmental agencies and NGOs consider each other’s goals and strategies to be antithetical to their own—

331 Ibid.
332 Ibid., pp. 387-388.
335 International Institute for Environment and Development, From Research to Innovation, [Page Introduction].
essentially, total divergence of preferred ends as well as means,” and that NGOs and governments “often find themselves in explicitly or implicitly adversarial relationships.”

In these cases, governments use their powers to coerce, harass, or repress NGOs. Najam also highlights cases in which NGOs resist government policies or “press for policy change that is otherwise not forthcoming.” He cites the violence between “nongovernmental and governmental forces” during the 1999 World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle as an example of a confrontational relationship.

Najam defines a co-optative relationship as governments and NGOs having different goals but similar strategies. Najam contends that co-optative relationships are built on power struggles. He cites Kenya as a specific example. NGOs in Kenya initiated education and health programs (the means) similar to those of government programs. Yet, the government perceived the outcome (the ends) of these NGO programs as different from their own. The goal of the government’s provision of these services was “to solidify one-party rule” while it perceived the ends of NGO’s provision of these services as “enticing people toward plural democracy.” The government of Kenya began to restrict NGO activities. As Najam observes, “co-optation is nearly always discussed as what governments try to do to NGOs, and it is a universally negative thing.” Yet, NGOs also

338 Ibid., p. 386.
339 Ibid.
340 Ibid., p. 388.
341 Ibid., p. 389.
342 Ibid.
343 Ibid.
344 Ibid.
345 Ibid.
346 Ibid.
attempt to change the preferences of the government.\textsuperscript{347} In these cases, there is a low level of cooperation between these entities.

As I discuss in the case study chapters, each of the three countries established relationships with both international and domestic NGOs. The type of relationships between NGOs and host governments may affect the cooperation between these two entities, which in turn may impact a specific outcome as a consequence – namely varied Syrian refugee enrollment rates. If the relationship between the host government and international and domestic NGOs is what Najam identifies as cooperative or complementary, then it may result in higher refugee enrollment rates. Yet, if host government-NGO relations are what Najam identifies as confrontational or co-optative, then refugee enrollment rates may be lower. In this alternative explanation, I consider the host governments’ coordination efforts with NGOs as the main influence on refugee policies. Thus, I posit that the interactions between the host governments and NGOs may influence refugee policies that may in turn impact refugee enrollment rates.

\textbf{Research Design and Methodology}

The ensuing case studies therefore examine four alternative explanations to determine which factors most influence refugee enrollment rates. I collected, analyzed and evaluated the utility of these different arguments using both quantitative and qualitative measures. I utilized qualitative research in the form of semi-structured interviews to gain the perspective of UN officials, NGO representatives, and host government officials regarding which factor most impacts refugee enrollment rates. I utilized quantitative research in the form of Q-sort exercises, by asking the same participants to rank in order

\textsuperscript{347} Ibid.
of importance what they believe are the factors that influence refugee policy. I analyzed the results of this exercise by conducting ANOVA tests and post hoc T-tests with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. The purpose of these tests was to compare the net results of the Q-sort exercise for statistical significance across the host countries and by actor type.

I conducted a cross national comparison of the factors that influence refugee policies, the policies themselves and their results (varied school enrollment ratios) to examine the reasons why there is divergence in Syrian refugee enrollment rates. I aggregated the data gathered from a series of semi-structured interviews, the Q-sort rankings and the ANOVA tests in my field research to discover what explains the variance in refugee enrollment ratios in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon.

This comparison represents a most similar research design. The countries studied in this dissertation – Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon – are examined because they share similar characteristics. While each country varies in their governance system, they are geopolitically bordered around the country of Syria. The three countries have a shared political history that may help to explain policy choices that impact refugee enrollment rates. The primary religion in each country is Islam. The dominant form of Islam is Sunni in Turkey and Jordan while 27% of the domestic population of Lebanon identify as Sunni, 27% identify as Shia and the rest identify as Christian and other religions. The majority

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349 Ibid.
350 The figures indicate that both Turkey and Jordan have the propensity for religious homogeneity while Lebanon has the propensity for heterogeneity. This heterogeneity has led to ethnic conflict in the past, a factor that differentiates the cases. These are the reported figures for Lebanon, but a government census has
of refugees who settled in the three countries are Sunni Muslims. Each country hosts a similar refugee population demographic, a factor that can be held constant when analyzing which factors drive policy, which in turn impact refugee enrollment rates. Each host country hosted over one million refugees, both registered and unregistered, over the first five years of the Syrian refugee crisis. Turkey’s refugee population is much bigger than Jordan and Lebanon’s refugee population, although it is not so proportionate to its national population. While Turkey is certainly a much larger country than Jordan and Lebanon, this is not a crucial factor because each country has been able to physically accommodate the refugees. Yet, the resources to host these significant refugee influxes are an important consideration because the amount of resources available varies in each host country. This is a major factor that will be analyzed as a potential driver of refugee policy, which in turn impacts enrollment rates.

In the broader universe of cases, there are other host countries that have accepted Syrian refugees. Many European Union countries host Syrian refugees - most notably, Germany. While Germany is hosting approximately 530,000 Syrian refugees as of

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January 2018, it is not examined in this dissertation because it differs geopolitically from Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. Its primary religion is Christianity in comparison to the majority Muslim countries studied in this dissertation. It also does not border Syria.

There were two other notable countries I rejected examining from the potential universe of cases to study: Iraq and Egypt. Both countries have smaller Syrian refugee populations as compared to the three countries at the time of research in 2016: Iraq hosted 310,000 Syrian refugees, and Egypt hosted 140,000 Syrian refugees. I rejected Iraq as a potential case study because approximately 77% of Syrian refugees settled in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. Most of the Syrian refugees who settled in this area are of Kurdish descent. Some Syrian Kurds who settled in this area adopted a combatant role against ISIS in Iraq, and also fought against ISIS in Syria. Aristide Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo would identify them as refugee warriors. These refugees are not passive, but rather “highly conscious refugee communities with a political leadership structure and

356 Central Intelligence Agency, "Europe: Germany," Central Intelligence Agency.
armed sections engaged in warfare for a political objective.”362 I focused on Syrian refugees who have been displaced by the Syrian civil war and were not combatants.

I also rejected Egypt as a case study. Syrian refugees became part of the conflict that embroiled Egypt because they were perceived as allies of the Muslim Brotherhood during the time of research for this dissertation.363 During their recent tenure governing Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood supported the insurgents in Syria and opened Egypt’s borders to Syrian refugees.364 After the fall of President Mohamed Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013, Syrian refugees themselves became the subject of hostility in Egypt.365 The Egyptian media depicted “all Syrians as fifth columnists and terrorists bent on bringing their country’s violence to Egypt.”366 The new government perceived Syrian refugees as a threat because of their ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and created restrictive refugee policies.367 I therefore disqualified Egypt as a case study. At the time of research, Syrian refugees were not the object of any comparable accusations by the government in Turkey, Jordan or Lebanon.

364 Ibid.
366 Lindsey, "To Be a Syrian," Opinion Pages.
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY AND GENERAL FINDINGS

Introduction

In Chapter Three, I provide an in-depth review of the data collected for this research project. I examine the potential major drivers of refugee policy in order to answer the research question: what accounts for the national differences in the gross enrollment ratios of Syrian refugees? I conducted semi-structured interviews in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon to acquire a thorough description of perceptions regarding which factors influence refugee policy. I conducted Q-sort exercises to establish how the participants ranked the possible influences on refugee policy decisions. I then conducted ANOVA tests and post hoc T-tests with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons to compare the net results of the Q-sort exercise for statistical significance across the host countries and by actor type. This chapter is structured as follows: an overview of the methodology, an analysis of the semi-structured interviews, an examination of the Q-sort exercise results, and an analysis of the ANOVA and post hoc tests.

Methodology

Participants were chosen through a purposive sample of people based on their experience with Syrian refugees within the host countries. My 70 semi-structured interviews with host government officials, UN officials, and NGO representatives in the three countries were conducted between June 2016 and August 2016, lasted between 30 and 60 minutes, and were conducted in person or over Skype. There were 31 interviews...

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368 The semi-structured interviews are the qualitative approach while the Q-sort exercises, the ANOVA tests and the post hoc tests are the quantitative approach to this field study.

369 For the purpose of this research project, a host government official is an active or retired employee of a state agency within the host countries. A United Nations official is an active or retired employee of a UN organization like UNHCR, UNICEF or UNESCO. A non-governmental organization representative is an
with participants in Jordan, 21 with participants in Turkey, and 18 with participants in Lebanon. There were 29 interviews with NGO officials, 21 interviews with UN officials, and 20 interviews with government officials across the three countries. Table 3.1 is a visual representation of demographic variables and their percentages.

active or retired employee of a non-profit group formed by citizens outside the government at the local, national or domestic level.

370 I interviewed host government officials from different departments across the three countries. In Jordan, host government officials were interviewed from the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Social Development, and in Lebanon host government officials were interviewed from the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) and the Ministry of Social Affairs. In Turkey, all host government officials interviewed were from AFAD, the Disaster and Emergency Management ministry. I interviewed United Nations officials from different departments across the three countries. In Jordan officials interviewed worked for UNICEF and UNHCR. In Lebanon officials interviewed worked for UNHCR, UNESCO, UNDP, and OCHA. In Turkey officials interviewed worked for UNHCR and UNICEF. In the three countries, I interviewed representatives from both local and international NGOs. The interviews were anonymous to protect the source. The only personal information collected was nationality and employment at one of the three institutions (Host government, UN, or NGO).
I was able to ask the participants a minimum of eight and a maximum of twelve questions with regards to their perspective on the factors influencing refugee enrollment rates.\textsuperscript{371} Four questions centered on the alternative explanation themes: security concerns, economic interests and constraints, elements of the host government’s historical relationship with Syria, and the host country’s relationship with the international entities

\textsuperscript{371} For the complete list of questions, please see Appendix C.
that support refugees.\textsuperscript{372} I also asked questions regarding the country’s initial response to the Syrian refugee crisis. If there was time, I asked additional questions regarding how policy was created and whether or not decision making was centralized in each country. (See Appendix C.) I utilized the NVivo software program to code the interviews.\textsuperscript{373}

There are limitations to this study. I conducted the interviews in English or the respondents’ native languages (Arabic and Turkish) with the assistance of qualified translators. My goal was to ask twelve questions during the semi-structured interview process. But in some cases, I was limited by time to asking eight or fewer questions. In those cases, I focused on the questions regarding the four themes and the background questions regarding the government’s initial response to the Syrian refugee crisis. Six participants across the three institutions (government, UN, and NGO) and the three countries abstained from participating in the Q-sort exercise.

One limitation deserves particular attention. I did not speak with Syrian refugee families about their decisions to allow or disallow their children access to educational services. First, I was unable to gain access to this population. I was unable to gain permission to visit a Syrian refugee camp in Turkey.\textsuperscript{374} Contacts in Jordan were unable to

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{372} When I asked questions in regards to cooperation with international entities that support refugees, I used the phrase – international refugee regime. This term came from the literature. The international refugee regime is defined as organizations or governments that support refugees including the United Nations, NGOs, and major donors to refugee crises like the United States and the European Union.  
\textsuperscript{373} I used NVivo software because it is a qualitative data analysis program that allows the user to process and organize text-based data from sources like semi-structured interviews. I used NVivo to evaluate the results of the semi-structured interviews and to look for patterns in the perceptions of UN officials, NGO representatives and host government officials. The software enabled me to create nodes for analysis and from this analysis to determine which refugee policy factors were mentioned with the highest frequency across host countries and across institutions.  
\textsuperscript{374} I contacted Mac McClelland, a journalist for the New York Times who wrote an article on Turkey’s Syrian refugee camps in 2015 titled \textit{How to Build the Perfect Refugee Camp}. She explained that it took her six months to gain permission to access the camps and that her contacts in Turkey were no longer in the position to assist with access. She would not give me her contacts. I tried other avenues to gain access to
\end{footnotesize}
guarantee access to a Syrian refugee camp at the time of preparation of my IRB application. I did not attempt to gain access to Syrian refugees in Lebanon because there were no official refugee camps established in Lebanon. Second, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) considers refugees to be a vulnerable population and requires specific rules and procedures be followed to interview refugees. In a brief span of time, I conducted my dissertation proposal defense, planned travel to the Middle East to conduct my field research during a limited window of opportunity in my teaching schedule, and submitted my application to the IRB to conduct the field research. I would have been unable to meet all of the IRB requirements in order to speak with refugees directly during that short time span.

I wanted to speak with Syrian refugee families because they are directly affected by access to educational services. They are also one of the key stakeholders who decide whether or not their children go to school. They make practical decisions about schooling for their children for a number of reasons including but not limited to the need for their children to work, safety concerns, and the utility of schooling when there is a lack of perceived future economic and livelihood opportunities. These decisions would impact refugee enrollment rates. While I address some of these factors in my research, I did not take into account the beliefs, perceptions and opinions of the Syrian refugees themselves.

refugee camps. I spoke with members of AFAD – the ministry responsible for managing the Syrian refugee crisis - and representatives of the UN. I had no success.

Semi-Structured Interview Results

The interviews provided information on the background, history, and the experiences unique to each host country, and help to explain why participants deemed certain factors as having the greatest impact on refugee policy. The following section will provide a description and an analysis of how the participants responded during the interviews.\footnote{376 This section contains are only representative comments of the semi-structured interviews and I will utilize significantly more in the case studies that follow.} This section is organized by theme, then by host country, and then by type of actor interviewed.

Security Concerns. Interview subjects were asked about the extent to which security concerns influence refugee policy. In Jordan, government officials cited ISIS and border security as security issues influencing refugee policy.\footnote{377 Many participants used the word, DAESH, for ISIS. DAESH stands for al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham. This translates in the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. From: Laura Reston, “World Leaders Have Taken to Calling ISIS “Daesh,” a Word the Islamic State Hates.,” New Republic, \url{https://newrepublic.com/minutes/123909/world-leaders-have-taken-to-calling-isis-daesh-a-word-the-islamic-state-hates}.} One government official explained, “Jordan had some concerns that maybe others come as refugees but are related to a military group or terrorist groups or DAESH.”\footnote{378 Interview with Subject J25MN, op. cit.} Three UN officials and eight NGO representatives mentioned ISIS as influencing refugee policy.\footnote{379 Interview with Subjects J14UN, J15UN, J17UN, J13NGO, J4NGO, J5NGO, J7NGO, J10NGO, J11NGO, J2NGO, and J3NGO, op. cit.} Five NGO representatives cited border security as influencing refugee policy.\footnote{380 Interview with Subjects J1NGO, J4NGO, J11NGO, J8NGO, and J3NGO, op. cit.}

In Lebanon, four of the five government officials interviewed stated that the change in demographics influenced refugee policy.\footnote{381 Interview with Subjects L16MN, L17MN, L15MN, and L18MN, op. cit.} At the time of writing, the approximately 1.5 million Syrian refugees represented 20\% of the total Lebanese population, and
approximately 90% were of Sunni descent.\textsuperscript{382} UN officials noted refugee policies regarding border security and residency permits were enacted due to security concerns.\textsuperscript{383} As one UN official stationed in Lebanon stated, “The security concerns have an influence. Lebanon is worried about their geographical region and the borders have threat elements like terrorist groups. It is hard to control this. In 2015, they closed the borders.”\textsuperscript{384} Similar to UN officials, four NGO representatives cited refugee policies regarding residency permits and restrictions at borders that have been created due to security concerns.\textsuperscript{385}

In Turkey four of the six government officials cited terrorism as a security concern but not necessarily an influence on refugee policy.\textsuperscript{386} All six UN officials cited the changes to the refugee policy pertaining to the borders as a reaction to security concerns.\textsuperscript{387} Four of the nine NGO representatives cited the changes to the refugee policies at the border due to concerns.\textsuperscript{388}

Of all the questions regarding factors that influence refugee policy, government officials, United Nations officials, and NGO representatives all cited security concerns as one of the factors that potentially influence refugee policy during the semi-structured

\textsuperscript{382} Amnesty International, "Syria's Refugee Crisis in Numbers," Amnesty International; and United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, \textit{Syria's Refugee Crisis July 2013 and its Implications}, by United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2013), http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/Syria%20Factsheet%20-%20July%202018.pdf, p. 1. It should also be noted here that from my interviews with participants in Lebanon, I learned that different host government ministries are controlled by either the Christian sect, the Shia sect, or the Sunni sect. Four of the five host government officials interviewed for this dissertation were employed with the Ministry of Education and Higher Education, a Christian controlled ministry.

\textsuperscript{383} Interviews with Subjects L13UN, L11UN, L10UN, L8UN, and L12UN, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{384} Interview with Subject L12UN, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{385} Interview with Subjects L5NGO, L7NGO, L1NGO, and L6NGO, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{386} Interviews with Subjects T17MN, T19MN, T21MN, and T18MN, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{387} Interview with Subjects T12UN, T11UN, T13UN, T14UN, T15UN, and T10UN, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{388} Interview with Subjects T1NGO, T7NGO, T3NGO, and T9NGO, op. cit.
interviews.\textsuperscript{389} It should be noted that these security concerns evolved over the first five years of the Syrian refugee crisis across Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon.\textsuperscript{390} There were fewer at the outset, but security concerns increased leading to more restrictive policies in response to the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees and an increase in attacks by terrorist groups.\textsuperscript{391} Several participants across the host countries and the institutions noted that the borders remained open at the onset of the crisis, but were closed or had access restricted at certain points over the first five years of the Syrian civil war.\textsuperscript{392} The implication of these assertions is that security concerns are relevant in all three countries and they influence refugee policy.

\textit{Economic Interests and Constraints.} Interview participants were asked to address to what extent, and in which ways, economic interests and constraints have influenced refugee policy. Participants in each of the countries noted that economic interests and constraints, like security concerns, evolved over time with the increase in the Syrian

\textsuperscript{389} This was not the case for all participants who ranked the factors that influence policy using the Q-sort exercise. This will be discussed later in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{390} Interview with Subjects L5NGO, T7NGO, and T13UN, op. cit.


\textsuperscript{392} Interview with Subjects J1NGO, J24MN, J5NGO, J4NGO, J29MN, J19UN, J2NGO, L5NGO, L12UN, and L13UN.
refugee population. In Jordan, five of the nine government officials cited the strains on the limited resources of the country like the national budget, water, electricity, and school capacity as an influence on refugee policy. Six of the nine government officials cited employment as an influence on refugee policy. As one government official stated,

> First of the concerns: the employment is number one... Water, electricity, the pressure on education services and health, the pressure [on] infrastructure, the increase in the number of schools... this costs very much [for] the government to build these schools and [to] add classrooms. All these factors influence the refugee policy.

Five of the nine UN officials cited employment as an influence on refugee policy. Four of the nine UN officials interviewed in Jordan cited the need for funding the Syrian refugee crisis as an influence on refugee policy. Four of the nine UN officials also cited Jordan’s lack of national resources like water, electricity, school capacity and housing as an influence. Eight of the thirteen NGO representatives cited employment as an influence on refugee policy. Six of the thirteen cited the Syrian refugees’ strain on national resources as an influence on refugee policy.

In Lebanon, government officials cited the same types of economic concerns as those participants interviewed in Jordan. Two of the five officials interviewed cited funding the Syrian refugee crisis as an influence on refugee policy. Three of the five cited

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393 Interview with Subjects J1NGO, J10NGO, L4NGO, T11UN, and L18MN, op. cit.
394 Interview with Subjects J23MN, J27MN, J31MN, J29MN, and J28MN, op. cit.
395 Interview with Subjects J26MN, J27MN, J25MN, J24MN, J30MN, and J29MN, op. cit.
396 Interview with Subject J26MN, op. cit.
397 Interview with Subjects J17UN, J21UN, J14UN, J21UN, and J20UN, op. cit.
398 Interview with Subjects J17UN, J15UN, J19UN, and J20UN, op. cit.
399 Interview with Subjects J21UN, J22UN, J18UN, and J20UN, op. cit.
400 Interview with Subjects J4NGO, J7NGO, J10NGO, J11NGO, J8NGO, J9NGO, J3NGO and J12NGO, op. cit.
401 Interview with Subjects J4NGO, J7NGO, J6NGO, J10NGO, J3NGO and J11NGO, op. cit.
402 Interview with Subjects L16MN and L14MN, op. cit.
employment as an influence on refugee policy. Additionally, three of the five cited the Syria refugee crisis’s strains on the national resources like water and electricity as an influence on refugee policy. All six UN officials cited employment as an influence. Seven of the nine NGO representatives cited employment as an influence on refugee policy. One official explained, “Refugees have zero rights to work in this country. That decision is linked to the employment of Lebanon. There are few jobs for Lebanese.”

In Turkey, three of the six government officials cited funding the Syrian refugee crisis as a concern that influences refugee policy. One government official observed, “We are using our resources to assist the Syrian refugees. Turkey has spent above 11 billion dollars to settle this situation…It is a big burden for the Turkish economy.” Three of the six cited employment as an influence on refugee policy, but noted that this economic concern is only in specific areas of the country where there are large populations of Syrian refugees competing with local host communities for low paying jobs. Four of the seven UN officials and six of the nine NGO representatives referenced employment as well.

The semi-structured interview results indicate that several participants from all three categories in all three countries cited employment policies specific to the host country that restrict Syrian refugees from working in certain job sectors in order to reduce

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403 Interview with Subjects L17MN, L15MN and L18MN, op. cit.
404 Interview with Subjects L17MN, L15MN, and L14MN, op. cit.
405 Interview with Subjects L9UN, L12UN, L8UN, L10UN, L11UN, and L13UN.
406 Interview with Subjects L5NGO, L7NGO, L1NGO, L3NGO, L4NGO, L2NGO, and L6NGO, op. cit.
407 Interview with Subject L5NGO, op. cit.
408 Interview with Subjects T18MN, T21MN, and T16MN, op. cit.
409 Interview with Subject T18MN, op. cit.
410 Interview with Subjects T12UN, T13UN, T14UN, T15UN, T7NGO, T5NGO, T4NGO, T8NGO, L7NGO, and J8NGO, op. cit.
411 Interview with Subjects T12UN, T13UN, T14UN, T15UN, T7NGO, T5NGO, T4NGO, T8NGO, L7NGO, and J8NGO, op. cit.
competition between the host communities and the Syrian refugees. The concern regarding the lack of resources to share between the host community and the refugee community was prevalent in both Jordan and Lebanon, but not in Turkey. Jordan and Lebanon are small countries that share a border and are located in the same geographical region with limited resources like water and electricity. Finally, government officials in Jordan and Turkey cited funding the Syrian refugee crisis within their borders as an economic concern that may influence refugee policy. The implications of these findings are that economic concerns are relevant in all three countries and are drivers of refugee policy.

Elements of the Host Government’s Historical Relationship with Syria. I also asked interview participants to what extent the host country’s prior history with Syria influences its refugee policy, if at all. Participants interpreted the phrase “host country’s prior history with Syria” as familial ties, economic ties, religious ties, cultural ties, or political history. In Jordan, the two countries’ prior history was often viewed as a positive influence. As one

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412 It should be noted that employment was considered a factor that influenced refugee policy in the semi-structured interviews, but participants in Turkey did not this factor highly when they completed the Q-sort exercise.


414 It should be noted that funding the Syrian refugee crisis was considered a factor that influenced refugee policy in the semi-structured interviews, but participants in Turkey did not this factor highly when they completed the Q-sort exercise.
government official said, “The historical relationship between Jordanians and Syrians was good before and we feel we are one family so this make the influence more positive for us to receive the refugees.”

Three of the nine government officials cited tourism and the prior purchasing of goods across the border as a positive influence on refugee policy. Three of the nine cited familial ties as a positive influence on refugee policy. For UN officials, three of the nine referenced familial ties as a potential influence. Four of the nine referenced Syria and Jordan’s similar cultural ties as a positive influence on refugee policy. Five of the thirteen NGO representatives cited familial ties as a potential influence on refugee policy. As one NGO representative explained, “Most of the clans, they are separated between the south of Syria and the north of Jordan. The same family lives in the two countries.

In contrast, the question regarding the prior history with Syria made some Lebanese government officials uncomfortable. Two government officials abstained from addressing to what extent the country’s prior history with Syria influences refugee policy if at all. Two other government officials cited the familial ties between the two nations. Six of the nine UN officials interviewed cited the contentious political history between Lebanon and Syria as an influence on refugee policy. As one UN official noted, “There is a

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415 Interview with Subject J30MN, op. cit.
416 Interview with Subject J26MN, J31MN, and J28MN, op. cit.
417 Interview with Subject J25MN, J30MN, and J28MN, op. cit.
418 Interview with Subjects J17UN, J16UN, and J21UN, op. cit.
419 Interview with Subjects J20UN, J18UN, J21UN, and J16UN, op. cit.
420 Interview with Subjects J4NGO, J5NGO, J7NGO, J11NGO, and J9NGO, op. cit. Only one subject referenced refugees being Sunni as a potential influence (Subject J5NGO) and only one references cultural ties (Subject J11NGO).
421 Interview with Subject J9NGO, op. cit.
422 Interview with Subjects L17MN and L14MN, op. cit.
423 Interview with Subjects L15MN and L18MN, op. cit.
424 Interview with Subjects L9UN, L12UN, L8UN, L10UN, L11UN, and L13UN, op. cit.
historical link. They are linked through the Lebanese civil war. This is an emotional component.  

Historically, the Syrian government was a key actor in the Lebanese civil war as former President Hafez al-Assad and his Alawite-backed government (a Shiite Muslim sect) supported Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Shiite militia. Before the Syrian civil war, Syria maintained a strong and powerful presence in Lebanon, influencing policy decisions. Syrian President Assad, for example, was successful in his attempt to pressure the Lebanese parliament to extend the presidential term of Emile Lahoud and to amend the constitution in September 2004. All seven NGO representatives cited the political history between Syria and Lebanon as an influence on refugee policy.

As to the extent that the historical relationship between Turkey and Syria influences refugee policy, Turkish government officials did not uniformly cite one factor that could potentially influence refugee policy. While officials were asked about historical factors, two of the six government officials identified the idea of Muslims helping Muslims, a religious factor, as an influential factor on refugee policy. Four of the six UN officials cited the prior positive political history between the governments of Turkey and Syria as an influencing factor. Three of the six UN officials referenced Turkey’s current Anti-Assad regime stance as an influencing factor. Four of the nine NGO representatives cited

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425 Interview with Subject L11UN, op. cit.
428 Ibid.
429 Interview with Subjects L5NGO, T3NGO, L1NGO, L3NGO, L4NGO, L2NGO, and L6NGO, op. cit.
430 Interview with Subjects T20MN and T17MN, op. cit.
431 Interview with Subjects T15UN, T14UN, T13UN, and T12UN, op. cit.
432 Interview with Subjects T13UN, T14UN, and T12UN, op. cit.
a religious factor - Muslims helping Muslims as an influencing historical factor. As one NGO representative explained, “In the 2000s, the AK Party government came into power. It is Islamic. It [focused] on national security and Islamic values…It is a mixture of security and humanitarian approach. This makes it possible for refugees to access services.”

I conclude from these findings that the varied interpretations of the host country’s prior history with Syria led to no one single factor emerging from the interviews as a driver of refugee policy. It also suggests that there was a problem with the phrasing of the question. I conclude that this alternative explanation is not a viable one due to its varied interpretation by participants. However, the answers to this question highlight the divide in opinions in Lebanon. Six of the nine UN officials and all seven NGO representatives mentioned the contentious political history between Syria and Lebanon, while no host government official referenced this contentious political history at all. This lack of acknowledgement from host government officials indicates an unwillingness by host government officials to transparently address this issue. It also highlights the divergence in the opinions of participants.

**Host Government Relationship with International Entities that Support Refugees.** I asked interview participants to what extent the host government’s relationship with the international refugee regime influences refugee policy. The international refugee regime includes three sets of actors who potentially support refugees: major donors to refugee causes like the United States and the European Union, intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations, and NGOs. These actors generally have direct relationships with

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433 Interview with Subject T4NGO, T8NGO, T3NGO, and T9NGO, op. cit.
434 Interview with Subject T1NGO, op. cit.
host governments and are key to providing refugee assistance programs. Major donors funnel millions of dollars into refugee programs within host countries.\textsuperscript{435} The UN acts as an intermediary between the host government and the donors, and provides the technical support needed during refugee crises.\textsuperscript{436} The NGOs provide the services to the refugees.\textsuperscript{437} The participants referenced these three sets of actors in their answers and their observations are discussed below.\textsuperscript{438}

In Jordan, the need for international funding by donors was mentioned by four of the nine government officials as an influence on refugee policy.\textsuperscript{439} Perceived relations between Jordan and the UN/NGOs were generally positive: For UN officials, seven of the nine officials cited positive cooperation between the Jordanian government and the UN, the donors, and the NGOs as an influence on refugee policy.\textsuperscript{440} As one UN official observed, “Of course it is the government itself to make the policy, but they listen to the main stakeholders.”\textsuperscript{441} Eight of the thirteen NGO representatives cited the need for international funding as an influence on refugee policy.\textsuperscript{442} Seven of the thirteen NGO representatives cited the Jordanian government’s willingness to cooperate with the UN and


\textsuperscript{438} These groups – the United Nations, INGOs, and major donors are known collectively as the international refugee regime.

\textsuperscript{439} Interview with Subjects JL4AMIN, JL4AMMN, J30MN, and J28MN, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{440} Interview with Subjects J21UN, JN28ISUN, J16UN, J19UN, J18UN, J20UN, and J14UN, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{441} Interview with Subject J19UN, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{442} Interview with Subjects J13NGO, J1NGO, J10NGO, J11NGO, J8NGO, J9NGO, J2NGO, and J3NGO, op. cit.
NGOs as an influence on refugee policy. Three UN officials and one NGO representative noted that Jordan created policies that allowed for a coordinated effort between the government, the UN and NGOs – a factor that will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

In Lebanon, views of the relationships were more mixed. Three of the five government officials cited a positive relationship between Lebanon and the UN as an influence on refugee policy. Three of the six UN officials cited international donors and funding needs as influences on refugee policy. As one UN official observed, “There is a lot of negotiation for what the donors offer and what is achieved. The government is more flexible to review their policies.” Four of the six UN officials referenced positive cooperation between Lebanon and the United Nations as an influence on refugee policy. Yet, three of the six UN officials mentioned that there were problems between the Lebanese government and the NGOs. NGO representatives offered several different answers to this question as well. Two NGO representatives offered the following explanations: the government’s internal coordination, the need for international funding, and donor influence as influences on refugee policy. Four of the seven claimed that the Lebanese government chose to allow the UN and NGOs to handle the crisis for the first couple of years rather than taking a leadership role. Three of the seven referenced that the government made it

443 Interview with Subjects J4NGO, J5NGO, J6NGO, J10NGO, J11NGO, J9NGO, and J12NGO, op. cit.
444 Interview with Subjects J14UN, JN28ISUN, and J21UN, and JL11NGO op. cit.
445 Interview with Subject L15MN, L14MN, L18MN, op. cit.
446 Interview with Subject L12UN, L8UN, L10UN, op. cit.
447 Interview with Subject L10UN, op. cit.
448 Interview with Subject L8UN, L10UN, L11UN, and L13UN, op. cit.
449 Interview with Subject L12UN, L8UN, L13UN, op. cit.
450 Interview with Subjects L7NGO and L4NGO, op. cit.
451 Interview with Subjects L5NGO, L3NGO, L4NGO, and L6NGO, op. cit.
difficult for NGOs to work in the country once the Lebanese government decided to take a
leadership role. As will be discussed in greater detail in the next section, the government
created policies that restricted the activities of NGOs.

In Turkey, government officials also offered mixed reactions when asked to what
extent does the host government’s relationship with the international refugee regime
influence refugee policy. Three of the six government officials stated that the host
government and the UN cooperate well. However, three of the six government officials
cited a strained relationship between Turkey and the UN, international organizations and
NGOs that support refugees. Four also cited the lack of international funding as an
issue.

When asked whether cooperation with the international refugee regime is an
influence on refugee policy, UN officials in Turkey offered numerous answers. Two UN
officials suggested that there was positive cooperation between Turkey and international
entities that support refugees. Two officials cited Turkey’s goal for membership into the
European Union (EU) as an influence on refugee policy. Two UN officials cited the
need for international funding as an influence on refugee policy. Finally, the long history
of the UN working in Turkey was cited by four of the six UN officials as an influence on
refugee policy. The Turkish government gave permission for UNICEF to distribute milk

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452 Interview with Subjects L5NGO, L7NGO, and L1NGO, op. cit.
453 Interview with Subjects T21MN, T16MN, and T17MN, op. cit.
454 Interview with Subjects T18MN, T20MN, and T19MN, op. cit.
455 Interview with Subjects T21MN, T20MN, T16MN, and T17MN, op. cit.
456 Interview with Subjects T12UN and T13UN, op. cit.
457 Interview with Subjects T11UN and T14UN, op. cit.
458 Interview with Subjects T10UN and T13UN, op. cit.
459 Interview with Subject T12UN, T10UN, T13UN, and T14UN, op. cit. Republic of Turkey Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, "The United Nations Organization and Turkey," Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, last modified 2011, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-united-nations-organization-and-turkey.en.mfa and
to schools and to create health campaigns in the 1960s. The UN and the government has since continued to work together to provide services to Turkish families in need.460 As one UN official recalled, “UNICEF has been here since the sixties. The government has been working with us for a long time.”461 Four of the nine NGO representatives noted that Turkey did not initially accept external assistance with the refugee crisis.462 Five of the nine cited Turkey’s relationship with the EU as an influence on refugee policy.463 Three of them referenced burden sharing and international funding as an influence on refugee policy.464

Five of the nine NGO representatives referenced a complicated relationship between the Turkish government and NGOs that support refugees.465 As in Lebanon, participants indicated that the host government’s unwillingness to cooperate with NGOs was a problem - an issue discussed in more detail below. Two UN officials and three NGO representatives also noted that the initial policy response was to exclude the United Nations and international NGOs from assisting with the Syrian refugee crisis – a factor that will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.466

Participants across countries and institutions had mixed reactions to the question of whether cooperation with the international refugee regime influences refugee policy.

461 Interview with Subject T10UN, op. cit.
462 Interview with Subjects T1NGO, T7NGO, T2NGO, and J8NGO, op. cit.
463 Interview with Subjects T1NGO, T6NGO, T4NGO, T8NGO and T3NGO, op. cit.
464 Interview with Subjects T1NGO, T6NGO and T3NGO, op. cit.
465 Interview with Subjects T7NGO, T4NGO, T8NGO, T3NGO, and J8NGO, op. cit.
466 Interview with Subjects T13UN, T15UN, T1NGO, T7NGO, and J8NGO, op cit.
Government officials, UN officials, and NGO representatives in Jordan repeatedly expressed the view that there was a cooperative relationship between the host government, the UN, and NGOs. They mentioned flexibility, collaboration, and well-coordinated efforts to provide services to Syrian refugees. Government and UN officials in Lebanon cited a positive relationship between their institutions, but some UN officials and NGO representatives acknowledged that the relationship between the government and the NGOs were problematic. In Turkey, government officials expressed mixed opinions – both positive and negative - regarding the government’s relationship with both the UN and the donors. UN officials acknowledged that there has been a long history between the UN and Turkey. NGO representatives stated Turkey’s relationship with the EU was an influence, and several acknowledged that the relationship between Turkey and the NGOs was a major issue.

**NGOs and Refugee Policy**

The interviews that I conducted with participants across the host countries and institutions indicated that the policies granting permission for both domestic and international NGOs to assist Syrian refugees greatly differed. This may help to explain the variance in refugee enrollment rates. Interview participants indicated that Jordan created policies that allowed for a coordinated effort between the government, the UN and both domestic and international NGOs to provide emergency provisions to Syrian refugees at the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis. Over time, its refugee policy transitioned from providing an emergency response to one that provided for a longer term strategy, allowing

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467 Interview with Subjects J14UN, JN28ISUN, and J21UN op. cit.
for a sustained cooperative effort among the institutions.\textsuperscript{468} NGO representatives, when interviewed, complained about the established policies and procedures. As one INGO representative explained, “As INGOs, most of our projects should get the approval of the government…We had a project we wanted to do for two months. One ministry approves it, but another ministry did not for a while. We were in negotiation. We are talking about education, an easy issue, but there is a lot of negotiation.”\textsuperscript{469} However, in other interviews, participants reported that local and international NGOs could influence refugee policy. As one NGO representative reported, “The NGOs play a main role in deciding the policy between the government of Jordan and the refugees because the donors and the NGOs are providing and donating to the refugees themselves and that helps the economic system of Jordan.”\textsuperscript{470} The implications of these findings are that Jordan immediately cooperated with the UN and both domestic and international NGOs to manage the crisis and initiated policies to assist refugees that supported cooperation among the main actors from the very beginning of the crisis. This may prospectively help to explain why Jordan consistently had the highest refugee enrollment rate.\textsuperscript{471}

Conversely, interview participants described as more restrictive the policies that managed NGOs in Turkey and Lebanon. The Lebanese government was uninvolved with the Syrian refugee crisis at the onset of the crisis.\textsuperscript{472} Several government, UN, and NGO

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{468} Interview with Subjects J14UN J21UN, J11NGO, J9NGO, JL4MMN, J25MN, J31MN, J20UN, J13NGO J5NGO, and J10NGO op. cit.
\textsuperscript{469} Interview with Subject J11NGO, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{470} Interview with Subject J10NGO, op. cit.
\end{footnotesize}
participants instead claimed that the Lebanese government initially allowed the UN and domestic and international NGOs to handle the crisis within its borders.\textsuperscript{473} Participants also claimed that the Lebanese government increased their involvement in 2014 and 2015.\textsuperscript{474} Once they did so, they created policies that restricted the activities of NGOs.

In an interview with a government official at the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE), for example, the participant stated that at the beginning of the summer of 2016, the MEHE asked the donors and the UN to refrain from funding certain NGOs that provided non-formal education to Syrian refugees because they were not registered with the Lebanese government.\textsuperscript{475} Yet, simultaneously, according to one NGO representative, the Lebanese government reputedly made it difficult for NGOs to register.\textsuperscript{476} The Lebanese government created a clear policy regarding funding, and at the same time, restricted the process by which NGOs could officially register - thus impeding their ability to deliver services.

Interviews with participants indicated that the Lebanese government delayed cooperation with the UN and NGO at the onset of the crisis. It refused to take a leadership

\textsuperscript{473} Interview with Subjects L18MN, L9UN, L13UN, L1NGO, L3NGO, L4NGO, and L6NGO op. cit. and LSE Middle East Centre, \textit{4 The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon}, pp. 9-10.
\textsuperscript{476} Interview with Subject L5NGO, op. cit.
role until 2014 after hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees had settled in the country. The creation of policies like the prohibition of funding certain NGOs that provide non-formal education services, and the claim that the government was impeding the process for NGOs to register with the government, could potentially decrease a Syrian refugee child’s access to education. Without the host government’s support and involvement, service provision, like refugee education, could be impeded. There may be less access to schooling for Syrian refugee children. This may prospectively help to explain the moderate enrollment rate in Lebanon.\(^{477}\) I examine this issue in greater detail in the subsequent case study on Lebanon.

In Turkey, participants noted that the initial policy response was to exclude the United Nations and international NGOs from assisting with the Syrian refugee crisis.\(^{478}\) But as the Syrian refugee population increased, the Turkish government changed its policies in 2012 to allow the UN to assist.\(^{479}\) The government changed its restrictive policy again in 2014, officially agreeing to allow INGOs to work with Syrian refugees.\(^{480}\) Despite the change in policy that allowed INGOs to assist Syrian refugees within Turkey, INGO representatives expressed frustration with the Turkish government.\(^{481}\) As one INGO representative explained, “The biggest difficulty is getting permission from the


\(^{478}\) Kirisci, *Syrian Refugees and Turkey’s Challenges*, [Page 38]; and Interview with Subjects T13UN, T15UN, T1NGO, T7NGO, and J8NGO, op cit.

\(^{479}\) Brookings Institute, *Syrian Refugees*, p. 38.

\(^{480}\) Interview with Subject J8NGO and T1NGO, op. cit.

\(^{481}\) Interview with Subjects T7NGO, T5NGO, T4NGO, T8NGO, and T3NGO op. cit.
government. We want to open a mental health program but have to wait for permission from the government.”482

These claims from interview participants indicate that the Turkish government’s policy restricting INGOs from assisting Syrian refugees until 2014 delayed service provisions like education for refugees. Additionally, according to several NGO representatives interviewed, Turkish government officials were more reluctant to cooperate with INGOs, despite the country’s policy permitting INGOs to assist Syrian refugees within its borders. This may potentially explain why Turkey consistently recorded the lowest Syrian refugee enrollment rate - a possibility I examine in the subsequent case study on Turkey.483

**Q-sort Exercises**

At the conclusion of the interviews, I asked the participants to complete a Q-sort. The purpose of the Q-sort exercise was to test for subject assessments by asking participants to rank the explanations on a continuum to gain an understanding of what they believe are the factors that influence refugee policy. A Q-sort exercise “asks its participants to decide what is ‘meaningful’ and hence what does (and what does not) have value and significance from their perspective.”484 The Q-sort exercises also revealed which factors would most impact the relationship between the NGOs who provide services, like education for refugees, and the host government.

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482 Interview with Subject T7NGO, op. cit.
Participants were presented with fifteen statements about both international and domestic factors as well as the history of the refugee crisis in the host countries. A sixteenth was provided to allow participants to provide their own answer. (See Appendix C.) The statements distributed to the participants were categorized under the following themes: security issues (four statements), economic interests and constraints (four statements), elements of the host government’s historical relationship with Syria (three statements), and the host government’s relationship with the international refugee regime - entities that support refugees like the UN, major donors, and INGOs (four statements).

I asked participants to place the statements in a forced normal distribution, ranging from disagree strongly (-3) to agree strongly (+3), with the midpoint representing neutral opinion (0), to determine the highest and lowest priorities. Upon the completion of the Q-sort, I asked participants to explain their justification for their placement of statements in the forced normal distribution.

I conducted a pattern analysis of the Q-sort data using SPSS statistical software. The goal was to identify the correlations from the underlying dimensions to help describe the dataset and to account for variance. I examined the data for overall patterns of similarities and differences both between and across the three host countries and for specific patterns among the groups interviewed: host government officials, UN officials, and NGO representatives. Using SPSS statistical software, variables were assigned a numeric value for calculation purposes. Calculations were based on percentages of

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485 The Q-sort distribution is forced in that a certain number of items is prescribed for each rank, but the participant may place a statement anywhere within the distribution. Within a forced distribution procedure, participants have complete freedom and control to place statements anywhere on the continuum.
486 SPSS statistical software was utilized for statistical analysis. It allows the user to conduct analytical tests. For this field research, I used SPSS to conduct one-way ANOVA tests with Bonferroni corrections.
487 For example, the country of Turkey was assigned the numeric value of 1, while Jordan and Lebanon were assigned 2 and 3 respectively.
participants who either chose ‘agree,’ which corresponded to the score of 2, or ‘strongly agree’ which corresponded to a score of 3 on the Q-sort. I then analyzed the Q-sort results based on a moderate to high level of agreement (50%-100%).

In Jordan, government officials, UN officials, and NGO representatives agreed moderately to strongly with many of the statements. In contrast, in Turkey, government officials, UN officials, and NGO representatives disagreed with almost all of the fifteen statements. In Lebanon, government officials, UN officials, and NGO representatives agreed with some of the statements. Table 3.2 is a visual representation of the ranking of priorities of all participants across host countries, expressed as percentages of agreement. The Q sorts indicate that there is not much general agreement regarding what factors have influence across the host countries. But this exercise did reveal that there are specific factors that particularly influenced refugee policy for each individual host country. These findings are important because they indicate what factors are prioritized. Notably, these factors either complement or conflict with the work of NGOs. The Q-sort exercise reveals which factors would impact the relationship between the host government and the NGOs. These findings are explained below in detail, by host country.

488 There were three significant limitations. Of the 70 subjects interviewed, 64 agreed to complete the Q-sort. Three of the seven NGO representatives from Lebanon did not complete the Q-sort exercise, limiting the quantitative data for that group category and host country. Additionally, in a regular Q-sort, the participants would take all of the statements and place them only in the spaces provided. Some participants did not do so. Instead, they placed more statements (or less) than the allotted slots. For example, Subject T8NGO placed three statements in the +3 slot even though there was only one slot allotted for +3. Finally, some participants refused to put certain statements on the Q-sort even though there were slots for no opinion. For example, Subject L9UN refused to place the statement regarding local conflict on the Q-sort, but placed the rest of the statements on the Q-sort. As a result of these limitations, my distribution is more skewed.
Table 3.2 Ranking of Priorities of All Participants across Host Countries as Expressed in Percentages of Agreement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other Factors</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>National Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>Spread of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Budgets</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>ISIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spread of War</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>Resources Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Assistance</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>Financial Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources Refugees</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>National Budgets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>Other Factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Pressure</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>Local Conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Conflicts</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>Resources Domestic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior History</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>International Pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources Domestic</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>Cooperation to Host Palestinians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>Syrian Influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Influence</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>Prior History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation to Host Palestinians</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Green: Security Concerns
- Orange: Elements of Host Government's Historical Relationship with Syria
- Blue: Economic Concerns
- Gray: Cooperation with International Refugee Regime
Jordan. I interviewed 31 participants in Jordan, with one abstaining from taking the Q-sort. In some cases, participants omitted a statement when completing the Q-sort. This is indicated when I mention the number of responses. In some cases, there are 29 responses and in others there are 30. Participants in Jordan ranked many of the statements highly regarding security, economics and the host government’s relationship with the international refugee regime as influences on refugee policy. Table 3.3 is a visual representation of the rankings of priorities by actor type as expressed in percentages in Jordan. I discuss the findings below.

Jordan – Security Concerns. Participants were given four security statements to place on the Q-sort. Once all data were collected, the rankings were determined by the percentage of participants who assigned the statement a 2 (agree) or 3 (strongly agree). The rankings indicate that the opinions of the participants representing the institutions converged. The rankings of the four security factors were close, with the exception of the lowest ranked security factor: concerns about local conflict between the host community and the Syrian refugees with a 24% difference in ranking between the host government (77.8%) and the NGOs (53.8%). The results of the quantitative data suggest that participants across the institutions viewed security issues as drivers of refugee policy.

489 The following are the four national security statements presented to participants: 1. The government’s national security concerns influence refugee policy decisions. 2. The government’s concerns regarding the spread of war from Syria to the host country influence refugee policy decisions. 3. The government’s concerns regarding ISIS/ISIL influence refugee policy decisions. 4. The government’s concerns to protect its citizens from local conflict with Syrian refugees influence policy decisions.
Table 3.3 Rankings of Priorities by Actor Type as Expressed in Percentages in Jordan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Participants</th>
<th>Host Government</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>NGO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Security</td>
<td>Spread of War</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Other Factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spread of War</td>
<td>National Security</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>National Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>Spread of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources Refugees</td>
<td>National Budgets</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>Spread of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Assistance</td>
<td>Resources Refugees</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>ISIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>Local Conflicts</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Budgets</td>
<td>Resources Domestic</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>Financial Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Factors</td>
<td>Financial Assistance</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>Resources Domestic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
<td>International Pressure</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Conflicts</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>Local Conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources Domestic</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>International Pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Pressure</td>
<td>Other Factors</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Resources Domestic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Influence</td>
<td>Syrian Influence</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>Prior History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior History</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>Syrian Influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Prior History</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Security Concerns**
- **Economic Concerns**
- **Elements of Host Government’s Historical Relationship with Syria**
- **Cooperation with International Refugee Regime**
Jordan – Economic Interests and Constraints. There were four statements that addressed economic concerns. In comparison to the rankings of the security factors, there was less convergence in the opinions on economic concerns expressed by the participants across the institutions. Host government and UN officials highly ranked both the concerns for having enough resources for refugees (88.9% and 100%) as well as the strain on the national budget (88.9% and 87.5%) as influences on refugee policy, while NGO representatives moderately ranked these factors (resources for refugees – 53.8% - and strains to national budget – 53.8%). Host government and UN officials moderately ranked concerns about having enough resources for the domestic population (77.8% and 71.4% respectively), while only 46.2% of the NGO representatives agreed that this factor was important. The results of the quantitative data indicate that participants viewed economic concerns as drivers of refugee policy - but not as influential as security factors. The results also indicate that the opinions of host government and UN officials converged more so than with NGO representatives.

Jordan and Its Relationships with the International Refugee Regime. Participants were given four statements regarding host countries and their relationships with entities in the international refugee regime. Participants across the institutions in Jordan agreed

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490 The following are the four economic statements presented to participants: 1. The government’s concerns regarding the Syrian refugee crisis’s strain on the national budget influence refugee policy decisions. 2. The government’s concerns regarding not having enough resources to house, feed, provide medical care, provide water, and to educate Syrian refugees influence refugee policy decisions. 3. The government’s concerns regarding the increase in the domestic population’s unemployment rate influence refugee policy decisions. 4. The government’s goal to continue to adequately provide and regulate the domestic population’s access to resources like food, water, and living spaces influences refugee policy decisions.

491 The following are the statements presented to the participants: 1. The promise of financial assistance from the international refugee regime, in particular the United Nations, to manage the current Syrian refugee crisis influences refugee policy decisions. 2. The promise of technical assistance from the United Nations to manage the Syrian refugee crisis (For example, the United Nations helps to provide services and resources within the host country) influences refugee policy decisions. 3. Pressure from the international...
less with the statement regarding past cooperation with the United Nations to host Palestinians in the country for 60 years as an influence on refugee policy decisions: 10 of the 30 responses (33.3%) assigning it a value of 2 or 3, but moderately agreed with the other three statements in the set – financial assistance, technical assistance, and international pressure.

Like the rankings of the security factors, there is convergence in the opinions of the participants across the institutions in Jordan regarding the statements pertaining to host countries and their relationships with the international refugee regime. Participants across the institutions moderately ranked three of the four statements. There was convergence in opinions of all participants as indicated by the close rankings regarding both financial and technical assistance. There was less convergence in the opinions of the participants across institutions on the international pressure statement as government officials ranked this statement higher than both UN officials and NGO representatives. The results of the quantitative analysis indicate that participants viewed the relationship between the host country and the international refugee regime as a driver of refugee policy but not as influential as security factors. The results of the quantitative analysis indicate that participants view financial support, technical support, and international pressure as moderate drivers of refugee policy.

Jordan Conclusions. The findings indicate that there was convergence in the opinions and attitudes of participants from all three categories of institutions in Jordan though there was less convergence of opinions on some of the economic statements. As for

community influences refugee policy decisions. 4. Past cooperation with the United Nations to host Palestinians in the country for 60 years influences refugee policy decisions.
economic factors, government and UN officials were more in agreement with each other than the NGOs. The Q-sort rankings indicate that participants across the three institutions believed that Jordan’s greatest priorities were security concerns followed by economic and financial concerns. The Q-sort rankings also revealed that Jordan was willing to cooperate with the international community so that it could receive, technical and - most importantly - financial assistance. As indicated from the findings of the semi-structured interviews, the host government was willing to work with outside institutions like the UN and NGOs and to collaborate on the provision of assistance to refugees. The priorities and conditions in Jordan were complementary to the work of NGOs, and as a result, NGOs in Jordan had the opportunity, capabilities and resources to politically work with the government. This may help to explain why Jordan had the highest enrollment rate of the three countries.

*Lebanon.* I interviewed 18 participants in Lebanon, with three of the seven NGO representatives abstaining from participating in the Q-sort. Of those who participated in the Q-sort exercise, three subjects omitted one or more statements of the Q-sort. This is reflected in the reported response numbers. Participants across the three categories of institutions in Lebanon showed varying degrees of agreement with the statements regarding national security, national budget strains, the resources for refugees, employment, prior history, and the Palestinian refugees as influences to refugee policy. Table 3.4 is a visual representation of the rankings of priorities by actor type as expressed in percentages in Lebanon. The results of the quantitative analysis indicate that participants viewed these factors as drivers of refugee policy, but I discovered that there is much divergence in opinion when analyzing which actor type agreed with these statements. The findings are discussed below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Participants</th>
<th>Host Government</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>NGO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Budgets</td>
<td>National Budgets</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>National Budgets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources Refugees</td>
<td>Resources Refugees</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Resources Domestic</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Other Factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior History</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>National Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security</td>
<td>Prior History</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>Financial Assistance</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Local Conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Resources Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Factors</td>
<td>National Security</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Prior History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spread of War</td>
<td>Spread of War</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Spread of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources Domestic</td>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>ISIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Assistance</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>International Pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Influence</td>
<td>Local Conflicts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Syrian Influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Conflicts</td>
<td>Syrian Influence</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Financial Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
<td>International Pressure</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Pressure</td>
<td>Other Factors</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Resources Domestic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Green**: Security Concerns
- **Orange**: Elements of Host Government's Historical Relationship with Syria
- **Blue**: Economic Concerns
- **Gray**: Cooperation with International Refugee Regime
Lebanon – Security Concerns. There was much divergence in the opinions of participants regarding security factors across actor type. Government officials ranked security concerns low. Only 20% of government officials believed that national security, the fear of the spread of war, and ISIS were drivers of refugee policy, and none of the host government officials ranked local conflict as a driver of refugee policy. Table 3.5 is a visual representation that compares UN and NGO participants’ ranking of security concerns. UN participants ranked security factors moderate to high while NGO participants’ rankings of security factors varied.

Table 3.5 UN and NGO Participants’ Ranking of Security Concerns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Participants</th>
<th>NGO Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Security – 83.3%</td>
<td>National Security – 75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concerns over Local Conflict – 80%</td>
<td>Fear of Spread of War – 75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of Spread of War – 50%</td>
<td>Threat of ISIS – 25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat of ISIS – 50%</td>
<td>Concerns over Local Conflicts – 0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When comparing the rankings, UN and NGO participants concurred in their agreement that national security was a driver of refugee policy (83.3% and 75%). Host government officials and NGO representatives concurred in their disagreement with both the ISIS statement (20% and 25%) and the local conflict statement (0%). Yet, upon examining Tables 3.4 and 3.5, there was more divergence than convergence regarding the security statements. Eighty percent of UN officials and zero percent of NGO representatives ranked concerns over local conflicts between the host community and refugees as a driver of refugee policy. Only 20% of host government officials agreed that
national security was a driver of refugee policy compared to 83.3% of UN officials and 75% of NGO representatives.

That host government officials disagreed with the security statements is interesting considering the state of security in Lebanon. Peace in Lebanon was fragile at the time of writing as it sought to maintain a sectarian balance amongst the Christians, Shias, and Sunnis. The introduction of 1.5 million mostly Sunni refugees in Lebanon had disrupted the sectarian balance.492 In 2016, Hezbollah militants from Lebanon were fighting for Syrian President Assad while the government of Lebanon declared its neutrality.493 This lack of agreement among the host government, UN and NGO participants highlights the divergence in opinion and attitudes among the groups. It indicates a willingness for those outside the government to acknowledge the problems inherent in the Lebanese political system which would impact refugee policy, while – in contrast - those in the government deny or refuse to acknowledge these influential factors.

_Lebanon – Economic Interests and Constraints._ Participants’ opinions were divided on the economic statements. I found that the opinions of the government and the UN officials concurred, as indicated by the similar ranking of three of the four economic factors as drivers of refugee policy: the strain on the national budget, the resources for refugees, unemployment. Table 3.4 indicates that government and UN officials saw economic factors as the drivers of policy. The opinions of the NGOs diverged from the opinions of the government and UN officials. It is surprising that only 50% of NGO representatives felt that economic factors were drivers of refugee policy because at the time of field research,

the Lebanese government had the same budget allocations and guidelines since 2005. This lack of concurrence is also surprising because, like Jordan, Lebanon is a small country with limited resources like electricity, water, and land. The findings in this section highlight the divergence in opinions, with NGO representatives agreeing less than UN and host government officials.

**Lebanon – Elements of Host Government’s Historical Relationship with Syria.** Participants’ opinions were divided on the three statements regarding the historical relationship with Syria: the large influx of mostly Sunni refugees influences refugee policy decisions; the prior history between Syria and Lebanon influences refugee policy, and Syria’s ability to influence the host government is an influence on refugee policy. The results indicated that the opinions among participants across the institutions starkly diverge. NGO representatives ranked the historical factors highly; the UN officials moderately ranked two of the three historical factors while host government officials ranked these factors lowly.

Only 20% of host government officials agreed that the large influx of mostly Sunni refugees influenced refugee policy decisions as compared to 100% of the NGO representatives. Almost 90% of registered Syrian refugees within the host countries were

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49^4^ Beginning in November 2016, the Lebanese government began to adjust and modify the budget allocations and guidelines to reflect the current needs of the nation. From Ayas, Abdel-Rahman. "Lebanon Plans First Budget Since 2005." The Arab Weekly, November 13, 2016. [http://www.thearabweekly.com/article/5874/Lebanon%20plans%20first%20budget%20since%202005](http://www.thearabweekly.com/article/5874/Lebanon%20plans%20first%20budget%20since%202005);
of Sunni descent.\textsuperscript{495} Lebanon was fractured by religious sectarianism at the time of field research. Approximately 54\% of the Lebanese population identified as Muslim, but Sunnis and Shiites were evenly divided, each sect represented almost 27\% of the total population.\textsuperscript{496} Approximately 40\% of the total population were of Christian descent.\textsuperscript{497} When conducting the Q-sort exercises, two host government officials abstained from placing the statement regarding the Syrian refugees being mostly comprised of Sunnis as a driver of refugee policy onto the Q-sort due to the sensitive nature of sectarianism. The Lebanese government is a confessional system, and each government ministry is controlled by one of the religious groups.\textsuperscript{498} Four of the five government officials I interviewed were employed with the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE), a Christian controlled ministry which could explain why only 20\% would recognize that a large influx of mostly Sunni refugees would be an influence on refugee policy.

There were mixed reactions to the statement regarding Syria’s ability to influence the host government as a driver of refugee policy. In Lebanon 66.7\% of NGO representatives agreed while zero percent of host government officials and 33.3\% of UN officials agreed. A few host government officials were uncomfortable addressing this statement and did not agree or abstained from placing the statement on the Q-sort. Alternatively, NGO representatives were comfortable addressing this statement because


\textsuperscript{496} It is important to note the last official government census was conducted in 1932. These figures reflect that census. Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Lebanon," CIA World Factbook, last modified January 12, 2017, \url{https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html}.

\textsuperscript{497} Ibid.

they had no political affiliation in Lebanon and had observed the government divided by the political history between the two countries.

The findings suggest that there is divergence in the attitudes and opinions between NGO representatives and host government officials. These three statements highlight that Lebanon, in addition to prioritizing resource and security concerns as Jordan does, faced the following concerns: the hosting of 1.5 million Sunni refugees in a country divided by religious sectarianism, the contentious political history between Syria and Lebanon, and the potential that the Syrian government could influence Lebanese politics. These factors and conditions conflict with the efforts of NGOs to provide services to refugees. They represent the obstacles that NGOs faced when providing services like education, and these factors inform the relationship between NGOs and the Lebanese government.

*Lebanon – Past Cooperation with the United Nations to Host Palestinian Refugees.* Views on the impact of past support for Palestinian refugees on refugee policy also diverged greatly between host government officials and other actors. Participants were given the following statement: Past cooperation with the United Nations to host Palestinians in the country for 60 years influences refugee policy decisions. Both Jordan and Lebanon have hosted Palestinian refugees for decades. Currently, more than two million Palestinians reside in Jordan.499 Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees have lived in Lebanon since the partition of Palestine in the 1940s.500 Jordan and Lebanon created different policies to manage this situation. Jordan integrated the initial influx of Palestinian refugees by offering citizenship to many, while Lebanon withheld


These mostly Sunni refugees have been blocked from obtaining citizenship because they would break the sectarian balance of Sunnis, Shiites, and Christians in Lebanon. Therefore, UN officials and NGO representatives ranked this statement highly, at 100%, while host government officials ranked this factor low, with only 25% of host government officials agreeing or strongly agreeing that this factor was a driver of refugee policy. There is a clear divergence in opinions.

*Lebanon Conclusions.* The perception of the participants in Lebanon varied in the extent to which they agreed with some of the statements in the four categories. But, more importantly, this exercise revealed the divergence of opinions of the participants across the institutions. The greatest divergence in opinions among the participants centered on sensitive political issues like the influx of mostly Sunni refugees into Lebanon, Syria and Lebanon’s prior interactions, Syria’s influence in Lebanese politics, and the country’s history of hosting Palestinian refugees. In Jordan, the historical statements were not considered sensitive in nature because Jordan’s political situation was more stable than Lebanon’s. Most of the population of Jordan identifies as Sunni Muslim; the Jordanian government was able to thwart Syrian attempts at political influence, and Jordan granted citizenship to many of their Palestinian refugees from the initial influx. The comparative lack of contentious factors and conditions in Jordan enabled the government to work with NGOs in a cooperative manner, unlike the situation in Lebanon. In Lebanon, the Syrian refugee crisis was connected to their political problems. The divergence in the opinions of

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501 Ibid.
502 Ibid.
503 The second wave of Palestinians did not gain citizenship, and this will be discussed in greater detail in the Jordan chapter.
government officials and NGO representatives indicates that the priorities and conditions that drive refugee policy were in opposition to the work of NGOs. This helps explain the restrictions placed on NGOs, which may explain the moderate enrollment rate.

*Turkey.* Of the 21 participants interviewed in Turkey, two abstained from completing the Q-sort – one UN and one government official. One UN official and two host government officials omitted two statements from the Q-sort. Participants across the three categories of institutions in Turkey generally disagreed with the statements. Table 3.6 is a visual representation of the rankings of priorities by actor type as expressed in percentages in Turkey. In comparing the rankings, there was only one factor that any participants agreed with - national security - and only UN (80%) and NGO (66.7%) participants agreed that it was a driver of refugee policy. The results are discussed below the table.
Table 3.6 Rankings of Priorities by Actor Type as Expressed in Percentages in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Participants</th>
<th>Host Government</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>NGO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other Factors</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security</td>
<td>63.2 Financial Assistance</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>National Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Budgets</td>
<td>50 National Security</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Spread of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spread of War</td>
<td>47.1 ISIS</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>ISIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Assistance</td>
<td>44.4 National Budgets</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>National Budgets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>42.1 Technical Assistance</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Resources Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources Refugees</td>
<td>38.9 International Pressure</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>International Pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>33.3 Spread of War</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
<td>33.3 Local Conflicts</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Resources Domestic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Pressure</td>
<td>33.3 Resources Refugees</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Conflicts</td>
<td>22.2 Unemployment</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Financial Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior History</td>
<td>21.1 Sunni</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources Domestic</td>
<td>16.7 Prior History</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Prior History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>16.7 Syrian Influence</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Local Conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Influence</td>
<td>10.5 Resources Domestic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Syrian Influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>0 Cooperation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Green**: Security Concerns
- **Orange**: Elements of Host Government’s Historical Relationship with Syria
- **Blue**: Economic Concerns
- **Gray**: Cooperation with International Refugee Regime
Seventeen of the 19 participants utilized Statement 16: “Please provide your own idea regarding the factor your feel influences refugee policy decisions that may impact refugee enrollment rates.” Participants offered several answers, but none predominated.

One UN official and four of the nine NGO representatives referred to Turkey’s interest in becoming part of the EU as a driver of refugee policy. Turkey applied to become part of the European Union in 1987, and up to 2016, in seeking accession, it had made changes to its policies to better align itself with European Union mandates. One government official and one NGO representative referenced the political interests of Turkey as drivers of refugee policy, particularly the internal politics of the Turkish state. A government official explained this reference, “It is about the government. If you [the politicians] can turn your interests in a way to stay in government, if you are about to lose your power, this would influence the policy, how the political structure will be affected by the 3 million Syrians.” Another government official referenced the Muslim idea of hospitality. One NGO representative referenced the ideology of the Justice and

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504 Interview with Subjects T11UN, T4NGO, T8NGO, T3NGO, and J8NGO, op. cit.
506 Interview with Subjects T19MN and T5NGO op. cit.
507 Interview with Subject T19MN, op. cit.
508 Interview with Subject T20MN, op. cit. Subject T20MN explained, “We are very hospitable. It’s also a religious culture thing that also mentioned by our Prophet when your neighbor cannot be hungry. Here you didn’t hear of any Syrians dying from starving. Because of Turkey’s hospitality, you have to help your neighbors.”
Development Party (AKP). Three NGO representatives and one UN official referenced Turkey’s interest in being a powerful political leader in the Middle East.

There was as much disagreement among the participants across the institutions in terms of the answers to Statement 16. What this exercise did reveal is that the priorities and conditions that drive refugee policy were very different in Turkey when compared to Jordan and Lebanon. Participants in Turkey did not share the concern about a lack of resources that was expressed by participants in Lebanon and Jordan, nor did they reference the need for financial or technical assistance as drivers of refugee policy, although some government officials did complain that the international community is providing insufficient financial aid.

The priorities and conditions that drive refugee policy differed significantly from those referenced in Jordan and Lebanon. Furthermore, what was referenced by participants in Turkey was not included in the fifteen statements generated from the literature review undertaken to create the Q-sort statements. Instead, participants utilized Statement 16 to offer new factors as drivers of refugee policy, citing both domestic and international political factors like the ideology of the ruling AKP Party and Turkey’s interests in Syria. Yet, no single factor emerged as a major driver of refugee policy. From the interviews, I

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509 Interview with Subject T1NGO, op. cit. Subject T1NGO observed, “The primary factor under this government, if talking about Syrians, is mainly the ideology of AKP and the president and the former PM. It was based on Turkish traditional relationships and the perception of the Assad regime. These are the political and ideological factors that play a role in general politics towards Syrians.”

discovered that Turkey initially enacted restrictive policies against INGOs providing services like refugee education. Later, these restrictions were lifted. Yet INGOs claimed that local governorates still refused to cooperate with them. I am unable to connect the results of the Q-sort exercise to explain why the government made it difficult to work with NGOs that provide services to refugees. It is unclear how these priorities and conditions highlighted in the Q-sort exercise had an impact on the relationship between the host government and INGOs, which in turn would impact refugee enrollment rates.\footnote{The interviews and Q-sort exercises did not reveal why the government of Turkey made it difficult for NGOs to work with refugees. I conducted further research into the Turkish government-NGO relationship for the case study chapter. As I will discuss in the case study chapter on Turkey, the government was suspicious of its domestic NGOs prior to the Syrian refugee crisis. Furthermore, very few INGOs were established in Turkey before the Syrian refugee crisis. The government of Turkey was unused to interacting with these outside entities that were accustomed to working autonomously within host countries.}

**Q-sort Conclusions.** The purpose of the Q-sort exercise was to reveal the participants’ ranking of factors that they considered the most important influences on refugee policy. The participants across actor type consistently chose no single statement as the most important influence. The implication of this finding is that there was no universal factor that influences refugee policy across all three host countries. Each country had its own unique factors that potentially influence refugee policy.

In Jordan, among all participants, the factors driving refugee policy that ranked the highest were national security (89.66%), fear of spread of war (83.3%), fear of ISIS (80%), having enough resources for refugees (76.7%), unemployment (75.9%), strains on the national budget (73.3%), and financial assistance from the international community (76.7%). When I analyzed the rankings by actor type (host government, UN, and NGO), the rankings indicated that there was much convergence in opinion across the institutions.
In Lebanon, for all participants, the factors driving refugee policy that ranked the highest were strains on the national budget (86.7%), not having enough resources for refugees (84.6%), and hosting Palestinian refugees for the past 60 years (76.9%). Yet when I analyzed the rankings by actor type (host government, UN, and NGO) there was little consensus among them, indicating a divergence in opinions among those who provide services to Syrian refugees. For example, government officials did not claim to see national security, politics, religion, the country’s prior history with Syria, and the Palestinian refugees as factors driving refugee policy – in contrast to NGO representatives who did. This lack of consensus might be attributable to the sensitive nature of the statements presented to the participants in a country faced with problems like religious sectarianism, an outdated budget, and a political history closely connected to Syria.

In Turkey, the factors that ranked the highest as an influence on refugee policy were Statement 16 – providing other factors (100%) – followed by national security (63.2%) and strains on the national budget (50%). Importantly, the only largely agreed upon factor seems to be national security, and even then agreement was restricted to only UN and NGO participants. Even among the answers provided for Statement 16, there was no consensus on one particular driving factor across institutions or individuals.

The factors that participants indicated as influential are important because they impacted the relationship between the host government and NGOs. This, in turn impeded the ability of NGOs to provide services like education for refugees.

In sum, the Q-sort results for all participants in Jordan indicated the following drivers of refugee policy: having sufficient resources (water, electricity, employment, and housing) for its citizens despite the strains created by a large influx of over one million
Syrian refugees; keeping its citizenry safe by protecting the border and safeguarding against increasing terrorist attacks; and having enough funding to provide services like education for refugees. The government achieved these priorities by working with the UN, the donors, and the NGOs to maintain peace and stability. The Q-sorts indicated a consensus of opinion among the three institutions with similar priorities, which helps explain why Jordan consistently had the highest refugee enrollment rates of the three countries.

For Lebanon, the priorities were to maintain a peaceful status quo in a country divided by sectarianism and a recent volatile political history; to maintain security within its borders; and to have sufficient resources during a time when the population increased by 20% due to the influx of 1.5 million refugees. Unlike in Jordan, Lebanon had a divided government that had not unified to manage a problem as immense as the Syrian refugee crisis. Its ministries were divided along religious sectarian lines and there was little consensus among them. A divided government dealing with complex issues of religious sectarianism, sixty years of hosting an unwanted refugee population of Palestinians, and a complicated political relationship with Syria may have impacted the relationship between the host government and the NGOs that provide services like education for refugees. The Q-sorts indicated divergence and a lack of consensus between the government and the NGOs. These conditions may cause the government to be more cautious and less

cooperative in its dealings with NGOs, which may impede the provision of education services and may help to explain the moderate enrollment rate.

Turkish priorities greatly differed from those of Jordan and Lebanon. The results of the Q-sort exercise revealed that economic concerns, historical factors and cooperation with international entities that support refugees were not drivers of refugee policy. UN and NGO participants believed that national security was a driver, but government officials did not. The Q-sorts indicated that the participants did not find the fifteen Q-sort statements generated from the literature review to be applicable to Turkey, with the exception of the national security and strains on the national budget statements. The evidence from this exercise did not highlight any factors that would impact the relationship between the host government and INGOs and does not help to explain refugee enrollment rates.

ANOVA Tests

To provide a more rigorous view of the differences in the Q-sort responses, I conducted one-way ANOVA tests using the results of the Q-sort exercises. An ANOVA (analysis of variance) “compares the means of two or more independent groups in order to determine whether there is statistical evidence that the associated population means are significantly different.” 513 The population means, in this study, are calculated based on the host country (Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon) and on the actor type (government officials, UN officials and NGO representatives).

The ANOVA tests do not reflect the individual statements of the Q-sort for this research exercise. Rather they reflect the four conceptual themes that were generated by

513 Kent State University, "One-Way ANOVA - SPSS," Kent State University - University Libraries, last modified August 26, 2016, http://libguides.library.kent.edu/SPSS/OneWayANOVA.
the literature review (security issues, economic interests and constraints, elements of the host government’s historical relationship with Syria, and the host government’s coordination with the international refugee regime). The dependent variables tested here are the net Q-sort scores for each theme. The tests do not distinguish the individual components of each theme. To conduct the tests, I took the statements for each of the four themes and summed the responses to create index scores for each theme. The possible scores ranged from -3 to +3 when conducting the Q sorts. To test the themes using ANOVAs, I added the score ranges to create an index score. For example, there were four statements for the security theme. I summed the range of the four statements so that the range for the security theme would be from -12 to +12. There were only three statements for the elements of host government’s historical relationship with Syria theme; therefore the range for this theme is -9 to +9. I then used the mean of the index score as the dependent variable of the ANOVA tests.

I ran two separate ANOVA tests – one by host country and one by actor type. I utilized SPSS statistical software to test for statistical significance (a 95% confidence interval) among the scores for this study. ANOVAs only identify if there is a significant difference among the groups of the independent variables (host countries and actor types), but not between which significant groups those differences lie. To determine this, I

514 For the rest of this section, I renamed the alternative explanation known as elements of host government’s historical relationship with Syria as historical factors. I also renamed the alternative explanation - the host government’s coordination with the international refugee regime - as cooperation factors.
515 These themes are represented by the indexes found on tables 3.7 to 3.10.
516 I used the following phrases for the indices: security index, economic index, history index and cooperation index. They represent the following themes in the same order: security issues, economic interests and constraints, elements of host government’s historical relationship with Syria, and the host government’s coordination with the international refugee regime.
conducted post-hoc T-tests with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. I chose to use the Bonferroni correction because this is a commonly used method for post hoc correction. Additionally, the Bonferroni correction is fairly strict in comparison to other multiple-comparisons corrections, and thus minimizes the chance of false-positives.

ANOVA results indicate that there were significant differences in the net Q-sort scores across the different host countries for all four factors. Table 3.7 is a visual representation of ANOVA tests by host country. This variance is indicated by the significance column. The results are significant when the p-value is less than .05. There is statistical significance for all four indexes as indicated by the p-value of .000. These results support the idea that there are substantive differences in the beliefs about the drivers of refugee policy. As previously noted, the ANOVA test only detects that there are differences in the scores, but does not identify where the differences are. I then conducted a post hoc test to identify where the differences are found, and I discuss the findings below Table 3.7.
### Table 3.7 ANOVA Tests by Host Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Index</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>463.895</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>231.948</td>
<td>9.794</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>1302.536</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>23.682</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1766.431</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Index</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>403.334</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>201.667</td>
<td>12.189</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>959.584</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>16.545</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1362.918</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>History Index</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>238.776</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>119.388</td>
<td>13.018</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>486.081</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>9.171</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>724.857</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cooperation Index</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>467.188</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>233.594</td>
<td>18.440</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>722.062</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>12.668</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1189.250</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Index</th>
<th>Economic Index</th>
<th>History Index</th>
<th>Cooperation Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Security</td>
<td>Strains on National Budget</td>
<td>Prior History with Syria</td>
<td>Promise of Financial Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of Spread of War</td>
<td>Concerns over Having Enough Resources for Refugees</td>
<td>Refugees Being Sunni</td>
<td>Promise of Technical Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat of ISIS</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>Syrian Influence over Host Country</td>
<td>International Pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of Local Conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperation to Host Palestinian Refugees for Past 60 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>between Host Community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Refugees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

517 For the ANOVA test, I renamed the alternative explanation known as elements of host government’s historical relationship with Syria as the history index. I also renamed the alternative explanation - the host government’s coordination with the international entities that support refugees - as the cooperation index.

518 This legend contains all of the factors that participants ranked on the Q-sort exercises. The factors are organized by themes.
I then conducted post hoc multiple comparison tests with a Bonferroni correction by host country to test for statistical significance within each index. The tests were also used to calculate the mean difference for the Q-sort exercise to test for any convergence of opinion regarding the importance of a driver of refugee policy. A Bonferroni correction is a multiple-comparison correction utilized when more than one dependent or independent statistical test is being performed at the same time, to ensure that the reported significance bounds the combined (“family-wide”) error rate of all comparisons, rather than for each one individually. I conducted ANOVA tests to compare the means of the three groups. I therefore utilized a Bonferroni correction to determine if the difference in the ANOVAs were between Turkey and the other two countries or between Jordan and Lebanon.

I utilized SPSS Statistical Software to conduct the multiple comparison tests because it allowed me to conduct mean comparisons of the answers given by host government officials, UN officials, and NGO representatives across the three countries. I assigned a numeric value to the host countries. I then compared the mean for each of the four themes pairwise across host countries to analyze the data. The post hoc tests reveal if the difference in means (i.e. perceived importance of the themes) between any two groups reach statistical significance.

The results of the pairwise post-hoc comparisons can be found below in Table 3.8. The findings reveal the following regarding the perceptions of the participants: security

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519 An ANOVA test indicates if there is an “overall difference between your groups, but it does not tell you which specific groups differed.” Post hoc tests specifies “where the differences occurred between groups. Post hoc tests “attempt to control the experimentwise [sic] error rate (usually alpha = 0.05) in the same manner that the one-way ANOVA is used instead of multiple t-tests.” From: Laerd Statistics, "One-way ANOVA: How to Report Significance Results, Homogeneity of Variance, and Running Posthoc Tests," Laerd Statistics, last modified 2018, [https://statistics.laerd.com/statistical-guides/one-way-anova-statistical-guide-4.php](https://statistics.laerd.com/statistical-guides/one-way-anova-statistical-guide-4.php).

520 The tests using the Bonferroni correction, for example, compares the means of Turkey to Lebanon, of Turkey to Jordan, and of Lebanon to Jordan to determine where the statistical significance resides.
concerns and cooperation factors drive refugee policy more in Jordan than in Turkey and Lebanon; economic concerns drive refugee policy more in Jordan and Lebanon than in Turkey; and historical factors are drivers of refugee policy more in Lebanon than in Jordan and Turkey.
Table 3.8 Multiple Comparisons – Host Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bonferroni</th>
<th>(i) Host Country</th>
<th>(j) Host Country</th>
<th>Mean Difference ((t_{ij}))</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Sig</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval Upper Bound</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security Index</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>5.67857*</td>
<td>1.59292</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>1.7450</td>
<td>9.6122</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>5.64286*</td>
<td>1.52511</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>1.8767</td>
<td>9.4060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>-5.67857*</td>
<td>1.59292</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>-9.6122</td>
<td>-1.7450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>-0.3571</td>
<td>1.78094</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-4.4336</td>
<td>4.3622</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>-5.64286*</td>
<td>1.52511</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>-9.4090</td>
<td>-1.8767</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>.03571</td>
<td>1.78094</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-4.3622</td>
<td>4.4336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Index</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1.93596</td>
<td>1.32373</td>
<td>.447</td>
<td>-1.3276</td>
<td>5.1995</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>6.01533*</td>
<td>1.22051</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>3.0063</td>
<td>9.0244</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
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<td>1.32373</td>
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<td>-5.1995</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>.5095</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
<td>-6.01533*</td>
<td>1.22051</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-9.0244</td>
<td>-3.0063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>4.07937*</td>
<td>1.44945</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>-7.6528</td>
<td>-3.0063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History Index</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>-5.15152*</td>
<td>1.08325</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-7.8297</td>
<td>-2.4733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>.11111</td>
<td>2.92152</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-2.1672</td>
<td>2.3894</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>5.15152*</td>
<td>1.08325</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>2.4733</td>
<td>7.8297</td>
</tr>
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<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>5.26263*</td>
<td>1.15909</td>
<td>.000</td>
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<td>8.1281</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>-1.11111</td>
<td>2.92152</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-2.3894</td>
<td>2.1672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>5.26263*</td>
<td>1.15909</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-8.1281</td>
<td>-2.3972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation Index</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>2.36074</td>
<td>1.18797</td>
<td>.155</td>
<td>-.5696</td>
<td>5.2911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>6.84846*</td>
<td>1.06798</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>3.8503</td>
<td>9.8190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>-2.36074</td>
<td>1.18797</td>
<td>.155</td>
<td>-5.2911</td>
<td>.5696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>4.12393*</td>
<td>1.29546</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.9284</td>
<td>7.3194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>6.84846*</td>
<td>1.06798</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-9.1190</td>
<td>-3.8503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>4.12393*</td>
<td>1.29546</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>-7.3194</td>
<td>-9.1190</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Regarding security issues, the post hoc test reveals that participants in Jordan saw security issues as more influential when compared to those in Lebanon and Turkey, as indicated by the p values: Jordan to Lebanon (.002) and Jordan to Turkey (.001). The p-
value between Turkey and Lebanon (1.00) indicates that these two host countries share similar opinions on security concerns as drivers of refugee policy.

I then examined the mean differences between the countries to further analyze the data. A negative mean difference indicates that the first country listed in the dependent variable section is in less agreement about the dependent variable than the second country listed. A positive mean difference indicates that the first country listed is in more agreement than the second country listed. The mean differences between Jordan and Lebanon is 5.67857 and indicate that participants in Jordan saw security issues more as drivers of refugee policy when compared to participants in Lebanon. The mean difference between Jordan and Turkey is similar (5.64286) and indicate that participants in Jordan saw security issues more as drivers of refugee policy than participants in Turkey.

The post hoc test also reveals that participants in Jordan and Lebanon are closely aligned (p-value=.447) in that they saw economic interests and constraints as influential when compared to those in Turkey: Jordan and Turkey (.000) and Lebanon and Turkey (.020). The mean differences between Jordan and Turkey (5.64286) and Lebanon and Turkey (4.07937) indicate that participants in Jordan and Lebanon have ranked economic concerns higher than those in Turkey and saw economic interests and constraints as drivers of refugee policy.

Regarding historical factors, the post-hoc test reveals that participants in Lebanon saw historical factors as larger drivers of refugee policy than those in Jordan and Turkey as indicated by the p values: Lebanon and Turkey (.000) and Lebanon and Jordan (.000). The p value of 1.00 for Jordan and Turkey indicates that participants in these host countries shared the opinion that historical factors are not major drivers of refugee policy. The mean
differences between Lebanon and Turkey (5.26263) and Lebanon and Jordan (5.15152) indicate that participants in Lebanon have ranked historical factors higher than those in Jordan and Turkey and that they saw historical factors as drivers of refugee policy.

Finally, the post hoc test indicates that participants in Jordan and Lebanon saw cooperation factors (coordination with the international refugee regime) as more influential compared to those in Turkey, as indicated by the p values: Jordan and Turkey (.000) and Lebanon and Turkey (.007). The p value of .155 for Jordan and Lebanon indicates that participants in these host countries shared a somewhat similar opinion that cooperation factors were drivers of refugee policy. The mean difference between Jordan and Turkey (6.48467) indicates that participants in Jordan ranked the cooperation statements much higher than those in Turkey. The mean difference between Jordan and Lebanon (2.36074) indicates that participants in Jordan ranked the cooperation statements higher than those in Lebanon. The results of the post hoc test data indicate that participants in Jordan and Lebanon viewed the factors associated with the relationship between the host government and the international refugee regime as drivers of refugee policy. The implications of these findings is that the results of these tests support the results of the Q-sort test.

I conducted one-way ANOVA tests using the results of the Q-sort exercises by actor type (host government, UN, and NGO). Table 3.9 is a visual representation of ANOVA tests by actor type. The results indicate that there is no significant difference by actor type for three of the four indexes: security issues, economic interests and constraints, and the host government’s coordination with the international refugee regime (cooperation index). Only the index associated with the prior history between the host government and the Syrian government demonstrated significant difference by actor type (p = .008).
Table 3.9 ANOVA Test by Actor Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security Index</td>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>32.553</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16.277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>1733.878</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>31.525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1766.431</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Index</td>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>26.580</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13.290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>1336.338</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>23.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1362.918</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History Index</td>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>120.274</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>60.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>604.583</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>11.407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>724.857</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation Index</td>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>13.197</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>1176.053</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>20.633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1189.250</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Index</th>
<th>Economic Index</th>
<th>History Index</th>
<th>Cooperation Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Security</td>
<td>Strains on National Budget</td>
<td>Prior History with Syria Refugees Being Sunni</td>
<td>Promise of Financial Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of Spread of War</td>
<td>Concerns over Having Enough Resources for Refugees</td>
<td>Syrian Influence over Host Country</td>
<td>Promise of Technical Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat of ISIS</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td></td>
<td>International Pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of Local Conflict between Host Community and Refugees</td>
<td>Concerns over Having Enough Resources for Domestic Population</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperation to Host Palestinian Refugees for Past 60 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The results of the post-hoc test for the History Index can be seen below in Table 3.10. When averaged across all three host countries, UN officials see historical factors as significantly more influential on refugee policy than do host country officials (p = .006).
Tables 3.8 and 3.10 respectively illustrate the differences in perceptions across the host countries and actor type. The results align with the findings of the interviews and the
Q-sort exercises: The opinions of the participants interviewed in Jordan, regardless of actor type, significantly differed from Lebanon and Turkey because they ranked security issues higher. The opinions of the participants interviewed in Jordan and Lebanon were significantly different from Turkey because they ranked economic concerns higher. The opinions of the participants interviewed in Lebanon is significantly different than Jordan and Turkey because they ranked historical factors higher.

**Conclusion**

Chapter 3 has provided a broad review of the data collected for this research project. In it, I have examined the potential major drivers of refugee policy in order to better understand the national differences in the gross enrollment ratios of Syrian refugees. The conclusion of this chapter is divided into two sections: The first section synthesizes the overall findings into a general summary, while the second section discusses the importance of NGOs in explaining the variance in Syrian refugee enrollments.

*Overall Findings.* From the semi-structured interviews, I discovered that the governments’ timing and the degree of engagement with the UN and NGOs to deal with the Syrian refugee crisis, as well as the policies they created overtime to cooperate with NGOs that provide refugee education services may best explain the variance in refugee enrollment rates.\(^{521}\) The Q-sort exercises and the ANOVA tests revealed which priorities and conditions drive the differences in refugee policy, and more importantly, how these priorities and conditions shape the host governments’ interactions with the UN and NGOs.

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\(^{521}\) See the section titled *NGOs and Refugee Policy.*
Governments play a large role in the timing and degree of engagement with the UN and NGOs in responding to the Syrian refugee crisis within their borders. This might be the most critical factor in explaining variance in refugee enrollment rates. The duration and degree of the host government’s engagements with the international community determines the level of cooperation, collaboration and trust present in those interactions. Interviews with participants across all three host countries revealed Jordan engaged both earlier and to a greater degree with the international community in addressing the crisis than did Lebanon and Turkey.

As the post hoc tests indicate, Lebanese and Turkish officials did not rank engagement with the international community highly. Interviews with participants in Lebanon indicated that the government delayed its involvement in the Syrian refugee crisis until 2014 – three years after the onset of the crisis. Instead, it allowed the UN and NGOs to manage the crisis. In contrast, Turkey did not permit the UN or NGOs to assist at the onset of the crisis and designed its own system to manage it. Then, in 2012, Turkey permitted the UN to assist and, in 2014, it officially permitted NGOs to assist once the numbers of Syrians seeking assistance increased into the millions. But by this time, hundreds of thousands of refugees lacked critical services – an issue largely caused by government delays in interacting with key providers of services - the UN and NGOs.

Second, my data suggests that differences in the policies implemented over time by the host governments to facilitate cooperation with NGOs that provide services - like education for refugees – help explain the variance in refugee enrollment rates. The host government’s policy decisions shape its interactions with NGOs. It creates the rules and procedures, establishes a bureaucracy to follow the policy, and decides which organizations
can work with refugees and how these organizations work with both the refugees and the host government. Interviews across all actor types in Jordan indicated that the government created NGO-friendly policies that fostered collaboration and welcomed NGO feedback from the onset of the crisis. In contrast, interviews with participants in Lebanon revealed that the government created policies that limited which NGOs could assist and receive funding. Interviews with participants in Turkey indicated that the government did not create policies to manage NGOs until 2014, and as will be discussed in greater detail in the case study chapter, it did not create clear guidelines to follow the established policies.

*The Importance of NGOs in Explaining the Variance in Syrian Refugee Enrollment Rates.* The Q-sort exercises, the ANOVA tests and the post hoc tests revealed the priorities and conditions that drive refugee policy, and more importantly, how these priorities and conditions inform the host governments’ interactions with NGOs – the main providers of refugee services.

The Qsorts, ANOVAs and post hoc tests revealed the following key drivers of refugee policy in Jordan: having sufficient resources, keeping its citizenry safe, and having enough funding to provide services like education for refugees. The government achieved these priorities through a high level of cooperation with the UN, the donors, and the NGOs. The Qsorts, the ANOVAS and the post hoc tests indicated a consensus of opinion among the three institutions with similar priorities. As the interviews indicated, NGOs had the opportunity, the capabilities and the resources to coordinate with the government, which explains the high enrollment rate of Syrian children.
The priorities and conditions that inform government-NGO interaction in Lebanon are more contentious. Lebanon’s government - as indicated by the participants’ comments and supported by the results of the Q-sort exercises, the ANOVA tests and the post hoc tests regarding the historical factors - is more divided. These factors, and additional problems – religious sectarianism, prior history with Syria, the large underclass of Palestinian refugees, the efforts to maintain a fragile peace – may impede cooperation efforts between the Lebanese government and the international community. As indicated by the interviews, NGOs had limited opportunities, capabilities and resources to coordinate with the government, which explains the moderate enrollment rate of Syrian children.

For Turkey, the Q-sort exercises, the ANOVA tests and the post hoc tests did not reveal which priorities and conditions drive refugee policy, or how these priorities and conditions inform the host governments’ interactions with NGOs – the main providers of refugee services. Yet, despite a lack of consensus, the interviews that I conducted still revealed a clear divide between the government and the NGOs. As indicated by the interviews, NGOs had the least opportunities, capabilities and resources to coordinate with the government, which explains the low enrollment rate of Syrian children. I investigate this division further in the case study chapter.

As I mentioned when discussing the fourth alternative explanation found in Chapter 2, some host governments welcome collaboration with NGOs and some create obstacles that impede NGOs’ provision of refugee services.\[^{522}\] As the interviews indicated, the Jordanian government welcomed collaboration with NGOs, the Lebanese government

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\[^{522}\] Najam, "The Four-C’s," [Page 385].
limited collaboration, and the Turkish government rejected collaboration. Added to this, the findings of the interviews and the Q-sort exercises I conducted indicated that NGOs encountered fiscal shortfalls, resource gaps, and restrictive refugee policies when attempting to provide education services to Syrian refugees. NGOs then have to devise a responsive strategy: whether and how to work within or circumvent these policies, procedures and directives, and how to overcome significant encumbrances on the ground. As I demonstrate, in each host country, NGOs employed very different strategies, and had opportunities, capabilities, and resources. I will describe the strategies adopted by NGOs, demonstrate how they implemented these strategies, and report on the extent to which they effectively addressed the problems associated with enrolling Syrian refugee children in the ensuing case study chapters.

I will begin each of the three case study chapters by describing the evolution of refugee policies prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, noting which international refugee conventions were signed by the host country, and which domestic refugee laws were created to manage prior refugee crises. Second, I will explore NGOs’ relationship with the host government and whether they provided any services within the host country prior to the Syrian refugee crisis. I will determine if the relationship was the source of any obstacle or was advantageous in the current crisis. Third, I will highlight the policies enacted to manage NGOs prior to the Syrian civil war. Fourth, I will analyze the role of NGOs in the country at the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis. Fifth, I will examine the strategies, opportunities, and advantages of NGOs to overcome the host government’s long-term refugee policy decisions in their quest to provide Syrian refugee education services from the beginning of the crisis to the summer of 2016 when I conducted my field research. Finally, I will
examine one particular INGO’s experience in each of the host countries to determine whether and how it was able to overcome impediments to their provision of refugee education services.
Chapter 4  
The Success of NGOs in Jordan

The purpose of this chapter is to account for the high enrollment rate of Syrian refugee children in Jordan.\(^{523}\) Interview subjects representing NGOs that provided education services to Syrian refugees in Jordan reported obstacles impacting the enrollment of Syrian refugee children: child labor, early marriage, refugee education costs, overcrowded classrooms, and untrained teachers.\(^{524}\) Furthermore, these NGOs contended with policies that restricted refugee registration, education certification, and employment opportunities. These obstacles impeded refugee access to education services and impacted enrollment rates.\(^{525}\) Yet, I argue that NGOs in Jordan had the most opportunities, strategies and capabilities to surmount obstacles to their provision of refugee education services.

I conducted Q-sort exercises that revealed the country’s priorities: having adequate resources and maintaining security. The responses from the Q-sort also indicated that to fulfill these priorities, the government was willing to cooperate with the UN, donors and NGOs. The ANOVA tests and post hoc tests results supported the findings of the Q-sort exercises. The interviews and the Q-sort exercises revealed a convergence in the views of the three actor types in Jordan: host government, UN, and NGOs. NGOs had the

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\(^{523}\) I conducted thirty-one interviews in Jordan from June to August 2016: nine host government officials from the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Social Development, nine United Nations officials from UNICEF and UNHCR, and thirteen representatives from INGOs.

\(^{524}\) Interview with Subjects J14UN, J24MN, J23MN, J13NGO, J1NGO, J10NGO, J28MN, J3NGO, and J7NGO, op. cit.

capabilities and opportunities to provide services like education because their priorities and values aligned with those of the government.

These findings exemplify what Adil Najam’s defines as a cooperative relationship - both the government and NGOs share similar policy goals (the ends) and the tactics (the means) to realize them.\textsuperscript{526} NGOs worked with a well-organized government infrastructure that was capable of managing refugee issues and was willing to cooperate with NGOs to provide refugee education services. The government’s willingness to cooperate with NGOs is attributable to three factors. First, NGOs had a long history of cooperating with the United Nations and the Government of Jordan on refugee and host community development projects. Second, NGOs were a conduit for millions of dollars of both humanitarian and development aid which was an incentive for government cooperation. NGOs had the ability to offer both financial assistance and technical support. Third, NGOs provided assistance to both Syrian refugees and Jordanians. I argue that these strategies, opportunities and advantages enabled NGOs in Jordan to overcome obstacles to the delivery of refugee services and explains why Jordan consistently had the highest Syrian refugee enrollment rate in formal and non-formal education in comparison to Lebanon and

\textsuperscript{526} Najam, "The Four-C's," [Page 384].
Turkey.\(^{527}\) Table 4.1 is a visual representation of Syrian refugee enrollment rates from 2013 to 2017. The enrollment rates increased from 68.1% in 2013 to 84.2% in 2016.\(^{528}\)

**Table 4.1 Syrian Refugee Enrollment Rates in Jordan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2013(^{529})</th>
<th>2014(^{530})</th>
<th>2015(^{531})</th>
<th>2016(^{532})</th>
<th>2017(^{533})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of School-Aged Refugee Children</td>
<td>157,505</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>217,083</td>
<td>232,470</td>
<td>195,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of School-Aged Refugee Children in School</td>
<td>107,226</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>182,867</td>
<td>191,161</td>
<td>129,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrollment Percentage of Children in School</td>
<td>68.1%</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
<td>84.2%</td>
<td>82.2%</td>
<td>66.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{528}\) I conducted my field research in the summer of 2016. I am unable to explain why the refugee enrollment rate decreased to 66.3% in 2017.


Refugee Policy Prior to the Syrian Refugee Crisis

Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol that compels host governments to abide by the rules of non-refoulement and guarantees that refugee rights are protected. But Jordan is a signatory to the United Nations 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that compels host countries to refrain from engaging in refoulement of refugees. Jordan is also a signatory to the 1989 Convention of the Rights of the Child, which compels host governments to “take appropriate measures to ensure that a child who is seeking refugee status or who is considered a refugee receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of applicable rights set forth in the present Convention.”

Although Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 convention, Alexandra Francis argues, “Nonetheless, Jordan has a relatively progressive stance on refugees and generally upholds international standards on their treatment.” One UN official interviewed for this research stated, “[Jordan] is the country of refugees. They never say no.” This was an advantage for NGOs that provide education services as Jordan abided by international law to provide basic support for refugees.

537 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Jordan's Refuge, [Page 6].
538 Interview with Subject J14UN, op. cit.
Jordan enacted domestic policy in reaction to each wave of refugees entering their country. The first wave of Palestinian refugees entered Jordan in the late 1940s.\textsuperscript{539} Jordan’s nationality laws - passed in 1949 and 1954 respectively - gave Palestinians “full Jordanian nationality following Jordan's incorporation of the West Bank in April 1950.”\textsuperscript{540} The government created policies to cooperate with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).\textsuperscript{541} The second major wave of Palestinian refugees entered in 1967, when 300,000 Palestinians took refuge in Jordan as a result of war initiated by several Arab states and the seizure of the Gaza Strip by Israel.\textsuperscript{542} The Palestinian Liberation Army established bases in Jordan, launched military operations against Israel, hijacked planes of Western airlines and forced them to land in Jordan.\textsuperscript{543} In 1970, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Yasser Arafat, ordered Palestinians to overthrow the Jordanian government.\textsuperscript{544} King Hussein ordered troops to expel the PLO out of Jordan in what became known as Black September.\textsuperscript{545} The second wave of Palestinians were granted fewer rights and denied Jordanian citizenship.\textsuperscript{546} They


\textsuperscript{544} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{545} Ibid.

were given “temporary two-year passports,” that denied them any rights to state education, property, or health insurance.”\(^547\) They were prohibited from working for the government, but were allowed to work in the private sector.\(^548\)

The first wave of Iraqi refugees entered Jordan during the 1991 Gulf War.\(^549\) Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees transited through Jordan to western countries of asylum while approximately 300,000 Iraqi refugees settled in Jordan.\(^550\) The second wave of Iraqi refugees entered Jordan with the fall of Saddam Hussein and the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.\(^551\) To assist Iraqi refugees, Jordan cooperated with the UNHCR by signing the 1998 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU): a framework that outlined Jordan’s refugee policy for non-Palestinian refugees and defined the partnership between the UNHCR and Jordan. The MOU however was not a legal obligation.\(^552\)

Jordan adopted a “semi-protectionist” policy towards Iraqi refugees, allowing them to stay in Jordan, but depriving them of employment and citizenship.\(^553\) Iraqis were not

\(^547\) Ramahi, *Palestinians and Jordanian*, [Pp. 7-8].
\(^548\) Ibid. p. 8.
\(^551\) Ibid.
granted Jordanian passports and were prohibited from acquiring residency permits which would permit them to work (1990-1991 and 2003 onward).\textsuperscript{554} Iraqi refugees found working illegally would be arrested.\textsuperscript{555} Jordan’s refugee policy became more restrictive after November 2005, when three Iraqi nationals detonated bombs in three hotels in Amman killing 60 people.\textsuperscript{556} Subsequently, the Jordanian government closed the international border with Iraq, enforced immigration policies, declined to renew visas, and fined refugees whose visas were expired.\textsuperscript{557}

**International Aid Prompts Refugee Policy Changes.** Historically, Jordan’s challenges have included debt, underemployment, unemployment, and chronically high poverty rates.\textsuperscript{558} It has relied on international financial assistance from the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.\textsuperscript{559} In April 2007, there was a pivotal refugee policy change as the government sought financial assistance from the international community to assist with the Iraqi refugee crisis.\textsuperscript{560} Jordan received 61\% of the UNHCR’s


\textsuperscript{556} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{557} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{559} Seeley, "The Politics of Aid”.

\textsuperscript{560} Seeley, "The Politics of Aid".
operational budget in conjunction with millions of dollars donated by the United States and the European Union.\textsuperscript{561} The money directly received by the government was utilized to build infrastructure and to expand services for refugees and Jordanians.\textsuperscript{562} Money distributed to NGOs was used to develop institutions that benefitted Jordanians and Iraqi refugees living in host communities.\textsuperscript{563} The influx of substantial financial aid led to the creation of policies to provide refugees with education and healthcare and for NGOs to provide these services.\textsuperscript{564} While Jordan’s refugee policies became more restrictive with each influx of refugees, Jordan eased strict policies during the second wave of Iraqi refugees when the country received substantial international financial aid. NGOs were given opportunities to provide services, with the caveat being the aid and services also benefit the Jordanian population.

The Role of NGOs Prior to Syrian Refugee Crisis

Prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, NGOs cooperated with the Jordanian government to provide assistance to both the domestic population and Palestinian and Iraqi refugees.\textsuperscript{565} Table 4.2 lists examples of domestic and international NGOs providing services in Jordan prior to the Syrian refugee crisis. Both domestic and international NGOs cooperated with the Jordanian Ministry of Social Affairs, UNRWA, and UNHCR.\textsuperscript{566} They organized

\textsuperscript{562} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{563} Seeley, “The Politics of Aid”.
\textsuperscript{564} Ibid.
development projects such as the creation of kindergartens in rural areas of the country.\textsuperscript{567} As one NGO representative interviewed for this research noted, “Before the [Syrian refugee] crisis, a lot of these NGOs were working on development. In 2010, they made a huge reform to strengthen education in all of the kingdom.”\textsuperscript{568} Another NGO representative recalled, “I have worked for seven years with Mercy Corps... Mercy Corps has had a national office since 2002. The office predates the Syrian crisis. A lot of work has been completed before the crisis.”\textsuperscript{569}


\textsuperscript{568} Simadi and Almomani, "Clients’ Satisfaction," [Page 41].

\textsuperscript{569} Interview with Subject J7NGO, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{569} Interview with Subject J4NGO, op. cit.
Table 4.2 Examples of NGOs Working in Jordan Prior to the Syrian Refugee Crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Domestic or International NGO</th>
<th>Year Established in Jordan</th>
<th>Services Provided Before Syrian Refugee Crisis</th>
<th>Groups Assisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| CARE International | International | 1948 | Poverty alleviation  
Market access  
Social justice  
Microfinance  
Humanitarian aid | Palestinians  
Jordanians |
| Caritas | International | 1967 | Medical services  
Education  
Food assistance | Jordanians  
Palestinians  
Iraqis |
| East Amman Charity | Domestic | 1996 | Healthcare  
Education  
Poverty alleviation | Jordanians |
| International Orthodox Christian Charities | International | 2005 | Emergency aid  
Health and medical support  
Economic empowerment | Jordanians  
Palestinians |
| Jordan Hashemite Charity Organization for Relief & Development | Domestic | 1990 | Disaster relief  
Poverty alleviation  
Humanitarian aid | Jordanians |
| Jordanian Association for Orphans & Widows Care | Domestic | 1996 | Women and children programs | Jordanians |

575 United Religions Initiative, "Jordanian Association for Orphans & Widows Care," United Religions Initiative, last modified July 31, 2010,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan River Foundation</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Child safety, Economic development</td>
<td>Jordanians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King Hussein Foundation</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Family health, Microfinance, Women empowerment</td>
<td>Jordanians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noor Al Hussein Foundation</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Poverty alleviation, Microfinance, Healthcare</td>
<td>Jordanians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief International</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Healthcare Education</td>
<td>Palestinian and Iraqi Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Children and family support, Formal and non-formal education</td>
<td>Jordanians, Iraqi Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Women Association</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Women and children projects</td>
<td>Syrians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaha Cultural Center</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Non-formal education, Children programs</td>
<td>Jordanians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Several domestic and international NGOs were advantageously situated at the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis to start providing services to this new refugee population because of their history managing regional issues, leading development projects, and providing education services.  

**Government Policies Regarding NGOs**

Prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, Jordan enacted policies that limited the activities of NGOs because some local grassroots NGOs were associated with the democratic movements of the 1980s and 1990s. The government perceived them as possible threats because they represented “independent centers of resources, initiatives, and power.” While the number of NGOs increased from 477 in 1989 to 796 in 2005, the government limited their political influence by enacting laws. By 1996, for example, Jordan enacted Welfare Law No. 33 granting the Ministry of Social Development the legal right to supervise the NGO activities and to examine their financial expenditures. The law banned NGOs from political activities.

Jordan also passed in 2009 the amended Law of Societies that “maintained the authority of the government to intrude in the internal activities of NGOs.”

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585 Ibid., p. 81.


587 Simadi and Almoman, "Clients’ Satisfaction," [Page 41].

588 Ibid.; and The Brookings Institute The Saban Center for Middle East Policy, *Civil Society*, [Page 8].

589 Ibid.
facilitated NGO registration but allowed “the government to grant or reject the right of a society to register, on arbitrary and political grounds, significantly impinging on freedom of association.”\textsuperscript{590} The Jordanian authorities also had the right to examine NGO bank accounts and to approve or deny foreign funding.\textsuperscript{591} Consequently, these laws complicated the relationship between the government and NGOs, hindering coordination efforts and NGO effectiveness.\textsuperscript{592}

Some NGOs expended resources “finding and exploiting loopholes in the various laws that affect their activities.”\textsuperscript{593} One strategy was to register under ministries “more likely to approve their applications, or more likely to turn a blind eye to their activities.”\textsuperscript{594} As one NGO representative interviewed for this dissertation claimed, “It is easy [for some NGOs] to register under the Ministry of Trade and Business. But this is not crisis-based. They register as a non-profit company because this ministry is focusing on bringing money to the government. But what this NGO delivers on the ground is a different scenario.”\textsuperscript{595}

The Syrian Refugee Crisis

Initially, Jordan did not create a legal strategy to deal with the Syrian refugee crisis because there were small numbers of refugees crossing into Jordan.\textsuperscript{596} In March 2012, there were approximately 8,000 registered Syrian refugees, and by June 2012, 25,000 were registered.\textsuperscript{597} While there was a lack of a clear governmental policy response, it was not

\textsuperscript{590} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{592} Simadi and Almomani, "Clients’ Satisfaction," [Page 42].
\textsuperscript{593} The Brookings Institute The Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Civil Society, [Page 8].
\textsuperscript{594} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{595} Interview with Subject J11NGO, op. cit. These policy restrictions continued to affect NGOs assisting Syrian refugees into 2017.
\textsuperscript{596} Seeley, "Jordan’s “Open,” Foreign Policy; and Médecins sans Frontières, A Review, [Page 4].
\textsuperscript{597} United Nations, Revised Syria, [Page 12].
considered an obstacle for NGOs because they were already established and providing services to the domestic population, as well as the Palestinian and Iraqi refugees. As one NGO representative recalled, “I think that in the beginning, everyone was hoping that this would be a short-lived crisis. So, short-term actions were taken – short-term budgets, short-term time horizons.”\footnote{Interview with Subject J4NGO, op. cit.} A few participants claimed that Syrians were allowed to work during the first years of the Syrian refugee crisis. As one NGO representative recalled, “At the beginning when everything started, the [Jordanian] government with the Syrian government...had an old agreement that the Syrians can work in Jordan freely without restrictions.”\footnote{Interview with Subject J9NGO, op. cit.} Another NGO representative remembered, “At the beginning they are not restricting Syrian refugees from working.”\footnote{Interview with Subject J12NGO, op. cit.} This was also an advantage to NGOs providing education because fewer refugee children needed to contribute to family income, freeing them to attend school instead.

\textit{Obstructive Long-Term Syrian Refugee Policy.} The government’s legal response to the Syrian refugee crisis evolved over the first five years from an emergency response to a long-term policy response in reaction to the large numbers of Syrians entering Jordan. Registered Syrian refugees increased from 38,117 in July 2012 to 133,180 in December 2012.\footnote{Médecins sans Frontières, \textit{A Review}, [Page 4].} By October 2013, the total registered Syrian refugees increased to 505,851 with an average of 26,000 Syrians entering each month between January and October 2013.\footnote{Ibid.} Table \ref{table:refugees} contains the figures of Syrian refugees entering into Jordan from 2012 to 2016.

As one NGO representative recalled, “We saw large numbers arriving and then the
situation escalated in six months. Whole lots arrived - thousands every week turned up. People began to realize the scale of the problem was much bigger.\textsuperscript{603}

**Graph 4.1 Syrian Refugees Registered in Jordan from 2012 to 2017\textsuperscript{604}**

![Graph 4.1 Syrian Refugees Registered in Jordan from 2012 to 2017](image)

In the beginning of 2013, approximately 2,000 Syrian children migrated daily into

\textsuperscript{603} Interview with Subject J1NGO, op. cit.

Jordan, and by the end of 2013, there were 311,000 registered Syrian refugee children.\textsuperscript{605} The government implemented a double shift program that split the school day into two shifts: Jordanian children attended school in the morning while Syrian refugee children attended school in the afternoon.\textsuperscript{606} As one NGO representative observed, “The refugees are highly concentrated in certain areas than others. You have to use double shifts.”\textsuperscript{607} A second NGO representative stated, “Schools have become double shifted and have reduced studying hours for Jordanians (7:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.)…Students are not able to participate in sport activities, libraries, or labs. Overcrowding is a problem, on average 60 and above in a classroom.”\textsuperscript{608} The large influx in 2013 caused a backlog of refugees trying to register to gain access to services.\textsuperscript{609} As NGOs struggled with capacity issues, refugee access to education services was restricted. As one NGO representative explained, “There is vulnerability in schools. There is a lack of capacity.”\textsuperscript{610}

Despite these conditions, the Jordanian government created refugee-friendly education policies. Syrian refugee children were permitted to either attend school inside

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Syrian\%20Refugees\%20at\%20a\%20Glance\%20February\%202013.pdf, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{606} United Nations Children's Fund, \textit{Access to Education for Syrian Refugee Children and Youth in Jordan Host Communities}, by Education Sector Working Group, [Page 14], March 2015,
\textsuperscript{607} Interview with Subject J13NGO, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{608} Interview with Subject J3NGO, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{609} United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "UNHCR Slashes Waiting Time, Clears Backlog of Syrian Registrations in Jordan," UNHCR The Refugee Agency, last modified October 3, 2013,
\textsuperscript{610} Interview with Subject J1NGO, op. cit.
camps or public schools in host communities. 611 Self-settled refugees had to register with the Ministry of Interior to attend Jordanian public schools.612 In the public schools, Syrian refugees integrated with Jordanian children and were instructed using the Jordanian curriculum.613 There were no language barriers since both Syrian and Jordanians speak Levantine Arabic.

The government permitted domestic and international NGOs to provide education services to refugees living in camps as well as those self-settled in host communities.614 The NGOs implemented formal education – the traditional, structured classroom-based system.615 Additionally, they offered non-formal education – Community-Based Education, Basic Literacy and Numeracy, Accelerated Learning Programs, catch-up programs and psychosocial activities - to prepare children for reintegration into formal schooling.616 They also provided remedial education, vocational education, and inclusive education for refugee children with disabilities.617 One NGO representative, for example,

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612 Ibid.


described their education program in Azraq Camp, ‘We work with three sectors in education – remedial, non-formal, and formal education from grades 1 to 12. We have 900 students: 450 girls and 450 boys. We have two shifts.’618 And as another NGO representative explained,

Our program brings out-of-school children into school. They transit through our program just to get back to the school environment. We have a remedial program [that] targets students in public schools but are still struggling to adjust in the school environment. They need remedial support so they don’t drop out. We have informal education in form of Arabic, English and math….We work in host communities. We also target Jordanians with struggles.619

Eventually however, the government created restrictive refugee policies. Jordan, for example, closed its international border with Syria in 2016.620 As a UN official stated, “Things are not clear on the border…The Jordan response is caution because the places the refugees come from are under ISIS control.621 The government created screening policies. As an official with the Ministry of Education acknowledged, “The government put more control and screening of the refugees entering the country… and they make a screening for refugees to put some limits on the daily numbers [of refugees crossing the border].”622

The Jordanian government made it progressively more difficult for Syrian refugees to attend public schools in host communities. Beginning in 2015, those who stayed in host

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618 Interview with Subject J5NGO, op. cit.
619 Interview with Subject J7NGO, op. cit.
621 Interview with Subject J22UN, op. cit.
622 Interview with Subject J25MN, op. cit.
communities had to obtain “service cards” issued by Jordan’s Ministry of the Interior in order to enroll in public schools. As one NGO representative explained,

> Every parent of a [refugee] child [does] not have this card. The MOE or school gives him a chance for six weeks. They accept the student at the school and the student can go to school for six weeks, giving parents the opportunity to have these documents to get this civil service card.

Refugees who had left the refugee camps after July 2014 without a Jordanian sponsor were ineligible for the cards. Furthermore, refugees had to present a birth certificate to obtain a service card. NGO officials and UN agencies reported that 30% or more Syrian children did not have these, and that “tens of thousands” were ineligible for this card - a major obstacle for NGOs providing education services. By 2016, the government created restrictive residency policies that forced newly-arrived Syrian refugees into camps, prohibiting them from living in host communities.

Economic concerns also led to work restrictions being placed on Syrian refugees. An August 2016 Human Rights Watch report found that adult refugees caught working were arrested and transferred to camps. The same report found that child labor rates had increased “four-fold among Syrian children in Jordan since the Syrian conflict began, as

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624 Interview with Subject J3NGO, op. cit.
children are seen as less at risk of arrest for informal work.\textsuperscript{629} As of March 2015, it was estimated that approximately 30,000 children had entered the informal work force.\textsuperscript{630} As of August 2016, it was estimated that 60 percent of self-settled Syrian families relied on their children to earn money.\textsuperscript{631} As one NGO representative claimed, “As the crisis progressed, the government implemented strict rules on work for Syrians - this encouraged child labor. Children 18 and under are found working, they are sent home by the police.”\textsuperscript{632}

**NGO Advantages, Opportunities, and Strategies**

From the research and interviews that I conducted in the field, I found that both domestic and international NGOs exploited various advantages and opportunities and employed strategies to achieve their goal of providing refugee education services. They had an advantage in that Jordan has a strong, centralized government that was willing to cooperate with NGOs in the provision of refugee education services. They were, for example, given the opportunity to help design and implement the Syrian refugee management plans. INGOs used their ability to acquire monetary aid from international sources as a negotiating tool with the government who saw that some projects created from the use of these funds benefit the domestic population of Jordan in the long term. Finally, international NGOs employed the strategy of delivering services and technical expertise to the benefit of both Syrian refugees and Jordanians. These factors explain why Jordan had a high Syrian refugee enrollment rate. I discuss these factors below and conclude this section with a brief description of the strategies of one INGO to overcome obstacles to

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{629} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{631} Human Rights Watch, "‘We’re Afraid,’” Human Rights Watch.  
\textsuperscript{632} Interview with J1NGO, op. cit.}
their provision of refugee education.

**NGO Advantage: Jordan’s Cooperative, Centralized Government.** Jordan is governed by King Abdullah and his Parliament.633 The Parliament has both an appointed prime minister and an Upper House Senate.634 There is a Lower House of Representatives that is elected by the public.635 Final decisions regarding Syrian refugee policy are made by the King and Parliament. As one Ministry of Education official explained, “The decision is centralized [with] both the government and the King’s thoughts and wishes regarding the Syrian refugee policy… Any changes in the policy, it comes from the government.”636

The lead refugee ministry overseeing the Syrian refugee crisis is the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC). It was previously established before the Syrian refugee crisis to manage the influx of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees.637 MOPIC cooperates with UN agencies, major donors, and domestic and international NGOs.638 As a Ministry of Social Affairs official explained,

> We have the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. They channel everything to other ministries. They are influential and the decision makers in this process. The other ministries follow the policies set by the Ministry of Planning. The ministries are able to make recommendations and to make decisions on a middle level. There is a bit of give and take.”639

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635 European Union, *The Quest*, [Page 6].

636 Interview with Subject J23MN, op. cit.


638 Ibid.

639 Interview with Subject J24MN, op. cit.
Jordan also created new ministries to manage the Syrian refugee crisis. As one UN official explained, “There is a Syrian Refugee Affairs Department with the Ministry of General Security. They have a special department for Syrian affairs...The SRAD – Syrian Refugee Affairs Department. You see one at each camp, in Amman and at the borders – anything to deal with security of refugees.”

Although decision making is centralized, NGO representatives noted that the government collected feedback when making policy decisions. The Jordanian government, for example, permitted the establishment of the Jordan NGO Forum. As one NGO representative explained,

The Jordan NGO Forum is 44 NGOs who came together to represent their voice in different forums. The government, the UN, the donors, the institutes – the idea is that I coordinate the work they do, provide them feedback and the discussion is ongoing...I showcase the work of NGOs in Jordan with a view to improve the situation of the population served. And to make sure the concerns of the NGOs are taken into account.

Another NGO representative praised the evolution of the coordination efforts:

To be honest, if you are talking about how government changes, there is a huge change. It is more coordinated with INGOs...There is more feedback and discussion between the parties. There are forums and big sectors. There is sharing of information together. We are working with more cooperation...There are guidelines for INGOs and the government.

Jordan’s centralized government was advantageous for NGOs providing education services since there was an organized chain of command of decision makers to manage the Syrian refugee crisis. Equally important, the government was willing to listen to NGO feedback during the decision-making process. As one UN official explained, “They open

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640 Interview with Subject J20UN, op. cit.
641 Interview with Subject J13NGO, op. cit.
642 Interview with Subject J11NGO, op. cit.
the border and cooperate and received a big number of refugees these five years...[To] receive this big number of refugees is more challenging...They try with NGOs to find the solution especially in the education system.”

*The Syrian Refugee Response Plan.* Domestic and international NGOs were invited to help create an initial formal refugee management plan and the subsequent annual revisions. In March 2012, the first Syrian Refugee Response Plan was drafted by the government, the UN, and 24 domestic and international NGOs. By October 2013, 59 INGOs coordinated with the government and the UN under the plan. The plan outlined strategic objectives and coordination efforts that were to be funded by the international community. The initial plan established a refugee program requiring Syrian refugees to register and to renew their registration every six months in order to receive services. The Zaatari Syrian Refugee Camp was built according to the plan. Located near Jordan’s international border with Syria, it was opened in June 2012 and hosted approximately 80,000 Syrian refugees as of November 2016.

By April 2012, domestic and international NGOs, the Ministry of Education and

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643 Interview with Subject J21UN, op. cit.
UNICEF collaborated to create the refugee education response, a subprogram of the Syrian Refugee Response Plan. A cluster approach was utilized to coordinate efforts. The Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies defines an education cluster as an “education sector working group, focused exclusively on responding to education in emergencies.” The response included collaboration among the main stakeholders to build aid coordination and capacity development, to create monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to track coordination and accountability, to distribute aid, and to mobilize resources and funding. Coordination efforts, refugee programs, and aid allocation were reported on a monthly or semi-monthly basis through sector reports uploaded to the Syria Regional Refugee Response Portal.

Under the plan, NGOs were tasked with providing refugee education services and technical expertise, and funding was sought from donors like the European Union and the United States. Table 4.3 demonstrates a list of funds requested and funds received by the Syrian refugee education sector. Technical services are “non-financial assistance…It can take the form of sharing information and expertise, instruction, skills training, transmission of working knowledge, and consulting services.” NGOs also provided assessments of

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the conditions in the host communities and camps for each subsequent response plan revision. As one UN official explained, “The best way to cooperate with NGOs is with what is on the ground and where is the need. The government does not have the tools to do this assessment, so they use the UN and NGOs to do this assessment.” By August 2016, the Education Sector Working Group reported that there were 24 domestic and international NGOs providing education services in Jordan. See Table 4.4 for examples of NGOs and the types of refugee education services they provide.

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658 Interview with Subject J21UN, op. cit.
659 Inter-Sector Working Group, Jordan, Education Sector, [Page 3].
Table 4.3 Jordan’s Education Sector Donor Funding Requirements and Funding Received

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2013$^{660}$</th>
<th>2014$^{661}$</th>
<th>2015$^{662}$</th>
<th>2016$^{663}$</th>
<th>2017$^{664}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding Requirement</td>
<td>$17,763,883</td>
<td>$73,772,698</td>
<td>$80,557,770</td>
<td>$83,770,387</td>
<td>$47,726,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding Received by Donors</td>
<td>$80,000</td>
<td>$64,004,358</td>
<td>$68,326,426</td>
<td>$103,041,763</td>
<td>$31,245,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Funding Received</td>
<td>.5%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>123%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Gap</td>
<td>99.5%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


$^{661}$ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Inter-agency Financial Tracking - Jordan (Jan-Dec 2014)," Syria Regional Refugee Response - Jordan, last modified February 3, 2015, [http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/documents.php?page=13&view=grid&Language%5B%5D=1&Country%5B%5D=107&Type%5B%5D=5](http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/documents.php?page=13&view=grid&Language%5B%5D=1&Country%5B%5D=107&Type%5B%5D=5).

$^{662}$ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Inter-agency Financial Tracking - Jordan (Jan-Dec 2015)," Syria Regional Refugee Response - Jordan, last modified February 10, 2016, [http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/documents.php?page=8&view=grid&Language%5B%5D=1&Country%5B%5D=107&Type%5B%5D=5](http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/documents.php?page=8&view=grid&Language%5B%5D=1&Country%5B%5D=107&Type%5B%5D=5).

$^{663}$ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Inter-agency Financial Tracking - Jordan (Jan-Dec 2016)," Syria Regional Refugee Response - Jordan, last modified February 2017, [http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/documents.php?page=5&view=grid&Language%5B%5D=1&Country%5B%5D=107&Type%5B%5D=5](http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/documents.php?page=5&view=grid&Language%5B%5D=1&Country%5B%5D=107&Type%5B%5D=5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>NGO Type</th>
<th>Refugee Services Provided</th>
<th>The Number of Children Who Benefited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caritas</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Non-formal education</td>
<td>6,000 students in 21 schools receive education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Amman Charity</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Psycho/social programs Remedial education</td>
<td>Hundreds receive education services. No exact figure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping Refugees in Jordan</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Non-formal education</td>
<td>450 students receive education services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Orthodox Christian Charities</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>School uniform and book bag distribution</td>
<td>30,000 refugee girls have uniforms. 50,000 refugees received school supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordanian Association for Orphans &amp; Widows Care</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Child protection Psycho/social activities</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan Hashemite Charity Organization for Relief &amp;</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Coordinating partner with INGOS and UN to provide services</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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670 Interview with Subject JINGO, op. cit.
671 International Orthodox Christian Charities, "Jordan|Where We Work," International Orthodox Christian Charities.
672 Ibid.
673 United Religions Initiative, "Jordanian Association," United Religions Initiative; and United Nations, Revised Syria, [Page 23].
674 Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>Psycho/social activities</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>King Hussein</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Psycho/social activities</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Non-formal education</td>
<td>Host community programs</td>
<td>Provided accommodations and enrolled 3,000 students with disabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Formal and non-formal education</td>
<td>Host communities and camps</td>
<td>Provided accommodations and enrolled 3,000 students with disabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noor Al Hussein</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Psycho/social activities</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Refugee</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Formal and non-formal education</td>
<td>Host communities and camps</td>
<td>Provided accommodations and enrolled 3,000 students with disabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Formal and non-formal education</td>
<td>Host communities and camps</td>
<td>Provided accommodations and enrolled 3,000 students with disabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief International</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Formal and non-formal education</td>
<td>Host communities and camps</td>
<td>Provided accommodations and enrolled 3,000 students with disabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Child and youth friendly spaces</td>
<td>Host communities and camps</td>
<td>Provided accommodations and enrolled 3,000 students with disabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Non-formal education</td>
<td>Early childhood development</td>
<td>Provided accommodations and enrolled 3,000 students with disabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Basic education</td>
<td>Informal education</td>
<td>Provided accommodations and enrolled 3,000 students with disabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000 children a day participate in education activities in designated child friendly spaces</td>
<td>1000 children a day participate in education activities in designated child friendly spaces</td>
<td>Provided accommodations and enrolled 3,000 students with disabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

674 Jordan Hashemite Charity Organization for Relief & Development (JHCO), "Establishment," Jordan Hashemite Charity Organization.
676 King Hussein Foundation, "King Hussein," King Hussein Foundation; and King Hussein Foundation, "Her Majesty," King Hussein Foundation.
681 Ibid. Figure as of 2016.
685 Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World Lutheran Foundation</th>
<th>International</th>
<th>School rehabilitation</th>
<th>Refurbished 12 schools and provided over 5,000 uniforms and school supplies to children.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zaha Cultural Center</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Non-formal education</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Children programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NGO representatives that I interviewed for this research perceived their participation in the creation and the implementation of the Syrian refugee response plan as advantageous with respect to the provision of refugee education services. As one NGO representative stated, “[The response] is more coordinated. The government works with different INGOs and the donors in order to design the response.” 689 Another NGO representative concluded, “In general, most of the NGOs have good coordination with the government.” 690

*NGO Advantage: NGO Financial Power.* Jordan is a resource-poor country dependent on foreign aid. From 1951 until 2016, Jordan received approximately $19.2 billion from the United States. 691 In 2016, the United States pledged to give Jordan an additional $1.6 billion in security and economic assistance. 692 Jordan also receives millions

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686 The Lutheran World Federation, "Jordan," The Lutheran World Federation, last modified March 16, 2015, [https://www.lutheranworld.org/content/jordan-0](https://www.lutheranworld.org/content/jordan-0).
687 Ibid.
689 Interview with J1NGO, op. cit.
690 Interview with Subject J9NGO, op. cit.
in aid from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the European Union, and international financial institutions like the World Bank, for the management of the refugee burden. See Table 4.5 for an example list of donors and their contributions to the Syrian Refugee Crisis.

| Table 4.5 Example List of Donors and Their Contributions to the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                                 | 2014            | 2015            | 2016            |
| European Union                  | $28,967,037     | $20,473,644     | $7,517,168      |
| Kuwait                          | $7,170,000      | $35,000,000     | N/A             |
| Saudi Arabia                    | $720,000        | N/A             | $4,200,000      |
| United Kingdom                  | $12,779,553     | $28,891,973     | $23,885,281     |
| United States                   | $69,700,000     | $70,914,847     | $70,412,069     |
| World Bank                      | N/A             | N/A             | $300,000,000    |

One NGO strategy is to leverage their ability to attract financial aid as a tool to gain cooperation from Jordan’s government. NGOs are conduits of foreign aid since they receive bilateral and multilateral aid from foreign offices of developed countries and

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694 There are more donor countries listed for each year. See links in footnotes 172, 173, and 174.


multilateral organizations like the United Nations.\footnote{Werker and Ahmed, "What Do Nongovernmental," [Pp. 73, 78]; Funds for NGOs, "Major Sources of Funding for NGOs," Funds for NGOs, last modified March 2, 2009,\url{https://www.fundsforngos.org/alternative-fundraising/3-major-sources-of-funding-for-ngos/}; and Timothy Besley and Maitreesh Ghatak, "Public–Private Partnerships for the Provision of Public Goods: Theory and an Application to NGOs," \textit{Research in Economics} 71 (April 2017): [Page 357], doi:10.1016/j.reie.2017.04.005.} On average, worldwide, the UN allocates 40% of their funding to NGO partners for refugee and host community projects.\footnote{United Nations High Commission for Refugees, "Non-Governmental Organizations," UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency, last modified 2017, \url{http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/non-governmental-organizations.html}.} Graph 4.2 shows the top ten NGOs to receive funding as a share of the total funding allocated to the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan in 2016. Additionally, NGOs fundraise and finance their own projects seeking financial donations from private charities, foundations and corporations.\footnote{Khaledoun AbouAssi, "Get Money Get Involved? NGO’s Reactions to Donor Funding and Their Potential Involvement in the Public Policy Processes," \textit{Voluntas} 25, no. 4 (2014): [Page 970], doi:10.1007/s11266-013-9389-y; and Funds for NGOs, "Major Sources," Funds for NGOs.} As a case in point, the UN’s 2012 Revised Syria Regional Response Plan reported that between March and May 2012, “Many local and community-based NGOs have received substantial funding from the Arab world…The Jordanian Hashemite Charity Organization…has reported that some US$ 2.2 million have been channeled through these actors.”\footnote{United Nations, \textit{Revised Syria}, [Page 13].}
NGOs gained leverage from their ability to obtain funding not granted to the Jordanian government. An NGO representative explained the financial importance of NGOs to Jordan,

The NGOs play a main role in deciding the policy between the government of Jordan and the refugees because the donors and the NGOs are providing and donating to the refugees themselves and that helps the economic system of Jordan...The government gets the money from the NGOs and the donors.\(^{705}\)

A Ministry of Education official summarized the significance of the financial relationship between the host government and the NGOs, suggesting that,

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\(^{705}\) Interview with Subject J10NGO, op. cit.
Jordan is a very poor country and [it] will not be able to receive this number of refugees. So, the Jordanians try to keep good relations with UN agencies and INGOs to receive more funds to provide facilities for Syrian refugees.706

Furthermore, some countries were more comfortable channeling aid to NGOs rather than directly to the host government. As one NGO representative contended, “The United States will be more easy with NGOs but not with the government.”707 Another NGO representative added, “If the funding goes through the agencies, the money is seen. But when the money goes through the government, they don’t see the money and improvements.”708

Jordan relies on international funding for both their domestic and refugee communities. NGOs had an advantage in that they attracted financial aid that ultimately benefitted Jordanians as well as refugees since a percentage of funding for the Syrian refugee crisis was allocated for the host communities and infrastructure projects.709 One NGO strategy was to leverage their funding to gain agreement on the delivery of education services.

**NGO Advantage: NGOs Assisting Both Domestic and Refugee Populations.** Since the 1950s, the Jordanian government and the United Nations have continuously entrusted domestic and international NGO partners with numerous refugee and host community projects like the basic provision of water, sanitation, health, shelter, logistics, protection,
and germane to this dissertation, education. For example, 90% of the kindergartens attended by domestic populations in rural areas of Jordan are provided by NGOs. According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, Jordan is considered a lower middle income country. Its citizenry endure high unemployment rates, an inadequate infrastructure, and a lack of resources. A 2014 World Bank study concluded that at least one-third of Jordanians live below the poverty line for one quarter of the year. The influx of over one million refugees has increased societal pressures.

The UNHCR implemented a holistic approach that provided assistance to both Syrian refugees and the host communities in Jordan known as the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP). The 3RP mandated that NGOs provide assistance to both refugees and the host communities in Jordan. NGOs were aware of the plight of Jordanians and also provided them with assistance as indicated by the interviews I conducted during my field work. The Jordanian government insisted that 30% of refugee aid be allocated for local host communities to offset the impact of refugees. As one UN official explained the allocation system, “The resources, the labor markets…and the residents are affected. In the planning, we have communities in each governorate that

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711 Simadi and Almomani, "Clients’ Satisfaction," [Page 41].
716 Ibid.
717 Interview with Subjects J7NGO, J1NGO and J4NGO op. cit.
718 Médecins sans Frontières, A Review, [Page 7].
support Jordanians and Syrians - 70% Syrian and 30% Jordanians to benefit.” An NGO representative also noted that, “They [the Jordanian government] ask the NGOs for help. When there is a gap, or where there is a place they can’t handle anymore, they ask the NGOs.” One such NGO that rendered assistance is examined more closely in the next section.

One INGO’s Experience in Jordan

Relief International (RI) is an international NGO that provides education to Syrian refugees in Jordan. It was established in 2004 with the goal of assisting Iraqi refugees through healthcare and education projects. At the time of research, RI provided formal and non-formal education services, psycho/social support services, and life skills training to both self-settled Syrian refugees and those in the Zaatari and Azraq Camps. RI received permission from the government to host regular education information sessions for parents and community members, and to organize outreach teams in Syrian communities. RI staffed help-desks at schools, NGO centers, and in camps to provide guidance in the enrollment of refugee children. RI endured impediments like restrictive refugee policies and school capacity issues. Despite these obstacles, RI provided education services to approximately 25,000 Syrian refugee children in 2016. The findings from the interviews I conducted with RI representatives indicate that they were able to overcome these obstacles, and have attributed their success to four factors: the

719 Interview with Subject J21UN, op. cit.
720 Interview with Subject J9NGO, op. cit.
722 Interview with Subject J3NGO, opt. cit.
723 Interview with Subjects J3NGO, J5NGO, J11NGO, op. cit.
724 Interview with Subject J3NGO, op. cit.
725 Ibid.
726 Interview with Subjects J3NGO and J5NGO, opt. cit.
strength of the Syrian Refugee Response Plan, a strong working relationship with the Ministry of Education, creating projects to benefit both Jordanians and refugees, and using funding as an influence.\textsuperscript{728} I now discuss these factors below.

\textit{Relief International and the Syrian Refugee Response Plan.} Relief International was one of the stakeholders that cooperated with the government and the UN to design the annual Syria refugee response plans.\textsuperscript{729} One RI representative described his first-hand experience,

\begin{quote}
I participated in the allotment of the Jordan response plan because I am the chair of the working group… We look at how much funding is needed… We agree on the framework… Then we finalize this document, and this is the reference for anyone to do a project. This makes sense and is easy for the government to oversee. There is a clear plan among partners… This document [response plan] is a kind of commitment for INGOs, UN, and government, and we agree together on these priorities on these sectors.\textsuperscript{730}
\end{quote}

When designing refugee education projects, RI was careful to align its projects with the objectives of the response plan. In doing so, most of their projects were approved by the Jordanian government.\textsuperscript{731} Since they were part of the design process, they knew the procedures to gain project approval.

\textit{Relief International’s Relationship with the Jordanian Government.} Since 2004, RI had used a variety of strategies to develop a strong relationship with the Ministry of Education. First, RI recruited employees who had worked for or with the Ministry of Education.\textsuperscript{732} As one RI representative explained the benefit of his past relationship with the Ministry of Education (MOE),

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{728} Interview with Subject J3NGO, opt. cit.
\item \textsuperscript{729} United Nations, \textit{Revised Syria}, [Page 5].
\item \textsuperscript{730} Interview with J3NGO, op. cit.
\item \textsuperscript{731} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{732} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
I worked with the MOE. I have better relationships. I can manage…more efficiently… I think I was an interesting example for other NGOs - how I communicate with the MOE. We move from the bottom to the top to provide education. Now RI is at the top in Jordan for providing education and that makes other NGOs want to do the same. For example, War Child UK contacted me, and I advised them to find someone in the ministry to work with. I provided feedback on the guy they [chose].

In a separate interview, an NGO representative unaffiliated with RI, highlighted the importance of these interpersonal relationships with members of the MOE in obtaining project approval,

For NGOs, you need approval from a huge number of ministries. [For refugee] education – Ministry of Education, Ministry of Social Development, Ministry of Planning and the Cabinet of Ministries. For the NGO to work in Jordan as an international NGO, it is dependent on who you know at the ministry level. A lot of procedures still works by name. If not, you are in for a long wait.”

Second, RI routinely invited, and often compensated, MOE officials to assist in recruiting and hiring Jordanian teachers to teach Syrian children. Third, when MOE officials participated in teaching education training sessions, RI paid them for their expertise. As one RI representative noted, “We pay them incentives for additional work.” Finally, RI requested that MOE officials monitor their projects, and they regularly reported to the MOE, providing constant communication. The aggregate effect of these strategies – recruitment, deference, and incentives – is that RI was more able to accomplish their projects that aid Syrian refugee children.

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733 Ibid.
734 Interview with Subject J7NGO, op. cit.
735 Interview with Subject J3NGO, op. cit.
736 Ibid.
737 Ibid.
738 Ibid.
Relief International Assists Both Jordanians and Refugees. Relief International was careful to create and manage health, technology, and education projects that benefitted both refugees and their host communities. For example, RI and its partners improved access to clean water and sanitation for 45 schools located in the Mafraq and Irbid governorates attended by both Jordanian and Syrian children. Furthermore, they provided sanitation and water conservation training to 15,000 Jordanian and Syrian families in these governorates.739 RI strategically collaborated with domestic NGOs (the East Amman Charity, Yarmouk Baqaa Club and Karak Youth Club) to provide education services to Syrian refugee children.740 It built the capacity of these Jordanian-staffed NGOs as part of a sustainability project. As a result, these domestic NGOs became qualified UNICEF partners.741 Additionally, RI actively recruited Jordanians to work on the projects they managed, offering steady employment and livable salaries.742 This was a particularly important strategy in a country with a high unemployment rate.

Fundraising as Strategy. At the time of research, RI had an annual refugee education budget of $7 million.743 Approximately 90% of RI’s funding was provided by UNICEF.744 Through an agreement with UNICEF, it was required to raise the other 10% or $700,000, through partnerships with other NGOs or private donors.745 One financial source revealed by an interview subject was a partnership with Italian agencies to build schools in camps and to contribute school and library supplies.746 An RI representative

[740] Interview with Subject J3NGO, op. cit.
[741] Ibid.
[743] Interview with Subject J3NGO, op. cit.
[744] Ibid.
[745] Ibid.
[746] Ibid.
explained that the government was more responsive to NGOs who have funding, “Having the money efficiently contributes and we can enter new services. This enhances the relationship with the government. It is an incentive, and the government responds.”

Relief International is an example of an international NGO that had successfully provided refugee education services. Its success can be attributed to the decision to employ Jordanians with personal connections with the Ministry of Education; its opportunity to collaborate in the design and implementation of the Syrian response plans; its creation of programs that assist both Jordanians and Syrians, and its ability to attract financial investment and outside partnerships that ultimately benefit Jordan.

**Conclusion**

Domestic and international NGOs faced obstacles to their provision of refugee education services in Jordan. Historically, refugee policies became more restrictive in reaction to the forced migration flows of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees. This trend continued with the Syrian refugee crisis when the government created long term restrictive border, encampment, residency, and employment policies that inhibited the ability of NGOs to provide refugee education services. The government did enact policies that restricted NGOs from participating in political activities, but allowed them to provide services and development projects.

As the Syrian refugee crisis evolved, NGOs struggled to provide refugee education services due to the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees in a relatively short period of time, causing backlogs and prohibiting children from entering school. Yet, by August

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747 Interview with Subject J3NGO, op. cit.
748 As of 2017, there were 18 international NGO education partners. Inter-Sector Working Group, Jordan, *Education Sector*, [Page 3].
2016, 191,161 of 232,470 or 82.2% of Syrian refugee children were enrolled in formal and non-formal education.\textsuperscript{749} This can be attributed to the domestic and international NGOs’ opportunities to collaborate with the Jordanian government; the advantage of being established in Jordan prior to the Syrian refugee crisis; the utilization of funding aid as a negotiating tool, and the strategy of providing for both refugees and Jordanians.

The Jordanian case study demonstrates that there are some conditions that are conducive to higher Syrian refugee enrollment rates that are not attributable to the actions of domestic and international NGOs, but rather the opportunities afforded to them by the Jordanian government. The government allowed domestic and international NGOs to provide education services to refugees at the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis. The government permitted NGOs to collaborate on the Syrian Refugee Response Plan, and allowed them to participate in an open dialogue with the government and the UN in forums intended to affect constructive change. As I discussed in Chapter 3, the results of the interviews and Q-sort exercises revealed that Jordan’s priorities include preserving their resources and maintaining security. The Jordanian government was willing to cooperate with other entities like the UN, the donors, and NGOs to achieve these priorities. Domestic and international NGOs were therefore afforded opportunities to cooperate that ultimately benefitted Syrian refugees, as indicated by high Syrian refugee enrollment rates. As will be discussed in the next two case study chapters, it is evident that NGOs in Lebanon and Turkey were – in contrast - limited in the opportunities afforded by the host governments. This negatively affected enrollment rates in these two countries.

\textsuperscript{749} This figure is as of August 2016. From: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 3RP Regional, [Page 35].
This case study also found that higher Syrian refugee enrollment rates were attributable to the direct actions taken by domestic and international NGOs. Analyzing the behaviors of the NGOs and their relationship to the government, the findings suggest that NGOs had actively fostered collaboration with the government. Both domestic and international NGOs learned to follow the guidelines and procedures for providing refugee education services to ensure that their programs were approved by the Ministry of Education and funded by the donors. As one NGO representative explained, “Daily relations with Ministry of Education - everything we do has to be with blessing of the Ministry.” NGOs provided services to benefit both refugees and host communities as refugees settled in poorer areas and strained local resources. INGOs also used the promise of funding to leverage government collaboration. One NGO representative indicated that one of her main roles was to expand the donor base. As one Ministry of Education official succinctly observed,

Jordan without cooperation with NGOs would not be able to receive large groups of refugees. Not only the financial dimensions or [to] influence the policy of refugees in Jordan, but also technical assistance plays a major role in this regard. Jordan is very poor country without resources. Without the support, we could not do this for Syrians.

Based on all of the factors discussed above, Adil Najam’s would therefore classify the relationship between the government of Jordan and NGOs as cooperative - both entities sharing similar policy goals (the ends) and the tactics (the means) to realize them. Najam states that in cooperative relationships there is an “absence of perceived threat—on the part

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750 Interview with J2NGO, op. cit.  
751 Ibid.  
752 Interview with Subject J28MN, op. cit.  
753 Najam, "The Four-C's," [Page 384].
of either NGOs or government—from the means or ends being pursued by the other.”

The interviews and Q-sort exercises indicated that Jordan’s priorities were having adequate resources and maintaining security and that the government was willing to cooperate with the UN, donors and NGOs. The government and NGOs worked in tandem to maintain peace and to ensure that there were enough resources for both refugees and the host community.

Relief International is the exemplar of an INGO that successfully collaborated with the government. RI fostered interpersonal relationships with officials at the Ministry of Education and hired an education expert with personal connections to the Ministry of Education. Furthermore, RI maintained its successful relationship with the Ministry of Education through a program of transparency and consultancy, inviting officials to events, and compensating them for their time. They cultivated relationships with local NGOs and hired Jordanians for positions within their institution. Over a five-year period, RI rose in prominence and continued to collaborate on the Syrian Refugee Response Plan and to deliver refugee education services.

The objective of my research is to add to the academic understanding of the nexus between refugees and their ability to access basic social services like education. The findings of the research in this chapter suggest that there are four key factors that impact the Syrian refugee enrollment rate. They are, in order of priority: a strong centralized government that is willing to cooperate with NGOs, a good relationship between the state and NGOs prior to the Syrian Refugee Crisis, the NGOs’ financial leverage with the host government, and the NGOs’ deliberate decision to provide for both Jordanians and Syrian

\[754\] Ibid.
refugees. These factors will be explored in the case studies of Lebanon and Turkey. As I will discuss in the Lebanon chapter, there is limited collaboration between the host government and the NGOs. This, I will suggest, explains the lower enrollment rate.
Chapter 5

The Struggles of NGOs in Lebanon

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the moderate enrollment ratio of Syrian refugee children in Lebanon. I interviewed subjects representing NGOs that provided education services to Syrian refugees in Lebanon. They reported obstacles to providing refugee education services: the prevalence of child labor, the cost of refugee education, school capacity issues, overcrowded classrooms, and lack of transportation to schools.755 NGOs contended with restrictive refugee registration, residency, and employment policies that hindered refugee access to the education services that NGOs provided.756 I argue that NGOs in Lebanon had limited opportunities, strategies, and capabilities to surmount these obstacles to their provision of refugee education services.

I conducted Q-sort exercises and substantiated the findings by conducting ANOVA tests and multiple comparison tests with a Bonferroni correction to examine how the participants ranked the priority of influences on refugee policy decisions. All of the following factors ranked highly as drivers of refugee policy: national security, national budget strains, resources for refugees, employment, prior history, and the presence of the Palestinian refugees. Yet, further analysis of which actor types prioritized each factor revealed that no single statement was selected as a driver of refugee policy by all actor types. I discovered that government and NGO participants exhibit a divergence of opinions

755 Interviews with Subjects L5NGO, L3NGO, L4NGO, and L6NGO, op. cit. I conducted eighteen interviews in Lebanon from June to August 2016: five host government officials from the Ministry of Education and Higher Education and the Ministry of Social Affairs, six United Nations officials from UNESCO, UNDP, UNHCR, and OCHA, and seven representatives from both domestic and international non-governmental organizations. Representatives from domestic and international NGOs requested that the names of their organizations be omitted.

centered on sensitive political issues like the influx of mostly Sunni refugees into Lebanon, Syria and Lebanon’s prior interactions, Syria’s influence in Lebanese politics, and the country’s history of hosting Palestinian refugees. The divergence in the opinions of government officials and NGO representatives indicate a difference in priorities, which in turn impacted the government-NGO relationship.

These findings exemplify what Adil Najam’s defines as a co-optative relationship model, where the government and NGOs have different goals (the ends) but employ similar strategies (the means).\textsuperscript{757} Co-optative relationships are built on power struggles.\textsuperscript{758} NGOs operated alongside a decentralized and uncooperative government that hindered domestic and international NGOs’ provision of essential education services to refugees.\textsuperscript{759} As I argued in previous chapters, the enrollment rate is attributable to the relationship between the NGOs – the organizations that provide refugee education services - and the host government. This explains why Lebanon had a lower ratio of Syrian refugee children enrolled in formal and non-formal education compared to Jordan.\textsuperscript{760} Table 5.1 represents the Syrian refugee enrollment rates from January 2013 to June 2017. There was an increase in enrollment from 2014 (24.4%) to 2016 (55.2%). Yet, the enrollment rate decreased from 55.2% in 2016 47.7% to 2017.

\textsuperscript{757} Najam, “The Four-C’s,” [Page 388].
\textsuperscript{758} Ibid., p. 389.
\textsuperscript{759} Interview with Subjects L3NGO, L6NGO, L1NGO, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{760} Please note that the enrollment rates have altered since 2016, and that the interviews I conducted are based on explaining the 2016 rates. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2017-2018, [Page 35].
Table 5.1 Syrian Refugee Enrollment Rates in Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2013(^{761})</th>
<th>2014(^{762})</th>
<th>2015(^{763})</th>
<th>2016(^{764})</th>
<th>2017(^{765})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of School-Aged</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>387,250(^{766})</td>
<td>285,661</td>
<td>379,299</td>
<td>423,832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of School-Aged</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>94,300</td>
<td>119,389</td>
<td>209,896</td>
<td>202,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Children in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrollment Percentage</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>41.8%</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of School-Aged</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Refugee Children in</td>
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<td>School</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

I begin this chapter with an analysis of Lebanese refugee policies prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, noting the international refugee conventions signed by Lebanon and the laws created to manage prior refugee crises. Second, I explore the NGOs’ relationship with the Government of Lebanon and the services they provided prior to the Syrian refugee crisis. By doing so, I determine if the relationship served as an obstacle or was advantageous to providing refugee education services in the current crisis. Third, I will highlight the policies enacted to manage NGOs prior to the Syrian civil war. Fourth, I will evaluate the role of


\(^{765}\) There were no figures on non-formal education for this time period. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "2017 June Statistical Dashboard," Inter-agency Coordination Lebanon, last modified August 9, 2017, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/working_group.php?Page=Country&LocationId=122&Id=21.

\(^{766}\) This number represents registered and non-registered Syrian refugee children aged 5-17 years old. From: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *UNHCR - Lebanon - Education UNHCR Monthly Update - December 2014*, [Page 1].
NGOs at the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon. Fifth, I will examine NGO strategies, opportunities, and advantages to overcome Lebanon’s long-term policy decisions and other problems associated with enrolling Syrian refugee children, from the onset of the crisis in March 2011 to August 2016. Finally, I conclude with an examination of one particular INGO’s experience in Lebanon to determine whether and how it was able to surmount obstacles to its provision of refugee education services.

Refugee Policy Prior to the Syrian Refugee Crisis

Lebanon is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol. It does not recognize the term “refugee” and does not grant legal status for refugees living in Lebanon. Yet it is a signatory to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that compels the country to refrain from the refoulement of refugees and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child that guarantees refugee children receive rights comparable to those of the domestic population. In September 2003, the Lebanese General Security Office signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the UNHCR stating that Lebanon is not an asylum country and

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768 Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty, *Marginalised Community: The Case of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, by Jaber Suleiman (Brighton, UK: University of Essex, 2006), [Page 4], [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08c4be5274a31e0001112/JaberEdited.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08c4be5274a31e0001112/JaberEdited.pdf).
that it will provide only temporary humanitarian support to refugees until they are resettled in a third country.\textsuperscript{770}

\textit{Lebanon’s Domestic Policy towards Palestinian Refugees}. The Lebanese government created domestic refugee policies in reaction to the influx of Palestinian refugees prior to the Syrian crisis. The first wave of Palestinians entered Lebanon in 1948.\textsuperscript{771} Lebanon cooperated with the UNRWA to establish Palestinian refugee camps.\textsuperscript{772}

Initially, Lebanese laws permitted Palestinian refugees to engage in political activity such as advocating for reclamation of their homeland, Palestine.\textsuperscript{773} This changed in 1958, when Israel rejected the UN General Assembly’s Resolution 194 to permit refugees to return to Palestine and to be compensated for the loss of their homes.\textsuperscript{774} The Lebanese government did not want to host hundreds of thousands of stateless Palestinians. Consequently, in 1962, the Lebanese government enacted policies declaring Palestinians to be foreigners and restricted their ability to obtain work permits.\textsuperscript{775} Furthermore, martial

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{772} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{774} Suleiman, "The Current," [Page 67]; and Forced Migration Organization, \textit{Palestinian Refugees}, [Pp. 6-7].
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
law was declared in the camps.\textsuperscript{776} By 1975, there were approximately 140,000 to 150,000 Palestinians living in the camps.\textsuperscript{777}

Some Lebanese government restrictions were lifted in reaction to Israel’s defeat of Syria and Egypt in the 1967 Six-Day War.\textsuperscript{778} There was increased Arab and Lebanese support for the PLO.\textsuperscript{779} Simultaneously, Israel invaded Lebanon in an attempt to suppress Palestinian guerillas who were invading Israel from Lebanese soil.\textsuperscript{780} Consequently, the Lebanese government and the PLO signed the 1969 Cairo Agreement that granted Palestinians rights to labor, freedom of movement, residency, and to bear arms against Israeli forces.\textsuperscript{781} The agreement never became national law to discourage permanent settlement, yet the PLO used this agreement to build institutions within Lebanon, essentially becoming a state within a state.\textsuperscript{782}

The PLO became a powerful force within Lebanon in the 1970s, offering military and financial support to the Lebanese left-wing.\textsuperscript{783} The organization also used its bases in Lebanon to attack Israel.\textsuperscript{784} These efforts created tensions within Lebanon and led to the

\textsuperscript{776} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{779} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{780} Forced Migration Organization, \textit{Palestinian Refugees}, [Page 7].
\textsuperscript{782} D’Aspremont, "The Development," Institut Medea; and Forced Migration Organization, \textit{Palestinian Refugees}, [Page 7].
\textsuperscript{783} Forced Migration Organization, \textit{Palestinian Refugees}, [Page 7].
\textsuperscript{784} Ibid.
The Lebanese civil war began when Christian Phalangists ambushed a bus carrying Palestinians and killed 27 passengers. This event was the catalyst that began the war between Christians who held the political power and the Muslims who demanded reform. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon and installed pro-Israeli Maronite Christian President Bachir Gemayel who ordered the expulsion of the PLO from the country. Many PLO institutions and services were dismantled. In 1987, the Lebanese government abrogated the 1969 Cairo Agreement. This abrogation prevented the re-establishment of Palestinian guerilla bases in Lebanon. On April 3, 2001, the Lebanese government enacted Law Number 296 further prohibiting Palestinians from owning property, obligating them to obtain work permits, and prohibiting them from working in 20 fields including business, trade, engineering, and medicine. Currently, there are approximately 450,000 Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA.

The Role of NGOs Prior to the Syrian Refugee Crisis

Historically, NGOs have been integral in the provision of services like healthcare and education. They are considered part of the “third sector” known as civil society organizations (CSOs) in Lebanon. Prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, some domestic

785 Ibid.
787 Ibid.
788 Ibid.
790 Forced Migration Organization, Palestinian Refugees, [Page 9].
793 Ibid.
794 The OECD defines civil society organizations as “The multitude of associations around which society voluntarily organizes itself and which represent a wide range of interests and ties. These can include
NGOs were affiliated with Lebanese political parties. Other domestic NGOs were affiliated with religious organizations known as confessional groups. In Shi’a regions in the south and northeast, NGOs associated with Hezbollah were the main providers of social services like healthcare, housing, and most germane to this dissertation, education. In Sunni regions in the north and southeast, NGOs like the Future Movement and the Hariri Foundation provided social services. Map 5.1 represents where these religious groups are located in Lebanon. Palestinian NGOs had been integral to the provision of social services. They contributed to the “Palestinian Sector” – the services and industries established by the PLO after the 1969 Cairo Agreement. They provided employment, education, vocational training, healthcare, and cultural activities for Palestinians. Map 5.2 represents where Palestinian camps are located in Lebanon. In 2016, there were over community-based organisations, indigenous peoples’ organisations and non-government organisations.”


796 Ibid.


798 Ibid.


800 Ibid.

801 There is no relationship between the maps because Palestinian camps are located in different regions with differing religious majorities.
5,000 NGOs registered in Lebanon. Table 5.2 lists examples of domestic and international NGOs providing services in Lebanon prior to the Syrian refugee crisis. This list represents the variety of services offered by NGOs and the variety of clients who benefitted prior to the crisis.

**Map 5.1: Distribution of Religious Groups and Population Density in Lebanon**

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Table 5.2 Examples of NGOs Working in Lebanon Prior to the Syrian Refugee Crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Domestic or International NGO</th>
<th>Year Established in Lebanon</th>
<th>Services Provided Before Syrian Refugee Crisis</th>
<th>Groups Assisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Ain Association for Development 805</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>No date found</td>
<td>Environment Education Small business development</td>
<td>Lebanese</td>
</tr>
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<td>Education Women and children projects</td>
<td>Lebanese</td>
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<td>1976</td>
<td>Humanitarian aid Emergency intervention Medical, social, education, and protection assistance</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The General Union of Palestinian Woman 808</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Community development Education/health/women Refugees/displaced Small business development</td>
<td>Palestinians</td>
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<td>International</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Emergency Aid, Health and Medical Support</td>
<td>Lebanese Palestinians</td>
</tr>
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</table>

806 Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Economic</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Economic Empowerment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercy Corps(^{810})</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Education Water Sanitation Hygiene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Human Rights</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lebanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization(^{811})</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Peace education Human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Red Crescent</td>
<td>Domestic/International</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Handicapped Health Emergencies/disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society(^{812})</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief International(^{813})</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Healthcare Partner with local</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>municipalities and small business for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>economic projects</td>
</tr>
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<td>1953</td>
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<td>Formal and Nonformal Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanese</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{809}\) International Orthodox Christian Charities, "Lebanon Where We Work," IOCC, last modified 2017, [https://www.iocc.org/where-we-work/lebanon](https://www.iocc.org/where-we-work/lebanon).


\(^{814}\) Save the Children, "Lebanon - Save the Children," Save the Children, last modified 2017, [http://www.savethechildren.org/site/c.8rKLIxMGIp14E/b.6153137/k.C268/Lebanon.htm](http://www.savethechildren.org/site/c.8rKLIxMGIp14E/b.6153137/k.C268/Lebanon.htm).
NGOs and the Lebanese Civil War. Domestic and international NGOs were essential during the Lebanese civil war between the various Christian and Muslim sects from 1975 to 1990.\textsuperscript{816} The government was unable to provide services to its citizenry and consequently, NGOs provided them instead. These services included healthcare, education, food distribution, and the repair of infrastructure damaged by the war.\textsuperscript{817} The NGOs were funded by Western countries and gained legitimacy and credibility because they provided what the government could not.\textsuperscript{818} An American University report found that, “The negligence of [Lebanese] local governments in providing basic services allows non-state actors to become the primary service providers at the local level, providing a delegitimizing mirror to the government.”\textsuperscript{819} The NGO sector grew, and coordination efforts evolved.\textsuperscript{820} By 1988 the Lebanese NGO Forum was established and consisted of ten major NGOs including the YMCA, the Lebanese Federation of Healthcare, and religious NGOs.\textsuperscript{821}

\begin{table}[h!]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
SAWA Group & Domestic & 1990 & Lebanese Palestinians \\
\hline
& & Children and youth development & \\
\hline
& & Human rights and protection & \\
\hline
& & Social and cultural development & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{818} D’Aspremont, "The Development," Institut Medea; and Applied Knowledge Services, \textit{International Aid to Lebanon}, by Emilie Combaz, August 2, 2013, \texttt{http://gsdrc.org/docs/open/hdq979.pdf}.
\textsuperscript{819} Defense Intelligence Agency School of International Service American University, \textit{Factors of Instability}, [Page 9].
\textsuperscript{821} D’Aspremont, "The Development," Institut Medea.
The civil war ended in October 1989 with the Taef Agreement.\(^\text{822}\) At the end of the war, one quarter of the Lebanese population was displaced with approximately 25\% - many highly educated - residing outside the country.\(^\text{823}\) By 2013, seven million Lebanese lived in Brazil, three million lived in the United States, and 250,000 lived in West Africa.\(^\text{824}\) NGOs continued to provide public social services.\(^\text{825}\) Many transitioned into development agencies and their projects were funded by local associations, the state, and developed countries.\(^\text{826}\) The government subcontracted public services to NGOs and distributed 80\% of the Ministry of Social Affairs’ budget to them.\(^\text{827}\)

\textit{NGOs and the Hezbollah-Israeli War of 2006.} In July and August 2006 Hezbollah and Israel engaged in a 33 day war after Hezbollah killed eight Israeli soldiers and captured two more.\(^\text{828}\) Approximately 730,000 people were displaced and 230,000 fled to countries bordering Lebanon.\(^\text{829}\) The United Nations distributed $520 million from donors like the United States, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates to provide services and to rebuild the areas impacted by the war.\(^\text{830}\) Graph 5.1 represents the top ten


\(^{826}\) D’Aspremont, "The Development," Institut Medea; and Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, \textit{Faith-based NGOs}, [Page 7].

\(^{827}\) Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, \textit{Faith-based NGOs}, [Page 8]. Please note that I was not able to find the funding amounts contributed by international donors and distributed to NGOs during the post-civil war reconstruction.


\(^{830}\) Ibid.
NGOs that received funding as a share of the total funding allocated after the Hezbollah Israel War in 2006. These funds were distributed to INGOs including the Norwegian Refugee Council, Mercy Corps, and World Vision International. Other recipients included Jihad al Bina – the NGO division of Hezbollah and the Lebanese Red Cross. I chose these NGOs because this is the data available from the UN’s Office of Humanitarian Affairs. The United Nations allocated funding to these NGOs in order to provide relief after the 2006 Hezbollah Israel War.

832 Mac Ginty and Hamieh, "Lebanon Case," [Page 40].
NGOs had worked extensively in Lebanon prior to the Syrian refugee crisis. They acted as a surrogate for the government, providing services to the Lebanese because the government institutions had a “weak capacity to respond to civil demand.” International donors distributed funding to NGOs to provide services and to rebuild after the conflicts.

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833 Ibid.
Several domestic and international NGOs were advantageously situated to help the Syrian refugee population as a result of their history as leaders in the provision of social services.

**Government Policies Regarding NGOs**

Prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, the Lebanese government enacted few policies to manage NGOs. The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law states that, “Lebanon has established one of the most enabling legal and regulatory environments for civil society in the entire Arab world.” Article 13 of the Lebanese Constitution permits the freedom to establish associations. The 1909 Ottoman Law of Associations grants the freedom of association with the only condition being that NGOs must notify the Ministry of the Interior of their existence. Amendments to the 1909 law specified organization classifications. The first amendment was the March 13, 1936, Decision No. 60 LR that granted legal status to associations “with charity, cultural, or education objectives…within the framework of the accepted order of confessions.” The second amendment was the December 1, 1939 Decision No. 369 LR that distinguished foreign associations by a special decree of the Council of Ministers. Foreign associations are defined by the following characteristics: the founder or director is foreign; the organization is based outside Lebanon, or more than 25% of its general assembly members are foreigners. These amendments were

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839 Ibid.
840 Ibid.
841 Ibid.
significant after 1982 when PLO institutions and services were disbanded and many Palestinian NGOs were forbidden from providing services.\textsuperscript{842} The 1909 Law of Associations amendments allowed Palestinian NGOs to continue operations if they were registered as foreign associations under Lebanese law, licensed through the Ministry of the Interior, obtained a license through presidential decree, or if they were religious groups affiliated with the Muslim Waqf.\textsuperscript{843}

Lebanon’s NGO policies permitted NGO efforts to provide social services.\textsuperscript{844} The laws were not impediments, but rather it was the government’s delay in the acknowledgement of receipt of notification that frustrated NGOs. NGOs could not “take full advantage of the rights and privileges afforded to registered, legal entities” until the government acknowledges them.\textsuperscript{845} The Lebanese government could delay notification receipt by months and sometimes years – an obstacle for NGOs trying to provide refugee education services.\textsuperscript{846} As one NGO representative observed, “The Lebanese government doesn’t have an expiration date for NGOs. However, [some] NGOs that put in their documents for registration have been pending for a year.”\textsuperscript{847}

**The Syrian Refugee Crisis**

The government of Lebanon did not create a legal strategy to manage the Syrian refugees at the onset of the crisis.\textsuperscript{848} Lebanon refused to formally recognize the “emergency

\textsuperscript{843} D’Aspremont, “The Development,” Institut Medea.
\textsuperscript{844} International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), "Civic Freedom," ICNL International Center for Not-for-Profit Law.
\textsuperscript{845} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{846} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{847} Interview with Subject L5NGO, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{848} Seeley, "Jordan’s “Open,” Foreign Policy.

The lack of a clear policy response was not a hindrance for domestic and international NGOs because they were already providing services to the domestic population and Palestinian refugees. As one NGO representative recalled,

> The crisis at the beginning was ad hoc managed. NGOs could come in with few restrictions. We were already here…NGOs and ex-pats could come without visas…Because of the way it was handled in the beginning, there was basically a period of lack of regulation. As it got bigger, the NGOs moved at the same time. A lot were not registered. It was the Wild West.\footnote{Interview with Subject L5NGO, op. cit.}

Yet, NGOs faced political impediments. As one domestic NGO representative recollected,
Technically, the war started in 2011... The refugees started to flee, trying to find places where they could live... They [the Lebanese government]... asked for passports and papers. Those that did not have papers, they sent them back. My organization provided heat and clothes before they went back... In 2012 in March, the war started to spread to Damascus. The Syrians from Damascus go to Lebanon. They went to tents that were near schools, but they weren't provided anything from Lebanon. 855

Prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, the Syrian government was a key actor in the Lebanese civil war from 1975 to 1990. 856 Former Syrian President Hafez al-Assad’s Alawite-backed government - a Shiite Muslim sect - supported Shiite Hezbollah during the war and further maintained an influential and powerful presence in Lebanese political affairs after the war. 857 This history informed the actions of the Lebanese government during the first years of the Syrian refugee crisis. As one UN official stated, “There was a political situation… Does the government get involved?” 858 A second UN official surmised, “Syria occupied Lebanon, and you could say half of the country is pro-Syria and half is against Assad. The government would tell you one way or another, how much they wanted to welcome the refugees.” 859

Domestic and international NGOs also had to contend with the religious divide. As an NGO representative explained, “The host community is divided. According to their background [Sunni, Shia, or Christian], they accepted the Syrians or not.” 860 Another NGO representative observed,

855 Interview with Subject L2 NGO, op. cit.
857 Ibid.
858 Interview with Subject L13 UN, op. cit.
859 Interview with Subject L9 UN, op. cit.
860 Interview of Subject L7 NGO, op. cit.
For those who have a negative experience - the Syrian army was in Lebanon for many years - they have a negative reaction to Syrian refugees. But for some who share the same religious background, they will be compelled to host them [refugees]. Sunni to support their Sunni brother.861

Domestic and international NGOs had two advantages at the beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis. First, they were already providing services to the domestic and Palestinian populations so that they were immediately able to assist Syrian refugees. Second, NGOs worked without interference or regulation from the government. Yet, the political divide hindered their work because the government refused to assist due to Lebanon’s contentious history with the Syrian government. NGOs also had to contend with a society fractured by religious sectarianism.

The government’s legal response evolved over the first five years from no government response to a long-term response. As one NGO representative explained, “The evolution went from non-engaging to engaging, from a denial phase to a ‘Whoops, we should be in charge phase.’ Now Lebanon wants to be in charge of the response and have more say for the country.”862 Another NGO representative explained, “In 2014, the government became part of the response…The response is the government’s plan and the UN supports it.”863 The number of registered Syrian refugees increased from 37,740 in August 2012 to 287,571 in February 2013 to 1.5 million registered and unregistered Syrian refugees by May 2013.864 Graph 5.2 indicates that there was a significant increase in the

861 Interview with Subject L4NGO, op. cit.
862 Interview with Subject L6NGO, op. cit.
863 Interview with Subject L4NGO, op. cit.
number of registered Syrian refugees who entered Lebanon from 2012 to 2017. The Lebanese government had to contend with a large displaced population needing services like shelter, healthcare, and education.

Graph 5.2 Syrian Refugees Registered in Lebanon from 2012 to 2017


Figures fluctuate based on resources used. Figure as of December 2012. From United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Syria Regional Response Plan January to June 2013, [page 46].

Initially, the government asked the UN to manage the crisis. Yet the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) immediately created refugee-friendly education policies. The MEHE permitted Syrian refugee children to enroll in public schools without providing proof of legal residency. The government also waived school enrollment fees, provided students with a certificate of completion, and allowed them the opportunity to sit for national exams. As one MEHE official recalled,

> When the crisis started, it was an emergency approach to absorb it. We try to absorb all the children...in our schools. We try to locate these children with whatever availability we have in our schools...It was part of our daily routine work.

Another MEHE official recollected,

> MEHE was very clear. It opened all the doors of public schools for school-aged children. At the beginning, many did not enroll because they thought the war would end. They lost that first year and the second year...Otherwise, our school principals were informed to give placement tests to see the ability of the refugees and to enroll them in a relevant class.

The rise in the Syrian population led to demands on the public education system. As one MEHE official explained, “It was part of our daily routine work [to register Syrian children for school], but then when the crisis takes much time and more people are coming, it was beyond the Ministry’s capacity to absorb all the children.” In 2013, the MEHE implemented a double shift program that split the school day into two shifts: Lebanese

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868 Interview with Subject L17MN, op. cit.
869 Interview with Subject L14MN, op. cit.
870 Interview with Subject L17MN, op. cit.
children attended school in the morning while Syrian children attended school in the afternoon. A MEHE official explained,

> The first year, we did not expect to reach what we are now. The first months of war were the end of our school year. By 2012, the number increased. The refugees were coming more and more. First, we were talking about receiving these extra children in our normal school system. After 2012, we felt that the procedures we normally follow would not absorb the refugees. Beginning 2012 school year, we plan to do something different, we started planning second shifts to open 2013.

The interviews I conducted with ministry officials show that the MEHE was earnest in its attempts to enroll Syrian children into the public school system, but it was unprepared for the task. Prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, the MEHE provided education to approximately 30% of school-aged children, most of whom were economically impoverished. Lebanon’s civil war decimated the public school system, causing approximately two-thirds of Lebanese children to attend private school. The public school system lacked trained teachers, school materials, and an infrastructure. As one UN official explained, “The system of MEHE was suffering from gaps and was weak…The private sector is very strong and the services are of a better quality.” Little funding was provided to the public school system. For example, in 2012 only 1.6% of GDP was

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872 Interview with Subject L16MN, op. cit.
876 Interview with Subject L10UN, op. cit.
distributed to public education of which 90% went to salaries. Chart 5.1 represents the Lebanese government’s expenditure on education as a total percentage of the gross domestic product. The chart indicates that expenditure fluctuated and was inconsistent over time. The gaps in the data indicate where the World Bank did not have the information for those years.

**Chart 5.1 The Government of Lebanon’s Expenditure on Education as a Total Percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)**

For those Syrian students who were unable to enter public school, the MEHE established non-formal education – “extra education programmes [sic]…outside of the

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878 I was unable to find the annual education budget for Lebanon. I was only able to find it as expressed as a percentage of the GDP. From: The World Bank, "Government Expenditure on Education, Total (% of GDP).” The World Bank, last modified 2017, [https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS?end=2013&locations=LB&start=1993&view=chart](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS?end=2013&locations=LB&start=1993&view=chart).
public sector and as an interim measure.”879 Some NGOs, in partnership with UNICEF and the UNHCR, were permitted to provide these programs.880 Other NGOs not affiliated with the MEHE employed a strategy of providing alternative education services for Syrian children who could not enter formal schooling in Lebanese public schools.881 They created accelerated learning programs and non-formal education programs.882

**Obstructive Long-Term Syrian Refugee Policies.** The Lebanese government created restrictive refugee policies in response to the consequences of hosting Syrian refugees, their prior relationship with Palestinian refugees, and religious sectarianism. In January 2015, Lebanon closed the border to Syria.883 Only exceptional humanitarian cases could enter if they met the conditions set by the Ministry of Social Affairs.884

The prior history between Lebanon and the Palestinian refugees influenced the relationship between the Lebanese and the Syrian refugees and added to the difficulties faced by NGOs. As one NGO representative observed, “They don’t want Syrians to become the Palestinians.”885 One UN official remarked, “The [Palestinian] history is very much present and very much impacting current policy.”886 The government prohibited the creation of Syrian refugee camps.887 An NGO representative explained, “There was a clear

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881 Université Saint-Joseph, *Analysis of Child*, [Page 7].
882 Interview with Subject L5NGO, op. cit.
885 Interview with Subject L7NGO, op. cit.
886 Interview with Subject L9UN, op. cit.
decision that they would not establish refugee camps. The decision not to establish camps is very much the legacy of the Palestinian refugee camps.”888 A government official explained, “Any policy of displacement is also influenced by the experience with the Palestinians who have been here for 60 years and are still not settled.”889 Consequently, there were over 1,900 informal settlements primarily in the poorest regions of the country where Syrians lived in tents, unfinished houses, garages, work sights, and collective centers.890 Map 5.3 indicates where Syrian refugees settled in Lebanon as of 2015. Syrian refugees were scattered throughout the country, which made it difficult to provide services to refugees. The map shows that Syrians settled along the coast, in the north and west, and with large settlements in and around Beirut.

888 Interview with Subject L5NGO, op. cit.
889 Interview with Subject L18MN, op. cit.
890 Human Rights Watch, “Barriers to Education,” Human Rights Watch; and Global Communities Partners for Good, Global Communities, [Page 12].
In January 2015, the Lebanese government enacted a residency policy that required Syrians to pay a $200 annual renewal fee, to sign a pledge not to work, to obtain a Lebanese sponsor, and to procure a “housing commitment” document.\textsuperscript{892} A 2016 Human Rights Watch report found that many Syrians lost their legal status due to the new residency policy.

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\textsuperscript{892} Federal Agency for Civic Education, "Regulations and Policies," Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
regulations, the restrictive document requirements and the annual $200 fee. The same report found that Syrians sent their children to work rather than school because there were fewer legal consequences for children found working. Some adults found working without a permit were arrested or deported.

Initially, Lebanon’s High Relief Commission cooperated with the UNHCR to register Syrian refugees. Yet by May 2015, the government requested that the UNHCR stop registering refugees until a “government-led mechanism to manage registration is established.” As one UN official explained, “Their logic – they don’t want to register them like the Palestinians. But now they don’t know who is in the country…They are not keeping track of who is actually here and where they are.” Security concerns, economic issues, and attempts to ensure that Syrian refugees did not stay permanently like the Palestinians were impediments that prevented refugees from accessing NGO-provided education services. Likewise, NGOs had a difficult time providing service because refugees were scattered in informal settlements across Lebanon, refugee children were forced to work, and refugees were being prohibited from registering.

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894 Ibid.
898 Interview with Subject L8UN, op. cit.
NGO Advantages, Opportunities and Strategies

From the research and interviews that I conducted in the field, I found that domestic and international NGOs have few advantages, opportunities, and strategies to achieve their goal of providing refugee education services. They had the advantage of funding from international sources. NGOs employed the strategy of delivering services and technical expertise to the benefit of both Syrian refugees and Lebanese. Yet, NGOs faced a substantial obstacle to their provision of refugee education services: an uncooperative and decentralized government. For example, the MEHE allowed NGO and UN agencies to design the refugee education management plans, but did not release the guidelines or procedures for the delivery of non-formal education programs. Additionally, the government limited the number of foreign workers who could work for NGOs in Lebanon. This impacted refugee education because foreign workers with technical expertise in the provision of refugee education were prohibited from entering Lebanon. These factors explain why Lebanon has a lower Syrian refugee enrollment rate as compared to Jordan and are discussed below. I conclude this section with a brief description of one international NGO’s attempts to overcome obstacles to their provision of refugee education services.

NGO Advantage: NGO Financial Power. Lebanon is a resource-poor country with an economy based on services, a strong financial sector, and tourism.899 It has received aid from Western countries such as the United States since 1951.900 Between 1975 and 2005, Lebanon received over $400 million from the United States government.901 After the 2006

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900 Ibid.
901 U.S. Department of State, Background Notes: Mideast, by U.S. Department of State, [Page Lebanon Section], March 2011, [https://books.google.com/books/about/Background_Notes_Mideast_March_2011.html?id=bLRoWtwJnZQC&printsec=frontcover&source=kt_read_button#v=onepage&q&f=false](https://books.google.com/books/about/Background_Notes_Mideast_March_2011.html?id=bLRoWtwJnZQC&printsec=frontcover&source=kt_read_button#v=onepage&q&f=false).
war between Hezbollah and Israel, the United States government pledged over $1 billion in additional support.\textsuperscript{902} Lebanon also received millions from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the European Union and international financial institutions like the World Bank for the management of the refugee burden.\textsuperscript{903} Table 5.3 lists example donors and their contributions to the Syrian refugee crisis. This list is incomplete but indicates that Lebanon received a significant amount of fiscal aid to manage the crisis from Western donors, Middle Eastern donors and international organizations.

Table 5.3 List of Example Donors and Their Contributions to the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon\textsuperscript{904}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>2014\textsuperscript{905}</th>
<th>2015\textsuperscript{906}</th>
<th>2016\textsuperscript{907}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>$73,440,701</td>
<td>$59,822,536</td>
<td>$55,575,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>$30,000,000</td>
<td>$31,000,000</td>
<td>$7,960,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>$2,227,000</td>
<td>$2,773,000</td>
<td>$4,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>$11,048,297</td>
<td>$44,371,394</td>
<td>$47,943,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>$123,400,000</td>
<td>$123,920,688</td>
<td>$113,355,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>$1,300,000,000\textsuperscript{908}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One NGO strategy was to leverage their ability to attract financial aid as a tool to gain cooperation from Lebanon’s government. When I conducted my field research in 2016, the government had a great financial need because it operated on budget allocations


\textsuperscript{904} There are more donor countries listed for each year.


established in 2005. As one government official stated, “We are working in accordance
to budget in 2005.” Another government official explained that there was no money to
be distributed to the Syrian refugee crisis,

Refugees are not under the [budgetary] lines in the ministries. We
cannot include the expenditures on the refugees in the ministry
budgets. The budget of 2005 did not include many things which we
are spending on now. 90% of the MEHE budget goes to fixed
expenditures – grants for schools, salaries, and the basics to run the
ministry. There is no extra money for refugees or projects. This is
our national situation.

A 2017 Human Rights Watch report found that domestic and international NGOs
received funding from international donors and conducted their own fundraising, but no
specific numbers were provided regarding the amount of funding provided to them. But
one NGO representative interviewed for this research claimed that NGOs received
significant amounts of funding at the onset of the crisis, “There was so much money coming
in [that] the NGOs themselves could not absorb it.” Others claimed that from the onset
of the crisis to 2016, the UN received international donor funding to be distributed for
projects. As one education officer from the UN explained,

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909 In October 2017, the government approved its first budget since 2005. From: Lisa Barrington,
“Lebanon's Parliament Approves Country's First Budget Since 2005,” Reuters, last modified October 19,
2017, [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-economy-budget/lebanons-parliament-approves-
country-s-first-budget-since-2005-idUSKBN1CO2T7](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-
910 Interview with Subject L14MN, op. cit.
911 Interview with Subject L16MN, op. cit.
912 Human Rights Watch, *Following the Money: Lack of Transparency in Donor Funding for Syrian
Refugee Education*, [Page 24], September 2017,
[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/crdsyrianrefugees0917_web_2.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/crdsyrianrefugees0917_web_2.pdf).
913 Interview with Subject L5NGO, op. cit.
The international community funds the response. In the education sector, in part, the whole structure of second shifts is 100% funded by the international community. The whole policy of the refugee response is dependent on relations with the international community. Funding has gone through the UN agencies - UNHCR, UNICEF, and the World Bank. EU funds through the UN.914

The UN’s Inter-agency Financial Tracking System reports on funding received for each sector, including education.915 Graph 5.3 shows the top ten NGOs that received funding as share of the total funding allocated to the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon in 2016. The graph indicates that international organizations such as Mercy Corps, the Norwegian Refugee Council, and the International Rescue Committee received significant portions of the total percentage of funds allocated.

914 Interview with L12UN, op. cit.
915 Human Rights Watch, Following the Money, [Page 23].
NGOs leveraged their ability to obtain funding. As one NGO representative stated, “The government gives more authority to the UN and INGOs…Money will affect the decisions made by the authorities.” As in Jordan, NGOs had an advantage in that they attracted financial aid that ultimately benefitted the Lebanese population and the Syrian refugees since 30% of funding for the Syrian refugee crisis was allocated for the host communities and infrastructure projects.

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917 Interview with L7NGO, op. cit.
918 The World Bank, "New Support," The World Bank; and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Second Revision, [Page 49 and 60].
NGO Advantage: NGOs Assisting Domestic and Refugee Populations. Since the 1950s, the Lebanese government and the United Nations have continuously entrusted domestic and international NGO partners with numerous projects that improve conditions for refugees and host communities alike. These projects include improved access to education, water, shelter, protection, and health.919 According to the World Bank’s Development Indicators, Lebanon is considered an upper middle income country.920 While World Bank indicators from 2016 showed that only 6.8% of Lebanese were unemployed, the unemployment rate for Lebanese aged 15-24 was 37.3%.921 A 2016, United Nations Development Programme report found that an average 27% of Lebanese lived below the poverty line, with higher levels of poverty in the north where Syrian refugees settled.922

The UNHCR implemented the 3RP plan which compelled NGOs to provide assistance to both Syrian refugees and the host communities in Lebanon.923 NGOs were aware of the plight of the Lebanese, and willingly provided services to host communities.924

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924 Interview with Subjects LSNGO; Caritas, "Lebanon - Caritas," Caritas; Relief International, "Lebanon Relief International," Relief International, "Lebanon Relief," Relief International; International Orthodox Christian Charities, "Lebanon|Where We Work," International Orthodox Christian Charities; and Save the Children, "Lebanon - Save," Save the Children.
The Lebanese government insisted that 30% of refugee aid be allocated for host communities to offset the impact of refugees.\textsuperscript{925} As one NGO representative explained, “We provide unconditional cash to Syrian refugees. We…expand this to vulnerable Lebanese… [We] facilitate activities and have referral services for both Lebanese and refugees.”\textsuperscript{926}

\textit{NGO Disadvantage: An Uncooperative, Dysfunctional Government.} NGOs encountered a substantial obstacle in the form of a decentralized and fractured government that limited its cooperation with NGOs. The Lebanese government is a parliamentary republic that is led by the president and prime minister.\textsuperscript{927} Its Parliament – known as the National Assembly - is divided into 18 sectarian groups – twelve Christian sects, four Muslim sects, a Druze sect, and a Judaic sect - with the 128 Parliamentary seats evenly divided between the Christian and Muslim communities.\textsuperscript{928} The highest offices are reserved for the three major religious sects: the President – a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister – a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament – a Shi’ite Muslim.\textsuperscript{929}

At the time of my field research, the government was hindered by two problems. First, no major decisions could be made without the consent of all represented.\textsuperscript{930} As one UN official observed, “In Lebanon, there are 26 different ministries. The Cabinet currently has a veto power. Anyone who disagrees can say no, and the Prime Minister cannot do

\textsuperscript{925} United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, \textit{Second Revision}, [Page 49 and 60].
\textsuperscript{926} Interview with Subject L5NGO, op. cit.
anything about it… They cannot agree on anything.\footnote{Interview with Subject L9UN, op. cit.} Second, the Lebanese constitution stipulates that the National Assembly cannot make decisions until a president is elected.\footnote{Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Lebanon," CIA World Factbook.} Lebanon was without a president for 29 months from May 2014 until October 2016 because the National Assembly could not reach a two-thirds majority to elect a president in the 45 attempts to do so.\footnote{Ibid.; The Economist, "Lebanon Census and Sensibility," The Economist, last modified November 5, 2016, \url{https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21709535-new-data-reveal-looming-crisis-lebanons-ruling-elite-exposing-fiction}; and Al Jazeera News, "Michel Aoun Elected President of Lebanon," Al Jazeera, last modified October 31, 2016, \url{http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/michel-aoun-elected-president-lebanon-161031105331767.html}.} As one UN official noted, “If a policy decision has to go through the Council, it won’t be voted on until there is a president.”\footnote{Interview with Subject L8UN, op. cit.} Another UN official also observed, “The inter-ministerial policy making is deadlocked because there is no meeting of the Council of Ministries...Ministries are working in a vacuum, and they don’t hold power over other ministries. Without a president…that level of the government is missing.”\footnote{Interview with Subject L13UN, op. cit.} An NGO representative explained, “They do not have a president and there is internal government tension that affects the coordination between INGOs, the UN, and the government.”\footnote{Interview with Subject L7NGO, op. cit.}

To circumvent these problems, some people I interviewed for this research claimed that the ministries made their own policies without the consent of other ministries. Consequently, the result was conflicting policies and the lack of policy enforcement.\footnote{Interview with Subjects L5NGO, L7NGO, L9UN, L1NGO, L8UN, L3NGO, and L13UN, op. cit.} As one representative from an INGO stated,
Different ministries make policies - whatever they want and when they want…The Parliament is not functioning. MEHE will make policy and the Ministry of Public Health makes their own. It is sector based. These policies come into conflict. One ministry could decide [policy] and another will make a contradictory policy.\footnote{Interview with Subject L5NGO, op. cit.}

Another NGO representative explained,

The Lebanese government does not agree on any policy as a government. It hasn’t had a government meeting for more than nine months…The Prime Minister gives the power to each ministry to make policy…Most of the policies made by each ministry is not agreed on by other ministries. This is very much complicated. This affects everything.\footnote{Interview with Subject L3NGO, op. cit.}

The difficulty caused by this lack of agreement is exemplified by the official position of the Lebanese government at the onset of the war: a policy of disassociation from Syria.\footnote{The people that I interviewed did not give a specific example of ministries creating policies that contradict each other. Hashem Osseiran, “Analysis: Assad’s Allies Trying to Reshape Lebanon’s Syria Policy,” \textit{Huffington Post}, September 1, 2017, \url{https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/analysis-assads-allies-trying-to-reshape-lebanons-syria-policy_us_59a98477e4b0dfaafceff5af}.} The policy prevented the government from engaging in an official capacity with the Syrian government, but it did not sever trade or diplomatic ties.\footnote{Ibid.} The policy also compelled the government to take a neutral stance with both Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian opposition.\footnote{Ibid.} Yet, government ministries associated with Hezbollah openly supported Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad while ministries associated with the Sunni Future Movement openly backed the Syrian opposition.\footnote{Ibid.} In a September 2017 article in \textit{The Huffington Post}, Sami Nader, head of the Beirut-based Levant Institute for Strategic Affairs, explained, “Right now we are in a situation where we have multiple
governments within one government, with each minister choosing to have a foreign policy of their own. It’s complete chaos.”

Delayed Government Cooperation. At the onset of the Syrian crisis, and in the absence of any government involvement in response planning, the UN invited both domestic and international NGOs to create a formal refugee management plan and the subsequent annual revisions. The second revision of the 2012 Syrian Response Plan stated that the “coordination of the inter-agency response rests with UNHCR, with UN agencies and NGOs playing critical roles in their respective areas of expertise.” By 2014, the government claimed a leadership role, and 54 domestic and international NGOs coordinated with the government and the UN. By 2015, the MEHE established the Education Center Working Group “to coordinate education activities” in support of the government-led Reaching All Children with Education program (RACE). The objective of RACE was to provide “vulnerable school-aged children 3-18 years, [both Syrian and Lebanese] affected by the Syria crisis…access [to] quality formal and non-formal learning opportunities in safe and protective environments.” Coordination efforts, refugee

\[944\] Ibid.
\[946\] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Second Revision, [Page 54].
\[949\] Ministry of Education and Higher Education, Reaching All Children, [Page 1].
education programs, and aid allocation were reported through sector reports. The European Union, the United States, and other donors were asked to fund RACE. Table 5.4 represents a list of funds requested and funds received for the Education Sector. The data indicates there were significant gaps in the amount of funding received depending on the year. For example, there was a 43% gap in funding for 2014 that resulted in a $76 million deficit for the Education Sector. The implications are that there was not enough funding to accommodate the education needs of Syrian refugee children.

Table 5.4 Lebanon’s Education Sector Donor Funding Requirements and Funding Received

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding Requirement</td>
<td>$13,830,000</td>
<td>$177,200,000</td>
<td>$263,600,000</td>
<td>$388,000,000</td>
<td>$372,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding Received</td>
<td>$6,500,000</td>
<td>$101,004,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>$253,000,000</td>
<td>$96,551,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Funding Received</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Gap</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

951 There is a caveat. Reports from both UN agencies and the government give different figures. Also, the response plans for Lebanon do not report these figures for each year.
Under the RACE program, the UN agencies and the MEHE-approved domestic and international NGOs were not permitted to provide formal education programs. They were permitted to provide non-formal education – programs offered outside the traditional class that instructs students in basic skills like literacy and math, remedial education, vocational education, peace education and inclusive education for refugee children with disabilities. NGOs were also permitted to rehabilitate schools and to provide nutrition programs for refugee children attending schools. The MEHE established a steering committee “to enhance management and improve coordination with the multitude of NGOs, especially those acting at decentralized levels.” Table 5.5 represents a list of NGOs and the types of refugee education services they provided. This list represents the variety and the amount of refugee education services offered by NGOs. Not all the NGOs provided information regarding numbers of people who received their services. The data also indicates that NGOs provided non-formal and informal instruction rather than formal instruction.

960 Interview with Subject L4NGO, op. cit.
962 The terms non-formal and informal are used interchangeably across the three countries. In this chapter, non-formal education includes remedial instruction, language classes and computer literacy. Informal education refers to art and drama classes, life skills classes, and sports.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>NGO Type</th>
<th>Services Provided</th>
<th>How Many Received Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basmeh and Zeitooneh</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Non-formal education, Peace education</td>
<td>Provides non-formal education to 700 students at Shatila Learning Center&lt;sup&gt;964&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caritas&lt;sup&gt;965&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Non-formal education, Remedial courses, School for migrants children, Psychosocial and recreational activities and summer camps</td>
<td>Number unknown&lt;sup&gt;966&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Orthodox Christian Charities&lt;sup&gt;967&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>School uniform, book bag, and lunch distribution, School rehabilitation</td>
<td>Assisted over 1000 Syrian refugees continue their education, supplementing school lunch in cooperation with the MEHE and United Nations World Food Programme. Rehabilitated more than 100 public schools&lt;sup&gt;968&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercy Corps&lt;sup&gt;969&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Informal education, Life skills education</td>
<td>Number unknown&lt;sup&gt;970&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>964</sup> Ibid.
<sup>966</sup> Caritas, "Lebanon - Caritas," Caritas.
<sup>967</sup> International Orthodox Christian Charities, "Lebanon|Where We Work," International Orthodox Christian Charities.
<sup>968</sup> Ibid.
<sup>970</sup> Ibid.
The NGO representatives that I interviewed cited major obstacles to the MEHE-led implementation. First, the government prohibited NGOs from providing formal education programs that result in an education certificate. Second, the MEHE did not release the standard operating procedures for two key non-formal education programs: literacy and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Najda Now</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Informal education, Non-formal education, Psycho/social support, Children and youth development</td>
<td>Number unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Non-formal education, Teacher training</td>
<td>25,066 children in non-formal and informal education programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Informal education</td>
<td>Assisted over 313,000 children with education services, protection, food and shelter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAWA Group</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Peace education, Informal education</td>
<td>Number unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Balamand</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Monitoring and supporting education access and retention, Teacher training</td>
<td>200 public schools, 1,200 public school teachers, and 37,000 Lebanese and Syrian children</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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972 Interview with Subject L3NGO, op. cit.
974 Ibid.
975 Save the Children, "Lebanon - Save," Save the Children.
976 Ibid.
978 SAWA, "SAWA - Programs," SAWA for Development and Aid, [http://sdaid.org/programs](http://sdaid.org/programs); and Interview with Subject L2NGO, op. cit.
979 University of Balamand, "The Resource Center for the Displaced, Refugees, and Host Communities in Lebanon (RDRC)," University of Balamand, [http://www.balamand.edu.lb/Academics/Faculties/FHS/CommunityEngagement/Coacademic/Programs/Pages/RDRC.aspx](http://www.balamand.edu.lb/Academics/Faculties/FHS/CommunityEngagement/Coacademic/Programs/Pages/RDRC.aspx).
980 Ibid.
numeracy. This caused a delay to providing essential education services. As one NGO representative noted,

First, the accelerated learning programs [were] rolled out by NGOs but then the government took this over. They were certified by the government, [and] there was a standardized curriculum, but the NGOs are not running this anymore. Then NGOs turned to non-formal education. The government did the same thing, saying, ‘We will standardize curriculum, and we will put forth the standards.’ NGOs can still work in non-formal education; however they have stopped most non-formal education programs until the curriculum is finalized. When you ask them when the curriculum will be finalized, they say six months to a year… You obviously have more Syrian children needing education. You need INGOs and NGOs to fill the gaps. They [the MEHE] have made non-formal education difficult to deliver.\(^\text{981}\)

Third, Lebanon’s inadequate public education system could not absorb the substantial influx of over one million registered and unregistered Syrian refugees.\(^\text{982}\) Consequently, the MEHE-affiliated and non-affiliated domestic and international NGOs created education programs to substitute for the public education system.\(^\text{983}\) NGOs not affiliated with the MEHE solicited the Ministry to approve their programs, but the MEHE would not license these NGOs to provide these services or certify their programs.\(^\text{984}\) As one MEHE official explained, “When we talked about regulating non-formal education, we requested to partners that they do not fund unregulated education from NGOs who are not registered within the government. We don’t recommend financing them or funding them. We have had a clear response in this regard.”\(^\text{985}\) An NGO representative observed, “The government

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981 Interview with Subject L5NGO, op. cit.
983 As indicated earlier in the chapter, historically, NGOs have provided services to both domestic and refugee communities when the government has been unwilling or unable to provide them.
984 Université Saint-Joseph, Analysis of Child, [Page 7].
985 Interview with Subject L14MN, op. cit.
is unwilling to work with some NGOs who provide education. They ask that they are not funded. But now this education matters, and it impacts the delivery of education services."  

Another NGO representative further explained,

They [MEHE] wants education to run through them. This is impossible. They barely control the schools that they open with second shifts with the UN…There are big numbers of Syrians out of school…The Lebanese government cannot help the children without the help of the NGOs. The Lebanese government tries their best to limit the work of the UN and NGOs and INGOs. For example, one of the international education groups - they had a pilot with our schools. They wanted to have their own curriculum which gives us a program to give a certificate for our students. They wanted to make it a regional certificate and the Lebanese government refused to meet with them.  

Finally, while there is a steering committee, the MEHE did not permit NGOs to make decisions on this committee. As one NGO representative observed, “The RACE Executive Committee – There are two NGO [representatives]…on it as observers, but they have no voting power. They can report back to the government what NGOs need, but they have no say.” A UN official stated, “The government wants control and they would much rather keep the decision making at their level…The Ministry calls the shots. They are in the lead…NGOS are not consulted.”

Government Limited Number of NGO Foreign Workers. The Lebanese government limited the number of foreigners that were allowed to work within Lebanon so that jobs would go to Lebanese workers. NGO foreign workers experienced delays in work visa

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986 Interview with L3NGO, op. cit.
987 Interview with Subject L1NGO, op. cit.
988 Interview with L5NGO, op. cit.
989 Interview with Subject L12UN, op. cit.
990 I have not found any laws that require INGOs to hire Lebanese workers instead of foreign workers. This is an informal practice conducted by the government.
approvals or had their renewal applications rejected without explanation.\textsuperscript{991} As one NGO representative who had worked previously in Lebanon claimed,

\begin{quote}
INGO workers in Lebanon – there are more restrictions on the expat…There is a policy in Lebanon to nationalize, to hire national staff. It is difficult [for ex-pats] to get a work permit…There are more restrictions on the expat…I am in Turkey because Lebanon would not give me a work permit.”\textsuperscript{992}
\end{quote}

A UN official stated,

\begin{quote}
There is block in registration with the number of workers coming into Lebanon to work with refugees…The ministries are making it difficult to get work permits for NGO officials. Some have been deported. Some…had to leave or they work on a tourist visa. If caught on tourist visa, they have to leave…It is not easy to get a work permit in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{993}
\end{quote}

The restriction of foreign worker permission to work in Lebanon impacted the services provided. As one NGO representative explained,

\begin{quote}
Ex-pats…are having a difficult time obtaining permits and residency. We are talking about skilled workers like directors and managers…This affects service to the refugees. There is only so much that the Lebanese [can] do. If you want to do a project and you are in the middle of nowhere North Lebanon and have a high-tech water infrastructure project, there is a good chance you need an expat to help. This is a problem.\textsuperscript{994}
\end{quote}

NGOs were negatively impacted by the actions of the Lebanese government. They were hindered by the government’s inability to make policy decisions that were agreed upon and enforced by all ministries. The MEHE-led education plan created serious obstacles for NGOs providing refugee education services. These obstacles included limiting the education services NGOs could provide, delaying the release of the standard

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{991} Interview with Subjects L5NGO, L7NGO, L3NGO, \\
\textsuperscript{992} Interview with Subject L7NGO, op. cit. \\
\textsuperscript{993} Interview with Subject L8UN, op. cit. \\
\textsuperscript{994} Interview with Subject L5NGO, op. cit.
\end{footnotesize}
operating procedures of education programs to NGOs, narrowly regulating which NGOs can provide government approved programs, and restricting the power of NGOs in committee meetings. The government also limited the number of foreign workers who could obtain work permits. This blocked people with expertise from improving programs and implementing projects. To further explore the issues raised by interviewees, one such NGO that rendered assistance is examined more closely in the next section.

**One INGO’s Experience in Lebanon**

An INGO representative agreed to speak about her organization’s experience on the condition that her name and organization be kept anonymous. This INGO was established in 2006 in Lebanon after the July 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel.995 It was awarded grants for the creation and management of local economic development projects. The representative recalled, “It was an emergency response due to the war and displacement in the south. The United States dumped a whole lot of money in Lebanon for reconstruction. We got a grant to do local economic development mostly in the north, but some in the south...That project ended in November 2011, and then the refugees started to come.”

At the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis, this organization began to provide services - education, health, and cash assistance programs - for the Syrian refugees. It created non-formal education programs that supported 5,000 Syrian refugee children in twenty-nine learning centers and public schools. This INGO also rehabilitated public schools. Yet, this INGO encountered obstacles to its provision of refugee education services. The findings from the interview I conducted with the representative for this INGO indicate that it

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995 Ibid.
struggled for four main reasons: limitations imposed by the government on what education services this organization could provide, the delay in providing non-formal education until the standard operating procedures were released, the inability to hire foreign workers with refugee project experience, and the lack of rapport with those in power at the MEHE. These obstacles are discussed below.

**Government Restrictions on INGO’s Refugee Programs.** At the beginning, the government did not monitor or regulate this INGO’s education program. The representative recalled,

> My job was to set up the Syrian response programs in Lebanon and Jordan. In Lebanon we started at end of 2012. Setting up the programs in the beginning, the Lebanese government was hardly involved...The government didn’t interfere or assist. We were running education programs not affiliated with the Ministry.

In 2014, the MEHE took a leadership role and began to restrict the activities of this particular INGO once it created the RACE program. The INGO representative stated, “The government...evolved to regulate...MEHE has been leading it [the response] and enforcing it.” Stricter guidelines were set and many education programs were stopped. As the representative noted, “They have cut off NGOs from one day to the next. They [MEHE] came out with RACE, standardized procedures and stopped programs...It is very clear what you can and cannot do and what is expected of the NGOs. If you don’t follow it, there are repercussions.” She described the repercussions, “Two years ago [2014], there was a big crackdown on INGOs and NGOs providing education. They [the MEHE] closed down the schools. They saw them as a parallel system and shut them down.”

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997 Interview with Subject L5NGO, op. cit.
998 Ibid.
MEHE prohibited this INGO from providing specific education services. As the representative explained,

The government made it clear that our job is not to educate Syrians or Lebanese. Our job is to support the government and public schools to get children into education - provision of supplies, after school help, transportation, and rehabilitation of schools. We can provide non-formal education, but it can only be provided to kids who can’t go to formal school.

Yet, the government would not release the standard operating procedures for two key non-formal education programs: literacy and numeracy. This resulted in a delay in providing essential education services. As the representative stated,

The issue we face as NGOs [is that] basic literacy and numeracy programs for non-formal education has still not been released for two years because it has not been authorized. So a lot of children are out of school. We can’t create programing.

At the time of writing this chapter, this INGO had not received the guidelines for the literacy and numeracy non-formal education programs.

Government Limitations on Numbers of Foreign Workers. This INGO was impacted by Lebanon’s restrictions on foreign workers. As the INGO representative explained,

More [foreign workers] are getting rejected, and most NGOs have reduced their size. I have had [INGO name omitted] staff who left and could not get back in. By the time you pay legal fees and spent time, it is not worth it… The Ministry of Labor makes it difficult for INGOs to operate…They want to maximize the Lebanese staff in these INGOs.

The INGO representative offered her own personal experience when attempting to obtain a work permit, “I submitted my work papers. I was rejected. I had to meet with the Ministry.” Eventually, she was approved. At the time of writing, only two of this organization’s staff were foreign workers with legal working and residency permits. She
noted, “We used to have six expats, but we were only able to get permits for three and now only two. This is very typical. I know expat directors have a hard time. So, you can’t hire them.” The rest of the staff were Lebanese citizens except for the outreach workers who conducted assessments. Approximately one-half of this team were Lebanese and the other half were Syrian.

Strategies Employed to Overcome Obstacles. The INGO representative revealed that her organization did not employ many strategies to improve coordination efforts with the government. She noted, “We don’t have a lot of choice. They [the MEHE] will cut you off. You toe the line. We want to contribute to the overall strategy. We value coordination.” Unlike the Relief International representative in Jordan who leveraged his personal ties and informal relationships with education ministry officials to gain permission for refugee education programs, the INGO representative in Lebanon admitted that her organization had few personal contacts with the MEHE and that their interactions were formal in nature. She explained, “I think it is one of our weaker points. We don’t have those contacts in MEHE. We have a good relationship with the Ministry of Public Health and stronger track record. Unfortunately, we don’t have those links with MEHE. We meet with them, but it is much more formal.”

That this INGO had some success when dealing with the MEHE is evident because they provided education, health, and cash assistance services to both Syrians and the Lebanese. The INGO representative stated, “All education services had been open to all nationalities, but the primary recipients were Syrian.” Additionally, in comparison to other

999 Ibid and interview with Subject J3NGO, op. cit.
1000 Ibid.
NGOs, she stated that the MEHE was more willing to listen to her organization because it fundraised for its refugee education programs. She explained,

> We do fundraising for our programs. We advocate to the donors. The UN agencies fund us. In terms of leverage with MEHE, yes and no. It is a nuanced answer. There are clear red lines in Lebanon. If you have funding you are in a better position to talk to the government. If you come with money, the talks go much easier.

She also mentioned that if problems arose between this INGO and the government, her organization spoke directly to the government while informing the donors of the situation. Yet, she acknowledged that “The donors can’t change much.”

Finally, to circumvent the Lebanese bureaucracy when the INGO needed to hire a foreign worker with expertise in refugee education programing, it hired a foreign expert on a temporary basis. As the INGO representative explained, “We brought in a consultant for five months from Zimbabwe…You bring in someone like that, you don’t apply for a work permit because they are on a special visa.”

My findings from this interview indicate that the organization was limited in its ability to overcome obstacles to the provision of refugee education services. This is attributed to four factors: the government limited what education services this organization could provide; the delay in providing non-formal education until the standard operating procedures were released, the inability to hire foreign workers with refugee project experience, and the lack of rapport with those in power at the MEHE.

**Conclusion**

At onset of the crisis, the MEHE created refugee-friendly education policies that welcomed Syrians. The MEHE permitted Syrian children to enroll in public schools. It
instituted double shifts and non-formal education programs to meet the demands, and it agreed to allow some NGOs to manage refugee education programs. Yet, the enrollment ratio fluctuated from 26.8% in 2013 to 55.2% in 2016 to 47.7% in June 2017.\textsuperscript{1001}

As I stated in the chapter on Jordan, the findings of my research suggest that there are four key factors that impact the Syrian refugee enrollment rate. They are in order from most to least important: a strong centralized government that is willing to cooperate with NGOs, a good prior relationship between the state and NGOs, the NGOs’ financial power relative to the state, and the NGOs’ deliberate decision to provide for both the host communities and the Syrian refugees. Like NGOs in Jordan, NGOs in Lebanon had the advantage of being established prior to the Syrian refugee crisis. Historically, they provided services like education and healthcare when the government could not.\textsuperscript{1002} NGOs, particularly INGOs, received significant funding from both the United Nations and international donors. That funding provided assistance and programs for refugees and host communities. NGOs deliberately provided for both impoverished Lebanese and Syrian refugees. Yet, unlike NGOs in Jordan, they were unable to overcome a substantial obstacle in Lebanon: a decentralized and fractured Lebanese government that limited cooperation with NGOs. This Lebanese case study demonstrates that this obstacle bears responsibility for the lower Syrian refugee enrollment rates. As my findings demonstrate, one of the most important factors in the provision of refugee education services is attributable to collaboration between the government and the NGOs. In Lebanon, there is limited


\textsuperscript{1002} D’Aspremont, “The Development,” Institut Medea.
collaboration between the government and the NGOs. The relationship between the
government of Lebanon and NGOs is what Adil Najam identifies as a co-optative
relationship - the government and NGOs have different goals (the ends) but similar
strategies (the means).\footnote{Najam, "The Four-C's," [Page 388].} Co-optative relationships are built on power struggles.\footnote{Ibid., p. 389.} This is evident when the Lebanese government decided to take control of the Syrian refugee
crisis in 2014, and refused to license NGOs unaffiliated with the MEHE to provide
services. Furthermore, the government delayed the release of the standard operating
procedures for non-formal literacy and numeracy programs that would be utilized by the
NGOs providing these services. This, I suggest, explains the lower enrollment rate. NGOs
experienced even more restrictive conditions in Turkey and will be discussed in the next
chapter.
Chapter 6
NGOs in Turkey– The Invisible Entities

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the low enrollment ratio of Syrian refugee children in Turkey. I interviewed subjects representing NGOs that provide education services to Syrian refugees in Turkey. They reported obstacles preventing the enrollment of Syrian refugee children including: refugee labor laws, a language barrier, bullying in school, early child marriage, and school capacity issues. NGOs contended with restrictive refugee registration, residency, and employment policies that hindered refugees’ access to the education services that NGOs provided. I argue that NGOs in Turkey, compared to those in Jordan and Lebanon, had the fewest opportunities, strategies, and capabilities to overcome obstacles to the delivery of refugee education services.

I conducted Q-sort exercises and substantiated the findings by conducting ANOVA tests and post hoc tests with a Bonferroni correction to examine how the participants ranked the priority of influences on refugee policy decisions. The data revealed that security was a priority for UN officials and NGO representatives only. It also revealed that all participants across the institutions could not agree that any of the fifteen factors were drivers of refugee policy. Instead, several participants cited both domestic and international

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1005 Interviews with Subjects T7NGO, T6NGO, T5NGO, T2NGO, op. cit. I conducted twenty-one interviews in Turkey from June to August 2016: six host government officials from the Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), six United Nations officials from UNHCR and UNICEF, and nine representatives from both domestic and international non-governmental organizations. It should be noted that Syrians speak Arabic and Turks speak Turkish.

political factors as influential, but none were mentioned as consistently as security considerations. The interviews and Q-sort exercises revealed that the government’s priorities included a wider political agenda. What I discovered from the interviews is that Turkey is a powerful country that is protective of its sovereignty. It is unused to allowing outside actors within its border to assist with socio-political problems like the Syrian refugee crisis. The interviews indicate a difference of priorities between the Turkish government and the NGOs.

These findings exemplify what Adil Najam would identify as a confrontational relationship: “when governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations consider each other’s goals and strategies to be antithetical to their own—essentially, total divergence of preferred ends as well as means.”

As will be discussed in this chapter, NGOs were confounded, despite their efforts to collaborate, by a strong, centralized government that was unwilling to cooperate with them. The government’s refusal to collaborate is attributable to the NGOs’ relationship with the Turkish government prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, and their lack of financial leverage. Additionally, unlike in Jordan and Lebanon, the domestic population had less of a need to share in the benefits of NGO projects for the aid of refugee populations. This explains why Turkey consistently had the lowest Syrian refugee enrollment ratio in comparison to Jordan and Lebanon. Table 6.1 shows the Syrian refugee enrollment rates from 2013 to 2017. The enrollment rate

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1007 Najam, "The Four-C's," [Page 385].
1008 Interview with Subjects T9NGO, T3NGO, T8NGO, T4NGO, T7NGO, T1NGO op. cit.
1009 See Graph 1.1 in Chapter 1 for the comparison of Syrian refugee children enrollment rates across Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon from 2013-2017.
decreased from 40.1% in 2014 to 34.7% in 2015 but increased to 40.4% or 341,689 of the 845,364 in August 2016 and 47.4% by June 2017.

Table 6.1 Syrian Refugee Enrollment Rates in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of School-Aged Refugee Children</td>
<td>700,000 approximate</td>
<td>531,071</td>
<td>663,000</td>
<td>845,364</td>
<td>1,029,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of School-Aged Refugee Children in School</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>213,140</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>341,689</td>
<td>487,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrollment Percentage of Children in School</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1010 There is no consistent source of enrollment data within host countries and across host countries.
1013 This figure is as of August 2015. From: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2016-2017, [page 34].
1015 This figure is as of July 2017: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 3RP 2017 Progress Report, [Page 25]. The 2017 Progress Report did not give the number of Syrian refugee children between the ages of 5 and 17. I calculated this number by the percentage of children ages 5 to 17 from the total number of refugees as of November 2017. (This number is constantly updated.) 31% of Syrian refugees are between the ages of 5 to 17. I multiplied .31 to the total number – 3,320,814. I received 1,029,452. From: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Syria Regional Refugee Response - Turkey, comp. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2017), https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224.
1016 It was estimated that 60% were enrolled in camps and 30% were enrolled in self-settled areas. From: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Syria Response Plan 5 2013 Final Report, [Page 34].
I begin the chapter with an analysis of Turkish refugee policies prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, noting both the international refugee conventions signed by Turkey and the domestic refugee laws created to manage prior refugee influxes. Second, I explore the services provided by NGOs prior to the current crisis to determine if the government-NGO relationship is an advantage or an obstacle to the provision of refugee education services. Third, I highlight the policies enacted to manage NGOs prior to the Syrian civil war. Fourth, I evaluate the role of NGOs at the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey. Fifth, I examine NGO strategies, opportunities, and advantages to overcome Turkey’s inconsistent policy decisions and other problems associated with enrolling Syrian refugee children, from the onset of the crisis to August 2016 when my field research concluded. Finally, I conclude with an examination of one particular INGO’s experience in Turkey to determine whether and how it was able to overcome encumbrances to the provision of refugee education services.

Refugee Policy Prior to the Syrian Refugee Crisis

Turkey is a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, with the restriction that refugees be of European descent. Turkey permits the UNHCR to conduct refugee status determinations on the condition that refugees do not integrate but resettle in a third country. Turkey is a signatory to both the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that compels the host government to refrain from refoulement of refugees and the 1989 Convention on the Rights

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of the Child that guarantees refugee children receive rights comparable to those of the domestic population.\textsuperscript{1019}

\textit{Turkey’s Domestic Policies towards Refugees.} Turkey enacted domestic policy in reaction to prior refugee influxes. Between 1923 and 1997 over 1.6 million people sought asylum in Turkey from the Balkan countries, the Communist states of Eastern Europe, Iran, Iraq, and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{1020} The Turkish Settlement Law of 1934 restricted asylum and immigration rights to people of Turkish descent.\textsuperscript{1021} In the 1980s and 1990s, refugees emigrated from war-torn countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq as well as Eastern Europeans seeking temporary work after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist systems.\textsuperscript{1022} Turkey created the 1994 Regulation that defined the conditions for asylum in Turkey, and kept the caveat of the 1951 Convention that refugees be of European descent.\textsuperscript{1023} In the 2000s, related to its bid for accession into the European Union, Turkey introduced new policies that adopted some EU directives on asylum and migration.\textsuperscript{1024} The 2003 Law on Work Permits of Foreigners, for example, made it easier for labor migrants to obtain work documents in Turkey.\textsuperscript{1025} Furthermore, the 2005 National Action Plan for Adoption of Acquis on Asylum and Migration promised to amend the legal structure

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1020}Kemal Kirisci, "Turkey: A Transformation from Emigration to Immigration," Migration Policy Institute, last modified November 1, 2003, \url{http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/turkey-transformation-emigration-immigration}; and Interview with T1NGO, op. cit.
\item \textsuperscript{1021}Ibid; and Library of Congress, "Refugee Law and Policy," Library of Congress.
\item \textsuperscript{1023}Icduygu, \textit{Turkey’s Migration}, [Page 5].
\item \textsuperscript{1024}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{1025}Ibid, p. 6.
\end{itemize}
regarding migration and to revise its geographic limitation that refugees be of European
descent.1026 Yet, the new Turkish Settlement Law of 2006 continued to restrict asylum and
immigration rights to people of Turkish descent.1027 Despite promises to ease asylum
policies, refugees were only permitted to transit through Turkey and to seek asylum in a
third country.

The Role of NGOs Prior to Syrian Refugee Crisis

Prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, domestic NGOs cooperated with the Turkish
government to provide assistance to both the domestic population and refugees.1028 They
are considered part of the “third sector” known in Turkey as civil society organizations
(CSOs).1029 In some cases, Turkish NGOs provided humanitarian aid in other countries.1030
They assisted in disaster relief efforts after earthquakes in Southeast Asia, Pakistan, Haiti,
Chile, Nepal, and Japan; they provided disaster relief after floods in Pakistan and
Macedonia; and delivered humanitarian relief in Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya.\textsuperscript{1031}

The number of domestic NGOs increased in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{1032} They played a role in Turkey’s pursuit of EU membership.\textsuperscript{1033} In 1999, the EU awarded Turkey a candidacy status.\textsuperscript{1034} As a candidate state, Turkey was required to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria that encouraged the development of civil society “because the diversity and dynamism of civil society is considered as an indicator of healthy pluralistic democracy.”\textsuperscript{1035} Subsequently, new NGOs formed.\textsuperscript{1036} The EU provided funding to form associations in Turkey that promoted the “democratization…of civil society.”\textsuperscript{1037} The goal was “the maturation of Turkish democracy in practice.”\textsuperscript{1038} Some of these NGOs were “seen as a check on the state and on its undemocratic attitudes.”\textsuperscript{1039} While the Turkish government permitted these NGOs to form in compliance with EU demands, they did not

\textsuperscript{1031} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1033} Yeni Yuziyil University The Malopolska School of Economics in Tarnow, The Role, [Page 234].
\textsuperscript{1034} Ibid, p. 236.
interact with these institutions. According to Hanna Muhlenhoff, the government “lets NGOs do their work but not much more.” By 2009, there were 80,212 civil society organizations; this was an increase from 72,800 in 2001. Forty-two percent of these organizations supported social welfare.

In contrast to Jordan and Lebanon, Turkey hosted few international NGOs prior to the Syrian refugee crisis. As one INGO representative I interviewed observed,

There [had] been a lot of efforts in place to try and understand the role of NGOs and humanitarian actors in the country. But there [was] resistance to allowing for a broader intervention, whereas in other countries, there [had] been a history with humanitarian actors…Turkey [was] not used to having humanitarian actors with the exception of helping with earthquakes.

A 2001 World Bank report listed twenty-nine INGOs working in Turkey. Table 6.1 lists examples of domestic and international organizations that provided services in Turkey prior to the Syrian refugee crisis. The list represents the variety of services offered by domestic and international NGOs and provides examples of NGOs that were created to promote human rights as a condition of EU candidacy.

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1040 Muhlenhoff, "Funding Democracy," [Page 112].
1041 Ibid.
1042 Son Guncellemce, “Istanbul Home to the Largest Number of NGOs,” Gundem, last modified January 5, 2009, [link]; and Turkish Cultural Foundation, “NGO’s,” Turkish Cultural Foundation, last modified February 1, 2001, [link].
1043 Guncellemce, "Istanbul Home," Gundem.
1045 Interview with Subject T8NGO, op. cit.
Table 6.2 Examples of NGOs Working in Turkey Prior to the Syrian Refugee Crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Domestic or International NGO</th>
<th>Year Established in Turkey</th>
<th>Services Provided Before Syrian Refugee Crisis</th>
<th>Groups Assisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ak-Der – Women Against Discrimination</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Women’s rights</td>
<td>Turks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caritas</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Medical assistance, Food assistance, Legal advice Education</td>
<td>Iraqis, Turks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Blue Crescent Relief and Development Foundation</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Food assistance, Education, Disaster relief</td>
<td>Turks, Citizens Located in Other Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadin Emegini Degerlendrme - The Foundation for the Support of Women’s Work</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Women empowerment, Education, Disaster preparedness</td>
<td>Turks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mazlum-Der Organization for Human Rights and Solidarity for</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>Turks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1047 Kadioglu, "Civil Society," [Page 29].
1049 IBC has assisted in disaster relief in other countries like Kosovo. IBC International Blue Crescent Relief and Development Foundation, "Who We Are," IBC International Blue Crescent Relief and Development Foundation, last modified 2017, https://www.ibc.org.tr/EN/250/who-we-are; and Interview with Subject T5NGO, op. cit.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Oppressed</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Democracy Citizen participation Government accountability</td>
<td>Turks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Democracy Human rights Grant-making NGOs capacity-building</td>
<td>Turks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Endowment for Democracy</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Democracy Human rights Grant-making NGOs capacity-building</td>
<td>Turks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ozgur-Der – Association for the Freedom of Thought and Education Rights</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Education rights</td>
<td>Turks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees International</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Advocacy organization serving refugees and displaced persons</td>
<td>Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>Food assistance Education</td>
<td>Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Life International Humanitarian Aid</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Disaster relief Rehabilitation Development programs</td>
<td>Turks Citizens in Other Countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1051 Kadioglu, "Civil Society," [Page 34].
1053 Ibid.
1054 Kadioglu, "Civil Society," [Page 32].
1057 This NGO was established in Turkey. It supports Turks and provided disaster relief in Belgium, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. From: Support to Life International Humanitarian Aid, "About Us," Support to Life International Humanitarian Aid, http://www.supporttolife.org/en/about-us/.
Government Policies Regarding NGOs

Prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, the Turkish government had enacted policies to manage NGOs. The 1982 Constitution granted few rights and freedoms to NGOs. According to the Third Sector Foundation of Turkey, the government practiced “restrictive legislation and excessive…oversight.” Article 33 of the Constitution limited the power of NGOs and gave the state the sole authority to recognize these organizations, as well as the ability to disband them. As per Article 33, NGOs may be justifiably disbanded for the “protection of the unity of the state with its nation, national sovereignty, Republic, national security, public order, general peace, morals and health, and public good.” Article 33 also prohibited NGOs from associating with “the organs within the political and

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1061 Third Sector Foundation of Turkey, The Landscape, [Page 13].
1062 Kadioglu, "Civil Society," [Pp. 28-29].
1063 Ibid.
economic society, such as political parties and trade unions.” In 1995, the government removed this limitation as part of the constitutional revisions.

To comply with EU candidacy standards, the government revised its civil society laws in 2004. Associations were given the right to obtain international funding, form partnerships and conduct activities without prior government authorization. They were also no longer required to inform local governments of scheduled meetings. Nor did they have to invite a government official to attend meetings. Government officials were required to give 24 hour notice for audits and “just cause for random audits.” Security forces were no longer permitted on NGO properties without a court order.

In 2008, Turkey passed the New Law on Foundations to further comply with the European Convention on Human Rights. The law permitted foreigners to be board members of Turkish foundations, but required the “majority of the executive board members to physically reside in Turkey.” Most importantly, and germane to this dissertation, the new law permitted foreigners to “establish foundations in Turkey as long as the law in their home country allows Turkish citizens to establish foundations.”

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1064 Ibid.
1065 Ibid.
1066 The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, "Civic Freedom," The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law.
1067 Ibid.
1068 Ibid.
1069 Ibid.
1070 Ibid.
1071 Ibid.
1073 Third Sector Foundation of Turkey, "The New Law on Foundations," Third Sector Foundation of Turkey.
1074 Ibid.
law thus allowed international NGOs to establish themselves in Turkey during the Syrian refugee crisis.

The European Union imposed changes on Turkish policies through NGOs. The EU required, as part of membership consideration, that Turkey make alterations to its policies which provided opportunities for civil society engagement and democratic empowerment. More NGOs formed as a result, some of which challenged the government. As Turkey was unused to checks and balances outside of the government, these concessions created a protracted antipathy towards NGOs that may help explain the government’s hostility to NGOs during the Syrian refugee crisis – a factor discussed in further detail in the next section.

The Syrian Refugee Crisis

Syrians began migrating into Turkey in April 2011. They were permitted to cross the border because Turkey and Syria had established a “reciprocal liberalization of visa policies in 2009” that permitted Syrians with passports to enter without issue when the crisis escalated. As one domestic NGO representative recalled,

Syrians were not required to get visas. They were able to visit their relatives and families. There was an improvement in the trade and trade relations from both sides. This lasted even after 2011, but then Turkish/Syrian relations deteriorated.


1077 Interview with TINGO, op. cit.
During many refugee crises, the UNHCR manages and regulates refugee services.\textsuperscript{1078} They coordinate efforts between the host government, various UN agencies, and domestic and international NGOs.\textsuperscript{1079} At the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis, Turkey cooperated with the UNHCR in granting Syrian refugees access to basic services.\textsuperscript{1080} Yet in contrast to Jordan and Lebanon, the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) – the Turkish institution charged with managing the refugee crisis – examined the UNHCR guidelines for refugee crisis management and then designed its own system.\textsuperscript{1081} The government requested that the United Nations take a secondary role.\textsuperscript{1082} As one AFAD official explained, “We allow the UN to work freely and have access, but there is a state. The State made it clear that this is not like a Middle East country, and they have to comply [with] our laws and policies.”\textsuperscript{1083} As one UN official explained, “The country responded well. They were ready to take the lead, not like other countries where the UN takes the lead. The UN provided support.”\textsuperscript{1084} Turkey also refused assistance from other countries at the beginning of the crisis.\textsuperscript{1085} As another UN official recalled, “From 2012 to 2014, the government was fully responsible for providing assistance to Syrian refugees. It was initially thought that the conflict would be a short period of time.”\textsuperscript{1086}

\textsuperscript{1079} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1081} Prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, AFAD managed natural disaster relief in Turkey. Interview with T12UN, op. cit.; and McClelland, "How to Build," Magazine.
\textsuperscript{1082} Interviews with Subjects T14UN and T11UN, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{1083} Interview with Subject T20MN, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{1084} Interview with Subject T11UN, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{1085} Interview with Subject TINGO, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{1086} Interview with Subject T14UN, op. cit.
AFAD designed and built 25 Syrian refugee camps that provided basic services to Syrian refugees.\(^{1087}\) As one domestic NGO representative stated,

\begin{quote}
The first night, the Turkey foreign minister...announced an open-door policy. UNHCR appreciated this and offered assistance but was kindly rejected. Turkey said, ‘We have the resources and we will provide it.’ UNHCR cooperated with Turkey. The Commissioner of UNHCR visited and announced that the camps were five stars.\(^{1088}\)
\end{quote}

Camps were managed by Turkish government employees and a few domestic NGOs were permitted to work in the camps.\(^{1089}\)

Yet, while the government created a management plan for the camps, it did not have a plan to assist self-settled refugees.\(^{1090}\) As one INGO representative recalled,

\begin{quote}
Once refugees [were] living in the host community, there was no support except for some services. They [faced] difficulty to survive in all aspects. They did not take economic considerations into account. The people in the host community, they [were] left without any support.\(^{1091}\)
\end{quote}

And, as another NGO representative explained, “All assistance came for the camp people. Meanwhile…many people increased who [lived] outside the camps until 2014. Early 2015, there was little attention to the huge number of people living in the cities. They were suffering.”\(^{1092}\) A UN official observed that, “Refugees who didn’t want to go to camps had problems.”\(^{1093}\)

Few NGOs assisted Syrian refugees at the onset of the crisis. A domestic NGO, the International Blue Crescent, provided aid to self-settled Syrians, Syrians in camps, and

\(^{1087}\) McClelland, “How to Build,” Magazine.
\(^{1088}\) Interview with Subject TINGO, op. cit.
\(^{1089}\) McClelland, “How to Build,” Magazine.
\(^{1090}\) Ibid; and Interviews with Subjects T14UN and T10UN, op. cit.
\(^{1091}\) Interview of Subject T9NGO, op. cit.
\(^{1092}\) Interview with TINGO, op. cit.
\(^{1093}\) Interview with Subject T14UN, op. cit.
Syrians displaced in Syria. The NGOs that offered refugees assistance differed depending on the region. Religiously-affiliated domestic NGOs provided support to self-settled Syrian refugees in the eastern provinces. But when Syrian refugees self-settled in western Turkish cities, it was secular, domestic NGOs that provided support.

Turkey hosted few INGOs prior to the Syrian refugee crisis. The government was cautious in its dealings with INGOs, and limited which ones could work in Turkey. As one UN official recalled, “Authorities [had] a preference for Turkish NGOs. They started to open to INGOs to work with refugees, but the number of INGOs [was] lower compared to other countries. The government [wanted] control over all aspects.” But in the first two years of the crisis, the government allowed some INGOs to establish offices in the Turkish provinces bordering Syria. They were permitted to assist self-settled Syrian refugees in Turkey and Syrians across the border in Syria. As one domestic NGO representative recalled, “In 2011 and after, the government started to let INGOs work…They did not have any role in the camps. They start slowly to run projects in the cities.”

Initially, Turkey had no legal framework to regulate INGOs, having little

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1096 Ibid.
1097 Longton, "Turkey Pushing," Middle East Institute; Mellen and Lynch, "Inside Turkey’s," Foreign Policy; and Heller, "Turkish Crackdown," The Century Foundation.
1098 Interview with Subject T13UN, op. cit.
1099 Mellen and Lynch, "Inside Turkey’s," Foreign Policy.
1100 Heller, "Turkish Crackdown," The Century Foundation.
1101 Interview with Subject T1NGO, op. cit.
experience with them. Turkey permitted them to enter but did not legally acknowledge or recognize them through regulation. Metin Corabatir from the Transatlantic Council on Migration, stated that,

For the first two years of the crisis, the government’s attitude towards international NGOs remained very conservative and the organizations were not officially permitted to work in Turkey. Still, many came and were allowed to work without registering with the Turkish authorities as long as their activities were limited to cross border relief operations under UNOCHA. Gradually, they also found a way to work with refugees inside Turkey under the guise of partnerships with local NGOs.

As one INGO representative explained, “The government [began] at first by not allowing [I]NGOs to be registered in Turkey. So, all of the [I]NGOs [were] working in a hidden way, kind of unofficially with the government of Turkey. But [I]NGOs [did] not have operational capacity to conduct activities. Not in an official capacity.”

INGOs working from Turkish bases and traveling into Syria were directed by the Turkish government “to mostly keep their work low-profile, and [the government] did not make a priority of organizations’ registrations or employees’ work permits”. The government allowed INGOs to provide services “without instituting major government oversight.” Turkey permitted entry for foreign workers and provided flexible working conditions to those providing aid to Syrian refugees.

1102 Heller, "Turkish Crackdown," The Century Foundation.
1103 Transatlantic Council on Migration, The Evolving, [Page 14].
1104 Interview with Subject T9NGO, op. cit.
1105 Heller, "Turkish Crackdown," The Century Foundation.
1106 Mellen and Lynch, "Inside Turkey’s," Foreign Policy.
1107 Longton, "Turkey Pushing," Middle East Institute.
The number of registered Syrian refugees increased from 137,756 in 2012 to 522,111 in 2013.\(^{1108}\) Graph 6.1 illustrates that there was a significant increase in the number of Syrian refugees who entered Turkey, from 2012 - 137,756 to 2016 - 2,814,631. As an AFAD official recalled, “Two hundred and fifty-two Syrians entered Turkey in 29 April 2011. At the beginning, Turkey admitted all these Syrians…In case of assistance, we…provided all the things. They give responsibility to AFAD. In a short time, it increased [quickly].”\(^{1109}\) A UN official observed,

At the beginning, it was responsive and effective - they [the government] were able to give services to Syrians…But this is not the case now…because the influx continued and reaches 2.76 million refugees as of today [July 2016]. This was obviously unexpected and the Turkish government who managed the response entirely in the first couple of years, saw its resources stretched and stretched and needed new actors and support – [the] UNHCR and humanitarian actors to integrate the efforts of the government.\(^{1110}\)

As the number of refugees increased, the government agreed to work with international organizations. By the end of 2012, the Turkish government cooperated with United Nations agencies to provide refugee services, both in the refugee camps and in host communities.\(^{1111}\) By 2014, INGOs were finally officially permitted to assist the hundreds of thousands of self-settled Syrian refugees.\(^{1112}\) Refugees primarily settled in the south and southeastern provinces of Turkey that bordered Syria. They also settled in major cities like

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\(^{1109}\) Interview with Subject T21MN, op. cit.

\(^{1110}\) Interview with Subject T13UN, op. cit.


\(^{1112}\) Transatlantic Council on Migration, *The Evolving*, [Page 14].
Istanbul and Ankara. See Map 6.1 for the figures where Syrian refugees settled in 2015. The areas where Syrian refugees settled is significant because they primarily settled in the poorer regions of southeast Turkey where resources like employment and government assistance were lacking. It is in these areas that INGOs established their offices.

**Graph 6.1 Syrian Refugees Registered in Turkey from 2012 to 2017**

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1114 Mellen and Lynch, "Inside Turkey’s," Foreign Policy.

The government granted Syrian refugee children the right to enroll in schools free of charge. Yet, between 2011 and 2013 self-settled Syrian families had to provide documentation of residency for their children to attend schools – a temporary protection identification card, a Foreigner’s Identification Card, or a residency permit. Then, in September 2014, Turkey adopted the Circular on Foreigners’ Access to Education No. 2014/21. The new law removed the residence permit restriction and allowed Syrian students without documentation to enroll as “guests” using a government-issued identification card. Yet Human Rights Watch reported that some Syrian refugees

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1116 Human Rights Watch, ““When I Picture,” Human Rights Watch.
1118 Seker et al., Turkish Migration, [Page 34].
1119 Ibid.
1120 Ibid; Culbertson and Constant, Education of Syrian, [Page 19]; and Human Rights Watch, ““When I Picture,” Human Rights Watch.
experienced a six-month wait for the identification card required for refugees to enroll in
public schools. Another Human Rights Watch report claimed that, despite the change
in the law, “Turkish public schools continued to demand they produce documents that are
no longer required for enrollment. Furthermore, many families lack crucial information
regarding Turkey’s school registration procedures, causing some to not register.”

The increase in the Syrian population led to an increase in demands on the public
education system. Turkey was unprepared to enroll hundreds of thousands of school-aged
Syrian refugees. Prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, Turkey’s public school system suffered
from a significant teacher shortage. A 2012 OECD report found that “eight out of ten
schools [had] staff shortages in key subjects.” As one UN official explained, “Before
all of this started, they had 100,000 empty teacher posts. There are 90 million people in
Turkey and 30 million school-aged children. They don’t have the budget and can’t recruit
enough people to become teachers.” At the time of field research, the government hired
teachers and assigned them to work in regions that could be different from where they
resided. The same UN official described the hiring process,

1121 Human Rights Watch, “Remove Barriers to Syrian Refugee Education,” Human Rights Watch, last
1122 Human Rights Watch, ““When I Picture,” Human Rights Watch.
1123 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "OECD Calls for New Approach to
1124 Interview with T10UN, op. cit.
1125 Tulay Cetingulec, "Schools in Crisis in Turkey’s Southeast," Al-Monitor The Pulse of the Middle East,
last modified October 23, 2015, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/10/turkey-southeast-
clashes-pkk-kurds-education-crisis.html.
You have to graduate with a certain degree… [and] go through a civil servant recruitment process. You have to work for two years in a far-away post, and after two years, you get a preference. They go to underserved areas in the southeast and east.1126

Teacher shortages were already at critical levels in southeastern and eastern Turkey before the refugee crisis. Newly graduated teachers did not want to be stationed in these regions because they did “not offer much of a social life for teachers.”1127 Many teachers requested reassignment after one year.1128 It is in these same southeastern and eastern regions where a significant number of Syrian refugees resided.

The Ministry of Education (MONE) built schools for the Syrian refugees, but there were not enough built to accommodate the large influx of Syrian children.1129 The government alternatively implemented a double shift program that split the school day into two shifts: half of enrolled Syrian refugees attended school in the morning while the other half attended school in the afternoon.1130 But there were still capacity issues: a lack of both teachers and schools.

In 2014, the government officially permitted INGOs to provide education services to self-settled refugees.1131 For Syrian students unable to enter the public school system,

1126 Interview with Subject T10UN, op. cit.
1128 Ibid.
1129 Culbertson and Constant, Education of Syrian, [Page xi].
the MONE permitted non-formal education in “temporary education centers” – a system of schools operated by individual NGOs, local communities and charities, and UNICEF.  

These centers were built or established by the Syrian refugee community or UNICEF, and funded by the Syrian diaspora, the Syrian opposition, domestic and international NGOs, and Turkish municipalities. They were staffed by Syrian educators and monitored by the MONE and UNICEF.

The type of curriculum taught was a concern during the first five years of the crisis because Syrian families were unsure what type of education certification would be accepted in Turkey if they stayed or in Syria if they returned. Initially, community education centers taught the Arabic language-based Syrian national curriculum, but these institutions were unaccredited and prohibited from being certified. The MONE, UN agencies, and the Syrian Interim Government - the opposition government headquartered in Turkey - developed a modified Syrian Arabic curriculum. This modified curriculum was taught at the primary school level in UNICEF-managed schools in the host communities and in the government-run refugee camps. Yet, some parents were “concerned that such certification [associated with the Opposition] could mean retribution upon return to Syria.” Parents were unsure who would lead Syria – President Assad’s

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1133 Culbertson and Constant, Education of Syrian, [Page 51].


1135 Ibid, p. 57.


1137 Culbertson and Constant, Education of Syrian, [Page 57].
regime or the opposition regime – when the war ended. Consequently, the government condoned the use of a modified Libyan curriculum because it was taught in Arabic, was “recognized by Turkish higher-education institutions and employers,” and the Libyan government agreed to allow Syrian children to use it.

Obstructive Long-Term Syrian Refugee Policy. The government’s legal response to the Syrian refugee crisis evolved over the first five years from an emergency response to a long-term policy. In 2013, Turkey created the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP), to “regulate the principles and procedures with regard to foreigners’ entry into, stay in, and exit from Turkey, and the scope and implementation of the protection to be provided for foreigners who seek protection from Turkey.” The LFIP established the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) under the authority of the Ministry of Interior to manage the Syrian refugee crisis with AFAD’s assistance. The law stipulated that Turkey provide for “refugees’ basic needs and also furnishes social services, translation services, IDs, travel documents, access to primary and secondary education, and work permits.” The LFIP granted Syrian refugees limited and temporary protection by allowing them to stay “until a long-term place of settlement outside Turkey” was established for them.

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1138 If Assad’s regime prevails, then that government may not accept education certificates from Syrian children who were taught using the opposition’s curriculum.
1139 Ibid; and Refugee Study Centre, Ensuring Quality, [Page 62].
1141 Ibid.
1142 Ibid.
In compliance with the LFIP, refugees were “obliged by the authorities to live in
designated reception and accommodation centers or in a specific location, and to report to
the authorities in a certain manner or at certain intervals.” A 2016 Human Rights Watch
report claimed that Syrians who relocated to another city after registering elsewhere lacked
“the necessary information to overcome bureaucratic hurdles and to secure access to
medical care and education in their new places of residence.”

The LFIP permitted registered Syrian refugees to apply for work permits. But after
applying, they had to wait six months or more to work and could only work in the location
where they applied for protection. The law also required refugees who wished to work
to secure a sponsorship from Turkish employers. According to a 2017 Human Rights
Watch report, “potential sponsors [were] reluctant to regularize informal workers because
of requirements to pay the minimum wage and social security contributions.” This had
a negative impact on the provision of refugee education services. As one INGO
representative explained,

1145 Human Rights Watch, "Q&A: The EU-Turkey Deal on Migration and Refugees," Human Rights
Watch, last modified March 3, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/03/qa-eu-turkey-deal-migration-
and-refugees.
1146 Bill Frelick, "Syrian Refugee Kids Still Out of School in Turkey," Human Rights Watch, last modified
turkey; Seker et al., Turkish Migration, [Page 33]; and Library of Congress, "Refugee Law and Policy,"
Library of Congress.
1147 Human Rights Watch, "Turkey: Education Barriers for Asylum Seekers," Humans Rights Watch, last
We see massive numbers of children working – 26% are working in Gaziantep area... It is difficult for adults to get work – they need a certain amount of money, insurance, and know how to get the permit. So, you see children earning the money for the family. This impacts the enrollment rates.\textsuperscript{1149}

**NGO Advantages, Opportunities, and Strategies**

Normally, domestic and international NGOs are two of the main institutions that provide refugee education services in countries that host significant numbers of refugees. From the research I conducted, I discovered that the Turkish government was unwilling to cooperate with INGOs. A strong, centralized government that is unwilling to cooperate with them is a significant obstacle to their provision of refugee education services. The degree of the Turkish government’s cooperation is attributable to three factors. They are in order of priority: the NGOs’ relationship to the government prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, the NGOs’ financial leverage, and the distribution of aid to both the Turks and the Syrian refugees. All three are discussed below.

*NGO Disadvantage: NGOs’ Prior Relationship to the Government.* As mentioned earlier, Turkey has had a complicated history with NGOs. Past relationships between NGOs and the government was contentious in some cases. As a UN official observed,

> The government is skeptical of the role of NGOs and perceives them as potential opponents. There has always been a controversial relationship between the government and INGOs and NGOs. The government is reluctant to engage with them....because they perceive NGOs as critical to the government.\textsuperscript{1150}

Another UN official gave an example, “There are verbal clashes with Amnesty International and the Turkish government. The government does not like this.”\textsuperscript{1151} At the

\textsuperscript{1149} Interview with Subject T7NGO, op. cit.  
\textsuperscript{1150} Interview with Subject T13UN, op. cit.  
\textsuperscript{1151} Interview with Subject T13UN, op. cit.
onset of the Syrian refugee crisis, the government permitted INGOs to assist, yet, because the Turkish government had limited experience with them, it was suspicious and distrustful of the INGOs.\textsuperscript{1152} Even after permitting INGOs to assist, they mandated that they were not permitted to conduct research.\textsuperscript{1153} As one UN official claimed, “In 2015 in April or May, [the government] had an internal circular that came out in the media that prior approval was needed from the Ministry of Interior to do research and assessment by INGOs, NGOs, and academia.”\textsuperscript{1154}

The government’s mistrust of INGOs prior to the Syrian refugee crisis continued throughout the first five years of the Syrian refugee crisis and culminated with a pivotal event that further damaged the relationship between the Turkish government and INGOs: the attempted coup on July 15, 2016. Members of the Turkish armed forces attempted to ouster President Recip Tayyip Erdogan.\textsuperscript{1155} Approximately 250 people died and over 2,100 people were injured.\textsuperscript{1156} Consequently, 50,000 people were arrested and over 150,000 people were fired from positions across professions.\textsuperscript{1157}

INGOs also suffered an impact from this event. After the failed coup, the government instituted “bureaucratic hoops that [made] it almost impossible for international NGOs to function.”\textsuperscript{1158} The Turkish government further complicated the

\textsuperscript{1152} Heller, “Turkish Crackdown,” The Century Foundation.
\textsuperscript{1154} Interview with Subject T12UN, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{1156} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1157} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1158} Peterson, "What Turkey's," The Christian Science Monitor.
registration system for INGOs. They were subjected to unannounced visits by the police and to audits and inspections to determine if they violated employment and visa policies. Foreign workers employed by INGOs applying for or renewing their work permits were denied, and faced deportation or arrest if caught without permits. Government regulations introduced after the coup required INGOs to hire more Turkish nationals. INGOs were also required to provide reports of funding sources.

Most importantly, the Turkish government closed some INGOs after the failed coup and detained, arrested, and expelled some foreign aid workers. Government officials ordered some INGOs, including Mercy Corps and the International Medical Corps, to leave. Others, such as Handicap International, Catholic Relief Services, and the Norwegian Refugee Council, simply stopped providing services within Turkey of their own volition. Ross Longton, in his 2017 Middle East Institute report, stated that, “Turkey is sending a clear message that humanitarian organizations are no longer immune to political battles, both domestic and international.” In March 2017, President Erdogan declared, “From now on, we will not allow any Europeans who are spying in our country under various titles, whether it be individuals or organizations.”

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1159 Mellen and Lynch, "Inside Turkey’s," Foreign Policy.
1160 Longton, "Turkey Pushing," Middle East Institute; and Heller, "Turkish Crackdown," The Century Foundation.
1161 Mellen and Lynch, "Inside Turkey’s," Foreign Policy.
1162 Ibid.
1163 Ibid.
1166 Mellen and Lynch, "Inside Turkey’s," Foreign Policy.
1167 Longton, "Turkey Pushing," Middle East Institute.
NGO Disadvantage: NGO Financial Power. In Jordan and Lebanon, INGOs had some advantage in that they were conduits for large amounts of financial aid from international donors that was used to benefit both the domestic population and the refugees. The provision of monetary aid served as leverage to gain government cooperation. Both countries needed financial assistance to improve infrastructure, to strengthen institutions, and to provide assistance to refugees.

This was not the case for Turkey. Turkey is an upper middle income country.\textsuperscript{1169} Since 2000, it had halved its poverty rate by 50\%, and had expanded access to public services.\textsuperscript{1170} Fiscal reforms imposed by the International Monetary Fund in 2001 contributed to annual economic growth rates averaging 6\% up to 2008.\textsuperscript{1171} The country’s economy rebounded after the global financial crisis of 2008.\textsuperscript{1172} This growth continued until the third quarter of 2016.\textsuperscript{1173} Graph 6.2 illustrates the GDP economic growth rate of Turkey from 2009 to 2016.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1169} The World Bank, "Turkey Overview," The World Bank, last modified 2017, \url{http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey/overview}.
\item \textsuperscript{1170} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{1172} Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Turkey," The CIA World Factbook.
\item \textsuperscript{1173} The failed military coup in July 2016 led to a drop in tourism rates. This led to a decline in economic growth. Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Turkey," The CIA World Factbook.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Turkey - in its bid to obtain EU membership – also received substantial financial support from the European Union to initiate reforms: €600 million from the EU on an annual basis.\textsuperscript{1175} Turkey’s biggest trading partner is the EU, with approximately 40% of Turkish trade conducted in EU countries.\textsuperscript{1176} By 2014, Turkey’s economy was the 17\textsuperscript{th} largest in the world.\textsuperscript{1177}


\textsuperscript{1175} Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, "EU and Turkey’s History," Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, last modified 2017, \url{https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/eu-and-turkeys-history-711}.

\textsuperscript{1176} Ibid; and The World Bank, "Turkey Overview," The World Bank.

Compared to Lebanon and Jordan, Turkey received modest financial support to help manage the refugee burden. The Turkish government claimed that it spent billions of dollars on the Syrian refugee crisis, but the actual amount they claim varies depending on the source. A 2015 Human Rights Watch report stated that Turkey claimed to have spent $7 billion on its refugee response between 2011 and 2015.1178 A 2016 Human Rights Watch report printed Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s claim that “Turkey has spent about US$10 billion on the Syrian refugees living in the camps since 2011, whereas US$20-25 billion more was spent on those living outside the camps.”1179

I interviewed two AFAD officials who asserted that Turkey could manage the refugee crisis without financial assistance.1180 As one AFAD official explained, “Turkey is a stronger country than Jordan and Lebanon in an economic sense…In an economic sense, there is not such a burden.”1181 An INGO representative observed, “Turkey spent really a lot to handle this refugee influx. But I don’t think the main concern is economic…Turkey could handle this to a certain extent.”1182

Nonetheless, other members of AFAD that I interviewed contradicted these assertions and complained that the donor countries were not providing enough fiscal support to the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey. As one AFAD official stated,
It’s not fair for the UN to give 1 billion dollars to Jordan and only $200,000 to Turkey. We have five times bigger the population. The UN thinks Turkey is handling this just fine, but this is very wrong. The donors have been discriminating against Turkey.1183

Another AFAD official suggested, “It is a big burden for the Turkish economy.”1184 Yet, Turkey did not receive as much funding as Jordan and Lebanon because it was not viewed as having significant financial need.

The government did not request monetary support from international donors until 2014. Yet, there were two significant issues that led to Turkey receiving the least amount of monetary aid. First, Turkey insisted that Western governments - the major donors to the Syrian refugee crisis - give monetary assistance directly to the government.1185 The government insisted that all “international funding be channeled to its own projects and that it remain directly responsible for their implementation.”1186 Western donor governments were “used to relying on INGO[s]” and refused to directly distribute funds to the Turkish government.1187 Consequently, international donors pressured the Turkish government to spend funds through INGOs.1188 A 2017 Century Foundation report claimed that, “These INGOS—which can satisfy Western donors’ reporting and monitoring standards in a way most local NGOs cannot—are a critical conduit for funds from donors including USAID, Britain’s Department for International Development (DFID), and the European Union.”1189 According to the Sam Heller of The Century Foundation,

1183 The interview subject used $200,000 in his estimation of the amount the United Nations has donated to the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey. This figure is incorrect. Interview with Subject T20MN, op. cit.
1184 Interview with Subject T18MN, op. cit.
1185 Heller, "Turkish Crackdown," The Century Foundation.
1186 Transatlantic Council on Migration, The Evolving, [Page 13].
1187 Heller, "Turkish Crackdown," The Century Foundation.
1188 Transatlantic Council on Migration, The Evolving, [Page 14].
1189 Heller, "Turkish Crackdown," The Century Foundation.
International humanitarian aid has mostly run through a handful of large relief INGOs including Mercy Corps, IMC, Save the Children, GOAL, and the International Rescue Committee (IRC). These INGOs have channeled UN and Western donor funding to their implementing staff inside the country and to Syrian and Turkish local NGO partners.1190

Turkey recognized that INGOs were a “conduit for part of a multi-billion-dollar Syria aid effort.”1191 As both the numbers of self-settled Syrian refugees and the need for financial support increased, Turkey allowed more INGOs to enter Turkey and to provide services.1192 Yet, the dispute about the distribution of funds continued. Donors did not distribute funding directly to the Turkish government nor did the government distribute funding to NGOs to provide services to Syrian refugees.1193 Metin Corabatir, a representative for the Transatlantic Council on Migration, explained that this dispute resulted in only 36 percent, or $294 million of the total $807 million appeal in 2016, being funded.1194 He stated, “The relatively low level of international aid for Turkey has been one result of the disagreements between the Turkish government and NGOs, donor countries, and international agencies over fund management and project implementation.”1195

Second, international donors did not view Turkey as having a significant financial need since it had a strong economy. It had not received much financial support compared to Jordan and Lebanon. A 2017 Human Rights Watch report found that, “UN aid appeals for Turkey were low relative to Jordan and Lebanon, which host fewer refugees” than

1190 Ibid.
1191 Ibid.
1192 Ibid.
1194 Ibid.
1195 Ibid.
Turkey. Graph 6.3 illustrates the amount of funding each country received in total to manage the Syrian refugee crisis. Turkey received considerably less funding. Table 6.3 lists example donors and their contributions to the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey. Several countries that contributed to Lebanon and Jordan contributed little to no aid to Turkey. For example, in 2015 Kuwait contributed approximately $35,000,000 to Jordan and $31,000,000 to Lebanon but did not contribute to Turkey. In 2015, the United Kingdom contributed approximately $29,000,000 to Jordan and $44,000,000 to Lebanon, but did not contribute to Turkey.

Graph 6.3 Total Amount of Funding Received by Host Countries to Manage Syrian Refugee Crisis

1196 Human Rights Watch, Following the Money, [Page 19].
1197 Funding figures vary based on the source reporting.
1198 See similar tables in the Jordan and Lebanon chapters for a comparison.
1199 See Table 4.5 Example List of Donors and Their Contributions to the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan in Chapter 4 and Table 5.4 List of Example Donors and Their Contributions to the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon in Chapter 5. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “2015 Contributions,” Syria Situation 2015.
1200 Ibid.
Table 6.3 List of Example Donors and Their Contributions to the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Turkey\textsuperscript{1201}

\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & 2014\textsuperscript{1202} & 2015\textsuperscript{1203} & 2016\textsuperscript{1204} \\
\hline
European Union & $7,553,995 & $4,802,412 & $ 1,301,419 \\
Kuwait & $5,000,000 & $890,000 & $0 \\
Saudi Arabia & $0 & $0 & $0 \\
United Kingdom & $0 & $0 & $0 \\
United States & $51,800,000 & $44,900,000 & $ 66,600,000 \\
World Bank & N/A & N/A & $0 \\
Total Funding by Donors & $84,376,385 & $ 67,056,906 & $101,053,927\textsuperscript{1205} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

The UN’s Inter-agency Financial Tracking System reports on funding received for each sector, including education.\textsuperscript{1206} Graph 6.4 shows the top ten NGOs that received funding as share of the total funding allocated to the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey in 2016. NGOs in Turkey received significantly less than NGOs in Jordan and Lebanon.\textsuperscript{1207} Chart 6.1 illustrates this discrepancy in the allocation of funding to Mercy Corps offices across the three countries. This data is significant because, unlike in Jordan and Lebanon, the amount of funding distributed to these INGOs did not offer a significant incentive to the Turkish government to cooperate with them. This is one of the variables that influences the willingness of the host government to cooperate with entities such as INGOs. Without this financial incentive, host governments like Turkey are disinclined to do so.

\textsuperscript{1201} There are more donor countries listed for each year. Funding contributions vary from report to report and from the source reporting the figures. It is difficult to find an accurate accounting of funding contributions.


\textsuperscript{1205} I did not include all of the donors to the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey. That is why the table does not add up to the total funding by donors.

\textsuperscript{1206} Human Rights Watch, Following the Money, [Page 23].

\textsuperscript{1207} See Graph 4.2 Top Ten NGOs that Received Funding as a Share of the Total Funding Allocated to the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan in 2016 in Chapter 4 and Graph 5.1 Top Ten NGOs that Received Funding as a Share of the Total Funding Allocated to the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon in 2016 in Chapter 5 to compare the total funding allocated to the Syrian refugee crisis across the host countries in 2016.
Graph 6.4 Top Ten NGOs that Received Funding as a Share of the Total Funding Allocated to the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Turkey in 2016\textsuperscript{1208}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Funding (US$)</th>
<th>Share of Total Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Medical Corps UK</td>
<td>3,871,681</td>
<td>6.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung e.V.</td>
<td>4,459,309</td>
<td>7.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handicap International</td>
<td>5,054,402</td>
<td>8.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td>5,307,856</td>
<td>8.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs (details not yet provided)</td>
<td>6,536,755</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Medical Corps</td>
<td>6,634,894</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
<td>6,802,744</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
<td>9,060,023</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
<td>24,548,718</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partners Turkey</td>
<td>43,453,832</td>
<td>70.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{1208} United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Financial Tracking." Financial Tracking Service.
NGO Advantage: NGOs Assisting Domestic and Refugee Populations. In the research and interviews that I conducted, I discovered that NGOs used the strategy of delivering services and technical expertise to the benefit of both Syrian refugees and Turks. The significant number of Syrian refugees affected the communities that hosted them. Areas with high concentrations of Syrian refugees experienced an increased unemployment rate and a decrease in formal and informal employment opportunities. The population of some host communities increased by 30%, straining local employment markets. In the city of Kilis in the southeastern province of the same name, Syrian refugees

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outnumbered the domestic population. As of January 2018, there were approximately 132,000 Syrian refugees as compared to approximately 131,000 Turks.\(^{1213}\)

The UNHCR mandated that NGOs provide assistance to both refugees and the host communities in Turkey.\(^{1214}\) NGOs were aware of the plight of economically disadvantaged Turks and provided them assistance as well.\(^{1215}\) For example, Mercy Corps reported that they provided social services to 100,000 Syrian refugees and Turks in 2016.\(^{1216}\) Two UNICEF reports from 2015 and 2016 indicated that their mandate was to provide for the most vulnerable in Turkey – both domestic and refugee children.\(^{1217}\) The 2015 UNICEF annual report referred to the NGOs strategy to provide for both populations:

The community-based models in particular will be built upon and expanded through NGO/civil society organization partnerships in order to benefit and integrate Syrian refugee and vulnerable Turkish young children in the south and the south-east of the country.\(^{1218}\)

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\(^1214\) Unlike Jordan and Lebanon, I was unable to find the exact percentage of aid allocation that was to be distributed to domestic Turks. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-16*, [Pp. 6 and 8].


The report did not name the NGOs that provided these services. An INGO representative interviewed for this research reported that their institution “created initiatives inside Turkey that target the refugee population and vulnerable members of the host communities.”

Unlike Lebanon and Jordan, Turkey is a strong centralized state that has significant welfare resources to distribute. Furthermore, the ratio of Syrian refugees to Turks was much lower than the population ratios of Syrians to the domestic populations of Jordan and Lebanon. As one AFAD official noted, “It’s [Turkey] different from Lebanon and Jordan, the Syrians are 4 or 5% of the total pop of Turkey [in comparison to 10% or higher in Jordan and Lebanon]. Turkey is also a stronger country than Jordan and Lebanon in an economic sense.” While NGOs provided assistance to both Turks and Syrians, Turkey had a greater ability than Jordan and Lebanon to provide for its own citizenry.

The three factors that can be attributed the willingness of the host government to cooperate are a positive prior history between the host government and NGOs, the financial power of NGOs relative to the host government, and the NGOs’ distribution of assistance to both the refugee and domestic population. NGOs did not have a positive relationship with Turkey prior to the Syrian refugee crisis. There was an increase in the number of NGOs in Turkey as a condition of EU candidacy, yet, the government did not interact with them. In a few cases, NGOs were openly critical of the government. Furthermore, there was little interaction between Turkey and INGOs prior to the Syrian refugee crisis because Turkey – differing from Jordan and Lebanon - did not rely upon INGOs to provide services or development. Turkey was suspicious of INGOs and delayed granting them official

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1219 Interview with Subject T7NGO, op. cit.
1220 Interview with Subject T21MN, op. cit.
permission to assist. NGOs had little financial leverage in Turkey. INGOs in Turkey received much less funding than their counterparts in Jordan and Lebanon. Consequently, there was little financial incentive for Turkey to cooperate with them. Finally, while NGOs provided for both impoverished Turks and Syrian refugees, the government had the resources to provide for its own citizenry and did not need NGO assistance. Hence, the level of government cooperation is the product of these three factors. Below, I discuss the government’s resultant behavior, citing specific government-created obstacles that prevented INGOs from providing refugee education services. I then conclude this section with a brief description of one INGO’s attempts to overcome encumbrances to their provision of refugee education services.

**NGO Disadvantage: An Uncooperative Government.** The Turkish government is a parliamentary republic led by the president and prime minister. Its Parliament – known as the Grand National Assembly – creates the laws. Under this centralized government, there are 81 administrative divisions known as provinces or governorates. Each province is led by an appointed governor responsible for legislation, constitutional and government decisions, and supervising “provincial administration.” Article 123 of the 1982 Constitution stipulates that “all local and central administrative units and bodies should function in unity and coherence in order to maintain integrity in public administration in terms of organizations and duties.”

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1223 Ibid.
1225 Ibid.
The Turkish government created obstacles that hindered the ability of NGOs and, in particular, INGOs to provide refugee education services. First, the government was reluctant to cooperate with the UN and INGOs on the creation and implementation of refugee response plans. Second, the government’s policies for dealing with INGOs evolved from an absence of policy to a complex bureaucratic system of continuously changing policy and procedures. Third, the government limited what services both domestic and international NGOs could provide and where they could provide them. Fourth, INGOs reported that some governors were more obstructive than their counterparts in other provinces where these organizations worked. Finally, the mistrust of international entities further exacerbated Turkish government efforts to block or stymie INGOs ability to work in the country. The resultant lack of cooperation impacted the refugee education services rendered by domestic and international NGOs and collectively explain why Turkey consistently had the lowest enrollment rate of Syrian refugees. I discuss each obstacle below.

Lack of Government Cooperation. Unlike Jordan and Lebanon, Turkey requested that the UN take a supporting role, rather than a lead role, in the Syrian refugee crisis. Yet, in June 2012, Turkey made a formal request to the UN to be included in the refugee response plan in order to receive international assistance. Turkey agreed to allow UN agencies as well as the World Food Program, the International Organization on Migration, and the World Health Organization to assist. Yet, in each subsequent Syrian refugee

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1227 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Second Revision, [Page 83].
response plan, the UNHCR clearly stated that the government of Turkey led the response.1228

As I discussed in the Jordan and Lebanon chapters, the inter-agency education working groups that consisted of representatives from the government, the UN, and NGOs published information regarding coordination efforts, refugee education programs, and aid allocation.1229 Turkey also had an inter-agency education working group, yet only UNICEF is listed as a partner.1230 The group posted basic enrollment rates and education programs information, but I was unable to locate systematic information on funding for education between 2013 and 2017.1231 Table 6.4 lists the funds requested and funds received for the Education Sector.1232


1231 Ibid.

1232 It is unclear why this information was not readily accessible. I derived these figures from reports produced by UNICEF and the UNHCR. Yet, this information was not available for each year to my knowledge.
Table 6.4 Turkey’s Education Sector Donor Funding Requirements and Funding Received

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding Requirement</th>
<th>2013\textsuperscript{1233}</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015\textsuperscript{1234}</th>
<th>2016\textsuperscript{1235}</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding Requirement</td>
<td>$6,500,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>$46,660,000</td>
<td>$137,000,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding Received</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>$46,000,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Funding Received</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Gap</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>66.4%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No NGO partners were mentioned in the Turkey 2012 and 2013 Syria regional refugee response plans.\textsuperscript{1236} The 2014 response plan stated that there were partnerships with local and international NGOs.\textsuperscript{1237} The report indicated,

\textbf{Unlike previous RRP}s [refugee response plans] which were implemented directly by participating UN agencies, an important feature of this RRP will be the partnering of both national and international NGOs to ensure rapid response to a significant number of beneficiaries.\textsuperscript{1238}

\textsuperscript{1237} United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, \textit{2014 Syria Regional Response Plan Turkey}, [Pp. 4, 8].
\textsuperscript{1238} Ibid, p 9.
In 2014, fewer than 20 INGOs and a limited number of domestic NGOs were able to register with the Turkish government to provide refugee education services.\textsuperscript{1239} A 2014 Oxford University Refugee Studies Program report listed the INGOs that provided refugee education services.\textsuperscript{1240} Table 6.5 lists examples of NGOs and the types of refugee education services they provided. The domestic NGOs were selected because they provided refugee education services and readily provided information on their websites. The INGOs were selected because they were the ones permitted to work within Turkey to provide refugee education services. I was unable to locate information about the number of Syrian children who received refugee education services.\textsuperscript{1241} With the exception of the 2014 Oxford University report on INGOs and NGOs providing refugee education services, I have found no other reports regarding which INGOs and NGOs provided refugee education services, and the UN-published refugee response plans offer little additional insight.\textsuperscript{1242} As one INGO representative observed, “In other countries, the projects are named in the report and the names of INGOs are included in the report, but not here.”\textsuperscript{1243} I was unable to find information from the relevant sources that I used for this research to determine why this information was unavailable.

\textsuperscript{1239} Refugee Study Centre, \textit{Ensuring Quality}, [Page 60]
\textsuperscript{1241} I wrote this chapter after the attempted coup in Turkey. Since the attempted coup, most INGOs were forced out of the country or they voluntarily left. As a result, it was difficult to find information because many INGOs removed information regarding the services they rendered in Turkey prior to leaving from their websites.
\textsuperscript{1242} The UNHCR published a partner list of INGOs and intergovernmental organizations that provided services. There are only two INGOs listed at the time of writing: the International Rescue Committee and the International Medical Corps. Most INGOs were asked to leave by October 2017. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Partner List." Syria Regional Refugee Response Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, \url{http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/partnerlist.php}.
\textsuperscript{1243} Interview with Subject T7NGO, op. cit.
Table 6.5 Examples of Domestic and International NGOs Assisting Refugees in Turkey\textsuperscript{1244}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>NGO Type</th>
<th>Services Provided</th>
<th>Amount Provided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Blue Crescent Relief and Development Foundation\textsuperscript{1245}</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Informal education courses Turkish language Computer literacy</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayata Destek Dernegi (Support to Life)</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Informal education Psycho/social wellbeing</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimse Yok Mu 1999</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Refugee education services</td>
<td>Operates 5 schools and reaches 2,500 children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council\textsuperscript{1247}</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Informal education Catch-up classes Turkish language courses Information outreach regarding enrollment</td>
<td>48,779 individuals, with education and shelter in 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children\textsuperscript{1248}</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Teacher incentives and trainings Rehabilitation of schools Provide education materials Informal education</td>
<td>13,000 Syrian children</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{1244} The terms informal education and non-formal education were used interchangeably.
\textsuperscript{1247} Norwegian Refugee Council, "NRC in Turkey," Norwegian Refugee Council, [https://www.nrc.no/countries/europe/turkey/](https://www.nrc.no/countries/europe/turkey/).
The interviews I conducted with representatives in Turkey, as well as a report by the Refugee Study Centre, revealed the type of refugee education services provided by NGOs in Turkey. Both domestic and international NGOs provided formal education – a traditional, structured classroom-based system. They also provided non-formal education – basic literacy and numeracy, catch-up programs, Turkish language classes, and psychosocial activities.

While NGOs and INGOs were permitted to provide refugee education services,

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1251 Ibid, p. 62; and Interviews with Subject T7NGO, T4NGO, T8NGO, and T3NGO.

1252 It is important to note that some participants used the terms – informal and non-formal – interchangeably. Ibid, p. 62; and Interviews with Subject T7NGO, T4NGO, T8NGO, and T3NGO.
they faced two major obstacles related to government cooperation. First, unlike Jordan and Lebanon, there did not appear to be an official, established MONE-led education plan that directed domestic and international NGOs in their implementation of refugee education services. As one INGO representative complained, “One of the frustrations we have is that there is no clearly written set of guidelines.” Another INGO stated, “We have to do everything by the book, but no one knows the strategies, and they keep rebuffing the NGOs.” Second, while the UNHCR established periodic “coordination and cluster meetings” to discuss a plan of action with INGOs and NGOs, the government of Turkey did not conduct committee meetings or forums with INGOs or NGOs. As one INGO representative observed,

We [NGOs] are not involved in consultation. Within the humanitarian sector in every emergency…the UN starts the cluster system…The UN can go to the government and say, ‘Here is the cluster system. The UN will lead it with an INGO co-lead. INGOs, NGOs, the ministries involved – the coordination mechanism – this was not activated in Turkey…We have an education working group led by UNHCR and attended by UNICEF, but there are no MONE people involved…We don’t have a member at national education department meetings. We don’t get asked by the government. There is no request for consultation from MONE.

And another NGO representative suggested that, “We need meetings and negotiation with the government because the government cannot do everything.”

Law and Implementation. Many UN officials and NGO representatives cited

1253 Interview with Subject T8NGO, op. cit.
1254 Interview with Subject T7NGO, op. cit.
1255 Kirisci, Syrian Refugees, [Page 39].
1256 Interview with Subject T7NGO, op. cit.
1257 Interview with Subject T4NGO, op. cit.
problems with Turkish laws and their implementation. First, the people I interviewed claimed that the laws were not easily understood. As one UN official recalled, “We, as NGOs and UN staff…try together to get information…The interpretation [of the law] is wide and the instructions are vague. You try to ask for clarification. You ask the government, and they cannot give specifics. It is quite hard.”

Speaking to the *Christian Science Monitor* in 2017, an INGO representative stated, “We have been playing this constant game, especially after NGOs got registered, of the ever-evolving interpretation and enforcement of the various laws.”

Interviewees complained that the government would change both the laws and the implementation process without notice. As one INGO representative recalled, “We talk about policy three months ago, and now this is changed. There is no consistency.”

Another INGO representative stated, “The processes change overnight without communication. For example, we applied for a refugee project for over a year. Then the procedure changes, and you have to do this over again. So, these procedures change, and we are not informed. This affects the services.”

During interviews for this research, INGO representatives claimed that some governors refused to cooperate with them. As one INGO representative explained,

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1258 *Interview with Subject T12UN*, op. cit.
1260 *Interview with Subject T4NGO*, op. cit.
1261 *Interview with Subject T8NGO*, op. cit.
I work in Urfa. The governor of Urfa is so welcoming to NGOs and INGOs. They see the clinics and the education are helping to take care of the refugee population. Gaziantep is the most difficult governorate to work with. It is the [southeastern] part of Turkey…It is horrible here to work as NGOs and INGOs…The government is most controlling. The government is suspicious of NGOs there. It depends on the people in charge. The policy comes from the central government. There is one policy, but the people in charge…they implement it differently.1262

A second INGO representative observed, “The application of regulations varies from one province to another. A lot of it is based on interpretation of the regulations.”1263

Some NGOs inadvertently broke the law because the laws and implementation procedures were confusing. As one INGO representative interviewed for the Christian Science Monitor in 2017 explained, “The fact is, it doesn’t matter how compliant we were, whether or not the law was clear or not, every single NGO working here has broken laws at some point. Some inadvertently. Some because there was no law in place to tell us how to do it, [like] the transfer of money.”1264 A Century Foundation report, confirming these comments, found that: “Turkey’s shifting, byzantine regulatory environment and INGOs’ initial go-go urgency in setting up their operations meant that nearly every INGO fell afoul of some regulation, and was thus potentially vulnerable to official reprisal.”1265

**Turkey’s Complex Bureaucratic System.** The UN officials and NGO representatives that I interviewed stated that the resistance of Turkish officials was a hindrance to the provision of refugee services. One NGO representative provided an example: “We want to open a mental health program, but have to wait for permission from the government. The

1262 Interview with Subject T4NGO, op. cit.
1263 Interview with Subject T8NGO, op. cit.
1264 Peterson, ”What Turkey’s,” The Christian Science Monitor.
1265 Heller, ”Turkish Crackdown,” The Century Foundation.
biggest challenge in Turkey is getting permission [from] the government for INGOs.”

Another INGO representative noted,

So we [INGOs] offer…assistance to boost the technical or financial or implementation capacity, but allow [the government] to push back. They are a sovereign country with a functional state. For NGOs and UN, it has been frustrating…We are not used to working with such a partner. We are used to having more autonomy…There is a lot of bureaucratic tape we need to go through.

Turkey’s powerful bureaucracy made it difficult for INGOs to gain approval for education projects. As one INGO representative stated, “There is a bureaucracy in Turkey. It tries not to work with the UN and INGOs...For example, if we want to work with Turkish institutions like education, we need many documents. We have to do much in deference to them and to meet their standards. If you compare [this] with other crises and responses all over the world, you will find it is not like that…There is a lot of red tape.”

Byzantine Registration Process. INGOs assisted Syrian refugees from 2011 to 2013 but did so covertly. Turkey was aware that they were in the country but did not register them. This changed as the numbers of self-settled Syrian refugees in the host communities grew. By 2014, the government created policies and procedures that required INGOs to officially register. The government “jury-rigged the application of existing laws and regulations to cover the incoming organizations.” INGOs reported that they encountered problems when trying to register and to operate legally. As one INGO representative recalled,

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1266 Interview with Subject T7NGO, op. cit.
1267 Interview with Subject T8NGO, op. cit.
1268 Interview with Subject T3NGO, op. cit.
1269 Interview with Subject T13UN, op. cit.
1270 Heller, “Turkish Crackdown,” The Century Foundation.
1271 Ibid.
The government was controlling the NGOs and sometimes closing the offices of some NGOs. They couldn’t continue with a low profile. They try to filter the NGOs and register the ones they wanted to register and not the others they did not want. The operations got more visible.\textsuperscript{1273}

After registering, INGOs were limited by the government where they could provide services. INGOs complained that the government denied them permission to open offices.\textsuperscript{1274} Since many INGOs registered in provinces that bordered Syria, they were barred from providing services in non-border provinces that hosted refugees, even when Syrians migrated north and west.\textsuperscript{1275} For example, a Save the Children representative interviewed for the \textit{Transatlantic Council on Migration} observed that their own officials eschewed refugee project proposals if the projects were launched in locations different from where this organization registered to work because Turkish authorities often rejected such requests.\textsuperscript{1276} To try and circumvent the restrictions, NGOs requested assistance from UN agencies, but the UN was unable to provide much assistance. As one UN official explained, “A lot of NGOs ask us for help. As the UN, we are in a more sensitive position, and we cannot push [the government] very much. Otherwise we could be banned. We are here to support the government.”\textsuperscript{1277}

\textit{Obstructive Work Permit Policy}. From 2011 to 2014 foreign workers employed by INGOs entered Turkey without restrictions to provide refugee services to Syrians.\textsuperscript{1278} The law changed in 2015, requiring foreign workers of INGOs to apply for work permits.\textsuperscript{1279}

\textsuperscript{1273} Interview with Subject T9NGO, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{1274} Kirisci, \textit{Syrian Refugees}, [Page 38].
\textsuperscript{1275} Transatlantic Council on Migration, \textit{The Evolving}, [Page 14].
\textsuperscript{1276} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1277} Interview with Subject T12UN, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{1278} Longton, “Turkey Pushing,” Middle East Institute.
\textsuperscript{1279} Ibid.
INGO representatives claimed that it was difficult to obtain the permits. As one INGO representative observed, “There have been continuous changes on what documents you need and conditions you need for NGOs to get Syrians work permits.” One INGO representative recalled his own experience stating, “There is a procedure for residency and work permits. This was a big change. I was obliged to leave the country two times to re-register my visa.” This change in policy hindered the ability to provide refugee education services. As one NGO representative explained,

They gave work permits, but there is a change in the policy. Before the national staff of INGOs in Turkey, they come here and apply for the work permit…Now…you are not allowed to apply for the work permit here anymore in Turkey. You have to go home to your country and apply to the Turkish embassy for the visa…This affects the services. To find a person with very long experience, [and who] can speak English, this is difficult to find. They are being stalled from coming to work.

One INGO’s Experience in Turkey

One INGO representative agreed to speak about her organization’s experience in Turkey if I agreed to keep her name and organization anonymous. I begin this section by systematically describing this INGO’s relationship to the government in terms of the three variables that impact government cooperation – a history of providing services prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, NGOs’ financial leverage, and the distribution of assistance to both Turks and Syrian refugees. I then discuss how they collectively had an impact on cooperation. Finally, I report on the efforts made by this institution to improve relations with the Turkish government.

1280 Interview with Subject T7NGO, op. cit.
1281 Interview with Subject T9NGO, op. cit.
1282 Interview with Subject T3NGO, op. cit.
History of Relationship between This INGO and the Government of Turkey. This INGO was not established in Turkey prior to the Syrian refugee crisis. It was established in Turkey in 2013. Yet the organization did not officially offer refugee services until 2014. The INGO representative explained the delay:

Turkey is quite different from Lebanon and Jordan. The programs for INGOs kicked in a lot later. For a long time, it was AFAD doing the work and the focus was on the camp population. It has only been the last year that there was funding for Turkey. The kick starter … [was]…the Kobani influx into Suruç in 2014… [This] kick started protection, shelter programing.

The organization began providing medical and health services for refugees, but then expanded into cash-assistance programs and, germane to this research, education.

Funding. In July 2015, this INGO received UNICEF funding to provide non-formal education. The INGO representative explained, “We bridge the gap… [We work] with children…We give them literacy and Turkish language [courses]. We also have youth programs, lessons to prepare them for adult life and the work force, and computer skills [courses].” Yet, I am unable to report the refugee education services funding budget for this INGO. I have made numerous attempts to request this information, but my requests were ignored.

Distribution of Assistance to Turks and Syrian Refugees. In July 2016, this INGO representative became the organization’s education program manager for Turkey. By August 2016, this organization provided over 6,000 Syrian children and impoverished Turkish children with assistance. Both health and medical services were offered to Syrian

1283 Interview with Subject T7NGO, op. cit.
1284 Ibid.
refugees and Turks, and yet education services were provided to Syrians only. Non-formal education services were provided only to Syrians due to the language barrier. Turkish children did not benefit from this service.

**The Impact on Turkish Cooperation.** While this INGO deliberately provided medical assistance to both Syrian refugees and vulnerable host community children, the lack of a prior history between this INGO and Turkey and the relatively weak financial power of this INGO impacted the level of Turkish government cooperation. Consequently, it encountered two significant obstacles to its provision of these services: The government provided no protocols for communication, and it was unwilling to provide a refugee education strategy. These obstacles are discussed below.

**No Communication of Protocol.** While the government permitted this organization to provide refugee education services, no instructions were communicated to it regarding how it should interact with the government or at what level. The INGO representative explained, “There [was] no clear way to coordinate with the government. There is the national government and there is the provincial and then [the] district decision maker. Do we go to provincial level or national level?” This INGO had difficulty obtaining approval for refugee education programs because the staff did not know which department to approach. She stated, “When we started our education program, the provincial government said we can work, but then we had to register this program, but we don’t know which department to go with.” She offered another example not affiliated with refugee education, “There is a lot of bureaucratic runaround. Turkey is a very bureaucratic country. We found out that we needed permission to distribute hygiene kits. So we try. We went to many departments…We went to the police, and they didn’t know why we were there.”
No Refugee Education Strategy. The Ministry of Education did not provide a refugee education plan nor any guidance for the implementation of refugee education services. The interview subject explained,

It [the government] is making the commitment to get kids into formal education. They created education centers. They have made big strides to get kids in school, but they don’t have a clear strategy. We continually avail ourselves to them, but we are pushed to different departments…Identifying out of school kids, they want to take on the lead, but are unclear on how they want to work with INGOs.

She stated that there was a “provincial level action plan,” but that the government never made it accessible to her organization. Her INGO consulted the MONE website and the UNHCR refugee response plans, but these sources offered little information on the refugee education plan or its implementation. The government also did not share the procedures for establishing a refugee education program. She gave this example, “Basically with UNICEF, we set up an informal education program. We [started] services. Then the government says, ‘You should have a protocol with us.’ You [the government] even told us informally we didn’t need one.” She added, “The biggest difficulty is getting permission from the government.” She believes that these factors impacted refugee education, “We are far behind in education.”

Strategies to Improve Coordination with Government. The INGO representative stated that her organization employed three strategies to improve coordination efforts with the government. First, like the strategy employed by Relief International in Jordan, this INGO attempted to build informal relationships with government officials within the

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1285 In the country of Turkey, the terms, non-formal education and informal education are interchangeable.
province where it was registered. But that strategy proved ineffective. As she recalled, “[We] spend all this time to make relationships with the provincial government to work with, [and] to get more information and support. We work within Gaziantep and this is one of the worst provinces to gain a relationship, to get support, to get information.” Second, the organization hired a lawyer to represent it when dealing with the government. She stated, “It is a difficult country to operate in…We need a liaison to work with the government to set up meetings, networking, relationship building, trying to get doors open.” Third, in July 2016, this INGO was invited to an UN-led refugee education workshop that was attended by government officials and INGOs. She observed,

In the last few months, there have been shifts. There was the workshop and the promise for plans to come out soon…We shall see. UNICEF said during the workshop that this is how Jordan and Lebanon is doing things as a signal to the MONE that here are successful ways to work together.”

My findings from this interview indicate that the organization was limited in its ability to overcome obstacles to the provision of refugee education services despite efforts to improve coordination with the government. It is important to note that by November 2016, the government ceased working with INGOs on refugee education projects. After the failed coup, the INGO representative explained, “The government decided to not work with INGOs anymore… They have some suspicions working with INGOs… As an INGO, we felt targeted…We had to find a national partner to hand this program over.” Consequently, this INGO transferred its refugee education program to a local NGO registered in Gaziantep.
Conclusion

At the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis, Turkey created policies that welcomed Syrian refugee children to enroll in formal and non-formal education programs. They instituted double shifts to meet new demands, and they agreed to open refugee education centers to accommodate Syrian children who could not enroll in Turkish public schools. Yet, by August 2016 only 40.4% - 341,689 of 845,364 of Syrian refugee children were enrolled in formal and non-formal education programs. To restate, the key determinant of the variation in refugee enrollment rates is the opportunities, strategies, and capabilities of NGOs to overcome obstacles in the host countries. I found that Turkey’s low enrollment rate is attributable to this explanation. To reiterate, the findings of my research suggest that there are four key factors connected to NGOs’ opportunities, strategies, and capabilities that have an impact on the Syrian refugee enrollment rate. The most significant factor is the domestic and international NGOs’ opportunities to collaborate with the Turkish government to provide refugee services. The other three factors are the conditions that impact the level of cooperation between the NGOs and Turkey. They include a good relationship between NGOs and the government prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, the NGOs’ utilization of fiscal aid as a negotiating tool with the state, and the strategy of providing for both refugees and Turks. I discuss these factors that influence cooperation, in order of priority from most to least important, below.

One condition that leads to government cooperation is a good prior relationship between the state and NGOs. Unlike in Jordan and Lebanon, NGOs in Turkey did not provide social services, such as education, prior to the Syrian refugee crisis. Most important to this study, NGOs played a major role in implementing the EU’s agenda of democratizing Turkey as a requisite of EU candidacy, thus impinging on Turkish sovereignty. While domestic NGOs were established prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, some were formed as a requirement for EU accession. A few of these NGOs were critical of the Turkish government and were considered counterweights to government action, causing the government to be wary of them. These concessions created a protracted antipathy towards NGOs during the Syrian refugee crisis.

Furthermore, prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, the government had limited interaction with INGOs because they had a strong network of domestic NGOs that assisted in humanitarian emergencies. The implications of these findings suggest that Turkey did not fully trust institutions like NGOs prior to the Syrian refugee crisis and this lack of trust informed the current relationship between these entities. As a result, NGOs and INGOs were unable to participate in the decision making processes. They were also prohibited from conducting surveys and needs assessments in communities that hosted Syrian refugees.

A second condition that leads to government cooperation is NGOs’ financial power relative to the state. In comparison to the INGOs in Jordan and Lebanon, INGOs in Turkey had far less financial leverage. Traditionally, INGOs are conduits for millions of dollars of international aid during a refugee crisis. Consistent with that trend, INGOs in Jordan and Lebanon received monies from international donors and dispensed millions of dollars that
benefitted both refugee and host communities. But this was not the case in Turkey. First, there were disputes between Turkey, the international donors, and the INGOs because Turkey wanted the funding to be given directly to the government rather than funneled through INGOs. Second, the international donors viewed Turkey as having less financial need than Jordan and Lebanon. As a result, international donors contributed less monetary aid to the refugee crisis in Turkey, and INGOs received less funding from the donors than their counterparts in Jordan and Lebanon. Consequently, the money distributed to INGOs was not an incentive for the Turkish government to cooperate with INGOs.

A third condition that elicits government cooperation is the NGOs’ deliberate decision to assist both the domestic population and the Syrian refugees. Domestic and international NGOs assisted both impoverished Turks and Syrian refugees, but the level of assistance needed by the Turks was less than what was needed by the domestic populations of Jordan and Lebanon. This was because Turkey had the seventeenth strongest economy in the world by 2014, and the state was able to care for its citizenry. While this was the only factor that gave some NGOs leverage, it was not enough to persuade the Turkish government to cooperate.

The Turkish case study demonstrates that there are conditions that are conducive to the lower Syrian refugee enrollment rates not attributable to the actions of domestic and international NGOs but rather to the lack of opportunities afforded to them. Instead of being welcomed by the government to provide adequate and comprehensive refugee education programs, they faced encumbrances that impeded or prohibited their efforts. Thus, the relationship between Turkey and INGOs is what Adil Najam would identify as a confrontational relationship - “when governmental agencies and non-governmental
organizations consider each other’s goals and strategies to be antithetical to their own—essentially, total divergence of preferred ends as well as means.”

The implications of these findings suggest that while NGOs attempted to overcome encumbrances to provide refugee education services, these attempts were insufficient because the host government was unwilling to cooperate. This is a particularly important factor. There is little that NGOs can do without the consent and support of the host government. While it should be noted that Turkey lacked the capacity to accommodate Syrian refugee children in Turkish public schools due to a significant teacher shortage, especially in the south and east provinces where most Syrians settled, it is the deliberate choice of the government not to cooperate with NGOs, and in particular with INGOs, that explains why Turkey had the lowest Syrian refugee enrollment rate.

1287 Najam, ”The Four-C’s,” [Page 385].
Chapter 7
Main Findings and Implications for Future Research

The final chapter of this dissertation discusses the main findings, the significance of my research, and the implications for future research. First, I provide a summary of the purpose of my research and the key findings across each case study. Second, I examine how the findings of my dissertation may contribute to three distinct research programs: the research program that identifies the key determinants of NGO-host government cooperation, the research program that examines domestic and international factors that influence refugee policy, and the research program that assesses refugee education programs and identifies the conditions that impact the delivery of education. Third, I discuss the policy implications of my study. Finally, I conclude with my recommendations for future research.

Summary of Key Findings

This dissertation attempts to explain the factors that determine the variance in Syrian refugee enrollment rates in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. Graph 7.1 illustrates the disparity in Syrian refugee enrollment rates. Jordan consistently had the highest refugee enrollment rates in comparison to Turkey and Lebanon from 2013 to 2017.
This marked variance across the three countries presented a puzzle. All three countries regarded education as a factor that protects national security, had signed international conventions giving access to education for all children, had participated in international education forums, and had provided access to education to Syrian refugees at the local level. Yet, there remained a significant gap in Syrian refugees’ access to education services. I posited that there were both domestic and international factors that influenced refugee policy, which would in turn impact refugee enrollment rates. I explored several alternative explanations to identify the key determinant that explains the variance in Syrian refugee enrollment rates. The domestic factors included security concerns, and economic

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1288 There is no percentage given for 2013 in Turkey except that it was estimated that 60% were enrolled in camps and 30% were enrolled in self-settled areas. From: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Syria Response Plan 5 2013 Final Report (UNHCR, 2013), [Page 34], http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php
constraints and interests. The international factors included the elements of the host government’s historical relationship with Syria and the host government’s relationship with international entities that support refugees – namely NGOs. I examined these factors on the assumption that there was a nexus between the state’s refugee policies and the variance in refugee enrollment rates. I collected, analyzed and evaluated the utility of these different alternative explanations, using both quantitative and qualitative measures.

The findings of my study suggest that the state refugee policies that regulate education, residency, and employment are similar across each host country. All three countries created refugee-friendly education policies that welcomed Syrian children to enroll in schools, providing access to formal and non-formal education services. Yet, all three countries created restrictive residency requirements and right to work policies that created obstacles to accessing refugee education services.

My findings therefore suggest that it is not a host government’s refugee policy that explains variance in Syrian refugee enrollment rates because they are similar in each of the study countries. Rather, from the interviews that I conducted, I discovered that the variance in refugee enrollment rates is explained by two factors: the timing and the degree of engagement by the three host governments with the UN and NGOs to address the Syrian refugee crisis within their borders, and the policies they created over time to cooperate with NGOs that provide services like education for refugees. The Q-sort exercises, the ANOVA tests, and the post hoc tests that I conducted revealed which domestic and international conditions drive refugee policy, but more importantly, how these priorities and conditions inform the host governments’ interactions with NGOs. Table 7.1 illustrates the factors that
influence refugee policies across the three countries and inform the host governments’ interaction with NGOs. The results are discussed below the table.

**Table 7.1 Factors that Influence Refugee Policies across the Three Host Countries and Inform Host Governments’ Interaction with NGOs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Security Concerns</th>
<th>Economic Interests and Constraints</th>
<th>Host Government’s Prior History with Syria</th>
<th>Host Government’s Coordination with NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Contingent(^{1289})</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Q-sort rankings by government, UN, and NGO participants in Jordan indicate that Jordan’s greatest priorities have been security concerns, followed by economic and financial concerns. Having adequate resources and maintaining security influenced Jordan’s refugee policy. The rankings revealed that Jordan was willing to cooperate with the international community so that it could receive, most importantly, financial assistance, and of a lesser concern, technical assistance. The Jordanian government was willing to work with external institutions like the UN and NGOs and to collaborate on assistance to refugees, a finding supported by the semi-structured interviews. NGOs also shared aid between the local host populations and refugees which was an incentive for the Jordanian government to collaborate. The priorities and conditions in Jordan were complementary to the work of NGOs, and as a result, NGOs in Jordan had the opportunity, capabilities, and resources to work within the system.

\(^{1289}\) Interviews with NGO representatives and UN officials indicated that the prior history between Lebanon and Syria impacted policy while most host government officials denied this.
In Lebanon, the interviews and the Q-sort exercises indicated a divergence in the views of the participants across the three different kinds of institutions. Resources and security were the priority issues for the Lebanese government, yet there were additional influential factors: a country and government divided by religious sectarianism, a need to preserve a fragile peace, and a desire to ensure that large numbers of Syrian refugees did not permanently settle in Lebanon as Palestinian refugees had done before the current crisis. The interviews revealed that NGOs had limited opportunities and capabilities to work with the Lebanese government and to overcome obstacles to providing refugee education. The host government was willing to cooperate with NGOs, but within clearly defined parameters.

In Turkey, security was identified as a concern by UN officials and NGO representatives, but the government’s priorities included a wider political agenda. Several participants cited both domestic and international political factors as influential, but none was mentioned consistently as a consideration. The interviews revealed that Turkey is a regionally powerful country focused on its sovereignty and was unused to permitting outside actors – specifically INGOs in this context - within its border to assist with socio-political problems like the Syrian refugee crisis. The government’s reaction at the onset of the crisis was to restrict assistance from international entities like the UN and INGOs. There was a delayed policy response to permit the UN and NGOs to provide services to millions of refugees. Yet, though the policy changed to allow INGOs to provide assistance, these entities still faced resistant local governments. The interviews revealed that NGOs had little opportunities and capabilities to work with the government and was therefore restricted in their efforts to overcome obstacles to providing services like education.
These findings explain the circumstances under which domestic and international NGOs – key actors in the provision of refugee education – delivered services in the three countries. The findings of my research also suggest that there are four key factors connected to NGOs’ opportunities, strategies, and capabilities that had an impact on the Syrian refugee enrollment rate. The most significant factor was the domestic and international NGOs’ opportunities to collaborate with the host government to provide refugee services. The other three factors were the conditions that impacted the level of cooperation between the NGOs and the host government. They included a good relationship between NGOs and the government prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, the NGOs’ utilization of fiscal aid as a negotiating tool with the state, and the strategy of providing for both refugees and the domestic population. Table 7.2 is a visual illustration of these factors across the host countries. These factors are arranged from left to right in the table in order of priority from most-to-least important. These factors are discussed in detail following the table.
Table 7.2 Three Key Factors That Impact the Level of Cooperation between Host Governments and NGOs in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Host Government Is Willing to Cooperate with NGOs</th>
<th>Good Prior Relationship between Government and NGOs</th>
<th>NGOs’ Utilization of Fiscal Aid as a Negotiating Tool</th>
<th>Provides for Both Refugees and Domestic Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Jordan.* In Jordan, domestic and international NGOs were afforded the most opportunities to collaborate with the Jordanian government. The government allowed domestic and international NGOs to provide education services to refugees at the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis. NGOs were permitted to collaborate on the Syrian Refugee Response Plan and were invited to participate in open dialogue forums with the government and the UN with the intent to affect constructive change. Table 7.2 demonstrates that all three factors that elicit government cooperation were evident in Jordan. First, NGOs had good relationships with the Jordanian government prior to the Syrian refugee crisis. NGOs were permitted to provide services and development projects to the domestic population, and to offer humanitarian relief to Palestinian and Iraqi refugees. NGOs established beneficial development projects like kindergarten education to the domestic population and were viewed by both the government and the domestic population favorably. Second, NGOs had considerable financial resources to leverage. Jordan is a resource-poor country in need of funding for infrastructure and programs. NGOs had considerable financial power because they served as conduits for millions of dollars from international donors and the United Nations. The promise of financial aid provided an incentive for the Jordanian
government to cooperate with NGOs. Third, domestic and international NGOs assisted both native Jordanians as well as Syrian refugees. These three factors in tandem explain why the Jordanian government was willing to cooperate with NGOs and why the Syrian refugee enrollment rate was consistently the highest from 2013 to 2017.

The Lebanese government limited its willingness to cooperate with NGOs. Prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, NGOs provided services like education and healthcare when the government could not, during the Lebanese civil war and its aftermath. The government relied on NGOs to provide social services, which helps to explain why NGOs were permitted to deliver education services in a limited capacity in the current Syrian refugee crisis. NGOs working in Lebanon, particularly INGOs, received significant funding from both the United Nations and international donors to provide assistance and create programs for refugees and host communities from 2011 to 2016. The government engaged in a minimal level of cooperation to receive funding as indicated by the interviews conducted for this research. Domestic and international NGOs assisted both impoverished Lebanese citizens as well as the Syrian refugees. Yet, domestic and international NGOs were unable to overcome a substantial obstacle in Lebanon: a decentralized and fractured Lebanese government. That fragmentation limited government cooperation with NGOs. That factor ultimately impacted Syrian refugees, as indicated by the lower Syrian refugee enrollment rate when compared to Jordan’s.

In Turkey, NGOs had the least amount of opportunity to provide adequate and comprehensive refugee education programs. This can be attributed to the absence of two of the three factors highlighted in Table 7.2. In contrast to Jordan and Lebanon, NGOs provided few social services prior to the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey. While domestic
NGOs were established prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, some were formed as a requirement for EU accession. Of these, a few were critical of the Turkish government, causing the government to be wary of them. Turkey did not fully trust NGOs prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, and this lack of trust informed their relationship during the Syrian refugee crisis. The government limited interaction with INGOs from 2011 to 2017 because the country had little historical experience interacting with them. Turkey had an established, strong network of domestic NGOs that assisted in prior Turkish humanitarian emergencies, like earthquakes. Historically, there was little need to request assistance from INGOs.

INGOs in Turkey had little financial leverage to incentivize cooperation because they received considerably less financial support in contrast to Jordan and Lebanon. That was because international donors viewed Turkey as having less financial need than Jordan and Lebanon, and consequently distributed less funding to INGOs in Turkey. Furthermore, there were disputes between Turkey, the international donors, and the INGOs over Turkey’s demands that the government – and not the INGOs - receive any funding directly. Thus, there was little financial incentive for Turkish officials to cooperate with INGOs. The only factor that had the potential to positively impact the Syrian refugee enrollment rates in Turkey was that domestic and international NGOs assisted both impoverished Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees. Yet, this factor was not enough to garner any significant cooperation from the state.

**Significance of the Findings**

The findings of my dissertation are significant because they may potentially contribute to three research programs. The first research program identifies the key
determinants of government-NGO cooperation and their implications on the delivery of social services, such as education. The second research program examines the domestic and international factors that potentially influence refugee policy in a host country. The third research program assesses refugee education programs and identifies the conditions that impact the delivery of education. These three research programs are linked because the factors that influence refugee policy - a top-down approach - impact the conditions on the ground that make it possible to provide refugee education services – a bottom-up approach. Furthermore, this is dependent upon the involvement of two key actors - host governments and NGOs - and the degree of interaction between them. I discuss each research program, noting how my findings may contribute to each below.

**NGO-Host Government Cooperation.** My work may potentially contribute to the research program that examines NGO-host government cooperation. My findings may be relevant to this program because I study one outcome of this willingness to cooperate – namely, the variance in the gross enrollment ratios of Syrian refugees in cross national study. Indeed, I have found no other comparative case study that examines this specific outcome in connection to a host government’s degree of engagement with NGOs.

My findings may make an empirical contribution to two subsets of the NGO-host government cooperation literature. First, how NGOs and host governments interact and second, the different mechanisms and tactics utilized by both entities to achieve their goals, to overcome obstructions or to gain cooperation from each other.

My findings reinforce the arguments that the scholars make in this research program. The literature notes that NGOs and governments interact through formal channels, such as contracts and policies, and through informal relationships, such as
alliances, networks and personal relationships. Several scholars in the literature contend that these informal relationships are crucial for NGOs to provide services because they increase NGO-government collaboration. My research may make an empirical contribution because this study demonstrates how NGOs and host governments engage with each other through both formal channels (policies) and informal means (practices and relationships) in order to determine how and whether these interactions impact refugee enrollment rates. I conducted an in-depth case study on one INGO’s interaction with government officials in each of the host countries to assess their level of success in gaining cooperation. The in-depth case study of Relief International in Jordan provides an example of how informal means can lead to cooperation. Relief International used the strategy of “back-staging” - the interactions that occur privately and informally between government officials and NGO representatives to gain government cooperation. Relief International fostered interpersonal relationships with officials at the Ministry of Education; hired an education expert with personal connections to the Ministry of Education, and maintained a successful relationship with the Ministry of Education through a program of transparency and consultancy. This INGOs’ efforts to improve its relationship with the government proved successful. Thus, my findings support the argument that establishing informal relationships with government officials is necessary to the success of NGOs.

1292 Pettigrew, "Power, Conflicts,” [Page 381].
The literature also conversely contends that if informal relationships are not established, collaborations between NGOs and governments are negatively impacted. The in-depth case studies of specific INGOs in both Lebanon and Turkey supports this claim. Neither were able to establish informal relationships with government officials, although the specific INGO that I examined in Lebanon did mention that it had fostered informal government relationships in its health sector and was thereby able to garner a higher level of cooperation in that sector. My findings therefore further support the claims made in the literature that informal relationships are a key determinant of host government cooperation.

The literature highlights that governments and NGOs use different types of leverage mechanisms and a myriad of strategies to achieve their goals, to overcome obstructions or to gain cooperation from each other. Most important to this dissertation, the literature indicates that the government’s most powerful mechanism is its decision to either withhold cooperation or to cooperate with NGOs. A government’s decision to cooperate is evident in two ways – through the creation of NGO-friendly legislation and the subsequent government actions and interactions with NGOs that impact the level of cooperation. My research supports these findings. I found that the Jordanian government demonstrated

a willingness to cooperate, through the creation of policies and practices to manage the NGOs. The government permitted NGOs to provide education services to refugees at the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis. Furthermore, the government permitted NGOs to collaborate on the Syrian Refugee Response Plan, and to participate in an open dialogue with the government and the UN in forums intended to affect constructive change.

The literature also suggests that the reciprocal exchanges of information, shared decision making, accountability, and mutual trust are the hallmarks of a strong government-NGO collaboration. The Jordanian government-NGO relationship embodied these assertions as indicated by the factors listed above. Both entities worked together to provide services to Syrian refugees. Jordan therefore had the highest Syrian refugee enrollment rate from 2013 to 2017.

The literature contends that governments exercise their power to withhold cooperation from NGOs. My research may make an empirical contribution to this literature by providing evidence to support this claim. I found that the Lebanese government delayed its creation of policy and practices to manage the NGOs until 2014. It created restrictive policies and procedures that limited NGO activities and restricted which organizations could participate in shared decision making once it engaged in managing the Syrian refugee crisis. The MEHE prohibited NGOs from providing formal education programs that result in an education certificate. The MEHE also did not release the standard operating procedures for two key non-formal education programs: literacy and numeracy.

1297 Postma, "NGO Partnership," [Page 451].
This caused a delay to providing essential education services. Lebanon therefore had moderate Syrian refugee enrollment rate from 2013 to 2017.

A. N. Zafar Ullah et al. lists three conditions for a successful partnership between governments and NGOs. These consist of fair policies, laws and regulatory frameworks, the involvement of all stakeholders at all levels from local to international, and the constant commitment from all parties. My findings from the interviews with the key stakeholders suggest that two of the three conditions needed for an effective collaboration between Turkey and the NGOs were notably absent. Turkey enacted NGO-friendly policies, but it did not initiate practices to support NGOs, comparable to other confrontational relationships discussed in the literature. NGOs in Turkey were denied the chance to conduct an open dialogue with the government. The Turkish government did not trust INGOs - a view supported by the events that took place after the failed coup attempt of July 2016 - and expelled them from the country. The literature highlights the fact that while governments may enact NGO-friendly policies, it is their subsequent actions and interactions with NGOs that indicate the level of cooperation. My findings from the Turkey case study support the conclusion that laws are not enough to compel governments to cooperate. Turkey therefore had the lowest Syrian refugee enrollment rate from 2013 to 2017.

My findings may make an empirical contribution to Adil Najam’s “theory of strategic institutional interests” by providing more examples of his typology of government-NGO relationships. Table 7.3 is a visual illustration of how each country fits within his typology. Jordan exemplifies a cooperative government-NGO relationship. Both

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1300 Batley, "Engaged or Divorced?," [Page 241].
entities shared similar policy goals (the ends) and the tactics (the means) to realize them.\textsuperscript{1301} The government’s priorities were having adequate resources and maintaining security, and for those priorities, it was willing to cooperate with the UN, donors and NGOs. The government and NGOs worked in tandem to ensure that there were enough resources for both refugees and the host community. The government and NGOs collaborated to provide services to Syrian refugees.

Lebanon exemplifies a co-optative relationship - governments and NGOs having different goals (the ends) but similar strategies (the means).\textsuperscript{1302} In these instances, there is a low level of cooperation between these entities. Najam observes that co-optative relationships are built on power struggles.\textsuperscript{1303} The history of NGO-government relations demonstrates that the Lebanese government was unable to provide social services like education during its civil war and subsequent reconstruction.\textsuperscript{1304} Instead, domestic and international NGOs representing varying religious sects and secular entities provided the bulk of these services from 1975 to the 2000s.\textsuperscript{1305} I learned that the government deferred the management of the Syrian refugee crisis to the UN and NGOs at the crisis’ onset, but

\textsuperscript{1301} Najam, "The Four-C's," [Page 384].
\textsuperscript{1302} Najam, "The Four-C's," [Page 388].
\textsuperscript{1303} Ibid., p. 389.
for reasons not accounted for in this research, the government decided to reclaim control of managing the crisis in 2014.\textsuperscript{1306} While both the government and NGOs provided education services to refugees, the government perceived NGO autonomy as a threat to government authority. It therefore restricted NGO activities in a bid to consolidate power.

Turkey exemplifies a confrontational relationship - “when governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations consider each other’s goals and strategies to be antithetical to their own—essentially, total divergence of preferred ends as well as means.”\textsuperscript{1307} NGOs played a major role in implementing the EU’s agenda of democratizing Turkey as a requisite of EU candidacy. Some formed as a requirement for EU accession and were critical of the Turkish government. Consequently, NGOs impinged on Turkish sovereignty, and led to a protracted antipathy towards NGOs during the Syrian refugee crisis. Furthermore, the government had limited interactions with INGOs prior to the Syrian refugee crisis. The government did not fully trust these outside entities and acted accordingly by creating obstacles that international NGOs were unable to surmount in their provision of refugee education services. Ultimately, the July 15, 2016 attempted coup d’état led to further encumbrances that caused many INGOs to stop providing services and to leave the country.

\textsuperscript{1306} Subject L5NGO stated a possible reason for the government to take control in 2014, “Two years ago [2014], there was a big crackdown on INGOS and NGOs providing education. They [the Ministry of Education and Higher Education] closed down the schools. They saw them as a parallel system and shut them down.” The same subject – L5NGO – stated that the MEHE had created its own program – RACE (Reaching All Children with Education) which would be in competition with NGO-created programs.

\textsuperscript{1307} Najam, "The Four-C’s," [Page 385].
Table 7.3 Adil Najam’s Typology of NGO-Government Relations Applied to Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred Strategies (Means)</th>
<th>Goals (Ends)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Similar</td>
<td>Dissimilar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation - Jordan</td>
<td>Co-optation - Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complementary</td>
<td>Confrontation - Turkey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The literature indicates that NGOs have a repertoire of powerful mechanisms at their disposal to overcome government obstruction – such as ‘naming and shaming,’ building alliances, organizing protests, using mass media, and openly defying government policy. The literature notes that NGOs are powerful because they are often funded by international donors, forcing governments to cooperate with them if they need financial assistance. My research supports this claim. Jordan is a resource-poor country dependent on foreign aid and cooperates with NGOs to receive funding that benefits both refugees and host communities. NGOS in Jordan used their ability to acquire monetary aid from international sources as a negotiating tool with the government. When I conducted my research in 2016, the Lebanese government had a great financial need because it operated on budget allocations established in 2005. NGOs in Lebanon had an advantage in that they attracted financial aid that ultimately benefitted both the Lebanese population

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and the Syrian refugees as a percentage of that funding was allocated for the host communities and infrastructure projects.\textsuperscript{1311} The Lebanese government therefore offered some degree of cooperation to NGOs, but not at the levels observed in Jordan. International donors did not view Turkey as having a significant financial need since it had a strong economy at the time of research. Turkey had the sixteenth strongest economy in 2013 and the seventeenth strongest economy in 2014, 2015, and 2016.\textsuperscript{1312} The amount of funding distributed to INGOs was not an incentive for the Turkish government to cooperate with them.

Overall, the findings of this dissertation may contribute to the literature that discusses the effectiveness of NGO strategies to provide refugee education services when host governments are unwilling to comply. My findings suggest that the effectiveness of NGO strategies to overcome government encumbrances is contingent upon the ability to use them in tandem with financial incentives. Thus, my research illustrates that the funding of NGOs by international donors and the United Nations might be a powerful tool for NGOs seeking host government cooperation in order to provide refugee education services.


Factors that Influence Refugee Policy. This dissertation potentially contributes to the research program that identifies both international and domestic factors as drivers of refugee policy. Based on the literature review, I identified national and local security concerns and economic interests and constraints as domestic drivers of refugee policy. I identified elements of the host government’s historical relationship with Syria - shared political influences, histories and events - as well as shared religious or kinship groups across borders as potential international factors that drive refugee policy. I also identified the host government’s coordination with NGOs as an international driver of refugee policy.

International NGOs are analytically distinct from domestic NGOs. INGOs have the same missions as domestic NGOs, “but it is international in scope and has outposts around the world to deal with specific issues in many countries.” INGOs provide logistic, institutional, technical, and financial support in a crisis and often seek partnerships with domestic NGOs. An important distinction between international and domestic NGOs is that in most cases, INGOs are conduits for international monetary aid during crises, and that host government have limited jurisdiction over INGOs.

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My work may contribute to this research because in the case studies of Jordan and Lebanon I provide empirical evidence that identifies the key factors that influence local refugee policy. I conclude that it is domestic factors that influence refugee policy in the case of Lebanon.\textsuperscript{1317} I conclude that it is both domestic and international factors that influence refugee policy in the case of Jordan. Participants in both countries believed that factors such as having adequate resources and maintaining both national and local security to ensure the safety of the domestic population influenced refugee policy. Participants in Jordan also believed that garnering financial assistance and to a lesser degree – technical assistance – from international entities that support refugees influenced refugee policy. This type of research supports the claims of Alan Dowty, Michael Teitelbaum and Karen Jacobsen that security is a primary factor driving refugee policy choices.\textsuperscript{1318} It also supports Gil Loescher and John Scanlan’s claim that a nation’s “social and economic health” is an influence.\textsuperscript{1319} I was unable to discover the key drivers that influence refugee policy in Turkey although national security concerns were cited by UN officials and NGO representatives as an influence on refugee policy. I discuss this in further detail in the future research section of this chapter.

\textit{Policy- and Advocacy-Oriented Refugee Education Programs.} My work may contribute to a body of policy- and advocacy-oriented refugee education literature published by the United Nations and NGOs that provide refugee education programs.\textsuperscript{1320}

\textsuperscript{1317} I was unable to discover the definitive factors that influence refugee policy in Turkey, and I will address this further in the future research section of this chapter.


\textsuperscript{1319} Loescher and Scanlan, \textit{Calculated Kindness}, [Page xvi].

\textsuperscript{1320} Examples of refugee education reports: Sarah Dryden-Peterson, \textit{Barriers to Accessing Primary Education in Conflict-affected Fragile States Final Report} (2009).
Generally, this literature describes and examines current refugee conditions, offers research-based recommendations to improve access to education services, and is designed to encourage donors to support refugee services like education. These reports are important because they provide a foundation upon which to study local conditions. They identify factors that impede the provision of education services to refugees: shortages of teachers, an inability of schools to obtain certification, a lack of financial resources, refugees’ lack of legal status or documentation to obtain services, overcrowded schools, a lack of transportation, discrimination and xenophobia from the host community, and the absence of coordination efforts. Some of these reports conclude that funding and capacity are the main obstacles to refugees’ access to education.

My research may make an empirical contribution to the policy- and advocacy-oriented refugee education literature. I identify that it is the opportunities, strategies, and


1322 On average, refugee education receives approximately 2% of humanitarian aid, the lowest of all sectors, and only 38% of aid requests for education are met, half the average of all other sectors.

capabilities of NGOs to overcome obstacles such as the lack of funding and capacity issues that explain variance in refugee education rates in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon.\textsuperscript{123} My research may add to this literature because I identify the factors that help explain why some NGOs are able to overcome impediments in host countries while other cannot. My research highlights the most important factor – the willingness of the host government to cooperate with NGOs that provide refugee education services. Furthermore, I identify which factors impact the degree of NGO-host government cooperation: a prior history between the host government and NGOs, the NGOs’ financial power relative to the state, and the provision of aid to both domestic and refugee populations. The findings of this dissertation may lead to additional insights into the barriers to access to refugee education services.

**Policy Implications**

The implications of my study reinforce the view that decision makers should consider policies that promote host government cooperation with NGOs in conjunction with pressuring host governments to establish refugee-friendly policies. My research discovered that there are three factors that impact the level of cooperation. One - the prior relationship between host governments and NGOs before a refugee crisis – is outside the realm of policymakers dealing with an imminent crisis. Yet, the other two factors may have an immediate impact - international funding, and the provision of services to both the domestic population and the refugees (within budget constraints). My research demonstrates that international entities that have much bearing on refugees’ access to education services – international donors, the United Nations and NGOs – can increase

\textsuperscript{123} Capacity refers to the number of pupils that schools can accommodate, the physical space needed, the availability of school resources and materials, and the number of teacher available to provide education services.
host government cooperation through two actions. First, and most obvious, is for these international entities to enhance the NGOs’ financial leverage over the state by increasing the amount of funding given to NGOs. My findings indicate that substantial financial donations are an incentive to elicit the host government’s cooperation with NGOs that provide refugee education services. My findings also suggest the continuation of a strategy of giving funding directly to NGOs in order to encourage host governments to engage with them. Second - the less obvious and more controversial action - is to guarantee a more equitable distribution of funds to aid both domestic and refugee populations of the host country. As stated in Chapter 1, lower and middle-income countries are frequently the recipients of significant refugee influxes.\textsuperscript{1324} In 2010, 80% or 8.3 million refugees were hosted by developing countries.\textsuperscript{1325} A 2016 UNHCR report – \textit{Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2016} - found that, “Developing regions hosted 84 per cent of the world’s refugees under UNHCR’s mandate, with about 14.5 million people.”\textsuperscript{1326} These host countries incur significant fiscal costs such as building an infrastructure to accommodate refugees, paying salaries to those who work with refugees, and providing social services to refugees.\textsuperscript{1327} Often, these host countries have to contend with significant domestic social problems such as high unemployment rates, unstable economies, an inadequate infrastructure, and national and local security concerns that existed before the large influx.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{1324} United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, \textit{The Role of Host Countries}, [Page 3].
\textsuperscript{1325} Ibid., p. 2.
\textsuperscript{1327} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
Therefore, the logical action is for these international entities to provide funding for programs that benefit and sustain both the domestic population and refugees.

This study demonstrates the need for engaged policy participants – international donors, the United Nations, and those in leadership in INGOs - to bring about host government compliance. The importance of host government-NGO relationship demands a clear policy response. Without the willingness of host governments to collaborate with NGOs – the providers of social services - then there will be less access to social services like education for refugees.

**Further Research**

I have identified two possible subjects for future research based on the results of my findings. First, I could further examine the priorities and conditions that drive refugee policy in Turkey. Second, I could conduct a study on the provision of equitable distribution of aid between domestic and refugee populations - its effect on cooperation, and on effective service provision. I discuss both below.

*Factors that Influence Turkish Refugee Policies.* In the Q-sort exercise, I discovered that the fifteen statements that expressed potential drivers of refugee policy did not apply to the case study of Turkey with the exception of national security.\(^{1329}\) When participants in Turkey – host government officials, United Nations officials and NGO representatives - were given the choice to provide their own answers using Statement 16, there was as much

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\(^{1329}\) To the statement that national security is an influence on refugee policy, only the UN officials and NGO representatives moderately agreed. Host government officials did not agree with this statement.
disagreement among their offered statements. While I discovered that the factors and conditions that drive refugee policy in Turkey are very different from the drivers in Jordan and Lebanon, I was unable to identify which factors and conditions were influential. Instead, participants cited a myriad of (often idiosyncratic) domestic and international political factors, like the ideology of the ruling AKP Party and Turkey’s interests in Syria. Yet, they concurred on no one factor as a major driver of refugee policy.

I will need to do further research in two literature programs to determine which factors are the main drivers of refugee policy in Turkey. First, I would need to investigate additional information regarding the history of migratory flows in and out of Turkey. Turkey has had notable episodes of immigration and emigration for the last 100 years. From 1923 to 1997 over 1.6 million people have sought asylum in Turkey from the Balkan countries, Communist states in Eastern Europe, Iran, Iraq, and the Soviet Union. Yet, in the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey was a country of emigration. It created policies that encouraged mass emigration in reaction to rapid urbanization and internal migration. In the 1980s and 1990s, Turkey became a country of immigration and emigration as Ahmet Icduygu states, “foreigners who were neither Turks nor Muslim” immigrated to Turkey. I believe conducting further research into this history may illuminate drivers of refugee policy that I had not considered.

1332 Ibid.
1333 Icduygu, Turkey’s Migration, [Page 5].
Second, I would further examine the Turkey-EU relations research program to determine what factors drive refugee policy in Turkey. The results of the Q-sort exercises indicated that one UN official and four NGO representatives referred to Turkey’s interest in becoming part of the EU as a driver of refugee policy when they were prompted to provide their own answer for Statement 16.\footnote{1334} When I conducted the Q-sort exercises, I did not have this factor as one of the predetermined 15 statements because I created general statements from the literature review which could pertain to all three countries. I did not mention Turkey’s goal of EU accession when I prompted participants to provide their own answer. Turkey applied to join the European Union in 1987. From that time until 2016, Turkey had made changes to its policies to better align itself to European Union mandates.\footnote{1335} It could be construed that to comply with the EU, Turkey may have created more refugee-friendly laws at the time of research for this study. Moreover, Turkey signed the EU-Turkey agreement in March 2016.\footnote{1336} In an attempt to stem the damaging flows of Syrian refugees from Turkey into Europe, Turkey agreed to allow the return of Syrian migrants and asylum seekers in exchange for the EU member states increasing the “resettlement of Syrian refugees residing in Turkey’s refugee camps,” accelerating “visa liberalization for Turkish nationals,” and boosting “existing financial support for Turkey’s

\footnote{1334}{Interview with Subjects T1UN, T4NGO, T8NGO, T3NGO, and J8NGO, op. cit.}
\footnote{1336}{Elizabeth Collett, "The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal." The Migration Policy Institute, last modified March 2016, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/paradox-eu-turkey-refugee-deal.}
I did not include the Turkey-EU deal as a potential driver of refugee policy in the 15 statements because this had not happened by the time of my proposal defense. I believe that if I had provided this factor as a pre-written statement, the participants in Turkey may have considered it as a driver that influences refugee policy. Thus, future research might explore this and other potential drivers of refugee policy through a single case study using statements specific to Turkey.

Equitable Distribution of Funding. Future research might apply the findings of this dissertation to other refugee crises to determine whether the equitable distribution of aid between domestic and refugee populations would have an impact on the degree of cooperation between NGOs and host governments for effective service provisions. There is a clear distinction between humanitarian and development aid. Humanitarian aid is short-term, life-saving assistance given during armed conflicts or natural disasters to those affected by these events. In contrast, development aid is long-term funding for social, economic, and environmental programs in developing countries. The UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as “one in which 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five consecutive years or more in a given asylum country.” In 2016, two-thirds of all refugees or 11.6 million refugees lived in protracted refugee situations, and of this number, 4.1 million were living in host countries for 20 years.

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1340 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Trends, [Page 22].
or more.\textsuperscript{1341} The majority of refugees settled in urban areas where both host community members and refugees compete for resources.\textsuperscript{1342}

Alexander Betts observes that social tensions between host communities and refugees may arise if there is a perception that refugees are benefitting from access to resources not available to the host community.\textsuperscript{1343} Yet, an approach that separates humanitarian aid from developmental aid is unable to address the complexity that characterizes a protracted refugee situation, where both refugees and the communities that host them have long-term needs. Thus, future research should be conducted on the equitable distribution of funding between refugees and host communities and its impact on host government cooperation. While refugees may receive less monetary aid, equitable distribution of funding that benefits both the host communities and refugees might be an incentive that leads to host government cooperation.\textsuperscript{1344}

Equitable distribution of funding between refugees and host communities has been debated since the 1960s.\textsuperscript{1345} There is a research program that discusses equitable distribution of funding between refugees and host communities.\textsuperscript{1346} I discuss the history

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\footnotesize
\bibitem{1341} Ibid.
\bibitem{1343} University of Oxford Refugees Study Centre, \textit{Development Assistance and Refugees Towards a North-South Grand Bargain?}, [Page 1].
\bibitem{1344} The World Bank, \textit{The Impacts of Refugees on Neighboring Countries}, [Page 10].
\end{thebibliography}
below, noting time periods when support for equitable distribution of aid was supported and rejected by international entities that support refugees. I conclude with an argument as to why future research is needed on this topic.

The rise of refugee migration in the mid-1960s led to an increase in international donors providing funding to support refugees.”\textsuperscript{1347} International organizations, donors, and governments created “integrated zonal development” programs that promoted “long-term benefits to both the refugees and the local population.”\textsuperscript{1348} The initial attempts to merge humanitarian and development aid were not successful in the 1960s which resulted in a lack of international donor support for these programs during most of the 1970s.\textsuperscript{1349} Yet, there was a resurgence of interest in merging development and refugee aid in the late 1970s and 1980s.\textsuperscript{1350} According to Jeff Crisp,
This approach stipulated that assistance should be development-oriented from the outset and thereby enable beneficiaries to move quickly towards self-sufficiency. Rather than focusing specifically on refugee camps and communities, the new strategy also emphasized the need for a focus on refugee-populated areas. International assistance, it was agreed, should be used not to provide open-ended relief but to promote sustainable development. And both refugees and the local population should benefit from that process.\textsuperscript{1351}

As mentioned in Chapter 2, there were two programs that were successful examples of the hybridization of humanitarian and development aid to assist both refugees and host communities. The International Conference on Refugees in Central America (CIREFCA) of 1989 provided targeted development assistance to the Mexican states of Campeche and Quintana Roo in exchange for offering the right to freedom of movement as well as livelihood opportunities to Guatemalan refugees.\textsuperscript{1352} The World Bank and the UNHCR funded a project with the cooperation of the government of Pakistan that provided millions of Pakistanis and Afghans with employment through reforestation programs, watershed management, road repair and construction, and flood protection projects.\textsuperscript{1353} Yet, support for these programs diminished in the 1990s. Host governments did not want to refugees to permanently settle and to obtain rights comparable to their citizenry while international donors did not want to invest significant amounts of money into programs if refugees were to return to their country of origin.\textsuperscript{1354} According to Jeff Crisp, international donors observed that this hybridized aid was primarily being used for development projects instead of supporting refugees. He states, “This suspicion was reinforced by the somewhat grandiose scale of the projects which they [the donors] were

\textsuperscript{1351} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1352} Mitra, "Pakistan – Third Income Generating Project," Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
\textsuperscript{1353} Crisp, "Mind the Gap!," [Page 171].
\textsuperscript{1354} Ibid., Page 172.
asked to finance and the limited capacity of the countries concerned to make effective use of such large resources.”

This led to donors supporting refugee repatriation programs in lieu of the hybridization of development and humanitarian aid in the 1990s.

There was a resurgence in the linkage of humanitarian and development aid in the 2000s with the funding of the Convention Plus Initiative from 2002 to 2005 and the Framework for Durable Solutions in reaction to protracted refugee situations. A 2003 UNHCR report identified that,

The countries hosting large refugee populations are usually themselves not just developing but poor. Refugee hosting communities are in remote areas where high level of poverty prevails. These countries need to be encouraged and supported in their receptivity to refugees. Hosting refugee populations for protracted periods have long-term economic and social impact that, if not adequately addressed, can create conflictual situations and insecurity.

Again, international donors offered equitable distribution of aid to host governments in exchange for refugees’ access to freedom of movement and opportunities to earn livelihoods. Yet, there was a significant decline in aid offered by international donors for protracted refugee situations which “reinforced host state perceptions of refugees as a burden.”

In 2000 and 2001, the UNHCR was forced to cut its budget for programs

1355 Ibid.
1358 Ibid., p. 4.
1359 Ibid.
in Africa by 10-20%. In 2003, the UNHCR had to scale back numerous refugee programs due to a reduction in funding.

At the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis, the UNHCR implemented a holistic approach combining humanitarian assistance to refugees with development programs for the host communities. The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016 in Response to the Syria Crisis 2015-2016 (3RP) was the regional framework established by the UNHCR in partnership with “200 humanitarian and development partners, including governments, United Nations agencies, and national and international NGOs” in order to “address refugee protection needs, the humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable, and the longer-term socio-economic impacts of the Syria crisis on neighbouring [sic] countries.” The plan utilized “humanitarian and development capacities, innovation, and resources.” The 3RP plan was aligned with the existing national plans of Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt. It emphasizes the importance of

the centrality of national ownership in securing a more effective and sustainable response to the crisis. All activities are designed in support of the priorities of governments with the response strategy adapted to the respective country context.

My findings suggest that assisting both Syrian refugees and host communities was one factor that impacted host government-NGO cooperation in Jordan, where the

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1361 Ibid.
1362 Loescher and Milner, "Defining the Problem," [Page 21].
1363 Ibid., p. 6.
1364 Ibid., p. 6.
1365 Ibid., p. 7.
1366 Ibid.
government fully cooperated with NGOs, in Lebanon where the government cooperated with NGOs but in a limited capacity, and in Turkey which cooperated to a far lesser degree in comparison to Jordan and Lebanon and for only a short period of time. My findings suggest that cooperation stemmed from a willingness on the part of the international donors to fund development projects where refugees were located. In the case of Turkey, that country was not deemed to be developing or in need of development, so it received much less international donor contribution as compared to Lebanon and Jordan. Consequently, there was much less incentive in Turkey to work with INGOs.

The literature indicates that international donor support for the equitable distribution of aid between refugees and host communities is cyclical. Further research could be conducted on the question of whether the equitable distribution of funding between refugees and the communities that host them would garner host government cooperation in other countries. It is important to note that one of the obstacles that I encountered was the inability to gather the exact amount of funding that was distributed to the communities that hosted Syrian refugees. This may be a challenge when conducting future research.
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APPENDIX A
IRB Approval Notices for the Research Project

May 3, 2016

Bridget Zino
638 Thomas Avenue
Newtown NJ 08877

Dear Bridget Zino:

Protocol Title: "Variance in Gross Enrollment Rates of Syrian Refugees in the Countries of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon"

This is to advise you that the above-referenced study has been presented to the Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research, and the following action was taken subject to the conditions and explanations provided below:

Approval Date: 3/24/2016  Expiration Date: 3/23/2017
Expedited Category(s): 7  Approved # of Subject(s): 100

This approval is based on the assumption that the materials you submitted to the Office of Research and Sponsored Programs (ORSP) contain a complete and accurate description of the ways in which human subjects are involved in your research. The following conditions apply:

- This Approval-The research will be conducted according to the most recent version of the protocol that was submitted.
- This approval is valid ONLY for the dates listed above;
- Reporting-ORSP must be immediately informed of any injuries to subjects that occur and/or problems that arise, in the course of your research;
- Modifications-Any proposed changes MUST be submitted to the IRB as an amendment for review and approval prior to implementation;
- Consent Form(s)-Each person who signs a consent document will be given a copy of that document, if you are using such documents in your research. The Principal Investigator must retain all signed documents for at least three years after the conclusion of the research;
- Continuing Review-You should receive a courtesy e-mail renewal notice for a Request for Continuing Review before the expiration of this project's approval. However, it is your responsibility to ensure that an application for continuing review has been submitted to the IRB for review and approval prior to the expiration date to extend the approval period.

Additional Notes:
- Expedited Approval per 45 CFR 46.110
- IRSCP Certification will no longer be accepted after 7/1/15 (including for anyone previously grandfathered). CRTT becomes effective on July 1, 2015 for all Rutgers faculty/staff/students engaged in human subjects research.

Failure to comply with these conditions will result in withdrawal of this approval.

Please note that the IRB has the authority to observe, or have a third party observe, the consent process or the research itself.
The Federal-wide Assurance (FWA) number for the Rutgers University IRB is FWA00003913; this number may be requested on funding applications or by collaborators.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]

[Title]
Beverly Tepper, Ph.D.
Professor, Department of Food Science
IRB Chair, Arts and Sciences Institutional Review Board
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

(PA)

cc: Simon Reich
APPENDIX B
ANONYMOUS CONSENT FORMS IN ENGLISH, TURKISH, AND ARABIC

CONSENT FORM - ANONYMOUS DATA COLLECTION

Principal Investigator: Bridget Zino
Project Title: Variance in Gross Enrollment Ratios of Syrian Refugees in the Countries of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon

You are invited to participate in a research study that is being conducted by Bridget Zino, a graduate student in the Division of Global Affairs at Rutgers University in Newark, New Jersey, United States. The purpose of this research is to examine the factors that influence refugee policy and impact refugee enrollment ratios. Approximately 50 subjects will participate in the study, and each individual's participation will last approximately thirty minutes. The study procedures include responding to approximately 10 semi-structured questions and sorting statements related to the objectives of this study.

This research is anonymous. Anonymous means that I will record no information about you that could identify you. There will be no linkage between your identity and your response in the research. This means that I will not record your name, address, phone number, date of birth, etc. I will collect information about your nationality, your job sector, and the general nature of your work. If you agree to take part in the study, you will be assigned a random code number that will be used for each interview and the exercise of sorting statements. Your name will appear only on a list of subjects, and will not be linked to the code number that is assigned to you. There will be no way to link your responses back to you. Therefore, data collection is anonymous.

Please note that we will keep this information anonymous by limiting individual's access to the research data and keeping it in a secure location. The research team and the institutional review board at Rutgers University are the only parties that will be allowed to see the data, except as may be required by law. If a report of this study is published, or the results are presented at a professional conference, only group results will be stated. No individual names of participants will be given. All study data will be kept for three years.

While in Turkey and Jordan, the data will be stored in a locked closet where I will live. In the United States, the data will be stored in a locked file cabinet accessible only to me, the Principal Investigator. After three years, all paper data will be shredded. All email correspondences will be deleted from the Principal Investigator's inbox as well as from the trash folder. All digital files will be deleted and the computer's Recycle Bin will be emptied.

There are no foreseeable risks to participation in this study. In addition, you may receive no direct benefit from taking part in this study. However, the knowledge that I obtain from your participation may help me to better understand which factors influence refugee policy decisions which in turn impact refugee enrollment ratios.

Participation in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate, and you may withdraw at any time during the study procedures without any penalty to you. In addition, you may choose not to answer any questions with which you are
not comfortable. You have the right to refuse to complete the exercise of sorting statements. If you decide to participate, you may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty and without loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. If you withdraw from the study before data collection is completed your data will be removed from the data set and destroyed.

If you have questions at any time about this research or the procedures, you may contact myself, Bridget Zino:
Rutgers University
Division of Global Affairs
175 University Avenue
Room 220A, Conklin Hall
Newark, NJ 07102
Phone: (973) 353-5585
bridget.zino@rutgers.edu

You can also contact my faculty advisor/dissertation supervisor, Dr. Simon Reich:
Rutgers University
Division of Global Affairs
175 University Avenue
Room 220A, Conklin Hall
Newark, NJ 07102
Phone: (973) 353-3280
reichs@rutgers.edu.

If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, please contact an IRB Administrator at the Rutgers University, Arts and Sciences IRB:
Institutional Review Board
Rutgers University, the State University of New Jersey
Liberty Plaza / Suite 3200
335 George Street, 3rd Floor
New Brunswick, NJ 08901
Phone: 732-235-9806
Email: humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu

Please retain a copy of this form for your records. By participating in the above stated procedures, then you agree to participation in this study.

For IRB Use Only. This Section Must be Included on the Consent Form and Cannot Be Altered Except For Updates to the Version Date.

APPROVED
MAR 24 2016
Approved by the
Rutgers IRB

EXPIRES
MAR 23 2017
Approved by the
Rutgers IRB

Version Date: v1.0
Page 2
Onay Formu – Anonim Veri Toplanması

Ana Araştırmacı: Bridget Zino
Proje Başlığı: Survilyle Göçmenlerin Türkiye, Ürđün ve Lübnan’dağ Kerel Katılım Oranlarındaki Değişkenlik

Rutgers Üniversitesi Global Affairs (Küresel Konular) Bölümünde yüksek öğrenim öğrencisi Bridget Zino’nun yapmış olduğu araştırmaya katılma davet edildiniz. Bu çalışmanın amacı multeci politikalarını ve multeci katılım oranlarını etkileyen faktörleri araştırmak. Bu çalışmaya yaklaşık 50 kişi katılacaktır, ve her bir kişinin katılımı yaklaşık 30 dakika sürecek. Çalışma prosedürü 10 yeri yapılıp alınmış soruyu cevaplama ve araştırma konusuya ilgili açıklamaları gruplara dağıtımayı içermektedir.


Türkiye’de ve Ürđün’de bulunduğu süre içinde veriler, kaldığım yerde kitlili bir dolapta saklanacaktır. Amerika Birleşik Devletinde veriler sadece benim, yanı baș araştırmacının, erişiminin olacağı kitlili bir dosya dolapında saklanacaktır. Üç yıl sonra, verilerin toplandığı kağıtlar kağıt doyayıcıda parçalanacaktır. Bütün e-mail yazışmaları Baș Araştırmaçının e-mail

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hesabının gelenler ve çöp kutularından silinecektir. Bütün dijital dosyalar bilgisayardan silinecek ve bilgisayara çöp/geri dönüşüm kutusu temizlenecektir.

Bu çalışmaya katılımınızı önümüzdeki birkaç hafta içerisinde belirleme yapabilirsiniz. Bu nedenle, bu çalışmaya katılımınızı belirleme yapmanızı ve çöp kutularını temizlemenizi tavsiye ederiz.

Bu çalışmaya katılımınıza tercih edebilirsiniz ve çalışmaya katılımınızı tercih ettiğiniz durumda size bir cezai mühürde uygulanmazacaktır. Ek olarak, kendiniz sahih hissetmediğiniz bir durum olduğunda tekrar teklifte bulunabilirsiniz.

Açıklama dahil eksersisini yapmayı reddetme hakkına sahipsiniz. Katılımınızı kararı verirseniz, çalışmaya katılımınızı bir hafta sonra tekrar teklifte bulunabilirsiniz. Size bir cezai mühürde uygulanmaz ve, eğer bunu yaparsanız, size tekrar teklifte bulunabilirsiniz.

Bu çalışmaya katılımınızı tercih ettiğiniz durumda tekrar teklifte bulunabilirsiniz. Bridget Zino

Rutgers University
Division of Global Affairs
175 University Avenue
Room 220A, Conklin Hall
Newark, NJ 07102
Phone: (973) 353-5585
bridget.zino@rutgers.edu

Ayrıca, Fakülte danışmanım / doktora tez danışmanım Dr. Simon Reich’e de ulaşabilirsiniz.

Rutgers University
Division of Global Affairs
175 University Avenue
Room 220A, Conklin Hall
Newark, NJ 07102
Araştırma katılımcısı olarak hakkınızı öğrenmek istiyorsanız, lütfen bir Rutgers Üniversitesi Kurumsal İnceleme Komitesi (IRB) yöneticisi ile irtibata geçiniz.

Rutgers University, Arts and Sciences IRB:
Institutional Review Board
Rutgers University, the State University of New Jersey
Liberty Plaza / Suite 3200
335 George Street, 3rd Floor
New Brunswick, NJ 08901
Phone: 732-235-9806
Email: humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu

Lütfen bu formun bir kopyasını kendinizi tutunuz.
Yukarıda belirlenen prosedürlere katılım yapmak kabul etmekle çalışmaya katılımıza kabul etmiş olmaktanız.

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Page 3

Version Date: v1.0
إعداد摒弃 – تجميع المعلومات الغير معروفة

الباحثة الرئيسية: بريجيت زينو
عنوان المنشور: الاختلاف في المعدل الإجمالي تسجيل للاجئين السوريين في الدول الأوروبية: تركيا والأردن وليبания.

إتم مدعون لكي تشاركو في الدراسة البحثية التي تقوم بها بريجيت زينوف هب طالبة متخرج من جامعة رجاير في مدينة نيويورك، نيوجيرسي في الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية. يقسم الشؤون الدولية. الغرض من هذا البحث هو فحص المواد التي تؤثر في إدارة وتنظيم معدلات تسجيل اللاجئين. سوف يشارك في هذا الدراسة تقريبا 50 شخصًا وقلد سوف يستمر حوالي ثلاثين دقيقة. الإجراءات الخاصة بهذه الدراسة تتضمن الأجابة على عشرة أسئلة شبة مركبة وت صفيف البيانات المتعلقة بأهداف هذه الدراسة.

هذا البحث غير موقع هذا يعني أن المعلومات التي تجمع منكم لانحلالية معلومات عن شخصيتكم ولا يوجد أي ارتباط بين شخصيتك وما تتذوق به في البحث وهذا يعني أن الاسم والعنوان ورق الهبات و التاريخ الميلادي لن يسمعوا أي الخ. سوف أقوم بجمع معلومات عن جنسيتك ومكان عملك ومعلومات عامة عن طبيعة عملك. إذا وافق وأن تشارك في هذه الدراسة سوف تعطي رقم جزافي تساعدك أنه تستعمله في كل مقاطعة لا تستطيع معرضة التفرقة بين البيانات. فاسمك سيظهر فقط على بعض قوائم الموضوعات ولا يرتبط بالرقم الجزافي الذي قد أعطي لك من قبل. وهذا يعني أنه لا يمكن ربط اجاباتكم باسمكم. لذلك البيانات التي تجمع غير موقعة.

سوف تحتفظ بهذه المعلومات على أساس السرية و المحافظة على الهوية بواسطة فرص قيود على من يريد الحصول على معلومات عن البحث والاحتفاظ بها. يمكن اتخاذ قرار البحث ومجلس الإدارة والمرافقية جامعته رجاير هم القادة الوحيد التي سوف يسمح لها باستخدام هذه البيانات فيما عدا ما يستلزم به القانون. فيما إذا تقرر أي تفريع عن هذه الدراسة أو النتائج المقدمة في مؤتمر رسمى. فلن تgere الناجحة فقط عن هذا المؤلف سوف تذكر ولا يمكن على الاطلاع الإحصائي عن اسمائ المشتركين. كل المعلومات الخاصة بهذه الدراسة سوف تحتفظ لمدة ثلاث سنوات. جميع البيانات سوف تحفظ في حجرة مغلقة في الوقت الذي عرض في تركيا والأردن. عندما أعود إلى الولايات المتحدة سوف اختيارات معلقة ولا يسمح لأحد خبراء بكتابة هذه الخزانة. بفضل مضي ثلاث سنوات. الحكومية والمعلومات المذكورة سوف تميز. وكذلك جميع المراسلات الإلكترونية سوف تتم من
الدوريات الخاصة بالباحثة الرئيسية وماكيا الإليكتروني الخاص بالمهمات. أيضًا كل الملفات الرقمية سوف تخفي وكذلك 문서 الخاص بجميع المواد التي يمكن إعدادها سوف يفرغ تمامًا.

لا يوجد تنزيل مباينة مخاطر جراء المشاركة في هذه الدراسة. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، هناك امكانية للحصول على فوائد نتيجة الاضطراب في هذه الدراسة. كما أنها المعلومات التي الحصول عليها من مشاركتكم سوف تساعدنى أكثر فهما للعوامل التي تؤثر في قرارات إدارة الأجانب والتعوامل التي تؤثر في معدات تسجيل الأجانب.

المشاركك تكون تطوعية في هذه الدراسة. وكممك عدم المشاركة في استuantكم الأسساعب أثناء سياسة الدراسة بدون توقيع اعوية عقوبة عليكم. وكذلك شروط اختيار فيما إذا رفضتم الجابة على الاستعلام التي ترونه غير مناسبة. لدينا مطلة حرية في عدم تكملة ممارسة تصنيف البيانات فيما إذا فردتم المشاركة وكممك الأسساعب من الدراسة في أي وقت وبدون عقوبة أو خسارة لاية فوائد قد تكون مستحقة لكم. إذا فردتم الأسساعب من الدراسة قبل استكمال الحصول على المعلومات هذه المعلومات سوف تحذف وتتمزق.

---

[Signature]

فقط من أجل استكمال الدراسة، يجب أن يظهر على استئناء القبول ولا يمكن أن يحدث تغيير في حالة التغذية للالتزامات التاريخية.

---

[Signature]

فقط من أجل استكمال رأي هذا الرأي يجب أن يظهر على استئناء القبول ولا يمكن أن يحدث تغيير في حالة التغذية للالتزامات التاريخية.

---

[Signature]

فقط من أجل استكمال الدراسة، يجب أن يظهر على استئناء القبول ولا يمكن أن يحدث تغيير في حالة التغذية للالتزامات التاريخية.
لديكم أسئلة في أي وقت بخصوص البحث أو الاجراءات يمكنكم الاتصال بزينة

جامعة زنجاز
قسم الشؤون الدولية
175 شارع الجامعة
حزمة 2201 بناية كونكلين
نيورك نيويورك 07102
هاتف: 73-353-3585
Bridget.zino @Rutgers.edu

يمكنكم أيضا الاتصال بالمستشار المشرف على البحث الدكتور سيمون ريتش

جامعة زنجاز
قسم الشؤون الدولية
175 شارع الجامعة
حزمة 2201 بناية كونكلين
نيورك نيويورك 07102
هاتف: 73-353-3280
reichs@Rutgers.edu
ان كان لديكم استفسارا فيما يتعلق بالصلاحيات كباحث في موضوع ما يمكن الاتصال أحد أفراد مجلس الإدارة بجامعة رتجرز مجلس ادارة اللقانون والعلوم
مجلس إدارة المراجعة
جامعة رتجرز جامعة ولاية نيوجيرزي
ميان الحرية غرفة 3200
335 شارع جورج الطابق الثالث
ليبرالزويك نيوجيرزي 08901
رقم الهاتف 235-732-9806
بريد الكتروني: humansubjects@orsp.rutgers.edu
يمكن الاحتفاظ بنسخة من هذه الاستمارة بواسطة المشاركة في الإجراءات المذكورة سابقا.
هذا يعني أنكم موافقون في المشاركة في هذه الدراسة

---

ختم مار 2, 2016
Approved by the Rutgers IRB

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ختم مار 2, 2016
Approved by the Rutgers IRB
APPENDIX C
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND Q-SORT STATEMENTS – ENGLISH, TURKISH AND ARABIC

Interview Questions

1. What is your nationality?

2. In what sector do you or have you worked? Choose 1.

<table>
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<th>Government</th>
<th>United Nations</th>
<th>Non-government Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3. Tell me a little bit about the work you do?

4. The Syrian War started in March 2011 and since then there has been a substantial influx of refugees into this country. How did the country’s response to the refugee crisis evolve over time?

5. How do national security concerns influence refugee policy if at all?

6. How do economic concerns influence refugee policy if at all?

7. How does the country’s prior history with Syria influence refugee policy if at all?

8. How does the government’s relationship with the United Nations and the international refugee regime influence refugee policy if at all?

Follow-up Questions (Asked after the participants complete the Q sort.)

9. Why did you choose _____X____ as the statement you agree with the most?

10. Why did you choose _____X____ as the statement you agree with the least?

11. Tell me more about why you chose to put _____X____ here.

12. Are there any other factors that may influence the creation of refugee policy that impact refugee education enrollment ratios that I have not considered?
Q Sort Instructions to Participants

We talked about refugee policy and its creation. I’m interested in your perspective. I’m going to show you several factors that may affect refugee policy. They have been written in statement form. Please take a moment to read the statements. (See next page.)

1. Please sort the cards into three piles. Place the statements that you agree with in a pile to your right. Place the statements that you do not agree with in a pile to your left. Place the items you are uncertain about or do not apply in the middle. At this time, there is no need to pay attention to how many go into each pile.

2. Look at the diagram of the Q sort. Sort the right hand pile into the high number categories, placing the statement you most agree with in the most right hand box. Move to the left, placing statements in order from agree strongly to agree.

3. Sort the left hand pile into the low number categories, placing the statement you agree with the least to the most left hand box. Move to the right, placing statements in order from disagree strongly to disagree.

4. Now sort the middle pile onto the Q sort diagram.

5. Check to make sure each box has a statement and that the order is correct. Make any final adjustments.
Q Sort Statements

Security based statements

1. The government’s national security concerns influence refugee policy decisions.

2. The government’s concerns regarding the spread of war from Syria to the host country influence refugee policy decisions.

3. The government’s concerns regarding ISIS/ISIL influences refugee policy decisions.

4. The government’s concern to protect its citizens from local conflict with Syrian refugees influences policy decisions.

Economic based statements

5. The government’s concerns regarding the strain on national budgets to provide for Syrian refugees influences refugee policy decisions.

6. The government’s concerns regarding not having enough resources to house, feed, provide medical care, provide water, and to educate Syrian refugees influence refugee policy decisions.

7. The government’s concerns regarding the increase in the domestic population’s unemployment rate influences refugee policy decisions.

8. The government’s goal to continue to adequately provide and regulate the domestic population’s access to resources like food, water, and living spaces influences refugee policy decisions.

Historical relationship statements

9. The large influx of mostly Sunni refugees influences refugee policy decisions.

10. The country’s prior history with Syria influences refugee policy decisions.

11. Syria’s influence over this country’s domestic political decisions influences refugee policy decisions.

Cooperation with the international refugee regime statements

12. The promise of financial assistance from the international refugee regime, in particular the United Nations, to manage the current Syrian refugee crisis influences refugee policy decisions.

13. The promise of technical assistance from the United Nations to manage the Syrian refugee crisis (For example, the United Nations helps to provide services and resources
within the host country and the United Nations helps the host country create refugee laws and policies) influences refugee policy decisions.

14. Pressure from the international community to assist refugees influences refugee policy decisions.

15. Past cooperation with the United Nations to host Palestinians in the country for 60 years influences refugee policy decisions.

16. Please provide your factor you feel influences refugee policy decisions that impact refugee policy decisions in a free space below.

Diagram of Q Sort

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>-3</th>
<th>-2</th>
<th>-1</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disagree Strongly</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree Somewhat</td>
<td>Not Sure/No Opinion</td>
<td>Agree Somewhat</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Agree Strongly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Diagram of Q Sort:

Diagram of Q Sort:
Anket Soruları ve Q Sıralama Açıklamaları

Baş Araştırmacı: Bridget Zino

Proje Konusu: Suriyeli Göçmenlerin Türkiye, Ürdün ve Lübnan’daki Genel Katılım Oranlarındaki Değişkenlik

Mülakat Soruları:

1. Milliyetiniz (uyruğunuz) nedir?
2. Daha önce hangi sektörlerde çalıştınız veya şu an çalışmaktadır?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Devlet Kurumları</th>
<th>Birleşmiş Milletler</th>
<th>Sivil Toplum Organizasyonları</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3. Yaptığınız işten kısaca bahsedebilir misiniz?
4. Suriye savaşı Mart 2011 de başladı ve o zamandan bugüne Türkiye’ye çok fazla mülteci akını oldu. Devletin zaman içinde mültcelere karşı izlediği politikalar nasıl değişti?
5. Ulusal güvenlik kaygıları mültciler politikasını etkiliyor mu? Etkiliyorsa size nasıl etkiliyor?
6. Ekonomik nedenler mülteci politikasını nasıl etkiliyor?
7. Devletin Suriye ile tarihi ilişkileri mültciler politikasını etkiliyor mu? Etkiliyorsa nasıl?
8. Devletin Birleşmiş Milletler ve Uluslararası Mülteci Yasaları ile ilişkileri mültciler politikalarını etkiliyor mu? Etkiliyorsa nasıl?
9. Neden _____X______’i en çok kaldığım açıklama olarak işaretlediniz?
10. Neden _____X______’i en az kaldığım açıklama olarak işaretlediniz?
11. Neden_____X______’i buraya koydunuzu biraz daha açıklayabilir misiniz?
12. Benim öngöremediğim mültcilerin eğitime katılımını etkileyici politikaların oluşmasında tesiri olan başka faktörler var mı?
Katılcılara Q-Gruplama Talimatları


4. Şimdi ortadaki grubu Q-dağılım tablosuna göre sıralayınız.

5. Her bir kutuda bir açıklama olduğunu ve sıralamanın doğru olduğunu kontrol ediniz. En son düzenlemeleri yapınız.
Q-dağılım Açıklamaları

Güvenlik temelli açıklamalar:

1. Devletin, ülkede fazla sayıda múlteciyi barındırmasının neticesinde içerdiden gelecek tehlikelere karşı koruma görevi múlteci politika kararlarını etkilemektedir.
2. Yerli nüfus ile ülkenin gıda, su ve yaşam alanları gibi kaynakları arasındaki dengeyi muhafaza etme çabası devletin múlteci politika kararlarını etkilemektedir.
3. Devletin ulusal güvenlik endişeleri múlteci politika kararlarını etkilemektedir.
4. Devletin lokal iç çatışma kaygıları múlteci politika kararlarını etkilemektedir.

Ekonomi Temelli Açıklamalar:

5. Devletin ulusal bütçe/ekonomi konusundaki kaygıları múlteci politika kararlarını etkilemektedir.
6. Devletin kapasite konusundaki kaygıları múlteci politika kararlarını etkilemektedir.
7. Devletin yerli nüfusun işsizlik oranı kaygıları múlteci politika kararlarını etkilemektedir.
8. Devletin kamu hizmetleri ve alt yapı yetersizliği konusundaki kaygıları múlteci politika kararlarını etkilemektedir.

Tarihsel İlişki Açıklamaları:

9. Çok sayıda Sünni múltecinin gelmesi devletin múlteci politika kararlarını etkilemektedir.
11. Ülkenin Suriye ile geçmişkte/tarihteki ilişkileri múlteci politika kararlarını etkilemektedir.

Uluslararası múlteci rejiminin ile işbirliği açıklamalar

13. Uluslararası kurumların, özellikle Birleşmiş Milletlerin, mevcut múlteci krizin çözümü için finansal yardım vaadi devletin múlteci politika kararlarını etkilemektedir.
15. Uluslararası toplumdan gelen baskılar devletin múlteci politika kararlarını etkilemektedir.
16. Filistinlilerin 60 yıl boyunca bu ülkede barındırılması konusunda Birleşmiş Milletler ile geçişte yaptığı işbirliği devletin múlteci politika kararlarını etkilemektedir.
Q-Dağılım Tablosu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>-3</th>
<th>-2</th>
<th>-1</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum</td>
<td>Emin değilim / Fikrim yok</td>
<td>Kısmen Katılıyorum</td>
<td>Kısmen Katılıyorum</td>
<td>Katılıyorum</td>
<td>Katılıyorum</td>
<td>Kesinlikle Katılıyorum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-3: Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum
-2: Katılmıyorum
-1: Kısmen Katılmıyorum
0: Emin değilim / Fikrim yok
1: Kısmen Katılıyorum
2: Katılıyorum
3: Kesinlikle Katılıyorum
البحث الرئيسية: بريجيت زينو
عنوان المشروع: الاختلافات في معدل الأجمالي لتسجيل اللاجئين السوريين في الدول الآتية: تركيا والأردن ولبنان
الأسئلة الخاصة بالمقابلة:
1- ما هي جنسيتك؟
2- في أي مجال أنت تعمل؟ أختار واحدة
3- أخبرني قليلا عن وظيفتك؟
4- بدأت الحرب السورية في شهر مارس أزار عام 2011 ومنذ ذلك الحين هناك تدفق دائم لللاجئين السوريين في هذا البلد. ما هو رد فعل الدولة بخصوص تفاقم أزمة اللاجئين السوريين طوال هذا الوقت؟
5- كيف تؤثر مصالح الأمن القومي على سياسة التعامل مع اللاجئين حتى إذا كان هذا على الاطلاق؟
6- كيف تؤثر المصالح الاقتصادية على قرارات سياسة التعامل مع اللاجئين حتى إذا كان هذا على الاطلاق؟
7- كيف تؤثر العلاقات السابقة بين سوريا والدولة المستضيفة على سياسة التعامل مع اللاجئين حتى إذا كان هذا على الاطلاق؟
8- كيف تؤثر العلاقات الحكومية مع نظام الاتحاد الدولي للاجئين على سياسة التعامل مع اللاجئين حتى لو كان هذا على الاطلاق؟

9- لماذا أخترت ______________ الرواية التي انت أكثر موافقة لها؟

10- لماذا أخترت ______________ الرواية التي انت أقل موافقة لها؟

11- أخبرني قليلا لماذا أنت أخترت أن تضع ______________ هنا

12- هل يوجد هناك عوامل أخرى التي من شأنها قد تؤثر في أيجاد سياسة لللاجئين و التي قد تؤثر في معدل تسجيل اللاجئين للدراسة، والتي تعتقد أنني لم اتطرق اليها؟
توزيع الارشادات على المشتركين

نحن نتحدث عن سياسة اللاجئين وكيف نشأت وأريد أن أعرف وجهة نظرك. سوف أعرض عليك عدة أسباب التي قد تؤثر في سياسة التعامل مع اللاجئين. هذه الأسباب مدونة في أستمارة البيانات. من فضلك لدي دقيقتين لكي تطلع عليها. (انظر إلى الصفحة التالية).

1. من فضلك وزع البطاقات على ثلاث مجموعات. ضع الأجابة التي تتفق معها في مجموعة على اليمين ثم ضع الأجابات التي لا تتفق معها في مجموعة على اليسار. و بعد ذلك ضع العبارات التي أنت لست متأكد منها في الوسط. وفي هذا الوقت يجب صرف النظر عن كم عدد البيانات في كل مجموعة.

2. - أنظر إلى الرسم البياني الخاص بتصنيف البيانات. وزع المجموعة التي على اليمين في خانة الأرقام العالية. ضع البيانات التي أنت تتفق معها أكثر في أقصى يمين الصندوق. أذهب إلى اليسار وضع البيانات بحسب الموافقة بشدة أو الموافقة فقط.

3. - وزع المجموعة التي تقع على اليسار في فئة الأرقام الصغيرة. ثم ضع البيانات التي تحوذ على مستوى أقل من الموافقة في أقصى يسار الصندوق ثم بعد ذلك أذهب إلى اليمين لتضع البيانات بحسب ترتيب عدم الموافقة بشدة ثم تدرج إلى عدم الموافقة فقط.

4. - الآن وزع المجموعة التي تقع في الوسط على الرسم البياني المجزا.

5- تأكد أن كل خانة تحتوي على بيان بحسب الترتيب الصحيح ثم قم بعمل أي تغيير نهائى.
تصنيف البيانات

بيانات مبنية على أساس الأمن

1- هدف الحكومة هو حماية الدولة من أي تهديد داخلي قد يحدث من استضافة عدد كبير من اللاجئين مما يؤثر على قرارات سياسة التعامل مع اللاجئين.

2- السعي للمحافظة على التوازن بين المواطنين المحليين ومواردهم الطبيعية مثل الطعام والماء وأماكن المعيشة يؤثر على قرارات سياسة التعامل مع اللاجئين.

3- الأمن القومي يؤثر في قرارات سياسة التعامل مع اللاجئين.

4- اهتمامات الحكومة في حصر الاختلافات الداخلية يؤثر في قرارات سياسة التعامل مع اللاجئين.

بيانات مبنية على أساس اقتصادى

5- اهتمامات الحكومة فيما يتعلق بوضع ميزانية الدولة الأمر الذي يؤثر في قرارات سياسة التعامل مع اللاجئين.

6- اهتمامات الحكومة بخصوم سعة القدرة على الاستيعاب يؤثر في قرارات سياسة التعامل مع اللاجئين.

7- اهتمامات الحكومة بمعدل البطالة السكانية الداخلية من شأنها يؤثر على قرارات سياسة التعامل مع اللاجئين.

8- اهتمامات الحكومة فيما يخص تقليل الخدمات السكانية و البنية التحتية يؤثر في سياسة التعامل مع اللاجئين.

بيانات العلاقات التاريخية

9- التدفق الكبير لللاجئين السنة السوريين يؤثر في قرارات سياسة التعامل مع اللاجئين.

10- معظم تدفق اللاجئين ذو المذهب السني قد يسبب اضطراب في توازن المذاهب الدينية والتي قد يؤثر في قرارات سياسة التعامل مع اللاجئين.
11- علاقة سوريا السابقة بالدولة المستضيفة تؤثر في قرارات سياسة التعامل مع اللاجئين.

12- التأثير السوري على القرارات السياسية الداخلية للدولة المستضيفة يؤثر في قرارات سياسة التعامل مع اللاجئين.

التعاون مع بيانات المنظمة الدولية لللاجئين

13- التعهد بمساعدات اقتصادية من المنظمة الدولية لللاجئين خاصة الأمم المتحدة لكي تستطيع القيام بإدارة أزمة اللاجئين السوريين يؤثر في قرارات سياسة التعامل مع اللاجئين.

14- التعهد بمساعدات فنية من المنظمة الدولية لللاجئين لكي تستطيع إدارة أزمة اللاجئين السوريين يؤثر في قرارات سياسة التعامل مع اللاجئين.

15- الضغط من المجتمع الدولي يؤثر في قرارات سياسة التعامل مع اللاجئين.

16- التعاون السابق مع الأمم المتحدة لكي تستضيف الفلسطينيين في دولتنا لمدة 60 عاماً يؤثر في قرارات سياسة التعامل مع اللاجئين.

التوزيع البيني

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3</th>
<th>2</th>
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<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>عدم الموافقة بشدة</td>
<td>عدم الموافقة</td>
<td>عدم الموافقة</td>
<td>موافقة</td>
<td>موافقة</td>
<td>موافقة بشدة</td>
<td>موافقة بشدة</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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