THE IMAGINATION ROUNDTABLE: PERFORMANCE AND INDIGENOUS REPRESENTATIONS IN PERU’S MESA DE CONCERTACIÓN PARA LA LUCHA CONTRA POBREZA

By

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This dissertation explores why volunteers at Peru’s *Mesa de Concertación Para la Lucha Contra Pobreza* dedicate considerable energy to service when neoliberal policies have diluted its mechanism of direct representation. Hailing from indigenous backgrounds, these volunteers view the *Mesa*, and associated decentralization reforms, as structural advances supporting their democratic representation. The *Mesa*’s decline would seem to be the logical consequence of theories positing that direct representation under neoliberal policies constrains activism or depoliticizes the population (Hale 2002). Conversely, my findings show that volunteers use the *Mesa*’s charter and programming to shape their inclusion in state institutions. To illustrate this, I apply a performative framework to the volunteers’ interactions with public officials orchestrated by the *Mesa*. This framing highlights the imaginative potential of their interactions for inclusion in a future state, demonstrating that they use neoliberal techniques for starkly different political projects than typically ascribed to neoliberalism.
Dedication

For Karin and Aneva
Epigraph

We stood together, and I was thinking of the way my father had described Cuzco on our journeys, when I heard a musical sound.

“The María Angola,” I cried.

“Yes, be still, It’s [sic] nine o’clock. It can be heard five leagues away on the Anta Plain. Travelers stop and cross themselves.”

The world must have changed into gold at that moment—I, too, as well as the walls and the city, the towers, and the façades I had seen.

The voice of the bell welled out again. And I seemed to see before me the image of my protectors, the Indian alcaldes – Don Maywa and Don Victor Pusa, praying on their knees before the façade of the whitewashed, adobe church of my village, while the evening light sang instead of glowing. In the pepper trees the hawks—the wamanchas so greatly feared because they were carnivorous—lifted their heads, drinking in the light, drowning in it.

José María Arguedas

Deep Rivers

Translated by Frances Horning Barraclough
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List of Acronyms

APRA  Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance)

ARDCP  Asociación Regional de Desplazados – Central Perú (Regional Association of Displaced Persons – Central Peru)

CTAR  Consejos Transitorios de Administración Regional (Transitional Regional Administrative Councils)

CONDECOREP  Coordinadora Nacional de Desplazados y Comunidades en Reconstrucción Del Perú (National Coordinator of Displaced Persons and Communities in Reconstruction of Peru)

CVR  Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (Truth and Reconciliation Commission)

GDP  Gross domestic product

IMF  International Monetary Fund

INEI  Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (National Institute of Statistics and Information)

JNE  Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (National Jury of Elections)

MIDIS  Ministerio de Desarrollo e Inclusión Social (Ministry of Development and Social Inclusion)

MRTA  Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement)

NGO  Non-governmental organization

PPBR  Presupuesto Participativo Basado en Resultados (Participatory Budget Based on Results)

PROMUDEH  Ministerio de Promoción de la Mujer y del Desarrollo Humano (Ministry for the Advancement of Women and Human Development)

SNIP  Sistema Nacional de Inversión Pública (National Public Investment System)

TRNC  Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
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<tr>
<td>UNCP</td>
<td>Universidad Nacional Del Centro - Perú (National University - Central Peru)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VRAEM</td>
<td>Valle de los ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (Valley of the Rivers Apurímac, Ene and Mantaro)</td>
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Introduction: Performance and Imagination in *La Lucha*

Some may read the title of the Peruvian public office where I conducted my fieldwork – the *Mesa de Concertación Para la Lucha Contra Pobreza* (Coordination Table for the Fight against Poverty, hereafter: the coordinating roundtable) – and mistakenly call to mind mental images of dry committee deliberations or a contingent of bureaucrats. “*La mesa*,” as my research participants call it, is in fact a curious hybrid. It could be best described as part community center, part clearinghouse, and part development workshop. Its staff and volunteers are approachable, dedicated and creative. There may be no better place to begin my dissertation than by honoring these qualities with an act of interpretation. I propose to substitute “roundtable” for *mesa* (table) when translating the Spanish title into English.¹ Notwithstanding the complaint that the roundtable’s founders were surely aware of the Spanish term, *mesa redonda*, for roundtable when they devised the institution, this interpretation captures the ethnographic experience of the institution for an English-reading audience. The substitution alludes to my experiences of the dedication and accessibility of the staff; the importance its volunteers placed on the institution’s commitment to multicultural inclusion; and the roundtable’s own promotional materials which contain illustrations of roundtables populated with chatty, multiethnic participants. To add to this interpretation, I propose to substitute an active verb, “coordinating” for the noun cognate of the term “coordination.” These changes will prepare readers to better understand the coordinating roundtable as a meeting place, a space for democratic imagination, and a workshop on the state.

In this dissertation I offer an ethnographic examination of the politics of indigeneity at the coordinating roundtable. My examination will support my thesis that
volunteers at the coordinating roundtable cultivate interpersonal encounters which draw on its charter and configuration to create openings towards inclusion for Andean Peruvians within state institutions. The starting point for understanding this thesis lies in the practical realities of the roundtable. In effect, it is an intersectional space both in terms of policy and daily circulation. The roundtable mediates between state anti-poverty programs and local understandings of development through meetings between community leaders and public officials. This convergence of politics and personalities make it a compelling space to document the signs of indigenous politics and the intents of state institutions. To better understand this interplay, I apply performative framework to the interactions between volunteers and public officials. The volunteers’ performative displays are informed by a history of inequality which has shaped the socioeconomic opportunities of Andean citizens from indigenous cultural backgrounds. Displays create openings for these indigenous citizens to influence the configuration and implicit convictions of democratic mechanisms (de la Cadena 2000; García 2005). In short, their displays allow them to imagine future states which include their histories.

These performative displays acquired heightened significance after the passage of pro-democracy reforms in 2001. This assortment of legislation and executive decrees decentralized the Peruvian state and initiated post-conflict recovery measures to heal the preceding two decades of political violence. The coordinating roundtable itself originated from this time of democratic transformation to foster local anti-poverty projects. During my fieldwork the volunteers identified a reversal of these reforms and flagging popular participation in their mechanisms. They viewed these trends as re-centralization by unofficial means. The symbolism of their performative displays at the
roundtable was therefore especially poignant. Re-centralization portended a return to the historic status quo of demoting the politics of people who exhibit indigenous cultural practices. Performative display offered volunteers a measure of democratic participation and a means to cultivate a shared imaginary of an inclusive democratic polity.

The pro-democracy reforms fundamentally addressed indigeneity because of the statutes’ frequent references to the inclusion of Peruvians affected by racial and socioeconomic hierarchies evident in the history of Peru. The Peruvian anthropologist Marisol de la Cadena documented that discrimination in the service of these hierarchies combined racist ideologies with historic logics of cultural difference. She explained that discrimination did incorporate racial distinctions but that people justified unequal treatment on the basis of cultural superiority (de la Cadena 2000). In short, their justifications represented Indianness as the equivalent of a cultural and physical state of wretchedness. As a matter of culture and not race, this discrimination has traditionally been openly practiced. Peru’s Nobel laurate, Mario Vargas Llosa, for example, has publicly characterized indigenous cultural practices in both glowing terms and as anti-modern (Mayer 1991; see also de la Cadena 2000). In practice, the victims of this discrimination might not exactly fit the image or skin color typically associated with the term *Indio* (Indian), but their lack of education or failure to meet modern standards of socioeconomic advancement could make them vulnerable to the word used in hate. Scholars of Peru have called this curious fluidity the *relational* and *context-dependent* nature of cultural discrimination (Fuenzalida 2009). It is little wonder then that the term Indian, which ostensibly denotes an identity-category, has become so loaded that few openly embrace it on its face (apart from its legal usage or the socio-political projects
proudly re-appropriating *Indio* and terms like it; projects which merit research of their own by all rights).³

The consequences of this discrimination reach beyond the individual circumstances of an exchange in which a hateful word is imparted. The faults imputed to Indianness were not only self-evidently immoral at an individual level, but also unethical as hindrances to Peru’s societal development. In the popular imagination, indigeneity is thus shaped according to perceived differences in the socioeconomic development of the administrative regions of Peru (de la Cadena 2000). Those who imagined themselves to belong to European-descended groups claimed the urban spaces of the capital and coasts, while indigenous-descended groups were consigned to the mountains and jungles of the country’s interior.⁴ These folk distinctions have withstood contradicting evidence of peoples’ mixing and movement over centuries (Romero 2001; de la Cadena 1988). Certain requirements of life in these regions came to reflect popular understandings of Indianness, like native fluency in Quechua; pasture-scale cultivation and livestock husbandry in the highland ecosystem; and even the more occasional folkloric activities like carnival celebrations. Certain aspects of indigenous life, particularly carnival celebrations, are elevated as emblems of Peruvian nationality even while indigenous peoples are discriminated against (Abercrombie 1996; Canessa 2006; Rockefeller 1998). Despite the stigma attached to these practices, they are deeply rooted as the sociocultural and material commitments of life in the Andes (Allen 2002). For the purposes of this dissertation, I address indigeneity as these practices and as subjective experience: as the epistemologies, modes of sociality, and moralities of persons living at my fieldsite of Huancayo in the Andean region of Junín.
The coordinating roundtable is a public service with the goal of improving the lives of the poor and “including” Peruvians who maintain such indigenous practices in the democratic life of the nation. This service acts as the institutional locus of my research. It connects my research participants from the roundtable staff, professional specialists from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), trade associations, and leaders from community organizations. As a group the staff and volunteers bring diverse professional and educational backgrounds to bear on anti-poverty initiatives. For simplicity I refer to the non-staff portion of this group as development volunteers in recognition of their common interest in furthering their projects with the help of the roundtable. For their part, the staff provides education, a network of contacts, and modest resources in support of their initiatives, in addition to fronting a few projects under the aegis of the roundtable itself. This dissertation will document the staff and volunteers’ activities both at events in and outside of the coordinating roundtable’s walls.

Among the development volunteers I have concentrated on a population of desplazados internos (internally displaced persons), or simply, desplazados: internal migrants who fled their homes during Peru’s years of political violence. Due to the associations of the violence with the indigenous population, the term desplazado nearly implies these peoples’ origins in the agrarian countryside surrounding major urban areas. Desplazado lives are more complex than this abbreviated understanding, however. Though desplazados are no longer exposed to the physical harm or terror of the years of political violence, their ability to build new lives in Huancayo is constrained by established residents’ discrimination against their telltale signs of foreignness. Because of these hardships they participated in regional associations of desplazados for
socioeconomic support and advocacy from virtually the moment they set foot in Huancayo. They also worked alongside the coordinating roundtable when it was created after the conflict. Their experiences of the violence and, just as importantly, their treatment afterward, positioned them to introduce powerful commentary into societal conversations about the functions and intents of democratic institutions.

I participated in the activities of the coordinating roundtable from February 2014 to March 2015. During these months, I gathered perspectives from its staff and volunteers on the pro-democracy reforms and the legacy of devastating political violence. The pro-democracy reforms once held the promise of a broad transformation of political life and a recovery. Measures such as decentralization reforms were intended to reshape unrepresentative democratic structures through new elections for regional seats, a devolution of responsibilities to local governments, and vital allocations of resources to populations of victims and desplazados who needed to regain a footing in the emerging neoliberal economy. At the time of my fieldwork, over a decade after the legislation passed, decentralization was highly contested in the press and among public functionaries. These groups critiqued the reforms for the inefficiencies they created, for the local graft correlated with devolved powers, and for the low levels of citizen confidence in their participatory mechanisms. The coordinating roundtable, as a signature component of the national administration’s policies for increased citizen participation, saw audiences for its events steadily decline in the years after 2006.

In this light, the dedication of this small group of NGO specialists, community leaders and desplazados to the work of development at the coordinating roundtable stood out. They held fast to their involvement despite an awareness of the flagging interest of
their colleagues and the conspicuous disregard of local politicians. Their dedication led me to the unspoken ways these participants negotiated the significance of political inclusion and indigenous identity through public performances at the coordinating roundtable. An understanding of who these participants are, how they view the efforts of its staff, and their own uses of the coordinating roundtable can tell us much about the interaction between the imperatives of state institutions and the expression of indigenous identity.

My involvement with this varied group of development volunteers at the coordinating roundtable tells a story of declining popular mobilization in the participatory mechanisms of the pro-democracy reforms, including the roundtable, since their inception in the term of President Alejandro Toledo in 2001. Instead of serving as an ending to the story of the coordinating roundtable, declining popular participation seems to have provided an opening for these development volunteers. In fact, their activities are broadly similar to other projects at the margins for the renewal of political community after mass violence (Rojas-Perez 2017) and correspond to other movements for participatory democracy in Peru (Nugent 2008). Their actions are targeted at what de la Cadena described as the history of “denaturalizing” indigenous subjectivity as a component of official institutions (de la Cadena 2010, 336); that which in other cases has been called a process of “racialization” (Briggs 2003). I extend this scholarship by arguing that the development volunteers operate within a “field of action” on development and democracy in which they imagine and articulate their relationship with state institutions (Bourdieu 1984; see also, Gilbert 2016, 718). My interest in the volunteers’ work therefore corresponds to similar projects generating positive visions of a
state after what Winifred Tate terms “an aspirational state” (Tate 2015, 236). This dissertation diverges from Tate’s focus on extra-local actors in supporting local vernaculars of rights claims in order to explore the form and themes of volunteer performative displays in constructing such visions.

The development volunteers’ imagining of democracy in this story does not emphasize procedural or institutional differences from the status quo ante – those qualifications which otherwise guide commonplace approaches to defining democracy. Instead, the volunteers’ interest in the democratic state centers on a different role for Andean social subjectivities as a set of relationships and experiences which remain external to bureaucratic decision-making and program designs for the populace in Junín. In this unorthodox approach, the volunteers’ project resonates with recent critical theories of democracy which scrutinize the creation of colloquial meanings of democracy, their circulation, and the normalization of dominant understandings. The anthropologist Julia Paley formulated this as anthropologists’ interest in “the way democracy has been conceptualized in public discourse and practice—both the logic underlying the idea that democracy is definable by discrete features and infinitely replicable and the process through which this notion of democracy has been generated and has come to predominate” (2008, 5). Accordingly, the volunteers view polices as only symptoms of broader problems concerning race and representation in their democratic institutions. Their focus lies with epistemic foundations and the problem of how to structure institutions with an understanding of their modes of human experience and conception with the autonomy to support their goals.
This story is therefore one of creativity as much as it is decline. This observation signals the contribution my dissertation will make to academic scholarship on neoliberalism and politics. Starting in the 1990s President Alberto Fujimori incorporated disparate neoliberal initiatives into a comprehensive program to transform the Peruvian economy. During these years certain communities in Latin America were also exploring political decentralization as innovative means of including the base of society into a model of incremental politico-economic development. The participatory budgeting process developed in Porto Alegre, Brazil, for example, inspired this expansive political practice in which official, private, and social institutions and organizations collaborated. This “new public management” addressed decentralization “not only the transfer of power, authority, and responsibility within government but also the sharing of authority and resources for shaping public policy within society” (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007, 6). Scholars endorsed this decentralization after years of critiquing the inefficiencies of state-led models of development and lauded its program for enabling local governments to opt for supposedly efficient market solutions to public services (Grindle 2007). In this, we can see that decentralization and neoliberal policies shared ideological precepts, including an emphasis on individual freedom to check consolidated power. This semantic overlap mirrored a blending of policies and politics. Policies inspired by the Porto Alegre example assimilated its model of direct representation into the governmental techniques for the retrenchment or privatization of public services under neoliberalization (Radcliffe, Laurie, and Andolina 2002). As a consequence of this mixing, many assessments of decentralization today define the practice as an instrument of neoliberalization and label participatory policy-making mechanisms, such as the
roundtable, as palliatives which obscure broader forces of political disenfranchisement and contraction of state services (Hale 2002).

The development volunteers’ activities cannot be read straightforwardly according to this understanding. Theirs is not another instance of indigenous communities’ recruitment into the neoliberal development model with the attendant presumption that their efforts will eventually be subordinated to the priorities of capitalist elites. Instead, the pro-democracy reforms activate a mode of political participation and representation around issues of indigeneity in an historically underrepresented region. This suggests that in Huancayo, rather than simply dismissing the activities of the coordinating roundtable as complicit with a neoliberal agenda, a researcher must embrace an ethnographically nuanced engagement with decentralization that goes beyond the common uses of the term. I address this discrepancy in neoliberal theory by representing life and change in Junín to relay my subjects’ engagement with decentralization as critical and uncertain through their performative displays. To substantiate this position, I pay close attention to the volunteers’ epistemological framings, historical memories, and moral narratives within their performative displays. And, as in other Latin American states, local political practice is a fruitful space for translating their indigenous identities into cultural and political resources (Albro 2010; Auyero 2001; Nuijten 2003; Orta 2013). Taking a page from this research, I theorize that these performative displays in local politics craft the imaginative space to reshape ideas underpinning democratic institutions. Their displays will reveal decentralization as a less stable and more conflicted process than what standard critiques of neoliberalism suggest.
Together with the larger aim of an ethnographic inquiry into the politics of indigeneity at the coordinating roundtable, a task of this project will be to analyze how its participants demonstrate their commitment to democratic representation through the imaginative potentialities of performative display. These intermittent displays are orchestrated through the events of the coordinating roundtable, or through people and events associated with the institution. They bring together the elite and volunteers at occasions like issue-specific forums, annual observances, or press events. At such events these speakers allude to morally charged narratives, provincially-specific values, (officially unacknowledged) pasts and collective memories. I analyze the embodied and oral elements of these displays. In these brief moments, the volunteers’ performative displays enact alternative visions of democratic inclusion and offer insights into how they attempt to devise common ground on political inclusion or signal possible avenues of shared authority. When the development volunteers take up a role as audiences, they also contribute to performative displays by others, and the resulting agreement or difference of understandings shape local political practice. Accordingly, the meaning and interpretation of public displays do not unilaterally belong to the “performers” or officiants (Duranti and Brenneis 1986). These displays illuminate the work of constructing democratic potentialities between audience and presenters, public officials, and citizens.

This dissertation is structured to support my investigation through chapters relaying my ethnographic research on perceptions of democratic crisis in Peru; desplazados’ performances of resentment against the state; the volunteers’ attempts to craft relationality in their performative displays; and their attempts to concretize these
imaginings through a Governance Accord signed by local politicians (see appendix 1 for a copy of the original accord). For the remainder of this introduction, I will explore the political context of the pro-democracy reforms and orient readers to the ethnographic considerations of my research. I will then turn to my theorization of interpersonal performative displays as a scale in which to document the local work of conceptualizing the state and its purposes.

Historical Background: Mass Violence and A Democratic Renewal

Not quite a civil war, nor entirely a revolution, intense political violence which swept across Peru between 1980 and 2000 defied attempts at classification. Most often
the citizens of Huancayo used the term *violencia política* (political violence) to refer to those years and *subversivos* (subversives or insurgents) for those, such as the militant group called Shining Path, who initiated and recruited others to the insurgency prosecuted largely in the rural administrative regions. Violence by both insurgents and state forces targeted the rural population in guerrilla and counter-insurgency offensives for control of what each saw as the others’ base of support. These combatants killed 69,280 persons, with the mass lethality occurring far from the lives, and some say awareness, of residents in the urban capital of Lima (Degregori 1998; Manrique 1998).²⁸

According to Peru’s *Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación* (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, or CVR to use the Spanish acronym), many of the victims of the political violence shared a familiar set of social characteristics including residence in rural areas, close ties to agricultural livelihoods, and native fluency in Quechua (Peru 2004). These overlapping social markers comprised indigeneity in the popular consciousness. Moreover, the commission identified the repression of Peruvians from indigenous backgrounds through enduring racial and socioeconomic hierarchies as a catalyst enabling the violence to spread and endure. Victims of the violence likely knew intimately of this social discrimination which the Peruvian historian Paulo Drinot described as “entrenched and intersecting class, ethnic and gender inequalities that separate the included few from the excluded many” (2009, 15). These hierarchies still shaped the lives of those traditionally hailing from indigenous and *mestizo* (culturally/racially mixed) backgrounds in the central sierra during my fieldwork, some 14 years after its official end.²⁹
Insurgent violence was conducted primarily by two groups, the Partido Comunista Del Perú Sendero Luminoso (Communist Party of Peru Shining Path) and the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, or MRTA to use its Spanish acronym). These groups sought the wholesale destruction of Peru’s ossified racial and socioeconomic hierarchies, and their corresponding economy, through radical acts of violence (Degregori 1998). That is to say, the violence seldom extended to direct confrontations with state forces. Instead, subversive groups and the Peruvian Armed Forces and National Police waged insurgent and counter-insurgent violence of a kind widely documented throughout Latin America starting in the 1970s (Grandin 2004), particularly as it was focused on and through local populations to achieve their respective goals (Peru 2004, 89). The insurgents targeted state forces or civilians suspected of pro-government loyalty for assassination (Oré Cárdenas 2001). In response, the Armed Forces waged a “merciless campaign of repression, guided by the North American counterinsurgency doctrine … [which] tried to isolate Shining Path by demonstrating that the army could exert even greater terror than the guerrillas” (Manrique 1998, 193). Both antagonists focused this terror on civilians of indigenous backgrounds and campesino (peasant) populations.

From the early 1990s the authoritarian methods of President Fujimori’s administration eroded popular support for this martial strategy to restore security, giving way to a view of state forces as instigators in Peru’s violent instability. Some of my participants bitterly recalled the infamous autogolpe (self-coup) in 1992, for example, where the president unlawfully dismissed the Congress of the Republic through force. They viewed the self-coup as another instance of such authoritarian overreach in a long
struggle for democratic rights and, more recently, for their very lives. Ultimately
President Fujimori abdicated the presidency and fled the country after the video
recordings came to light which documented his head of intelligence, Vladimiro
Montesinos, bribing members of congress and media executives. Against this political
scandal an incriminating record of the administration’s violence toward its own civilian
population began to appear in the national press as well, demonstrated through
documented accounts of systematic violations of the human rights of civilians. The CVR
implicated the Fujimori administration and the military in the political violence through
explicit references to these crimes in its Final Report after the violence. Fujimori himself
was convicted in 2009 of human rights violations for ordering attacks on Peruvian
citizens.

After this period of violence and political turmoil, most Peruvians favored
proposals for greater democratic representation by decentralizing the government along
with official reconstruction and support for victims. In 2001 newly-elected President
Alejandro Toledo sought to chart this new path for the country in both legal and symbolic
terms.\textsuperscript{11} Associated victories by Toledo’s party in the legislature excised Fujimori’s
remaining allies and installed a governing majority coalition comprised of Toledo’s party
Perú Posible (Peru Possible) and the historically-important leftist party Alianza Popular
Revolucionaria Americana (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, APRA). This
governing coalition passed into law a host of reforms to the state, including: the Statutory
Law of Regional Governments, which mandated elections for regional and municipal
governments; the Supreme Directive, which created the official association of
coordinating roundtables; and the Law Creating the Integrated Reparations Plan, which
established a registry of victims and a reparation fund to respond to the human crisis generated by 20 years of mass violence.\textsuperscript{12}

Toledo’s focus on decentralizing the government built upon a history of thought and action surrounding centralization with roots reaching far into Peru’s history. Pivotal intellectuals, including José Carlos Mariátegui and Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre (the founder of the APRA party), to mention only a few, wrote in the early 1900s on the “malaise” of centralization and early remedial efforts. The work of these intellectuals in the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century informed policies and legislation in its second half. Two of these programs stood out as precursors. First, the \textit{Ley de Bases de la Regionalización} (Law on the Foundations for Regionalization), passed in the first term of Alan García in 1988, bolstered growing efforts to found democratically elected regions (Reyna Izaguirre 2000).\textsuperscript{13} Next, the new constitution dictated by the Fujimori Administration in 1993 transformed sub-regional governance. The new constitution (along with other laws created by Fujimori) were curious for supporting certain aspects of decentralization even as they undermined regionalization. For example, Fujimori’s \textit{Consejos Transitorios de Administración Regional} (Regional Transitional Administrative Councils, known by the Spanish acronym CTAR) replaced the elected regional governments, serving for years as the highest governing bodies with accountability only to the Ministry of the Presidency (La Contraloría General de la República del Perú 2014).\textsuperscript{14} Some scholars have thus stressed the paradox that Fujimori was committed to certain decentralization features – including standardizing municipal powers (i.e. “municipalization”), strengthening the autonomy of sub-regional government, and even aspects of citizen participation (Azpur 2010; León 2013) – despite his administration’s strong preference for centralization in
development initiatives, security strategy, and Fujimori’s own ideological posture toward his popular bases of support (Manrique 1998; Mayer 2002a). Both these precursors were narrower in scope than the reforms Toledo initiated in 2000, though they established structures and logics underpinning later efforts. The law established the regions as independent entities, while the new constitution elaborated further on the transfer of authority to sub-regional governments.

President Toledo’s ambition to restructure governance signaled a potentially historic turning point in Peru’s modern political history. Symbolically, Toledo used his success as Peru’s first elected president from an indigenous, Quechua-speaking, background to lead administrative restructuring. He publicly blessed a new path for the country through a kind of executive-quorum called the Acuerdo Nacional (National Accord), which he signed in 2002. Toledo’s government promoted the National Accord as a collective resolution to chart a post-conflict future. The accord specifically addressed the findings of the Final Report by the CVR in endorsing “strengthened democratic governance” and sustainable development with a special emphasis on “equality and social justice.” To implement these projects the National Accord recommended integrating citizen voices into the selection processes for infrastructure projects within the Ministries of the Economy and of Development and Social Inclusion. These changes refashioned the role of non-state actors in certain public policy settings. New participatory spaces now incorporated contributions from a range of participants including individual citizens, unions, chambers of commerce, and NGOs in deciding how public funds would be allocated (including the coordinating roundtable). The understanding of development in Peru which emerged from the accord could not be
functionally separated from considerations of neoliberal democracy, however.

Development continued to reflect a “focus on the state as a machinery of delivery and economic management” whereby the state was defined as a “political entity whose legitimacy derives from development” (Mosse 2013, 230). The ethos of the National Accord guided a myriad of public services and served as a primary source for public officials in justifying state-led interventions.

From the perspective of local development practitioners living in Andean regions like Junín, the Toledo administration’s effort to decentralize representation and state functions held the potential to reverse centuries of political asymmetry that concentrated power in the capital. In some ways this division reflected a tacit implementation of the trope of the “two Perus:” the popular dichotomy in which a division between the coast and sierra supposedly reflects the spatial and socio-cultural divisions between whites and Indians. This trope’s stark divisions never adequately captured the complexities of circulation of people and goods or the true history of mestizaje in Peru. Societal discrimination had repeatedly thwarted political reform projects to address the participation of these groups in power in a variety of areas of socio-political life (Berg and Tamagno 2006). My research participants disclosed that the same had come to pass in the case of the pro-democracy reforms. The progressive ambitions of the legislation lacked follow-up with ongoing political support, bureaucratic resolve, and resources. Years of ineffective and opaque decision-making within these participatory mechanisms disabused many in the development community, and the broader public, of the notion that they could change the power relationships underlying democracy.
Real and symbolic inclusion of Andean Peruvians in which they feature as political agents are so scarce that it seemed necessary in the epigraph of this dissertation to invoke the theme of hope found in the writing of the Peruvian scholar and author José María Arguedas. In *Ríos Profundos* (Deep Rivers), Arguedas writes a meditation on communal memory, indigeneity, and politics from the perspective of a child (1978a, 32). With the deep ring of the bells in the plaza of Cusco the child is disassociated from his temporal frame. He is momentarily transported beyond the social strictures of the moment to a place informed by memory but not of it: a place where he re-imagines the local political leaders of his youth, and channels them through the motif of the ringing bells into the present. Arguedas’ rendering of these exemplars of political dignity is an inspiration and artistically summons the importance of historical memory and creative imagining for these communities, themes which I will explore in the following chapters.
Huancayo: A Cultural Crossroads

To the new arrival, the city of Huancayo presents many identities. At turns it appears as a thriving commercial hub, an agricultural marketplace, or a center of higher education. Each of these identities captures a part of Huancayo, but none are as encompassing of life in the Andean city as the image of a cultural crossroads. Located in central Peru, the city occupies the southeast corner of the Mantaro Valley at a position over 10,000 feet above sea level. It is home to 499,432 residents. Stepping out of your door you could see a woman in “traditional” dress selling sundries arranged on her manta (a variegated wool blanket, the design of which traditionally identifies town of origin), while others passed her in formal Western attire on their way to office jobs. It is easy to
see why the city is the commercial center of the Junin region when you stand in the plaza at the center of the city. The bustle of its streets and hustle on its sidewalks can easily match any city around. But the city’s boundaries seemingly melt into the valley’s farmland. In some outlying districts the blocks end in the intersection of dirt roads with cement lanes. Neighborhoods at the periphery are outwardly urban; three-story homes lay virtually on top of one another. Walk only a few blocks to the north and you encounter herds of horses or goats clapping along the cement pavement as taxi drivers angle around the animals with practiced skill. This interface attests to the valley’s agricultural production, which feeds into the city’s renowned street markets.²⁰ Commercial and educational opportunities support a bustling circulation of merchants, farmers, and school-aged children throughout the valley each week. Huancayo’s ubiquitous mode of transport, mini-van buses called *combis*, reflect this in the composition of their passengers. Children in school uniforms and women with bundles of fresh-cut hay at their feet fill the interiors. In terms of livelihoods at least, the city is in no way disentangled from the countryside, nor entirely given over to urban commerce.

The Mantaro Valley held strong mythic-historical associations for many Peruvians whom I encountered, so it is worthwhile to review them briefly. Huancayo grew as a waypoint on the route from the capital on the coast to the fertile jungle on the eastern side of the Andean mountain chain (Manrique 2014). Often referred to as the breadbasket of Lima, the Mantaro Valley’s plain was a checker-board of small, detached-parcel plots (Méndez 2005, 16). It is equally known for a proud regional identity. A history of circulation through the valley transformed the racial composition its peoples,
catalyzing a process of mestizaje which scholars have argued differentiates its inhabitants from discourses which portray them as uniformly indigenous (Berg 2015; Romero 2001).

In my experience, many residents described their origins by referencing the town in the valley where they were born. Their hyper-local sense of origin corresponded to their pride of ownership over a patchwork of diverse music, dance, and celebratory practices which were renowned throughout Peru (Mendoza 2000; Romero 2001). The saints’ days given to each town, the colors and design of their folk art, and the shifts in styles of hats and dress worn by residents all attest to these subtle variations on identity among towns not more than tens of miles from one another. When I traveled around Peru, sometimes I would mention to a cab driver or hotel clerk that I knew Huancayo. Given its location far off the typical tourist “gringo trail” (non-Spanish speaking foreigner) leading to Cusco, they might have expressed surprise. But they almost always would repeat the famous line that the valley has more holidays than there are days in the calendar (a reference to the popular belief that the number of valley towns holding annual celebrations outnumbers the 365 days of the Gregorian calendar).

It would be hard to overstate the importance of such celebratory rituals on the rhythm of life in Huancayo. A close neighborhood friend of mine named Felicidad devoted considerable energy to the planning committee of an annual cortemonte (tree-felling festival) celebration hosted in Huancayo to honor her ancestral town in the valley. Every year the committee would spend two days cutting three mature eucalyptus trees from the countryside, transporting them to a soccer pitch, re-erecting them with cranes, decorating them, and then cutting them again with axes passed among the participants amid a ceremonial dance. Cortemonte events were central times for connection and
expression of township identity in the months of March and April. Similar days of
carnival-like celebration marked Santiago, the annual holiday feted by Huancaínos in
July. The anthropologist Raúl Romero properly characterized the culminating events at
these celebrations as “dance-dramas” (2001): ornate dance scenes combining specialized
dress, patterned movements and ritual language. These scenes recreated everything from
the mannered cordiality of colonial men and women, to the rollicking bravado of guerrilla
fighters called Avelinos who dressed in rainbow patchwork suits during the anniversaries
of the towns Hualhua and San Jeronimo.\textsuperscript{22} Huaylas, the central dance of Santiago, even
attained a place in the national consciousness through televised dance competitions.

Folkloric and cultural practices constituted an aspect of life in Huancayo that was
arguably inseparable from even the more technocratic elements of the volunteers’ work.
Aside demarcating the annual calendar, folkloric rituals sometimes appeared as part of
development workshops and presentations supported by the coordinating roundtable.
Typically, these interludes took the form of a dance presentation, or a ritual offering of
coca leaves to Pachamama (Earth Mother) at the end of an event. I came to think of
these scenes as a local means of translating the technocratic logics of development into
socially meaningful modes of action and communication in the Mantaro Valley.\textsuperscript{23} When
combined with folkloric celebration outside of the coordinating roundtable, I took away
an impression of the near ubiquity of folkloric celebration as part of social life in
Regions with similar demographic compositions to Junín featured in the thinking of national political elites, though for reasons of a more administrative kind. In the years approaching independence, incidences of rebellion reinforced a conviction among national leaders of the Andes’ defiant style of politics. The brief insurrection led by Túpac Amaru II in the Cusco region in 1780, for example, left an indelible impression. At independence, the criollo elite (those born in Peru but of Spanish descent who claim the cultural privileges associated with whiteness) faced the tricky issue of securing independence from Spain while also suppressing the political aspirations of these indigenous movements (Larson 2004; see also Abercrombie 1996). These elites
radically monopolized the infrastructure of colonial administration at independence, and diminished peasant political conduits into politics by removing mediating actors in government (Thurner 1997). They embraced centralization when Peru declared independence in 1821, particularly as it concerned political decision-making and the military. The extension of this “colonial heritage of the state,” as Thurner termed it, cemented Cusco’s rival position vis-à-vis the government seat in Lima (1997, 4). As the former center of the Incan indigenous empire – emperors once deemed it their spiritual and political capital, the “navel of the world” – its symbolism informed perceptions of the region as a hothouse for rebellion (de la Cadena 2000). Since independence, the city, along with Túpac Amaru II, served as symbols of indigenista (indigenous) politics throughout the country. Successive leaders embraced political centralization to prevent these regions from gaining too much autonomy and to forestall rebellion.26

The Mantaro Valley has had a long history of independence which has done little to overcome an indirect association with rebel politics.27 The region’s inhabitants are known for holding a historical memory of independence going back to their forbears’ resistance to the Incan empire (Arguedas 1978b). The typical version of this narrative attributes bravery to indigenous groups living in the region, known as the Huancans. Locals believe Huancan leaders agreed to fight alongside the newly arrived Spanish colonists in exchange for the right to their own land in the Mantaro Valley after the Incans were vanquished. The agreement is cited as the reason there are relatively few haciendas (ranch estates) in the valley as compared with other regions in the central sierra.28 While the historical record does not reflect all of this historical memory, it does appear that related indigenous inhabitants of the valley, known as the Xauxas (said to
inhabit the space of the modern-day city of Jauja, 1 hour north of Huancayo), may have been one of the few groups who did violently resist Incan incursions (Hurtado Ames 2010). Since then, Huancayo exhibited fewer instances of organized rebellion than Cusco, but the pride of independence by Huancainos is symbolized in the statues of Tupac Amaru II which dot the city. His likenesses stand amongst the other tributes to their regional identity, including depictions of gods thought to be Huancan deities. His likeness even surveils the crossroads at the regional hospital, the virtual doorstep to the city.

Because of its people and history, Huancayo is a compelling place for an ethnography of the pro-democracy reforms. The pro-democracy reforms aimed to integrate populations, such as the citizens of the Mantaro Valley, into political decision-making. Decentralization offered them unprecedented opportunities to participate in their democracy. But beyond the sheer challenge of encouraging the population to embrace these participatory mechanisms, the reforms faced another test over the extent to which these mechanisms would transmit Andean political subjectivities into the state and politics. At the time of my fieldwork this struggle over this colonial heritage of the state was still playing out.

Ethnographic Engagement in the Indigenous Sierra

Research on indigeneity in Latin American states has had a formative influence on my dissertation. Since the late 1970s this research might be described as breaking with a tendency to subordinate questions of indigeneity to other sociocultural categories. Beginning in the late 1980s, anthropologists began emphasizing indigeneity as a central
consideration of state-formation and nationalism (Abercrombie 1998; Rappaport 1994; Rivera Cusicanqui 1987; B. F. Williams 1991). Others explored these themes through indigeneity’s cultural construction in research on popular racial distinctions (Canessa 2006; Fuenzalida 1970; Poole 1997; Wade 2005; Weismantel 2001; Weismantel and Eisenman 1998). The most compelling work for Peru in this latter regard was devised by de la Cadena. Though earlier scholarship treated the popular categories of mestizo and Indian separately, de la Cadena pioneered a view of creative hybridity. She proposed the concept of “indigenous mestizos,” after those in her research who shed the unwanted social markers of indigeneity (and thus were upwardly mobile), but who also upheld select cultural beliefs and practices traditionally associated with indigenous groups (de la Cadena 2000, 30).

In the Mantaro Valley I encountered similarities to the ways in which people of indigenous backgrounds struggled against dominant practices in Cusco. Development and politics at the coordinating roundtable opened a new view onto this process by demonstrating that the volunteers’ imaginative projects also intersected with indigeneity. The development volunteers translated their cultural perspectives on Peru’s colonial heritage of the state, its history of violence in the Andes, and the pro-democracy reforms into the language and practices of the development programs I documented there. The coordinating roundtable was thus a staging ground for the volunteers to contest these broad politico-historical forces and suggested a parallel process of creation and self-realization to the one de la Cadena described.

Taking inspiration de la Cadena’s insight, I use the notion of *indigenous democrats* to denote the development volunteers’ self-appointed responsibility to imagine
an inclusive state. With its first half, this term denotes the process by which the development volunteers draw upon a subaltern cultural heritage in their understandings of development and politics. With the second half of the term, democrat, I hope to reflect their actions to devise a state which is responsive to their lives. Using this term to understand the volunteers’ own struggles against dominant practices surrounding indigeneity and neoliberalism will press the process de la Cadena documented beyond strict considerations of cultural identity to an incipient political identity.

Before my dissertation turns to theoretical considerations, it will be helpful to expand briefly on indigeneity’s broader role in the life of Huancaínos. This role was driven home to me in a tangential way through a conversation with a close friend. I first met this friend, whom I call Felicidad, on a short pre-research fieldtrip to Huancayo. She was not connected to the coordinating roundtable, and she was not a desplazada. But her history resonated with accounts I later collected from the volunteers. Felicidad lived with four generations of her family in a multistory cinderblock home on the outskirts of the city. The matriarch of the house, Felicidad’s aging mother, spoke Spanish as a second language after her native Quechua. Felicidad and her husband spoke some Quechua, though their children showed less interest in adopting the language. She and her husband loved teaching me about the traditional folklore celebrations of the Mantaro Valley and would mime the movements of the Huaylas dance as we talked into the night. They would regale me with stories of how their former lives in a company mining town had given them the means to build their home in Huancayo. Felicidad and her family exemplified those who upheld indigenous cultural practices even as, over the generations, their children shed the social status of Indian-ness.
One evening I lingered in Felicidad’s kitchen as she told me about the political violence. I had been trying to stave off the mountain chill in the dissipating warmth. Kitchens were gathering places at night in an area where central heating systems were practically non-existent. Her kitchen was small, and the table was wrapped in clear plastic over a white tablecloth. She sat at the table, small against a plain white wall behind her. Though Felicidad spoke only rarely about the political violence, her emotion was plain to see. She framed her narrative in generalities about the difficulties faced by her neighbors and extended family. She told of families with no knowledge of the circumstances under which their loved ones disappeared. Others, like the women and men who were forcibly sterilized on the orders of the government of President Fujimori, knew the circumstances of the crimes, but faced the unwillingness of judicial officials to pursue their cases. Felicidad’s daughter murmured the names of some of these families as she narrated, though I could not hear, and Felicidad herself did not expand. After this conversation, I realized that Felicidad was strenuously trying to avoid naming names as she spoke.

From my vantage point after thirteen months of fieldwork with desplazados, I recognize now that Felicidad’s technique of generalization was meant to avoid the reemergence of old or unverified charges. Felicidad may have felt that returning to these dormant accusations with scant new evidence or little recourse to justice could antagonize those with whom one lives day to day. Or, for accusations against the powerful, such an anonymous account may have been a technique of averting economic or social repercussions for Felicidad’s family. Many desplazados who spoke Quechua replicated this presentation in generalities regarding their own histories.
The significance of this conversation was not immediately obvious to me. It did not conform to a traditional ethnographic encounter; I did not get an opportunity to behave as an anthropologist, gathering information about the identities and relationships of victims and perpetrators. Felicidad conveyed depth of feeling however that was more significant than the informational content. Her narrative and emotion revealed that the past was not settled for many citizens of Huancayo. She signaled the re-introduction of history, and its affective entanglements, into the socio-political relationships of the present. Her emotion was connected to the broader reasons why the violence broke out; to who the victims of violence predominantly were; to the spaces where the violence occurred outside of the capital; and in the legal and socio-cultural embroilments through which families managed the unanswered questions about their loved-ones. She gave voice to a history of violence against indigenous peoples that shaped both her day to day interactions, and how she understood her place in Peru’s political community. The volunteers as a group equally shared in Felicidad’s understanding of history and the political violence. They either experienced that history directly for themselves, or they understood it indirectly through the communities whom they sought to integrate and support with anti-poverty programs.

As I set out to explore these themes further among the development volunteers, I did not expect the question of access to the desplazado sub-set of the development volunteers to grow more complicated as my research progressed. My interest in desplazados’ neglect since the political violence required that I understand their interpretations of the violence and return with them to painful memories of that era. A good number of desplazados cast a wary eye on my attempts to establish rapport through
inquiries about the violence and their opinions on the state. Consequently, I found first impressions with desplazados to be a challenge, and interviews were difficult to secure. To a certain extent I was never able to bridge this distance. Desplazado organizations declined my requests to attend their internal meetings and their appointments with lower-level politicians (their initial contact with candidate for Regional President Unchupaico stands out as an exception which I document in chapter 3). Their reluctance was unfortunate for my ambitions as an anthropological researcher, and consequently I have researched their more public forms of speech; one of my primary interests in any event. I also relied on the assistance of two desplazados active in advocacy, Anita and Conrado, to help provide introductions for me. Anita and Conrado mediated my access to the desplazado community somewhat, but they also enabled me to obtain greater access to desplazados than I would have generated on my own. Moreover, they were prodigious sources of information themselves. These facts outweighed my concerns that they might interject a bias into my research through their introductions on my behalf.

It may be understandable then that because of this context of violence I use pseudonyms for the people who appear in these pages. For desplazados, their distrust of authority made confidentiality almost a precondition for some to reach an open exchange about the past. They wished to tell their tales, but not for the eye of what they believed was a capricious and illegitimate state to fall upon their lives once again. Confidentiality served another purpose among my non-desplazado research participants. For the staff and participants of the coordinating roundtable, confidentiality allowed them to offer critiques of the coordinating roundtable’s programs or the state. Without confidentiality, I was sure that their doubts over the roundtable’s independence from the state would have
prompted them to curtail their talk (I review the claim of the roundtable’s independence in greater detail in chapter 1). By offering their candid thoughts on these themes they ran a risk to their livelihoods or reprisals against the support of their projects. Unless otherwise noted all translations in this work are mine, and all reported speech is quoted from my notes or recordings. However, for these reasons, I have employed an editorial hand. At times I have held back details regarding my participants’ specific employment situations or, less occasionally, edited the sequence of conversation to obscure personal identifying details while preserving clarity.

Literature Review: Neoliberalism

Junín’s historical image as rebellious could appear to a visitor today as a distant past, one nearly unrelated to the recent period of economic expansion in which Peru’s annual gross domestic product (GDP) grew on average by 5.9% between 2005-2015. Yet if a visitor stayed for any length of time, they might see that citizens in the central sierra have received only sporadic benefits from this growth as most economic gains accrued to conglomerated industries located on the coasts or to export-focused international corporations. Citizens in the Mantaro Valley, for example, have endured austere limits on upward mobility in the period of neoliberal-led growth which began in 1990. Under these policies, the privatization of Peru’s nationalized industries and the implementation of new legal and procedural incentives designed to support private enterprise left many in the Andes without formal employment. Overcrowded marketplaces and growing numbers of “informals” – street vendors exposed to the insecurities of the market as well as the street – illustrate the structural immobility and
vulnerability foisted on those at the bottom of social and class structures in other cities like Huancayo around Latin America (Goldstein 2016). With few other options at their disposal, citizens in the central sierra have resorted to survival measures like selling sundries on the streets to get by.

Theorists of neoliberalism are adept at accounting for the dissonance between these conflicting trends of macroeconomic advances and growing informality. They are even adept at introducing considerations of indigeneity into neoliberalism, as the work I review below on “neoliberal multiculturalism” will demonstrate. Yet these approaches are insufficient in accounting for the imaginative and symbolic potential of the volunteers’ uses of direct representation inherent to decentralization in shaping Peru’s democratic future. I acknowledge the democratic agency of my research participants under neoliberalism by exploring the democratic and progressive possibilities inherent to the motives of the pro-democracy reforms. This impulse is inspired by James Ferguson’s enjoiinder to progressively minded scholars to account for anti-poverty policies which use typical neoliberal mechanisms (2010). The increasingly ambiguous outcomes of these hybrids highlight the need for greater scrutiny of such policy mechanisms ostensibly labeled as neoliberal. Likewise, the consequences of the volunteers’ participation are both uncertain and unorthodox. As in other areas of Latin America where citizens on the margins are forced to “make do” under neoliberal policies for survival, the development volunteers’ activities are a form of “self-help,” in which they embrace the participatory mechanisms of decentralization but for informal and politically pluralistic goals (Goldstein 2012). In Peru, such a nuanced approach to neoliberalism requires addressing
the intersection between decentralization’s capacity to shape the democratic state and the subjectivities of people from indigenous backgrounds.

Before I address this discussion, it is necessary to address the more fundamental issue that the term neoliberalism is notoriously difficult to define. Once memorably described as a “rascal concept” (Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010, 4), the term has inspired a field of theorizing whose incongruities clash against shared assumptions, making a concise summary difficult. Defining the term is complicated by a host of interpretations within anthropology, differing emphases on the term across academic disciplines, and a not inconsiderable usage among practitioners, including those in the fields of international development and public policy. Anthropologists have indulged in an academic trade in taxonomies of its usage to get around this variety, and it is here that consensus emerges. Some leading thinkers propose to distinguish neoliberal theory from practice (Harvey 2005), while others, no less well-known, trace the signatures of iconic theorists in definitions of neoliberalism (Wacquant 2012; Ortner 2016). Instead of adjudicating this division, or developing a comprehensive review, I will focus on the former strain of theorizing as a better fit for facilitating a discussion of neoliberalism with regard to the policy and political issues of decentralization.

As this brief discussion of the term may make clear, the best definitions of neoliberalism are syncretic. They account for the evident reality of neoliberalism’s life beyond its principled ideation. Mathieu Hilgers, for example, writes that the term must at once take into account usage in the policy and development fields while also remaining sensitive to anthropological themes. His definition weaves together these strands using the theory-practice approach.
Theoretical neoliberalism is a body of literature mostly generated by economists. Practical neoliberalism includes (a) reforms or actions taken in the name of neoliberalism or based on its assumptions, of which the quintessential expression is the Washington consensus and (b) the embodiment of a principle of competition and maximization in the categories of perception and practice of social agents and institutions. (Hilgers 2012, 81)

Though wordy, Hilgers’ definition is useful in offering breadth. It is not limited to “the economy” – the technical minutia of capital flow liberalization or fiscal budgets – but extends to anthropological interests in “social agents and institutions.” In this sense the definition strikes a balance between academic concerns and the socio-historical implementation of neoliberal policies. For these reasons, Hilgers’ scholarship serves as an operative definition of neoliberalism for my dissertation.

Conceptualizing neoliberal theory as distinct from neoliberal policies has been worthwhile in explaining the recent histories of Latin American states. Perhaps no other name is associated with this approach to neoliberalism than that of the prolific scholar David Harvey. Harvey recounts the utopian project of a small group of scholars inspired in the main by the economist Friedrich August von Hayek to form the Mont Pèlerin Society (2005). Their number would shape neoliberalism as a byword for economic freedom. Harvey stresses, however, that the concepts of the society were nevertheless transformed in practice as political leaders sought to hitch their ideas about free markets and trade to parochial politics. While this conceptual division is useful, in fact neoliberal policies and principles have been intertwined as the historian Greg Grandin details in a history of reactionary conservative movements across Latin America in the 1970s and 80s. One of the first neoliberal democracies, Chile, would not have been possible if Hayek and the economist Milton Friedman had not met with Augusto Pinochet’s government after President Salvador Allende was killed in a coup in 1973 (Grandin
Chile’s example reminds us that from the start violence was instrumental to the implementation of the principled ideas generated by the Mont Pèlerin Society (Slobodian 2018, 277). History showed that the division between theory and practice, though useful as an analytical divide, were not as distinct in real life.

Scholars soon recognized the need to reconcile the spread of cultural awareness and indigenous rights emerging at this time with the “neoliberal economic catechism” of the states of Central and South America (Orta 2013, 109). Charles Hale’s concept of neoliberal multiculturalism has been central to understanding this trend in the official acknowledgement of the needs of indigenous populations as they appear in Guatemala, Bolivia, and other states with significant histories of indigenous activism (2002). Hale observed that multicultural initiatives and cabinet level ministries for social inclusion in Guatemala grant rights and entitlements to indigenous groups while also delegitimizing indigenous rights campaigns as culturally inflammatory. He warned that “the concessions and prohibitions of neoliberal multiculturalism structure the spaces that cultural rights activists occupy: defining the language of contention; stating which rights are legitimate, and what forms of political action are appropriate” (2002, 490). A range of subsequent ethnographic inquiries embraced Hale’s concept with incredible thoughtfulness while producing contradictory findings, as Bolivia’s case of “semineoliberalism” exemplifies (Orta 2013). For some, the multicultural policies emerging from the success of President Evo Morales’ Movimiento Al Socialismo (Movement Towards Socialism) political party in Bolivia vaulted indigenous subjectivities and rationalities into the construction of citizenship (Postero 2007). Others warned against the “postmulticultural” optimism of these narratives, arguing that the
marginalization of the Ayoro Puyedie (“the prohibited ones,” those stigmatized as indigenous prostitutes) in Morales’ Bolivia refutes the notion that semi-neoliberal policies rectify the sociocultural status of indigenous populations (Bessire 2014). My reading of this disagreement about the extent and consequences of multicultural policies in Bolivia’s neoliberal democracy builds off of critiques of the methodological ambiguity of neoliberalism (Collier 2012; Mains 2012). These critiques suggest that neoliberalism’s continual expansion as an analytical construct confounds lived experiences of its contradictions or potentialities, and undermines the salutary nuance provided by concepts like multicultural neoliberalism.

Discussions of this historical entanglement between neoliberalism and indigeneity in Latin America corresponded with neoliberalism’s spread in academic thinking more generally. In this, the theory’s popularity has been exemplified by a subtle creep in some ethnographic descriptions from an exploration of its nuances to depictions of its mechanical inevitability. The theory’s strengths in contributing to ethnographic research on the structural determinants, life chances, and modes of subjectification under public policy reforms tends in these descriptions towards overdetermination. Ferguson recently characterized this dilemma as anthropologists’ use of neoliberalism as an origin-story. Too often, he said, neoliberalism is presented as the source of all possibilities, a “gigantic, all-powerful first cause (as categories like “Modernity” or “Capitalism” have done before it) - that malevolent force that causes everything else to happen” (Ferguson 2010, 171). My dissertation responds to the problems Ferguson identifies and uses his critique as an inspiration in detailing my ethnographic research. The decentralization policies begun in 2001 for example do not fall neatly into the political categories of
conservative or progressive. My research on their significance lies nearly as much in the historical moment in which Peruvian officials built institutional mechanisms for political enfranchisement, out of an imperative to refashion democratic representation after the political violence, as it does with the more general characterization of decentralization as neoliberal tool.

Literature Review: State Formation

One morning a friend named Teofilo instructed me on the historical dilemma of indigeneity at the core of authority in Peru. He and a college-aged intern named Ishmael discussed how Peru is a “very diverse country.” Even within a single region they tallied considerable differences in music, language, cuisine and more. Take Junín as an example, they urged. The region illustrated the challenges of devising anti-poverty policy for the inhabitants of a single region. Junín encompassed both the city of Huancayo, located in the central sierra, and a host of smaller cities, including Satipo located in foothills of the Amazon. These localities included indigenous communities whose languages and customs bore little resemblance to one another.

Their seemingly straightforward statement, that Peru is a very diverse country, stuck with me. Its simplicity masked complex implications for the state. They concluded it was impossible for Peru to create a unified political system that could address the needs of this diversity, despite having sought to do so (by eliding indigeneity) through its history. Ishmael – a young man whose gentleness came across by speaking at a level somewhere just above a murmur – emphasized “this was impossible” in a louder, conversational tone. He virtually shouted his insistence. They understood the state as
only provisionally settled: Peru was engaged in a perpetual search for a state reflecting this plurinational composition.

That indigeneity represents a problem at the heart of governance in Peru has been evident to scholars as well. Since the colonial era the lack of indigenous voices in politics has been an enduring obstacle to stable governance. Segments of the population could not identify with the state as documented in research topics as varied as the agricultural development of the Mantaro Valley, the colonial legal system, and the changing social landscape after the political violence (Mallon 1995; Theidon 2003; Walker 2013; Wilson 2013).

To say that the source of this dissonance lies in the colonial encounter conveys more than the matter of identifying an original sin – an early period of destruction and lethality. It means recognizing that the destruction of indigenous political modalities, and imposition of European temporal, organizational, and cultural logics have had lasting repercussions on official institutions (Abercrombie 1998; de la Cadena 2010).

Subsequent rulers failed to correct these iniquities, to incorporate the modes of conceptualizing life and the political subjectivities of Peruvians of indigenous backgrounds. That failure implanted an enduring contradiction within state institutions. The Peruvian anthropologist Fernando Fuenzalida noted this in the inconsistent priorities of the Congress of the Republic through legislation that alternatively discriminated, promoted, or concocted the vassalage of those of indigenous backgrounds over the years (1970). Likewise, the iconic Peruvian sociologist Julio Cotler identified the continuing exploitation of Peruvians from indigenous backgrounds as underpinning a cyclical politics of domination and revolution in the country. Ultimately, Cotler concluded, this
exploitation undermined Peruvian leaders’ ability “to handle the development of a
democratic and liberal society and politics, and to construct a state of ‘all of us’, capable
of arbitrating and conciliating the social antagonisms, instilling the belief that [it]
represented the reign of equality” (my translation, 2005, 338). The measure of this
quandary today lies in the felt absence of the state as a grouping of institutions which
ought to address the concerns of all.

My conversation with Teofilo and Ishmael shaped my thinking on the
complexities of decentralization as a chapter in Peru’s state formation. A seminal
definition of state formation defined the topic not through evolving military capacity, or
the number of bureaucrats a state employs, but as a kind of “moral regulation”: those
state activities which serve “a project of normalizing, rendering natural, taken for
granted, in a word ‘obvious,’ what are in fact ontological and epistemological premises of
a particular and historical form of social order” (Corrigan and Sayer 1985, 4). As Teofilo
and Ishmael taught me, defining the state as an incomplete project is central to
understanding Peru. Moreover, the abrogation of Peru’s indigenous population from
state institutions and politics is a particularly pernicious example of such ontological
premise at the heart of a historical social order. But the unintended uses of
decentralization by the development volunteers also raises the topic of state formation
concerning the role of imagining and the contribution of average citizens. The
anthropologist David Nugent writes that state formation is “a cultural process, rooted in
violence, that seeks to normalize and legitimize the organized political subjection of
large-scale societies” (2010, 681). Nugent’s framing is accessible and emerges from a
long career studying state formation in Peru, though its accessibility obscures the non-
violent work of legitimizing new forms of politics by non-official actors at the margins. My analysis of performative displays at the coordinating roundtable will show that participants grapple with the failings of the Peruvian state, specifically on matters of indigeneity, from their local perspective as development practitioners, desplazados, or community leaders. It is important to note that this work is tentative and at times only minimally effective in the terms of policy changes. But it nevertheless contributes to the moral renewal of politics in Junin. The public displays in the quasi-official confines of the coordinating roundtable are thus daily negotiations of statehood which incorporate local politics. Essentially, it is the everyday work of state formation by official and non-official parties.

To understand the concepts underpinning this critical orientation, scholars of state formation investigated states as phenomena in-process, rather than as finished objects of study since the mid-1980s. These anthropologists, historians and unconventional political theorists adopted an inherent skepticism of the assumed supremacy of the state over society. Like A. R. Radcliffe-Brown’s famous proclamation in 1940 that the state was a fiction, they embraced the view that the state “does not exist in the phenomenal world; it is a fiction of the philosophers. What does exist is an organization, i.e. a collection of individual human beings connected by a complex system of relations” (Radcliffe-Brown 1987, xxiii). Beginning in the 1970s, scholars adapted such critical perspectives to states as phenomena inflected by non-political themes and framed their emergence in the context of other influences of social life (Skocpol 1985). Consequently, one approach by the iconic scholar Max Weber fell into relative disuse among these critical scholars of the state. This shift reflected the ineffectiveness of Weber’s mode of
isolating the uniqueness of states for their studies of the processes behind this fiction. His systematic catalogues of the distinguishing features of a state which marked it as distinct from, say, private, feudal, or honorific forms of organizing, strongly imparted stasis and reification to the state in a way which ran counter to this critical scholarship (1968). To adequately address their interests in the globalizing world these scholars forged an intellectual path which broke with Weber’s methodological concentration, if not his thematic interests.35

This multidisciplinary body of work on state formation combined an impulse to deconstruct the state with an inclination to social realism which favored institutions, laws, and the histories of great personages. While it was primarily anthropologists who would contribute their hallmark strength in contesting the positivism of this thrust, there were undercurrents which depicted states as less tangible than previously thought. These undercurrents drew upon the topics of cultural practices, class structures, and even imagination in non-anthropological scholarship. A seminal work by Philip Abrams insisted that scholars uncover the state as complex social emanation, “Whose power must be both critically investigated and disenchanted” (Abrams 1988, 374). Abrams’ impulse to demystify relied on conceptualizations of consciousness and ideology in the formation of the state consistent with Antonio Gramsci’s vision of a proletariat which actively resists the representations made by a bourgeois political elite (1971). Further pressing the state’s immateriality, the political scientists Timothy Mitchell and Theda Skocpol posited the idea of state effects (1991; 1985). Mitchell theorized another side to states as the supreme institutional object of analysis, suggesting their influence was located in the articulation of activities, including “the organized partitioning of space, the regular
distribution of bodies, exact timing, the coordination of moment, the combining of elements, and endless repetition” (1991, 93–94). And, as noted above, the British sociologists Corrigan and Sayer emphasized the cultural work of shaping acceptable social life as the definition of states (1985). Instead of starting from the assumption that the state was a finished product – an established phenomenon of the real world to be studied – these approaches tracked the “everyday forms of state formation,” as an influential title put it (M. G. Joseph and Nugent 1994). They devised methods to study it as a commonplace process of legitimating power and solidifying socially advantageous arrangements of institutions.

The intertwined themes of performance and imagining deserve special attention in this work for how states are experienced in social life. Next to the seemingly practical matters of power and coercion, this concentration on performance could appear a sentimental distraction. But the topic holds real stakes for politics. Performances and representations are central considerations of how state elites legitimate their power, specifically through iterative actions demonstrating continuity and consolidation (Nugent 2010). The importance of these themes was illustrated in the introduction to The Anthropology of the State. In it, Akhil Gupta claimed that “It is in the realm of representation that an explicit discourse of the state is produced. Public cultural representations and performance of statehood crucially shape people’s perceptions about the nature of the state” (2006, 18). Though they may share little else in common, the work of Gupta could be considered an outcome of Radcliffe-Brown’s critical perspective in this regard. Both Gupta and Radcliffe-Brown approached the state as an abstraction,
though Gupta’s review highlighted the performative work necessary to construct the image of the state.

One common application of performance studies how the administration of states has been conceptualized as a technology by which actors abstract the state and create its effects. Ethnographic inquiries on this theme documented conversations turn-by-turn between bureaucrats and state subjects for example (Kravel-Tovi 2012), and scrutinized the study of documents, objects, and signs of the state (Gupta 2006; I. Feldman 2008). Repetition and specialization in these official activities projected a sense of proficiency, consolidation, and scale. The mundane iterations of the state pass below the level of everyday awareness but create an impression of the state’s expansiveness and cogency. Yet representations of the state’s solidity require a political community which identifies with its messages to inspire their collective action. In this regard, performance has also been useful for studying the formation of the nation in nation-states. Stewart Rockefeller studied practices of theatric, rehearsed carnival behaviors as techniques of conceptualizing and communicating the nation to audiences of Bolivian peasants (1998; see also Abercrombie 1996; Mendoza 2000). In response, marginalized populations seeking to critique the state’s representations employ performance from a perspective of their lived circumstances of political, social, or economic exclusion within states (Fabricant 2009; Wade 2005). In this usage the term applies generally to the practice of “calling attention to oneself or one’s group by means of public display” (Goldstein 2005, 17). It denoted a last-ditch channel by which the desperate contest processes constructing their marginalization.
I use performance in this dissertation from this later perspective of marginalized communities but press beyond this foundation by conceiving of performance as commonplace displays of knowledge and subjectivity. An innovative work by Diana Taylor explains this approach to performance by proposing a shift from defining performance according to the conventional events and practices associated with the term, like rehearsal and theatricality, to performance as a perspective on social modes of conception and becoming in everyday life. Drawing upon the thought of Victor Turner and Judith Butler, Taylor devises the term, *the performative*, to denote this methodological approach. Taylor uses this term to refer to commonplace activities which conveyed embodied subjectivity. Taylor argues that people’s everyday actions constitute a kind of knowledge transfer, and that “To understand these as performance suggests that performance also functions as an epistemology. Embodied practice, along with and bound up with other cultural practices, offers a way of knowing.” (2003, 3). Performance as an analytic thus offers a shift in perspective for the researcher, one in which ordinary activity conveys the social meanings and outlooks of indigenous peoples. In the context of Latin America’s historic class, ethnic, and gender inequalities, Taylor’s emphasis on embodiment also implies a progressive project. Interpreting everyday actions as communicating their epistemologies means acknowledging the struggle by many to enshrine their ways of knowing and being in their social orders through non-discursive means. Her definition highlighted a theoretical means to understand the representations of those who do not explicitly see their social subjectivities reflected in their governance and institutions.
If state officials persuade, encourage, and ultimately shape the imagining of the state through public displays, then it’s worth exploring the relationship between Taylor’s idea of performative displays and everyday “audiences.” As linguistic anthropologists have long pointed out, social meaning is constructed not just by the speaker, but in conjunction with an audience (Duranti and Brenneis 1986). The same would appear to be true in the case of states. In a brilliant summary work Begoña Aretxaga offered a nuanced framing of states which introduces the role of ordinary citizens as performers and active audiences into state formation. Aretxaga advocated for inverting anthropology’s traditional methodology of studying states through institutions and politics. Instead, she argued for investigating our subjects’ sense of states.

The question of subjectivity emerges as critical in a variety of ways. On the one hand, there are the subjective dynamics that link people to states, something that Weber already pointed out; on the other hand is what one would call the subjectivity of the state being (Taussig 1992, 1997). How does it become a social subject in everyday life? This is to ask about bodily excitations and sensualities, powerful identifications, and unconscious desires of state officials (Aretxaga 2000a, 2001a); about performances and public representations of statehood; and about discourses, narratives, and fantasies generated around the idea of the state. (Aretxaga 2003, 395)

Aretxaga’s proposal to research the subjectivities of states entailed researching the life of the state in ordinary circumstances for ordinary citizens. It entailed imagining of the subjective being of states as a fictive but potent social form. The anthropologist Yael Navaro-Yashin built upon Aretxaga’s thought by linking the iterative practice of a de facto state in Northern Cyprus, though it had no formal recognition, with the Turkish-Cypriot community’s imagining of their polity (2012). Works such as Navaro-Yashin’s clarify how metaphors of the state are made effective and experienced in the relationship between citizens and officials (J. Ferguson and Gupta 2002).
Aretxaga’s shift in perspective to the imaginative potentialities of performance in states has some precedents in Latin American anthropology. Work by Postero and Fabricant illustrated the eruption of a related term, fantasy, in combination with the politics of representation. They documented pantomimes of racial violence within conservative “rights marches” which galvanized an imagining of political community with the goal of curtailing Indian progress in Bolivia. They argued the conservative rights movement evoked Aretxaga’s theoretical and cultural analysis.

fantasy is a major component of political life and a key factor structuring power relations. By fantasy, [Aretxaga] does not refer to the illusory, but rather to ‘a form of reality in its own right, a scene whose structure traverses the boundary between the conscious and the unconscious’ (2001:4)….The staged performances of victimhood and oppression in Santa Cruz operate to vivify and legitimate these fantasies. (Fabricant and Postero 2013, 206)

Postero and Fabricant saw in these imaginings the production of a version of social reality with significance for local politics. Their work established the potential of performative displays at the coordinating roundtable in my own research to enact imaginative constructions of the Peruvian state but from a progressive foundation which addresses the historical legacy of indigeneity.

With Aretxaga’s summation, a historian of state formation notes that anthropologists have traveled a good distance from a social-realist end of the continuum to the intersection of imagination and lived experience. These works illustrate the trajectory of thinking on state formation from every day settings to a focus on performative, iterative behaviors and the “internalized manifestations of governance” among the populace (Krupa and Nugent 2015, 4). The combination of these official and popular actions give the state a presence, a gravity beyond its idealization as a staid object “above” or “apart” from society (Corrigan and Sayer 1985; J. Ferguson and Gupta
This research thus shifted from the social realism of other disciplines and depicted the state as a kind of magic produced by “an ensemble of practices, institutions, and ideologies of rule” (Coronil 1997, 4). Anthropologists eschewed a materialist understanding of states, focusing instead on the images, meanings, and logics employed by state officials which drove at the reality “behind” states. They also introduced indeterminacy to state-formation by revealing its production in commonplace interactions; the uses of performance as a way of conveying knowledge; and the importance of imagining. These theories demonstrate that the formation of the state is a fraught process evident at multiple scales and in seemingly mundane interactions.

Representation(s) and Direct Democracy

Teofilo and Ishmael’s words gave shape to the feeling of socio-historical divides running through the practice of politics and governance. In his understanding the current practice of politics contradicted classical ideas of republican democracy. Instead of a relation of mutual support between elected officials and citizens to pursue the collective welfare, some citizens still struggle to be seen and heard in the halls of the state (Arendt 1969; A. Ferguson 1995; Locke 1988; Tocqueville 1945). The coordinating roundtable was ostensibly designed to counteract precisely this weakness in democratic representation after the political violence, as reflected more broadly in the participatory mechanisms of the pro-democracy reforms. Instead, it and other channels designed to extend participation fell into disuse while unofficial re-centralization reasserted older hierarchies of power. But the development volunteers still had reasons to participate.
The performative dimensions of the development volunteers’ activities attempted to rehabilitate accountability and representation. Their use of the coordinating roundtable for this end was more than publicization and advocacy; it was a means of shaping democratic subjectivities and the purposes of state institutions.

This dissertation will begin by exploring the national political context and the structural invisibility of the development volunteers. The first chapter documents the politico-economic consequences of neoliberal changes and the pro-democracy reforms for Junín. In it I recount the development volunteers’ views on how the roundtable accomplishes the work of development while subject to political challenges which undermine its agency. I frame these challenges variously as re-centralization, interference politics, and unassured development interventions. These challenges have checked the democratic gains of the regions in favor of a colonialist political arrangement of power. Against these constraints, the volunteers recount the limits on progressive anti-poverty policies and the consequences for the roundtable’s ability to support their initiatives. In the second chapter I explore desplazados’ positionality as a sub-grouping of the development volunteers by reviewing their historical memories of the political violence. Their invisibility is evident in the debate over what obligations the nation owes to the victims of the political violence and what responsibilities state agents have for its outcomes today. Desplazados’ aggrieved claims for indemnification stand out as a voice of refusal in these discourses: a refusal to accept disappearances or forgettings. In this political context, their performative displays are a highly charged means to confront officials over political inaction. Public displays activate a form of moral self-expression
which contradict officials’ active efforts to purge the historical responsibility of state
agents.

The third and fourth chapters turn directly to my ethnographic accounts of the role
of the coordinating roundtable in supporting the volunteers’ interpersonal encounters to
create openings towards inclusion within state institutions. The third chapter establishes
the grounds for why I consider the volunteers of the coordinating roundtable to be a
public concerned with the classical conceptions of participatory democracy. Their
convergence as a public in turn underpins their attempts to craft relationality through
public displays. Crafting relationality enables volunteers, particularly desplazados, to
convey their experiences of neglect and discrimination through narratives which vivify
their experiences and influence the knowledge of policy-makers. The fourth chapter
follows the roundtable staff’s efforts to design, promote and ratify the Acuerdo de
Gobernabilidad (Governance Accord) within the setting of the election campaign for
regional president. The accord was an initiative organized by the coordinating roundtable
to hold politicians accountable to socioeconomic development targets. Principally, the
chapter details the ceremonial events for the accord which were attended by the leading
candidates for regional president. As such, the Governance Accord offers a view on the
intersections of power and political scales, and the resulting imaginative potentialities of
public display by the volunteers. In the conclusion to this dissertation, I turn to directions
for policy and research emerging from my findings. Regarding policies, I follow the
spirit of the volunteers’ political struggles to suggest guidelines for their inclusion in state
institutions. Regarding future research in places like Huancayo, I argue that
anthropologists must meet the challenges of digital states our participants will soon face
by familiarizing ourselves with digital media to situate its uses in global political economies of power and as emerging tools.

The monographs of the two principle theorists who have inspired my dissertation hint at the challenge that lies ahead to represent the development volunteers’ own efforts to be seen and heard in their democracy. For all their theoretical originality, both Aretxaga and Taylor still grappled with the partiality inherent to academic creation. For Aretxaga, this challenge lay in the impossibility of giving voice to all types of activism against the political violence in Northern Ireland (1997). For Taylor, the challenge took the shape of the silencing of her voice as a foreigner and as a woman on matters of identity and gender in Argentina’s history (1997). There are clear differences between my research and their scholarship, the most prominent of which concern gender and the access afforded to the respective researchers. Fundamentally, my ethnographic narrative is written during a period of relative peace in Peru’s history, not during the violent repression of the Northern Irish. In this sense, it has more in common with the tensions over interpretations of the past, like the those of the fascist terror of the military junta in Argentina which Taylor encountered. But insofar as this dissertation addresses democratic expression in a country with a history of violence, it may leave little possibility for a balanced point of view. Legal proceedings against state agents, and the continuing protection of privileges accruing to those at the top of Peru’s social and ethnic hierarchies ensure that my choice of topic and goals will entail controversy. So, the depths of Aretxaga’s own uncertainty on the possibilities of her study thus seem like an appropriate way of capturing the same potential inherent in this narrative project: “it risks pleasing nobody, and it is likely to play into the lines of current conflicts. I have no
control about the latter, but I must assume full responsibility for the authorship of the story I am about to tell” (Aretxaga 1997, 23). I also seek such responsibility in telling this narrative about volunteers and citizens of Junín whose participation in democracy has historically been restricted. When so many have been granted so little opportunity to influence their state, a narrative which foregrounds their voices can be a necessary act of representation.
1. Attrition of the Pro-Democracy Reforms

“It wouldn’t be impossible when elections come around on the 7th,” said the public official whom I have chosen to call Teofilo, “that all the front-runners will be in jail.” Teofilo made this observation moments after I first entered the coordinating roundtable’s cavernous main hall one morning. When I arrived, it took a minute for my eyes to adjust to the dim light of the hall. A few volunteers were already seated at the conference table. As I approached, I recalled that you had to be careful not to place any significant weight on the table. If you leaned on the unsecured tabletop it would tip over into your lap. Each time I recalled this wobbly table, a rudimentary analysis would begin to form in my mind. It was as though the coordinating roundtable was constrained at the very site of its core mission: its physical collection point for interaction and coordination-building was compromised. The staff would tell you that the table’s virtue was that it could be easily repositioned for public events, but I was never convinced. The volunteers were determined to make the table work though. As they sat, they included Clementina, who worked for an NGO promoting women’s advancement; Guillermo, who worked for an association dedicated to environmental preservation; and Maribel, who worked at the coordinating roundtable. Ofelia was also there. She told me in passing once what she did, but when she spoke the street noise was so great that I never caught what she said.

We gathered to discuss how to encourage responsible conduct in public governance among the incoming crop of election candidates. Making small talk before the meeting began, I asked whether anyone had seen the news. The question was more specific than it appeared on its face. The local press had revealed a scandal: links
between a political fixer named Martín Belaunde and the current Regional President of Junín, Vladimir Cerrón. Allegedly the pair were involved in money laundering and kickbacks in connection with a project to build a bridge over the Mantaro River outside the city (Muñoz 2014). Concurrently, coverage on Cerrón’s primary challenger, Ángel Unchupaico, tracked a complaint of improper financial gain moving through the court system (Diario Correo 2014). The volunteers grappled with how to interpret the corruption scandals in the context of regional elections.

Teofilo arrived and listened to this talk for a few moments. He worked as a chief of staff for one of the sub-offices within the Ministerio de Desarrollo e Inclusión Social (Ministry of Development and Social Inclusion, known by its Spanish acronym MIDIS) division branch of Huancayo. The others grew quiet when he spoke up. Perhaps his words carried the weight of an insider’s view. The corruption scandals surrounding the candidates meant that the coordinating roundtable’s initiatives to establish accountability and transparency in regional governance were as important as ever, he said. He reminded everyone that the objectives of good governance, social inclusion, and development had been interlinked in state programs ever since President Toledo signed the Acuerdo Nacional (National Accord) in 2002. There was a risk that, because the coordinating roundtable implemented the National Accord by advocating for good governance, it might be perceived by the public to be failing at these resolutions. Blame for the politicians’ misconduct could possibly spread from a focus on the alleged crimes to accusations against the coordinating roundtable for not having done more. Moreover, if the judicial system determined both candidates were legally ineligible to run, only the vice-presidential candidates would remain in the contest for regional president. This
latter possibility was potentially the worst part. Teofilo worried the scandals would broadcast to the nation that they were facing a “crisis for democracy.”

This crisis for democracy unfolded in the specific context of Junín’s campaign for regional president. In a certain light, it is true that Teofilo’s comments could be interpreted to suggest that a crisis for the regions was no different than a crisis for the national state. And yet, while it was possible the state could face repercussions stemming from the corruption of regional officials, this was not a terribly likely outcome in the political environment of 2014. Conversely, the regions faced starker risks. A far more likely scenario would have been for the national government to assert its prerogative to curtail, or even reverse, regional democracy in the name of combating corruption and ensuring political stability. Regional democracy was treated by the populace and elites as a wholly separate form of governance – relative to Peru’s other political institutions, regional democracy was still young – which was distinct from Peru’s historically centralized state. When the regions experienced political turmoil, references to the past of political appointees who answered directly to the president began to rise. In 2014 these calls for national government to review regional democracy were growing louder in the press.

The regions’ ability to implement democratic government was not helped by national public officials operating in the regions. These officials steadily undermined the techniques of direct representation created by the pro-democracy reforms whether through neglect or deliberate subversion. These actions by state officials pertained to three areas of life in regional democracy. Firstly, there was the challenge of re-centralization. Neglect of rural areas and officials’ preference for tacitly re-centralizing
policies had begun to undermine the legislation which had established the regions.
Secondly, members of congress displayed a capricious lack of commitment to preserving
the existing policies of regional government. The political class as a whole suffered from
widespread mistrust over endless corruption scandals linked to prominent politicians.
Even public intuitions and organizations had been discredited, creating an anemic climate
for political will. ¹ I came to think of these limitations on political reliability as
interference politics. In the Mantaro Valley, citizens were so well acquainted with
interference politics that few believed in their authorities’ ability to follow-through on the
public’s direct participation. Thirdly, unassured development interventions underwritten
by the national administration did not offer durable solutions to life in the Andes. Public
works projects were state-funded and depended upon local guidance. These projects
created infrastructure which responded to public needs, like the construction of hospitals
or roads, but the projects usually lacked the staff or maintenance schedules to ensure their
effective use by the population. Yet this failure of state-led development to strengthen
regional democracy did not draw the same kind of national opprobrium as regional
corruption scandals did. Collectively, all three challenges portended an official re-
centralization of the state. They raised the specter of a reassertion of the historic political
containment of Andean Peruvians.

Re-centralization, interference politics, and unassured development each
contribute to an accrual of pressures on the democratic representation of the pro-
democracy reforms. This chapter will shed light on how these challenges undermine the
pro-democracy reforms, with special emphasis on the Statutory Law of Regional
Governments which chartered regional franchise for Andean Peruvians. I theorize that
these challenges construct a restricted sort of regional democracy, an interdependent form of regional enfranchisement, which serves to check the promise implied in the pro-democracy reforms. Each of these challenges varies in the timing and scale of interventions as well as the intents of the agents propagating them. For example, politicians’ failure to preserve existing policies undermined the reforms by neglect, while bureaucrats’ re-centralization activities diminished the reforms though deliberate choices of alternatives to decentralization. Independently each of these challenges presents moderate reasons for alarm, but together they are decisive. As a secondary goal, this chapter will also document how these challenges abet the decline of popular participation in the coordinating roundtable in Junín. By constraining the coordinating roundtable’s capacity to translate public participation into results of importance to people in Junín, the actions of state officials hamper the direct participation of Andean citizens in the shape of Peruvian institutions.

The resilience of socioeconomic and racial hierarchies has distinguished Peru’s decentralization process from similar initiatives among neighboring states. In Bolivia, for example, decentralization policies were implemented under a multicultural constitution which explicitly recognized plurinationalism and enshrined a robust rights regime to promote indigenous groups (Orta 2013). Bolivia’s case showed that, in practice, decentralization turned on questions of autonomy for the regions, echoing the trajectory of other states in which indigenous communities carved out political spaces to practice their modes of governance within neoliberal structures (Obarrio 2010). In Peru, conversely, neoliberal democracy has flourished without a corresponding acknowledgement of indigeneity as indispensable to its political community.
Experiences of the development volunteers with decentralization thus have sidestepped questions of regional or local autonomy. Instead, decentralization processes themselves have offered the spaces where the signs of indigeneity can be constructed in conjunction with evolving institutions. The story of Peru’s decentralization therefore is a story of the relative power of groups at these different scales struggling to shape meanings of democratic community at the heart of the state.

The consequences of attrition, or even a reversal of democratic representation, include a risk of a re-constitution of the historic colonialist administrative relationship between the Andean regions and the capital. This risk exists because questions of the balance of governance in Peru involve indigeneity in inchoate but important ways. As de la Cadena outlines in her research, the association of racial hierarchies with political spaces in Peru’s history creates a stigma in which race is constructed as co-extensive with geography, “Following this racialization of geography, people were ranked according to their surroundings: the higher the geographical elevation, the lower the social status of its inhabitants” (de la Cadena 2000, 19). We can extend de la Cadena’s theory on geography to politics. A reversal of decentralization would pose not only a loss of regional democratic representation, but also portend a return to this historical subordination of indigenous populations in priorities of state institutions and, most likely, the reinforcement of hierarchies in society more broadly. As such, challenges by state officials to regional franchise evince a process of attrition on the trajectory of the citizens in these regions to gain a new role in Peru’s political community.

It would be accurate to argue that the popular disaffection engendered by this interdependent regional enfranchisement is connected to the political economy of Peru’s
neoliberal turn. It would be equally accurate to state that relying upon the scholarship of neoliberalism alone to explain the actions of state, regional, and local officials regarding the pro-democracy reforms is insufficient. Scholarly discussions on neoliberalism and decentralization tend to conclude that declines in popular political participation signal the political disenfranchisement of the public (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000; J. Ferguson 2006; Ganti 2014). This interpretation fails to capture the struggles over local meanings of direct representation and democratic community evident from my interviews with the development volunteers. The volunteers remain invested in the coordinating roundtable, and they reveal deeply felt commitments to democratic egalitarianism and meritocratic government. Their continued participation does not convey political dispossession. Even their critiques of the coordinating roundtable cannot be properly understood as expressions of pessimism, but instead paint a picture of the entanglement of neoliberal restructuring with struggles over racial and socioeconomic hierarchies.

This chapter is structured to convey the perspectives of the volunteers and ordinary citizens on how these challenges diminished the pro-democracy reforms. First, I address the locus of my field research by introducing the coordinating roundtable to detail its role and who its participants were. Next, I address the implementation of neoliberal policies amid the years of the political violence to understand how political elites elide indigeneity in statecraft. This context will establish the socio-historical conditions preceding the pro-democracy reforms. The chapter will then shift from this background to the timeframe of my research and to establish the challenges to the pro-democracy reforms. Here I will present data from individual interviews organized according to the themes of re-centralization, interference politics, and unassured
development. Lastly, I present development volunteers’ experiences with the coordinating roundtable’s decline to show that their criticisms of its operation also originate from these challenges to the pro-democracy reforms.

A Portrait of the Coordinating Roundtable in 2014

The coordinating roundtable staff works in a single-story building next to a preschool in Huancayo. With its plain sheet metal facade and angled plastic roof, the building is unassuming. It sits at the feet of one of the major arteries of the city, Avenida Huancavelica. Outside, *combi* mini-buses and white hatch-back taxis jostle for advantage on the cement street. Only a modest sign displaying the title, a logo, and the addendum “Regional Executive Committee – Junín,” lets the visitor know that they have arrived. Stepping through the sheet metal door frame, the interior space resembles a warehouse like that of any of the wholesale vendors which line the avenue. Neon pendant lights the size of basketballs hang from the ceiling. The wooden conference table sits in the corner. Children’s cries from the nearby school and the din of truck engines reverberate through plastic sheet roofing as people work. At the back an aluminum staircase leads to a landing open to the main floor below. This holds the office space for employees and occasional part-time staff.

As its name suggests, the coordinating roundtable staff was tasked with coordinating anti-poverty efforts and promoting social inclusion between private and public entities. Its mission came from Supreme Directive N° 28592 creating an institution to formalize a channel for citizen involvement in development and coordinate the state, private sector, and civic groups under a common cause for the “fight against
poverty.” The directive appointed a national executive committee to provide oversight for the activities of the regional committees, of which the branch in Huancayo was one (according to the confusing organization of the government, this entire configuration is housed within MIDIS). Over the years, the national committee overseeing the roundtables has interpreted its objectives as “integrated human development,” divided according to four concentrations including social, environmental, economic and institutional themes. During my research the staff and volunteers dedicated themselves to these themes in the form of producing political accountability; supporting civil society initiatives by citizens such as desplazado groups; and increasing participation in electoral democracy during the campaign for regional president.
Because the coordinating roundtable aimed to facilitate direct dialogue among people from different social and economic backgrounds, it created a welcoming impression. The staff did not interpret the goal of promoting social inclusion in the abstract as, say, an extensionist campaign to encourage participation in existing government services. They understood the goals of dialogue and inclusion as injunctions requiring face-to-face contact and used their facility to realize these goals. They were at pains to orchestrate their commitments so that staff could participate in meetings held at the roundtable.

The theme of inclusion appeared in the roundtable’s activities in multiple ways. In its own representations, the coordinating roundtable favored images of multicultural
and multiracial interactions. Its promotional materials included images of roundtables depicting men and women of diverse races and ages at moments of remarkable chattiness. The inclusiveness of these images extended to its practice. Outside of the roundtable the development volunteers casually invited visitors to attend, as though anyone might show up anytime, without invitation or previous acquaintance with one of its staff. This sort of inclusivity contrasted sharply with the exasperation of my local neighborhood friends with state institutions. My friends maintained that government offices typically meted out services based on connections; a personal contact was extremely useful in facilitating and expediting the delivery of services. At the coordinating roundtable many visitors did show up with little notice, and the staff always made sure they had a seat. The volunteers’ ease with the institution taught me that the coordinating roundtable’s commitment to inclusivity was a daily practice, not a formality. In this sense the coordinating roundtable operated almost like a development-oriented community center rather than a typical agency of the state.

Specifying who participated in the coordinating roundtable day to day would likewise read like the registration ledger at such a community center. It was difficult to find common characteristics among the businesspeople, public functionaries, civic leaders and enthusiasts who treaded its floors. Most participants appeared for one-time events. Others came repeatedly for workshops or forums on a specific topic. The development volunteers by contrast attended several times a month. For the development volunteers, a commitment to the coordinating roundtable was like a second unpaid job. They participated through their own areas of interest, but they also contributed to organizing and planning the roundtable’s own homegrown initiative, the Acuerdo de
Though the size of this core group waxed and waned, at meetings they tended to number between 6-18 people. They largely represented NGOs and associations with offices based in Huancayo or the districts bordering the city. As I mentioned at the start of this chapter, they included Clementina, Guillermo, and Ofelia. There was also Lucía, who worked for an association with ties to a local church; Luís, a desplazado who had been in and out of leadership positions in their organizations since the political violence; Isa, who focused on poverty reduction; and Esmerelda, who worked on good governance (I introduce Isa and Esmerelda in more detail below). To maintain confidentiality, I shall settle for this general sketch of the volunteers here, but in what follows I offer more ethnographically situated introductions to these volunteers in scenes that allow for further details while protecting their identities.

To fulfill its objective of coordination, the staff typically referred proposals and initiatives brought by volunteers to like-minded NGOs, state ministries, or ad hoc groups who participated in its programming. The staff would then attempt to broker deeper collaboration between these parties. In part, this activity was more than a matter of the roundtable’s mission objective to coordinate. It was also a pragmatic strategy. If, say, a local neighborhood association wanted to transform its focus to improve the entrepreneurial skills of local women, they might send a representative to the coordinating roundtable. The roundtable staff would organize a meeting where they would invite similar groups. To the extent that these advocates agreed on a common cause, they marshaled more public attention and greater resources together than as separate initiatives. This tendency to pool resources bled into its approach to publicity as
well. Occasionally such groups requested the use of the coordinating roundtable’s hall to host press events (though this was often accepted by its staff after some search for alternatives). The staff had greater contacts with the local press. Using their contacts thus offered a more direct route to elevating the visibility of a cause.

A cornerstone of the coordinating roundtable’s ability to encourage dialogue lay in its political independence. The roundtable staff promoted its activities as independent from the political interests of present and past governments on the grounds that it required participation by a wide cross-section of society. This broad base of support was key to addressing the kinds of development challenges in areas like public health or the environment which required multi-sector participation by volunteers from different organizations. A variety of participants was also important to the coordinating roundtable for access. The volunteers themselves acted as channels to populations which the roundtable wanted to support. They had contacts as well as credibility among marginalized communities, and therefore were indispensable to the roundtable’s anti-poverty mission as it did not have a substantive base of participants of its own. But such access also positioned the volunteers to be effective critics of the state. Through direct work with their communities, the volunteers saw the need for programming which implicitly contravened the policies of the state or required public critiques of state-led development. In contrast, the neutral stance of the coordinating roundtable supposedly enabled the roundtable staff to claim that they supported all actors equally.

Scholars of international development and humanitarian industries tend to agree that such claims to neutrality are shaky (J. Ferguson 1990; Schuller 2016, 12). As part of the state’s institutional structure, the coordinating roundtable received its budget from
MIDIS. The roundtable’s employment regulations for staffing revealed this. The national executive committee elected the head position of coordinator every two years as a non-remunerated position. Staff below this position were considered state employees whose contracts were written so that they were reviewed every nine months. One staffer at the coordinating roundtable named Maribel asserted that despite their employment by the state, they were not subject to the same kind of regulations placed on employees to follow official policy as in other ministries.

Even though they may be free to act as they see fit, the staff could very well be inclined to monitor their own critiques of the state due to these short contract periods. Such facts which tie the coordinating roundtable to the state often went unremarked upon by the volunteers, but in interviews I felt these ambiguities accounted for the reasons why participants became vague or evasive on topics relating to the coordinating roundtable’s management. The volunteers were in the position of needing the state to participate with the roundtable to coordinate resources and encourage wider public engagement as well, so I surmise that they felt they could not directly critique the staff.

Now that we have a better picture of the coordinating roundtable, we can turn to the underlying meanings surrounding Teofilo’s comments about democratic crisis offered at the beginning of the chapter. In the following sections I present historical background on Peru’s neoliberal democracy through interview data. These sections will expand my argument that the challenges of re-centralization, interference politics, and unassured development subverted the pro-democracy reforms.
Historical Background: Neoliberal Fervor and Limits on Democratic Enfranchisement

The neoliberal policy reforms implemented by President Fujimori’s administration in the early 1990s marked a stark transition from an era of Peruvian history in which the state orchestrated ambitious leftist interventions in the economy. Previous governments interceded in industrial development and led campaigns to revolutionize labor relations in the countryside. Agricultural reforms, initiated in 1969, were perhaps the most comprehensive of these state interventions prior to Fujimori’s administration. Born of a leftist military coup, the agricultural reforms reflected the intent of a leader who justified the overthrow of democracy in the name of
revolutionizing the condition of the agrarian class. General Juan Velasco, acting as President of the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces, envisioned reengineering the socioeconomic structure of rural Peru. The reforms expropriated hacienda-owned lands in order to combat the colonial legacy which concentrated ownership in the hands of a few; enforced forms of servitude on the estates according to racial hierarchies; and tacitly allowed hacienda owners to reproduce racial violence for dispute settlement (Mayer 2002b). Subsequent military and civil administrations took up differing positions on Velasco’s reforms by adding to, neglecting, or rolling-back the initial program of his government up until a period of economic inflation in the late 1980s.4 With Fujimori’s election in 1990, the government broke entirely with this course, contending that new radical measures were required to combat the co-occurring threats of political violence and rising inflationary instability.5

Many sensed that the survival of Peruvian society depended on this fresh action. Colloquially known as the “Fuji-shock,” Fujimori’s policies finalized the state’s exit from management and production in agrarian life (Mayer 2002a, 323), privatized national industries, and reduced barriers to entry for international enterprises. Fujimori’s government welcomed multinational corporations in extractive industries and reanimated Peru’s historic focus on mining to immense, neoextractivist scales (Graeter 2017). Meanwhile the growing NGO sector interceded where it could after the retreat of the state from redistributive services. Public officials viewed these neoliberal policies as so successful in combating inflation and reestablishing economic stability that all subsequent governments looked favorably on Fujimori’s economic legacy.
In 2013 the government of President Ollanta Humala embraced the neoliberal development model despite the pronounced fears of critics that Humala favored the politics of Bolivarian revolution once led by President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela. Humala evidently felt so assured of this model that his administration reported through the *Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática* (National Institute of Statistics and Information, *INEI*) that 491,000 Peruvians had been lifted out of poverty as measured by the growth of their household incomes beyond poverty thresholds (Maeshiro 2014). This GDP growth between 2005 and 2015 was celebrated by Humala’s government as prima facie evidence of the benefits of continued neoliberal development for its poorer citizens.

Celebrations of growth figures like that of the INEI’s oversimplify experiences of poverty, however. Anthropologists and development practitioners alike question the plausibility of connecting individual welfare to aggregate economic indicators, even the more complex ones like GDP. These indicators mask the range and extent of local cooperative intensity and entrepreneurial skill development. The stagnation of these “social foundations of development” are particularly evident in Peru’s case as export industries compose a large portion of economic activity. More importantly, GDP growth masks growing inequalities of opportunity, access, and wealth accumulation in Junín. The statistics portray strides in poverty reduction but obscure inter-regional differences where the benefits of growth accrue in areas of conglomerated agricultural industries located on the coasts or the mining sector (Mayer 2002a). Meanwhile, the young, citizens in rural areas, and Quechua-speakers still experience exclusion from formal employment (La República 2014a; Maeshiro 2014). Paradoxically, these same groups are heralded as creative engines of growth, leaders of an “emergent” informal sector,
sometimes called the “sector migrante-emprendedor” (itinerant-entrepreneurial sector).
The optimism of these depictions fails to reflect the life of daily insecurity and occasional violence for these “informals,” those who lack the protections of formalized labor relations (Auyero and Berti 2015; Goldstein 2016; Meléndez 2014c). Even enforcement of the laws offers them only minor assistance, as state authorities construct a “double outlawing” of informals in which their basic protection is unmet while they are constrained by regulations unsuited to the realities of their communities and workplaces (Goldstein 2012, 6; see also Auyero and Berti 2015). Their experiences of unequal growth and continuing impoverishment are the tangible result of neoliberal-based polices which structurally position these populations at a disadvantage to pursue their own welfare.

Praise for Fujimori’s neoliberal transformation omitted attention to this inequality. The Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto’s well-known works The Other Path and The Mystery of Capital, for example, did not address the knotty problematic of violence, discrimination and the long, slow destruction of indigenous ways of life so much as reduce them to economistic logics. De Soto recoded indigenous populations as simply agrarian businesspeople: they were proto-capitalist entrepreneurs deprived of due legal and procedural means to succeed. Omitting any kind of sociological or anthropological examination, de Soto grounded this argument narrowly on the logic of economic incentives. His neoliberal economic and legal reforms could expand peasants’ opportunities, offering them an alternative “path” to the vision of life which insurgents imposed on rural populations (hence de Soto’s play on the word “path” in using name of the principle insurgent group Shining Path). De Soto renewed this argument in a series of
op-eds in 2014 which garnered less attention in the English-speaking world than his books. In Peru’s premier conservative broadsheet, El Comercio, de Soto wrote that his thinktank was, in fact, responsible for defeating the insurgents by way of its lobbying for, and drafting of, neoliberal reforms under the Fujimori government. De Soto reasoned that these reforms for individual ownership rights were so valued by peasants that they organized rondas campesinas – civil self-defense committees – to defend the principle of individual property rights against the insurgents’ threat to collectivize their lands (de Soto 2014). This characterization of peasant communities’ experiences of the terror set the ethnographic record on its head. Critics of de Soto noted that peasants initiated their self-defense only after their local authorities and kin were assassinated, not as a reaction to the earlier threats against their pastures and livestock (Eugenia Ulfe 2014; Gorriti 2014; Peru 2004). Such selective attention reflected an historic tendency to elide indigenous experiences at every turn while stressing the political and economic priorities which favored an elite class.

What such venerations of neoliberalism overlooked were the ethnic and gender inequalities which depreciated the lives and work of indigenous populations. These inequalities emerged in the shape of political unrest at the eve of the political violence. Recruiters from Shining Path relied upon an intuitive understanding of this repression among peasant populations to enlist guerilla fighters. During the violence its leaders sought the wholesale destruction of state and indigenous institutions which tacitly impeded young people of the rural Andes from advancing in society. Shining Path leaders envisioned a self-sufficient socioeconomic order would rise from the ashes guided by an interpretation of Maoist ideology. In fact, that vision was fundamentally at
odds with the historical market orientation of regions like the Mantaro Valley (Peru 2004, 171). Because the violence claimed so many, it is also worth repeating that the antagonists’ violence was extended and compounded by socio-historical hierarchies in Peruvian society which left many sympathetic the insurgents’ revolution (Starn 1998; Degregori 1998; Manrique 1998).

As in other states with histories of violence, the legacy of mass lethality continued to shape the fragile stability of Peruvian democracy long after the political violence ended. Interpretations of how the violence metastasized re-emerged in the context of present-day controversies and influenced the evolution of state institutions in the name of preventing a reoccurrence of the past (M. Scott 2018). For example, many average Peruvians considered the structural explanation of inequalities at the root of the violence to be unconvincing, even when the Final Report of the CVR added support for that view. Opponents of the structural view interpreted the era of political violence as the sole outcome of a small group of debased insurgents whose inclination to subversion could be traced no further than their own perverted psychologies (see this study’s chapter on desplazados for an ethnographic account of this debate in Huancayo). Furthermore, they argued that the Final Report of the CVR was a product of “cavíares” (caviars), or privileged leftist elites, based in Lima, who compromised its objectivity in order to advance their own political and class projects (Chávez 2012). By this logic, the insurgents were the only guilty party, whatever one’s view on the violence by the state against its own population. As the argument goes, state agents were less culpable for violence (if not exonerated), as their intent was to restore order, not subvert it. These opponents attributed an ethical imperative to state agents’ actions, elevating their conduct
(which included human rights violations) over the crimes committed by insurgents. This dispute over the interpretations of the violence smoldered in the years after, while the chance for a conversation on ethnic discrimination and economic inequality for citizens in states like Junín receded behind sharpened divisions (Drinot 2009). Consequently, neoliberal policies generating the impressive economic expansion proceeded without a national discussion on their contribution to enduring socioeconomic inequalities.

De Soto’s argument grew out of this silence surrounding Peru’s post-violence growth. But his high-profile celebration of neoliberal measures abrogated the intertwined issues of impoverishment, indigeneity, and the responsibilities of state institutions. The unsaid implication arising from de Soto’s argument was that the political subjectivity of populations in the Andean regions – their representations of self which personify a history of subjugation and a critique of the extralegal exemption of violence against them – was immaterial to their unequal socioeconomic position in society. Extending de Soto’s line of reasoning, an observer is forced into a contradictory position. They could recognize a degree of responsiveness by the state to matters of indigeneity, as in the National Accord’s commitment to social inclusion. This position would be largely consistent with nuanced analyses of neoliberalism which account for identity, such as Hale’s conception of neoliberal multiculturalism (2002). At the same time, the observer would be justified in pointing out that in national discourses indigeneity has little political weight; it is not recognizable as a counter-position which pundits or public functionaries argue against. It is invisible, an “excess” otherwise untranslatable to political outcomes influencing the structures which reproduce impoverishment and insecurity (de la Cadena 2010).
The denial of history implied by such a contradiction in social life requires extraordinary work and eminent spokespersons. We can identify this work in the promotion of neoliberalism by all of Peru’s recent presidents. In a well-observed monograph the Peruvian anthropologist Isaias Rojas-Perez noted that the neoliberal vision promoted by each of these recent leaders offered citizens “a particular political temporality meant not so much to abstractly prioritize the future at the expense of the past, as to foreclose those areas of the past that did not serve the purpose of that future” (2017, 13). Presidential endorsements of neoliberal-driven economic growth elide the state’s tacit centralization and thus support these historic socioeconomic inequalities. Consequently, populations in the Andean regions see their relationship with the state as marked by an act of non-concession from the outset. The prerogatives of continued growth drive official institutions instead of a relationship based on recognition of their political membership as deserving an attendant reciprocity and relationality inherent to federated democracy. To understand how this relationship unfolded in the context of my fieldwork, I will next turn to the challenges of re-centralization, interference politics, and unassured development.

Re-centralization

The scale of decentralization’s transformation of democracy singles it out as an important consideration of the Peruvian democracy which emerged from the era of political violence. Decentralization, as it is typically conceptualized, concerns the administrative challenge of delegating responsibilities for official functions from national levels to regional and district governments. Scholars tend to agree that decentralization
includes the negotiation of implicit social and political concerns like the sharing of
era in public institutions (Grindle 2007). With my introduction to the
coordinating roundtable Teofilo taught me how decentralization unfolded in practice over
the previous decade. Our conversation got started when I asked for his thoughts on
whether the Andean regions constituted a united political front in national politics.
Teofilo refuted my idea by observing that it was difficult to envision such a thing because
the balance of politics under the decentralization reforms had tipped back to the capital.
He argued that this revealed that the country was not decentralizing any longer, despite
the national edicts directing state intuitions to continue implementing decentralization
policies. In fact, the country could be better described as re-centralizing. He cited the
government’s comparative lack of attention to rural areas in the Mantaro Valley and
surrounding regions as evidence of this. There were few state-sponsored health posts,
job-creation programs, or educational opportunities in the countryside. If you wanted
these things you had to commute or relocate to Huancayo (or even further; certain
medical services, like oncology treatments, were only available in Lima). Many did just
that, or went to even greater lengths to commute to Huancayo during the week for school
and return to their homes on the weekends.

Public critiques of decentralization were inexorably justified in terms of its stark
de-paradigm from Peruvian political history. I received a separate confirmation of Teofilo’s
observations from a man who worked for the Humala administration named Sebastián.
Fittingly, for a high-level bureaucrat, Sebastián had a savvy way of responding to my
questions in terms of historical processes rather than specifics. When I asked Sebastián
why centralism was so strong, he answered that the decentralization process was
relatively new, and that these administrative responsibilities had never existed at the regional level. Prior to the Toledo administration there were *prefectos*, regional prefects, who were accountable to the president of the republic. This political arrangement located oversight in one individual and established a direct channel between the political imperatives of the executive and the prefects who implemented them. With decentralization, the public selected presidents and councils to lead regional government. All of these officials were tasked with coordinating amongst themselves and others at the national, municipal, and district levels. Such a significant reordering of political relationships entailed a period of working out new responsibilities. There were difficulties in ordering this style of collaborative local politics he said; how to coordinate diffused responsibilities among numerous individuals and scales of government without clear codification. And the levels of oversight over the regions which the populace had been accustomed to under the prefects no longer existed. Moreover, many high profile politicians operated independently in pursuit of political agendas wholly separate from the national political parties. Some argued that reversing Peru’s course by re-centralizing would be easier than sorting out these problems.

Interference Politics

In Huancayo, people believed that politicians were consistently unreliable. While these sentiments about politics shared clear similarities with other expressions of mistrust in politics documented in the region (Goldstein 2002; Lazar 2004), the implications of insubstantial political activity and corruption exposed the regions to the threat of formal re-centralization by the national state. During my research I thought of this dynamic as
interference politics: the tendency of public officials and politicians to break their promises, or fail to implement legislation, with the consequence of thwarting the intents of the pro-democracy reforms to cultivate public participation. Unlike the challenge of re-centralization which displayed equal parts neglect and deliberate subversion of existing policies, interference politics did not amount to a problem of deliberate actions to undermine the pro-democracy reforms. Instead interference politics was the result of politicians’ neglect; of civic and political institutions which had exhausted the public’s trust; and in national discourses which painted corruption as a uniquely regional problem. From the development volunteers’ point of view interference politics cultivated the public’s skepticism of regional democracy and hampered their ability to engage with politicians who would shepherd multi-party consensus into regulations and policies on issues critical to regional development.

For the purposes of this section, I have grouped people’s perceptions of interference politics into four areas of political life according to the subsections which follow. These areas concerned people’s perceptions of politicians, of political parties and other politically-inclined civic organizations, of the state itself, and of corruption scandals. Regarding the first area, politicians were widely distrusted as a rule. Few development volunteers, much less the wider Huancaino public, expressed confidence that elected officials would follow-through on campaign promises. Regarding the second area, people held similar feelings of both the new forms political organizing, such as the regional political parties, and familiar civic organizations like labor unions. The regional political parties lacked the internal cohesion and coordination across scales to deliver effectively on their political promises. Meanwhile organizations traditionally associated
with the left were viewed with skepticism for their historic sympathy of the insurgents’ revolutionary aims. Regarding the third area of the state, many citizens believed the Republic of Peru was permanently compromised by the actions of national police and military forces during the political violence. Citizens in the valley held the conviction that the state was fundamentally untrustworthy, if not illegitimate, owing to the use of counter-insurgent tactics which mirrored the terror of insurgents. This feeling was compounded by the absence of non-military development in the Mantaro Valley. People viewed the funds that poured into military operations as a form of partial neglect; a sign that their convictions of the state’s illegitimacy remained valid. Regarding the fourth area, corruption scandals were certainly harmful to regional democracy, but the national reactions to the scandals exhibited an anti-regional bias with a subtle anti-indigenous subtext. In Huancayo people understood corruption to be a critical issue for democracy, but not necessarily in the terms of this anti-regional polemic. These arguments made selective use of the facts to construct a link between corruption and the incapacity of federated democracy to create political stability for the country.

Politicians

Interference politics arose clearly in daily life through language. Idioms at once encapsulated and commented on the historical moment of interference politics. Long-time observers of Peru will quickly recognize many of the phrases below. Notwithstanding their long histories of usage, their appearance, specifically with regard to political misfunction across regional and national scales, summarized feelings of political disaffection in a way that both evoked collective memory and adapted it to
interpret the present. Idioms evinced a sense in which historical trends – the dynamics of power enabling socioeconomic inequalities – reemerged as part of the everyday operation of decentralized administration.

To see this, consider one of the first idioms I was introduced to in the timeworn phrase *la ley se acata pero no se cumple* (the law is in force, but not fulfilled). While discussing my research one afternoon with Teofilo, I inquired about the significance of community-led organizing. He cautioned me that this subject would have little to do with my interest in politics, as politicians were disinclined to attend to this scale of activity. They were more interested in macro-scale issues, he said, than they were in cultivating grassroots political change. They tended to be *centralista* (centralizers). Yet even from their macro-perspective, they typically failed to follow-through. To describe this, he said with some flourish, “*la ley se acata pero no se cumple.*” He explained the phrase as laws were passed but not really followed in practice. Additionally, many laws were so poorly written that it was as though government required new laws to enforce existing ones. Teofilo said that politicians and bureaucrats, when pressed, will even concede that laws exist but find reasons not to fulfill legal stipulations. That they were seen in the act of legislating was more significant than the subsequent implementation of the law.\(^15\)

Though Teofilo left it unsaid, the likeness in structure and tone of this conversation to our discussion of re-centralization drew a link for me between the idiom *la ley se acata pero no se cumple* and our extended conversation about the coordinating roundtable.

My introduction to the highest-ranking member of the coordinating roundtable in Junín offered another example of an idiom associated to decentralization politics. I met this man, Nivardo Santillán, during the early phase of engaging with the coordinating
roundtable. Nivardo introduced himself by explaining that he understood his responsibilities to be that of a convener: someone who embodied the coordinating roundtable’s objective of assembling societal figures and government officials for dialogue. He reflected that this was best achieved with transparency and advised me to follow the same in the conduct of my research. The reason he offered for this was that politicians were particularly noteworthy for disregarding transparency, with detrimental consequences for the public trust. In Peru, he said, politicians often would sacar de la vuelta (to break off course). My inelegant translation fails to capture the idiosyncrasies of this phrase, which was typically used to express betrayal in long-term romantic relationships, like marital infidelity. Interestingly, in the context of the relationship between elected officials and voters, the phrase applied marital betrayal as a standing condition; it expressed a skepticism born of longstanding faithlessness. People knew politicians to be inherently duplicitous, making promises without the intention of keeping them.\textsuperscript{16} I gathered that as a result the public did not trust politicians to undertake long-term policies like decentralization.

\textit{Political Parties & Labor Unions}

People’s views about the unreliability of politicians extended to other areas associated with the pro-democracy reforms, particularly as it regarded political parties. After the political violence the political parties had been discredited by their inability to devise solutions to the political violence; by their shifts to the partisan edges of the political spectrum; and by Fujimori’s vilification of the traditional party system (de Olarte 2007). In their stead, electoral movements grew around single politicians at the
national level. In the years following the pro-democracy reforms, additional legislation loosened the regulations governing how political parties were formed and the electoral movement model spread to regional elections (Tuesta 2014). Short life spans, ad hoc organizational structures, and the tendency to back a single politician distinguished these movements from traditional political parties with mature internal structures and mechanisms for developing new leadership. Regional movements therefore shared some of the complaints people leveled at politicians, specifically that they were unreliable. Regional movements also had unique problems of their own in that the movement model brought to light problems of accountability across differing levels of government.

A former political consultant named Aurelio explained this situation to me. He was a tall man with salt and pepper hair, and wore gold-rimmed glasses. We met on a grey winter morning. The cold and rain marked the season’s change. Aurelio wore a burgundy sweater with a shawl collar and a green windbreaker. He explained that he was no longer active in politics. He now spent his time as a youth educator and used his position to teach the young about political parties on the left. He spoke easily, pausing from time to time in our interview to take a handful of cancha (oven-dried corn kernels; a ubiquitous appetizer in the Andes) in the middle of a sentence, seemingly to chew on his words in equal measure to the cancha and let his points land.

The regional movements could not be understood entirely in terms of the old model of political parties he said. At their core, these movements typically centered on close-knit groupings of intimates. He observed that the family of Regional President Cerrón invested in Cerrón’s re-election campaign. The campaign of Cerrón’s primary challenger, candidate Unchupaico, listed Unchupaico’s brother as a funder. These
intimates invested in their family because they expected to prosper when the candidate ascended to public office, he said. Simply stated, the movements were “business organizations with the goal of capturing resources and enrichment.” The movements were a new kind of entity that resembled the structure of a family firm whose business was politics.

Aurelio also pointed out that there was no legal basis, specifically no articles in the law of political parties, that mandated coordination between national parties and regional movements to accomplish political goals. In the regional movements a leading candidate might campaign for others in their districts but, if these lower-level officials prevailed, they returned to their districts and “the two never meet again.” In comparison Aurelio surmised that if Barack Obama’s party won in say, Colorado, then the president’s party would provide direction on what the party wanted to achieve at the state level. Here, lower tier candidates did not take instruction from the regional movement they ran under.

Teofilo likewise lay blame for interference politics on the laws governing the political parties. He thought the problem was that the laws governing elections and parties were too weak. To elaborate, he observed that there were no internal elections for the party candidates in regional movements. I surmised that Teofilo meant the candidacy typically went to the person who could conceivably fund a campaign, or who had the most connections, rather than the candidate voters might favor and who the organization could back with pooled resources. As if to confirm my thought, Teofilo added that the regional movements were empresas (businesses), echoing Aurelio’s description. The problem with financial incentives driving regional movements, he explained, was that it
made the movements vulnerable to anyone with deep pockets. It would compound the problems of foreign influence from “Mexico and Colombia,” expanding into the regions’ electoral system.

This choice of words was fascinating. On its face, Teofilo’s reference to Mexico and Columbia might be interpreted as bald stereotype about the proliferation of narco-based criminal organizations. The pundit class had recently made sophisticated arguments on this theme, suggesting that local democracy was susceptible to capture by organized criminal enterprise in Mexico. Some warned this could come to pass in Peru’s environment of lax vigilance (Trejo 2014). Alternatively, Teofilo could also have been referencing the unprecedented seizure of 7.5 tons of cocaine in the coastal city of Trujillo just a month prior. The cocaine was thought to belong to a Mexican drug trafficker, Rodrigo Torres, who allegedly had connections to Peruvian congressman José León. Though Junín was far from the coastal city of Trujillo, the region had its own history as a conduit for narcotrafficking, ensuring that his words were more than an idle consideration. Following this observation, Teofilo repeated once again his belief that this amounted to a “crisis for democracy” in Peru.

Regional movements were not the only political organizations people distrusted. There was also an ardent skepticism of traditional organizations associated with the liberal left. I first learned about this perception from a staff member at the coordinating roundtable named Beatriz. Beatriz and I would sometimes have wide-ranging conversations on days when the other staff were working in the field. Beatriz was young, had a university education, and believed in the coordinating roundtable’s goal of social inclusion. So, it came as a surprise when she cautioned me on my support for sindicatos
(labor unions) because of historic links between the unions and the insurgent group Shining Path. She explained her feeling by recounting the unions’ initial support for Shining Path alongside several different episodes in South America’s recent history. She grouped these examples loosely together as emerging from leftist politics or thought, including the nationalization of industries and agrarian reforms in Peru, Cuba’s communist revolution, and the violence perpetrated by Sendero Luminoso. Beatriz did not draw an explicit connection between these projects and the violence initiated by Shining Path, but rather understood them as part of an historical moment in which the left was ascendant across the region, but which also ended in disaster. The correlation was enough to shape a deeply felt sense of caution in Beatriz. She remembered that life stopped during the violence, she could not attend school, there were no public services. As a young person, she could not explain why.

The conclusions Beatriz drew from her experience took the form of an urgent, visceral need to prevent a return of violence. I was struck by the forcefulness of this conviction. Of course, her conflation of different societal projects as corresponding to a single overarching category on the left was shaky. The academic part of my brain also knew it was inconsistent to equate labor organizing in the pre-neoliberal economy of the 1980s to that of 2014. But Beatriz’s recollections operated from a different logic. It is worth recalling that many young people in Huancayo spent their formative years enduring the violence and seeming dissolution of society between 1980 and 2000. At the time of my research they were moving into the positions of midlife while trying to situate their search for meanings of the violence in their new responsibilities. Her logic emerged from her historical experience of violence which many viewed as threatening society’s
survival. The problem, however, was that by holding organizations on the left responsible for that history, it hamstrung the progressive potential of their organizing through a seemingly endless orientation to the past.

Traditional groups on the left therefore represented a challenge for the coordinating roundtable and development volunteers. Organizations which had once been allies of the progressive left had mis-stepped in voicing support for the insurgents. Labor unions could no longer take a political position simply in the good faith of advocating for their membership without also arousing the suspicions of these past associations.\textsuperscript{17} This was true even among development professionals such as Beatriz who were committed to inclusion. Her feeling of mistrust toward the labor unions underscored the obstacles to the roundtable’s mission. The volunteers and staff faced the tricky act of incorporating indigenous peoples without being seen to advocate for institutions which had traditionally supported them.\textsuperscript{18}

Though he was older, Aurelio echoed Beatriz’s thoughts. Aurelio’s life had been transformed by the political violence, but Aurelio’s did not turn away from politics. On the contrary, it led him to trade his scientific training for work as a consultant for regional movements on the left. He recalled that, at first, the armed forces treated citizens indiscriminately and that anyone identified with the political left was labeled a terrorist. “Nobody on the left could be left because that \textit{was} terrorism,” he said. The population “had suffered the consequences of the internal war: the pull of politics was synonymous with the pull of terrorism. So ultimately the political rights of these persons were relieved of, were limited, as it is said.”\textsuperscript{19} He concluded that citizens no longer had the right to their own political views. Along with the military’s selective persecution of
those associated with the left during the violence, these trends ultimately intensified the stigma against leftist politics after the conflict.20

Beatriz and Aurelio’s words outline a contradiction at the heart of politics in the regions today. There is strong current of thinking that a return to the years of violence must be avoided at all costs. This feeling deepens their suspicions of activism by traditional organizations supporting politics of the left. It also translates into a constraint consisting in the uncertainty people held about the hold of these past stigmas on the politics of the present; uncertainty about what it might take to change perspectives – about what new language would be required to shift the political environment. While this change in politics might come from outside the coordinating roundtable, the erosion in support for institutions supporting progressive causes necessarily limits the reach of the development volunteers’ goals for anti-poverty programs and social inclusion.

The Republic of Peru

The feeling of mistrust expressed through idioms such as *la ley se acata pero no se cumple* (the law is in force, but not fulfilled) arose in the volunteers’ perspectives on the state as well. One of the development volunteers, a woman named Isa, had experience working with populations in the countryside who experienced the terror firsthand. I met Isa through one of the younger volunteers at the coordinating roundtable, a man named Héctor who had views of his own on the roundtable which I recount further below. Héctor approached me to ask for some help translating documents at the NGO where he worked which I will call *Crecimiento* (growth). Isa was the director there.
When I first visited the Crecimiento offices I nearly passed the building without taking notice. Only a small sign hanging outside the second floor marked the spot on the otherwise unassuming lane. A white staircase led me past the first floor, with its air of an unused storefront, to Crecimiento’s offices on the next level. Isa was a middle-aged woman of medium height. She spoke slowly, seemingly to choose her words as she spoke. On the day of our interview I found her engrossed in her computer monitor.

She observed that the Mantaro Valley’s population shared elements of an outlook on the state which she first noticed among inhabitants in the former so-called “red zones.” These were areas the armed forces determined were home to insurgent loyalists, as distinct from the “liberated zones” with populations loyal to the state. She observed, “In these zones, this is difficult, because these are zones that have a past strongly marked by terrorism, for example, where the state has no legitimacy. Or rather it was Shining Path, and they had the authority at that time. Even though that all finished more than 10 years ago.” Over a decade had passed since the end of the political violence, but for populations in the valley the state was illegitimate. These populations may have still sympathized with the insurgents’ aims. Others harbored the conviction of the state’s illegitimacy out of a feeling of being “caught in-between” the lethal terror committed by both sides. I recognized this later feeling from the desplazados with whom I worked. They too would never relinquish their suspicion of the state over the betrayal of its imperative to protect them (I explore this theme as it regards desplazados in greater detail in chapter 2). These convictions also shifted across generations. Isa explained: “demographically, these current populations today were between young and adult in those years…young people have a different vision of the state. Indeed, they recognize
the state, its legitimacy. But the older population, of adults more than 40 or 50 years? No.”

After the conflict the state had done little in the red zones to improve its image. There was no substantive increase in its non-military presence, in the form of education, health or economic programs. Isa elaborated, “in the zones that border the jungle, respectively Junín, Huancavelica and Pasco – the VRAEM (Valleys of the Rivers Apurímac, Ene and Mantaro) – there is no state. There are armed forces. There are soldiers which the government intends to militarize the zones, to put the army in, in order to diminish narcotrafficking. But this is a lie. Because narcotrafficking grows.” For Isa, the lack of non-military development did not mean that people were underserved, but not served at all. The military’s presence moreover signaled to the population that they were policed, despite the state’s claim that the military’s only goal was to secure the zone. Not only were non-military services absent, but the rationale for the military’s presence was a transparent pretext for the armed forces to conduct an ongoing counter-insurgency campaign.

This is not to suggest that the way people in the Mantaro Valley think is synonymous with the way people of the former red zones of the VRAEM experience the state’s militarized presence. Isa’s comments do however indicate that there are similarities in the views of the two populations. This overlap is evidence of the depth of betrayal people feel. For even those who do not receive material benefits from the state are quick to suspect its motives in other civic activities. She concluded by observing: “I don’t know when they’ll overcome it, because as I told you, more than 10 years has passed since the era of terrorism, and still [people] don’t feel the state is an authority; as a
father that would shelter and protect. One does not have that feeling. And the laws that
eexist aren’t valid. Today they aren’t valued here.”

Corruption

Language about corruption was another area where the public’s concerns over
democracy surfaced in everyday life. During my fieldwork, creative neologisms emerged
as an outlet for these concerns. The prefix “narco-” appeared in front of a coterie of
stories about malfeasance in the press. For example, the National Police’s seizure of the
cocaine shipment in Trujillo connected with congressman José León led to discussions of
“narcocandidatos” (narco-candidates) to describe candidates for elected office who took
campaign contributions from organized crime. Another, “narcoindultos” (narco-
pardons), gained salience in connection to reports that former President Alan Garcia had
offered pardons to convicted drug traffickers during the period of his presidential tenure.
The press about President Garcia gave opponents the ammunition to attack his party, the
APRA, and its historic claim of advancing progressive causes in Peru. But perhaps the
most ominous of these neologisms was made famous by the historian Nelson Manrique.
Manrique observed that the course of corruption in public services portended a
“narcoestado,” (narco-state) and warned against its prospect as criminal organizations
increasingly penetrated politics and state institutions (2014).

In national discourses these expressions of alarm over corruption evolved with a
subtle anti-regional bias. To be sure, corruption was by no means isolated to the regions.
Nor was it a present-day phenomenon. It affected all levels of society, both public and
private. The scandal involving Martín Belaunde, mentioned at the start of this chapter,
reached as high as President Humala and the first lady. Allegations of the presidential couple’s potential money laundering, however, paled in comparison with charges brought against the regional president of Ancash. In 2014 Regional President César Álvarez was caught directing the assassinations of his political opponents, and in orchestrating a network of kickbacks for government supporters. Álvarez’s savagery was interpreted by pundits as an example of the regions’ reckless lack of oversight. Centralization supporters, many of whom were writing from Lima, cited Álvarez’s example as a rationale for why the regions were not prepared for the democratic autonomy and political power inherent to decentralization. These anti-democratic arguments surrounding corruption implied portentous consequences for the administrative balance of power between the regions and the national government. Arguments linking decentralization with corruption interacted in complex ways with the history of indigeneity. They cast the electoral choices of populations in the regions as an implicit political threat to the function of national democracy.

Another expression which gained currency during election season succinctly expressed the common outlook among my research participants. That phrase, *roba pero hace obras* (steal but build public works), appeared in pundits’ columns and candidates’ speeches in seemingly paradoxical ways. In some registers, it was a critique made by citizens about the blithe tolerance of elected officials toward corruption, so long as it was compensated by infrastructure projects while they were in office. The phrase suggested that democracy had become too transactional; that the imperatives of a political and moral collectivity eroded when the relationship between elected officials and citizens amounted to calculations of votes, public works, and corruption like *diezmos* (archaic:
tithes; now used to denote the corrupt practice of a 10% kickback to public officials off the reported value of public projects). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the political class re-coded this register of critique for advantage during election season. Candidates used the phrase in races for the mayoral post of Lima, for example, by promising to combat the incumbents’ mentality of *roba pero hace obras*. The phrase signaled growing unease with the integration of corruption into commonplace political practice.

Press attention to such corruption by public officials reflected more than journalists’ healthy respect for the principles of their trade. President Fujimori’s administration seemed invulnerable to scandals through the 1980s, but the exposure of a corruption ring in the press toppled his government. The impact of this topic arose once when I asked Héctor for his opinion on how the media covered Regional President Álvarez. Something I had to take into consideration, he said, was the way President Fujimori’s crimes were exposed. Fujimori had tasked his intelligence chief, Vladimiro Montesinos, with systematically bribing lawmakers, judicial officials and media executives, in order to ensure as little opposition as possible to his policies. The striking thing was that Montesinos had recorded his own perfidy. When the press revealed the tapes, the full extent of evidence was devastating to Fujimori’s government. The bribery turned out to be just one indictment against Fujimori’s government among others, which included systematic human rights violations. The media’s attention was instrumental in formulating a picture of Fujimori’s administration as a dark period for Peruvian democracy in the years thereafter. Héctor observed that subsequently the populace was alert to how institutionally destabilizing revelations of corruption could be when expressed through the press. The national captivation with Álvarez’s corruption in
Ancash pointed to a similar awareness, but in the uncharted waters of the regions’
democratic functions.

Though Álvarez’s crimes did not precipitate arguments against decentralization –
such arguments appeared even prior to its passage into law – the extent of his misconduct
raised the profile of corruption at the regional level. Feature debates appeared in national
newspapers with commentators laying out the pros and cons of decentralization with
abstract opinions on comparative institutional arrangements. A notable entry in this
practice from the Peruvian political scientist Carlos Meléndez lamented the lack of
penetration by national parties in the regions after decentralization, which in turn had
allowed “fragmentation and regional mafias” to intensify in the regions (my translation,
2014d). Even defenders of decentralization conceded that changes had to be made
(Zapata 2014). But these arguments often made little to no references of the reasons for
which decentralization was passed in the first place. And they made only passing
reference to corruption scandals at other scales of Peruvian governance, if they
mentioned other instances at all.

I cite this not to pick on Meléndez, but to draw our attention to discourses in the
press which exclusively connected the problem of corruption with regional governance
through the issue of oversight. Questions of institutional oversight, however, cannot be
separated from the achievement of regional enfranchisement for populations in the
Andes. Many in Junín recall that historically these populations were subject to multiple,
overlapping forms of oversight under a centralized government which traditionally
operated as a tool to address the excesses of the “indigenous question.” For populations
like that of Junín, state interventions constitute a part of their *historical memory* of past
measures to reform their lives (Rivera Cusicanqui 1987). Legislators’ floor debates over the special indigenous legislation of the 1920s, for example, reveal such language of using state powers to correct the social ills of the Indian.

the tenants of the new [indigenous] laws speak of “redeeming it [the Indian] from its holocaust”, of “regenerating it”, of “saving it”, of “protecting it”, of “defending it”, of “improving its conditions [of life]”, and of “stimulating its cultural and economic development by the most appropriate means”. Penetrated of this spirit, an elaborated legal body, of paternalistic and tutorial inspiration, develops promptly and does not cease to be reinforced with new laws, statutes, regulations and dispositions up to the present time. (my translation, Fuenzalida 1970, 149)

Arguments against the inherent corruption of the regions which implicitly or explicitly suggest state intervention to reform regional democracy thus have historical connotations regarding indigeneity. Andean Peruvians fear that state intervention will curtail their newly won regional franchise and assume that any intervention will come under the banner of a new political evangelism to rid them of the latest fault attributed to them. Time may have made the indigenous laws a memory, but state officials still view the state as a mechanism for addressing Andean Peruvians who are thought to be incapable managing their own politics.

The current-day opponents of regional enfranchisement are not so brazen as to frame any such potential intervention as strictly a problem of indigeneity. Instead their arguments focus on technocratic considerations of fiscal auditing and staff levels of offices of comptrollers general. Nevertheless, such technocratic arguments cast these populations as social problems eligible for state regulations because they rely upon “dual indexicality” in which discriminatory attitudes toward indigeneity act as a “covert racist discourse.” These concepts, which come from the linguistic anthropologist Jane Hill, are evident in her explanation of presupposition and entailment. Remarking on the co-
construction of covert meanings in commonplace talk and text, Hill observes “presuppositions and entailments are retrieved by listeners and readers, who make contextually based inferences that may be quite automatic. The presuppositions or entailment invited by covert racist discourse include very negative stereotypes that might be sharply censured if they were made explicit” (Hill 2008, 51). Much like the Latino populations which Hill argues are the target of this dual indexing of daily discourses in a U.S. context, Andean populations are also cast, implicitly, as “stupid, politically corrupt, sexually loose, lazy, dirty, and disorderly” (Hill 1998, 683). Such covert presuppositions of indigeneity, circulating in national discourses, act as a sub-textual scaffolding to these debates about regional enfranchisement abetting the possibility of state enforcement. This pattern of cultural meanings allows such anti-democratic arguments to convey multiple valiances for national readers beyond a strict reading of arguments for a comparative analysis of democratic institutions. The substance and subtext of these arguments thus condemns the democratic representation of populations in the Andean regions and hints at an ethic of centralized political power and colonial era racial relationships.

Unassured Development

Curiously, the phrase roba pero hace obras acknowledged some measure of responsibility despite its moral recklessness. It signaled that politicians recognized an implied relationship with voters to address their needs, even if the broader public increasingly saw the relationship as too transactional. Public officials placed emphasis on public works completed under their tenures to legitimate lawmaking and the
orchestration of order at the municipal, regional and national levels. In this light, the operation of state-led development mirrored the arguments made by anthropologists over the past two decades on how states legitimize their power based on narratives of societal progress (Coronil 1997; Escobar 1995; J. Ferguson 2006; Mains 2012). Certain types of development projects – particularly well-publicized and physically arresting *megaproyectos* (mega-projects) – served to fulfill this obligation. Politicians classified infrastructure upgrades, such as the expansion of utilities and improved public health services similarly as development. In 2014, President Humala undertook a seemingly endless road-tour to inaugurate dams and electrical grids among other projects and mega-projects around the country. His repeated appearances in the national news media captured the nation’s highest politician at this work of signaling the currency of state-managed infrastructural change for electoral support traded in the spaces of televised events.

Yet politicians’ claims that public works constituted *desarrollo* (development) was a shaky proposition for the development volunteers. Some did feel that state-led development projects offered a form of support to the regions, if only by enabling the survival of citizens. Others suggested that more could be done to advance human skills or support promising entrepreneurial initiatives and civic organizing. At best, these projects and programs had ambiguous consequences for Andean Peruvians in the country’s political community. At worst, they represented missed opportunities and misspent resources.

To further understand state-led development, it is helpful to break development projects in the Mantaro Valley into two separate historical moments. Though I present
these moments as a conceptual tool to aid in understanding how the population of the Mantaro Valley conceives of the differences in development over the past two decades, both moments are reflected in the historical record through broad transformations of Peru’s administrative and political structures. The first of these two moments coincided with in Fujimori’s presidential tenure. Fujimori’s development interventions in the countryside meticulously spread infrastructural change which made people feel attention was being paid by the government to even the remotest hamlets (Mayer 2002a; Sheahan 1999). Systematized projects like rural electrification or health outposts extended the state’s presence into their everyday lives. Fujimori’s populist politics of prioritizing peasants in Peru’s economic advancement tied into this development program through a focus on projects which specifically underpinned the expansion of private markets.

These interventions were far from the revolutionary intents of the agrarian reforms implemented by the leftist government of President Velasco. But, as Mayer observed, Fujimori’s rural development interventions were both popular and “extremely centralized and demobilizing; they were also clearly used for narrow political purposes” (2002a, 323). Fujimori emphasized public works so long as they were placed under centralized control and subordinate to the neoliberal transformation of the economy.

The second period, by contrast, lacked the overall vision and coordination of Fujimori’s time, and spanned the multiple administrations, including President Humala’s in 2014. Development projects during this period similarly legitimated politicians and policy-makers, but projects were sporadic and unconnected to a populist program of economic transformation (de Olarte 2007). Most importantly, during this second moment, development shifted from a wholly centralized operation in which projects were
created and implemented by state ministries to the introduction of channels which ostensibly incorporated local contributions to shape allocations of development funds. At one end of a spectrum spanning these projects stood the Sistema Nacional de Inversión Pública (National Public Investment System, known as SNIP in Spanish), housed under the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, through which the national administration exclusively decided on development projects for each region. At the other end of this spectrum stood the Presupuesto Participativo Basado en Resultados (Participatory Budget Based on Results or PPBR, which I outline below) and coordinating roundtable as institutions designed from the ground up to incorporate citizens in development. In this second period Fujimori’s methodical development approach transformed into a disarrayed collection of projects, all of which had varying degrees of state intervention, even if they lacked Fujimori’s focus on markets and elevation of the peasant class.

My conversations non-volunteers about development in the Mantaro Valley tended to always involve the first of these historical moments. Development as it was understood by the populace more broadly was still associated with Fujimori’s tenure. Many recalled, with some affection, that Fujimori was one of the few Presidents in recent memory who campaigned on reforming the role of Peru’s peasants. They felt, as my close friend Felicidad did, that Fujimori’s investments were an outsized symbol of this commitment. Fujimori’s construction of electric grids and health clinics in the Mantaro Valley during that time completely overshadowed his anti-democratic actions. This history was current again in present-day politics because Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of former President Fujimori, had announced her candidacy for presidential elections to be
One of the coordinating roundtable staff, the woman named Maribel who attended the meeting with Teofilo at the start of this chapter, even once remarked to me that desplazados and others affected by the violence of state agents would vote for Keiko because they expected some return in the form of a renewal of this legacy in Junín. Among a segment of the public, the importance of the pro-democracy reforms for direct enfranchisement, or their role in reshaping the colonialist administrative balance of power, were secondary concerns. Strengthening regional democracy remained an abstraction against Fujimori’s tangible investments in a rural future.

Despite the ubiquity of references to Fujimori, the substance of my conversations focused on the second of these historical moments. Theoretically I conceived of state-funded development projects during this period as episodic infrastructure upgrades and social benefits programs, as opposed to the catch-all quality of the term *desarrollo* used by many in Peru. Aurelio supplied the reason for this substitution. Development programs, as he traditionally understood by the term, implied interventions to enable people to advance economically. By this line of thinking, state-led development interventions would address the unique challenges that the poor face, whether it be in their pastures or in preparation for white-collar work. Such programs might involve skills development curricula or infrastructure by which the state could construct supporting institutions and channel resources into grassroots-led organizing. In contrast, public officials played an outsized role in promoting an alternative definition of *desarrollo*. They labeled many state-led services as *desarrollo*, whether or not a service met Aurelio’s definition. Many people followed in this example, characterizing widely known state programs this way. These programs included a conditional cash transfer
program encouraging children’s health and education called *Juntos* (Together); a university scholarship program called *Beca 18* (Scholarship 18); a program for new mothers providing post-natal nutritional supplements called *Vasos de Leche* (Glasses of Milk); and a pension scheme called *Pensión 65* (Pension 65). Aurelio, aware of the politicians’ practice, made a point of telling me that these programs could not possibly meet the definition he presented.

Aurelio described these social benefits programs as “a crumb:” palliative measures which delivered temporary assistance in the form of monetary resources but provided little to resolve the underlying factors influencing impoverishment. It was true, that if you were poor, the assistance programs were a humane lifeline. Yet by design the programs had no intention of resolving the reasons for poverty. *Juntos* and *Beca 18* offered evidence to this point. Eligibility for these programs was based on assessments by state officials to allocate cash transfers or scholarships. These eligibility requirements divided Huancainos into those who could marshal the resources to prove eligibility and those who could not. For example, programs like *Juntos* and *Beca 18* required documentation of identity or home-ownership. Home-owners with a permanent address, identity card holders, or parents with documented links to their offspring were thus more likely to be enrolled in these programs.28 Those most in need typically could not produce these documents, making them some of the least able to access these services. Their exclusion based on the eligibility criteria suggested something other than an empathic assessment of developmental needs. Selection procedures of social welfare benefits programs undermined the justifications public officials gave for the programs as supporting the most impoverished. It was clear to me that using the term *desarrollo* to
characterize these programs raised significant ethical and conceptual challenges.

Therefore, in these pages I will attempt to distinguish *desarrollo* primarily as the state’s management and delivery of public projects from this secondary folk theory of quasi-direct transfers through social welfare benefits programs.

Clementina provided another perspective on the social welfare benefits programs. Clementina was a stalwart volunteer at the coordinating roundtable. She worked for an NGO with a mission to improve the lives of women. She was about average height, with straight hair down to her shoulders. I remember the day I went to interview her. The sun had come out for the first time in weeks, signaling that an end to the winter rains was coming. When I arrived at the location Clementina gave me for our interview, I called her cellular phone. She emerged from a block of suburban homes across from the park bench where I sat. She wore a puffy vest over a sweater and jeans. She showed me inside the offices to talk at a conference table.

Clementina said many of the urban women with whom she worked felt the social welfare benefits were a crucial form of assistance. She said, “there are many women who, thanks to social programs like Beca 18, have children who are following a course of superior studies that would have been limited if suddenly it did not exist.” She observed that among her grantees “I think they do feel the presence of the state, that they feel attended to.” These women recognized the contribution of the state. They viewed *Beca 18* as *desarrollo* because it enabled them to participate in education, and thus make meaningful contributions to their families’ improvement.

Urgently required infrastructure upgrades were also often characterized as development projects by the populace. Infrastructure upgrades had been associated with
good governance and development more broadly since the National Accord signed by President Toledo in 2002. In the intervening years these links between infrastructure, inclusion, and development had begun to unravel. Beatriz reported as much in a conversation on the incumbent, Regional President Cerrón. Beatriz found Cerrón to be overly focused on getting re-elected at the expense of fulfilling the spirit of his campaign promises. Having attended several identical PowerPoint presentations produced by the Junín government, I knew Cerrón’s staff was quick to promote projects completed under his administration.29 When I countered with these points, Beatriz agreed that in fact people did applaud projects like hospitals. That is, they applauded the structures. The facilities were there, but the follow-through for skilled workers to put the structures to use was not. A shortage of trained staff was itself an unseen crisis, and obtaining medical treatment was a protracted problem of negotiating the availability of the undersized medical faculty.

In practice, the requirement to obtain local contributions to development during this second historical moment did not translate to substantive representation of average citizens in deliberations on state funds. The Participatory Budget Based on Results (PPBR) was a prime example of a state-led development mechanism whose local contributions veered toward the merely ornamental. The PPBR was designed to stimulate public involvement in development by holding annual sessions to gather public input on how funds marked for development should be allocated. The PPBR process was implemented in each of the regions in 2003 after the pro-democracy reforms passed. It was housed under the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, and its workshops drew upon funds the Ministry had set aside for development. Though the PPBR and the
coordinating roundtable were housed in separate ministries, they showed similarities as participatory institutions chartered to stimulate development. The roundtable staff often encouraged me to attend PPBR events to familiarize myself with how development transpired in Peru.

Almost from the very start, the public’s hopes for a voice in development were dashed. Clementina said in the years after the PPBR was introduced the populace quickly learned that its actual operation did not fit with the participatory label of its title. First, there were barriers to entry. Héctor told me that the annual PPBR workshops were indeed “open” to public attendance, but with provisos. Anyone could walk in and listen to the discussion for development projects at the PPBR sessions. However, only those who had previously registered as “participating agents,” or those who had been designated as part of contributing “technical teams,” could contribute to the proceedings and thus shape how development funds were spent. Secondly, PPBR seminars were couched in a language of development policy which I felt would be difficult for an average citizen to enter into midstream. I attended two PPBR seminars during my research and the structure of the workshops bore this out. In both instances, most of the scheduled time for the workshop covered university-style lectures on the macroeconomic position of Junín and technical considerations in the field of international development. This language and the prerequisite knowledge it required created high barriers to entry for a sizable part of the public if they wished to attend PPBR sessions held in Junín. If the purpose of these requirements was to quietly impose barriers which would discourage public participation in development, the evidence suggests that they were a complete success.
When combined with corruption, the deficiency of involvement in successful
development improvements in people’s everyday lives made Fujimori’s methods seem
attractive by comparison. Beatriz thus worried a popular backlash was in the offing. She
observed that mismanagement and corruption inclined people to want strong leaders.
Beatriz felt that when Cerrón was seen to *sacar de la vuelta* while in public office, his
behavior lent credibility to calls for a *política de mano dura* (literally, firm-hand
policies).\(^3\) She reminded me that Peru had witnessed several *golpes del estado* (coups)
in the past where strongmen came to power to implement such firm-hand policies (of
which Fujimori’s would be the most immediate example for someone of Beatriz’s age).
The strongmen who headed these coups would talk of changing things, but they too had
proved vulnerable to corruption. Democracy was a fragile achievement in her mind.
Nevertheless, Beatriz said people would vote for Keiko Fujimori because they expected
she would replicate her father’s development successes and that she would implement a
*política de mano dura* again against corruption and crime. When I asked what would
happen if there was hypothetical reemergence of the insurgents, Beatriz said Keiko would
win in a walk.

Assessing these two historical moments reveals the meaning of unassured
development. Neither of these two moments addressed the problem of giving
populations in the Andes increased control over development, whether it concerned
infrastructure upgrades, capacity building projects, or social welfare benefits programs.
Nor did these moments give people a sense of contributing to *societal* development,
constituted through their involvement in shaping the state to represent indigenous
democrat lives. Both moments illustrate that through very different political and
administrative arrangements, the state eliminated the possibility of direct participation in
development. Considering the intent of the pro-democracy reforms to address these
societal problems, the failure to meaningfully incorporate the general public in
development was a critical shortcoming.

This historical context reveals the less-obvious risks of the Fujimori ideology of
state-led development interventions and their potential for emulation under future
governments. State actions undermining people’s direct involvement in development
also erodes their faith in the overall functioning of governance because they have been
defined as coextensive by successive governments. Against this disfunction, Fujimori’s
legacy (and present-day supporters of his party’s legacy) remain deeply engrained as part
of the Peruvian political formation. The Fujimori ideology owes its enduring allure in
part to the successes of his rural legacy. Faced with the options of no substantive
participation and poor development interventions, or effective development which is
demobilizing, some are in such a state of need under neoliberal policies that the latter
option can come to seem an improvement. Nevertheless, re-animating Fujimori’s
approach would appease only a portion of the populace in exchange for short-sighted
gains. The expectations of rural development held by supporters of Fujimorista
candidates obscure the anti-democratic elements of Fujimori’s program which
emphasized a strong centralized state with few democratic checks. Overlooking this
centralizing tendency in the fervor for any kind of substantive state intervention risks
minimizing or reversing the democratic franchise of indigenous democrats in the Andes.
This would be a clear violation of the spirit of the pro-democracy reforms to address the
problems underlying Peruvian society. It potentially would risk a re-strengthening of structural inequalities in the name of development.

Diminishing the Coordinating Roundtable

By the time of my fieldwork, the coordinating roundtable had entered a new phase of steady, diminished participation by the public. This fact of the coordinating roundtable’s degraded popularity was common knowledge. Despite this reduced role, the staff demonstrated considerable dedication to the mission of the roundtable and even self-sacrifice in support of the volunteers. Consequently, critical commentary offered by the volunteers served as evidence of state priorities which undermined the powers of the institution to carry out an anti-poverty mission through direct representation.

Figure 1, “Comparative table of citizen participation, 2005-2013.” Yellow portions correspond to participation of state officials, blue to civil society representatives. Published with permission from Coordinating Roundtable presentation titled Participación Ciudadana para el Desarrollo Regional (Citizen Participation for the Regional Development) publicly presented on the 23rd of May 2013.
Elías, a volunteer in his mid-thirties, offered some of the most candid thoughts about the coordinating roundtable’s declining popular participation. Isa, the director at Crecimiento, introduced me to Elías after our interviews concluded. Among his other duties at Crecimiento, Elías had worked with roundtable staff often in the past. He narrated its history for me. To Elías, its decline was located in the usurpation of the coordinating roundtable’s functions by new legislation which made the coordinating roundtable redundant.

I believe in those years, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, where the mechanisms of participation began to be originated [(sic) “incepcionizar”] in Peru, the coordinating roundtable had articulated, had facilitated – with a methodology – throughout these processes: it had arrived at consensus. After this date, post-2008, after 2008 rather, then it was created, through law, that these processes must be implemented, not by the roundtable, but rather …by the local governments. And many of the functionaries and all had, at this time, already developed capacities in all of the processes that the roundtables drove. So, in terms of executing, the roundtable had no function, it didn’t serve much, and it didn’t provide much. So, what is its role [today]? One says, we channel efforts, that is, between the state and civil society and the rest. But this isn’t the case - only that we did not have a regional agreement that has not been a failure.

Elías’ comments outlined a broader statutory transformation which subverted the initial role devised for the coordinating roundtables. Specifically, Elías referenced the duplication of functions through legislation which transferred established powers to local governments. Attrition of the coordinating roundtable’s capacities was an early example of re-centralization, despite the appearance of a lateral transfer of powers from the roundtable to local governments. The reason this represented re-centralization was that it removed powers from an institution designed to improve direct representation and allocated them to unrelated public officials of local governments. Transfer of powers thus removed the citizenry from having a direct voice in the anti-poverty function of the
roundtable and reasserted the prerogative of unelected public officials in deciding how the region would allocate national funds.\(^{31}\)

The final sentence of Elías’ observations highlighted his feelings of frustration with a comment on the work of the Governance Accord.\(^{32}\) The development volunteers measured the effectiveness of the coordinating roundtable through the success of the Governance Accord as one of the few remaining initiatives it still controlled after its other functions were divested. Regarding the failure that season to recruit candidates for regional president to sign the accord, Elías added, “So, if we are not able to convene candidates in any case to sign a regional agreement, then we have to be critical with ourselves. That is, there remains another look, or, I don’t know, another perspective on the roundtable.” After much negotiation, and not a few failures, the coordinating roundtable did eventually obtain signatures from candidates Unchupaico and Cerrón. Elías’ words about another perspective on the roundtable, however, conveyed the frustration of working with what he perceived was an obsolete process and mission, particularly where it emphasized consensus. The new perspective he spoke of hinted at the internal debates by the volunteers over the roundtable’s independence and whether it ought to evolve a narrower focus.

Clementina questioned the diminished role and efficacy of the roundtable by specifically drawing attention to gender in the implementation of its goals. Her comments were particularly interesting from the point of view of a woman working for an NGO devoted to women’s socioeconomic advancement. She observed, “Personally, I see that it is a space, as we say, in need of greater strengthening: work on the theme of legitimacy as a space.” More specifically, she questioned “the extent to which it is
effectively a voice, effectively a representative space of society, that promulgates the demands of distinct sectors of society.” Taken together, her comments on representation and legitimacy suggest that she felt the roundtable needed to focus on women’s issues. She elaborated that her organization was active while the coordinating roundtable was seemingly too sluggish to hold politicians accountable to the Governance Accord.

Clementina’s NGO took a more assertive stance, perusing multiple avenues to achieve its goals by pressuring some government ministries, working with others, and approaching elected officials on its own. Consequently, her comments centered on a strategy of continual multi-pronged engagement under a banner of the moral cause to champion women’s rights. Her concern was whether the roundtable had “the capacity to effectively pressure the authorities,” and could pointedly follow-up with elected officials using its “channels of communication to talk with them and tell them ‘you have agreed to this and you were of the intention of fulfilling it.’” She therefore saw in the coordinating roundtable a potential means to structure a kind of accountability mechanism for their collective interests, provided that women properly had a role in shaping that interest.

The official divestiture of the roundtable’s capacities alongside the unofficial trend of re-centralization further diminished people’s sense of direct participation. Another stalwart development volunteer named Esmerelda identified this as the most important issue concerning its decline. Esmerelda was a passionate speaker, who never failed to move me with convincing emotion in responses to my dry interests in the state and development. When I asked her in an interview what she thought about state-led development, she gave an answer which summarized the development volunteers’ frustrations with the erosion of direct participation. She lamented, “More than
development what we’re worried about is participation; that it isn’t written anywhere that organizations come, or that the state guarantee its [own] participation.” Next, she answered out loud the question forming in my mind. “Why don’t people come? Because they don’t have confidence, and I don’t have confidence. Am I going to send a proposal? For what? For in the end they [the authorities] are going to do what they want, because they are going to say, ‘this is what I want [Esmerelda gestured to lose papers].’” She shrugged and added, “‘and for that I’ll waste my time?’ That is what was missing.” She put words to the futility people felt about the coordinating roundtable’s calls for dialogue when their deliberations and decisions were sidelined by public officials with similar powers who had no legal responsibility to solicit citizen input. It was little wonder then that volunteers like Elías suggested that people “do not believe in the roundtable. It is as I said, it has worn out its image.” Failure of this image was critical because without an image imparting the confidence that people could contribute as part of its dialogue, and see their contributions enacted, the roundtable’s open invitation to all no longer appeared to have the openness which the roundtable claimed. With its reputation for the ability to carry out material changes weakened, its mission to create inclusion also suffered.

The volunteers’ perspectives on the loss of the coordinating roundtable’s functions are indirect evidence that challenges to regional democracy abetted the decline in the coordinating roundtable over the years. Elías’ observations illustrate that the coordinating roundtable’s powers were undermined early on by the transfer of its powers to non-representative institutions. Clementina and Esmerelda’s added that the failures of local politicians to carry out the coordinating roundtable’s resolutions hobbled its capacity to shepherd consensus into results. Esmerelda also raised the point that national
public officials have neglected to support the coordinating roundtable in compelling participation in its activities. Together these critiques outline the challenges to the coordinating roundtable’s growth since 2008.

Drawing Conclusions

Re-centralization, interference politics, unassured development: the cumulative effect of these challenges to regional democracy raises an alarming prospect for the franchise of Andean Peruvians. The challenges indirectly recall a critique leveled at anthropologists researching Peru in the 1980s. At that time, North American anthropologists were accused of inadequately attending to the fundamental discrimination posed by racial and socioeconomic hierarchies at the root of mass violence (Starn 1991). According to Orin Starn these anthropologists investigated their subjects’ lives in the service of abstracting their ethnographic findings to conceptual models of ecological or ritual analysis which Starn felt depicted rural Peruvians as disconnected from modernity. His critique reproved these researchers for not attending to the pragmatic function of their subjects’ words and acts for their increasingly confrontational political consequences.33 Whatever the validity of Starn’s critique, the spirit of his call to understand experiences under socio-historical hierarchies, not just as elements of an abstraction (such as neoliberalism), but as pragmatic struggles which potentially entail political unrest on the behalf of our research subjects, should remain an unmistakable guide in Peru’s post-conflict society.

In this light, the current movement away from the direct representation embedded in the pro-democracy reforms is a discouraging sign. In this chapter, I argued that the
The question of whether interdependent regional enfranchisement is evidence of the predominance of neoliberal restructurings of Peru’s political economy is less straightforward to answer. The critiques which the development volunteers raise, for example, illustrate inconsistencies for an interpretation favoring neoliberalism. If neoliberalism is ascendant, how should we understand the development volunteers’ considerable expenditures of time and effort on the remainders of direct representation at the coordinating roundtable when studies of neoliberalism tell us that Andean populations should be depoliticized? How do we assess the significance of renewed attacks on decentralization when these policies supposedly serve neoliberal goals by palliating
indigenous activism? Do these challenges represent efforts to definitively consolidate neoliberal policies? An analysis of these trends which presents an impending consolidation of neoliberalism is too totalizing to fit with the struggles by the volunteers. What emerges from the development volunteers’ views is an overlay of neoliberal development wrought through with internal contradictions. These contradictions expose the still contested nature of the state and possibilities for change.

Re-centralization itself is perhaps the most powerful single piece of evidence pointing to the significance of indigeneity in a more nuanced explanation of these themes. The volunteers’ reports of re-centralization hint at the implementation of colonial administrative relationships at the expense of mass democracy: it is a reassertion of governance structured to diminish participation in mass politics not unlike the intents of the counterrevolutionary movement against egalitarian social democracy which swept Latin America at the turn of the 20th century, but on a smaller scale (Grandin 2004). These fractured, ambiguous currents surrounding the coordinating roundtable thus speak to a reconfiguring political collectivity and, by extension, a struggle for control over the state’s administrative institutions consistent with the political subordination of indigeneity in Peru. For the development volunteers, the past decade of decline constituted an experience that transformed their approach to democracy. They recounted how they devoted themselves to a regime of pro-democracy reforms, through their repeated practice at the coordinating roundtable in the years prior to my research. As the promise of the pro-democracy reforms has changed, it has duly altered how they understand their work. Their observations on the coordinating roundtable’s decline tell us that their small number is prepared to influence meanings of political community and
inclusion in subtler ways. I explore this theme in the following three chapters by exploring their interactions orchestrated with the assistance of the coordinating roundtable.
2. Displaying Resentment, Demanding Indemnification

On the 28th of August each year, Huancayo’s desplazado population observes the anniversary of the final report issued by Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In 2014 this ritual observance of the Commission’s Final Report coincided with campaigns for Junín’s regional elections, offering desplazados a rare opportunity to meet directly with political elites. The confluence of such a somber occasion with election season even raised peoples’ hopes for a frank exchange. Their invitation took the form of a forum on “Proposals for Peace and Reconciliation,” held in the main hall of the coordinating roundtable. During the question period, a woman who identified herself as a desplazada from the Orcotuna district outside the city spoke to their continuing struggle using a language of inclusion. Wearing traditional skirts, stockings, and a waist-length braid of hair, she posed her question to a nearly all-male panel of regional presidency candidates in business suits. Specifically, she inquired about Public Law N° 28592, the national legislation outlining reparations for eligible desplazado organizations which, she reminded them, “tells us that we should have, as reparations, lands suitable for starting a project.” She charged the candidates with the task of fulfilling this law, “in order that you aid us with this incorporation.”1
To those unacquainted with desplazados’ histories of survival and marginalization, this scene of a lone woman seeking someone to champion her inclusion in the legal code could invoke a picture of a pitched struggle within Peruvian society involving imbalances of power and the politics of gender and race. Yet the impression of desplazados on a straightforward quest for inclusion is complicated by their profound feelings of resentment. Having fought for reparations, housing, employment, and dedicated health and psychiatric services for over a decade, many desplazados perceive social and political inclusion as a bygone possibility given the dearth of political will for desplazado causes today. Contrary to the thrust of inclusion in the desplazada’s question, they experience profound social and political exclusion. More than a few desplazados
turn their ensuing resentment onto the state itself by rejecting its legitimacy. Most view the morality of Peru’s political class as permanently compromised. For desplazados then, public forums provide opportunities to convey more than just petitions regarding the legal code. They are opportunities for desplazados to confront officials over their neglect and encourage audiences to envisage a politics that acknowledges the moral reality of their lives.

I conceive of desplazados’ political advocacy as informed by this resentment. Resentment, however, is a potentially tricky term for a researcher to embrace in seeking to conceptually elucidate desplazados’ political struggles. Before I turn to their understandings of this term, let us begin with an English definition. Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary defines resentment as “a feeling of indignant displeasure or persistent ill will at something regarded as a wrong, insult, or injury” (Merriam-Webster Online, s.v. “resentment,” accessed December 23, 2018, http://www.merriam-webster.com). The advantage of the term is that it points up desplazados’ occupation of a moral state of injury which shapes their social role. Readers will note that this definition differs from the negative cast of its common usage in English where the term sometimes conjures images of a bitter and isolated person. Though formal definitions like Merriam-Webster’s make no mention of misanthropy or dormancy, typically the term carries a connotation of passivity, of victims’ refrain from public engagement on the sources which give rise to resentment. Conversely, it could be said that the woman who opened this chapter demonstrates an affect bordering on bravery by raising her claims regarding the injustice of desplazados’ exclusion from the Comprehensive Reparations Plan (the principal reparations policy devised from law N° 28592), and arguing for the candidates’
obligation to fulfill the spirit of its passage.3 At once affective and political, her resentment conforms to Didier Fassin’s understanding of the term as a “moral affect” which our research participants offer for action. Fassin argues resentment is a moral judgement of social life which extends beyond questions of the good to the “moral sentiments that escape the alternative between good and evil and make sense in relation to political issues” (2013, 249). Like Fassin’s ethnography, my research reveals that desplazados were anything but congenitally disaffected. Desplazados carry a feeling of a central, persistent, injury which acts as a motivation for their ongoing activism. By comparison, related terms, such as indignation, convey a sense of impermanence or anger directed at specific issues. The risk of confusion notwithstanding, I will use resentment here as an affect which animates desplazados’ performative engagement with state functionaries in public.

I first heard the term resentimientos (resentments) from the development volunteer named Esmerelda. Esmerelda was not a desplazada herself, though she worked with “isolated communities” including desplazados in the Mantaro Valley. She spoke with some emotion on the place of desplazados in Peruvian society (I outline her words below). Despite her affecting depiction, I did not initially move to focus on desplazado resentimientos as a way of conceptualizing their engagement with the state. It was only after another of my participants, a man whom I will call Luis, consistently used resentimientos in an interview that I began to view resentment as central to their social and political perspectives on society. Luis spoke on his escape from violence and subsequent loss of properties and possessions, now claimed by others. His use of resentimientos highlighted a persistent occupation of an affect underpinning both his
activism and his perspective on life after the political violence. Specifically, his resentment was directed against the combatants who created the conditions for him to be displaced. After my interview with Luís I began to use the term *resentimientos* directly in my interview questions to prompt other desplazados to speak of a durable shift in their relationship with the state in post-conflict society. After that I could no longer verify whether the term would arise organically in the flow of conversation, as I had initiated its usage to frame our talk. I could have used other terms in place of *resentimientos* (Luisa, whom I introduce below, once used the term *indignación* (indignation) to explain her feelings). Yet *resentimientos* captured a previous event of social metamorphosis - a moral injury at the center of desplazados’ search for indemnification. It conveyed the agency of acting on their injury, and illuminated desplazado performative displays as activating their moral knowledge within local political practice.

In discussions with desplazados like Luís a sense of history would arise as we shifted from the temporal frame of the present peace to the events of Peru’s past political violence. I understood these shifts as a means of explaining to an anthropologist why resentment arises or a technique for supplying context for a given familial situation. Aside from these reasons, this talk often would also illustrate connections between past and present injustices, tracing a thread of oppression or exclusion across decades. This layering of history into our discussions illustrated the grounding of desplazados’ resentment in Peru’s historical legacy of racial and socioeconomic hierarchies. Given that some researchers consider desplazados’ displacement between 1980 and 2000 to be one of a series of displacements of peasant populations by colonists and capitalists stretching throughout Peruvian history (Rojas 1997, 295), there are strong grounds for
taking these notional connections at face value. The Bolivian sociologist Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui characterized such a pan-historical understanding as the “distant memory” of Quechua- and Aymara-speakers in a similar case of resistance to the Bolivian state (1987). Many of the desplazados I interviewed would be considered peasants, indigenous democrats, or Quechua-speakers of indigenous origins. For citizens classified according to these racial categories, the distant memory of exploitation and oppression was suffused into their present-day relationships with Peru’s governing classes.

To frame desplazados’ material and moral goals, it is instructive to consider recent thinking by anthropologists on conflict migration and refugees. For the sake of brevity, this literature might be characterized as a spectrum of approaches, where at one endpoint lies work of Carolyn Nordstrom who explores the capacity of violence to destroy people’s life worlds and social networks. Nordstrom views the consequences of violence as a maximal transformation of lived experience in which forced migration is a common result (2004). At the other end of the spectrum, the anthropologist Stephen Lubkemann critiques refugee studies for infusing research on conflict migrants with themes of loss and implicit non-agency without deeper scrutiny (2008). For Lubkemann violence is too readily sketched as absolute and total, overstating its power to shape the life courses of migrants during conflict, migration, or in the aftermath. While this chapter will not seek to adjudicate these views, my field research falls into a subgenre of these studies which looks at how conflict migrants "negotiate the many effects of displacement" (Lubkemann 2008, 5), specifically the long-term political and policy challenges posed by the violence and Peru’s concurrent neoliberal consolidation.
The importance of desplazados’ moral experience and historical memory for their political engagement is reflected in recent thinking on the cultural decline of indigenous groups’ epistemic and ethical worlds since colonization. Thomas Abercrombie points to the generation of social memory among these groups as a fertile grounds for re-imaginings of community and resistance to cultural erasure as they find themselves “engaged not only in political struggle but also in a struggle to mark out relatively autonomous spheres in which to gain control over the meanings of their lives” (1998, 10). In the current context of radically circumscribed spaces for indigenous political autonomy and economic prosperity, historical memory offers a starting point for refashioning spheres of indigenous understanding within Peruvian political and cultural institutions. Rivera Cusicanqui, for example, observes that distant memory cognitively “recasts” facts, linking the isolated histories of separate events to inform alternative visions of society, “legitimizing the growing dissidence of the peasant movement [in the 1960-1970 period in Bolivia]” (1987, 5). Desplazados mobilize a similar interplay between distant memory and experience to assert their understandings of indemnification, welfare, and inclusion. Resentment as a moral affect synthesizes these lived experiences of betrayal during the political conflict with a larger perspective on historic oppression within Peruvian society.

This chapter will examine two performative displays between desplazado groups and state functionaries to illustrate desplazados’ political experience. Before moving to an analysis of these events in detail, the chapter will briefly survey Peru’s political conflict in the Junín region as a context for desplazados’ individual histories and resentment. Next the chapter will look at an example of language use among desplazados
as a basis for contextualizing their assessments as an audience at public events. On the one hand, the following analysis of these performative displays will reveal state functionaries’ attempts to exclude desplazado claims as credible political expression and erase the state’s historical responsibility for violence. On the other, it will show desplazados’ attempts to rescind their invisibility and imagine a future where they have a recognized moral role in Peruvian citizenship. The artifice of this contrast of cases will in part play up the unequal and convulsive relationship between desplazados and state functionaries. It will also highlight the divergence at work in the assessments by desplazados at public events. Foregrounding the dissonance of their experience is central to establishing the moral import of their lives and is a starting point for envisioning a morally-grounded politics.

Given the unequal rates of participation by men and women in institutionalized politics, an assessment of the role of gender in desplazados’ performative displays can expand our understanding of political invisibility and translation in regional politics today. The form these displays take points to the paucity of avenues for self-expression by women from desplazado backgrounds. The displays which I document here each feature a man or woman in a central role. While the women I document in this chapter were more inclined to raise the topic of psychiatric services for desplazados, overall their stated aims echoed the men’s. That said, women’s performative displays may obtain greater social significance by providing them with an expressly political voice in a society where relatively few women hold elected office, and few female politicians come from the racial and historical backgrounds of many desplazados. The analysis which follows will document men speaking on themes of respect, indemnification, and the
legitimacy of the state. The women quoted in this chapter also talk about indemnification, but their performative displays expand our understanding of resentment to include recognition of the moral import of their experiences, and even their self-realization, as interlinked with reparations and inclusion in society more broadly. They imagine a future in which they have a place in their own country, in contrast to the “foreignness” they experience today.

The Years of Subversion

The CVR estimated that nearly 70,000 people were killed by insurgents, the armed forces, and national police through combat, terrorist-style violence, extra-judicial killings, and forced disappearances. Many civilians were wounded by the systematic use of torture, rape, and sexual assault. The Final Report of CVR circumscribes this violence to a twenty-year period roughly between 1980 and 2000. It is important to underscore again that this time frame extends beyond the triumphant capture of the leader and figurehead of Shining Path, Abimael Guzmán, in 1992. The demarcation of this twenty-year span is consequently significant for its inclusion of political events in addition to the violence of combatants. For my research participants, official accounts associating human rights violations by the Armed Forces and National Police together with the violence of insurgents resonates with those who gave voice to the pain of being caught in-between; to the trauma they carry of a state which destroyed its citizens and its democracy; and to their loss of faith in Peru’s institutions stemming from this period.

Desplazados who fled the violence for the relative safety of Huancayo faced escalating violence within the city as well. They traveled to the city from as far away as
the regions of Ayacucho and Huancavelica, but also from the nearby towns which dot the Mantaro Valley. The increased presence of the armed forces and the police meant Huancayo offered some semblance of protection. As the commercial hub of the Junín region there were even occasional opportunities for work. But even though the city was home to a military base and several police precincts, its citizens lived with constant fear during these years. Violence included assassinations, including that of Mayor Saúl Muñoz Menacho and party officials, as well as disappearances of local leaders; attacks on state institutions and infrastructure; a police manhunt for Guzmán; and violence and intimidation against local organizations viewed as bases of support for insurgents. Desplazados nevertheless felt that despite the increase in violence Huancayo still offered more security than the towns of the valley whose smaller official presence meant few, if any, patrols.

Upon arrival, internally displaced Peruvians were labeled according to the Quechua term *hatariy ayllu*, (lifted families), or by the Spanish term *migrantes Quechuas* (Quechua migrants). These early terms, referencing the Quechua-language spoken by migrants, illustrated the non-Andean populace’s understanding of the violence as an esoteric dispute affecting indigenous lives. Later, when the United Nations recognized internal displacement as distinct from the category of refugees who crossed international borders, desplazados themselves adopted the classification *desplazados internos* (internally displaced persons). However, they most often described themselves through the details of their personal stories of flight. They “escaped,” “survived,” and, for the religiously observant, were “saved.”
Huancayo’s public university, the Universidad Nacional Del Centro - Perú (National University - Central Peru, or UNCP to use its Spanish acronym), could not escape the escalation of violence in the city. Universities around the country became the recruitment sites for Shining Path and MRTA, who sought to appeal to a younger generation’s sense of socioeconomic injustice in Peruvian society. But UNCP’s connection to Ayacucho set it apart. Guzmán conceived of and led Shining Path while employed at the public university branch in Ayacucho, at the Universidad Nacional San Cristóbal de Huamanga. These two public branches of Peru’s university system reached an agreement wherein students from both universities could access Huancayo’s law school, thereby establishing a flow of students and ideas between Huancayo and the birthplace of Shining Path. Additionally, Osmán Morote Barrionuevo, who is now imprisoned for his actions as Guzmán’s second in the Shining Path hierarchy, was also employed as Professor of anthropology at UNCP. As a consequence of this fertile exchange of people and ideas the UNCP campus was an especially militant and violent space. According to the Commission over 100 faculty and students were killed between 1980 and 2000 by insurgents and the Peruvian armed forces (Peru 2004, 459). Many of Huancayo’s officials attended UNCP in these years and have gone on to positions of influence in the city. Their specific histories lie hidden from the ordinary operation of politics in the city and yet they cannot be untangled from political practice or collective understanding of Huancaínos.
Displacement without Victimhood

Today, desplazados participate in a number of regional and local associations, but perhaps the most active in Huancayo is the Asociación Regional de Desplazados – Central Perú (Regional Association of Displaced Persons, Central Peru, the ARDCP to use its Spanish acronym). Since the mid-2000s groups such as the ARDCP have approached every level of government for greater rights under the Comprehensive Reparations Plan of Public Law N° 28592 and regional-level statutes providing victim benefits. According to the language of the Comprehensive Reparations Plan devised from the law’s mandate, the status of desplazado is separate from afectados por la violencia (those “affected by violence”) and distinguishes between rights to collective or individual monetary indemnities among several categories of victims. Eligible beneficiaries who classify as “only” displaced (i.e. not as victims) can receive collective reparations or educational scholarships for their families. In contrast with individual reparations, the collective reparations scheme is available to registered associations of desplazados and funds are only disbursed for their project proposals. Victims, conversely, also face evidentiary standards but if found eligible are more likely to receive reparations for personal use. Unless desplazados can demonstrate evidence attesting to histories of victimhood, the fact of displacement alone falls short of eligibility thresholds for individual reparations.

Serving as an umbrella organization, the ARDCP affiliated with many smaller grassroots groups around the city. Leaders from these community groups typically sought out the experience and contacts of ARDCP members, and in some instances came to serve as representatives of the ARDCP themselves. A friend named Víctor served in
this dual role as the leader of a grassroots group and representative for the ARDCP. His local affiliate was composed of several older women who only spoke Quechua. Víctor received guidance and support from the ARDCP on the documentary and legal requirements for joining the Registro Único de Víctimas (Unified Registry of Victims), the initial step necessary to apply for collective reparations. For example, ARDCP leaders suggested he collect the birth dates and identification credentials of each of the members who made up his organization to confirm their number met the threshold to classify as a desplazado association, and to do so in advance of the eight hour trip to Lima. Víctor would also have to orchestrate legal recognition of his group with a notary, which advisors estimated would cost around 500 soles, a considerable sum. With that documentation he could thwart the bureaucrats’ tactic of sending candidates who lacked these documents away without initiating their registration. Such small though consequential obstacles for desplazados are what my friend Conrado called the “papeleo” (paperwork) problem – the procedures and requirements used by bureaucrats to effect a de facto denial of eligibility. Still, the advice itself posed a significant obstacle for Víctor’s group, as many who experienced violence were illiterate, or did not possess official identification. Others could not muster together the funds to contribute to the costs involved. Víctor volunteered as a representative with the ARDCP to meet with political leaders to obtain further support.

From the perspective of desplazado advocacy groups the distinction between victims and displaced is an unjust legal semantic demonstrating the bad faith of successive governments in defining the experience of the political conflict so narrowly. Desplazados view the distinction as a legal escape clause, allowing the state to preclude
reparations or an expansion of support mandated under an historic piece of legislation. Regarding the 2005 Comprehensive Reparations Plan, Conrado claimed that politicians have tried to minimize the reparations process. He used the verb *tapar* (to put a lid on, cover up), claiming that they tried to hide the past. Desplazados continue to have recourse to collective reparations under this framework, but, as I will discuss below, the eligibility requirements also present a set of obstacles that lead desplazados to wonder whether the entire evaluation framework had been designed to make it difficult to succeed in obtaining any state reparations whatsoever. Not quite victims, desplazados cannot claim individual reparations under the law. Yet their experiences of dislocation and loss put them unmistakably at the center of Peru’s recent political and social history.

Consequently, desplazados hold an unshakable conviction of having been betrayed by the Peruvian state when it failed in its obligation to protect its citizens. This feeling is rooted in the history of the counterinsurgent campaign by state forces. Desplazados felt they were either accused of being complicit with insurgents or simply abandoned to fend for themselves in a skirmish between violent antagonists. They sustain this sense of betrayal in the present-day through resentments over the expropriation of former property, the neglect of their welfare by the state, and their exclusion from the legal code enacted to compensate victims of the violence. Regarding the later, the passage of public law N° 28592 marked a progressive milestone for Peru’s historically disenfranchised peasants and the law continues to serve as a symbolic and legal motif for desplazados in their quest to claim reparations and inclusion more broadly. Desplazados publicly contest the legal semantics of the Comprehensive Reparations Plan...
of law N° 28592 which render them eligible for collective but not for individual reparations.

Indemnification as Social Debt

The state, Huberto asserted, “has a social debt, because it still is not compensating [“resarciendo”] the population.”\textsuperscript{13} As the former leader of a local association of desplazados, Huberto was in a position to understand desplazados’ resentment stemming from betrayal and neglect. In the years after the political violence he solicited support for desplazado welfare, traveling around the country and beyond to meet with influential public officials. When we met one afternoon on the outskirts of the city, his tenure had long since passed. He now only participated as a rank and file member in the local desplazado association. Huberto was the first to draw my attention to the term resarcir (to indemnify, the cognate of the present progressive tense “resarciendo”) in the context of desplazados’ struggles for recognition. He demanded that the state indemnify desplazados and outlined that its denial of their claims constituted part of their social and economic exclusion. His words spoke to the fact that the meaning of indemnification for desplazados went far beyond the strict transactional connotation implied by compensation. Striving for years to obtain reparations, his quest conveyed a sense of struggle: indemnification took place through numerous meetings, talks, observances, and, not least, movilizaciones (protest actions).

The notion of using resentment as a concept to understand desplazados’ political engagements was suggested to me by pervasive expressions of betrayal in my interviews. For desplazados and victims the shock of the subversives’ extreme violence gave way to
a difficult realization when the armed forces arrived: that their own protectors held no presumption of their innocence. Any of the hallmarks of an ability to aid the insurgency made one an object of suspicion. Huberto described this status as akin to being “requisitoriados” (those who are wanted), because rural populations generally were suspected of secretly harboring sympathy for insurgents on the assumption of a shared history and cultural background. Conrado described this from the perspective of one who held some university-level education. Conrado was a middle-aged man who spoke in a kind of Spanish which conveyed this learning in grammatical tense and vocabulary. He wore a thick woven sweater and corduroy pants the day we met in the courtyard of an historic building in the old quarter of the city. His background once enabled him to travel between two worlds, presumably making him an asset to the armed forces. But these advantages were just as easily perceived as threats. Speaking of how education within rural populations itself became a marker of subversion, Conrado remarked:

It was very very very difficult to survive at that time. Especially those who had a certain education were seen to be supposed collaborators [against] the military because they wanted people who echo, like zombies, what they do, nearly everything that they made them say. So, one who had a certain education was, for them, an assumed enemy.

The armed forces of Peru did not arrive in these areas to treat rural communities with anything as sensitive as an awareness of this impossible choice put to those caught in the middle. Conrado was an object of suspicion. In addition, he faced the choice of declaring which side he was on. Caught between two warring factions, some desplazados have never forgotten these years of external, violent coercion designed to obtain their compliance to partisans in a fight that was not theirs.
Desplazados’ conviction on this point was unassailable. A man named Álvaro told me of his leadership of a *ronda campesina* (peasant civil defense committee) and his direct experience with Shining Path’s capacity for violence. He explained that towns like his found themselves forced to transition from otherwise peaceful hamlets into battlegrounds as the insurgency began. Witnessing the murder of traditional leaders by Shining Path, Álvaro said his community had no choice but to organize for their own defense: “we organized as a town which had had nothing to do with their concerns. Not only [with the concerns] of the terrorists, but also those used by the military; the police. We were stuck between a rock and a hard place.” By perpetrating violence against campesino populations around the country or abandoning and exposing them to the violence of the antagonists, the state was irreparably transformed in their eyes. This historical betrayal is at the center of their present-day denials of the legitimacy of the state.

Desplazados’ resentment also lies in unresolved claims of ownership. As a consequence of fleeing under risk to life and limb – often under cover of darkness and without recourse to anyone for aid – many were unable to take their possessions with them, much less arrange for the sale or management of their property. As they left with nothing, they could bring nothing to bear in their search for shelter when they arrived in Huancayo. Early arrivals would typically squat on farmland outside of the city limits. As the conflict dragged on, their concentrations forced many into the streets and unused lots of the city. These migrants often came from rural economic backgrounds, with experience in animal husbandry and subsistence agriculture. Ideally, they sought out a contiguous plot of homestead and agricultural land. The Chilca district of Huancayo got
its start under these circumstances as groups of desplazados settled just outside the city limits. In this new district, even a small adjoining lot could be used to grow a few rows of corn. In other settlements, like the asentamiento humano (human settlement) bordering the regional hospital in the city, land became too scarce for anything but habitation. Many fell short of even this ideal, and flowed into the growing services sector of the city. Moreover, desplazados’ former lands and property were subsequently expropriated. Without any resources to act as collateral, many have had to scratch together legal claims to ownership over the years. Resolving these unsecured claims to new and former property are a central goal of desplazado groups. Desplazados have not forgotten what they know rightfully ought to belong to them, adding to their sense of resentment.
Photo 7, Cross overlooking major road of Huancayo, Av. Huancavelica. Murals of firearms, village scenes, eyes with tears, and flames appear on its concrete beams. Photo by the author.
The history of Luisa is an especially striking record of dispossession and exclusion. I first visited Luisa’s home on a summer day in the Mantaro Valley. It was clear and windy, and the low ceiling of clouds which had clung to the valley walls had disbursed. There was abundant equatorial sun, and one could feel the aridity of living 10,000 feet above sea level in the Andes. I crossed the patchy grass bordering the train tracks running down one of Huancayo’s major avenues, and approached the raw concrete structures making up Luisa’s block. A mother of two, Luisa stood about five feet tall. Climbing a number of uneven steps, she led me to the roof where we chatted while her family attended to the chores. Rooftops are common locations for wash basins, and often a rough stool is at hand for someone to talk while they apply themselves to tasks. Luisa’s posture and voice reported a jarring history; her voice sometimes cut short on a word as she jumped to another thought, as though the experiences were not falling out of her fast enough. At other times, her lilt would soften, and her face would be at the point of tears.

During the political violence, when the armed forces had established a presence in her community, she reported having been sexually assaulted by the newly arrived soldiers. She described living through these assaults as a sacrifice of her body necessary to keep her family safe. Her husband bore the pressure of conscription into the rondas campesinas (peasant civil defense committees whose members were referred to as ronderos) to patrol for Shining Path fighters. Often the ronderos drank heavily to fortify themselves for missions. The combination of pressures, threats, and violence left Luisa’s family feeling that they had no choice but to escape. She recalled that she and her family had to leave for Huancayo in the middle of the night “like cats,” silently and swiftly,
without “even a shoe” or a goodbye to anyone. They had no one in Huancayo to turn to and no way to get to the city, being forced to beg for rides from passing truck drivers. Like others who took refuge in caves or the fields as they fled, Louisa’s family slept in the open on the streets in cardboard boxes.

Over the years, Luisa’s troubles continued in the form of a lack of political or economic access. Unable to obtain a loan, Luisa’s vision of opening a small business failed to materialize. Private lenders have stepped in to fill this capacity, though desplazados have few resources to serve as collateral and private enterprise is not bound by any obligation to give loans to displaced citizens. In recognition of these challenges the Congress of the Republic passed legislation enabling victims to find housing or apartments. However, these public programs posed considerable bureaucratic obstacles in their own right. To enroll in the Sistema de Focalización de Hogares (Peru’s National Housing Codification System) for those identified as meeting poverty thresholds, Luisa was told that she would need proof of land title for the property where she currently lives, demonstrated by a title’s existence in the public registry. This would additionally be verified by an in-person assessment of their lands or existing premises by more than one of the national agencies involved. Luisa had rented for many years but needed a loan to purchase land and a home in the first place, obviating her ability to demonstrate land title. These obstacles constrained the participation of families like Luisa’s. Moreover, the obstacles to meeting these provisions went beyond the complications of legal possession. Given the persecution of desplazados at the hands of the Peruvian military, many desplazados held fears of, if not outright animus toward, public officials. They were very reluctant to invite them into the intimate spaces of their
homes. Without these documents, some were left without access to funds to purchase a home or the residential equity to offer as collateral for a business loan. As she said, “If everything isn’t on paper you can’t gain access” to loans, and as a poor person without a loan “you can’t do a thing.”

Possession (or lack thereof) of legal title to land has far reaching effects beyond access to a physical space of one’s own or the benefits of credit. Many of the national social welfare programs, such as the support for the early education program Juntos (Together), or the pension plan for those over the age of 65, Pension 65, require proof of residence in order for administrators to comply with oversight requirements to prevent abuse as mandated by law. Some desplazados who lived through the violence are no longer of child bearing age or cannot have children – whether as a consequence of injuries suffered by sexual violence or by forced sterilizations – and thereby could not benefit from Juntos even if they were eligible. Because revealing one’s home address can potentially reveal that a claim to a plot of land is not legal, others feel they must avoid the risk of providing their addresses to the authorities for fear of eviction and are thereby precluded from state benefits widely available to many Peruvians. It is little wonder then that desplazados find public officials’ assertions that these “development” programs are provided for their benefit to be specious. Desplazados reported that these programs exclusively benefit lugareños (literally, locals or persons belonging to a place; in this context the term referred to property owners), those already able to afford land for themselves.

Exclusionary grouping between “old” Huancaínos and desplazados has been the most salient feature of local politics in Luisa’s life in Huancayo. Those whose residency
extends further back than 1980 claim rights to Huancayo’s resources over desplazados who arrived during the political violence. When desplazados arrived in Huancayo, some were greeted with racially inflected slurs of *chupatas* (a term thought to derive from the Quechua term for “the place of the Indians;” as a slur it is meant to call out one’s foreignness to the urban environs of Huancayo), *calatas* (those without clothes), and *turrucos* (also *turcos*; archaic reference to ottoman invaders of imperial Roman territory; in current pejorative usage, terrorists). Most recently a politics of post-conflict autochthony arose in the campaigns for regional president. Luisa’s family regarded a prominent front runner, Ángel Unchupaico, to be a residency fundamentalist. According to Luisa’s husband, Unchupaico considered families like his as “alien” to Huancayo. Beyond compromising what little political support Luisa could muster to find a home, Unchupaico’s views influenced a debate surrounding public and communal lands. Desplazados see Unchupaico’s position favoring Huancaínos’ ancestral rights, blocking desplazados from controlling some of the only spaces left available for development within the city.

From the perspective of the desplazados associating for collective reparations, urban land use bears directly on the issue of reparations. If they were to meet eligibility thresholds as an organization, and could demonstrate legal access to the unused lands, desplazado associations could be eligible for collective reparations dedicated to communal projects. These funds may not be used for individual housing, but schools or other forms of community buildings are viable projects. Since urban desplazados in Huancayo cannot first gain access to land as a group in which to form such associations, they cannot pass the first step in eligibility in order to demonstrate that they could
undertake a project. Luisa concluded that politicians favored long-term Huancainos as constituents. She said this amounted to discrimination at the level of political access: those who are clearly from Junín enjoy the privilege of political participation, but desplazados project a stigma of foreignness announced in advance. Such a stigma amounted to a loss of the right to access to her own political representatives to whom she could plead her case.

Violence has left its enduring scars on Luisa’s family as well. Luisa felt that she was incapacitated as a result of her wounds and unable to fulfill traditional social roles in helping her family to excel. As a young person she was raised on the notion that little by little her family would move up the economic ladder, and that her children would be able to attend university. Now she found herself unable to work due to ill health and could not provide an additional income to the household. As economic advancement was put further out of her reach, she felt a kind of social death. Luisa described this status to me using the metaphor of a foreigner arriving to a small town, where, unknown to the townspeople, she would have no social worth among the residents: “But after leaving there [Luisa’s ancestral home], nothing came back to us, as though we were foreigners that didn’t have anything, and arrived at a town where we were worth very little. This is the indignación (indignation) of people.” Recently she had become the leader of a grassroots organization in her district which advocates for home ownership. Her resentment towards the state started with the war-time powers given to the military which allowed state forces to pelear them (to fight; given its context, to beat, or massacre also serves). She viewed a thread of exclusion extending continuously from those losses and pain in the past to her family’s current position. The state’s failure to protect campesinos
in the 1980s and 90s was part of the exclusion they have always felt, continuing today in
the form of the failure of the state to support jobs, provide education, and underwrite
housing.

Attempts by the government to minimize their past and procedurally obstruct
them from individual reparations feeds a profound sense of resentment and feeling of
exclusion for many whose lives were disastrously upended in these years. By the point at
which I asked her about desplazados’ resentimientos, Luisa had reached an emotional
state in which she could hardly finish a sentence before the next outrage poured out.

That resentimiento, up to now, we carry for the state. Because the state sent us that
coup d'état, that is, that coup no? Between us it made us fight. Among us there were
massacres…now it says that ‘we are going to repair, we are going to give, and we are
going to,’ and never-. Now without a house, without anything, without- and our
children, nor are we even given that Beca 18. That is resentimiento that we carry for
the state.

It is perhaps a measure of desplazados’ ongoing vulnerability that they seek the
solidity of their own homes as Luisa does. Scholars have demonstrated that migrants’
desires for housing reach beyond the practicalities of shelter or financial security as
homes confer symbolic benefits to individuals and signal status to the larger community.
Like what Ilana Feldman terms the “visibility projects” of other refugee groups,
desplazados “are acutely aware of the importance of having tangible evidence of their
claims: to their homes, to self-determination, and to existence as an identifiable people.
These claims are both collective and individual” (2008, 503). Feldman’s insight
underscores that the tokens of citizenship simultaneously carry idiosyncratic meanings
specific to individuals while also serving as outward proclamations of one’s claim to
space and resources as a citizen. Desplazados view a home as elemental to the
redemption of the forced choice once put to them; a means to restore their standing as
Peruvian citizens. As such, they term the lack of access to housing and mortgage support a form of systematic discrimination against them and a source of their resentment.

Luisa’s realization that her dreams had been so worn away as to become unfamiliar to even herself parallels in individual psychology the concurrent dissolution of an imagining of a one-day prosperous Peru. Civilians, the very ones that the armed forces were ostensibly meant to protect, were the very persons who also suffered greatly. Their losses from the violence included individual lives – a source of ongoing, extensive anguish – as well as this collective belief in a shared future. Esmerelda helped me to understand this demise. We talked about desplazados one morning at the great open space on the first floor of the coordinating roundtable. At a dark wood meeting table, we were dwarfed by the empty warehouse-like space whose vastness caught the sounds from the street outside and amplified them against the plastic sheet roofing. Esmerelda spoke quickly and in low tones when we reached the topic of the resentments among the desplazado community. While she had not personally been affected by violence, she spoke in a detailed and thoughtful way, with a quiver in her voice when she described the pain and loss of the desplazado community. About the political conflict’s legacy on desplazados she recounted: “The political violence left a lot of pain, a lot of mistrust in a poor abandoned country. The tale in which in this country everything could improve, because they wanted it to, collapsed.” This loss stemmed from the state’s betrayal of its responsibility to protect. “That’s why the people, the populations, when they see the army, that sustains- some of them have been left resentful.” Esmerelda’s words suggested that the loss of hope by those who suffered most was a source of desplazado resentments: a loss of faith in the conviction that their lives could change simply because
one willed it. While this dream died for desplazados, for others it is still an account of social life which holds significance as many benefited from Peru’s recent years of high economic growth.

Esmerelda’s words also reflect the cognate finding that desplazados do not hold out hope for a hypothetical transformative leader, or a grass-roots movement that could somehow reform Peru’s political system from within. Desplazado resentment coalesces around memories of betrayal and experiences of neglect to take the form of an adamant rejection of assertions by state officials of attendance to desplazado welfare. They are convinced that any government inheriting the mantel of the Peruvian state is, through these historical associations, tarnished. Again and again, desplazados in interviews and at public appearances would remain unwavering in this conviction. In order to further explore their views on authority informing their performative displays, I will first turn to desplazados’ use of language to understand what is conveyed in words as ordinary as “the state” itself.

Naming the State

Interpretations of history are particularly relevant to many residents in the Mantaro Valley who saw little that distinguished their fates from those who lived through Peru’s colonial history. The literal outbreak of violence served as a defining feature of the 1990s. Otherwise the scarcities of life under Fujimori’s neoliberal economic reforms, for some, approximated the severities of life in earlier eras of Peru’s history. Awareness of exploitation runs through these otherwise very different memories, informing desplazados’ relationship with the state, and entrenching their view whatever its
legislative or institutional forms. For these desplazados, the administration of President Ollanta Humala differed little from Fujimori’s, or Fernando Belaúnde’s of over two decades ago. Conrado and Luisa explained this ongoing marginalization through use of the verb *atender*, using the term on separate occasions. *Atender* in my translation is defined as “to favorably embrace, or to satisfy desires” (Diccionario de la lengua española de la Real Academia Española Online, s.v. “atender,” accessed December 23, 2018, https://dle.rae.es/). They asserted, “*nunca nos atiende el estado*” (the state never looks after us). In its most basic sense, their choice of *atender* conveys a reversal of intimacy, a subjective shift from embrace to exposure.

Because their current neglect contains a resemblance to the persecution leading to many desplazados’ displacement in the 1980s and 90s, desplazados view the state’s failure to care as a consistent position by the authorities to condemn their community. Enacting this first-hand knowledge in talk makes up a central element of desplazados’ denial of the legitimacy of the Peruvian state. Desplazados enact this position by invoking their experience of social discrimination in the very word “the state.” To publicly name the Peruvian state, their speech resembles Judith Butler’s performativity framework for thinking through the power of hate speech. Butler’s notion of the “social ritual” accompanying hate speech, which endows such hate with a citational capacity to recall social histories of bigotry, is likewise at play when desplazados speak of the Peruvian state. The social ritual of using hate speech condenses social inequalities into language.

The name has, thus, a *historicity*, what might be understood as the history which has become internal to a name, has come to constitute the contemporary meaning of a name: the sedimentation of its usages as they have become part of the very name, a
sedimentation, a repetition that congeals, that gives the name its force. (Butler 1997, 36)

The density of historical meaning with which desplazados imbue their references to the Peruvian state mirrors this structure of usage in hate speech, albeit from a completely different social orientation. Desplazados cite a historicity in naming the state from a position of marginalization. Thus, Conrado and Luisa’s use of *never* in their statement, “the state never looks after us,” implies more than just hyperbole about the state in their lifetimes. Looked at from the perspective of performativity, *never* highlights for the listener a longer historical durée altogether when referring to the state; another stratum of experience with the state’s discrimination which grounds their views of its illegitimacy.

A kind of naming by the excluded, desplazados’ words condense the violence, betrayal, and ultimately the resentment they hold towards being put into positions of vulnerability. Yet because of the diversity of experiences during the political violence, desplazados cannot simply annunciate “the state” and rely upon social convention to convey the power it holds for desplazados to a wider audience as would any other hateful word. They must embed their naming of the state in an affect of resentment, and offer cues of tone or references to the talk of official speeches as aids to convey this sense of the Peruvian state’s legacy of violence. By understanding the history of the Peruvian state as inextricable from the current one, and citing it in performance, they call to light the continued injustice of their dispossession and attempt a reversal of their social and economic status.
Huancayo’s Memorial

Desplazados’ uses of performative display conformed with the goals for a brand new regional memorial titled, *Yalpana Wasi – Wiñay Yalpanapa* (*Casa de la Memoria Para Recordar Eternamente*; House of Memory for Eternal Remembrance). Recently inaugurated on a lot in the Chilca district of the city in 2014, the memorial was one of the first structures in Peru constructed from the ground up for the purposes of education about the political violence, and as a monument to those lost during the conflict. It took up a place among other memorialization initiatives including “the publication of testimonials and community histories, NGO-sponsored workshops, the establishment of small museums and memorial sites, and the appearance of war and postwar themes in domains of art, cinema, and popular music” (J. P. Feldman 2012, 488). Junín too did not lack for memorials; they abounded in the valley, taking a variety of shapes, themes, and styles of symbolism for their purposes. Those visiting Huancayo could not fail to notice an enormous steel crucifix overlooking the city. Constructed out of the twisted metal of power-line towers sabotaged during the political violence, its outline blazed at night with white light. Another crucifix on Avenida Huancavelica in the center of town depicted hand-painted murals of these years.

The regional memorial, in contrast was part museum and part shrine. It housed extensive textual and photographic exhibits detailing the local effects of violence in the Mantaro Valley, at UNCP, and around the city. Commemoration was expressed in uniquely local artistic forms as well. Renderings were displayed on traditional media such as *mates burilados* (inscribed gourds), woven tapestries, and paintings where traditional themes of the Peruvian countryside were transformed into scenes of warfare or
images of loved ones. This didactic aim corresponded to desplazados’ own goals to educate the public, specifically the next generation, so as to prevent history from repeating itself. As such, desplazado group representatives, Junín public officials, and the press described the memorial as fulfilling a “symbolic reparation” to the conflict’s victims. This seemingly abstract appeal was more than a political talking-point designed to burnish the electoral credentials of the incumbent administration of Junín. In truth the phrase was a reference to the state’s loss of legitimacy during the conflict. Recognizing this deficit, the CVR recommended symbolic observances in civic rituals to recognize the damage done by subversive groups and the state in order to restore “the social ties between the state and the people fractured by the violence” (Peru 2004, 419).

While the symbolic intent of the memorial was clear, the historical and political role of the venue evaded consensus. Chilca was chosen to be the location of the memorial due in part to its proportionately large population of desplazado residents. By constructing the memorial in Chilca, the reasoning went, its functions could be knit into the fabric of a community which shared its aims. Desplazados were invited to make use of the memorial’s facilities to meet dignitaries, hold events, and participate in its official goal of educating youth about the political conflict. Despite this well-meaning engagement, Teofilo recalled disagreement among desplazados over the priorities of symbolic reparations and education at the expense of monetary reparations. Many questioned why great sums of Soles were financing the construction of an architecturally innovative, multi-story building when many desplazados still struggled to find secure employment and homes. Critics countered that the monies budgeted for its construction
could have been simply disbursed directly in recognition of needs of living desplazados who had not received recompense.

Predictably, these divisions over the memorial were also sources of political disputes during the campaign for regional president. Vladimir Cerrón, the Regional President of Junín, had overseen the construction of the memorial during his tenure. His primary contender, former District Mayor Unchupaico, called the memorial a prime example of wasteful projects with little benefit to the general population. In fact, the memorial was administered by the Regional Government of Junín. The regional government’s choices of managers outside of the desplazado community was seen by them as a slight, and has not been forgotten by desplazado groups. Conrado and Teofilo both separately expressed frustration over the omission of desplazados from its superintendence and thought the move represented an oversight of their organizational experience, if not a missed opportunity to involve desplazados in the activities and organization of a space dedicated to histories they directly experienced. Unchupaico among other candidates enjoyed attacking Cerrón on this issue. He incongruously promoted desplazado interests by arguing that management of the memorial ought to have some form of directorial input from their community.

Despite the memorial’s didactic program, the possibility of profound consideration of the memorial’s exhibits is compromised by the building’s physical proximity to Huancayo’s own military garrison. In a jarring contrast of exhibition narrative and physical spaces, the garrison’s hand-painted camouflage barriers can be seen from the top floors of the memorial as the visitor moves between exhibits on sexual violence and photographic collages of the disappeared and killed. The dissonance
between the shrine-like stillness of the memorial and the activities of the base is still more disturbing when one recalls that the same garrison served as the primary counter-insurgent base for the Peruvian armed forces in the Mantaro Valley and surrounding regions during the conflict. Proximity and contrast of institutional objectives embodied by the two buildings also point up the state’s own contradictory discourses concerning peace and reconciliation. While the military and police employ violence against the remaining traces of the insurgency, and as a response against civil demonstrations around the country, the memorial explains the historical context of the political violence in oppression and social division. On the evidence of deadly clashes between police and civic protesters, this detached historical verdict on Peru’s history provided by the memorial seems to play very little role in the state’s approach to contemporary movements which, broadly speaking, advocate for social progress.

As a site for performative displays the memorial nevertheless is a valuable symbolic platform to amplify desplazados’ views on indemnification and politics. To explore the contextual and performative resources at work in desplazado displays at the memorial we shall next turn to two cases in which desplazado public appearances transmitted a moral affect of resentment.
Official displays: Effacing State Violence

My first trip to the memorial revealed that both desplazados and state functionaries struggle to harness its symbolism and resources in the service of competing narratives about Peru’s history. Arriving early one morning I was able to take in its newly hewn white stone and polarized glass facade, gleaming in the sun as I stood at the crossroads of an unpaved side street. Upon entering the memorial, I faced a large circular reception desk, staffed by a security guard, where many were asked to register in writing. The ground floor was exceptionally open and filled with light, serving as a pavilion space within the building to accommodate a waterfall feature. Portrait photographs of those killed during the political violence were projected upon its falling
waters. Proceeding ahead there was an equipped auditorium space accommodating upwards of a hundred participants.

While the forum that morning announced a sober consideration of violence, the symbolism of the memorial and performances by the invitees transformed it into an impassioned performative display. The audience that morning for the forum on “Cultures of Peace and Conflict Management” numbered about fifty people. In attendance I could see police officers in uniform, women in “traditional” skirts and hats, and others in business attire. We had been invited to hear several presentations, including one by Dr. Adolfo Ibarra González, of the Defensoría Del Pueblo - Oficina Defensorial de Junín (Public Ombudsman, Junín Office). Dr. Ibarra offered a didactic presentation entitled “Social Conflicts in Peru,” whose chief contribution explored the difference between social conflict and violence. The latter, he asserted, originates in definable, isolated groups who “sadly, use the mechanism of violence to make demands.”

The nuance of Dr. Ibarra’s definition of violence was immediately apparent to a group of women whose delegate went on to interrupt the ombudsman several times throughout his presentation. They were represented by a woman whom I will call Mercedes. Mercedes wore business attire, glasses, and her brown hair loose at her shoulders. She identified the rest of her group as desplazados who, when they arrived in Huancayo, had “absolutely nothing.” Their number wore traditional hats, variegated mantas (woven blankets), skirts, and their hair in braids. Mercedes spoke in Spanish and provided translation into Quechua for her group on the direct exchanges she had with Dr. Ibarra. Mercedes raised her hand while the ombudsman spoke, asking pardon for the interruption. Once the ombudsman acceded to her request, she began to attest to a history
of violence in Peru. A culture of violence, Mercedes countered, “can be seen as a constant.” “In the history of Peru,” she observed, “basically there have been violent events since the era of the Incas to the current day. So, the Peruvian people, has- we now have established this behavior.”

Dr. Ibarra elaborated upon his isolated-groups theory by way of a typology in which he provided a range of different social actors defined as “users of violence.” In this typology rondas campesinas and coca-grower’s movements appeared as perpetrators of violence alongside state-identified terrorist groups such as Shining Path and broader, but no less headline-worthy, categories including assassins (sicarios), and criminal gang formation (“pandillaje” according to his slide). A paradox to Dr. Ibarra’s position immediately came to light in this patchwork classification of groups. In his capacity as Public Ombudsman, Dr. Ibarra claimed to act for the citizens of Peru through initiatives addressing social and economic equality to prevent conflict, and by offering aid and legal resources in the event of outbreaks of violence. If these were Dr. Ibarra’s aims then he demonstrated a remarkable tolerance for unsound associations and simplification about Peruvians. His speech did not note the historically lawful organizing of Peruvian unions, nor the Peruvian military’s role in coercing the rondas campesinas into violent situations. Nevertheless, by situating these social movements next to subversives who sought the overthrow of the Peruvian state, or the more recent social scourge of unchecked criminality, Dr. Ibarra narratively ordered his discourse to create associations for the listener/viewer. Dr. Ibarra thus alluded to the immorality of these social groups through the proximity to subversives’ use of extreme violence. His reasoning illustrates that the
state’s narrative would turn upon powerful feelings surrounding the era of political violence to position the state as external to considerations of conflict and violence.

Although these social actors were defined in the ombudsman’s typology, the state’s own use of deadly force did not classify as violence. Dr. Ibarra made this plain in a hypothetical example of civil disobedience: whereas for the protest action of occupying highways or public buildings the modifier “violence” applied, the state’s response to these actions cannot qualify as violence. Instead, the representative claimed these were attempts to “reestablish order.” As many in attendance that day would be able to recall, violent actions carry a connotation of a breakdown of civic order, raising memories of their darkest hours. The unembellished way a roundtable staffer named Beatriz recalled Huancayo in the 1980s and 90s, highlights the despair of the years of car bombs and disappearances. She said that life had become very “ugly.” Two decades later, those same memories were distilled in Dr. Ibarra’s use of violence and order, but in a very different political context. Here, the modifier violence carries the weight of a moral valance. Disruptions to order, as in non-violent protests which obstruct extractive industry ventures, are cast as inherently amoral for the potential for disorder that they portend. The state held the opposite position, completely free of violence and conflict. In fact, by definition the state was incapable of violence. Dr. Ibarra stated this corollary more audaciously as: “El estado no es violento” (The state is not violent). Introducing this violence/order account as a component of the state’s mandate further mobilized the experience of the conflict alongside talk his designed to persuade.

Rumblings flowed from the desplazados’ section of the audience during the ombudsman’s discussion. Mercedes again interjected: this time not pausing to pose her
comments as a question; she did not raise her hand to signal to Dr. Ibarra that she had something to say. Mercedes excused her interruption to obtain the ombudsman’s attention, rose from her seat, and before he could finish protesting the continuing disruptions, began to address his theory. In contrast to the ombudsman’s abstraction, she emphasized the ubiquity of violence as a quotidian reality and a cultural experience: “today, the citizen here, what they confront is apparent violence, in the streets, apparent violence in the homes, apparent at the level of the state - it exists.” She pleaded with the ombudsman, as a matter of truth, to see that “our culture makes it so that we suffer, and in no way are able to see – able to accept – ourselves as we are, with our errors and faults, and improve.” Mercedes assertions were given further moral weight by the quiet presence of the desplazados next to her as she spoke. She insisted on a clear-eyed view of violence’s ubiquity as a key to resolving everyday suffering. With greater self-knowledge there was a possibility of improvement – and even social actualization – in a quest to resolve a societal scourge.

Because the state’s role in “restoring order” takes extraordinary liberties, the omission of its own contributions to violent situations is no small detail. Recently the deadly use of force by the national police made headlines in protests against extractive industry projects (Prado 2014). To his credit the ombudsman alluded to these headlines, admonishing police to respond in an appropriate manner while respecting the human rights of citizens. Offered out of context, a commitment to holding officers accountable might hardly seem objectionable. What the ombudsman failed to address was the recently passed law, N° 30151, which legally ordains police and military officers to be inimputable (immune from prosecution) for the use of deadly force. His allusions to
these headlines gave the ombudsman the appearance of being in touch with social and
economic conflicts that matter to the populace. Yet the matter at hand turned not on
whether human rights ought to be respected in the abstract but whether the human rights
of protesters provide greater protections than the legal right of officers to employ deadly
force without judicial review.

Mercedes’ refutation illuminated the moral experience of desplazados wherein
violence occupied a temporal horizon beyond the discussion of crime, protests, and
insurgents. In this narrative the state was directly implicated as a culprit within a larger
story where violence suffused Peruvian society, both historically and at multiple scales.
Even the present-day experience of desplazados revealed violence as a fact of life,
regardless of the ombudsman’s theoretical confinement of it to finer points. For
Mercedes, the flagrancy of violence also entailed an ethical corollary: everyone shared
responsibility for its persistence. She admonished, “We have to accept that we are
owners; that we have a culture of violence- that we have to change back.” Finally as if to
underline that it was the ombudsman’s position that inhibited perspicuity, she concluded,
“We have to change, Doctor.” The desplazado group would not accept Dr. Ibarra’s
retreat from responsibility for the violence that they experience as a quotidian reality,
hinting at a comprehensive examination of violence and crime, if not a number of frank
acknowledgements and reconciliations regarding Peru’s history. As she pointed out,
they had survived to the current moment from a point of gross loss, suggesting in the very
least a consideration of violence whose effects extend beyond the moment harm was
done by one to another.
Dr. Ibarra continued after a brief response ruling out conquest from his definition of violence. He offered an episode free of the details of place names or official titles of hidden groups that seek to “generate destruction” and subvert the state’s role in preserving order. He told of a cabal of students on an undisclosed university campus who organized against university programs and contemplated violence. The quick action of state forces instead thwarted their intents. The details of this anecdote may be impossible to obtain, as Dr. Ibarra justified the use of the anonymous example on the grounds of state security. However, our stymied interrogation of the facts of Dr. Ibarra’s account only serves to intensify the interest in what other work the tale did in conveying to its audience a distinctly moral subtext as a justification for the state’s position. There can be no mistake that the historical symbolism of Dr. Ibarra’s sort of story would resonate in nearly every corner of Peru due to the intents of Shining Path and MRTA to infiltrate Peru’s university system. In Huancayo the power of such an anecdote has acute local significance given that UNCP was a contested terrain of ideology and recruitment for insurgent groups during the political violence. The story worked, insofar as it was not received by the broader audience with heckles or abuse. Few in the audience would miss the historical parallel he was constructing: the implication that anonymous militant students contemplating violence today are the ideological inheritors of the subversives’ bloody aims. For a generation of Peruvians that grew up with political violence, Dr. Ibarra’s story conveyed far more than a justification designed to rationally sway an audience on the reasonableness of his position. Rather the story invoked an allegory on the moral, if not existential, hazard posed by violence. It was a performance which deployed an archetype of well-known historical facts alongside a moral affect. These
moral and affective allusions unbuttoned rational critiques of its factual gaps. In these arguments, the representative’s performative display was brought off by relying on the public’s conviction that a return to the type of violence witnessed during the conflict must be avoided. The account gives the state a thinly veiled cover to prioritize security at the expense of policies focused on those displaced by conflict.

By narratively curating Peru’s sociological and historical makeup with oversimplification and false associations, the ombudsman discursively absented the state in the topos of violent actors. The anthropologist Michael Herzfeld in studying the intimate apprehensions of power and display between rulers and the ruled labeled this absenting of the powerful a “performed absence or nonevent,” arranged by state functionaries (Herzfeld 2015, 21). Absent as a user of violence, but not as a broadcaster of the normative conduct of society, the state performs this nonevent while ardently reprehending audiences according to its own moral framework. Dr. Ibarra’s performed absence might be seen as sacrilegious or hapless considering his words were proffered in the very space dedicated to those killed at the hands of state agents. It is a measure of Dr. Ibarra’s intent to use the memorial’s symbolic significance in service of the state’s self-positioning that the Defensoría would overlook such considerations.

The cultural expectations of a forum as a conventional, repeated structure of talk offers a means through which desplazados would make their lives visible within the ombudsman’s remarks. Regarding this power, it is worthwhile to revisit the scholar Dell Hymes’ ambition to devise an ethnography of speaking which appreciated the implicit role of the audience (1981). Hymes’ theory posits that an audience’s interpretation of talk, affect, and physical virtuosity is as central to the creation of performance as the style
and substance of the primary display. In the words of Hymes’ successor Richard Bauman, “Performance as a mode of spoken verbal communication consists in the assumption of responsibility to an audience for a display of communicative competence” (1975, 293). If we consider the forum encounter in the terms of desplazados’ intuition of the power offered to assess the ombudsman’s communicative competence, then we can understand it from a perspective of the creative adaptability. The interruptions signal the desplazados’ objection to the moral reality at stake in the ombudsman’s depiction, and suggest that the performer’s communicative competence was mismatched to the audience’s assessment.

Stepping back from the detail of their exchanges, a forum like the “Cultures of Peace and Conflict Management” can also be viewed through the analytical lens of performance as an enactment of contrasting epistemologies. The desplazados’ responses to the ombudsman developed a state of feeling of contradistinction between the moral reality of their lives and the state’s theory of society which absolved it from greater responsibility for violent customs. The desplazados attested to a reality in which separate violent episodes were not isolated but interlinked. In the words of the performance studies scholar Diana Taylor, the women’s responses referred not solely to the Dr. Ibarra’s words, but acted as the self-expression of their moral experience through the “individual cultural agency” inherent to performance (Taylor 2003, 14). To paraphrase Taylor, their enactment of a moral reality comes into relief if we bracket the women’s interaction with Dr. Ibarra as an expression of “cultural and historical specificity as much in enactment as in the viewing/reception” (2003, 3). Interpreting the interaction along the lines of enactment illustrates why it was so important that Mercedes’ desplazado
colleagues be present even if they did not orally contribute to the Spanish-led discussion. By subverting the convention of a didactic lecture (where questions are traditionally reserved for the termination), their interruptions demanded to make their histories known through their own narratives, and Quechua terms, which are otherwise obscured from the forum’s focus. This performative dissonance was the point: by drawing the contradiction implicit in their presence to the foreground of the forum’s discussion, they beckoned the wider audience to understand their lives, trusting others would witness the amorality of denying their experience.41

Mercedes also relied upon a variety of unstated cultural values in offering the assessment of desplazados in front of the wider audience. As a group chiefly made up by women, their objections to single instances or isolated users of violence alluded to a growing awareness of domestic and sexual violence against women and girls in Peruvian society as a comprehensive threat to the health of the Peruvian population.42 Correspondingly, considerations of gender also framed the arrangement of power and status between the two parties. The desplazados’ interjections upended a traditional scenario in which a male public functionary officiates on a topic from a perspective of the interests of state elites. Their interjections therefore entailed a rejection of the traditional authority accorded to men, if not the tradition of enforcing deference by Quechua-speakers toward Spanish-speaking male authorities. Mercedes gave voice to a group of Quechua-speaking desplazado women whose untranslatability in Peruvian society ordinarily prevents them from reaching the broader public. While far from putting these women on an equal footing with men in politics more broadly, their public objections
offered a rare instance in which their linguistic and non-linguistic communication was not discounted but a form of political self-expression.

Performative displays of the State’s Illegitimacy

Later that year the campaign for Junín’s regional presidency offered more opportunities than usual for desplazados to encounter state officials in public settings. None were as symbolically significant as the annual observance of the Final Report of the CVR. A full week of activities had been planned leading up to the anniversary, including a host of dedications, talks, movie screenings, and gallery exhibitions taking place around the city. It was the end of summer, and the heady days of plentiful sun and dry, dusty winds were turning. Rain had begun to sow hints of green in the straw-yellow mountains enclosing the city. On the morning of the anniversary, I could make out rows of chairs in red molded plastic in the courtyard as I again approached the memorial. A cluster of awnings lined the wall of the courtyard, comprising what the program billed as an information and services fair. By the start of the ceremony there would be about a hundred people occupying the chairs or milling about the fair. Upon the threshold stood a head-table. The dignitaries who sat upon its broad steps shaded their eyes against the breaks in the clouds and luster of the memorial’s faux-marble steps. The dignitaries were positioned at a ninety-degree angle to the audience, so that everyone faced an empty space leading to the corner of the courtyard where the flag pole stood. All around the staff set up chairs, tables, and adjusted the sound system with an occasional crackle or burst of static.
While dedicated as an observance of the political violence, a string of images and oratory reinforced the presence of the state alongside the primary intent of remembrance on the anniversary of the Final Report. The ordering of the agenda highlighted the state’s presence with the flag raising, anthem, and the majority of the keynote speeches allocated to public officials. The slate of speakers invited to provide remarks included Dr. Ibarra, a representative of the Commission for Peace, Reparations and Reconciliation, the Director of the memorial, and the president of the non-governmental ARDCP. In the audience I recognized citizens, NGO staff, journalists, students and government officials. This bias of the agenda towards the signs of official deference must have been apparent in advance. The ARDCP had organized a second flag raising of a standard of their own design,
showing a dove on a white background. Dr. Ibarra raised the Peruvian flag to half-mast, the desplazado representatives raised the second flag to the same height, and we all observed a moment of silence.

Two special exhibits supplemented the agenda during the observance of the anniversary. The first was an exhibition of amateur paintings from the era of political violence, and the second was a selection of prints from national exhibition Yuyanapaq (To Remember). The later accompanied the release of the Final Report of the CVR, and its images are displayed at the Museum of the Nation in Lima. Its photo selection thematically illustrated the intersections of violence with the material structures and officials of the state: one image showed a man rolling up a poster of President Belaúnde within the husk of a destroyed building; another showed a police officer removing the eviscerated carcass of a dog strung up as a warning; and another, the image of a passport-sized photograph typically used in bureaucratic processes for identification. In these images the inclusion of the officials and sites of the state give it a spectral presence alongside themes of violence and loss. For all of the words a photograph can spare, the construction of these of photos did not convey the origins of the political violence in subversives’ indiscriminate use of violence to destroy unjust social and economic institutions and the casualties which followed. Instead, it created the sense that the state’s ability to control violence was as important to an understanding of the past as honoring the lives and social worlds of those who had perished.
The desplazados in attendance broadcast a counter-narrative to the deference paid to the state even as we were only just gathering at the appointed hour. I recognized Luis in the crowd and I moved to exchange pleasantries. As I briefly noted at the start of this chapter, Luis was an older man who had served in leadership positions for local and regional desplazado organizations in Huancayo. Standing in the courtyard he wore a ball-cap, a waist-length jacket, and dark wool slacks. As he spoke, he gestured to a few people sitting nearby. He positioned his body at an angle to mine so that he faced the open courtyard and the backs of those sitting in the rows of chairs. He expressed the opinion that the people dressed “traditionally” in the audience were not thought of as campesinos (peasants) because they lived in the urban areas of the city. But, he countered, they were in fact modesto (humble) people because they still maintained
connections with their rural birthrights. “Politicians don’t pay any attention to these people though,” he remarked to anyone as much as to me. Returning to my gaze, he asked: “could President Obama ignore the people who elected him, huh?” Luís scoffed as though the answer was self-evident. He asked the question as a politician might lob ingratiating one-liners into an audience during a stump speech: to get a listener energized and onto a specific train of argument. Altogether my impression was of a conversation intended for another audience besides myself.

Scrutiny of Luís’ choice of words in the setting offers insights into subtlety of his counter-narrative. When Luís spoke of the audience members he suggested they were commonly perceived of as former peasants caught up in the challenges of city life (even despite attire traditionally associated with a rural setting). Luís contradicted the commonsense view. His compatriots were indeed as virtuous as their rural counterparts. Their virtue lay in a disinclination to the corruption of politics, putting them at odds with a political class which served in the name of the people but in practice refused to help those in need. The contrast suggested that his compatriots in the audience had more integrity, despite the circumstances of their social and economic status. Desplazados’ deprivation would not tarnish this moral virtue. This linguistic reinterpretation of modesty was distinguished by a performative register which sought to convince and incite an audience. Luís was broadcasting an interpretation which empowered its audience even before an utterance had been offered in commemoration.

Some in the audience had profound reasons to commiserate with Luís’ position. While I waited in the courtyard for the ceremony to begin a middle-aged woman wearing a red sweat suit sidled up next to me. “Joven,” (young man) she spoke softly, “what is
“What’s going on here today?” Trying to be helpful, I pointed out that the tents were full of information on state services and that the dignitaries were there to mark the occasion. As we talked, she introduced friends of hers. One woman, whose name was Martha, had a ball-cap on at a slight angle, and lighter, curly hair falling out at the sides. She wore a purple windbreaker jacket with tan fleece pants. In response to my purpose for being in Huancayo, Martha reported that the politicians had given desplazados nothing. As if to fill me in, the woman in red later whispered to me that Martha was still waiting to find out the whereabouts of the bodies of her loved ones, a decade after the release of the Final Report of the CVR. She confided that Martha had not received any substantial aid in trying to find them.

As the only non-governmental entity invited to offer remarks on the anniversary the ARDCP’s took its origins to lie in pressing these matters of desplazado welfare into public view. During the conflict began many of Peru’s public institutions had been discredited, including the military, the Fujimori administration, and the leading political parties. But prior to the completion of the CVR’s Final Report, few organizations represented desplazados at the national level. Instead, desplazados allied with others affected by violence to form broad-based interest groups. According to Conrado, who served as a former official in the ARDCP, one of the first purely desplazado-led organizations ran under the name hatariy ayllu “lifted families” in Huancayo. Once it was announced that the Final Report was going to be released, a rumor began to circulate that the report recommended reparations payments according to categories of victims, and that the state was inclined to distribute benefits. At that point, the national associations started to divide into more specific categories. Today the ARDCP is a local
affiliate of *Coordinaora Nacional de Desplazados y Comunidades en Reconstrucción Del Perú* (the National Coordinator of Desplazados and Communities in Reconstruction or CONDECOREP, to use its Spanish acronym). Its goal at first was to advocate for reparations. Ever since the passage of law N° 28592 in 2005, and subsequent classification of eligible categories of victims, the organization has pushed to hold the state accountable for individually indemnifying its members, increasing reparations amounts, and rescinding the number of restrictions on collective reparations awards.

As the face of the ARDCP, its president seeks to redefine how law N° 28592 has taken shape as policy so as to exclude desplazados from the monetary reparations programs. The Integrated Reparations Plan which arose out of the legislation under the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights devised seven programs of reparations for victims, out of which the state ultimately decided to individually indemnify only four of the categories. The ARDCP holds a difference between the intent of law N° 28592, now on the books for over a decade, and what they regard as the essentially bureaucratic distinctions of the Plan which seem to be intentionally designed to prevent them from taking part in the law. In the decade of intervening struggle, the ARDCP morphed from its inception as a vehicle for mobilization surrounding reparations into the role of perpetual government watchdog. As Conrado put it, “the state never gives anything unless it is demanded.”

Conrado explained this transition in terms of the state’s intransigence.

What state is going to recognize the struggle of an oppressed population? What state is going to recognize the struggle of a population who has suffered violence? Rather it will try to minimize, detract from, forget, or bury [their histories] so that all is forgotten. We have a trajectory of struggle, we try always to shine a light so that the state fulfills these laws.
Conrado saw this as the ARDCP’s unstated role: to keep a sharp eye on the state, hold it accountable, and prevent it from forgetting its responsibility for desplazado welfare. When I suggested that their lives served as a kind of national patrimony, Conrado quickly corrected my mistake: desplazados were not waiting for their histories to be honored by the state. After all, they have spoken for and even documented their own histories many times over. Their active struggle today lies forcing the state to accept its own body of law.

Where Luis’ comments sought a reversal of desplazado social roles, the president focused attention on responsibility and accountability in his performance. In contrast to the savvy speaking styles of Dr. Ibarra and the Director of the memorial, the president of the ARDCP spoke in a halting tone, standing apart from the head-table on the wide steps. Of average height, he wore slacks and a sweater cardigan over a button-down shirt. His face contorted, and he paused between words. As best I could tell, his struggle was perhaps the outward manifestation of a psychological burden, or the product of the effort to speak in front of an audience, or both. But the dramatic effect of the president’s effort to talk made for a speech that was somehow both affecting and suppressed. Excerpting one section of his address, I focus on where he critiqued the historical irresponsibility of remembrance without mention of accountability. Instead the president spoke from a historically situated perspective.

Today we feel remembrance (of) the situation that had passed in 1980-2000 [sic], already passed in Peru, in the region of Junín. We have lost many lives. This situation began with the slaughter, by both sectors: as much by Shining Path and also by the armed forces of the state. We have lost the innocent lives of our families! There has not been respect.
Several aspects of this oratory underscore the performative arrangement of desplazado counter-narratives. His first and second sentences reify the commemorative occasion. In this statement he proscribes violence not out of ethical principle, nor for the sake of societal order, but calls upon the audience to remember the history of Junín. The following two sentences reinforce the significance of this history for desplazados’ understanding of remembrance, and contend that neither the state nor subversives could be cast as neutral in the loss of life. This choice of wording is conspicuous in relation to the previous speakers, as it implicated the state in the violence directly. Next, by suggesting that desplazado lives were innocent in relation to these warring parties, his remarks acknowledge the reality of injustice for those who remain. Lastly, there is an opaque reference to respect. Does he imply that respect is not afforded to desplazados? Or is it broader, as though the outbreak of violence was precipitated by a loss of respect between the antagonists? His use of the present perfect tense offers one interpretation: “there has not been.” As opposed to a past tense usage, this tense implies that the lack of respect continues. The continuity of a lack of respect in connection with the preceding line regarding the loss of lives suggests that it is desplazados’ losses which have not been recognized properly. The lack of respect acts both as an allusion to the state’s intransigence, as well as a suggestion that dignity continues to elude desplazados.

Interestingly, the president makes a point of underscoring the state’s, as well as subversives’, complicity in the political violence. This inclusion distinguishes the president’s words for their form as much as their referential content. The reference to the state’s violence reminded the audience of history while also opening the anniversary to questions of responsibility, welfare, and the lasting consequences of violence. When the
state’s own crimes have been established in the public domain, including as a subject of the Final Report of the CVR, it introduces little new information to proclaim the state’s misdeeds on the occasion of the anniversary. In light of the memorial’s tilt as a platform for the state’s narratives, his introduction of the state’s role in violence was contextually more meaningful.

The president was the fourth and last speaker, but also the first to mention any notion of accountability regarding the state’s role. In this, his remarks recontextualized the previous speeches, to borrow from the thinking of the linguistic anthropologists Charles Briggs and Richard Bauman (1992). To explain the analytical perspective afforded by recontextualization it is necessary to briefly tour through anthropological considerations of the concept of genre. Briggs and Bauman use intertextuality to address debates surrounding genre; that analytic framework thought to be either a structuring property of texts and talk, or expectations about social forms and practices of texts. The authors side-step this debate by developing genre in relation to other talk and text, using links to previous instantiations of talk as a defining feature of genre. Thinking about genre diachronically they observe that when a contemporary author evokes a traditional genre, she is enabled to harness considerable cultural persuasiveness through both its structure and social expectations in support of the content of her performance.

By invoking a particular genre, producers of discourse assert (tacitly or explicitly) that they possess the authority needed to decontextualize discourse that bears these historical and social connections and to recontextualize it in the current discursive setting. When great authority is invested in text associated with elders or ancestors, traditionalizing discourse by creating links with traditional genres is often the most powerful strategy for creating textual authority (see Briggs 1998; Gossen 1974; Kuipers 1990). We can say, thus, that generic intertextuality affords great power for naturalizing both texts and the cultural reality that they represent. (Briggs and Bauman 1992, 148)
The performance of the president of the ARDCP is a similar instance of naturalizing a discourse of desplazados’ calls for indemnification through the generic structure of a tribute. His oratorical framing arrogated to him the solemnity of an observance through the introduction: “Today we feel remembrance (of) the situation that had passed in 1980-2000 [sic], already passed in Peru, in the region of Junín.” Positioned within the tradition of the annual observance of the CVR, he turns his talk to the losses sustained by victims and desplazados as a group distinct from the state or subversives and establishes these losses as an incomplete social condition relative to the others. Enlisting the conventionality of the occasion, and his responsibility to the audience, the narrative arrangement recontextualizes the discourse of state functionaries from one of performed absence to one of the visibility of the state’s betrayal of desplazados and their experiences of neglect.
Returning to the content of the president’s speech, he next became more direct with his use of the stage. He recalled the militants of both sides who had “routed their cooperatives, communal businesses,” and perhaps most insidiously, the “confidence in our authorities.” This clause speaks to the conviction with which some desplazados challenge the legitimacy of the Peruvian state. In the president’s words, desplazados’ loss of confidence stemmed from the destruction of their lives and livelihoods. Proclaiming this betrayal at a public observance would be striking if only for the risk it ran of embarrassing invited guests. But beyond considerations of decorum, the display was an important means of contradicting the emphasis on state deference where public functionaries implicitly occupied the state’s prerogative to speak for the will of the
people. As distinct from a condemnation of state institutions, or the party politics of its government, the president’s disavowal constituted a blanket rejection of the state’s privilege to represent desplazado interests short of reconstituting respect. The state’s faithless, bloodstained history, and its continuing subordination of their political goals denies desplazados’ moral point of view in Peruvian society. To counter this condition, desplazados rely on the public remonstration of the public functionaries to produce a deconstruction of the state’s democratic authority, implying the need for a revised relation between government and the governed.

The president of the ARDCP may not appear particularly charismatic as a spokesperson for desplazados. When weighed from the point of view of a style of electoral campaigning which has come to mark modern democratic politics in Latin America, his dress and bearing may seem quaint if unknowing of tactics characterized by oversimplified campaign promises, opaque deep-pocketed financing, and networks of connections which reach from the Andes to Lima. But measuring the president’s performance against traditional political operation risks applying a standard that may not be relevant to the performative content of his remarks. The qualifying signs of “serious” politics, these attributes are associated for desplazados with the indefatigable corruption of Peruvian politicians (see chapter two for ethnographic study on this theme). Small and restrained as he was on the steps, his ability to sway a broader audience lay in the values and moral affect he was able to convey as much as in his acumen as a public speaker. Immediately what struck an observer about the president were outward signs of propriety and courteous restraint. The care with which he faithfully preserved norms of dress and cleanliness were the minimum signs necessary to convey his dependability. He was not
shrill; he did not assume the guise of a protester, but a wronged citizen. Lastly, there were his appeals to the injustice of betrayal. In this, he built upon the unfairness of desplazados’ social condition by juxtaposing losses in the past with the present-day marginalization of desplazados, creating a figurative thread of continuity of desplazado suffering.

This discussion has focused on desplazados’ moral justifications through performance, though hints of desplazado strategic interests can be found in the president’s proclamations of betrayal which fell short of directly attributing responsibility to specific parties. In his speech he was careful not to directly accuse any attending public officials or cite their words specifically in asserting that the state was involved in violence. By omitting a direct accusation of the state’s intransigence as the party who withholds respect towards desplazados, he generated one possible interpretation that the state was the remaining violent actor who is at fault. Yet this implication was not too strenuous, avoiding attributions of specific agency to state officials through the unspecified use of the present perfect tense: “there has been.” His non-agentive wording left room for the open-ended question of precisely which officials acted to deny desplazados respect. This tactic perhaps avoids pitting his membership directly against state functionaries in an adversarial manner, which could risk casting them in the role of disrupters of order or otherwise allow the state to continue dismissing their claims to reparations.
Conclusion

Desplazados have transformed their moral experience into a political position and a vehicle to influence Peruvian democracy. That desplazado resentment features in politics in this way reflects the nation’s historical context of violence, colonialism, and the decease of a shared dream of Peru’s future amid its neoliberal consolidation. Some have queried whether that dream was ever accessible to all Peruvians (Thurner 1997), but for neoliberal subjects such exegeses can be meager substitutes for the hope offered by imagining a better world even if it is often out of reach. As a consequence of this history, desplazados are at the forefront in plotting a future in which they would have a greater social and economic role. Their performative displays lay a moral groundwork for inclusive democracy amid the demise of a previous fantasy of Peru’s development.

While individual reparations serve as a focal point for mobilization, the quest to use their moral experience to inform politics and public life is a profound if unrecognized dimension of desplazado struggle. Public fora have become accessible spaces for desplazados in this quest as venues where the act of contestation provides an opening to introduce performative displays. These displays are predicated on transmitting to their audiences an understanding of distant memory, linking commonly known events in a narrative attesting to their neglect. They are occasions where desplazados can illustrate the morality of their position, appeal to common values, and broadcast what they see as the illegitimacy of the state and its policies. Such performative displays do not fall neatly into considerations of desplazados’ practical or moral aspirations. Instead, their struggle suggests that the inchoate dimensions of morality and democratic inclusion intertwine as part of their express demands for reparations.
To the extent that desplazados’ struggles for reparations and political self-expression continue to be guided by resentment, they will remain self-appointed watchpersons over the state’s accountability to its populace. The paradox between their political aims and convictions about the state points up this anthropological imperative. Desplazados call out the state as illegitimate in its current guise but also hold out a hope of receiving individual reparations, recognition, and political influence more broadly. At once on guard against the state while also aspiring to a new status, their resentment positions them between opposing social roles. Perpetually in-between categories, their quest for inclusion is characterized by an ambivalence toward the inattentiveness to history by much of the population. Furthermore, in combination with the felt intensity of their resentment, their position may mean that even securing individual reparations would not let them view the state with an unwary eye ever again. Securing these benefits in the Peruvian state as it exists today may not be the sort of victory they envision without broader accompanying changes to Peruvian democracy. The worrisome news of widespread corruption and infiltration by organized crime into Peru’s governance present a set of challenges which desplazados share with the population as a whole, and whose consequences may generate more fundamental obstacles to democratic inclusion than they faced in their quest for reparations.\textsuperscript{54}

It seems fitting to conclude then on one of Fassin’s insights into the anthropological position of those who hold political resentment in the wake of mass atrocities. Like European Holocaust survivors whose social place became uncertain amid a politics of atonement and reconciliation, desplazados draw upon their moral experience to devise a defense of “a form of dignity that is increasingly censored and that has
become unintelligible” (Fassin 2013, 253). In seeking to hold the state to account for existing laws, desplazados have come to define themselves through this material and moral struggle. Their resentment informs their views of responsibility and welfare in relation to politics and the state more broadly, particularly as it concerns the quality of their democratic participation. Given the profound threats to representation in the Peruvian state, this moral experience will be an important contribution in debates about Peru’s democratic future.
3. Performative Publics at the Sites of the State

Performative displays could arise at curious times. As shown in the previous chapter, one of the most striking occasions was the question and answer period of organized forums during which a volunteer (or one of their constituents) addressed the prepared remarks of an invited speaker. In these moments the volunteers’ inquiries exceeded the boundaries of a question to signify and shape the context of the event. These questions, if they could still be called that, invariably communicated narratives of social experience as much as an inquiry.

At one such forum held on a bright January day, this procedure connected Huancayo’s local world with pressing national matters. Inside the coordinating
roundtable’s main hall, a group of young people talked amidst tables and chairs arranged in the typical forum layout. About 30-40 individuals were present.\(^1\) A head table had been set up, with a second table positioned perpendicular to it. Rows of faded orange chairs, marked with the logo of a national lager beer on the back, stood in rows facing the tables. A sign behind the head table read COLECTIVO DE JÓVENES INDIGNAD@S - #INCONTRASTABLE ¡LEVÁNTATE! – NO RÉGIMEN LABORAL PARA JÓVENES (OUTRAGED YOUNG PERSON’S COLLECTIVE - #HUANCAYORISEUP! – NO LABOR CODE FOR YOUNG PEOPLE). The group called themselves the COLECTIVO DE JÓVENES INDIGNAD@S (the outraged young person’s collective).\(^2\)

The forum offered an opportunity to debate proposed legislation to alter the Régimen Laboral Juvenil (Juvenile Labor Code). There was real substance behind lawmakers’ desires to revisit these regulations. Statistical measures of informal employment revealed that 18-24 year-olds without a labor contract exceeded 50% of the working age population in 2014, according to Business Research Center of the National Chamber of Commerce, Production, Tourism and Services (Perú21 2015).\(^3\) To encourage the hiring of young people, legislators had drafted the proposed law stipulating on-the-job training. Lawmakers reasoned that the bill would create opportunities for young people to gain access to formalized workplaces as companies reduced their costs and hired more workers. The additional cost savings were achieved through more controversial measures, however. The legislation stipulated the divestiture of labor protections for young people. If the law was passed, they could be hired without severance benefits, bonuses, guaranteed time off, or insurance policies typically offered to labor in exchange for the new training.
Did legislators grasp the irony of their claim to be combating informality by making existing employment less formal? As the press began to cover the legislation, it became clear that this fact was not lost on the public. Protests against rescinding labor protections sprang up around the country. National disapproval of the proposed
legislation spanned multiple sectors of society (Guzmán 2015). Workers of various stripes joined the young people in protest marches. They added to young people’s concerns with the critique that the law would open a loophole in which large corporations seeking menial laborers could select younger hires who, even with the training, would cost the companies less than more experienced workers. National disapproval of the law was captured in the playful name for the proposed legislation, the *Ley Pulpín* (Pulpín law). To be honest, it took me some days to figure out what *Pulpín* meant after it surfaced in the news. The term was a metonym. It referred a brand of commercially-produced juice box. The juice boxes were ubiquitous on primary school lunch programs. Perhaps because of this ubiquity among children the term also came to signify an ingenue. Accordingly, the press dubbed the youthful opponents of the law *Pulpines*.5

Sergio Tejada, a national congressman for Lima, arrived soon after I did and sat down at the center of the head table. A tall man, Tejada wore clothing I did not often come across in Huancayo: a tailored sportscoat with a khaki shirt and jeans. His opening remarks revealed that he came to the coordinating roundtable to defend the proposed legislation. Against the din of truck engines and car horns from the avenue, Tejada’s referenced Hernando de Soto’s book *The Other Path* to justify his support. As de Soto had written, Tejada told everyone of the dangers arising from a societal configuration in which young persons were consigned to work without access to formal labor markets and, therefore, were barred from greater economic mobility. Tejada spelled out that danger. He reminded the audience that they knew what it was like to live with political violence, though he was careful not to frame this argument as suggesting a causal link between labor informality and the subversives. The appearance of their correlation was
enough for his defense of rescinding labor protections in the name of helping young people gain formalized employment.

The time allotted for audience participation demonstrated that the students intended to live up to the indignación (indignation) of their banners. Their words contained a mix of directness and subtext which gave the questions a declarative tone. One audience member defiantly wondered whether the law legalized the labor exploitation of young people. Another knowingly asked whether the law had been made with consultation from grassroots organizations. Knowing, because it was unlikely that grassroots organizations would promote a roll-back of established labor protections. A third asked why “militarized” police confronted peaceful protesters of the law.

I recognized references to the cultural politics of work under neoliberalism and histories of labor in Peru in these comments. For my purposes here, I want to shift from these themes to concentrate on the style and substance of the penultimate comment during this question and answer period. A young woman, dressed in business attire, walked up beside the head table. She rapidly and loudly shouted their principles into the microphone: “let’s go the workers of Huancayo and Peru!” The audience responded with, “Viva!” (Hurrah!). Next, she said, “Let’s go decent people who are going to preserve their rights!” and again the audience responded, “Hurrah!” And finally, “Let’s go participatory audiences and specific articles!” Again, “Hurrah!”

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Though I was unacquainted with the young people who represented the Colectivo de Jóvenes Indignad@s, I have included this brief sketch of their interaction with Congressman Tejada because it captures a performative display in the era of re-
centralization. As I demonstrated in chapter 1, the development volunteers were aware that the coordinating roundtable, as a development concern, occupied an ambiguous position. It no longer held the kind of inter-institutional agency or presidential attention that would allow it to coax its participants to concrete results. Yet the coordinating roundtable could still convene policy-makers such as Congressman Tejada together with citizens for substantive debate. Providing a space for this form of encounter, along with the active exchange, was valued by the development volunteers in the aftermath of the roundtable’s declining powers. Such encounters provided the opportunity for their performative displays to convey imaginings of politics. The last statement by the young woman alludes to this point. When she called for participatory audiences, it was as though she was rhetorically outlining the function of their audience at the very moment that the audience was undertaking that role. Her words served as both a general call to action as well as a call upon Tejada; the young-people demanded that he recognize a deeply Aretxagian form of political imagining in their staging a performance of indignation and civic responsibility as engaged citizens.

The young woman generated this knowledge of herself and her constituency through the substance and style of calling-out and calling-upon in her performative display. Her call for participatory audiences, for example, echoes a refrain in my fieldwork on the volunteers’ self-understanding and active engagement in their democracy. This form of self-fashioning – as informed citizens capable of holding officials accountable – corresponds with theories on how democratic publics take shape (Cody 2011; Warner 2002). The volunteers all but cite classical political theorists to describe their responsibilities as civic republicans. Self-awareness and knowledgeability
constitute their responsibilities as performers/audiences; what they as a group must bring to their interactions, and how they want others to perceive them. I conceive of this formation as an initial, though unnamed, accomplishment in their intent to craft relationality with public officials in order to translate their imaginings into political action.

In this chapter I will explore how the development volunteers establish relationality of their political imaginings in their encounters which are orchestrated through the coordinating roundtable. The chapter focuses on the desplazado sub-section of the development volunteers, though the coordinating roundtable imparted this quality to many encounters as the episode with the young people illustrates. Desplazados who sought to establish this relationality did not utilize it as channel cultural incorporation, but as media enabling recognition of their imaginings for their goal of democratic reciprocity. In this chapter, I present two encounters between desplazados and public officials where such relationality was at stake. In these displays, desplazados humanize their claims to resources and services through their experiences. They establish relationality also by outlining the moral reality of their lives and insisting on living in a condition of accountability to the historical facts of the political violence. I argue that the coordinating roundtable orchestrated the possibility of this form of democratic reciprocity in encounters inside and outside of its walls.

In pursuing relationality, the development volunteers sought to overcome their political invisibility. Accordingly, I reframe the question of indigenous democrat needs by asking how it may be that the development volunteers raise their needs as indigenous democrats. Simply put, how is it that they establish their needs as valid political
priorities when previously they had garnered less attention? This question arises prior to addressing the negotiation of those needs within the field of politics. The values encapsulated by the coordinating roundtable animate a temporally demarcated space which focuses interactions around inclusivity and participation as the common tenets structuring interactions. Performative displays build upon these shared suppositions providing the opportunity for the volunteers to craft relationality as a first step toward a radical democratic politics. Displays convey the depths of indigenous citizens’ historical experience to construct moments of empathic understanding and shared knowledge.

To demonstrate this, I offer ethnographic scenes set against the backdrop of the 2014 election cycle. In chapter 4 I will provide greater detail about the electoral side of campaign season as it unfolded over the months between August and December in 2014. For my purposes here, I document a forum held at the coordinating roundtable in August by desplazados for the candidates to outline their political platforms. Afterward, the election took place as scheduled in October. The count revealed that no individual candidate had obtained enough votes to win the contest outright. A runoff election between the two candidates who garnered the most votes was then scheduled for December. In the second-round election candidate Ángel Unchupaico ran against the incumbent, Regional President Vladimir Cerrón. Prior to the second round election, the candidates intensified their canvassing to turn out the vote. In October, a desplazado group led by Conrado met with candidate Unchupaico in a private meeting in which I took part. These two scenes anchor the ethnographic narrative around which my argument will unfold.
My argument here will proceed through in two parts. In the first part I conceptualize the coordinating roundtable as a site of the state, and outline how it orchestrates the performative displays of the development volunteers by exploring their self-conception as a public. In the second part, I focus on the desplazado sub-section of the volunteers. Using the two examples of their performative displays, one at the roundtable and one in the field, I document the production of relationality through their interactions with politicians. My argument concludes by weighing the ideas of the state established in the volunteers’ performative displays against the stakes of discourses like Congressman Tejada’s which incorporate the history of political violence to justify the market-based solutions of the neoliberal turn.

Theorizing Relationality at the Disbursed Sites of the State

Given that many of the public officials with whom the volunteers interacted were from Huancayo, this emphasis on performative displays might seem misdirected. Local politicians and public officials were also vested in the experiences and histories of their constituents, and therefore did not require moments of relationality to grasp their hardships. A skeptic might add that marginalized communities, the same ones whom the volunteers intended to support through their service, endured daily risks and scarcities which were not easily remedied by acts of signification. What did performative displays do to satisfy their needs that political brokering did not already achieve? It is true that the needs of indigenous democrats and desplazados were often negotiated with politicians, especially as it concerned elections season (Lazar 2004). Many at the bottom of Latin America’s class structures used forms of brokering, including clientelist relationships, to
gain political goods (Auyero 2000). Yet this research accounts for already established forms of participation and exchange.

My intervention here steps back from the question of negotiating immediate material improvements by first considering the invisibility of indigeneity as a context informing any moment of brokering. Public officials’ knowledge of the lives their constituents may indeed be robust, but the episodic development interventions they offer in response demonstrate asymmetrical “solutions” to their constituents’ needs. Grandiose material projects, such as hospitals or roads, reflect flows of accountability from politicians to centralized state institutions. These development interventions issue from societal consensus in which indigenous identity has been screened from state institutions, and so subsequently such projects are identified by the populace and politicians as the currency of development (García 2005). Such signature projects do not signify accountability downward to improve the social and economic exclusion of their constituents. For the volunteers and the beneficiaries of anti-poverty polices, any move beyond this model requires the cultural work of shaping politics and the state.

A reminder of this cultural consensus which subordinates Andean Peruvians in national politics could be found in the prevalent stereotypes of the popular television series *La Paisana Jacinta* (The Countrywoman Jacinta). In *La Paisana Jacinta* the comic actor Jorge Benavides dressed as older Andean woman and played up the supposed characteristics thought to prevail among the character’s gender, age, and ethnicity. Its comedy of gender-crossing, with the wardrobe and cosmetics to match, was not out of step with impulses behind other derogatory depictions. Benavides’ use of make-up to darken his face, and a nose prosthesis to enlarge his features, recalled the
minstrel parodies stereotyping black Americans in the U.S. during the 19th century. Unfortunately, *La Paisana Jacinta* reached far more Peruvians than depictions of Andean life produced by Andean Peruvians themselves. Consequently, the program was less an occasion for casual observational humor than a serial production of gender assumptions about older Andean women, which renewed a distance between behaviors diagnosed as indigenous and the proper traits assigned to citizens in a rapidly changing society.

Peruvian journalists, scholars, and bloggers have capably critiqued the phenomena of Jacinta’s continued popularity (see Vidal 2014). What I find interesting about the show’s popularity relative to the populations of the Mantaro Valley is that *La Paisana Jacinta*’s depiction is indicative of the limits within national discourse which foreclose accurate views of how Peruvians from indigenous backgrounds sustain social relations, human action, and experience. De la Cadena describes this neglect in her work on social discrimination. She explains how elites at Peru’s independence sought to shape debates about race by arguing that their advantages were evidence of the merits of their culture, not the privileges accorded to their phenotype. She observes “modern Peruvian race-making paralleled a political process of place-making as it assigned races to spaces and evaluated these within evolutionary temporal schemes” (de la Cadena 2000, 21).

Within this racial topography local public officials and politicians face strong incentives to display outwards signs of indigeneity – in such areas as language, culinary and fashion tastes, and in the pastimes of the Mantaro Valley – during stumping but not in the fulfillment of political tasks, or as a broader project to shape political structures. Few incentives exist to prod politicians into integrating indigenous epistemologies. While politicians might, for the most part, be skilled with the outward markers of Andean
indigeneity, and even share in these backgrounds, they have few ethical imperatives to anchor indigenous democrat experiences in decision-making mechanisms at the heart of state institutions.

The direct, interpersonal scale of the volunteers’ displays thus has significance for the institutional structures of the state. As my research participants have made clear, state institutional power in Peru cannot be conceived of as a consolidated, corporatist structure organized from the top down. They speak of the state as a project in-process. Accordingly, I understand the state as a decentralized project found in the spaces which the development volunteers circulate. It is evident in their theories and representations about how the state functions as much as it is expressed through material power and intermediary bureaucracies. In this approach I follow in Monique Nuijten’s descriptions of Mexico where she comments that

This does not mean that power elites do not have projects of domination, but that we should not assume their effectiveness in advance, nor their centrality for understanding the working of state power. Starting from these decentred notions of power we then have to develop an analytical framework in which the state is conceptualised at several levels and in different dimensions (Trouillot 2001). Hence it is important to take into account the cultural dimension of power relations. (Nuijten 2003, 15)⑨

Nuijten proceeds from this basis to describe exchanges between public officials brokering land and her research subjects as “the practices of representation and interpretation which characterise the relation between people and the state bureaucracy and through which the idea of the state is constructed” (Nuijten 2003, 17 emphasis mine). In a similar manner, I approach the development volunteers’ interactions with public officials as moments of cultural interpretation of state institutions through the relationality created by their performative displays. I also do not assume the effectiveness of elite dominance in advance. Instead I consider it a cultural achievement continually renewed in moments
not unlike the meeting with Congressman Tejada above. From these interactions, the idea of the state becomes an operable moral project (Abrams 1988; Nuijten 2003, 15).

Unlike the Nuijten’s analysis of the Mexican case, the development volunteers occupy a curious role as neither officials of the state, nor typical citizens who view the state from below and who would otherwise exhibit the grassroots qualities of being “closer to the ground, more authentic and more ‘rooted.’” (J. Ferguson and Gupta 2002, 982). The volunteers are at once deeply enmeshed in contributing to a state-sponsored development scheme in the roundtable, as well as representatives of their communities. Their actions are performative both at sites specifically separated from everyday life, like the roundtables’ forums and ceremonies, but also as an element of all potential action, as Diana Taylor has argued (2003). This interstitial position enhances their chances to use the relationality of performative displays to influence state institutions.

To see this, it is necessary to anticipate a theoretical inconsistency raised by my argument. The distribution of performative displays, in spaces both inside and outside the coordinating roundtable, on formalized occasions as well as everyday encounters, demonstrates that the volunteers craft relationality in a variety of situational contexts. Conceiving of a spectrum of social situations as performative risks muddying what is culturally suasive about these displays. To put this differently, if many types of social encounters are potentially performative, what import does any action have over another? This problem was familiar to anthropologists studying ritual with similar spectrum of social sites and occasions.9 The anthropologist Rupert Stasch summarized how scholars of ritual solved this problem, explaining that anthropologists understood “ritual as a matter of degree: Ritual intensifies features common to human activity at large. But the
theory also understands differences of degree in this area to amount to a difference in kind. The more elaborate an act’s poetic density, the more the act stands out from other actions as metasemiotic (or metacommunicative, after Bateson 1972)” (Stasch 2011, 162). Borrowing from Stasch’s logic, a similar reasoning can be applied to performative displays. I theorize that everyday events convey historical experience, though not to the extent of events purposefully set off from the everyday. As I shall demonstrate, the candidates’ forum, for example, drew upon the roundtable’s setting and orchestration to convey greater salience to their performative display than the ad hoc meeting between the desplazados and candidate Unchupaico.

Converging on a Public

Paradoxically, re-centralization of the state played a central role in strengthening the volunteers’ convergence as a semi-autonomous public. The volunteers shared in the experience of the rescinding of the coordinating roundtable’s institutional agency and, though increasingly isolated, they developed commonalities in their critiques of the roundtable. As the introduction of my dissertation states, I do not frame these critiques as evidence of the volunteers’ depoliticization. Instead I view their critiques as a critical first step of identifying the moral deficiencies of the political process; a process that they had previously attempted to change through the facilities of direct representation in the coordinating roundtable. 10 Their subsequent critique supported a diagnostic of the roundtable’s shortcomings and allowed them to outline how to proceed in the new stage of its circumscribed agency.11 They collectively sought to define the roundtable’s limitations while constructing a new form of political engagement with Huancayo’s politics at the same time.
The critiques of a volunteer named Isabel Alvarez offered evidence on this point. Isabel had a no-nonsense kind of sensibility. She had worked as the head of an organization advocating for political and social rights for poor women to help them escape “extreme poverty.”12 She had also made an unsuccessful run for mayor of the town where she lived named Pilcomayo. The town was located less than thirty minutes from Huancayo. When I arrived for our interview, Isabel suggested we go to the municipal building. The low, two-story municipality faced a quiet plaza. We entered and passed a kiosk where a receptionist sat (the receptionist was Isabel’s sister). She proceeded into the lobby to a small square table covered in a green sheet located along
one of the walls. Realizing that this was where she wanted to talk, I was a bit nonplused by the thought of holding an interview in the open. At one point during our conversation I became dimly aware of a line of people waiting at the kiosk, looking on as she spoke. Isabel did not seem concerned by conducting an interview in this fashion. In fact, she insisted on transparency in my published works and requested that I document her full name. The photo she asked me to take of her at the end of our interview – “in her municipality” as she put it – left me inspired by her commitment.

Arranging for our interview to be held openly in a public space like this was a fascinating choice on Isabel’s part. In our conversation Isabel wanted to discuss gender imbalances in politics and felt completely at home making her points in the lobby of the building she had campaigned to govern. Isabel described her organization as having originated as a form of protest, as a means of organizing for women, by women. She criticized the *brechas de genio* (gender gap) in politics and the lack of women in positions of political power. She was also pointedly critical of the path for the economy set by the Humala administration and advocated sustainable “human development” which would break Peru free from its current unequal distribution of economic gains. Her choice of location for our interview could have been important for the symbolism that my presence conveyed. She made a point of displaying my attention in the lobby. It may have been that she contemplated another run for office and wanted locals to reconsider her candidacy. As a foreign anthropologist who showed the interest to ask for an interview, I guessed that I lent visibility to her political aspirations.

Isabel leveled her most trenchant critiques at the coordinating roundtable. “How many, for example, of the [Governance] Accord,” she asked, “were advanced or
nevertheless had been achieved?” She questioned the roundtable’s efforts, and the motives of the political class in participating. She observed that politicians had little incentive to follow through on agreements like the Governance Accord. She insisted, “If there is no political effect from the same [politicians] who will do this? It is civil society!” To address this, the solution lay in collective action. She added, “The problem is the doing of monitoring; the follow-up of the compliance of the accords.” In placing the responsibility on civil actors, Isabel held an image of the development volunteers and roundtable staff as a public. They occupied this role out of necessity. If they did not hold politicians accountable, nobody else would. She next described her own work of calling-on, brokering, and following-up with these politicians. She said, “I’m tired every day, no? I’m going to make the case. But that’s the impact, that’s the way to get them to listen to us.” Her interest in material changes for women had become this work of accountability. “It is a process that has to do the follow-up” she said.

The volunteers as a public coalesced around these issues of political accountability and shortcomings specifically as it regarded the coordinating roundtable’s authority to enforce moral and ethical standards. Guillermo, the gentleman who introduced in chapter 1 who worked for an environmental association, helped me to see this in the volunteers’ shared experiences as a public one winter afternoon. Guillermo was a stalwart volunteer. He reliably offered thoughtful comments at meetings on the Governance Accord. When I arrived at his workplace, I found him at the corner buying a snack of roasted peanuts. As he chatted with the vendor, I noticed that his hair was mostly grey and had thinned at the front. He wore a navy colored cardigan over a white dress shirt and wore expensive-looking rimless glasses. He showed me past a pair of
engraved wooden doors into a private residence which opened onto a courtyard. A pickup truck was parked at its center, next to a pile of furniture. Guillermo made his way over to a stair in the corner of the courtyard, and we proceeded to his office on the second floor. As people walked past his office, the worn wooden veranda creaked loudly, and the office floor shook. In our interview he spoke of his faith as we addressed the roundtable’s development initiatives and how he felt burdened by inequality and unfairness in the world.

In the interview Guillermo explained his perspective to me by way of the theme of *la ley se acata pero no se cumple* (the law is in force, but not fulfilled; recounted in chapter 1). He observed that the legal protections for citizens’ rights were in fact already enshrined in the constitution, but that they were overlooked. He said, “There are many very positive aspects of our constitution, but they aren’t fulfilled. So that is where we come in, we citizens, organizations, or organized groups – precisely to enforce or demand, no? From within a process of vigilance.” Guillermo expressed a frustration with interference politics (specifically, leaders’ neglect of the laws) which was familiar from my other interviews. Consequently, he saw their responsibility as citizens to lie in monitoring lawmakers. While the process of holding politicians accountable to existing legislation could be frustrating, Guillermo added that a positive byproduct of the work of vigilance was that they converged as an informed citizenry.

Constructing citizenship is being aware and, at the same time, to comprehend and demand our rights and responsibilities as citizens. Rights and responsibilities no? The other thing is being well-positioned, as we say, as citizens as much as groups, in a democracy; not formal as such, but a more participatory democracy. And this will lead us rightly – if we are informed, if we teach ourselves of the process – to be more attentive. And that it will be good that we position ourselves to be vigilant means demanding our rights. It is not a request for a present, or *asistencialismo* (sic, i.e.
welfare support) but the purpose that the state has, that the organization of the state has according to our constitution.

For now, I would like to focus on the first five sentences of this statement where Guillermo describes the development volunteers’ work as converging on a public. First, he repeats his belief that citizenship entails vigilance to ensure accountability. To do this, he explains that the volunteers must organize, self-reflect, and monitor public officials. This process of abstraction and objectivation signals their convergence as a public (Warner 2002). He specifically noted this as well, adding after this statement: “comprehending, informing oneself, respectively; it is demanding, in other words, rights so that the laws, ordinances, regulations are fulfilled. So that now, when this collective is informed – primarily the individual, that is the citizen, and citizens in conjunction with organizations – that permits legitimacy.” The volunteers’ identification of the responsibilities of a democratic public and express intent to exercise that role solidified their status as a rival. For Guillermo this spontaneous convergence served as a source of legitimacy for the institutions of the state.

Guillermo’s words conform to classical political philosophies which posited a connection between elected officials, law, and the consent of citizens (A. Ferguson 1995; Hobbes 1968; Locke 1988; Tocqueville 1945). He drew upon these philosophes as though he were describing the activities of state-formation. He also spoke as though the theories were instrumental texts or source materials for application. This intersection between classical political theory and implementation shares commonalities with other research on democratically active groups living in post-conflict states. The anthropologist Andrew Gilbert, for instance, studied humanitarian aid workers’ interactions with elected officials in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina. Gilbert drew
upon Hannah Arendt’s writings (Arendt too was inclined to these classical topics of republican democracy) to theorize that the socio-cultural work of development specialists to define any given activity as “development” first requires the achievement of establishing consent as a sociality. On these key moments, Gilbert wrote “Any given collective endeavor is thus inherently unpredictable and fragile: it requires the ongoing, nonautomatic, noncoerced consent and support of its co-participants, continually manifested through deeds and words” (Gilbert 2016, 720).

Gilbert’s theorization corresponds to the development volunteers’ self-perceptions. Guillermo’s description of the volunteers highlights their production, through deeds and words, of manifesting consent and support for democracy as a public. There is a corollary to Guillermo’s description in that the production of this ongoing consent is achieved in the course of establishing accountability through the coordinating roundtable. He asserted that by the very process of questioning their leaders they produced democratic legitimacy: “We will not be able to demand legitimacy if we cannot recognize it, if we are not informed. For this, we have to be inquisitive (sic, “inquiriente”) no?” Like the humanitarianism case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the volunteers produce a form of consent through their ongoing contribution to the coordinating roundtable. They approach self-awareness – both as self-understanding of their responsibility to question and of their technical proficiencies required for their work – as supporting their distinctive ability to hold politicians accountable.

Returning to Guillermo’s extended speech set off above, in the final two sentences he presents a preemptive defense of the volunteers’ demands that their constitutional rights be respected. This defense raises the fact of the opposition to the
development volunteers’ work. As I have outlined in the initial chapters of this dissertation, discrimination based on cultural beliefs lies behind opposition to civil initiatives for socioeconomic equality. For these opponents the profile of those demanding rights – their socio-racial background coming from areas coded as indigenous – cannot be separated from the claims they make. More broadly, the volunteers also faced opposition to democratic freedoms by the populace. One national newspaper, Perú21, annually engaged a polling firm to track the “ideological profile” of the populace. In 2014 its poll revealed 31% of the population identified as “autoritarios o totalitarios” (authoritarian or totalitarian) which the paper defined as citizens who “consider that the state should rule over all or almost all issues, always putting the common good before the individual” (Perú21 2014). Perú21 interpreted the growth trend of this figure as a rising belief among the populace that individual rights were dispensable. Guillermo offered a preemptive defense against these attacks. He argued that holding the state accountable to individual rights enshrined in the constitution was not equivalent to a request for unwarranted benefits; demanding their rights did not make them free-riders. This response also further defined their public. By anticipating their opponents’ claims and conceptualizing responses, he facilitated their cohesion and self-fashioning as a rival public (Warner 2002).

Esmerelda, a volunteer whom I interviewed for chapters 1 and 2, felt similarly to Guillermo. She added that the development volunteers offered a perspective unique as a consequence of their association. During our interview, she raised the notorious case of La Oroya as an example of the volunteers’ unity in grappling with societal questions which others could not address. La Oroya referred both to an historic site of extractive
industry and a town in Junín, which the U.S. company Doe Run managed from 1997 to 2012. Lying about midway between Huancayo and Lima on the carretera central 22 (national route 22), La Oroya received copious traffic from the two-lane freeway that allowed access into the Andes. Driving through the town, homes appeared to run right up the Andean slopes. Cables crisscrossed the air. Their cauldrons transported raw material to the smelter’s conveyer belts at the end of town. Studies of the town’s residents revealed that this operation contributed to elevated levels of lead and heavy metals in residents’ blood screenings (Graeter 2017).

Esmerelda observed that the unwillingness of the state to decisively intervene in the name of public health for La Oroya’s residents justified citizen demands for accountability. It was also a reason to reflect. The state appeared to prioritize extractive industry for the export of raw materials over the citizens of La Oroya. To explain this incongruence, she said she believed a sense of goodwill towards all citizens existed in the populace but that this was undermined by discrimination: “There is a very good will on the one hand within the state itself, but there are also stubborn strata of society still, and the profundity of this concern as a policy [is] to see to those who need it the most.” Her words expressed the struggle of realizing democratic inclusion and awareness-raising on the volunteers’ anti-poverty goals in a political environment of persistent discrimination. She continued by wondering aloud “How we solve, how we advance together? Because all are equal and we merit a better quality of life, and our country is the antithesis; it is a fight to understand ourselves.” In the last clause she suggested that the volunteers’ purpose lay in catalyzing public dialogue on all the experiences and lives of Peru’s social body. In this, her words resonate Guillermo’s beliefs about their vigilant public and
express a commitment to equal treatment and social actualization through their understandings of equality.

These interviews support the point that the coordinating roundtable in 2014 supported performative displays through the volunteers’ self-fashioning as a public. Moreover, their understanding was that this was not a public in any casual sense. The way they spoke of their goals can be found in the works of classical thinkers. Their idealization of their actions was aspirational; in outlining a theory of democratic legitimacy they sought to change current political practice. They had a self-referential sense of implementing these “classical” functions of a democratic citizenry: their talk of publics carrying out the functions of democracy exhibited an awareness of their own actions to bring that very democracy into being. They talked and acted as though their public was born of the coordinating roundtable, but not subordinated to it; that they could, and perhaps should, act independently to hold politicians accountable.

The Candidate Forum: Shaping Democratic Mutuality

Owing to harrowing past experiences and current politics, the desplazado volunteers were arguably distinctive from the other volunteers. Nevertheless, they comprised a part of the volunteers’ public as they subscribed to the same notions of self-knowledge, political accountability, and legitimacy. They participated in the consensus-building and legitimation established through the coordinating roundtable’s meetings, and were committed to its continued function.

Desplazados derived a notable benefit through the simple fact that by volunteering they increased the probability of encountering public officials. I
conceptualize these encounters as the basic setting for performative displays. These encounters at the coordinating roundtable took on particularly ritualistic forms. Forums, press conferences, signings and innumerable meetings each established repeated organizational and structural patterns which the volunteers could anticipate and utilize in moments of display. A moment like the question and answer period of a forum was a transitory opportunity to craft relationality with public officials and establish their accountability to the volunteers’ objectives.

A forum exhibiting these qualities took place at the coordinating roundtable in August 2014. August 28th marked the anniversary of the final report issued by the CVR and several institutions in Huancayo had planned observance activities. The National University - Central Peru announced an observance at its memorial. The Catholic Archdiocese of Huancayo, and the Government of Junín held similar observances at symbolically important sites around the city. Several artistic events were scheduled as well, including a documentary film screening of Estado de Miedo (State of Fear, which incidentally included an interview with the iconic Peruvian anthropologist Carlos Iván Degregori) with discussion panel, and an “itinerant museum” titled Arte por la Memoria (Art for the Memory) sponsored by The George Mason University Center for Global Studies. A week’s worth of activities culminated in a central observance held on the anniversary at the regional memorial documented in the previous chapter.

Falling so close to the end of campaign season in October, the anniversary and week of activities favored the desplazados’ political agenda. The constituencies of the desplazado organizations constituted a voting group which, to a degree, had a shared an interest in voting together. The anniversary events offered occasions to demonstrate
desplazado numbers in public, convey their needs, and utilize the climax of the campaign to extract concessions from the candidates. Inviting the candidates to discuss desplazado appeals was an obvious way to raise the profile of their organizations and make headway on material support for their communities. The coordinating roundtable had agreed to co-host the forum with the ARDCP desplazado group to meet the candidates and hear their proposals. The forum would open with a desplazado presentation, followed by political speeches, and finish with questions. Only half the eligible candidates showed in person for the forum, however. The remaining candidates sent representatives in their stead.

When I walked into the roundtable that morning, the interior hall was brimming with people. The women outnumbered the men. They dressed in traditional skirts, sweaters, and hats. There were several children playing in the aisles. Infant cries reverberated in the hall. More than one woman knitted while people talked. All told there may have been roughly 100 people in attendance, and more filed in as the forum began. A head-table had been set up at the back of the hall. Three of the candidates sat at the table adorned with a baby blue acrylic tablecloth. Two representatives from the ARDCP sat beside them. The faint outline of a computer screen was projected onto the white wall behind the candidates as they sat. A member of the roundtable staff was acting as the master of ceremonies. Occasionally he was compelled to remind the audience to pay close attention or to move out to the street if they wanted to talk.

The audience members belonged to local desplazado groups, the organizaciones de bases (grassroots organizations), which fed into the regional association of desplazados which co-hosted the event. Their banners lined the walls in acrylic fabrics of white, orange and blue. One banner proclaimed in simple block print “Association of
Desplazados of Manta and Huancavelica Annexes – _ADEMAH_” with a graphic of hands shaking. Another from the district of El Tambo, where I lived, conveyed similar information and presented the registration number of their membership in the public record of the National Superintendency of Public Records.

The vice-president of the desplazado organization, a man named Edelberto Óre, was invited to speak first. Edelberto wore a thick cardigan sweater over a white dress shirt with blue jeans. As Edelberto began, the candidates shuffled seats so that they could read his digital slides projected onto the wall. His presentation appealed for support in diverse areas of desplazado life including education, health, collective reparations, symbolic reparations, access to habitation, small business training and seed grants. He
proceeded through his slides, each titled according to these topics. During his presentation, Edelberto did not give an impassioned speech. From my interviews with former leaders of desplazado organizations this was important. Héctor, the former leader of a grassroots desplazado group introduced in chapter 1, had taught me that portraying a professional persona – one that minimized emotion and formalized their claims – was fundamental to their cause. Desplazados purposefully sought to mimic commonplace forms of political brokering to convey that their needs should be not understood in terms of social relations, which occasioned little more than sympathy, but as claims with material consequences requiring a political response. Edelberto’s emotion was perhaps conveyed instead through the haste of his exposition of the digital print projected on the wall. His words tumbled out.

Edelberto’s curation of the desplazados’ appeals and care in wording hinted at this performative display. Looking at the whole of his presentation reveals this logic, particularly through the topics of education and symbolic reparations. The presentation began with a slide on education, highlighting its importance to the desplazado cause. The very first item of his presentation read, *Regional government should issue resolutions so that benefits for the children of victims and desplazados be permanent and not temporary, for the access to universities, institutions, and educational levels.* He addressed scholarship availability and student body quotas for desplazado students in enrollment decisions each in sequence. These points conformed to my understanding of desplazado needs. In my interviews, education arose in one of two ways: as a matter of access or of content. Edelberto’s first slide showed that desplazados were prioritizing access to education for their children. Desplazados also tended to view education the
way that anthropologists have written about the subject in recent years: as a gateway to
the benefits of citizenship (García 2005; Rosaldo 1994). Education was primary means
of upward mobility, and so access to higher education was an opening invitation to
understand desplazados as pursuing the socioeconomic mobility afforded by recent years
of economic growth. As any other ordinary citizen sought to do, they appealed to
politicians for education to pursue a better life for their families.

The next subject revealed a strategic reversal in desplazado attitudes toward the
memorial. The slide was titled symbolic reparations and it contained only two simple
bullet points: Respect for the memorial and its objectives and Insert the memorial in
touristic circuits of the Junín region. The simplicity of these points downplayed the
importance of this shift in desplazados’ previous position regarding the memorial.
Edelberto explained to the audience that “Young people are unaware, no? Of the process
of political violence.” Edelberto suggested that they were pursuing a didactic path
through the symbolic and educational content of the memorial. Rather than advocate for
their representation within its management, their concern now centered on defending the
memorial’s continued existence as a didactic space: as a physical site realizing
desplazado goals of teaching understanding, remembrance, and historical accountability.
This position tied directly to Edelberto’s next point on tourism. Integrating the memorial
into “touristic circuits” meant including the memorial on packaged tours and in official
promotional materials as a point of interest composing the significant places of Junín’s
history. This would entail greater numbers of tourist visits and increased exposure to
desplazados’ moral themes through the memorial. If they could not obtain control of the
memorial, they could at least ensure that their goal of accountability to the past was fulfilled through its didactic role.

On collective reparations, Edelberto spoke on two points regarding accreditation and capacity building in quick succession. The first read, *That the regional and local government recognize and accredit the organizations of affected, victims, and internally displaced persons through the political violence*, and the second, *elaboration of profiles of productive projects and strengthening of existing family and group production units in reparations for internally displaced people non-returned*. To summarize these points, the desplazados sought recognition by regional and local governments as an accredited organizational actor with trained members who could appraise and advise on the policy minutiae of their reparations claims. The reference to strengthening existing family and group production units, moreover, is a reference to the state’s collective reparations requirements which compel desplazados to obtain certification as collectives after which they may submit proposals for projects benefiting their communities. Principally, they objected to the difficulty of establishing consensus among 20 different individuals with different interests and socioeconomic positions to settle on a one-off, discrete project. Desplazados view these requirements as deliberate obstacles designed to prevent their ability to meet eligibility, though they have little choice but to strengthen their professional skills and improve their group cohesion to respond.

Beyond this organization of the presentation’s topics, the words and embodiment of Edelberto’s display conveyed the desplazado project to craft relationality. When Edelberto came to the slide on health, for example, he read aloud an appeal for specialized medical practices for desplazados: *Mental health team trained in reparations*
that provides specialized attention in an individual, family, and group manner. He explained, “There are persons, in other words, communities, that live in a climate of the political violence. There are raped women, there are all types of people affected by the violence. Of these people we have to grasp the consciousness of the population, the consciousness of the political violence.” Even though Edelberto’s choice of words was best characterized as an extemporaneous statement, they were insightful because in improvisation, they reveal long-held beliefs about their experience which they understand as morally and affectively distinct. His selection of the present-tense to describe the political violence reveals this: that communities live with it, have consciousness of it. This language resonates with desplazados’ sense of the ongoing-past of neglect in the present. Certainly, the composition of the audience for the forum indicates that this description was not primarily intended for the majority. Edelberto’s comments were intended for the candidates. He invited a form of relationality between the candidates and desplazado audience through the image that suffering, as a result of the political violence, did not lie in a past unconnected to the present. It was active. If desplazados could credibly claim their suffering continued, then they would bolster their appeals to public officials to act out of a moral duty. Edelberto explicitly asked the candidates to adopt this role; one of consciousness of their lives. This rhetorical move was emblematic of desplazados’ efforts to vivify their experiences of the political violence. In doing so they could foster a sense of the moral necessity to address their needs as urgent matters of politics.

The charged nature of Edelberto’s supporting example of rape was also revealing in this regard. Crimes of sexual violence tend to invoke deeply held assumptions about
gender roles, and this day was no different. The forum constructed a ritual context that amplified the symbolic content of Edelberto’s presentation, so that this sub-textual thread was closely associated with the rest of his speech. Not least among these assumptions about gender roles was a traditional responsibility of men to physically protect women and the young. The fact of rape was prima facie evidence that desplazado men had failed to meet this responsibility, though superior forces had been arrayed against them. It may have been that by making the candidates aware of the fact of rape, that Edelberto sought not only for the candidates to recognize the victims’ needs, but also to empathize with the weight of the men’s guilt and responsibilities. The candidates were nearly all men as well, so this extension of empathy among men hinged on shared gender assumptions that would have been less feasible among a more mixed group of candidates.

The gender connotations underlying Edelberto’s performative display revealed that for all the effort to ensure their appeals were heard as official political petitions, desplazados did rely upon affect and morality. This use of affect and morality potentially humanized the desplazado male petitioners by encouraging empathy. Symbolic and material reparations, by extension, would not only make them whole materially, but also act as a psychological bridge to allow desplazado men to relinquish these past associations; to end the continual reintroduction of the past into the present. By inciting the audience to sympathize in this way might seem paradoxical given that desplazados were careful to adhere to the self-presentation as qualified constituent-petitioners. Edelberto had hitherto displayed the signs of their eligibility in the democratic political process through the digital media presentation, the appeals in the language of public policy, and the structure of forum presentation as an exchange of views. But while
desplazados sought a maximize the signs of formalization, objectivity, and professionalism, it was clear that they used these logics in equal measure with moral and affective narratives.

Photo 16, Edelberto Óre presents at Forum: Proposals for the Reconciliation and the Peace for the Good Governance Accord of the Candidates to the Junín Region held at the coordinating roundtable. Photo by the author.

Finally, the last point of Edelberto’s slide on collective reparations raised an appeal which disproved a common perception of desplazados. The slide addressed the topic of reintegration into rural communities. It read, *Support for persons that desire to return and reintegrate to their communities of origin (management of lands and proprieties)*. Starting with this parenthetical clause first, Edelberto’s words were likely a locution referring to desplazados’ desire for state intervention in disputed claims to lands and properties once belonging to desplazados. Complex claims to ownership required an authority with coercive capacities to identify and reallocate those lands and properties.
Knotty though the matter of property was, the central issue of reintegration into former communities held greater complications. Conrado had confided that a major obstacle to return was the continued presence of insurgent organizers and sympathizers in his community. In addition, he said that there was no infrastructure, schools or clinics of significance in his old hometown. The state had not invested in rural areas before the conflict and did not look likely to do so through official resettlement programs. For these reasons he would not move back.

Among the development volunteers and coordinating roundtable staff, there was a feeling that official efforts to reintegrate desplazados in the past had failed. Teofilo had once described this effort to me, titled the Programa de Apoyo al Repoblamiento y Desarrollo de Zonas de Emergencia (Support Program for Repopulation and Development of Emergency Zones), which was funded in part by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The outbreak of political violence impelled many to flee the areas of relative insecurity in the countryside for cities with concentrations of state forces. The arrival of these migrants translated to the burgeoning growth of the outlying districts such as Chilca and El Tambo in Huancayo.16 This resettlement of conflict migrants in urban areas corresponded with a larger and longer historical process of internal migration by those seeking education and employment. These migrant flows shaped new settlements and reflected undeniable material and social investments to these spaces. Instead of leading intermitted lives in the city, migration induced many, especially desplazados, to establish new socio-cultural connections.

I spoke with Teofilo about the Programa de Apoyo al Repoblamiento y Desarrollo de Zonas de Emergencia on an occasion before the day of the forum. During
that talk, Teofilo had guest who did not offer a name to me. This guest listened as Teofilo spoke and interjected that the resettlement program was a “trampa tremenda” (tremendous trick). The visitor explained briefly that the program offered tools and agricultural inputs to entice people to move back to their rural communities. However, it was poorly conceived. He said that policy-makers should have made much bigger investments in the rural regions if they really wanted people to go back after they had been displaced (this was an oblique reference to the perennial feeling of underinvestment in rural areas, see chapter 1). The resources devoted to resettlement were meager the stranger added; it was as though they were offering desplazados a caramelo (a candy) to induce them to return their places of origin before the conflict. The visitor and Teofilo both recalled the that the program had plenty of fanfare though; chartered buses transported people back to the rural areas, bands welcomed the returnees, and there were infrastructure projects for the bombed-out areas of the highlands. These enticements did cause some people to return but did not prompt them to stay. Teofilo said people went back for the ceremony, stayed for a time while they visited with relatives, and then returned to the cities afterward. He concluded that the government did not understand that resettlement “wasn’t that easy.”

To non-desplazados, the unwillingness of desplazados to return undermined their appeals. The stranger added that on the contrary, desplazados occupied the “papel del victimo” (role of the victim) beyond what was reasonable, having fashioned victimhood into a means to obtain any number of unnecessary claims. The issue of failed resettlement led such critics to argue that desplazados’ needs were politically motivated; that they were the preferences of a distinct group who sought to capitalize on their
hardship to obtain unfair advantages. If they would not move back to occupy what was once theirs, what moral claim could they have on new resources which they did not have previously?

Clearly desplazados themselves did not view their claims in this light. They had lost everything in a fight that was not theirs. Fulfillment of desplazado demands was therefore a moral as well as a political issue. Perhaps Edelberto’s suggestion linking resettlement to a renewed official effort to adjudicate property claims was designed to resolve this debate. Taken together housing, education, and anti-poverty benefits concerned the injustice of being deprived of life and property, and the state’s debt to them as citizens.

Photo 17, Candidates and candidate-representatives accept a round of applause after attending the forum. Photograph by the author.
Comments & Questions

The remainder of the forum proceeded through the candidates’ presentations. These varied from digital media presentations, to stump speeches, and what seemed like extemporaneous speechifying in the moment. Some candidates made gestures to the planks set out in Edelberto’s presentation, while others stuck to their scripted comments. Afterward, the period of audience participation resonated with the performative display of Edelberto’s presentation. People lined up beside a sign advertising the forum to wait for a portable microphone. The candidates looked on, made notes, or sipped from the straws of juice boxes provided by the roundtable staff. Almost every question began with words of exposition, comments, or opinions.

This comment-question form of audience response was by no means unusual at many of the meetings I attended in Huancayo and was common among meetings that had no relevance to desplazado causes. Meeting organizers were aware of Huancaínos’ preference to speak their minds for minutes at a time during periods of audience participation. Staffers for the coordinating roundtable would prevent these episodes from taking up too much time by standing near the microphone to monitor and cajole their overlong opining. But while it was common to offer comments or opinions in question and answer periods at meetings in Huancayo generally, what was unique at this forum was the amount of discourse on naming and defining desplazado experience.

Luís rose to speak. On that day he wore a baseball cap, and a red polyester-looking baseball jacket with wool slacks. I knew Luís from his participation at the coordinating roundtable where I had arranged to interview him once. Luís had a
contrarian streak which I had observed during meetings of the development volunteers. I had come to learn that he was driven to expose the state’s negligence, even if it appeared heedless to his peers. He raised uncomfortable truths and broke with decorum. In a sense, his questioning was a type of defiance and therefore a commentary on the moral illegitimacy of current leaders.

Luís spoke during both rounds of questions. During his first turn he talked for four minutes and did not pose an inquiry to the candidates until his last sentence. He opened by offering the greetings of the desplazados. Then he observed of the “humble” people before them, “These women aren’t peasants, they are desplazados [sic]. They have 60-70 years of age. According to the law, her reparations are stopped.” This statement was designed draw attention to the fact that desplazados were entering their later years and required continuing assistance with medical conditions resulting from the political violence or simply as a matter of old age. Their evident continuing need contrasted with the regulations governing reparations which had capped grant budgets and stipulated the closing of the registration of victims. Restricting the time window when new desplazados could be officially registered was viewed by desplazados as pernicious, given that many distrusted the state and were reluctant to come forward during the registration period or could not easily register since they did not have official identification. He went on, adding “I can assert that their human rights have been violated at all extremes.” Toward the end of his comments, Luis observed that Peru had passed a law on reparations and, in addition, “that we have the law of the Organization of American States, we have the law of the United Nations …. For this reason, we ask, will you be respectful of complying with the laws?” His question highlighted the
international legal statutes which upheld the imperative to support their lives among international bodies, which, Luís was careful to note, legislators had endorsed through Peru’s own law of reparations.

Luís’ comment-question made specific reference to the laws governing reparations by number as well as title. Drawing attention to the identification numbers ensured that both the audience and the candidates were reminded that the laws exist as statutory regulations, not as wishes or hopes of the desplazado groups. The desplazados’ emphasized this fact to appropriate the imperatives of the reparations mechanism, which validated their experience as nationally significant (an example of this appears in the scene of the desplazada who speaks at the start of chapter 2 as well). They did not have access to the material documents, but the codification indexed the statutory obligations of the absent text. By displaying his knowledge of the laws his question sought to ensure accountability alongside crafting relationality. It also recalled the way my research participant Guillermo advocated for an informed constituency: a body of electors able to hold their representatives accountable. Given that desplazados’ human rights had been violated in contravention of various statues, Luís put the responsibility on lawmakers to uphold their established rights.

Looking beyond desplazados’ success in mimicking a constituent-elector relationship to the communication imparted by their performative displays completes a demonstration of my argument. Edelberto’s presentation did succeed in conforming to the structure and tone of a typical organized civic group petitioning elected officials. Though this only demonstrates my argument in part. Perhaps the most compelling aspect of the performative display was the context informing the desplazados’ appearance. As I
noted in chapter 2, desplazados’ resentments meant that their desire to conform to societal and market imperatives to improve their lives has, since the violence, become co-extensive with a more profound moral project. They wish to participate as members of society, but they cannot also discharge themselves from a responsibility to hold society accountable to its past. Desplazados’ performative displays therefore conform to what Didier Fassin identified as the moral function of the French term \textit{ressentiment}, translated as resentment, but which implies the distinct moral project found in the writings of Belgian philosopher Jean Améry. Améry viewed the obligation for survivors as a state of “keeping alive for the perpetrators the meaning of what they have done: ‘My ressentiment is there in order that the crime become a moral reality for the criminal’” (Fassin 2013, 251). Likewise, what distinguished Edelberto and Luís’s words were that they outlined a project to profoundly shape and deepen the morality of politics from their experience.\footnote{18} They achieved this by crafting relationality through the experience of desplazado life; by conveying the affective and moral experience of their social position. In creating opportunities for empathic participation, these statements opened the political space to consider morality as a currency of relations of politics.
Brokerage Politics and Desplazado Epistemologies

Before the second round vote, I attended a group parley between Conrado’s desplazado advocacy group and candidate Unchupaico. Conrado explained that meeting was as an opportunity for the parties to explore what Unchupaico would be willing to support in the way of desplazados’ interests. Conrado’s association was contemplating throwing their political support behind Unchupaico. That they were considering abandoning the incumbent, Regional President Cerrón, made sense to me. Cerrón had sidelined the desplazados in the administration of the regional memorial unveiled that year. But that they were considering Unchupaico as an alternative came as a surprise,
even if he was the only remaining viable opponent. In fact, Unchupaico’s electoral success in earning a spot in the runoff election had presented desplazado group members with a knotty problem. Questions lingered over his former views of their membership, but they did not have a viable option in Cerrón.

Unchupaico had held an antipathetic position to desplazados during his tenure as mayor of the city district of El Tambo. When Unchupaico stepped down as mayor to run for regional president, he had completed nearly one term in office. This period had deepened the public record, giving the electorate experience with his positions. For desplazado members, their opinions on his statements and actions were occasionally a source of the resentment. Their criticisms against the candidate, for example, could be relatively dispassionate (some would not vote for him because he had promised to pave the side streets as mayor but never completed the task). In interviews, desplazados could also be more pointed: they believed that he shared the prejudice ascribed to some established Huancainos that their number were “alien,” that they hailed from the countryside and other regions altogether; or that they were uneducated Indians and therefore had no claim to land in the city.

Desplazado leaders said much the same. Conrado observed that Unchupaico had called the memorial a “white elephant” (about an extravagance with expenses out of proportion to the benefit to Junín). The comment was a bald insult to the desplazado community. It denigrated the importance they placed on education, remembrance, and accountability to Peru’s own history. Conrado further confided a rumor that “a candidate” was against the memorial because he and his followers had vested interests in hiding the truth. This statement likely referred to the candidacy of Unchupaico, given his
history of opposition to desplazado causes, though Conrado would not confirm my suspicions. It may have been an oblique reference to desplazados’ irritation with Cerrón’s betrayal. It was clear that desplazados were seeking out leaders who would take their interests seriously. This meant that Conrado’s group went into the meeting uncertain over whether Unchupaico maintained these views. That uncertainty in turn fed the impulse to elaborate a defense of the desplazados’ policy priorities.

When Conrado asked if I would like to attend the meeting with Unchupaico’s campaign, I had not considered how such a meeting would fit into the desplazados’ political strategy. Since then I have come to think that engaging Unchupaico was a savvy move for the desplazados. There was a pragmatism in arranging the parley. It was, in part, an acceptance of the political reality that Unchupaico was a primary contender for the regional presidency. Levelheaded though this might have been, I could not help but wonder whether there was also something strategic behind the rapprochement.

Desplazado groups faced flagging public interest in their cause for reparations. If they could reach an agreement with a popular candidate, they might be able to raise the public profile of their claims through a political champion (regardless of this past conduct). Desplazados were more established, individually and organizationally, than they had been when they first arrived to Huancayo, though this was hardly a victory. The continued tenuousness of their position in the city informed the political priorities through which they engaged the election season candidates. Reparations remained at the center of their concerns, along with health and housing services, access to land, and support for building homes.
Unchupaico, moreover, sought to cultivate audiences specifically like desplazados through liberal use of agrarian and folk symbols associated with the Mantaro Valley. He would appear on stage with a variegated manta (blanket) tied as a sash across his chest. His head was often topped (incongruously to a foreigner) with a flat-brimmed hat worn by women throughout the valley. Unchupaico’s opponents also used these symbols, but he had a longer track record of employing them officially. As mayor he literally made his mark by stamping public works with a drawing of a mate burilado (dried gourds traditionally used as media for artistic etchings on the gourds’ exterior surfaces). Delicately incised with intricate designs of the countryside, artisans typically decorated the outsides of the gourds with the flora and fauna of the valley, invoking an agrarian imaginary. Unchupaico’s district gourd imprints on public works indexed this folkloric practice and its imaginary of the valley’s folk life of art, music, dance-dramas, and festivals.

On the day of the parley, I met up with Conrado’s group in front of a gourd on one of the main boulevards downtown (the depiction his campaign headquarters of a mate burilado matched the symbol used on election ballots for Unchupaico’s regional movement Junín Sostenible [Sustainable Junín]). The boulevard in front of the headquarters was closed off for the observance of Mes Morada (Purple Month). It was lined with purple stalls occupied by vendors selling baked goods. Mounds of shortbread cakes lacquered with honey called turrones waited for caseras (patrons). Conrado and I met up with Luisa; Liliana, the secretary for youth membership of the group; and Víctor, the leader of a grassroots desplazado group (Víctor appears in chapter 2). As we stood
outside waiting for the staff to receive us, we tried to avoid the bees drawn to the honeyed treats.

One could be forgiven for thinking Unchupaico’s headquarters was a hastily constructed shack. Inside the tin roof was exposed with raw split-wood beams crossing at uneven intervals. Nevertheless, the building had the sense of tumult I imagined of a campaign headquarters. In the main room there were several seats in rows, arranged as if to host an audience. Groups of people conferred, staffers came and went, and music played at such a volume as to make everyone speak just a notch louder than normal. An aide welcomed us in, and a woman named Carmen introduced herself as part of Unchupaico’s staff. She wore a dark sport coat, turquoise pants, heels, and gold adornments. She used a large touchscreen phone to tell callers that the desplazados had arrived. She spoke confidently and not forcefully. She was joined by a gentleman who called himself Isidoro. He wore a white dress shirt, a red sweater vest, khaki colored slacks, and brown shoes. He informed us that he was from Ayacucho and married to Carmen. He followed his statements with Quechua translations throughout the meeting, and translated portions of Unchupaico’s statements after the candidate arrived. Lastly, Unchupaico’s candidate for vice regional president, Peter Giomar, introduced himself but said little else for much of the conversation.

Conrado and Carmen began to discuss the desplazados’ concerns immediately. Conrado offered her a sheet of paper with the desplazados’ policy articles. Against the music in the headquarters I strained to hear their words. The desplazados began with their interest in obtaining greater access to health services. Carmen read aloud a few of the points on the sheet Conrado handed to her and breezily confirmed that the
desplazados’ points fit with this or that plank of Unchupaico’s campaign program. She suggested their health concerns, for example, were consistent with Unchupaico’s existing promises on health care upgrades. I knew that the desplazados had more specific concerns than simply “access” to health services in the way the general population demanded politicians address the provision of health services. Desplazados specified their needs for individual, group, and familial psychological therapy services on health issues. They also sought long-term rehabilitative care for medical injuries suffered in the course of violence. Carmen’s brevity was disorienting. I wondered whether perhaps it lay with the candidate to address the details?

Unprompted, Carmen next brought up the matter of the memorial. In contrast to the previous minutes of talk, she was more detailed on this matter. She inquired whether the desplazados were involved with the administration of the memorial. The question struck me as strange, as I felt it was common knowledge among the development volunteers that the memorial was not controlled by the desplazados. She forcefully contended that desplazado groups should be in control of the memorial’s administration. She reported Unchupaico wanted it to be for them.

The interesting part of this exchange was the unsaid fact that Conrado’s organization had already decided that the governance of the memorial was no longer a priority. They sought a more modest goal, though one that was perhaps no less critical: that the memorial “be respected.” As I explained above, this was a reference to desplazados’ fears that, if elected, Unchupaico would minimize the memorial’s aim of educating the public, or at worst, close the institution altogether (his past antipathy to their causes lied at the source of these concerns). Carmen’s offering came across as a
gesture to reassure the desplazados by expressing the willingness of Unchupaico to put desplazados in control.

Rather than continue with the theme of the memorial, the desplazados returned to the theme of health as we continued to wait for Unchupaico. They related that they must travel to Lima for health services. They objected that during campaigns there was talk about helping people with health issues, but that often that was all it amounted to, just talk. Isidoro agreed with this comment but assured them that this would not be the case with Unchupaico. Carmen added that Unchupaico’s team wanted, once in government, to hold monthly meetings with a women’s committee from their group to update them on reparations. Did they know, she then asked, that Junín Sostenible counted seven victorious candidates for the regional council from the first round of elections? If Unchupaico did not win there would be an imbalance between Cerrón’s regional presidency and the Junín Sostenible counselors with whom he would be forced to cooperate. Presumably this last comment was meant to further entice the desplazados into voting for Unchupaico on the grounds of efficient governance. Unchupaico’s staff seemed eager to secure the desplazado vote.21

The desplazados did not respond to Carmen’s appeal for political unity inside the regional government. Conrado instead pressed Carmen next on the issue of accrediting his organization. The desplazados wanted Unchupaico’s political allies at the local level to grant them an audience and facilitate the legal incorporation of their organization. Carmen offered that she had contacts at the local level whom she could use to orchestrate follow-up visits by Unchupaico. This seemed to be an area where Unchupaico’s staff was open to the request to approach district and municipal public functionaries about
facilitating reparations claims. She offered that their campaign could organize monthly meetings between Unchupaico’s staff and local politicians to assess the progress of obtaining indemnifications required by the existing laws. On this matter, at least, the desplazados seemed to receive a more specific assurance.

Unchupaico arrived and the discussion restarted. He wore dark jeans, a canvas green jacket, brown leather shoes, and a dress shirt with white and blue stripes. The candidate’s appearance struck me. Unchupaico looked like he was going to fall asleep. He closed his eyes as people talked and seemed to have trouble keeping them open. I suspected that this was not an indication that the interaction bored him, but rather he had been awake for some time without rest. Conrado talked to him about seeking his support
and said that the law of reparations was important to his group. Unchupaico acknowledged that the region had not given priority to their needs. At this point I foresaw a rehash of the spasmodic conversation Conrado just had with Carmen. But Unchupaico interrupted the desplazados by saying that he was willing to commit by signing something like an accord or promise on reparations. It was no exaggeration to say that he cut to the chase before the desplazados could explain what they were after.

Before the desplazados could respond, Isidoro began translating what Unchupaico had said into Quechua. Unchupaico closed his eyes. Carmen then raised the issue of control of the memorial again. Conrado responded that he wanted Unchupaico to respect it. Conrado did not dwell on the topic of the memorial and quickly transitioned to homes and land for desplazados. Víctor added that they needed support from Junín Sostenible in Huancayo’s outlying districts where 14 of the 26 grassroots groups were located. Unchupaico did not respond to these specifics. Instead he repeated that a wider agreement can be reached. He wanted to see how the desplazados could oversee the memorial. He said he would meet with them to sign a compromise (agreement), they just needed to set up a time.

Unchupaico rose and shook hands as he left. Carmen and Conrado talked over the desplazados’ support and the logistics for an agreement. She went into more detail, inquiring about desplazados grassroots organizations. She held a list with the representatives and their names in front of her. Carmen asked how many people the desplazados could recruit to attend a signing and Conrado offered a hundred. We then left the building and congregated on the sidewalk. I remarked to Conrado afterward that the meeting went well. He nodded, but did not comment on the meeting, instead
lamenting that more of his people had not showed. When the desplazado group members arrived to formalize their support the next day, Unchupaico kept them waiting for over two hours. Victor told me many of their number were forced to leave before they could even meet with him. Though the desplazados entered into a political arrangement for their support, I wondered how much would be done to meet their concerns if he won.

The shifts in this conversation appeared to put the desplazados off balance. They attempted to return to specifics during the parley, even though they were outflanked by Carmen’s rapid changes of topic and upfront use of concessions to shape the talk. She showed modest interest the content of desplazados’ points, but continued to bring up the issue of the memorial’s management. Later, Unchupaico even cut to the chase by saying he was willing to broker a deal. The desplazados attempted to return to the subjects of health, land use, and official accreditation by local governments. These were central issues to desplazados, but the Unchupaico team would only address the points in generalities. This was not necessarily an evasion of the issues so much as simple attempts to define the meeting in divergent ways with the result that the parley could not be stabilized.

Desplazados’ disorientation and distrust, expressed after the encounter, exist in part because of the two co-extensive processes occurring during the parley. For the sake of my argument, I distinguish the process of crafting relationality as a question that needed to be conceptually addressed first, before desplazado material needs could be addressed. The reality of this encounter demonstrates that the two processes were intertwined. On the one hand, the encounter was a meeting where the parties straightforwardly brokered support in return for material improvements for welfare. The
reality of desplazados’ situation supports this view. Why, after all, had the desplazados decided to explore a relationship with Unchupaico in the first place, given his history of antipathy, if not because they had no other recourse? Unchupaico’s campaign offered the potential of relation with a political champion in contrast to their isolation from Regional President Cerrón. A close relationship with Unchupaico could facilitate their ability to become accredited by the state as candidates for reparations and strengthen their links in municipal governments to negotiate land parcels for collective projects. At one level then, this meeting was surely an example of the “brokerage politics” employed by those on the margins (Auyero 2000; Lazar 2004).

In other respects, the meeting also served as an example of constructing relationality. In similar research on citizen distrust of mainstream politicians, the anthropologist Insa Koch found that residents of British housing estates who felt unable to hold local politicians accountable sought to vernacularize politics by constructing personal relationships with politicians who came from their estates. Koch wrote that citizen revulsion to the political system was nearly as important as their everyday needs and motivated them to “‘tame’ a political system that they experience as hostile by building personalized relations with politicians that are coextensive with their own logics of mutual support and care” (2016, 284). Like the example Koch offers, desplazados employed logics of support and care in developing a personal connection to the candidates. That personal relation entailed building reassurances on Unchupaico’s past antipathy by assessing his willingness to acknowledge their experiences. In this respect, the meeting did not offer desplazados much when the conversation careened between the parties, with the consequence that the meeting centered on generalities. Without attention
to both their material concerns and attempts to build a relational framework in order to
tame politics and moralize politicians, the desplazados felt the meeting was only a partial
step forward.

Conclusion: On the Stakes for Democratic Mechanisms

In this chapter I argued that the coordinating roundtable facilitated the volunteers’
performative displays through their convergence as a public. The coordinating
roundtable as an institution supported these displays in direct and indirect modalities.
With the candidate’s forum, the roundtable staff played a clear role in facilitating the
encounter. They connected desplazados with candidates and organized the forum’s
expository and participatory sections successfully. Whatever benefits the desplazados
obtained from the forum, the ability to carry out the forum without a political
predicament illustrates some level of effective participation as a public (see chapter 4 for
an example of failure by the roundtable to orchestrate this participation). With the
desplazados’ encounter with Unchupaico, the coordinating roundtable’s role was indirect.
Conrado’s desplazo group owed its strength in part to the work of coordinating
roundtable to cultivate grassroots engagement. In its coordinating role, the roundtable
aided in formalizing links between grassroots and regional groups. Holding the meeting
outside of the coordinating roundtable had the benefit of allowing the desplazados to
explore explicitly political relationships, but that freedom came with drawbacks. Within
the encounter a lack of structure contributed to the desplazados’ disorientation. The free-
form flow of discussion limited the possibilities of the parley.
I also sought to demonstrate that through performative displays the desplazados’ establish relationality with their audiences. Relationality offers an initial step in shaping desplazados’ desired political outcomes. Desplazados vivify their social experiences of living under socioeconomic and racial hierarchies and frame their experiences through commonplace moral understandings to incite support. To be clear, the effectiveness of public display in each of these settings was ambiguous. In the forum setting, the candidates regarded by the press as doubtful prospects were more likely to respond directly to desplazados’ appeals through verbal promises. It was only after the first round of voting that a front-runner, candidate Unchupaico, was compelled to meet with the desplazados directly. In the face to face meeting the desplazados’ attempts to craft relationality were diffused by the aims of the campaign team, though they reached an agreement.

Looking at these interactions alongside the words of one of the coordinating roundtable staff illustrates the stakes for elaborating performative displays, and of inaction, for the volunteers. In chapter 1, I introduced the roundtable staffer Beatriz. She and I talked about the possibility of President Fujimori’s daughter running for president in the upcoming 2016 election. Beatriz reasoned that Fujimori’s daughter had good odds of winning because people admired the former president for his display of strength against terrorism and development project in the countryside. In a follow-up, I asked her whether she thought the threat of terrorism could rematerialize today. She joked darkly that “nos encantamos repetir la historia” (we love to repeat history). Earlier in our conversation she described corrupt practices as well: how they endured over the years despite changes of presidents or law-makers.
I cite Beatriz’s words not to generate fear over re-emerging cycles of violence or authoritarian counter-responses, and to thereby lend urgency to my own narrative, but to illustrate the irrefutable sway of such discourses about terrorism on local political action. After I wrote down my observations about Congressman Tejada’s oblique references to the years of political violence, I subsequently became wary of the uses of terrorism in public discourse. Citing the violence could foreclose debate through affectively-charged memories of fear and anguish. Public officials used that threat to supersede the need for public debate; they reimposed the past through an affective state of fear which foreclosed rational assessment of policies. I resolved to address any reference to terrorism in public settings with a critical eye.

As if to embody such a critical perspective, Beatriz did not let her fears dominate her reflections. Just moments after her joke she very nearly contradicted herself on the repetition of history by observing that Peru had indeed changed. If it were not for the conflict, all political power would still be concentrated in Lima she said. It was only after the violence that law-makers passed the decentralization law. Her conflicting interpretations showed the split understandings of the past and present that the volunteers and staffers must navigate. On the one hand Beatriz expressed optimism about decentralization and felt the challenges today lay in stemming corruption and correcting its failings. On the other hand, there was her fear and caution. I could not separate these offhand reflections about increased participatory democracy from her fears of repeating history. As counterpoised positions they did not lend themselves to a clean narrative; her shifting adjustments forced me as a researcher to see that the staff and volunteers had to work to navigate something akin to what Lauren Berlant called a “precarious public
sphere” (2011, 3). Beatriz continually managed a retraction of security and prosperity of a social democracy, while at the same time watching her democracy evolve under a neoliberal economy.

Congressman Tejada’s appearance in Huancayo ties into Beatriz’s thoughts by showing how warnings against a return of history are connected to Peru’s neoliberal turn. Tejada’s justified rescinding labor protections under the specter of terrorism and sought to integrate its regime of diminished rights with the reassertion of centralized political power over labor. This discourse masked the perseverance of the discriminatory status quo for indigenous peoples living in the Andes. The volunteers’ performative displays thus act like a rival idea of the state, vivifying and giving voice to life under these socioeconomic and racial hierarchies along with a hope for something different.

Consequently, the volunteers’ attempts at relationality do not conform to typical arguments about decentralized participatory mechanisms or neoliberal multiculturalism in which formal institutions co-opt transformational politics. More precisely their actions weave through these limits as an original moral subjectivity. The anthropologist Andrea Muehlebach has characterized such individual-scale ethical stances under neoliberalism as wholly original responses with the potential to influence the national. She observes “One might call this a moral neoliberal that has come to accompany the market neoliberal (Muehlebach 2012) — a moral neoliberal that cannot easily be read as a thinly disguised weapon wielded to mask the realities of exploitation nor as a social palliative” (Muehlebach 2013, 300). Desplazados’ micro-scale displays reconfigure silences and their isolation. As distinct from indigenous political movements in neighboring states of Ecuador or Bolivia, or even the complex history of the Indigenismo (Indigenism) and
neo-indigenista (pro-Indian) political projects of Peru (see de la Cadena 2000), their performative displays exist within interpersonal encounters of the local administrate environment. What this position lacks in a corporate, national-scale mode of political practice, it makes up for in vivifying the social experience of indigeneity in local politics. Participation, perhaps more than the success of it, thus enables desplazados hold themselves accountable to history even as they seek to ensure others do the same.
Both the staff and volunteers viewed campaign season as foreshadowing an approaching period of political instability. They speculated that in other countries when a candidate vacated office their programs and policies would continue despite the transition in power. In contrast, if the transition in Junin was not managed well local programs might suffer or stop altogether. This was all but an acknowledgement that the new officials would replace employees with their own appointees (Lazar 2004). Problems of continuity were further compounded by a lack of political will. Such interference politics had taught the volunteers to be proactive if they wanted to see the candidates’ promises turned into reality while in office. To ensure that political candidates acted ethically and
reliably, the roundtable staff and development volunteers fostered best practices through the *Acuerdo de Gobernabilidad* (Governance Accord). With elections scheduled for October of 2014, the coordinating roundtable’s small staff devoted themselves to no other activity so much as this accord. The volunteers generated consensus around the document by soliciting the needs of the populace and working with the candidates for accountability. The process of drafting the accord and negotiating its ratification amounted to a charter for local governance over the next four years.

The accord addressed continuity and ethics through good governance with a special focus on creating political accountability. As indicated in the term *Gobernabilidad* of its title, the accord announced this work by exercising specific ideas of “governing” (*gobernanza*, the verb cognate of the term, refers to “governance”).

While devising the accord’s precepts over several months leading up to elections, the development volunteers also debated a variety of aphorisms. Debate included terms such as *concertar* (to agree) and *consensos* (consensus), to describe the accord’s purpose, but *compromisos* (agreement, commitment) was the favorite. In the end they selected *Compromisos para un Buen Gobierno* (Commitments to Good Governance). Together the title and aphorism framed best practices and dedication as the minimum steps necessary to improve local political practice.

Good governance also issued from the accord’s design. The accord contained objectives written in a policy language reminiscent of the state bureaucracy. Yet the accord was not a policy document. It mixed the qualities of a political resolution with a contract. Its primary content included regional policy “agreements,” which the candidates would endorse. The volunteers supported this design because responsive
politicians did not simply appear by the fact that they lived in a democracy. In fact, they assumed the opposite: that many politicians did what they found expedient once elected. So, while the accord included these policy recommendations for regional development, the volunteers viewed the document as a mechanism to institutionalize accountability and conceived of the accord as both its written text and its associated activity which reached beyond elections. These activities included the planning, drafting, publicizing, and advocating for its policy recommendations among politicians and civic groups. The volunteers met multiple times with elected officials to advocate for its resolutions and hold them accountable for their endorsements. Their plans for monitoring and follow-up extended beyond elections.

To finalize the accord, the coordinating roundtable staged signing expositions. At these events the public converged with political candidates, development volunteers and other public functionaries. Crossing the ceremonial trappings of an official state event with the chatter and debate of a general public assembly, the signing expositions were symbolically set apart from everyday life in front of an audience. During the ceremonies the staff and volunteers presented the completed accord as a register of the people’s will. As the candidates signed the accord the participants pronounced it active. While ostensibly these events were designed to meet the coordinating roundtable’s mandated requirements – and by extension the Humala administration’s goals – the symbolism of the events extended beyond these official intents to the volunteers’ own understandings of the accord.

These understandings become apparent at the point where the impulses of candidates, public officials, and development volunteers overlap specifically, through the
crafting of the state enabled by the accord. What is at stake for the volunteers in the accord is an opportunity to see their lives reflected in governance. The regional policy agreements of the accord symbolize the volunteers’ imaginings of inclusive democracy. I therefore conceptualize their drafting and ratifying of the Governance Accord as a process through which these imaginings about social democracy become statecraft. In this chapter I document this process of creating the Governance Accord, of obtaining the written endorsement of the candidates, and of holding the public signing ceremonies. This ethnographic narrative will show that the signing expositions reformulate the volunteers’ imaginings into a national vernacular of development policy. Rather than a simple transmission of the volunteers’ subjectivity “upward” within an hierarchical state, the process of signing the accord demonstrates a circuitous movement: the subjectivities on display proceed through decentralized and asymmetric sites of the state in which the volunteers circulate. These spaces expose the limitations on the volunteers’ performances; limitations on their ability to realize a performative display in situations convening several different parties. While their imaginings take advantage of the authority and procedures of the coordinating roundtable, the introduction of new powerful participants creates nexuses of clashing interests. Politicians and state elites are able to arrogate the accord to their own projects. Interactions within the ceremonies demonstrate the extent to which the agency of these outside actors mediates the volunteers’ work as statecraft.

Due to the unforeseen need for a second round vote, the campaign unfolded over the months between July and December of 2014. Peru’s national electoral authority, the Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (National Jury of Elections, JNE to use its Spanish
acronym) originally set elections for October 5th. On that date no candidate for regional president obtained more than thirty percent of the eligible votes cast to claim victory outright as stipulated by election laws. Percentages of the vote obtained by the candidates revealed who had passed the JNE thresholds to proceed to a second round. The field of thirteen candidates subsequently narrowed to two candidates, Unchupaico and Cerrón, who qualified. The JNE arranged for the second round of elections to be held on December 7th (a majority of Peru’s regions failed to produce an outright winner for regional president and were also scheduled to hold runoff elections on the same date). In the second round candidate Unchupaico prevailed.

The coordinating roundtable scheduled the drafting and signing of the Governance Accord to correspond to this timeline for elections. Drafting began with a call for a public convocation on June 12th. The convocation allowed the roundtable staff and development volunteers to gather information about what the public wanted to see enacted in the new regional government (the broader public, as distinct from the volunteers’ specific constituencies). With this input the volunteers began drafting the accord in July over monthly, and eventually weekly, meetings. The staff and volunteers also labored extensively to plan and implement public signing expositions held prior to each of the two rounds of voting. The coordinating roundtable held the first of these signing expositions on September 16th. That event combined a presentation of the accord, the candidates’ debate, and the signing into an omnibus forum. Three of the original thirteen candidates did not attend this forum at all, and several of the invited candidates staged a walk-out during its initial moments. For the second signing ceremony, the staff organized a debate separate from the signing, and divided the signing
into two individual ceremonies for Unchupaico and Cerrón over consecutive days in
November. As I document in further detail below, the staff designed this staggered
schedule to avoid a repeat of the walk out in the first round. Ultimately, the coordinating
roundtable obtained signatures from many of the candidates, including the two finalists,
just prior to the second round of voting.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds through three parts. In the first part I
expand on the meaning of the Governance Accord for the development volunteers. The
accord serves as an extension of their self-understanding as civic republicans.
Specifically, they understand the accord as a mechanism enabling them to hold the
candidates accountable over an extended period. In the second part I document how
corruption scandals and criminal allegations during the election campaign influence the
volunteers. The scandals raised questions of the effectiveness of democratic
representation which went to the heart of the accord’s intents. In the third part, I analyze
the two signing ceremonies held prior to each round of elections. For the first signing, I
focus on the orchestration and enactment of the signing rather than on an extended
analysis of the candidates’ speeches. This choice reflects my intent to analyze the
performative display of the events – to offer one interpretation of the activities – rather
than analyze the candidates’ political views.\(^1\) The symbolism of the events, as well as the
volunteers’ reactions to them, reveals their imaginings of democracy and the work of
translating their local projects into state institutions. Even though the volunteers might be
categorized as having mixed success in achieving this, their perseverance – both in the
difficult task of persuading politicians to sign, and in the work of follow-up – constitutes
a realm of unnoticed political action.
Theorizing the Governance Accord

The coordinating roundtable’s capacity for this circuitous translation is apparent elsewhere in its activities. Self-promotion by its staff – through explanations of origins of the coordinating roundtable in the legislation of the Toledo era – establishes the ground for this translation. This talk by staffers at numerous non-accord events throughout the region communicates the coordinating roundtable’s origins in these reforms of the state along with its legislative mandate. This talk often bookends public speech and appeals by development volunteers and others, reinforcing an association between development projects initiated by locals and the wider logic of state-orchestrated development in Peru. Consequently, the coordinating roundtable serves as a local gatekeeper at the nexus between the local and the national, articulating volunteers’ projects into a national “field of action” on anti-poverty and initiatives for social inclusion (Bourdieu 1984; see also, Gilbert 2016, 718). From the volunteers’ perspective, this oratory offers an asset for their projects. They leverage its symbolic authority to translate their experience into what counts as democratic contribution to the state.

As I argued in previous chapters, the development volunteers’ political subjectivity was invisible as an expression by citizens in national discourse. Populations in the Andean regions saw their relationship with the state as obstructed by an act of non-concession from the outset. In place of a relationship based on recognition and reciprocity inherent to federated democracy, the prerogatives of continued neoliberal-led growth underpinned official institutions. Translating their subjective experience through the coordinating roundtable offered a way of making the development volunteers’ claims
legible as political action. This creativity confirmed that decentralization more broadly offered a mechanism to shape the state through the accord’s expression of their cultural identities.

My first conceptual aim for this chapter consists in outlining how their work on the accord influenced the state. The substance of the accord evinces this influence on state-formation because of the moral and historical predisposition of its recommendations for regional development. Such themes also occupy scholars of state-formation. Scholars such as Corrigan and Sayer, for example, think of the state as a project engaged in this management of moral orders.

Out of the vast range of human social capacities—possible ways in which social life could be lived—state activities more or less forcibly “encourage” some while suppressing, marginalizing, eroding, undermining others ... We call this moral regulation: a project of normalizing, rendering natural, taken for granted, in a word “obvious,” what are in fact ontological and epistemological premises of a particular...form of social order. (Corrigan and Sayer 1985, 4)

Others confirm Corrigan and Sayer’s understanding of state-formation by elaborating on how unmatched contestants seek to align official structures with their strategic projects (B. F. Williams 1991). Yet consistent normalization of a social order does not dispel social activities which are not reducible to this project of moral regulation. On the contrary, regulation cannot but stimulate possibility, creation, variety and dissidence (Alonso 1995; Roseberry 1994; R. Williams 1977). Imagination and aspiration exist alongside moral regulation in imaginings of the “right” and “good” politics of a multitude of projects claiming democratic legitimacy (Paley 2008). These varied forms of imagining shape both the moral posture of the state, as well as its public or social being. In this, the volunteers’ aspirational imaginings corresponds to what Aretxaga and Navaro-Yashin conceived of as “people’s imaginative potentialities as central to the
making of their political realities” (Navaro-Yashin 2007, 80). What I find compelling when reading these two sets of scholarship side by side is that the combination of normalization and commonplace practices of political imaging implicate everyday encounters as extended sites of the construction of the state and politics. The volunteers’ imaging of a moral politics emanates from these ordinary activities by citizens engaged in decentralization mechanisms.

Using performance as an analytic in Taylor’s formulation obliges researchers to understand “the nature of performance as reiterative process … as well as its potential for historical specificity, transition and individual cultural agency” (Taylor 2003, 14). Taylor’s theory of performance allows for an analytical position which acknowledges past indigenous practices and agency; practices of display which at one time did not share the distinctions among Western fields of knowledge and experience. The accord, therefore, is not simply a reformulation of the volunteers’ activism into a Western schema of discourse and meaning, but a hybrid construction. We can identify in its structure inferences from their history, memory, and social relations – indications of their lives suffused in its otherwise straightforward policy language. These subtle references ensure that the accord is an expression of sociopolitical life in the Andes in its own right. It is a document which captures and conveys their historical experience and projects it as statecraft. Consequently, the practices and discourses in this chapter contain more than what their outward appearances would suggest.

In strict ethnographic terms therefore, the accord and the signing ceremonies do not offer clear and direct statements of indigenous subjectivity. For the ethnographic narrative I offer here, I propose using tools of symbolic analysis: of interpreting the
“text” of cultural actions, popularized through the influence of Clifford Geertz (1973). I am aware, however, of the valid criticisms of Geertz’s approach as inattentive to the agency and voices of women, indigenous populations, and dominated peoples otherwise missing from his wholistic focus on the foundational or structuring elements of cultures. To address these concerns, I rely upon Sian Lazar’s example of employing Geertz’s analytical technique with more modest aims (2015). Following Lazar’s approach, I focus on the sub-techniques of the signing expositions to produce my interpretation, with the support of the perspectives of my research participants, as one interpretation among many. In this way, Lazar argues, anthropologists may avoid a tendency to view events like the signing ceremonies “as revealing (or creating) underlying or formative aspects of a given culture or society – ritual as structuring structure or revelatory of forms of social order or macrocosmic orders” (2015, 245). This limited symbolic analysis compliments the understanding of performative displays I employ in this dissertation. I contend that the staid bureaucratic language of the Governance Accord or the evident acts of politicians and public officials at the signing ceremonies convey more than what an “objective” rendering might suggest. Reading the “text” of the following ethnographic scenes from the perspective of a population in Junín reveals socio-historical meanings which are otherwise obscured in the procedures of the ceremonies.

Building the Meanings of the Governance Accord

Teofilo once referred to the Governance Accord as a “social pact.” He explained this statement by suggesting that the accord stimulated people’s involvement in democracy. By structuring a formal process to conceptualize what they wanted from their state, the drafting of the Governance Accord strengthened socio-political association
in Junín. On another occasion he described the importance of the Governance Accord through the context of campaign season: he said that this was a “key year” for the coordinating roundtable. As it happened, appointments for regional government were not the only elections scheduled. Elections were planned for the mayoral post of Huancayo and district-level mayoral and council posts in the valley, heralding potential shifts in the shape of local politics. Civic organizations, including professional unions, were also holding elections for their leadership structures in 2014. The coordinating roundtable had a role in informing the populace and ensuring accountability at the level of regional governance.
A directive issued by the national executive committee requires the coordinating roundtables in each of the regions to produce their own Governance Accords once every four years. To fulfill the requirement, the roundtables draft an accord with the input of local civic actors. Once the accords are complete, the national executive committee directs the regional roundtables to obtain local political cooperation. The date of elections serves as an unofficial deadline to obtain the commitment of the new regional president before the transfer of power. As such, these accords combine regulation with creativity. There is regulation in that the regional roundtables cannot opt out of the process of drafting. Nor can they complete it on a different timeframe other than one that mirrors the election cycle. The roundtables cannot extend the deadline if more time was necessary to achieve substantial commitments from civic leaders or politicians. There was creativity in this as well, since the roundtable has the autonomy to incorporate the development volunteers’ views.

Overall, the staff estimated that about 40 institutions would participate in some form for the accord in 2014. Participation in the drafting varied widely, however. Only about a dozen development volunteers sustained their participation throughout the process of creating the accord. The staff oversaw the writing of the accords’ recommendations on anti-poverty objectives, but this content was largely left to the volunteers. To write the accord, the volunteers selected a *grupo de gestores* (management team) and further divided themselves into *ejes* (ideas, themes, foci) to begin the drafting process. The division of the themes mirrored the coordinating roundtable’s own four concentrations on social, environmental, economic and institutional themes. The development volunteers self-sorted their organizations
according to these themes though they were free to participate in more than one focus area. The staff provided an overall structure to the document and managed the signing expositions. They also employed a network of contractors and vendors to publish the accord and provide media services around press events and public ceremonies. In public the staff specified that the accord’s recommendations came from the management team and the thematic groups to highlight the collaborative nature of the accord’s content.

During drafting period, the volunteers debated how detailed the accord should be. This debate took shape over whether to include quantitative measures, including statistical targets, for the recommendations by the thematic groups. At one meeting, held after the first round of elections, the volunteers took the interlude between votes to take stock and invite outsiders to collaborate and comment on their work. There were seven volunteers at the meeting when I arrived, including Maribel, Beatriz, Ofelia, and Teofilo. A woman from MIDIS named Eva attended the meeting as well, and the roundtable staff introduced her as holding the title of coordinator. They explained to Eva that the development volunteers had decided to stage the candidate debate separate from the signing. The coordinating roundtable staff arranged for the signing ceremony to take place at UNCP. Teofilo observed that this would be “historic” because both the candidates obtained their degrees there (and Cerrón’s father was employed as an administrator there as well).

The group then went through the signing’s agenda point by point to solicit suggestions on the structure they had devised. First there would be a reception and registration, followed by the anthem, then a welcome message and explanation of the origins of the accord, and so on, leading up to the exposition and signing by the
candidates. Eva suggested that they must supply more detail about how the candidates should fulfill the Governance Accord. Some of the volunteers endorsed this idea, but wanted the candidates to outline the details, while Eva pressed for more “concrete” goals. Teofilo offered a contrasting opinion by advising realism. He felt the candidates were not going to discard their prerogatives for the Governance Accord, and that the development volunteers needed to find areas of overlap with the candidates’ agendas. Ofelia joined Teofilo, saying they were “puro ONGs” (mere NGOs), in reference to their limited abilities to draw the candidates into an agreement. Eva pressed back, saying that they should add tips for the candidates. As it stood, Eva felt the accord was ephemeral. Teofilo responded by changing the topic to nominating leaders from the thematic groups. Eva pressed again, interjecting that previous accords had specific targets to meet. Teofilo conceded, saying a “memory aid” would be useful for the thematic groups when they present, to make their recommendations concrete.

Providing statistical measures with their recommendations was not the only way of making their recommendations more concrete. For Eva concreteness seemed to reside both in targets and a means to bind the candidates to their endorsements by allocating budget percentages and trained personnel. These observations suggested her incentives as a civil servant gravitated towards policy accountability which differed from the volunteers’ conception of the accord as a tool to pressure politicians. The volunteers wanted accountability but granted some accommodation on questions of how to implement the recommendations of the accord.
The substance of the accord reflected these political considerations in its brevity.

At its initial printing the accord was no longer five pages. A margin on the left side of
each page reprinted the graphical logos of contributors, including the organizations of the development volunteers. Interestingly, this initial version of the accord contained very little descriptive information about the coordinating roundtable or the volunteers aside from these graphic depictions. A lone introductory paragraph revealed the purpose of the accord. The remaining space covered over 20 areas of recommendations, titled “regional policy agreements,” across the four “dimensions” of the coordinating roundtable’s concentrations. These spanned topics from health and domestic violence in the social dimension, to climate change in the environmental dimension, and fighting corruption in the institutional dimension (see appendix 1). Each of these regional policy agreements also contained objetivo estratégico (strategic objective) outlining one or more recommendations or figures for the regional policy agreements.

The language the volunteers used to write the accord mimicked the language of a legal document. On the final page there was a space which listed the invited candidates and their political movements with a space for signatures alongside. The page of endorsements included the candidates’ agreement which replicated official forms of written agreement.

In our condition as candidates of the political organizations whom we represent and aware that the management of the democracy and the regional governance has as its essence the citizen and its institutions; we value, we recognize the effort and proposal of the Governance Management Team expressed in the “Governance Accord for the Regional Development of Junin 2015-2018” as an instrument of dialogue, agreement, articulated and planned management, within the framework of the four dimensions of development, proposals of policies, strategic objectives and of pre-programming annexed to the present AGREEMENT; the same that will be agreed and executed in a consensual manner through administrative and government actions from the year 2015; by virtue of which we subscribe to the present accord.

Such legal-sounding language accomplished the feat of lending an air of official sanction to the accord. Appropriating the rituals and signs of state structures, its design resembles
similar documents mimicking the genre of legal writing researched by Susan Helen Ellison in Bolivia. Ellison found that appellants used unofficial dispute arbitration processes to obtain documentation of debts and settlements. The design of the Governance Accord reflects the Bolivian practice in that its unofficial legal language serves “as an easily accessible sign of the formal [democratic] system and the coercive apparatus it indexes” (Ellison 2017, 525). The signature section of the accord elicits this sense of appropriating the coercive agency of the state to enforce accountability, even if the state has no legal incentive to intercede to ensure the accord’s policy agreements are met.

Local contributions to the accord were the accord’s reason for being, so it does not convey much new information to claim that the accord in Junín reflected the lives of locals. The same would be true for any of the administrative regions which drafted their own accords, whether it was in Lambayeque or Moquegua. The regional policy agreements and strategic objectives are striking as representations of indigeneity in the Andes, however. A sampling of the four thematic areas demonstrates this purpose.

Regional policy agreement 4.3, under the institutional dimension, recommends Junín’s leaders act to: Ensure the strengthening of public institutions in the region for proper service, proper attention to the population, improved credibility, trust in the system of public administration, the quality of the services and adequate management of human resources. This regional policy agreement could stand on its own as an aphorism for the development volunteers and their work: it is a means of combating interference politics and corruption which diminish the regional franchise of indigenous democrats. It is also an appeal to extend substantial democratic governance to the region.
Representations of indigeneity are evident in other strategic objectives to reduce illiteracy, improve primary education and promote *Andean and Amazonian intercultural education*. These strategic objectives address legally recognized indigenous communities, but other agreement points reference the broader population of Junín. The strategic objective of regional policy agreement 1.4 on human rights and vulnerable populations offers dispensations to desplazados: *Implement and manage individual, collective and reparations of associations of displaced persons affected by the political violence*. Including desplazados’ objectives in the accord in particular serves as a distinct acknowledgement of indigenous subjectivities because desplazados as a group are viewed by the population as exhibiting some of the most distinctive signs of indigeneity.

Fulfilling desplazados’ demands for reparations is an initial step in recognizing their histories. By adding desplazados’ appeals as political priorities for the Regional Government of Junín, the accord directly seeks to substantiate desplazado and indigenous subjectivities as policies of regional democracy and the state.

The economic dimension of the accord continues with measures tailored to the population of Junín. Regional policy agreement 2.4 recommends *Promotion of the formalization of small and medium enterprise of manufacturing, agro-industries and textiles, in the sierra and jungle, as dynamics of local economies and the generation of inclusive income*. The last half of this regional policy agreement on the generation of inclusive income hints at a broader vision for redefining economic activity to ensure equitable wealth generation across Peru’s regions. Cultivating small and medium enterprise would open access to the economy to informals in the Andes who had typically been denied channels for advancement. Diversifying and reorganizing the economy to
correspond with ways of life in the Andes also arises in regional policy agreement 2.7 on the promotion of non-dominant energy production. The strategic objectives of agreement recommend: *Promote responsible small-scale mining* and *Promote the use of the conventional and unconventional energies such as the hydraulic and solar*. The volunteers’ advocacy of responsible wildcat-scale mining and non-hydrocarbon energy production is distinctly at odds with the global enterprises operating in the mining sector of Junín promoted by the Humala administration. The agreement falls short of challenging the dominance of global corporations, but at least addresses the problems inherent to the expansion of the informal sector. These regional policies reflect the material, economic, and even social commitments of life in the Andes in a manner which is not reflected in neoliberal practice.

A regional policy agreement reaffirming the volunteers’ commitment to decentralization is one of the most interesting sections of the accord from the perspective of existing scholarship on neoliberalism. Regional policy agreement 4.5 petitions the candidates to ensure that decentralization will continue. It stipulates: *Promotion of the institutionalization of the processes of associativity of the Joint Municipal Community of the Mantaro Corridor, of the Joint Community of the Andes, the strengthening of the Junín Regional Agreement as a body for coordination and formulation of medium- and long-term Regional Public Policies, and the functioning of the Regional Planning Center (CEPLAR) as priorities for the territorial management and the strengthening of the decentralization.* 6 This regional policy agreement recommends strengthening a variety of entities to support decentralization policies emphasizing the political integration of Junín. Because the accord is designed by the volunteers, this agreement suggests that the
volunteers want to support decentralization nearly a decade after the reforms had been put in place. In fact, they move beyond support to extending its impact through strengthened local entities. Volunteer contributions to Junin’s accord thus not only express the modalities of social life in the Andes but also affirm their commitment to democratic representation. The regional policy agreement therefore is a reiteration of their commitment to regional democracy, their franchise, and the political mechanisms which could eventually support their subjectivity as part of the intuitions of the state.

In front of public audiences, the development volunteers sought to accentuate the accord’s legalistic qualities. At a personal level, however, the Governance Accord may have had more in common with the ‘make-believe’ legal paper Navaro-Yashin studied regarding the unrecognized state of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC). Navaro-Yashin’s research demonstrated that legal documents carried affective and ideological connotations in relation to the TRNC. She wrote that Turkish-Cypriots inhabiting Greek-Cypriot land presented their deeds to the land from TRNC with deep ambivalence. Residents were profoundly uneasy about the deeds because they signified a Turkish-Cypriot’s unlawful squatting on lands Greek-Cypriots vacated under threat. Yet the paper made possible an imagining of a polity populating the TRNC, which, in turn, informed its de facto political activities as a state (Navaro-Yashin 2007). This imagining was not centered on establishing the state so much as how it animated political activity in general. She clarifies, “I do not introduce the category of the ‘make-believe’ just as a device to distinguish the illegal regime in the ‘TRNC’ away from its legal counterparts, but in order to illuminate the phantasmatic aspect of politics” (Navaro-Yashin 2007, 80).
This intimate attachment to paper signified and activated powerful affective and historical entanglements in constituting the state.

The Governance Accord produces a similar effect to Navaro-Yashin’s example of TRNC though in different circumstances. Unlike the example of the TRNC, the accord is a pact between the public of Junín and regional politicians, certified by an established state. Nevertheless, Navaro-Yashin’s framing is pertinent because the accord is a hybrid: it straddles the roles of official document and a proposal. It is a recommendation on development practices and objectives, which, for all its symbolic appropriation of the signs of the state, ultimately are not enforced by a coercive apparatus. As such, it is as much an aspirational, imaginative investment in a future Peruvian state as it is a quasi-legalistic document. Furthermore, Navaro-Yashin’s conclusion also applies to the signing ceremony where ratification by the candidates endorses the volunteers’ attachment to the pact as generating a “specific kinds of affectivity among the persons who employ them” (2007, 88). In the volunteers’ case, that affective attachment consists in a socially inclusive future of democracy. The accord is a materialization, an act of making-visible, of the development themes which correspond to indigenous experience. To demonstrate how this is achieved I will now turn to the cultivation of their attachment during a period when it seemed as though the accord was at risk in the campaign.

Elections: Generating “Misrule”

Press coverage of corruption scandals during the 2014 campaign for regional president raised concerns about the legitimacy of regional elections for the volunteers. For a start, the volunteers shared the opinion of the wider Huancaíno public that various
press outlets tended to favor one candidate or another and speculated that coverage reflected kickbacks for press exposure. They also lamented the press’ focus on issues of personal scandals rather than explaining policy issues. Beatriz once remarked that she found Cerrón to be very arrogant, and that overall the candidates’ campaigns were focused on a “guerra sucia” (dirty war). I wondered what this meant, and she responded that the two candidates traded barbs over social media and did not elaborate their policies in debate. She concluded from their behavior that they tended to be more focused on themselves at the expense of responsible service to the public.

The volunteers were often uncertain about legal proceedings against the candidates’ alleged crimes and the public’s reaction. Teofilo speculated that Unchupaico was in a state of some uncertainty as elections neared because the Poder Judicial (Judicial Authorities) had ruled that his sentence would prevent him from governing. Similarly, the investigative news television program Cuarto Poder (Fourth Estate) had revealed connections between the political fixer Belaunde, President Humala, and multiple regional presidents including Cerrón. The volunteers believed Cerrón did not want to commit to signing the accord in the closing days of the campaign because this news cycle was driving his actions. Civil disobedience surrounding elections further compounded these complexities. Just prior to the vote in October, unknown assailants damaged a vehicle and an office of the JNE in the northern Andean region of Cajamarca (La República 2014b). The roundtable participants interpreted that violence as a moment of exposure; a rift that revealed the political dysfunction across regional and national governance which portended repercussions by the state against the regions.
Idle discussion in the meetings on the accord showed the extent to which these crises influenced the populace’s understanding of the campaign for regional president. As early as September the volunteers worried that the accord would reinforce the transactional nature of elections in Junín. Guillermo commented in one meeting that the candidates were only asking themselves, “how many votes can I generate” when they agreed to participate in the accord. This comment could have been the height of Guillermo’s pessimism were it not for his coda that the volunteers should proceed to think about how to shift the candidates’ view from one of figures – of the total votes they could earn – to responsibility for their polity. The volunteers ought to strategize on convincing politicians that the volunteers were more important than their campaigns because, as he put it, they represent society and would continue to hold the politicians accountable.

The implications played out further at a meeting after the first round in November, during which development volunteers debated how to proceed after the first round failed to secure an outright winner. Their anxieties over the press coverage sharpened now that the field of contenders narrowed to just Unchupaico and Cerrón. During the meeting, Guillermo offered another observation. There was no commitment, he said. No commitment by the public to the regional movements, nor any strategies by the movements to get out the vote on the behalf of the campaigns. Portions of the populace, moreover, were still loyal to candidates from the first round who were no longer eligible. He added that some of these disqualified candidates were suggesting that people put forward blank votes which, in his opinion, was illegal. Casting votes for ineligible candidates, or simply casting blank votes, undermined the electoral process
while also fulfilling the legal obligation to vote (thereby not only avoiding a fine but also registering political discontent in the process). He concluded that the management team needed to “reevaluar bien,” (properly reevaluate) their strategy and discuss specifically how to respond to the candidates’ evasions and their unwillingness to clarify their stances on corruption.

Shortly before the second round in December the volunteers held another meeting in which the topic of the rising illegitimacy of the vote arose again. The meeting stood out for the participation of a young woman named Inma from the JNE division of citizen education. As JNE representative, she would be holding an election fair the following day in the plaza to raise awareness about the second round vote. To present her talk to us, she opened a retractable vinyl sign on a stand. It was a simple design, with the graphic of the JNE along with its title in white against a crimson background. Inma wore a red cloth vest with matching JNE decals on the breast. After she spoke, the group solicited Inma’s thoughts. In the process of taking notes, I did not hear who broached the topic, but someone asked Inma why the JNE registration forms did not address whether the candidates had been convicted of a crime (I knew this question was at the top of the volunteers’ minds because in several recent meetings they had played out hypothetical scenarios in which the allegations circulating in the press against the candidates were adjudicated against them in court). Inma answered that the candidates supplied information to the JNE about their backgrounds on a regulation form, but that the section of the form documenting past convictions was voluntary because candidates wanted to protect their privacy. No one pursued the point that past conviction of a crime might be
Later in the conversation, they moved to the topic of public apathy over the election for regional president. Inma recounted how at an election fair at the UNCP students had commented that neither of the candidates were worthy – they wanted to cast blank votes. In response, Inma asked the students to consider what they thought was best for Junín. Did they want works? Did they want infrastructure, roads? She implied that they would receive the right kinds of public investment by voting for a candidate rather than by not participating. Clementina interjected immediately after Inma finished, saying that she had heard people talk of casting blank votes as well. But when she considered what Inma was saying, from her position as a JNE representative, Inma was implying to the students that it was obligatory that they choose one or the other candidate. Voting was obligatory by law, with penalties levied on citizens for failure to appear at assigned polling precincts. Clementina’s interjection therefore was a surprising claim because, after all, it was Inma’s job to inform people about elections. To clarify Clementina countered that the students in Inma’s story “had a legitimate right” to cast a blank vote. Clementina asserted that the constitution did not require people to vote; that voting historically had only been a suggestion though it had become legally compulsory. To add to this, she heard from people that the media was completely partial. Between poor information and poor candidates, the public had strong reasons for apathy about the election for regional president.

Inma responded to Clementina that she simply wanted people to evaluate which candidate they favored. Yet there was no avoiding the fact that the problem lay in the
quality of political candidates, whether they would bring public works to Junin or not. In this sense, Clementina’s objection to Inma’s advocacy had its own logic. Inma’s suggestion to focus on public works over an assessment of the honesty of the candidates was potentially misdirected if those public works were hampered by corruption. Inma’s suggestion – that she just wanted the students to evaluate “what was best” for the region – and Clementina’s response, illustrated the limitations inherent to relying on the democratic system as it stood. It was as though Inma, as a representative of the government, was comfortable with the imperfections of current democratic practice such as a lack of local political accountability. Clementina, conversely, was likely expressing frustration over structures whose only options were for the populace to make the best of their poor choices. Clementina’s rebuttal framed the volunteers’ work on the ethical and political illegitimacy of the current system.

During this meeting in December the volunteers later speculated on whether Junin would have to annul its vote. If one region came to the point of canceling the results from the second round election due to blank or ineligible votes, then the volunteers would be put out, but they would manage. Teofilo observed that the number of regions which were going to a second round – fourteen, a majority of the total – portended a more challenging outcome if the blank voting practice spread. If, say, three regions all canceled their second round elections due to blank votes, it would be a sign of a deeper problems regarding the legitimacy of regional democracy. They did not perceive this threat as a pretext for speculating on another form of political representation. Teofilo’s speculation was a sign of the volunteers’ affective investment in the accord and regional democracy. Imagining a scenario of failed elections expressed their anxiety that
decentralization had not proceeded far enough; not that regional democracy was a failed experiment. At this point, Clementina wondered why there was a uniform law regarding elections at all. In a country as culturally heterogeneous as Peru, she argued, there might not be a case for such uniformity. Clementina would have taken regional democracy a step further than even the accord stipulated.

Closely contested races for district mayors, failure to elect a candidate in the first round of elections, violence in other regions – these facts alone would have troubled any reasonable observer of Peruvian regional politics. Teofilo had still more to add. He observed that a candidate for mayor running on an anti-mining campaign had won in the Morococha district. Morococha was a mining stronghold surrounding the Ticlio pass and an historic home to the mining industry. This conflict between elected officials and the main industry in the area was sure to cause political challenges over the extent of mining to an unprecedented degree. Closer to home in the Mantaro Valley, candidates had won by such narrow margins that their mandates would be contested through convocatorias (calls, implying referenda). These outcomes had demonstrated to Teofilo that decentralization in its current form held the potential for a kind of “misrule.” Using the Spanish word, desgobierno, he said of this apathy, discontent, and contrarian politics, “va a generar desgobierno” (going to generate misrule).

It is worth pausing for a moment to explore this phrase. There is some rhetorical slippage between Teofilo’s use of the noun form of this term in a gerund structure and its translation into English. To clarify the situational context, it may be helpful to introduce further cognates of desgobierno. In the English translation, misrule comes about from a lack of skill or negligence on the part of the officials who undertake to rule (Merriam-
Webster Online, s.v. “misrule,” accessed December 23, 2018, http://www.merriam-webster.com). In contrast, the context of Teofilo’s speech references the continuous operation of *desgobierno*. His speech implies agency regarding the active legislating away of existing regulations, or assiduous subversion of laws and institutions. This active practice is evident in the Spanish definition of the verb form of the term, *desgobernar*, which in my translation reads as the “destruction, undoing, disruption, or confounding of the proper order of government” (Diccionario de la lengua española de la Real Academia Española Online, s.v. “desgobernar,” accessed December 23, 2018, https://dle.rae.es/). The verb form of *desgobernar* properly describes the harm the volunteers perceive (in this sense it is more akin to the English definition of “misgovern”). Teofilo’s gerund tense combined with the verb’s definition highlights a vision of forces undoing the operation of regional democracy. This shift encapsulates the development volunteers’ fears of a future that could come to pass: a false future which would potentially overtake the imagined one implicit to their work.

This extrapolation from current events shaped the way that the development volunteers represented themselves and the Governance Accord in the spaces of the signing ceremonies and in encounters with public officials. Their fears that regional democracy was under threat imparted a sense of urgency to their activities. This self-generated sense of urgency recalls the work of the anthropologist Janet Roitman who characterized the generation of crisis as a term and practice imparting a narratological framework of transcendence to human affairs. Roitman described these uses of crisis as generating “a non-locus from which to claim access to both history and knowledge of history. In other words, crisis is mobilized in narrative constructions to mark out or to
designate ‘moments of truth’; it is taken to be a means to access historical truth” (Roitman 2013, 3). Roitman’s idea corresponds with the volunteers’ self-understanding and action. Through their work they possessed unique view on the socio-political dynamics of the election campaign; a campaign which could be fairly characterized as marred by scandals and threats to regional democracy. Through a crisis framework they saw the truth behind the government’s representations, about the candidates and operation of corruption on the election. At a broader scale, the sense of crisis of regional democracy allowed the volunteers to feel uniquely positioned to prioritize its rehabilitation and consequently they became acutely attached to what the accord represented. A sense of crisis decentered the national as a driver of socio-politico referents, and positioned them as “natural” defenders of regional democracy.

Final counts supplied after the second round of voting allayed the volunteers’ fears of the illegitimacy of the new government. Out of the eligible public of roughly 852,000 people in Junín, the JNE counted 622,370 votes cast on December 7th (Silvestre 2014). Of the total vote, 296,088 votes were cast for Unchupaico and 261,193 for Cerrón, with 5,741 blank votes and 59,348 null votes counted (a null vote may have been a vote cast for ineligible contender among other issues). According to these figures about 10 percent of the population of Junín cast a null or blank vote. Subtracting the null and blank votes arrived at the valid vote count, on which the JNE reported that Cerrón received 46 percent while Unchupaico received 53 percent.8

These figures seemingly suggest that the felt sense of crisis which the volunteers gave voice to was exaggerated. Rather than cast the significance of their deliberations over the phenomena of blank votes as anomalous activity, the contrast between the
relatively small impact of blank votes and the breadth of their deliberations points up their attachment to the accord and regional franchise. This affective and intellectual engagement with elections is telling at two levels. First, it illustrated the extent to which they felt regional democracy to be under threat. Second, it demonstrated their attachment to their work, made manifest in the physical document of the accord. Fears for the legitimacy of regional democracy prompted them to consider preventative actions and carefully orchestrate their public service leading up to the election. Though the blank votes as a measure of discontent did not technically undermine the election, their alarm at the prospect served as a motivating factor driving their perseverance through the obstacles to the first signing ceremony, which I outline next.

Signing the Accord - Round I: The Forum

Centrally located in the heart of the city, the auditorium of Our Lady of the Valley sits adjacent to the Catholic Cathedral in Huancayo’s Plaza de la Constitución. As I enter the auditorium of Our Lady of the Valley, I hear the pre-recorded sounds of cover bands playing pop hits by artists like Bruno Mars, U2, and the works of Frank Sinatra. The auditorium is open and expansive, with walls of concrete painted over in white. Accent lights create a theater like atmosphere. Rows of seats run at a slope down to a stage. Red carpets are positioned alongside the rows and the seats are covered with glossy red vinyl covers. Upfront, a long table is centered on the stage with a sky-blue acrylic cloth covering it. A large banner for the Governance Accord hangs on the wall behind. The banner is positioned just off center. It overlaps with an image of a computer operating system desktop projected onto the back wall of the stage.
By 10:30 there are approximately 100 people in attendance as the forum begins with a recitation of the national anthem. There are college-age people in attendance, men in suits, middle-aged women dressed in traditional clothing, and I recognize some desplazados. As the anthem emanates from the speakers we rise to our feet. A woman acting as the master of ceremonies offers a welcome after the anthem. Then she introduces Nivardo Santillán, the Regional Coordinator of the coordinating roundtable. Nivardo is the highest-ranking official of the coordinating roundtable in Junín. His position is elected by the National Executive Committee. As regional coordinator he is not involved in the day to day running of coordinating roundtable, but is responsible for the roundtable’s strategy and directly accountable to the National Executive Committee. Nivardo’s height is the first thing I notice about him. He is nearly as tall as I am. The second thing I notice is his shock of white hair. He wears a suit and speaks clearly using full sentences. He speaks in a clear and grammatically distinct way, different from the question and response style of everyday conversation I hear in the valley. Nivardo speaks of the Governance Accord in front of a music stand at one end of the stage. He tells us that, to date, seventeen coordinating roundtables have signed Governance Accords around the country, and this process gives us a picture of public’s involvement in governance. He explains that the coordinating roundtable was created out of laws passed in the last decade; that the accord serves to “facilitate dialogue between civil society and the state;” and concludes on the note that “the good governance compacts that are signed are in and of themselves part of the policies of the state.”

This is a solemn start to public debate. The master of ceremonies then takes over from Nivardo, and says this event is an important point for democracy. Next, she
introduces the candidates. She proceeds to announce their names and they appear onstage to take their seats. After nearly everyone has been seated, a commotion begins. As she is announcing the remaining candidates, Edgar Raymundo, the candidate from the Movimiento Regional Bloque Popular Junín (Regional Movement Popular Block Junín), waves his hands from his seat at the table onstage. The master of ceremonies breaks with her script and comments that the candidates are “not in agreement” with her announcement. The audience begins to murmur. Raymundo waves at his retinue in the first rows and stages a walk-out. Many in the first two rows follow him as he proceeds down the steps from the stage and ascends the red-carpeted aisle. He does not offer a statement. Members of the coordinating roundtable staff try to talk to him as he is leaving, but he and others continue to the exits. My immediate seat-mates and I struggle to make sense of what was going on. Other candidates evidently feel the same way he does. They rise to leave as well. Four candidates retire from the forum. Five remain.

Nivardo returns to the microphone to reassure the ones withdrawing that the forum is only for candidates from the parties running and asserts there are no advisers nor delegates from the Juntos por Junín (United for Junín) regional movement. I ask around to try to figure out what is going on. A familiar face from the coordinating roundtable in the row behind me offers that the candidates left because they took offense to the fact that the United for Junin movement was present but sent a representative, instead of the candidate, to the forum. He adds that it is interesting that the ones left are the most cuestionados (questionable) among the candidates in the race, implying that they are corrupt.
After a pause, the master of ceremonies continues, introducing a moderator for the debate portion of the forum. The moderator reviews a comprehensive list of rules for the debate which include prohibitions on crying out in support of candidates or handing out leaflets. Next, the master of ceremonies plays a video from the Archbishop of Huancayo, Monsignor Pedro Barreto Jimeno. On the video the monsignor says that politics has been discredited, that there is a widespread lack of confidence, and that the humildes (humble) need authority. He pleads with the candidates to fight corruption.

After the archbishop’s video, two development volunteers review the accord. I do not recognize the first presenter, a woman named María Camarena de la Cruz representing the Consejo Regional de Mujeres de Junín (Junín Regional Women’s Council). The second is a man I do recognize from his occasional participation at the coordinating roundtable. His name is Santiago Mendoza. Santiago represents an organization of handicapped persons titled Federación Regional de Personas con Discapacidad de Junín (Junín Regional Federation of Persons with Disabilities). María presents the points of the accord, occasionally adding extemporaneous thoughts to her presentation of the recommendations. She adds that there are laws against sexual violence in the region, but the problem is that they are not enforced. Next, the debate portion of the event begins. The moderator has the candidates draw straws to establish an order and gives them seven minutes each to talk. After the speeches conclude, the master of ceremonies announces the signing of the accord. The candidates who remain sign the accord as photographers swarm the stage. At the closing a man named Américo Cabecilla speaks from the Consejo Regional de Pueblos Indígenas (Regional Council of Indigenous Communities). He repeats a charge, stated in a few of the candidates’
speeches and by my seatmate, that the four candidates who left did so because they were corrupt.

After the forum ends, Nivardo holds a press conference in which he addresses the withdrawal of the five candidates. He announces that there is an interpretation that the presence of a delegate from United for Junín movement, in the place of the candidate Nidia Vilchez, meant that the presence of the other candidates was not required and so they withdrew. However, he points out, the candidates who left so abruptly did not explain why they quickly arrived at this interpretation. Then he says, “the true will for this pact is what candidates of the state have and those that lack, withdrew, and we are intent on signing.” He says that there was a need for political will, communication
channels dedicated to development, and an organized, active, civil society to move forward. Nivardo explains that, in truth, this is a forum for candidates for the regional presidency of Junín. Then he says the withdrawal of the candidates was a conclusion based in erroneous judgment and that, in his opinion, the scene amounted to an “incidente de formas” (procedural incident). This last I understand as something having to do with appearances – political posturing – in contrast, I suppose, to the substance of the accord, a debate real (genuine debate). As I am preparing to leave Nivardo takes questions.

Santiago poses a question to Nivardo in front of the press. He asks how we could possibly elect people who do not agree to sign the Governance Accord.

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In follow-up meetings afterward, the staff and volunteers did acknowledge that there was a certain inevitability to conflict built into the orchestration of a debate among such a large field of candidates. Teofilo interpreted the walk-out in terms of the horserace for the regional presidential seat. Out of a field of twelve candidates, he remarked, the top third wanted to debate amongst themselves without interference from the rest, while the remaining candidates wanted to debate “up” with the top third as opposed to debating with one another. Still, he wondered whether more could have been done to ensure the participation of all the candidates.

There was a certain logic in their self-reproach. Perhaps there was a gap in the staff’s implementation of protocol. Perhaps they could have prepared better to pre-empt Raymundo’s concerns of partiality and representation. But the inchoate rules governing protocol were not nearly the most important aspect of the walkout. From a moral perspective, Raymundo and the other candidates’ insistence on unanimity for signing the
accord was shaky. It did not follow that all the candidates would need to endorse the accord in order to improve political practice in the region; accountability was not dependent upon their peers also pledging the same to be effective. Individual pledges of accountability to the accord would indeed improve the quality of political practice.

It was a further indication of the state of local politics that the candidates could publicly signify that accountability was only useful to a political leader insofar as everyone else behaved the same way. The walk-out allowed Raymundo to continue to evade their responsibility for signing the document, and his disagreement prompted other candidates to evade it as well. It may have been that Raymundo and the others felt that the Governance Accord hampered their ability to campaign for the electoral seat and would have used whatever pretext they could find to withdraw. But this had an effect on the coordinating roundtable participants. In the months after, the staff and volunteers spent many meetings devising a second round of signings which would minimize the possibilities for this sort of disagreement.10

Whatever the rationale of the candidates who withdrew, thinking through the event using performative display as an analytic opens a view on the relative politics of morality at work. We can conceive of the politicians and the development volunteers as driven by contrasting moral positions. The candidates assessed whether their unethical actions would be challenged or condoned by the populace. In this regard, the elaboration of the ceremony for the Governance Accord exemplified their actions through a recontextualization of the event for their own purposes (Briggs and Bauman 1992). By walking out they could use a public stage to show umbrage at the fact of their relative
standing in the campaign in front of an audience where they might find support or at least negative sentiment against the front runners.

My informal talks with other audience members, however, showed the contrasting view. Their walk-out was interpreted by the audience as a sign that the questionable candidates were so secure in their corruption that they felt immune to what the forum represented. Raymundo’s timing of a walk-out obscured these contextual meanings because he portrayed it as a statement about his relationship to the other absent candidates, revealed through their absence at the moment of introductions. By walking out before they signed, Raymundo and the others nevertheless evaded a public which sought to hold them accountable. Denying a democratic gesture such as this could not but be perceived, by the volunteers and the public, against an historical context of unaccountable authoritarian leaders and the current allegations of corruption in the campaigns.

These democratic stakes shift our attention from the drama of the walk-out to the organization of the accord. The denouement of the ceremony shows the volunteers’ imagining of inclusive democracy was co-opted not just by the candidate but also by the state as well. To see the state’s role, consider Nivardo’s oratory. In Nivardo’s words the accord is virtually a policy of the state. From the point of view of increasing citizen participation in democratic mechanisms, Nivardo’s statement suggests an act of transposition from a local political sphere to a national one in the ceremony through language (language which otherwise might be mistaken for inflated praise of citizens’ contributions to democracy). This occurs through a *speech act*, that concept of the cultural actions achieved through words made famous by John L. Austin (1975).
Nivardo’s presence contributes to the language he used, heightening his capacity to undertake a ritualized speech act. His status as a senior government official, his formal education (evidenced by his linguistic training), his western dress, and even his physical height and hair color which stood out among the population of the Andes, combine in empowering his words, “this is the policy of the state.” With this phrase he signals a culmination of the volunteers’ work. By pronouncing the Governance Accord to be the policies of the state, he brought what heretofore were the uncertified goals of the group into the technocratic realm of policy and ordained a cathartic, finalizing event. It annulled the processual and participatory nature of the Governance Accord and subsumed the document into a policy realm.

Signing the Accord - Round II: Discrete Signings

The second round election was scheduled for December 7th. In the months between rounds, the development volunteers renewed their effort to convince Cerrón and Unchupaico to sign the accord. In meetings, the staff and volunteers also judged that their strategy could use fine-tuning to meet their fundamental goal of ratifying the accord. They departed from the format of a combined forum for the first signing by separating the occasion of the signing ceremony from the debate portion. The rationale for this change was that it reduced the possibilities for offense by separating the debate for an alternate date. Conceivably, the rancor of the debate may have cooled by the time of the signing so as to minimize the opportunities for the candidates to reverse their endorsement. For the signing itself, the staff strongly pushed a format for the signing ceremony which would only include a preliminary statement from the archbishop,
reviews of the regional policy agreements by the thematic group leaders, followed by statements from the candidates. The ceremony would close with the official signing. The staff and volunteers also agreed to finding a “neutral” site for the next signing ceremony. With much coaxing both the runoff candidates eventually did agree to attend signing ceremonies at the UNCP and a separate debate at the chamber of commerce. Last minute complications over the site, however, caused the staff to shift the signing ceremony to the main hall of the coordinating roundtable itself.

Photo 24, From left, Monsignor Pedro Barreto Jimeno, Regional President Vladimir Cerrón, and Technical Secretary of the coordinating roundtable Fred Goytendia. Photo by the author.

I arrived on the day of the signing for incumbent candidate Cerrón to find the coordinating roundtable had been transformed into a presentation space. Twenty of the orange chairs had been positioned in rows on either side of a center aisle. The staff had
fitted white sateen-looking covers over the chairs. The covers reminded me of the ornate kind I had seen at weddings. They had been secured with blue ribbon. The empty rows faced the table of honor. A banner with the graphic advertising the Governance Accord had been laid over the table to face the audience. A second table for the leaders of the thematic groups stood perpendicular to the first. The official mood was finalized with several flags, including two on the table: one for the coordinating roundtable, as well as the familiar red and white of the national standard.

When I arrived, there were about fourteen people milling about, not including technicians. The technicians were working on the audio-visual equipment and played music over the speakers while they completed their work. That work included a projection onto the wall, perpendicular to the table of honor, so that the guests at the place of honor would have to turn their heads ninety degrees to see it. Cerrón arrived with a retinue at about this time and started by working the room, shaking hands. He wore a dark suit without a tie. Afterward he sat at the front with his people. Members of the press showed up and the ceremony began minutes later.

The organization of talk during the signing ceremony proceeded from Archbishop Barreto, to the development volunteers, and lastly to Cerrón. A new moderator began with a welcome and greeting to the NGO and association representatives present. He introduced the representatives of the thematic groups who included three women and a man. Esmerelda sat smiling, along with Isa and others as they waited to present the regional policy agreements to Cerrón. Monsignor Barreto arrived and the press cameramen scrambled. He sat down at the head table alongside Fred Goytendia, a staffer from the coordinating roundtable, and Cerrón. The archbishop spoke for five minutes on
the responsibilities of politicians for the most vulnerable. He explained that a regional accord must consider the fact that you find people in great need if you travel outside of Huancayo. Listening to them, he asserted, was fundamental to the definition of regional development. Next, the master of ceremonies described the Governance Accord and the thematic groups followed with their presentations of the regional policy agreements. Cerrón spoke for about thirty minutes after that.

Cerrón opened by stating that he had small reservations about the accord. This modesty was misleading. Nearly all his talk was occupied with his concerns about the policy agreements. He sat as he spoke to the document’s text. At first, his reservations consisted in outlining what the accord lacked. This related to education and infant mortality targets. Next, he proceeded through each of the regional policy agreements. Cerrón’s quick dispatching of each of these agreements might be best summarized through the theme of limits. For each regional policy agreement, he outlined the limitations on the regional government to achieve what the regional policy agreement specified – what he lacked in the way of funds or mandate – or how the regional government had been obstructed from achieving a related goal in the past. Rarely he would offer that there was more that the Regional Government of Junín could do, or spoke to his administration’s efforts to achieve what the Governance Accord set out. A notable example of this later track regarded housing on the regional policy agreement for human rights and desplazados: he observed there was still room for efforts on the behalf of the Regional Government of Junín. Cerrón concluded that he did not see the need to sign the Governance Accord, because legal statues and policy memoranda had been
written to address the concerns it outlined in prior years. But, “since it does little it does little damage to do so,” he said he would sign it.

![Candidate for Regional President Ángel Unchupaico addressing audience at the singing of the Acuerdo de Gobernabilidad. Photo by the author.](image)

The signing ceremony held for candidate Unchupaico the next morning followed the same format and layout. The organization of the signing ceremony proceeded from a representative of the archbishop, to the development volunteers, and then to Unchupaico. I arrived at 11, and Unchupaico appeared ten minutes later. He wore shirt sleeves and a hat worn as a part of traditional dress of women in the region.

Unchupaico’s prepared remarks centered on a critique of the Regional Government of Junín’s activities over the past four years. Unchupaico was animated as he spoke using his arms while he stood and talked to the audience. He deployed a more arrhythmic speech pattern than Cerrón, elongating certain words or enunciating the syllables of a word for emphasis. He began his remarks with the history of pacificación puritana (puritanical pacification) undertaken by the Fujimori administration. He argued
that Fujimori’s state-led terror campaign could not be recklessly forgotten. Leaders, he argued, must tend to social peace to stimulate development and attract investment. In this spirit, he saluted the efforts of the roundtable which had brought them together. He panned the current Regional Government of Junín for failing to attract even one *megaproyecto* (mega-project) to Junín; he endorsed Hernando de Soto’s research connecting economic development with individual rights, proposing a crash program of *titulación* (titling) in the region; and he critiqued the Regional Government of Junín on citizen security among other topics. He concluded by telling us that men who did not fear a higher power were prone to extreme violence, and that Junín had to be on guard—attentive to its history—while increasing the amount of material investment in the region.

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In comparison to the signing ceremony of the first round of elections, these two days of signings were less eventful. No outbursts or accusations against the roundtable marred the ceremonies. The coordinating roundtable staff and volunteers interpreted this ability to pull off the ceremonies as a sign of successful implementation of lessons they learned from the first round. They were proud of the altered procedure to separate out the debate portion and thus ensure that the candidates did not meet directly on the day of the signing. Success, demonstrated by the lack of further public spectacles, exemplified their commitment a professional and inspirational exercise of democratic assembly.

As their speeches made clear, the candidates themselves prioritized the terms of their own political projects during the ceremonies to sign the accord. For Cerrón this translated into condescension and carping about what the accord omitted or reproduced in the way of legislative activity. No statement better captured this than his complaint that
the accord reproduced existing legal and policy measures and therefore was not worth signing. This struck me as a very casual delivery of disdain for the months of work on the behalf of dozens of development and policy proponents, some of whom wanted to vote for him. But my personal reaction was not the important thing about Cerrón’s words. According to Cerrón’s comment, it was as though the volunteers’ efforts were only a facsimile of public officials’ own work. The issue of accountability for public officials did not register in this public assessment of the accord as a nonofficial diversion. By measuring the volunteers’ interests in good governance against “already existing” policies, Cerrón implied government policies and laws were more authoritative compared to the participation of the populace in advocating for their needs and, by extension accountability was unnecessary.

Unchupaico was more tactful in his approach, but also depreciated the volunteers’ work by omissions. First, he soft-pedaled the accord’s appeals by framing its content in the terms of his political vision and goals for the region. He opened his comments by insisting that his political vision incorporated “the best” for Junín and framed the rest of his comments as trying to achieve this best for everyone. He next suggested that his vision of the best necessarily entailed alterations on the accord: “en esa término [sic] ‘lo mejor de lo mejor’ para Junín, tiene varias cosas puntuales que me gustaría responsor con sugerencia a este esquema de trabajo” (in that term “the best of the best” for Junín, has [sic] several specific things that I would like to respond with suggestion to this scheme of work). In this sentence, Unchupaico made respectful allusion to the volunteers’ work. He offered suggestions, but he left some ambiguity in the structure of his sentence as to whether these suggestions came from him. Why use such a non-
agentive framing of his intent to offer suggestions? A show of high deference while absenting himself from the agency of offering suggestions worked to conceal that Unchupaico was also publicly recontextualizing the accord according to his own strategic interests. The regional policy agreements allowed him to raise the points of his stump speech from which he would critique Cerrón’s government, which, of course, was not the intent of the volunteers. His talk framed a one-way relationship from the accord to his prerogatives, showing that in the signing ceremonies relatively little work was done on an exchange of commitments. Conversely the candidates labored lengthily to circumscribe the development volunteers’ efforts to hold them accountable and minimize the accord’s discourses on the commons in favor of the terms of their own political calculations.

The candidates’ production of distance from the accord in policy and political terms, even as they prepared to sign the document, was not lost on the volunteers. To ensure the candidates engaged with the accord, the volunteers took considerable care to design the second signing ceremonies to prevent a repeat of the walk-out. Even though the staff and volunteers were aware of the interpretation that Raymundo and the other candidates used the walk-out to further their own strategic interests, they nevertheless behaved as though they bore responsibility for a failure arising from procedural errors during the first signing ceremony. Consequently, in meetings on the Governance Accord afterward, their talk tended to center on these alternative techniques for the second round of signing ceremonies rather than direct consideration of the candidates’ understandings of the accord. After the second round, however, there was some indication that the volunteers were dissatisfied with the candidates’ engagement. During one meeting,
shortly after the second signing ceremony, Clementina observed that the candidates did not engage with the accord substantively during their comments.

Another constant across the two rounds of signings lay in the coordinating roundtable staff’s description and justification of the Governance Accord. For both rounds the timing of the staff’s oratory seemingly fit with the ordinary arrangement of a ceremonial procedure. The agenda of both events allowed the staff to offer talk about the coordinating roundtable just prior to the oratory of the development volunteers or candidates. Procedurally, this arrangement made sense if the audience was unfamiliar with the Governance Accord. Alternatives would not have been untoward, however. The candidates could have been given an opportunity to talk sooner. The development volunteers themselves could have introduced the coordinating roundtable and spoke directly with the candidates. As it stood, the timing of the staff’s talk, combined with the substance of the staffers’ oratory, created an effect of official sanction. The staffers’ descriptions of the accord as an element of the state enclosed the activities of the independent actors (the development volunteers and politicians). In the first round, this was established by Nivardo’s talk in which he explicitly cited the Governance Accord as the policy of the state. Likewise, in the second round of signing ceremonies, both Fred Goytendia and the master of ceremonies framed the Governance Accord as an element of the state legitimated by the people’s will. The closing ceremonies of both events completed this enclosure. Again, the coordinating roundtable staff would be the logical ones to close the ceremony was familiar from the standpoint of effectuating a traditional public ceremony. In this, the signing ceremonies were not only unilateral productions of these reasonable roles, but also served as the work of state-making.
This kind of appropriation by the state through a performative setting is akin to Stuart Alexander Rockefeller’s depiction of a cultural shift in public celebrations in Bolivia (1998). Rockefeller documented this shift of the ‘text’ of fiesta-style music and dance, to folkloric festivals sponsored by religious institutions. These festivals served to recognize the culture of campesinos from the countryside and promote their humanity. Festivals achieved this by constructing a meta-discourse which extracted the activities and histories of fiestas into an object, “their culture,” for diffusion in festivals. The organization of festivals, in contrast to fiestas (celebration events), abstracted dance and music from their original social contexts and elevated the practices for explicit focus by a non-participating, observing audience. Festivals therefore created teachable moments to campesinos about new meanings imputed to their customs. The foregrounding of music and dancing, otherwise background elements in fiestas, created a clearly labeled object for attention in a new context, in which their meanings transformed into a lesson on nationalism without specifically talking about the nation.

The signing ceremonies share structural similarities with Rockefeller’s analysis. From the perspective of Peruvian state, the signing ceremonies are events designed to abstract the volunteers’ activism into a product, the accord. That product is then displayed for explicit focus by an ostensibly non-participating audience (that is, non-participating from an elite perspective). As Nivardo’s comments above illustrate, his audition transposed the efforts of the volunteers from a local context into the terms of the state. This orchestration of the signing ceremonies provides an official sanction to the volunteers’ imaginings while also minimizing the import of the accord as amounting to a register which only authenticates and preserves that the public had participated in
democracy. They authenticated democratic participation while also signaling an end to such participation. As such, the ceremonies demonstrate just how far parties in attendance went in shaping the volunteers’ political creativity into conventional contributions to the state.

Conclusion

Arguments about decentralization in connection with neoliberalism suggest that participatory mechanisms, despite the appearances of inviting citizen input, are palliative instruments preventing citizens from mobilizing radical political change (Hale 2002; Radcliffe, Laurie, and Andolina 2002). This logic of formalized institutional participation which thwarts radical political change is also apparent in broader arguments on the confluence of multiculturalism and neoliberalism found in Hale’s concept of multicultural neoliberalism (2002). Yet these arguments account for the initial waves of participation in decentralization and do not address long-term support for direct representation evidenced by the volunteers. If the volunteers are diverted from radical politics by participatory mechanisms, how can we account for their express commitments to these instruments – found in the accord’s regional policy agreements – a decade after decentralization has been set in place?

This contradiction forces us to extend scholars’ early assessments of decentralization beyond their original bounds and examine the logical conclusions of their arguments in today’s environment. Retaining these arguments in the face of the evidence that certain populations remain committed to these participatory mechanisms would suggest that something like the concept of false consciousness has been scuttled
into our discussion without full acknowledgement (Gramsci 1971). Though this might be an apposite moment to review theories of hegemony and resistance in anthropology to explore this concept (M. G. Joseph and Nugent 1994; Roseberry 1994; J. C. Scott 1976; Wolf 1966), this debate has been thoroughly explored elsewhere (Ortner 1995). In place of this debate, I propose the insights of a recent essay on feminism and U.S. and European sexual attitudes by Amia Srinivasan which summarizes the problem of mediating the truth status of our participants’ claims. If readers will pardon a small (but powerful) digression into a quasi-methodological discussion facing scholars of gender studies, Srinivasan’s formulation is informative of the stakes involved in how scholars treat the words of their research participants.

The important thing now is to take women at their word. If a woman says she enjoys working in porn, or being paid to have sex with men, or engaging in rape fantasies, or wearing stilettos – and even that she doesn’t just enjoy these things but finds them emancipatory, part of her feminist praxis – then we are required, as feminists, to trust her. This is not merely an epistemic claim: that a woman’s saying something about her own experience gives us strong, if not indefeasible, reason to think it true. It is also, or perhaps primarily, an ethical claim: a feminism that trades too freely in notions of self-deception is a feminism that risks dominating the subjects it wants to liberate. (Srinivasan 2018)

Srinivasan’s argument about self-deception and academic domination approximates the problem of false consciousness without the Marxist ideological and structural discussion because it raises the problem of truth-claims and contradictory evidence. The ethical challenge she identifies for the feminist project to avoid reproducing a relation of domination over their subjects recalls’ U.S. anthropologists own progressive foundations at the heart of their discipline (see Boas 1896, 1920). Feminist scholars have learned they must trust the words of collaborators, even if they display what previous generations of scholars thought contradicted their political intents. This is
because when researchers accept their participants words, “as feminists,” they are
preforming an essential move in the feminist liberatory project where they acknowledge
that liberation comes in many forms. Validating such contradictory words is the height
of this liberation because it avoids a new denial of feminist praxis and a potential
reproduction of relationships of power and domination in the form of the scholar-subject
relationship. Just as feminist scholars must trust the words of their collaborators, so must
anthropologists.

A critic may respond that perhaps pursuing this argument about decentralization
to the conclusion of false consciousness is too radical. Perhaps a middle ground is
acceptable? Yet if we take Srinivasan’s ethical formulation seriously, we cannot operate
in a middle ground where scholars’ trust in their research participants’ words is opaque or
ambivalent. Insofar as it waves away the doubts researchers hold towards the self-
understanding of their research participants in order to construct an argument implicitly
suggesting mystification or political incapacity under decentralization, the middle ground
is ethically unsound. If people affirm a commitment to decentralization, then we are
obligated to renew our understanding of that commitment regardless of what traditional
understandings would posit is its association with demobilizing neoliberal policies.

Consequently, the volunteers’ explicit attachment to the accord was compelling
evidence of their political agency and I view that agency as an imagining of an inclusive
political future. Their affective attachment manifested as an expanse of emotional
impressions, reactions and intensities they sensed during its production and ratification.
Their trepidation at shepherding the accord to ratification revealed this through what
Navaro-Yashin called the “phantasmatic power” of documents. Navaro-Yashin describes
this concept as peoples’ affective entanglements with the ideological signs represented by documents (Navaro-Yashin 2007, 82). These phantasmic attachments arose prominently in reaction to the performative displays of other actors, like the volunteers’ unease over the candidates’ distortions of their work, but also in their fears for the operation of regional elections. This affective attachment in turn suggests that the accord expressed their historical experience, in line with anthropological understandings of embodied knowledge and affect (Porcello et al. 2010; Ramos-Zayas 2012; Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987, 29). Their preferential reactions to the otherwise staid language of the accord thus are evidence of an imagined, future state which included their subjectivities.

The signing ceremonies were central sites in broadcasting this imagining. Even though the volunteers appeared to only read off the text during these events, the content of the text conveyed indigenous subjectivity. It may have been predictable that the volunteers’ personal investment in the accord would suffer as the accord was co-opted into the strategic projects of the other parties involved. But foreknowledge of this fact may not have mitigated the politicians’ appropriation or Nivardo’s recontextualization of the accord as the archrival body of the state. That is, the volunteers accepted that the accord was always a part of a larger process, and yet they nevertheless remained attached to the imagining of inclusive political community it communicated.

How would the volunteers avoid the complexities and co-option which mitigated the imaginative potentiality of their contributions? The politicians and public officials who mitigated their aims were a central part of the coordinating roundtable, so one might rephrase this question as: should the volunteers remove themselves from the coordinating roundtable to avoid possible co-option? I think absenting themselves from the
coordinating roundtable would pose a significant loss to the volunteers’ aims. Clearly, there would be a lack of a center without the coordinating roundtable; a loss of an organizational focus catalyzing diverse actors to converge and elaborate on their ideas. The absence of that organizational center would make it more difficult to sustain broad-based, publicly-oriented action. More specifically, removing the coordinating roundtable would impede the development volunteers from connecting with the very public officials and politicians with whom they need to collaborate, if shaping the state around their subjectivities is to be successful. Interestingly, these points illustrate the continuing importance of the coordinating roundtable in the space were local politics intersects with the nation-state. The coordinating roundtable itself is central as a site facilitating encounters between public officials and citizens with the volunteers’ imaginings. These facts underscore an irony that the state facilitates a public which contributes to an expansion of the commons and ultimately attempts to reshape the state itself.

Rather than resorting to separating themselves from the advantages afforded by their service, they might consider an alternative course. Greater work on establishing relationality with politicians would perhaps offer a fruitful path. Establishing relationality with politicians, if successful, would convey the affective and experiential dimensions of their lives to a potential political champion. Relationality would make the volunteers’ appeals more compelling to politicians as a political platform, and help to establish a shared responsibility for the volunteers’ political goals by aligning potential leaders with the accord rather than the reverse. Politicians would then perhaps be more willing to act as allies with the development volunteers in the spaces of the signing expositions, and to promote their subjectivities in state institutions while in office.
In theoretical terms this recommendation is straightforward but, as demonstrated in chapter 3, establishing this kind of relationality between the volunteers and politicians in practice was difficult. Politicians are clearly fickle allies for the volunteers. Other options, in contrast, offer increasingly unlikely premises. Though difficult, establishing relationality is more plausible than wholesale repeal of neoliberal structuration of the state and economy, or engineering a return to the coordinating roundtable’s powers of previous years. Coordination and cooperation, those hallmarks of the roundtable, may still be the best means to establishing relationality as preparatory work to facilitate greater acceptance of their imaginings in public assemblies such as the singings of the Governance Accord.
For long stretches of Peruvian history many perceived people from the country’s Andean regions to be impediments to the advance of society (de la Cadena 2000). Their lives and work were considered inaccessible and isolated. Inaccessible, because their culturally distinct ways of life were viewed as obstacles to the dominant behaviors and consciousness of a changing nation. Isolated, because the remoteness of the spaces they occupied – captured by the ruggedness the sierra – supposedly separated them from economic revolutions of capitalism. In politics, these qualities made these populations a liability. Viewed as too rebellious or too immiserated to trust with direct representation,
Peru’s leaders developed a centralized state to check the supposed dangers posed by their communities to dominant visions for the nation-state (Larson 2004; Thurner 1997).

Many scholars have critiqued the epistemic failures of these perceptions. They deconstructed narratives of linear progress underpinning the nation-state which supported the work of producing the identity of these populations in the public eye (Poole 1997). In fact, Andean Peruvians have always been modern, both in terms of their economic activity and cultural practices (Berg 2015; Starn 1998; Stern 1987; Romero 2001). Scholars showed that their supposed inability to contribute to national development was a Eurocentric construction passed down from the time of colonization (de la Cadena 2000; García 2005). Meanwhile, others explored the socioeconomic and political transformations over the past 60 years which shifted the reality of these people’s lives. The agrarian reforms (Mayer 2002b), mass migration to urban areas (de la Cadena 1988), deepening scarcities imposed by neoliberal democracy (Cusicanqui and Geidel 2010; Hale 2002; Sawyer 2004; Speed 2008), and the pro-democracy reforms shaped peoples’ everyday experiences in ways which contradict these threadbare assumptions.

Peru’s recent history of violence is an example of the complexities lying just behind such discourses about the inhabitants of the interior. The nation’s struggle to understand the violence presents to the outside observer as a binary debate at first. On the one side of this debate are those who view Peru’s racial and socioeconomic hierarchies as a catalyst of the violence. Extending from this observation, they argue that such hierarchies remain a critically unheeded abuse requiring societal action. On the other side are those who do not recognize any structural inequalities, but only villainous individuals who prosecuted a renegade campaign to destroy their society. It is easy to
grasp the sides of this debate and be drawn into its politics, but the violence of the past holds a grip on the present in other, less noticed ways. People in the Mantaro Valley still struggle to understand the violence through the lasting traumas of pain and loss. They have acute senses of the damage done to the democratic nation. Desplazados view the violence of the Armed Forces against rural populations as a pivotal event which triggered their isolation from Peru’s political community. The state’s refusal to indemnify desplazados and its negligible support of their search to find a place in post-conflict society catalyzed feelings of neglect and invisibility. Understanding and resolution among Peruvians has been further compromised by public officials’ limited attempts to obtain justice for the families of those who died at the hands of state agents. Their experiences of living with the history of violence exceeded the divisions of the national debate.

A goal of this dissertation has been to contribute to a fuller portrait of Andean Peruvians’ lives under neoliberal structures. Its value as an ethnographic account lies in exposing the work of crafting these national representations of indigenous democrats; in exposing racial and socioeconomic hierarchies; and in sketching the nuances of their struggles with and through neoliberal policies. Like previous studies of the Mantaro Valley – of which José María Arguedas’ ethnographic research set an early empathetic standard (Arguedas 1978b) – this dissertation contributes to this body of scholarship on human action in the Andes (Altamirano Rúa 2011; Berg 2015; Long and Roberts 1978, 1984; Romero 2001). This body of scholarship remains an important source of representations countering dominant discourses casting Andean Peruvians as wretched, lacking, or doubtful agents of their own politics.
The pro-democracy reforms passed in the early 2000s introduced a measure of democratic participation at the national scale and established an auspicious environment for regional democracy. The reforms offered the possibility of direct representation as a corrective for the historical position of these populations in Peru’s political structures. The development volunteers’ faith persists in these institutional supports, even as they face the pressures of interference politics, corruption, and unassured development on the operation of regional democracy and direct representation chartered by the reforms. In this, the pro-democracy reforms act as a bulwark upon which active citizens have attempted to build representative structures reflecting their lives.

This history should remind us of our priority as researchers to accept the actions of our research participants as reflections of their true intents and recognize how limitations in their lives affect their politics. In the case of the development volunteers this is perhaps doubly important because their representations of self and their political actions have not been taken seriously in the history of the independent state. The development volunteers’ actions and self-understandings must stand as pragmatic statements of their epistemological and political status which do not require further interpretation as derivatives of neoliberalism. Addressing impoverishment and suffering are just one dimension of their project which includes their quest to see their lives in the Andes reflected in composition of state institutions.

Direction for Public Policy: Requirements for Indigenous Democratic Representation

In the interest of the development volunteers’ own dedication to finding solutions which formalize their imaginings of social inclusion, let us briefly explore policy
recommendations to redress indigenous democrats’ feelings of isolation from the state’s institutions and objectives. To avoid the risk of reproducing the multicultural policies which were once offered as integrative, but subsequently did not satisfy the demands of these populations (Hale 2002), it may be more productive to discuss the requirements and boundaries of processes for integration. First, however, we must acknowledge that any policies to integrate indigenous democrats face a variety of political challenges. Beyond the challenges noted in this dissertation, a broad network of corruption activities involving the governments of Peru and neighboring states has led to a rather uncertain political environment. At the time of this writing, corruption scandals seem to have laid the foundation for public sympathy with *mano dura* (firm-hand) approaches to crime and corruption (The Associated Press 2018). In the coming years there may be little room to build indigenous political movements surrounding issues that Andean Peruvians care about while the national consciousness is occupied with these scandals and their political consequences.

Apart from the politics of the moment, what form should policies take to integrate these populations in state-formation? I admit that this is not a simple question to answer. First, and most importantly, repeal of neoliberal policies inculcating inequality and deepening precarity of these populations is a priority. Additional policy priorities are evident from the critiques by the development volunteers as well. These include building greater mechanisms for politicians’ accountability; renewing the former faculties of the coordinating roundtable as a mechanism of direct representation in development; reaffirming the primacy of decentralization as state policy; and diminishing the incentives for local politicians to be held accountable to a centralized state at the expense of regional
democracy. These recommendations are the minimal requirements for renewing the intents of the pro-democracy reforms.

The challenge for designing such integrative policies will center on avoiding the imposition of top-down, unrepresentative solutions. Critically, inclusion regards not only ensuring that indigenous voices appear in debates about the structures of institutions, but also that participants feel like they make substantive contributions to the implementation of policy. Co-option or dilution of their voices will have the contravening effect of reinforcing the status quo, so policy designs should pay careful attention to their input. This means soliciting their participation not just on the design of policy, but also on its ongoing implementation through regular check-ins. It cannot be stressed enough that policy initiatives must draw upon the input of indigenous democrats themselves if they are to achieve something so nebulous as a sense of involvement.

The problems outlined for the populations this dissertation, as anthropologists well know, concern invisible relationships in socio-political life. Further answers to the question of integration in state-making thus require processual solutions. At the level of ministerial policy-making, any solution designed to further strengthen the representation of Peruvians from indigenous backgrounds should not focus on quantifiable outcomes, but on dialogue and exchange for renewed state institutions. Regarding how to measure the impact of such policies, material changes to state institutions are not likely to be the primary way in which to assess the success of policies oriented at integrating indigenous democrats into the state. The success of integration policies will depend less on quantifiable criteria than on indicators of the sense of inclusion by these populations. Success can thus be measured through ethnographic methods. Indicators can include the
traditional tools of ethnography such as fieldwork among existing groups to see if, in their internal meetings, they use a language of inclusion. Such methods include soliciting the opinions of engaged citizens like the development volunteers, convening thematic groups, and attending meetings and public events to ascertain the emphases of volunteers’ agendas. Effective measurement will require close attention to language to understand whether the bulk of talk centers on the positive outcomes of policies in practice. Reports of these measurements might include visual representations, like word-cloud analysis of key words to demonstrate these outcomes. These methods certainly are not automated; they require investments in effort as well as sustained, substantive exchange with grassroots organizers.

Directions for Research: Imagining Digital States

On February 28, 2014, Edita Guerrero, leader of the pop music group *Corazón Serrano* (Sierran Heart), died of a cerebral hemorrhage at the age of 31 leaving behind two children. On the day of Guerrero’s death, the truism that humans are interested in staying abreast of news on changes in their social worlds somehow never seemed more relevant. Guerrero’s death was processed, online, through expressions of anguish by her supporters as well as vitriolic posts created by anonymous accounts. Her enemies made vicious attacks on her supposed racial characteristics and castigated her group’s explicit propagation of the artistry and lifeways of peoples in the Andes. These terrible words about her “sangre indígena” (indigenous blood) would have strained any observers’ definition of the work of signifying grief to say the least. Many commentators in the media, in fact, were taken by surprise at the scope of these racist comments on the social
media platform Twitter (National Geographic 2014). Anonymous posters also turned their attacks on her fans for supposedly carrying the same racial characteristics as Guerrero.

In 2014 the connection between public opinion, automated digital tools, social media, and democratic participation had not yet begun to fully emerge in the public’s awareness. High profile events in which digital media played a remarkable role – as in the 2016 U.S. and 2018 Brazilian presidential elections – were still years away. Yet from our vantage point today, the online exchange surrounding Guerrero’s death exhibited shades of these same trends. The exchange appears like an early skirmish to define the digital forms of politics in the future of Peru’s political community.

Specifically, the exchange highlights the instrumentality of digital media in propagating historic racial and socioeconomic hierarchies. This inherent potential by digital media to define political community points to the importance of “the make-believe” aspect of the state’s composition once again, reminding us of Aretxaga’s emphasis on “people’s imaginative potentialities as central to the making of their political realities” (Navaro-Yashin 2007, 80). In this regard, the exchange surrounding Guerrero’s death should serve as an early indicator that democracy and the Peruvian state will be shaped by these digital media in ways that critical studies of the state have not yet begun to examine. I want to briefly make a case that researchers interested in states will need to draw upon the techniques of journalists investigating digital media alongside their traditional tools to assess the risks and opportunities posed by these changes.

Before outlining future directions for research emerging from my findings, I want to acknowledge that a casual reliance on “the digital” in a conclusion such as this entails
the risk of appearing glib. On the one hand, anthropologists have been thinking for some time now over the implications of the increasing digitization of human action. Any blithe reference gesturing in the direction of “technology” would be a disservice to their work. On the other hand, the digital mediation of politics came under increasing scrutiny by the media in the U.S. presidential election of 2016. At the time of this writing, social media platforms have been so extensively critiqued by lawmakers and in the press that by bringing up digital media at all I run the risk of appearing to defer to popular tastes. Yet the risks as well as possibilities posed by digital media intersect with the volunteers’ concerns over direct representation in ways that would be reckless to overlook.

For researchers interested in communities like those in Huancayo, the uses of digital media and automating technologies are a newly relevant area for research, specifically as it concerns the “strategic uses of online platforms to influence the public for economic and political gain” (Rainie, Anderson, and Albright 2017; see also Zuboff 2019). Digital media was a theme which existed on the periphery of my research without fully coming into my explicit focus during my fieldwork. In conducting research on how the development volunteers influenced state-formation through performative displays, I became slowly aware that their displays included digital sites and modalities. I had studiously preserved a pile of pamphlets, booklets, and memos regarding state services and policies during my time in Huancayo, though perhaps this was redundant – a handful of these materials existed online. The roundtable staff tended to focus on traditional media such as radio to publicize events. As I was preparing to leave my fieldsite they opened Twitter and Facebook accounts, and the volunteers used social media to link to events in which they took part, including the Governance Accord. Though they had yet
to embrace the full potential of these tools, it was clear that the staff and volunteers intended for these tools to play a role in the elaboration of the Governance Accord in the future. This transition to the state’s digital presence indicated that the ways states reproduce their meanings digitally will pose new challenges for those seeking a voice.

Anthropologists interested in the themes of digital media and states must be particularly attentive to structures of power in assessing how digital media serves the communities we study. It is true that digital media, particularly social media platforms, are increasingly used to scrutinize and challenge the representations made by states (Adunbi 2017). As Bonilla and Rosa observe, “The increased use and availability of these technologies has provided marginalized and racialized populations with new tools for documenting incidents of state-sanctioned violence and contesting media representations of racialized bodies and marginalized communities” (Bonilla and Rosa 2015, 5). Yet Bonilla and Rosa’s argument suggests that social activists employing Twitter harness the platform with expressly liberatory and democratic intents in a manner reminiscent of “ techno-utopian” narratives propagated by the founders of these technologies and arguably share in the genres on the “technological sublime” which reach as far back as the invention of the steam engine (Flichy 2007; Vaidhyanathan 2012). It is clear that there is a vast difference between the meanings of progress and liberalism used by these communities. Moreover, Twitter itself can be distinguished as both a social media platform and as a company at the head of the structure of neoliberal democracy in the U.S. The leading position of its commercial enterprise raises questions about the relationship between employees and investors who build positions of power based on the success of its technology and the platform which encapsulates both the potential to
support progressive causes as well as possibly manipulate the general public. More importantly, these platforms have been instrumental to repression and violence by state officials, shining a light on their potential for deadly applications (Mozur 2018). Bonilla and Rosa’s embrace of such a narrative for the social movements they wish to empower, though a coincidence of overlapping general principles, signals one of the first cautions anthropologists should heed when studying these platforms. Researchers must not only situate digital media with respect to the individuals and communities using them (Postill and Pink 2012), but also situate these platforms in the political economy of their research participants. Internet-related research must disentangle their participants’ uses of these platforms, the centralized and unaccountable companies profiting by them, and state’s role.

Researchers who wish to apply anthropological concepts to technology in aiding activists and social movements should recognize existing digital rights movements and what these movements are telling us about technologies such as Twitter. These movements include the organizations of coalitions such as the Electronic Frontier Alliance which is associated with the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a longtime defender of digital rights. Others include the loose communities devoted to digital justice, to an “indieweb,” or to a “distributed web” (the latter two constitute those who seek to decentralize web applications and technologies away from corporate or centralized control). The communities emphasize shielding ordinary users’ data and redistributing digital content from unaccountable enterprises.⁶ There are also more inchoate meanings and practices which call for further anthropological study including the term Free and Open Source Software and the movement to “self-host” common digital applications.⁷ In
turn these movements have spawned intriguing practical applications with socially progressive uses such as mobile micro-network technologies. These technologies purportedly adapt models of “local community” into technologies for “file-sharing and communications systems” to circumvent corporate regulation and establish representations which counter those of corporations and states. Like noncommercial low-power radio stations broadcasting to spaces measured in the single digits, these alternative digital mediations not only provide interesting avenues for communities like the development volunteers to potentially distribute their performative displays in digital forms, but are also areas for research on the intersection of common tropes and technology.

As representations and interpretation of states move to digital worlds, populations such as the development volunteers will face new struggles. Administration and regulation of populations through automation technologies highlights these challenges. Many services provided by states rely on digital platforms as primary or secondary channels to convey information to the public. In the global north these efforts have moved beyond the relatively straightforward – like web portals collecting preliminary registration information or electronic database repositories for public data – to these more complex deployments. Services like the Allegheny Family Screening Tool (AFST), for example, demonstrate the digital automation of public social biases. The AFST, implemented with the participation of IBM, used “statistical modeling to provide hotline screeners with a predictive risk score that shapes the decision whether or not to open child abuse and neglect investigations” (Eubanks 2018, 12). Virginia Eubanks documented that the AFST program subjected black American families to state
regulations, police interventions, and inclusion in benefits programs at greater rates than non-black applicants (2018). Such automated decision-making for public service delivery introduces a juncture between technology and ideologies of inclusion in political community which anthropologists are traditionally well-positioned to study.

Reading Eubanks’ research alongside Coronil’s seminal ethnohistory of the Venezuelan state provides a compelling hint of the future of these technologies within state-making. Coronil’s work divides the state in Venezuelan history into a formerly fragile and contested state, and a *magical* state which replaced it. His book argues that the magical state’s achievement of convincing its population of its own solidity was built upon an expansion of the public sector in conjunction with a (re)presentation of Venezuelan history. The work illustrates that state elites carefully curated history as part of this act of representing.

The persuasiveness of a historical account, like that of a magical performance, depends on rendering invisible the artifice of its production. Just as history refers ambiguously to the past in its completeness and to the selective remembering of stories about the past, magic alludes to an extraordinary reality as well as to the selective presentation of the elements that create the illusion of its existence through invisible tricks that exploit distraction and diversion. (Coronil 1997, 3)

Coronil’s analogy to the magician’s sleight of hand wonderfully draws our attention to the state’s selecting and eliding in constructing a reality which is extraordinary as both an artifice and as a new public sphere which exceeds the ordinary. With digital media and automated technologies, this state sleight of hand disappears further into its recesses from the standpoint of technological barriers inhibiting understanding (Zuboff 2019). A combined reading of the authors suggests researching the state’s representations starts with the elementary questions of who, how and where with regard to these technologies. As Eubanks pointed out, these digital tools create new limits on economic mobility,
political mobilization, and even endanger lives. The state’s selective presentation will be
not just a matter of what data is made public, but also how it is made public, and where
that data circulates.

These are not stray thoughts as it concerns the national context of Peru or how
these technologies appear in neighboring states. Recently Keiko Fujimori was sentenced
to three years of pre-trial incarceration as investigators search for further evidence of a
conspiracy involving judges and businessmen who exchanged bribes for amendments to
penal sentencing procedures. Transcripts of Keiko’s conversations as the head of the
primary opposition party in the country appeared on Gustavo Gorriti’s investigative
journalism website *IDL-Reporteros* (2018). Gorriti’s team printed copies of the
Transmission conversation (Transmission is a digital communication app and a
competitor with other instant messaging applications such as WhatsApp) in which Keiko
instructed her subordinates to continue supporting those accused in the bribery scandal.
Similarly, in neighboring Brazil, political scientists researching the exchange of
information during the Brazilian election in 2018 found irregularities in flows of
conversation on the app WhatsApp (Isaac and Roose 2018). During the election, the
digital communications platform took on an outsized role for hosting encrypted group
chats which were shown to have been seedbeds for rumors and false accounts of the
candidates which subsequently circulated in non-encrypted contexts. Like the case of
Guerrero’s death, these cases reveal that digital media already plays an increasingly
significant role in influencing the shape of political community in Latin America.

Reporting on these efforts demonstrates that multidisciplinary methods to study
digital media may offer tools to complement anthropologists’ traditional strengths. Data
journalism scholar Jonathan Albright uses the term *media analytics* to describe the study of “cross-platform information flows” and the tools Albright employs seem particularly promising in this regard (2018b). Tracking the selective representations of state elites will require that researchers not only balance such virtual and material ethnographies (Postill and Pink 2012), but also that they critically interrogate how these platforms manipulate or elevate the truth claims of rumors or folk theories. Research to this end has tended to focus on single platforms, such as Twitter in Bonilla and Rosa’s research (2015), or Facebook in Omolade Adunbi’s study of Nigerian presidential politics (2017). But as Postill and Pink note, “Social media ethnography therefore does not mean doing fieldwork in or about one particular social media platform – such as Facebook, Twitter or YouTube. While the latter is possible, it is complicated by the fact that most internet users constantly criss-cross a range of platforms through aggregators, search engines, hyperlinks and other devices” (Postill and Pink 2012, 131). Studying how information is disseminated and accrued must be connected to how social media platforms make conversations *multivocal* and *dialogical* across platforms (Bonilla and Rosa 2015), to further situate how the digital worlds of our research participants interact with the national and global socioeconomic structures they live under.

In summary, Abrams injunction for researchers to deconstruct legitimating accounts of the state will increasingly take scholars to the fields of digital production (1988). To the extent that Peruvians from indigenous backgrounds want to see their lives reflected in their institutions, an understanding digital media and automation’s uses and abuses in statecraft will aid us with their understandings of their place in the world. Anthropologists should recognize the competency they bring to these digital worlds and
familiarize themselves with the language of digital media and the technical structures of its tools. Though the technical specifications of digital tools may lie beyond the traditional training of anthropologists, these barriers should not prevent researchers of states from recognizing the analytical and theoretical competence they can bring to conversations about the digital representations of the state and social justice.

Photo 27, Meeting of the development volunteers on the Acuerdo de Gobernabilidad, Coordinating Roundtable. Photo by the author.

Conclusion: Solidity and Safety Nets

Stepping onto the sidewalk outside my apartment in the mornings, I sometimes saw the mountains facing me from the far side of the valley. Their peaks occasionally wore a cloak of white from the snowfall overnight. A crispness in the air told me that the
clouds had moved on. I knew the afternoon would have plenty of wind and sun.

Walking from my apartment towards the main road, I passed dusty dirt roads, the ragged grasses of playing fields, and cement sidewalks. The sounds of traffic, with an occasional backfire, grew louder as I drew close. At the avenue, I waited to catch a *combi* (mini-bus) or *colectivo* (shared taxi) on the corner. Sometimes I waited with middle-aged men and women and children in school uniforms. A minibus drove us along the cement sections of the road, the tires rhythmically tapping out the tune of the road’s joints. It carried us downtown, past stereo speakers playing advertisements to passing traffic at the intersections. We passed small businesses, empty wholesale warehouses, and a home supply materials megastore. Descending from the minibus at the entrance to the coordinating roundtable, I noticed the sunshine had started to warm things up. The welded sheets of metal formed into the door at the entryway to the coordinating roundtable seemed precariously thin. How would it stop the winds sweeping up the valley later in the day?

Stepping through the frame into the cavernous space, I was always aware of a strange feeling of uncertainty. It was more than the feeling of being out of place, it was like a feeling of insolidity. The feeling was not unique to coordinating roundtable, but the act of stepping through the door frame somehow set the feeling into relief. After 13 months of fieldwork, I can see now that this feeling was related to the anticipation any researcher might feel as they embark to a new setting; stepping through the metal door to the roundtable was like the physical manifestation of stepping from a familiar world to an unfamiliar one. The feeling stayed with me as the months went by. It was the sense that an assurance provided by a scaffolding of institutional and political structures now
operated in an unfamiliar way. It was a feeling that I had walked beyond a familiar rhythm of change and negotiation in official institutions. My time in the Mantaro Valley taught me that the solidity of the state was a peculiar thing in human affairs.

The volunteers’ steady efforts diminished this feeling. Their dedication was probably in part why I was drawn to their work. The outcomes of their activity were small in comparison to the state policies of neoliberal deregulation they struggled against. Their solutions only partially mitigated the retreat of material and organizational safety nets once provided by the services traditionally maintained in social democracies. But they were driven by ideas: ideas which were outsized and reflected the themes which drew me to anthropological research. As they worked, I thought of Mary Douglas’ classic work on taboo and pollution where she argued that commonplace activities exposed the inner preoccupation of society with political questions.

The vital questions in any theistic world-view are the same as for the [supposedly animistic] Azande: why did this farmer’s crops fail and not his neighbour’s? Why did this man get gored by a wild buffalo and not another of his hunting party? Why did this man’s children or cows die? Why me? Why today? What can be done about it?...These questions are not phrased primarily to satisfy man's curiosity about the seasons and the rest of the natural environment. They are phrased to satisfy a dominant social concern, the problem of how to organize together in society. They can only be answered, it is true, in terms of man's place in nature. But the metaphysic is a by-product, as it were, of the urgent practical concern. (emphasis mine, Douglas 1966, 112–13)

Some may look at this paragraph and see the fragments of outdated theoretical concentrations. They may focus on Douglas’ use of the pronoun term “man,” or her usage of practical concerns to ascribe a function to belief and world-views. Looking at Douglas’ formulation now, I see these remnants of a former era of thought in anthropology, but I am still moved by her words. I see in Douglas’ work an enduring formulation of a question at the heart of political anthropology. How do people build
authority? How do they shape official structures to respond to their lives? What is the
relationship between these questions and their daily reality? My fieldwork with the
volunteers emphasized the volunteers’ challenges to the status quo and the resulting
plurality of imaginings of political orders. The considerable service the volunteers put
into the coordinating roundtable was evidence of their dedication to the pro-democracy
reforms, especially decentralization and the coordinating roundtable itself, as offering
direct representation to historically disaffected populations. Their activity taught me that
their imaginings were provided answers to the question of how to organize. Taking part
in state-formation was one such political concern at the center of everyday life.
Appendix 1

A copy of the initial draft of the Governance Accord provided to attendees of the forum on September 16th, 2014 begins on the following page.
El Grupo de Gestores de Gobernabilidad que impulsan este Acuerdo de Gobernabilidad para el Desarrollo Regional 2015 al 2018 y tiene por objetivo poner de agenda las principales demandas de los sectores sociales en las propuestas de los candidatos al gobierno regional, en tal sentido presentamos esta Propuesta a ser próximamente consensuada y concertada con el Próximo Gobierno Regional, las fuerzas políticas, el empresariado y todas las fuerzas sociales de la Región Junín.

1. DIMENSIÓN SOCIAL

1.1 ACUERDO DE POLÍTICA REGIONAL EN SALUD
Promoción del acceso a los servicios de salud integral de calidad y de amplia cobertura con preferencia a los más vulnerables, con igualdad de oportunidades, inclusión intercultural e intergeneracional, en las zonas urbanas y rurales de la sierra y la selva de la región Junín.

OBJETIVOS ESTRATÉGICOS:
- a) Reducir la alta incidencia de embarazo en adolescentes de 12 a 17 años.
- b) Reducir la incidencia de la desnutrición en niños y niñas menores de 05 años en la sierra y selva de la región.
- c) Reducir la incidencia de mortalidad materna.

1.2 ACUERDO DE POLÍTICA REGIONAL EN EDUCACIÓN Y CULTURA
Mejoramiento de la calidad educativa en cuanto al aprendizaje de los estudiantes en los niveles inicial, primario y secundario en sierra y selva, en población urbana y rural de la región Junín. La curricula será pertinente a la realidad local y regional, siendo competitiva y comprometida con los nuevos enfoques de resultados, equidad e igualdad de oportunidades, interculturalidad y los derechos humanos.

OBJETIVOS ESTRATÉGICOS:
- a) Mejorar los logros de aprendizaje de los Estudiantes de Educación Básica Regular.
- b) Dismunuir el analfabetismo en la población de 15 años a más.
- c) Promover la educación intercultural andina y amazónica.

1.3 ACUERDO DE POLÍTICA REGIONAL CONTRA LA VIOLENCIA DE LA MUJER, INFANCIA Y JUVENTUD.
Desarrollo de sistemas de prevención y atención integral frente a la violencia a la mujer e implementación de políticas públicas que contribuyan a la atención integral de los niños, niñas, adolescentes y jóvenes.

OBJETIVOS ESTRATÉGICOS:
- a) Promover sistemas de prevención y atención oportuna contra la violencia a la mujer (física, psicológica y sexual).
- b) Dismunuir los casos de niños, niñas y adolescentes en situación de abandono y trabajo infantil.
- c) Mejorar la atención de los procesos de filiación y asistencia alimentaria del niño, niña y adolescente.
- d) Reducir problemas sociales como el: alcoholismo, drogadicción, pandillaje, ludopatía y psiquiátricos en adolescentes y jóvenes.

1.4 ACUERDO DE POLÍTICA REGIONAL EN DERECHOS HUMANOS Y POBLACIONES VULNERABLES.
Crear condiciones para el ejercicio pleno de los derechos civiles, políticos, económicos, sociales y culturales, con respeto irrestricto de la persona humana y la igualdad de oportunidades sin discriminación alguna.

OBJETIVOS ESTRATÉGICOS:
- a) Implementar y gestionar las reparaciones individuales, colectivas y de Asociaciones de Desplazados Afectados por la Violencia Política.
- b) Ampliar el acceso de personas con discapacidad al mercado laboral.
- c) Mejorar la accesibilidad de las personas con discapacidad a los entornos urbanísticos y arquitectónicos.

1.5 ACUERDO DE POLÍTICA REGIONAL EN PREVENCIÓN DEL DELITO Y SEGURIDAD CIUDADANA
Promover la implementación de programas y/o proyectos con la participación de sociedad civil.

OBJETIVO ESTRATÉGICO:
- a) Reducir los índices de inseguridad ciudadana.
II. DIMENSIÓN AMBIENTAL

3.1 ACUERDO DE POLÍTICA REGIONAL PARA LA GESTIÓN AMBIENTAL
Fortalecer el sistema regional de la Gestión Ambiental incorporando la variable de cambio climático para el desarrollo sostenible en todos los niveles: distrital, provincial y regional con enfoques de género, derechos humanos e interculturalidad.

OBJETIVO ESTRATÉGICO
a) Mejorar la disponibilidad hídrica del Corredor Vial Mantaro a través del manejo racional y equilibrado de los ecosistemas alto andinos.
b) Promover la forestación y reforestación de bosques nativos tropicales y de montañas
c) Gestionar la reducción de la contaminación del aire, agua y suelos, y promover la remediación de suelos contaminados.
d) Promover el manejo económicamente eficiente y socialmente justo de la gestión ambiental, social y gubernamental en la región Junín.
e) Gestionar y administrar de manera eficiente el territorio y patrimonio (cultural, recursos históricos).

3.2 ACUERDO DE POLÍTICA REGIONAL PARA UN AMBIENTE SALUDABLE
Planificar y desarrollar acciones para preservar el ambiente saludable, a fin de que se reduzcan los riesgos que afectan a las poblaciones urbanas y rurales, andinas y amazónicas, especialmente a poblaciones más vulnerables promoviendo una cultura ambiental saludable

OBJETIVO ESTRATÉGICO
a) Implementar políticas de gestión ambiental para contribuir a disminuir los riesgos en la calidad de vida de las personas, especialmente en poblaciones vulnerables: mujeres gestantes, niños, y adultos mayores afectados por la contaminación ambiental (metales y otras sustancias tóxicas).

3.3 ACUERDO DE POLÍTICA REGIONAL FREnte AL CAMBIO CLIMÁTICO
Desarrollar acciones concertadas para mitigar los efectos del cambio climático y la gestión de riesgos ocasionados por el deterioro del ambiente y el calentamiento global

OBJETIVO ESTRATÉGICO
a) Desarrollar acciones de adaptación y mitigación al calentamiento global de la Tierra y al Cambio Climático, que incorpore la prevención, gestión de riesgos de desastres y recursos hídricos, fortaleciendo las capacidades adaptativas de la población, remediando e indemnizando a los grupos afectados por pérdidas y daños causados por la inacción en la lucha contra el cambio climático.

IV. DIMENSIÓN INSTITUCIONAL

4.1 ACUERDO DE POLÍTICA REGIONAL PARA LA LUCHA CONTRA LA CORRUPCIÓN
Garantizar y Promover la participación del Estado y la sociedad en la efectiva lucha contra la corrupción mediante un sistema eficaz de prevención, seguimiento, fiscalización, control y sanción, enfatizando el acceso a la información, la vigilancia ciudadana, la modernización de los mecanismos de control, la ética pública, el fortalecimiento del Consejo Regional Anticorrupción y la cultura de valores.

OBJETIVO ESTRATÉGICO
a) Garantizar la efectiva reducción de los casos de corrupción en los sectores públicos y privados para una gestión pública ética, moderna, participativa, inclusiva, transparente, eficiente y eficaz.

4.2 ACUERDO DE POLÍTICA REGIONAL PARA PARTICIPACION CIUDADANA
Promover y garantizar un sistema efectivo de participación ciudadana en los espacios de decisión pública y concertación regional, enfatizando el planeamiento, presupuesto participativo, la rendición de cuentas, la vigilancia ciudadana, el Consejo de Coordinación Regional, la institucionalización del Acuerdo de Gobernabilidad Regional 2015 – 2018, articulado al Acuerdo Regional Junín

OBJETIVOS ESTRATÉGICOS
a) Incrementar, fortalecer la participación y la concertación para el planeamiento estratégico del desarrollo sostenible regional
b) Institucionalizar el carácter vinculante del Acuerdo de Gobernabilidad para el Desarrollo Regional de Junín 2015 al 2018
4.3. ACUERDO DE POLÍTICA REGIONAL PARA EL FORTALECIMIENTO Y EFICIENCIA EN LA GESTIÓN PÚBLICA.

Garantizar fortalecimiento de las instituciones públicas de la región para un buen servicio, buena atención a la población, mejorar la credibilidad, confianza en el sistema de administración pública, la calidad de los servicios y gestión adecuada de recursos humanos.

OBJETIVOS ESTRATÉGICOS

a) Promover el Sistema de la Carrera Pública Regional, para el mejor desempeño de los servidores públicos de la región incentivando la capacitación y la meritocracia en las instituciones públicas

b) Elevar la credibilidad, fortalecer la eficiencia de la gestión pública, con ingreso laboral mediante procesos de concursos públicos a la administración pública incluyendo los niveles gerenciales.

4.4. ACUERDO DE POLÍTICA REGIONAL PARA INSTITUCIONALIZAR COMO VINCULANTE EL ACUERDO DE GOBERNABILIDAD 2015 - 2018

Institucionalizar el Acuerdo de Gobernabilidad para el Desarrollo Regional de Junín 2015 al 2018, a través de una Ordenanza Regional, otorgando el carácter vinculante y de obligatorio cumplimiento por el sector público regional.

OBJETIVO ESTRATÉGICO

a) Institucionalizar con carácter vinculante al Acuerdo de Gobernabilidad para el Desarrollo Regional de Junín 2015 al 2018

4.5. ACUERDO DE POLÍTICA REGIONAL PARA LA DESCENTRALIZACIÓN

Promoción de la institucionalización de los procesos de asociatividad municipal de La Mancomunidad Municipal del Corredor Mantaro, de la Mancomunidad de Los Andes, el fortalecimiento del Acuerdo Regional Junín como instancia de concertación y formulación de Políticas Públicas Regionales a mediano y largo plazo, y el funcionamiento del Centro de Planeamiento Regional – CEPLAR como prioridades para la gestión territorial y el fortalecimiento de la descentralización.

OBJETIVO ESTRATÉGICO

a) Fortalecer la asociatividad municipal e interregional la pública, la concertación y formulación de políticas y el sistema de planeamiento territorial para la gestión sostenible y concertada del territorio a través del CEPLAR.

En nuestra condición de candidatos de las organizaciones políticas a las que representamos y conocedores que la gestión de la democracia y la gobernabilidad regional tiene como esencia al ciudadano y sus instituciones; valoramos, reconocemos el esfuerzo y propuesta del Equipo de Gestores de Gobernabilidad expresado en el “Acuerdo de Gobernabilidad para el Desarrollo Regional de Junín 2015-2018” como instrumento de diálogo, concertación, gestión articulada y planificada, en el marco de las cuatro dimensiones del desarrollo, propuestas de políticas, objetivos estratégicos y de pre programación anexada al presente ACUERDO; los mismos que se concertaran y ejecutan de manera consensuada mediante acciones administrativas y de gobierno a partir del año 2015; en tal virtud suscribimos el presente acta.

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<td>MANUEL RAFAEL TRAVERSO CARDEÑAS</td>
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**2015-2018**
**GRUPO DE GESTORES**
**REGIÓN JUNIN**

_AUSPICIAN Y RETRANSMITEN:_
EXITOSA TV LOCAL E INTERNET
Notes

Introduction

1 To explain this choice further, roundtable gives readers a sense of the literal space of the institution which alternatives for mesa (such as “committee”) do not convey. Together coordinating and roundtable convey a sense of the unrestricted access the institution provides, as well as the practical diversity of contributors which included unions, chambers of commerce, NGOs, community organizations, and state institutions.

2 These attitudes on re-centralization find confirmation from Peruvian scholars as well. See Javier Paulini (2010).

3 Many in the valley can indeed trace family histories to indigenous backgrounds, though the use of the term “indigenous” in common conversation tends to have a specific legal meaning which many Peruvians disavow. In 1974, the Law of Native Communities established legal rights for the designation of indigenous and conferred protections for communally-held land. In my experience the common usage of indígenas or Indio/a refers to this recognition under the legal code. Hence, using the term indigenous in everyday life refers to a portion of the current population which has obtained protected legal status and is quite small. This fact could be a source of confusion regarding racial and socioeconomic hierarchies which have characterized life in Peru so widely for centuries. Outsiders may mistakenly believe, when using these terms, that these racial and socioeconomic hierarchies only apply to this small fraction of the population. Looking beyond this legal term to the history of mestizaje allows for a broader perspective on structural inequalities faced by indigenous mestizos. See Deborah Poole (1997), and Mary Weismantel (2001), for a discussion of these terms and greater context.

4 During my field research, the city of Lima announced the inauguration of El Parque del Migrante (the Park of the Migrant). The park was located in an area known as La Parada, which was once home to a sizable open-air market of small-scale commercial vendors like any of the type found throughout Latin America. Critics observed that the dedication of the park to “migrants” was code for Peruvians of Andean and Amazonian backgrounds, some of whom could trace their urban residency back generations. Moreover, critics asked why the park was founded in a district on the outskirts of the city whose origins owe in part to the socioeconomic restructurings prompting more recent migration flows. These were the same forces which barred new migrants from the city’s prospering industries and urban living spaces. The park’s proposed location was so distant that it ensured these groups would remain invisible to Lima’s elite (Meléndez 2014b). The debate surrounding El Parque del Migrante was thus a lower-stakes but symbolic example of how discrimination in Peru concerns the (in)visibility of indigeneity. The discourses and practices surrounding the park produced who or what constituted Indian-ness according to what de la Cadena called “the national cultural formation” (2000).

5 Perhaps the hate conveyed by the term Indian carries less sting in the polyglot city of Huancayo, but desplazados have stood out as both Indians and outsiders.
For the term subjectivity I rely upon Goodman, Tomlinson, and Richland’s understanding where they state, “In employing the term ‘subjectivity,’ we refer to the experience of oneself as a subject in relation to other subjects. Per Bakhtin (1981), we see subjectivity as an emergent and dialogical achievement in that a subject is brought into being through a process of variously assimilating or distancing from the words of others” (Goodman, Tomlinson, and Richland 2014, 455). This emphasis on socio-linguistic activity in defining subjectivity corresponds with this dissertation’s emphasis on embodied and oral performance.

It may be helpful to recall that linguistic anthropologists have treated audiences as both *multivocal* and responsible, in part, for the construction of meaning surrounding performances. Alessandro Duranti observes: “Interpretation is not conceived as the speaker’s privilege. On the contrary, it is based on the ability (and power) that others may have to invoke certain conventions, to establish links between different acts and different social personae. Meaning is collectively defined on the basis of recognized (and sometimes restated) social relationships” (1986, 241).

Limeños did in fact live with violence as well. Assassinations and threats were common in Lima in the 1980s. And while insurgents largely operated in the obscurity afforded by Peru’s formidable mountains and jungle forests, in the later years of the political violence they deployed larger-scale terror attacks in the urban centers. The Tarata car bomb attack in Miraflores in 1992 was among the largest of these attacks, killing 25, and wounding 150, and in devastating a city block.

I have adopted this translation for simplicity, but in recent years scholars have introduced increasing complexity to understandings of *mestizaje*. Peter Wade for example has argued that *mestizaje* at once captures the creativity of a sociocultural “mosaic” including embodiment, difference, and personal expression by mestizos while simultaneously acting as a referent subject to the power and traditional racial hierarchies of Latin American societies (2005).

Shining Path lives on in a drug-trafficking guise today. As recently as 2014 the military had been conducting operations in the *VRAEM* against the inheritors of the Shining Path mantle. See Doris Aguirre (2014).

Lest my framing of the transition from an authoritarian leader to democratic elections leave readers with a false sense of uplift, it is helpful to recall that every former president of Peru after President Fernando Belaúnde has been, or is currently, legally embroiled in corruption charges by Peruvian jurists. At the time of this writing the Peruvian government is reported to be evaluating an extradition request for Toledo’s arrest; President Alan García is reportedly under investigation; and President Ollanta Humala and the former first lady are awaiting their own trial. Fujimori was only recently released from his prison sentence in a byzantine political deal to save then-current President Pablo Kuczynski from a vote of no confidence, also in connection with corruption allegations. President Kuczynski resigned soon thereafter under the glare of corruption charges, and Fujimori was ordered by the Supreme Court to return to incarceration (Zarate and Casey 2018).

I focus here on a set of laws devised between 2000 and 2005 which formalized these trends and to which I refer as pro-democracy reforms. Respectively, those laws are the
Ley Orgánica de Gobiernos Regionales Nº 27867 (Statutory Law of Regional Governments), the Ley que Crea El Plan Integral de Reparaciones Nº 28592 (Law Creating the Integrated Reparations Plan), and the Decreto Supremo 001-2001-PROMUDEH (Supreme Directive to the Ministry for the Promotion of Women and Human development, [Ministerio de Promoción de la Mujer y del Desarrollo Humano, PROMUDEH]).

13 The statutory progress achieved under García’s administration at the regional level was summarily halted by his successor’s “self-coup.” In 1992 President Fujimori arrogated to the executive the ability to pass laws and quickly annulled parts of the constitution as it stood.

14 Fujimori’s constitution of 1993 did concede that in the future the regions would have the opportunity to hold elections for the highest posts in regional government. In the meantime, the transitional councils, and later the ministries, handled most decisions concerning development funds and welfare programming. See La Contraloría General de la República del Perú (2014)

15 This definition demonstrates what scholars agree is a movement “beyond critique” in studies of the term development (Mosse 2013). Previously, researchers focused on the discursive construction of development as “category of analysis” (Escobar 1995; see also Edelman and Haugerud 2005), whereas more recent research addresses the term as a “category of practice” (Mosse 2013, 229). Regarding this practice, the term can be stated another way as a methodology which organizes the state’s (typically infrastructural) interventions which is grounded in neoliberal deregulation and liberalization.

16 This organization of new procedures for citizen participation, representation and devolution of authority and responsibilities to the regional governments exemplified the proliferation of participatory mechanisms throughout Latin America during the 1990s (Grindle 2007). Supporters of Peru’s decentralization, it should be noted, had actively campaigned for greater representation through the concept of elected regional governments long before Toledo rose to the presidency. Additionally, some argue that Toledo’s interest in passing decentralization legislation may have owed more to his electoral calculations than to the high-minded principles of thinking on decentralization (Tanaka 2002).

17 This trope often appears in the scholarship on Peru, though to my knowledge its origins are difficult to ascertain. Fernando Fuenzalida attributes the idea to the work of Peruvian writer and political activist José Carlos Mariátegui in his classic Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality (Fuenzalida 2009, 147). Though it should be said that the social and political structures contributing to the trope existed since at least the inception of separate legal systems for Indians and Spanish devised by Spanish colonists. See the work of Larson (2004) and Thurner (1997) on this later topic.

18 I obtained these population figures from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (National Institute of Statistics and Information), accessed on December 13, 2017 at http://www.inei.gob.pe/estadisticas/indice-tematico/poblacion-y-vivienda/.

19 In referring to attire in the Andes, I use quotes around the term traditional at this first juncture to draw awareness to the complications of perspective and the process of racialization when garments are viewed out of context. Clothing is a first visible
indication by which a viewer’s ideologies of belonging, race, and nationality (to name a few) enter into their consideration of other peoples. Citizens in the global north may view style of dress of in the Andes according to these ideological frameworks as old, authentic, or symbols of the isolation of those wearing the multicolored fabrics and hats. These externally attributed values misconstrue the lives of women and men in the city of Huancayo. The global interconnectedness of the Andes reaches back at least as far as the era of colonial expansion by European powers, and perhaps even to before the era of Incan conquest. Such history subverts any notions of isolation, and complicates the term authentic, as populations and their dress have morphed through cultural contact, capitalism, and racial oppression. Moreover, in the present day the elaborate varieties of these garments reserved for high ceremony are by no means cheap to obtain (and high ceremonial garments provide subtle distinctions of class and race beyond the scope of this paper). My convention of quotes is meant to remind the reader of this thicket of essentialisms which may underlie a cursory reading. See the work of Deborah Poole for an extensive exploration of the cultural production of an essential Peru from afar through visual media (1997); Starn for a related discussion of U.S. anthropology’s own role in devising essentialisms in Peru (1991); and Stern for further information on capitalism’s reshaping of the Andes into a global crossroads and the concurrent production of tradition as its antithesis (1987).

Huancayo is also known as the ferial (market) capital of Peru, a title referring to Huancayo’s revolving street markets. On Sundays, Avenida Huancavelica, one of the two main thoroughfares bisecting the city, is closed to vehicle traffic creating the space for the best-known street fair of Huancayo. Merchants sell a host of imported wares, as well as folkloric products including mates burilados (inscribed gourds) and woven tapestries. On any given day of the week satellite markets also spring up to supplement the central market in the city center. The title ferial not only captures these practices, but also could very well refer to the itinerant class of merchants from the valley’s hamlets who travel to Huancayo to participate in these open markets on most days.

When addressing Peruvians and foreigners who were unfamiliar with the region, many would simply say they were from Huancayo or the Mantaro Valley.

Avelinos were guerrilla volunteers so named for their response to President Andrés Avelino Cáceres’ call to resist Chilean occupation during the war of the Pacific in the 1880s.

My justification for this elementary theory is based on the work of Stuart Rockefeller (1998) as well as Thomas Abercrombie (1998). Rockefeller writes that festivals allow for the abstraction of traditional rituals from their contexts in contrast with fiestas (parties). These customs are staged for explicit focus by a non-participating, observing audience, creating a teachable setting for campesinos (peasants) about their customs and the nation. I reverse Rockefeller’s analytical operation in the setting of the roundtable: the appearance of these folkloric practices, often condensed or extracted from the larger ritual dance-dramas of which they are a part, lend a kind of framework of social meanings to technocratic logics in an act of reverse translation. Allen also provides
important context for this operation through exploration of the importance of coca-chewing generally in constructing social meaning in the Andes (1981).

Interestingly, the rebellion of Tupac Amaru II in 1780 predated the watershed moment for the Western Hemisphere of Haitian revolution in 1791. The example of the Haitian revolution inspired a dread of rebellions in ruling elites and prompted a host of preventative repressions to forestall the same from occurring in their states (Ferrer 1999). While Amaru II’s rebellion had a similar effect locally, it lies beyond the scope of this dissertation to assess its hemispheric significance.

The Spanish Constitution of Cádiz, ratified in 1812, featured in Huancayo’s own history. The constitution enshrined certain “universal” rights though they favored white racial groups and men in particular. Shortly after its passage a collection of Huancainos publicly upheld its tenants in the central plaza, giving birth to the plaza’s name, la plaza de la constitución (the plaza of the constitution) instead of the more common Peruvian nomenclature of plaza de armas.

David Nugent and Deborah Poole argue that Peru has only had a tenuous form of centralization, as evidenced by the fact that the state is effectively absent in many rural areas. To be clear, I distinguish centralization in this dissertation in an assessment of democratic representation of indigenous democrats in governing institutions which historically have not reflected their voices in decision-making. In contrast, these scholars analyze the practical existence of state institutions and activities in the regions, and understand deficits in their extend and elaboration as a weak and loose form of centralization. See Julio Cotler in La República (2014a), Nugent (1997), and Poole (2004) for more on this previous argument.

The city’s moniker attests to this former role in the national formation. In 1822 the Supreme Delegate of Peru, José Bernardo de Tagle y Portocarrero, conferred the city with the title la ciudad incontestable (the uncontested city, or city incapable of being defeated) in homage to its citizens’ service in the rebel army and their resistance during a multi-year occupation by colonial forces.

According to this local narrative, the interest of Spanish colonizers in seizing and consolidating large parcels of land (practices which eventually led to the hacienda land-ownership system) was impeded through this pact.

This renewed scholarly attention to race was refracted through the warped prism of violence in the case of Peru, resulting in a parallel wave of self-examination, though this one more rankled and soul-searching. The debate centered on whether North American anthropologists recognized the structural repression of many Peruvians who lived in the rural parts of the country. Orin Starn, for example, questioned whether U.S. anthropologists bore responsibility for overlooking political discontent in the years leading up to the outbreak of violence, as evidenced by monographs depicting their lives as timeless and apolitical when politics would soon claim over 70,000 lives (1991). Starn’s conclusion – that even the most physically remote citizens of the central sierra were not lost to history, nor without politics – characterized a transformation brewing in these years on the contribution of indigenous and peasant actors in violence and politics.

Parenthetically, the social life of Huancainos reflected the folkloric practices mentioned in the previous section. The cortamonte celebrations. Huancayo’s Santiago
holiday, and saints’ day celebrations around the valley were central events organizing the annual calendar and structured the agricultural life of the valley. These celebrations color my memories of Huancayo’s social life. See Mendoza for further discussion of the structure and meaning of these events (2000).

Rojas-Perez estimates that as of 2015 the state had identified only one-tenth of an estimated 18,000 disappeared persons and recovered only one-fifth of their remains (2017, 21).

Moreover, my experience of Huancayo’s professional development community is that it is small enough that even broad strokes in these pages can be revealing, necessitating confidentiality.

This data appears in the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Database accessed in April of 2017 at http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO.

Wacquant and Ortner both assign this influence to the seminal thinkers Karl Marx and Michel Foucault, respectively. Though I will not pursue this taxonomy here, it seems pertinent to outline their thinking. In the words of a recent summary by Tejaswini Ganti, the Marxian variant on neoliberalism views the topic as a “structural force that affects people’s lives and life-chances” (2014, 90). According to these thinkers, principles of marketplace-based competition galvanized the transformation of institutions and policies, with special emphasis on rolling-back public services and social welfare benefits traditionally provided by states in the West after World War II. Foucauldian-inspired scholars, conversely, conceive of neoliberalism as an “ideology of governance that shapes subjectivities” (Ganti 2014, 90). Foucaultian-inspired thinkers view the widespread dissemination of competition and marketization as resulting in self-disciplining, self-monitoring, and self-fashioning of individuals who internalize such economistic logics as prerequisites for contemporary life.

This is to say that Weber’s work, particularly as it concerns bureaucracies, continues to serve as a touchstone in this critical scholarship on states. See Michal Kravel-Tovi for an example of scholarship combining Weber’s understandings of bureaucracy with critical approaches to state formation (2012).

Taylor also initiates a break with the colonial positioning of performance in academic production as exclusively referencing the discursive products by integrating research participants in knowledge production from writing to distribution and analysis.

See also Krupa and Nugent (2015) and Tate (2015) for more on this internalization of, and affective attachment to, states in the Andes.

See Reuters (2016).

Chapter 1

1 To define this amorphous concept, I draw upon a recent study which defines political will as “the extent of committed support among key decision makers for a particular policy solution to a particular problem” (Post, Raile, and Raile 2010, 659).

2 Though admittedly such practices have been eroded by values of meritocracy implemented in the civil service. See Auyero (2001).
3 One much-loved publication in academic circles titled *QUEHACER* (work, duty) was an example of this practice. The monthly magazine was published the Centro de Estudios y Promoción de Desarrollo (Center for Study and Promotion of Development, DESCO). DESCO announced it would cease publication of *QUEHACER* during my field research for unrelated reasons.

4 I characterize the agricultural reforms in this limited way because they are most often associated with the suspension of democracy and leftist societal interventions of General Velasco. However, the reforms spanned several governments of different ideological persuasions. This diversity of ideological leanings entailed programs – ostensibly categorized as agricultural reforms – which varied widely with regard to General Velasco’s intent to socially reengineer class relations of rural Peru. Readers interested in a more advanced review of the agricultural reforms refer to Mayer for further discussion (2002b).

5 Inflation posed a thorny political problem in the years leading to Fujimori’s election. The economist John Sheahan characterized the political elite’s views of the economic turmoil caused by inflation as “of secondary importance at most and that too much attention to them could block essential structural reforms” necessary to fulfill General Velasco’s dream of redistributing wealth and demolishing privileges concentrated in the upper classes (1999, 132). Additionally, between Belaúnde’s first administration in 1963 and Fujimori’s in 1990, state-led programs to address inflation undermined the public’s confidence in the state’s management of the economy and set the stage for the Fujimori’s embrace of private sector alternatives through a program of neoliberal transformation (Sheahan 1999).

6 Anthropologists also critique the uses of publicity for such measurements. They point to their political and anti-political signaling effects (J. Ferguson 1990), and the desire of national governments to “negotiate soft loans from international financial institutions to obtain foreign exchange” through favorable statistical representations (Mayer 2002a, 321).

7 This point references critical development studies and comparative historical studies of industrialization which critique development supervised through centralized administration, whether conducted by governments or NGOs. These studies advocate for the cultivation, and scaling-up of local organizing as an alternative. Building these “social foundations of development” offers the benefits of ensuring participant ownership and responsibility for their own growth while augmenting their repertoire of skills and occupational relationships. This argument may be indirectly observed in the works of such writers as James Given (1990), Robert Nisbet (1975), James Scott (1998), and Linda Weiss and John Hobson (1995) among others. While space precludes me from making an extended case for this argument here, I want to acknowledge the diligence of Dr. Grace Goodell in developing this theme into a superlative course of graduate study.

8 Even from a technocratic perspective, Peru’s neoliberal growth has fallen short of predictions for poverty reduction. The Peruvian economist Efraín Gonzales de Olarte argues that state reforms supported Peru’s extraordinary short term economic expansion, but that in the long-term growth is undermined by the failure to implement associated
social welfare and redistribution policies to address economic inequality engendered by neoliberalism (2007).

9 I present research that confirms this in chapter 2.

10 For further discussion on the interaction between the cultural politics of mass violence and democratic institutions see Green (1999), Manz (2005), Nelson (1999) and Tate (2007) for perspectives on Latin America.

11 The stakes are high for these interpretations. At the time of this writing, the structural side of this debate prevails in the form of several legal rulings against former state agents and insurgents. Opponents of the structural view gained a highly significant victory in the pardon of the former President Alberto Fujimori in January of 2018, although Fujimori was recently reincarcerated on an order of the Supreme Court (Zarate and Casey 2018).

12 Paulo Drinot and Kimberly Theidon suggest that the binary debate between these interpretations is misleading (2009; 2003). They argue for greater scrutiny of groups whose voices go unheard in Peruvian society – including Quechua-speakers and rural women, among others – whose narratives would reveal polyvalent interpretations of the conflict. The binary structure they critique is reproduced in these pages, however, as a means of illustrating the metanarrative limits in the national media and promulgated by public officials.

13 Evidence for this impulse was found in the considerable energy the press devoted to analyzing the reasons for the decelerating “Peruvian miracle,” or rate of GDP growth during my fieldwork.

14 The Peruvian political scientist Steven Levitsky noted that, contrary to narratives circulating among the pundit class, there was nothing wrong with Peruvians in the Andean regions casting votes for politicians who they mistrusted. Levitsky, drawing on writing by Meléndez, theorized that these votes could possibly be understood as “anti-system” votes for conservative candidates who promised to reintroduce rural development and investment. Marginalized rural populations long neglected by lawmakers may have been prepared to overlook corruption in the candidates’ personal histories so long as they promised development projects. I draw upon these themes of the neglect of rural areas and the popularity of conservative candidates in the section on corruption below. See Meléndez (2014a) and Levitsky (2014).

15 I later learned that this phrase has an older pedigree related to catholic priests’ objections to violence against the indigenous population in the early era of colonization. During colonization, laws passed by the crown prohibiting this violence proved hard to enforce. The phrase therefore is not unique to Peru because of its origins in the regional character of the Spanish administration of the colonies at the time.

16 Nivardo did not qualify the statement further. He only suggested that his job was to improve upon the public’s mistrust. This forthright assessment of politicians reflected his own commitment to transparency: the work that lay ahead of him to bridge the distrust between the public and elected officials. His candor was likely an expression of the coordinating roundtable’s explicit goal to repair this image; see the coordinating roundtable’s efforts surrounding the Governance Accord in chapter 4.
The failure of Peru’s official institutions and unofficial associations as a result of the political violence did not stop at the unions, but extended to various entities including the primary political parties during the conflict (including the APRA) and the armed forces. De Olarte argues that unions were also weakened by the inflationary period when workers deserted in search of alternative sources of income. Already weakened, the unions posed a reduced threat to the neoliberal Fuji-shock which further hastened their decline (de Olarte 2007, 30).

In Aurelio’s words, “Había sufrido (los-) las consecuencias de la guerra interna: halar de la política era sinónimo de halar de que es terrorista no? Entonces por lo tonto los derechos políticos de esos personas se alivien, se limiten, como dice no?” Though it was true that the armed forces switched from this indiscriminate approach to a more targeted, intelligence-based, strategy in the later years of the war, their use of terror had a disproportionate impact. Extra-legal human rights violations, including forced disappearances and murder, left lasting marks on their reputation up to the present day.

VRAEM is often used as a shorthand in press accounts to describe a geographic area spanning the regions of Ayacucho, Cuzco, Huancavelica, and Junin. This unofficial space is distinguished, according to the Peruvian government, by high rates of impoverishment and a complex topography which allows insurgents to continue to evade state authorities.

The construction of the red zones and the reality of their lack of state services corresponds to what the anthropologists Veena Das and Deborah Poole have called the continual re-founding of states’ law- and order-making imperatives through reference to spaces of wildness (2004).

Formalization procedures for re-centralization were rumored to be in the works during 2014 under the auspices of the Constitutional Committee of the Congress. Many in fact argued against the merits of re-centralization of the state. Others simply neglected to support decentralization as it stood in 2014. Meléndez took the later route, see (2014d).

Seligmann documents similar stereotypes of indigenous identity, particularly as it regards cholaje (literally referring to a racial category between Indian and white, cholo/a is typically used in a pejorative manner or to intimate shifts in sexuality, gender and morality as it concerns persons of Indian backgrounds, particularly market women). Seligmann studied campaigns the ideas about race and cholaje in campaigns to cleanse and modernize Cusco’s permanent and itinerant street markets. See Seligmann (2004).

This was particularly true of the Presupuesto Participativo Basado en Resultados (Participatory Budget Based on Results or PPBR). I outline the PPBR further as it regarded participatory budgeting below.

Even the auto-golpe (self-coup), where Fujimori ordered tanks into Lima’s Plaza de Armas to dismiss the Congress of the Republic by force, did not diminish people’s estimation of Fujimori’s commitment to rural areas. And Felicidad was not alone in this view. As the economist John Sheahan pointed out, Fujimori’s self-coup was met with a resounding silence from the business community (1999).

Keiko Fujimori narrowly lost the general election in 2016 after a runoff vote. She remained at the head of her congressional party after the election which obtained a majority position in congress. At the time of this writing Keiko had been preemptively
imprisoned prior to trial on corruption charges over funds allegedly paid to her and her congressional party during the 2016 campaign. Though imprisonment will significantly hinder her ability to launch a new bid for the presidency, the words of Meléndez, cited in a recent Reuters news article on Fujimorism’s resiliency, ought to be given serious consideration when assessing her future. He said, “‘This is not the first time Fujimorism has been in a terminal crisis,’ said political scientist Carlos Meléndez [sic]. ‘It’s not the first time Fujimorism has had a leader in prison. It's not the first time it cries political persecution. It's not the first time it loses public support’” (Reuters 2018).

Desplazados have viewed this basis in merit-assessment itself as inherently discriminatory, arguing that eligibility restrictions undermined the state’s claims that these programs constitute development since they do not benefit citizens universally. I detail their claims through Luisa’s history in chapter 2.

As if to support Beatriz’s point, I produced from my memory a remark by Teofilo that the way Cerrón talked in public made Junín seem like a region full of hospital patients; he publicized his administrations’ building of hospitals endlessly. Friends from my neighborhood had also told me of the substandard hospital care in Junín, so I had assumed that these projects would be widely popular, but Beatriz voiced an alternative view.

Sometimes translated as “iron-fist” policies, the uses of política de mano dura are multiple and overlapping. At the time of this writing the phrase could be used to refer to hardline policies against crime in states struggling with extensive criminal activity in Central America such as El Salvador, Honduras, or Guatemala. In previous decades, the phrase was associated with policies against corruption and with authoritarian governments which employed terror and violence against purported “enemies of the state.”

This was just one scale at which there was overlap between existing institutional functions and the coordinating roundtable. The Peruvian political scientist Martín Tanaka observed in 2002 that the structure of the coordinating roundtable system supplemented and duplicated the activities of the congress and ministries as well (2002). Although Tanaka did note that the roundtables further integrated people into MIDIS’ Fondo de Cooperación para el Desarrollo Social (Cooperation Fund for Social Development, FONCODES to use its Spanish acronym) by involving the public in drafting “more far-reaching development plans” (Tanaka 2002, 20).

In chapter 4, I present the Governance Accord in greater detail, though I want to briefly touch on it here for the purposes of illustrating the coordinating roundtable’s decline.

There are likenesses between Starn’s critique of Peruvian anthropology during the 1970s and the debate concerning the “ontological turn” in anthropology. The critique by Michael Cepek of researchers’ tendency to understand their research participants’ “statements seriously as declarations of multiple real worlds,” for example echoes Starn’s charge against scholars’ understanding of their words as examples of abstract ecological or cosmological models at the cost of their pragmatic effects (Cepek 2016, 624).

Chapter 2
In this chapter, I will include in endnotes Spanish translations of phrasing, as the individual choices of words illustrate for the dual-language literate the vernacular contours of Huancayo. In her own words, she stated: “La ley 28592 nos dicen que deben tener, para reparación, un terreno propio para empezar un proyecto…pués que nos ayuden para estos inclusiones.”

This confusion is not helped by divergences in definitions of the term between English and Spanish. In the Merriam-Webster entry in English there is no mention of isolation or passivity. The Spanish definition defines the term as “the act and effect of resenting [reflexive],” and further defines the verb cognate as “1. Begin to falter, 2. Having feeling, grief, or anger about something. 3. Feeling pain or discomfort in any part of the body, due to a past illness or illness” (my translation, Diccionario de la lengua española de la Real Academia Española Online, s.v. “resentirse,” accessed December 23, 2018, https://dle.rae.es/).

To be sure, in interviews many people expressed anger, grief, bitterness, and indignation among many types of emotional upset. For the purposes of this chapter, I think it would be less productive, if not sophistic by the contemporary standards of anthropological inquiry, to categorize these affective states.

This chapter will rely upon distant and social memory as distinct from the anthropological study of memory more broadly, which is a category in its own right calling for greater consideration than would be possible in these pages.

For other examples of which lie on the half of the continuum closest to Nordstrom see Manz (Manz 2005), Riaño-Alcalá (2008) and Whyte et al. (2012).

For other examples of which lie on the half of the continuum closest to Lubkemann see Malkki (1992) and Utas (2005).

Ana Maria Alonso’s ethnography of the Mexican frontier arrives at a similar position on Mexican peasants’ construction of the past in the form of ‘traditional’ values and meanings. These narratives in turn mobilized peasant resistance to the encroachment of the state and market economy. See Alonso (1995).

My research participants’ accounts of these years were incredibly frightening. They told of students dragged from classes at the hands of masked men, and of the bodies of the disappeared buried on the grounds of a now-abandoned arboretum which adjoins campus. Others noted the presence of one student militant group in particular, the Alliance Revolucionario Estudiantil – Rojo (Revolutionary Student Alliance – Red, known by its acronym ARE - Rojo). See the Final Report of the CVR for references to the forcible removal of students in broad daylight (Peru 2004, 93).

The incumbent candidate for regional president of Junín, Vladimir Cerrón, was shaped by this history as his own father taught at UNCP and was killed during this period.

Desplazados feel unable to return to their homes of origin for reasons of ongoing risks to their personal safety and their integration into their new surroundings. I explore this theme in detail in chapter three in the section “The Candidate Forum: Shaping Democratic Mutuality” regarding the USAID sponsored Programa de Apoyo al Repoblamiento y Desarrollo de Zonas de Emergencia.

Other histories determining eligibility for individual reparations include victims of crimes committed by the Peruvian armed forces, or reparations for service in certain,
officially documented, *rondas campesinas*. See discussion of this term’s definition in endnote 14 of this chapter.

12 I should emphasize that their betrayal is a retrospective interpretation by desplazados. A straightforward characterization of being caught in-between two warring parties simplifies the complex intersections of ideology, power, and unexpected consequences of violence as the conflict dragged on. In recent years researchers have contextualized the role of peasants through examples of changing allegiances, and uncovered evidence of local disputes playing out in the guise of ideological divides (Stern 1998). There is evidence that peasants at first held sympathy for the revolutionary aims of Shining Path, particularly where the insurgents’ actions appealed to “the desires in an impoverished countryside for a more just order” (Starn 1998, 229). According to these arguments, as the antagonists’ violence increasingly touched upon nearly every aspect of peasant life, people lost sympathy for the insurgents’ cause. To these local dynamics we can add the influence of the Peruvian armed forces and police in encouraging or cajoling peasants into confronting insurgents themselves. Consequently, as the anthropologist Orin Starn reminds us, we ought not to forget the individual agency inherent to peasants in choosing their own path. I view the interpretations of my research participants in the current day not as canonical accounts of this history but rather their explicitly moral recollections of the conflict which inform their resentment and motivate political action in the current day.

13 In Huberto’s words: “El estado tiene una deuda social, tienen social [sic] porque todavía no está resarcendo a la población.”

14 *Rondas campesinos* (and to a lesser extent their urban counterpart, the *rondas vecinales* or neighborhood civil defense patrols), deployed according to varying levels of coercion from the Peruvian armed forces. However, the *rondas* cannot be categorically viewed as a product of state oppression. Starn for example dispels the notion that they were simply a reproduction of the “strategic hamlets” counterinsurgency strategy employed in Guatemala stemming from U.S. military deployment to Vietnam (1998). Shining Path’s brutal attacks on peasant communities led them to embrace organized self-defense (1998, 150).

The struggle to define the *rondas* however remains an enduring object of academic interest. The *rondas* serve variously as a stand in for such forces as capitalism, imperialism or as a peasant achievement in their own right [Stern observed this academic over-interest in the *rondas* even prior to the end of the conflict, see (1998)]. The most recent interpretation by the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto counters those who portray the *rondas* as “defenders of a pastoral tradition,” and positions them as evidence of an organic middle class arising out of the birth of neoliberalism in Peru. This latest interpretation is contested by Peruvian anthropologists. See María Eugenia Ulfe (2014).

15 In his words: “Nos hemos organizaba alrededor del pueblo que nada tiene que ver a en este problema. ¿No solamente los terroristas, sino también usaron el mismo ejército, la misma policía no? ¿Entonces estábamos entre dos paredes o estábamos entre la pared y la espada no?”

16 Residents of the Mantaro Valley have traditionally integrated pasture-scale agriculture and livestock husbandry with seasonal work in the mining industry since the birth of the republic, if not earlier. See Long and Roberts (1978) and (1984) and Mallon (1995).
Fears of eviction gained national notoriety following a number of desalojados (evictions) which had ended in violence in the fall of 2014. The intersection of police impunity, home ownership, and the expansion of financial capitalism met when news cameras captured the killing of a citizen by police in the process of eviction in Cajamarca.

I use quotation marks here around development programs, perhaps ostentatiously, as a means to call out the fact that these programs constituted something closer to a form of social welfare benefits programs.

In 1970 Fuenzalida noted that this term had an older history originating in Peru’s racial hierarchies. He remarked “an indigenous person will not spontaneously use the term ‘indio’ [Indian] but will prefer to point out himself as llajtaruna, man of puebleo, or as haciendaruna, man of hacienda. If rushed to say it in Spanish, he will call himself a natural, which is equivalent to saying: ‘a lugareño’” (my translation, Fuenzalida 2009, 153).

In Esmerelda’s words, “Por eso es que la gente, las poblaciones, cuando lo ver el ejército, esa sustenta algunos- de se ha quedado resentimiento.”

When one considers that former military officers who contributed to counter-insurgency have held positions of public office, it is easy to see why people hold this conclusion (consider the examples of then Minister of the Interior, Daniel Urresti, or even that of President Humala himself).

Using the term “social ritual” to designate the thick ethnographic operation going on behind language is an unwieldy generalization to analyze the process of hate speech, though it is preserved here for fidelity to Butler’s original language.

It is clear to me that by using performativity here in conjunction with my more expanded use of performance risks a confusion of concepts. Nevertheless, I offer performativity to understand a component of displaced experience, rather than as an analytical framework, and trust this brief interlude will not burden the reader.

There is of course the permanent exhibition at the Museum of the Nation in Lima, which is quite informative. Its materials carry a national perspective reflecting the findings of the Final Report of the CVR. At the time of my fieldwork the new national memorial located in Lima, dedicated as a national monument of remembrance, had yet to be completed.

In the press the memorial is often referred to first by its Spanish name, and second by its Quechua name. This practice illustrates a curious turn of cultural interpretation and the lack of familiarity of the wider population with the memorial. Journalists persist in this practice despite the memorial’s singular Quechua language inscription, adjacent to the front entrance: “Yalpana Wasi – Wiñay Yalpanapa” (House of Memory for Eternal Remembrance [Casa de la Memoria Para Recordar Eternamente]). I will take the liberty here of referring to Yalpana Wasi – Wiñay Yalpanapa, or the lugar de memoria (site of memory) as Huancainos often spoke of it; as the memorial. This choice reflects a need to convey to an English-speaking audience the practical functions the edifice served, as well as how the wider population of Huancayo understood its function (if, typically, only from a distance).
Because of these comments, and his statements in favor of Huancaíno’s land tenure, desplazados tended to be distrustful of Unchupaico.

I only observed the desplazado community to be involved in consultation and publicity of events organized by the memorial’s staff.

That is, assuming that such a distanced subject position were possible at all in the aftermath of violence.

The garrison continues in this role as home to the Base Contrasubversiva de Huachocolpa (Counter-Insurgent Base of Huachocolpa). The base had made recent headlines as home to units accused of human rights violations during raids in the region of the VRAEM in 2014. See Aguirre (2014).

Nobody remarked on the oddity of asking those who may not have the ability to write to sign in to a memorial, nor on the sinister possibilities which could emerge from a record of attendance at a memorial dedicated to political violence.

Mantas are used to carry infants or lightweight effects in the style of a backpack. One often sees a pair of eyes peak out from the back of a woman who carries such a load. They have the additional capability to be unfurled with their contents laid out on the ground, as itinerant merchants will sometimes do. Their designs typically feature alternating bands of solid colors which signal town of origin of the wearer in the Mantaro Valley.

In Mercedes’ words: “La política de violencia en el Perú esa veíamos un constante. El historia [sic] de Perú básicamente ha tenido eventos de violencia desde el época de los incas hasta la fecha. Entonces el pueblo Peruano tiene- tenemos ya instalado esa actitud.”

The Defensoría has been involved in arbitrating conflicts between district governments and international mining corporations in the region of Cajamarca in one notable example of this type of activity.

Perhaps it is no coincidence that peasant and labor organizations were highlighted in this slide. These groups often present opposition to neoliberal policies to retrench social welfare programs or restructure the ownership of water, lands, and sub-surface mineral rights in favor of corporate ventures.

Mercedes spoke: “Hoy la ciudadano aquí lo que está confrontando es evidente violencia en las calles, evidente violencia en los hogares, a nivel del estado, existe.”

Mercedes said: “Nuestra cultura hizo nos duele y en nunca forma de poder nos ver de poder nos aceptar como somos con nuestros errores con nuestros faltas y poder mejorar.”

She indicated this responsibility through the choice of the nos pronoun for the collective “us,” and of plural possessive tense of compound verb tener que (we must). Mercedes also supported her position by referring to a work by Leonardo Rafael Cevallos Pérez entitled Política y Violencia en la Historia del Perú (Politics and Violence in the History of Peru).

This situation, in which women call upon a man to take responsibility for the public sphere from a position within that sphere, bears a similarity to the Madres del Plaza de Mayo who subverted gender associations which typically construed women with the private sphere and men with the public. See Taylor (1997).

This is compounded by the fact that it was faceless account, amplifying the quality of a threat with whose capacities cannot, by definition, be reckoned with.
As part of her proposal to redefine performance in the context of populations typically excluded from performative products, Taylor considers whether non-European words such as the Arawak term *aririn* might aid in her project. Described by Taylor as collective acts of performance which claimed “aesthetic as well as social, political and religious legitimacy,” her interpretation of *aririn* is an inspiration in framing how differing parties’ performative behaviors intertwine historical as well as cultural legitimacy in their displays (2003, 15). I draw upon this example to understand public interactions between state functionaries and desplazados at routinized events such as this.

In this sense the women’s activities recall similar instances in Latin America where citizens have been forced to mediate their own insertion into the structures of the state. Goldstein’s notion of “substantial citizenship,” used to characterize a variety of actions taken by barrio residents to secure their community, for example, resembles their activity (2005, 222).

Sexual assault had gained increasing coverage in the national press, particularly after the installation of a new public bus system in Lima. Shortly after its inauguration, multiple accounts of women who suffered assaults on crowded buses underpinned nationwide calls for acknowledgement of the scale of violence against women.

Echoing motifs in Christian theology regarding the virtues of the poor, Louis’ sociological mapping resembled Fassin’s distinction of *ressentiment* (resentment) from resentment. According to Fassin, *ressentiment* drew its foundations from the moral philosophy of Fredrick Nietzsche as a moral inversion by the weak: “a condition that characterizes the repressed feeling of the dominated and legitimizes their reaction against the dominant” (2013, 253). Louis similarly positioned desplazados (and himself at their head) as one of the dominated in such an inversion.

In Conrado’s words: “El estado nunca da nada sin es por exigencia.”

He spoke, “¿Qué estado va a reconocer la lucha de una población oprimida? ¿Qué estado va reconocer la lucha de una población que ha sufrido la violencia? Más bien trata de minimizar, opacar, olvidar, y a que echar la tierra para que todo se olvide. Tenemos una trayectoria de lucha, nos tratamos de siempre de sacar a luz para que cumpla el estado estas leyes.”

My mistake was likely rooted in the fact that patrimony is a legalistic term applied by the Ministry of Culture to areas deemed to be national heritage. Architectural styles, archeological sites, musical genres and varieties of dance, among other areas, are designated by the term.

He said, “Hoy día nos sentimos, recordar la situación (sic) que ha pasado de ochenta a dos mil, ya pasado en Perú, en región Junín. Muchas vidas hemos perdido. Esta situación por el empezó ya dado la matanza incluir (sic) de ambas sectores, tanto del sendero luminoso y también por las fuerzas armadas del estado. ¡Hemos perdió (sic), inocentemente, la vida de nuestras familias! No había respito (sic).”

This sentence perhaps appealed to a latent desire for autochthony by those who feel that their endurance of the violence in the Mantaro Valley has earned them the right to belong.

The use of the word “respect” is notable in this sense as it arises in desplazados’ descriptions of the ongoing failure by the state to provide reparations and community support at the regional and national levels.
Contextualization, in Briggs and Bauman’s usage, resembles closely *intertextuality*, that staple of literary theory, developed by Julia Kristeva (see discussion in Bauman 2005). Kristeva was inspired by Mikhail Bakhtin’s work on the dialogism of texts. See Bakhtin for a discussion of dialogism (1984).

In the President’s words, “Destrozaron cooperativas, empresas comunales! En este mismo momento la fe de la nuestros (sic) autoridades.”

Corruption involving such financing and obscure political links was at the forefront of the national press in 2014 with a nation-wide manhunt for one such political fixer, Belaunde Lossio, who was alleged to have links to President Humala and the First Lady (Muñoz 2014).

Seligmann highlights how these very same notions of decorum and cleanliness have been used to oppress groups from mestizo and indigenous backgrounds. See Seligmann (2004) and Weismantel (2001).

The transformation of regional and local politics according to the dictates of organized crime is particularly troubling. See warnings in the conclusion of Auyero and Berti (2015), or editorial content on this subject by Gustavo Gorriti, Carlos Rivera Paz, or Martín Tanaka.

Chapter 3

1 It was not uncommon for me to arrive and find a meeting of some kind underway. Many meetings were arranged at the last minute, and the staff would keep me updated as best they could.

2 The addition here of the ampersand symbol in place of the traditional spelling of *indignados* was an initial signal of the progressive stance of the group toward gender and class. Doing away with a specific reference to either the male or female cognates of the term, the ampersand signaled that their number used an inclusive foundation to understand their purpose. The symbolic gesture suggested an expansive understanding of who constitutes a laborer and has a voice in deciding their future.

3 If one constricted the data to the study’s concept of “macro-regions” for the Center, South and West, this figure was more than 60%.

4 The students’ sign at the coordinating roundtable reflected the fears of older workers that perhaps they were to be next in line to have their benefits cut. It reproduced a political cartoon from the left-leaning newspaper La República. The cartoon satirized President Humala’s attempts to reassure existing workers that, once the law had been passed, they would not be laid off only to be reemployed under the new regime of scant protections. In the cartoon a man in a business suit stands at the president’s side and audibly agrees with him, but privately thinks to himself “I will lay them off and hire completely different workers.” It illustrated how little trust there was between laborers and management and expressed their fears that, without stipulated protections, corporations would do little to protect them.

5 It was unclear, when the press called the young people *Pulpines*, whether this was an instance of reclaiming an injurious word by those injured. An alternative explanation was that by applying *Pulpín* to the young opposition, the press sought to characterize
lawmakers as deceitful and call out an act of taking advantage of young-people’s inexperience as the primary group affected by the legislation.

This framing in the national debate suggests a kind of stock narrative structure of news articles, in which the press, by dubbing the young people as inexperienced, primes their indignation at being taken advantage of. There were however more nuanced explanations. One journalist framed the popular backlash led by the multi-sector coalition as representative of a generational divide against neoliberal policies. Jose Alejandro Godoy wrote, “Those who had protested are the children of the middle class that had sacrificed with the promise of a better future through the adjustment and new market rules. These young people, after a quarter of a century of the Fuji-shock, want a better quality in their labor relation and more money in their pockets” (my translation, Godoy 2015). According to Godoy, young-people’s experience of coming of age under neoliberalism’s requirements coincided with their feeling that the government also had exhausted its promise that a good life was just around the corner. Consequently, young people no longer felt compelled to sacrifice on anyone else’s behalf.

She brought to life Victor Turner’s observation that performance is an activity in which we make sense of ourselves; in his words, “performances are, in a way, reflexive, in performing he reveals himself to himself” (Turner 1987, 81). The performer thereby makes their subject known not only to others, but also to themselves.

In contrast, Noah Tamarkin for example discusses affect and intimacy separately from relational personhood. Tamarkin states, “Affect, emotions, and intimacy are sites of inquiry that demand a particular kind of attention because much of what they seek to account for is not easily apprehended or named” (2018, 315).

The political scientist James C. Scott formulated a similar thought in a canonical historical collection. Scott, in fact, pressed the matter of elite projects of domination further than Nuijten, stating, “we cannot simply take it for granted that state elites have a ‘hegemonic project’ at all. This must be an empirical question, not a presupposition. Second, and more important, although one may occasionally be able to speak of a hegemonic project of state elites, one must always speak of popular culture and resistance to such projects in the plural” (1994, xi).

Ritual as a field of anthropological research in some sense prefigured the rise of performance as an area of study. Turner’s own professional interest in the two subjects spanned decades, reflected in the sequence of his works from The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure in 1969, to Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society in 1975, and The Anthropology of Performance in 1986. The way in which Taylor surveyed anthropologists studying ritual to formulate her approach to performance, moreover, makes the close relationship of the two fields clear.

I take the same approach to the general decline of popular engagement with the roundtable.

This process of reflection and action most closely resembles how the anthropologist Conrad Arensberg theorized that social groupings coalesced. See Arensberg (1972).

Official definitions of poverty by MIDIS divide the population into several sections, of which extreme poverty represents the most impoverished section of the population as measured by their expenditures of Soles per day. See Mayer (2002a) and Sheahan (1999) for further discussion of these divisions.
By including these poll figures here, I do not mean to offer an endorsement of the accuracy of the poll in question. In fact, from a purely anthropological perspective this use of polling to ascertain the ideological leanings of the populace is problematic, as it assumes a uniform body – Peruvians – who carry one of four different sorts of shared ideologies which have not been previously demonstrated as coherent social practices. Further, the poll implies a positivist conclusion: that based on ideological outlook people proceed to make political choices. On the contrary, there is evidence that people do not act according to what social scientists modeling their behavior would expect. See Levitsky (2014). I have included this use of polling to demonstrate the opposition, reflected in the press, to the development volunteers’ positions.

In writing this portion I was faced with a trade-off regarding ethnographic representation and the remaining space available to me. I could either document the desplazados’ appeals and reactions to the candidates or the politicians’ speeches, but not both. Because my focus is on performative displays, I have chosen to omit the content of the eight candidates and candidate delegates who appeared that day. This choice is further justified by the fact that the three candidates who, according to the consensus of the volunteers and the press, were the frontrunners of the campaign who did not elect to appear in person (they were Unchupaico, Cerrón, and Nidia Vilchez). Arguably, these three were the most significant political actors in the campaign and as such their interactions with desplazados and the coordinating roundtable deserve closer examination. For this reason, I have opted to dedicate space to the desplazados’ interaction with Unchupaico in the following section.

This action to embellish their discursive and embodied knowledge again recalls the understanding of entextualization outlined by Briggs and Bauman, see (1992).

For more information on this migration in the context of the Mantaro Valley, see de la Cadena (1988) and Long and Roberts (1984, 1978).

Along with the limits on monetary allocations, the limitation on reparations for collective projects confirmed desplazados’ beliefs that the state acted in bad-faith. This is not to say that morality has no role in politics in Huancayo. Citizens exercise moral judgement through condemnation of corruption and criminality, or in popular outrage over right and wrong behaviors as matters for public regulation.

In this section I rely upon participant observation, without the use of recording devices. For this reason, I am unable to supply direct quotations in this section.

Expanding health services appealed to many groups, as many people had to travel to Lima in order to obtain specialized care.

The political scientist Fernando Tuesta attributes the mismatch between party loyalties between the regional president and the composition of the regional councils as a byproduct of a change to elections for regional authorities in 2009. After the change, Tuesta argues, seats have been allocated in relation to percentages of votes so that absolute majorities in the regional councils corresponding with the candidate-elect’s party are harder to achieve. See Tuesta (2014).

I can only speculate as to whether their refusal to appear was evidence of disinterest in desplazados as a constituency in the period prior to the first round of voting, or whether something more mundane was at work.
It was true that the threat of violence was real. Shining Path had survived the capture of several of its leaders and mutated into a narcotics-funded insurgency, which was still active in Junín, and the VAREM in 2014 and 2015. In the city the public’s fears were stoked when graffiti was discovered on the walls of a school one morning in November 2014. The tag displayed a red flag with a sickle and hammer and accompanying references to subversives, raising fears of the analogous start to the political violence in 1980.

Chapter 4

1 Predictably, the candidates addressed the Governance Accord in their speeches insofar as the document related to their own campaigns, rather than as a mechanism of the larger production of national statecraft. Summarizing five candidates presenting over two different rounds of debate during the first signing of the accord would rapidly exceed the space available for my argument.

2 For more on the sociological analysis of asymmetrically positioned groups under the state see Abrams (1988) and Gramsci (1971).

3 There are linguistic grounds for extending our reading of the Governance Accord beyond its written inscriptions as well. Writing on the expansion of Arabic in online interactions which bucked standardization efforts, Becky Schulthies argues that YouTube commentaries show heteroglossic forces. She argues that for an American audience these forces are otherwise unseen because American folk theories of writing conceive of written forms as a direct transmission mechanism for meaning. In truth, she writes, “Some forms of writing are meant to intertextually evoke, through multimodal signals, ways of speaking tied to historically significant social distinctions and thus involve heterographic functions of writing that go beyond simple denotative encoding and decoding” (Schulthies 2014, 41). While Schulthies’ project focused on a very different context of the role of digital media in spreading non-standard functions of writing and associated social distinctions, her point that writing is not an unmediated, direct technology for conveying of meaning applies in the context of the volunteers’ written contributions to the Governance Accord.

4 I reference here the initial draft as opposed to the final, signed draft created as a publicity product for the coordinating roundtable. This initial version was used for the signing and differed from the final draft which compiled the signed pages along with more expository sections into a longer document.

5 I review in an endnote the differences between indigenous communities defined by the law and indigenous mestizos more broadly. Please see chapter 1, endnote 4.

6 In the original Spanish, regional policy agreement 4.5 reads: “Promoción de la institucionalización de los procesos de asociatividad municipal de La Mancomunidad Municipal del Corredor Mantaro, de la Mancomunidad de Los Andes, el fortalecimiento del Acuerdo Regional Junín como instancia de concertación y formulación de Políticas Públicas Regionales a mediano y largo plazo, y el funcionamiento del Centro de Planeamiento Regional ‘CEPLAR’ como prioridades para gestión territorial y el fortalecimiento de la descentralización.” Two terms in this regional policy agreement, asociatividad and mancomunidad, pose translation problems. To my knowledge, the
first, asociatividad, appears to lack a common definition. I have opted for “associativity.” The second, mancomunidad, does have a Spanish definition but lacks a commonly accepted translation into English. My translation of the Spanish definition of the term is, “Corporation or entity legally constituted by a grouping of municipalities or provinces” (Diccionario de la lengua española de la Real Academia Española Online, s.v. “mancomunidad,” accessed December 23, 2018, https://dle.rae.es/). For the purposes of brevity, I will condense this definition to “joint community.”

This regional policy agreement also names to several entities, such as the Joint Municipal Community of the Mantaro Corridor and the Regional Planning Center (CEPLAR), whose existence I was unable to verify. Whether these terms represent aspirations, actual incorporated administrative entities, or informal groupings was never clarified to my satisfaction.

In part this discussion is based on a later interview with Beatriz where I asked what desgobierno was. She replied that the term applied to when government revolved around a single personality, as is commonly accredited to the regional movements. Her comments suggest a cult of personality existed and, I concluded, that the regional movements therefore did not strengthen the institutional structures of regional democracy.

These figures showed that blank votes were far from the most important issue that the volunteers faced. According to my calculations based on officially reported figures, blank votes cast in the election amounted to less than 1 percent of the total vote count and invalid “null” votes amounted to around 9 percent. Given its diminutive scale, it is interesting that the phenomenon of blank votes would concern the volunteers as null votes posed a greater problem in numerical terms (it is unclear whether a null vote, in which a voter cast a ballot for an ineligible candidate, overlaps with the category of blank votes as a measure of voter dissatisfaction with the election). Yet the intensity of the volunteers’ concerns demonstrates that a researcher could be misled over the significance of voting problems from a strictly quantitative perspective. Though quantifiably small in terms of overall figures, these wayward votes had an outsized influence how the volunteers understood regional democracy.

Monseñor Pedro Barreto Jimeno held the title of cardinal of the Catholic Church at the time of this writing.

To further complicate the matter, the candidates’ departure was striking for the seeming ignorance it conveyed the audience. It was no secret that Nidia Vilchez was in Lima at the time of the signing of the Governance Accord. Even my neighborhood friends who held only modest interest in politics were aware of her absence from press accounts at the time. So, it is curious that the candidates who withdrew did not know this information prior to reaching the forum. One explanation is that perhaps they did know, but assumed that the frontrunners would return for the forum. The moment when the delegates from Vilchez’s party were announced may have served to disabuse the candidates this assumptions.

To be fair, Unchupaico did offer praise for the work the volunteers put into the accord, and identified, at least once, how the volunteers’ regional policy agreements coincided with his own vision.
As many readers will recall, false consciousness is a concept derived from Karl Marx’s theories of historical materialism. Several scholars, including Georg Lukács and Herbert Marcuse, first extended thinking on the term. It later gained wider recognition through the popularization of Gramsci’s works on ideology and consciousness in descriptions of resistance to states.

Conclusion

Several corruption scandals have emerged in recent years. Among these systematic kickbacks and bribes paid to Peruvian officials and political parties by the construction conglomerate Odebrecht Group stand at the center of a public backlash against official corruption. The extent of the Odebrecht Group’s corrupt dealings was still being unraveled at the time of this writing (both in Peru and elsewhere), more than three years after the initial anti-corruption investigation in Brazil imprisoned the group’s principle leadership. See More (2018).

To say nothing of other intersections between digital media and democracy as in Spain. See Postill and Pink (2012).

Of course, media and mediation have been central considerations of ethnographic methodologies for studying states. In Gupta’s introduction to *The Anthropology of the State*, for example, he suggests researchers analyze the textual products of states “to tease out shifts, overlaps, and disjunctures in the (re)production of the state in a spatial frame that transcends the nation” (2006, 18). Not forgetting to ground these products in the communities anthropologists study, Gupta adds an injunction to focus on “how messages about the state are interpreted and mobilized by people according to their particular contexts, and social locations” (2006, 19). I characterize these two points as Gupta’s focus on the circulation and interpretation of representations of the state.


To add to these reservations, it is unlikely that digital media or automation technologies will influence the practice of governance in Huancayo over the short term. Yet while the timing may be uncertain it is reasonable to predict that automation technologies will eventually play a role in governance. It is particularly likely that the fact of absence will serve to construct international interventions. Researchers have shown how narratives of lack in the global south mobilized interventionist projects for development techniques and tools by commercial and non-profit interests as a means of constructing new markets for their services and products (Ferguson 1990, 2006). If history is any guide, it is not illogical to envision a similar construction of narratives claiming an unconscionable scarcity of technological governance in the global south to replicate legitimating prerogative to intervene and draw states of the global south into the community of digitized states.

The Indieweb project is billed as “a people-focused alternative to the ‘corporate web.’” Further information can be found at [http://indieweb.org/](http://indieweb.org/). The distributed web is based on the Inter Planetary File System protocol, a program language for a new type of network exchange. That project is characterized as a “file system that seeks to connect all
computing devices with the same system of files.” Further information can be found at http://ipfs.io/.

7 I do not explicitly include peer-to-peer technology in this section because the term is most often associated in the public consciousness with the verb “to steal.” Peer-to-peer technology does merit mention, however, as it has many uses in the context of decentralizing content. See Anderson for discussion of the distinction between sharing and stealing in relation to these technologies, including the micro-local networks mentioned in this paragraph (2011).

8 These systems, less complicated than they might seem, use cheap mini computers with minimal trappings fixed to bare circuit boards called “single-board computers.”

9 In a review of Eubanks’ work, Jacob Weisberg suggests that the mathematical issues informing the algorithmic automation of state decision-making are too complex for public debate. Weisberg says, “The AFST is a fully transparent algorithm that has been subject to extensive discussion in both New Zealand and the United States. While this means that flaws can be discovered, as they have been by Eubanks, the resulting knowledge is probably too esoteric and technical to be of much use” (2018). While Weisberg has a point regarding the average citizen, too often public debate surrounding technology defers to the expertise of technologists, obscuring the social import of new technologies. If anthropological arguments surrounding the uses of digital technology are going to have a public policy impact, anthropologists must be able to engage in the discourses of technology advocates.

10 Gorriti is well-known as an investigative journalist who published widely on President Fujimori’s corruption in the 1990s. Fujimori later ordered the armed forces to kidnap Gorriti during this period. Gorriti was later released.

11 Albright suggests research focus on tracking shares, interactions, and links between pages online, for example (2018a).

12 Of course, it does not require a deep psychoanalytical training to recognize that this feeling was somehow related to the fact that I, the foreign anthropologist, was the object out of place.

13 As a student who tries to be aware of projects for the rights and equality of all genders, races and ethnicities, I am also struck by Douglas’ language. I will trust that my audience may read Douglas’ text in the context of the social norms of her time.
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