

©2019

EUNKYUNG SONG

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

POWER FROM THE FINGERTIPS:
WRITING ALONE AND WORKING TOGETHER
IN THE 2008 CANDLELIGHT PROTESTS IN SOUTH KOREA

By

EUNKYUNG SONG

A dissertation submitted to the

School of Graduate Studies

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

In partial fulfillment of the requirements

For the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Program in Sociology

Written under the direction of

Paul D. McLean

And approved by

New Brunswick, New Jersey

May, 2019

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Power from the Fingertips:
Writing Alone and Working Together
In the 2008 Candlelight Protests
By EUNKYUNG SONG

Dissertation Director:

Paul D. McLean

This dissertation examines how online communication shapes protests with a case study of the 2008 Candlelight Protests that took place in South Korea. To investigate how protest claims and repertoires are developed initially and transformed over time, I propose a departure from individual-oriented approaches that overly emphasize individuality and network-oriented approaches that treat online communication as a static conduit of messages. Instead, I stress both the interactive and dynamic process of online communication, which I explore through semantic network analysis and qualitative analysis applied to a collection of digital posts. In so doing, I focus on how micro-interactions form large-scale protests under communicative constraints in digital platforms, depending on the degree of exclusivity to a specific topic and the degree of anonymity. The findings of this dissertation demonstrate that anonymity and dissensus shaped solidarity during the 2008 Candlelight Protests as follows. Topic modeling and

network analysis applied to digital posts show that protest claims were formed out of the messiness of concurrent issues, whose coherence emerged from repeated patterns of connecting and disconnecting those issues. The protest repertoires of the 2008 Candlelight Protests that promoted legal protests were an outcome of fierce disputes over the fact that the participants were anonymous online without a decision-making process that bound them. My semantic network analysis, which conceptualizes a single sequence of digital interaction as a set of an initial post and replies given to it, reveals how disputes themselves drove interacting parties to envision a collective, which both reaffirmed the legality repertoire and led to new layers of disputes. In conclusion, I propose further research regarding the implications of legality as protest repertoires both in the studied protest case and similar cases that came later; semantic network analysis with an emphasis on the dynamics of interactions; and the potentiality of replies in digital interactions for relational sociology.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Shortly before submitting a draft of this doctoral dissertation to my adviser, Paul McLean, I came across Jhumpa Lahiri's *New Yorker* piece, whose publication process caught my attention, as she had originally written it in Italian and had it translated into English. Her words had traveled across the ocean like her story of living in and with different languages. Three sentences in particular struck me: "In Italian I write without style, in a primitive way. I'm always uncertain. My sole intention, along with a blind but sincere faith, is to be understood, and to understand myself." I have undergone a similar journey.

A meaningful difference in my desire to be understood and to understand myself, however, is the fact that I have an inspiring and supportive committee for my dissertation. Judy Gerson's "Narratives" and "Feminist methodology" seminars inspired me to explore various forms of utterance as materials and methods for sociological analysis. I soon became a regular visitor in her office hours, from which I always returned with my intellectual battery fully recharged. My first road trip to a neighboring state was with Richard Williams shortly before my first Thanksgiving in New Jersey. Traveling with another student who also did not own a car, we talked about trivial things like having sushi with coke or what it is like to drive in the darkness. In his writing seminar, I learned that writing is somewhat similar to a road trip that becomes enjoyable with patient, steady, and explorative companions, like him.

"Hi Eunkyung, I'm your adviser, Ann Mische!" After this greeting at the welcoming party for my cohort, we talked in her office, in her car to Highland Park, in the seminar room, at cafés, and at her place until she left for Indiana. From her I learned that

seemingly brief and routine interactions can amount to social change as well as personal growth. Lastly, Paul McLean, my adviser, has walked with me along the long, rocky, and turbulent journey that I took. One of my best moments at Rutgers was the weekly meeting I had with him to check my progress in writing. The only thing he asked me to promise was to keep writing and talking. And as such, I wrote and talked. He read tirelessly, listened carefully, and responded with excitement. I would have not explored the messiness of digital interactions without his insightful questions and genuine encouragement. I feel ready to take another step in my journey as a sociologist thanks to my committee's firm belief that being understood is synonymous to working together.

I would like to thank other people at Rutgers, as well. My entangled ideas could have not produced anything without the seminars and workshops with József Böröcz, Ethel Brooks, Zaire Dinzey-Flore, Catherine Lee, Julie Phillips, Zakia Salime, Hana Shepherd, Kristen Springer, Arlene Stein, and Eviatar Zerubavel. In addition, I am grateful to colleagues and friends, with whom I engaged in intellectual exchanges, such as Crystal Bedley, Analena Bruce, Andrea Catone, Neha Gondal, Victoria Gonzalez, Tsai-Yen Han, Jorie Hofstra, Hwa-Yen Huang, Eiko Saeki, Vikas Singh, Ghassan Moussawi, and Changhye Ahn. I am also grateful to the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan, the Rutgers Center for Historical Analysis, and the Institute for Research on Women at Rutgers, for funding my dissertation work.

Without old friends and teachers my journey would have been much duller and lonelier. My life at Highland Park has been warm and cozy with Ja Yun Choi, Eui Young Kim, Sung Un Kim, Oh Jung Kwon, and Ji Hye Shin. Su Young Choi, Christina Kim,

Soo Hyun Kim, and Joo Hyun Park, whom I met at workshops and conferences, became my emotional and intellectual shelter. I am grateful to Soo Jung Shin, Minzee Kim, Sai Rom Kim, Joo Young Lee, and Eun Ae Yeom, who were by my side regardless of where they were in person. I am indebted to Sung Mi Cho, Young Hee Hahn, Eun Hee Lee, and Soo Mi Lee for showing me that doing research together is equivalent to growing together. Woo Hee Kim and Jung Sun Moon have encouraged me as they did in my teens. I am grateful to my sociology professors in Korea, Hyoung Cho, Nam Hee Cha, and Usic Kim, for their unwavering support.

Chattering with Rancy Kim and Hyun Joo Moon have always made me happy since our time at college. Sur Ah Hahn, Eunice Lee-Ahn, and Soo Yeon Im have been my mentors, sisters, and companions. I have laughed, cried, and shared happiness with them. I am grateful to Na Mi Shin for all of her years as my wonderful housemate. We have cooked together, taken care of each other, and worked together, and I hope we will continue to do so in the years to come. I'd like to thank my new landlord and his family for their generosity. It was not until hearing the music played on the piano on the night of my moving in that I realized that I truly felt at home with the sound of the piano, which I always heard while growing up, thanks to my mom who recently retired from her thirty-year-long career of teaching the piano.

While I selfishly wrestled with my fledgling projects, my brother Kyo Hyun Song, has filled in for my absence in our family. I wish the best of luck and health for his new family, Go Eun Hahn and Chae Yool Song. Lastly, I extend my heartfelt appreciation to my parents, Yi Soon Ahn and Gwan Seop Song, for their love and support.

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION	ii
List of Tables.....	ix
List of Illustrations	x
Chapter 1 Introduction.....	1
<i>The 2008 Candlelight Protests in Korea and Digital Interactions</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>Digital Media Users and Their Networks</i>	<i>10</i>
Self-Motivated Individuals	13
Network-Oriented Approach	18
Collectivity Through Interactions	20
<i>Digital Platforms, Digital Interactions and Protests.....</i>	<i>21</i>
Digital Platforms: Online Communication and Netizens	22
Digital Interactions: Meanings and Communication Networks	28
<i>Research Questions</i>	<i>31</i>
<i>Chapter Outline</i>	<i>33</i>
Chapter 2 Dynamics of Digital Interactions and Meaning.....	38
<i>Data</i>	<i>38</i>
Primary Data	38
Secondary Data	46
<i>Three Challenges in an Analysis of Digital Posts</i>	<i>47</i>
<i>Digital Platforms</i>	<i>55</i>
Local Settings vs. Overall Network	55
Noise in Digital Platforms	58
<i>Digital Posts as Digital Interactions</i>	<i>60</i>
Topic Modeling	62
Semantic Networks	67
<i>Conclusion.....</i>	<i>71</i>
Chapter 3 The Fifteen Days: Building Contexts and Claims	82
<i>Digital Interactions and the Candlelight Protests</i>	<i>82</i>
<i>Topic Modeling and Constructing Topic Networks</i>	<i>85</i>
<i>Topic Networks before the Candlelight Protests: April 16 and May 2.....</i>	<i>89</i>
Topic Network for April 16	90
Topic Network for May 2	93
<i>Contexts and Claims Investigated Through Topic Networks Over Time</i>	<i>95</i>
Low Modularity	99
High Modularity: Cohesive Topical Communities as a Claim	104

<i>Discussion: Contexts, Claims, and the Candlelight Protests on the April 29 network</i>	110
<i>Conclusion</i>	112
Chapter 4 Outsourcing Solidarity: Voluntariness and Legality	128
<i>Introduction</i>	128
<i>Protest Repertoire: Anonymity and Collective Actors</i>	133
Coordinating Actions in Online and Offline Domains.....	133
Protest Repertoires in Dynamics.....	136
Anonymity and Collective Actors	140
<i>Incitation and Solidarity</i>	142
Confusion, Disputes, the Assembly and Demonstration Act	142
Illegality and the Assembly and Demonstration Act	149
Diversity Across Participating Groups in the Streets.....	152
Albas online	159
<i>Conclusion</i>	162
Chapter 5 Internal Strife and Illegal Protests	166
<i>Introduction</i>	166
A Steering Meeting on May 16.....	168
Street Marches on May 24 and 25	171
<i>Analytic Strategies: Digital Interactions and Semantic Analysis</i>	173
A Single Sequence of Digital Interaction	175
Multiple Digital Posts	179
Periodization	182
<i>Analysis</i>	189
A Quantitative Overview of Dynamic Semantic Networks	189
Interpretation of the Semantic Networks of the Three Periods	191
Divergence into Two Strands of Personal Recounts: The second period of May (May 15 to 21)	202
<i>Conclusion</i>	210
Chapter 6 Conclusion	230
<i>Summary of Findings</i>	230
<i>Closing remarks</i>	234
Legal Protests and Their Implications	234
How Can Semantic Network Analysis Be Developed Further?.....	237
Relational Sociology and Digital Interactions	240
Appendix	243
Acknowledgement of Previous Publication	244
Bibliography	245

List of Tables

Table 1.1. Two Analytical Approaches to Effects of Online Communication on Protests	12
Table 1.2. Charges of Those Found Guilty at Trials.....	36
Table 2.1. Digital Posts	72
Table 2.2. Search Terms Used to Generate the Collection of ANTI-MB posts	74
Table 2.3. Descriptive Statistics of the Collections of ANTI-MB and 82cook from April through August 2008.....	75
Table 2.4. A Matrix of an ANTI-MB Post.....	79
Table 3.1. Profile of the Collection of Digital Posts for Topic Modeling	115
Table 3.2. Top 30 Terms of the Topic Modeling Result of the April 16 Collection	116
Table 3.3. Quantity of Terms Used in Topic Networks.....	119
Table 5.1. Profile on Digital Interactions on the Term of Illegality	213
Table 5.2. Terms by Distance from the Notion of Illegality.....	214
Table 5.3. Link Terms Spanning on Multiple Steps (May 1 ~ 14)	223
Table 5.4. Link Terms Spanning on Multiple Steps (May 21 ~ 31)	226
Table 5.5. Selected Link Terms, May 2008.....	229

List of Illustrations

Figure 1.1. Arrests during the Candlelight Protests of 2008.....	35
Figure 1.2. ANTI-MB Profile from December 2007 to September 2008.....	37
Figure 2.1. Word Clouds of April 16, 21, 26 and May 2 (clockwise)	73
Figure 2.2. Distribution of Replies Over Time (ANTI-MB)	76
Figure 2.3. Distribution of Replies Over Time (82cook).....	77
Figure 2.4. Digital Platform by Topical Openness and Anonymity	78
Figure 2.5. Tentative Reply Analysis	80
Figure 2.6. Tentative Reply Analysis (2).....	81
Figure 3.1. Networks of Topics of April 16 and May 2	120
Figure 3.2. Modularity Scores of Topic Networks	122
Figure 3.3. Low Modularity in Topic Networks.....	123
Figure 3.4. High Modularity in Topic Networks	125
Figure 3.5. Topic Networks for April 29, 2008	127
Figure 5.1. A Sequence of Digital Interaction in Time.....	215
Figure 5.2. Semantic Networks in Dynamic Analysis.....	217
Figure 5.3. Semantic Networks in Dynamic Analysis (2)	218
Figure 5.4. Timeline of the Candlelight Protests, May 2008.....	219
Figure 5.5. April 23, 28, and 30	220
Figure 5.6. Paths from the Notion of “Illegality” in April 2008.....	221
Figure 5.7. Link Terms by Post at Multiple Steps (May 1 ~ 14).....	222
Figure 5.8. Link Terms by Post at Multiple Steps (May 15 ~ 21).....	225
Figure 5.9. Link Terms by Post at Multiple Steps (May 21 ~ 31).....	228

Chapter 1 Introduction

The Candlelight Protests of 2008 (henceforth referred to as the Candlelight Protests) were a series of collective actions in South Korea that originated from innumerable instances of digital interaction, and mobilized millions of people in total on the streets for a period of around three months. Their conspicuous claim was a protest against impending modifications to the sanitary standards on the quality and quantity of beef products imported from the United States. The new changes sought to increase the volume of the beef trade by lifting bans on beef parts with the potential to contain Specified Risk Materials (SRMs) known to cause mad cow disease in cattle. SRMs are also known as a factor related to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans, which has no cure at present.

With the aim to alleviate public outcry, then-President Lee Myung-bak¹ emphasized that the new policy would benefit lower-income families by supplying high-quality beef at lower costs. He also highlighted that the policy had already been underway due to his predecessor, Roh Moo-hyun, who had initiated the negotiations for the Korean-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (ROK-US FTA) with the promise to increase the volume of the beef trade. Rejecting Lee's economic rationale, candlelight participants contextualized the new policy within the frames of public health and democracy. They asserted that the consumption of mad cow disease-risk beef would inflict irrecoverable

¹ Korean names will be written in the Korean style, in which the surname precedes the given name.

damage on public health, and Lee's lukewarm reactions to their demands would only demonstrate undemocratic governance.

This dissertation examines the formation of protest claims and repertoires of the Candlelight Protests by qualitatively and quantitatively analyzing digital posts produced during their first two months. The goal of this dissertation is to elaborate on how solidarity is formed through digital interactions and their connection to coordinated activities on the streets. To accomplish this goal, it focuses on structural and communicative constraints on digital interactions, and how digital interactions generate the meanings of messages as communication networks are formed and coordinated acts are performed online.

The rest of this introduction has four sections. The first section illustrates the Candlelight Protests with vignettes that demonstrate their participants' solidarity, from which this dissertation's inquiries are forged. The second section reviews the fast-growing literature on the impacts of communication networks on collective action, chiefly large-scale protests. It reviews three scholarly approaches, which emphasize (1) individuals' capabilities to organize collective action without conventional resources such as social movement organizations (SMOs), (2) communication networks among such individuals, and (3) a new type of collective, respectively. Despite the contributions of each camp, I argue in the third section that they all lack (1) a discussion on communicative and structural constraints that affect social relations of digital interactions, and (2) an analysis of how digital interactions generate meanings, as opposed to simply conveying them. To incorporate these two points, this section discusses the importance of the following points: (1) the layout of digital platforms, (2)

the co-existence of multiple platforms where the same topic can be discussed, and (3) the co-existence of different ideas. The fourth section outlines three research questions of this dissertation. After introducing the analytic frame and research questions of this dissertation, this chapter concludes with a chapter outline.

The 2008 Candlelight Protests in Korea and Digital Interactions

Since the 2000s in South Korea, participants in large-scale protests often combined online communication and street events of protesting while each holding a lit candle, including the Candlelight Protests of 2008 as examined in this dissertation. In the winter of 2002, deploring the deaths of two girls in an accident involving a U.S. military vehicle, a netizen nicknamed *Angma*² proposed a public event outside of the digital space in order to mourn them properly. The suggestion was swiftly and warmly received by the victims' school friends, digital media users, and nationalist activists who had led an enduring movement that demanded substantive modifications to Korea's Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United States (Kang 2009, 2016). Two years later, candlelight protests appeared again upon the passage of the impeachment motion of then-President Roh for his alleged violation of neutrality in the general election. Aiming to restore his presidency, Roh's supporters and progressive SMOs aimed to apply pressure on the Korean Constitutional Court (equivalent to the U.S. Supreme Court) to deliver a ruling favorable to Roh. Besides these two incidents at the national level, candlelight vigils were employed to address a variety of issues and by many small groups as well.

² The account names of digital media users are expressed in italics in this dissertation.

The availability of the repertoire helped potential protesters in 2008 to link their intent to protest in the streets to the format of candlelight vigils. And yet, the initial affinity ends there, as the Candlelight Protests carved out their peculiar features over time with collective deliberation held in advance or contingently. Among notable instances was a steering committee meeting held on May 16, two weeks into the Candlelight Protests (see Chapter 5 for more details). Under the title, “Netizens Towards a New Movement Beyond Candlelight,” about sixteen people sat down together, and this meeting was aired on the Internet news outlet *Ohmynews*. The attending netizens were well-known to the extent they were acknowledged by their digital media usernames, and the attending represented the National Committee, which was organized on May 7, as a historic coalition with a record-high number of civil society actors, grassroots organizations, some online communities, and opposition parties in support of candlelight participants. The meeting’s subject pertained to the future of the Candlelight Protests with the aim to reinforce their effectiveness and prevent fatigue and diminished turnout among the majority of the participants.

Financial deficiency was one of the major challenges addressed at the meeting. To accommodate crowds of an ever-growing scale at the time, it appeared necessary to procure audio and lighting equipment for a large-scale podium, which soon became a pressing matter. Some asserted that the challenge was not merely about insufficient financial resources. Rather, they saw it as a self-destructive tactic. Having a large-scale podium to which participants’ attention is directed disrupts otherwise organically-initiated conversations among the participants. It was argued that street gatherings should be an extension of digital interactions, whose participants could freely join and move

across multiple online dialogues.³ In terms of the effectiveness of the Candlelight Protests as a movement, some mentioned that legislative actions should have received greater focus in order to translate the public uproar into substantive legislative accomplishments. After two hours or so, the meeting ended without any decisions being made. The activist from the National Committee was the only one who promised to share various ideas discussed at the meeting with other activists. The brainstorming process did not conclude with any decisions, or even a list of desirable action plans.

A decision was demanded, however, on June 10. On the same day, twenty-one years previously, the June 10 Uprising erupted, forcing then-President Chun Doo-hwan to promise the abdication of his authoritarian regime through a direct vote. The victorious legacy of the democratization movement of the 1980s inspired candlelight participants and the National Committee to prepare for a grand event in Seoul, named “The Million Candlelight March”. On the day, no military tanks or armed soldiers were deployed, as they had been back in the 1980s. Instead, the police stacked shipment cargo containers in a two-story height across the main road to block a potential massive march towards the Blue House, the presidential office and residence. Facing the makeshift barricade, candlelight participants did not hide frustration and anger, to the extent that many netizens worried about uncontrollable violent clashes between the participants and the

³ A similar dispute occurred during the Candlelight Protests of 2002. Netizens and activists engaged in fierce disputes over the use of flags representing the participating SMOs, as the netizens felt that the flags did not represent them. They also criticized the decision-making process, from which the netizens were largely excluded. Refuting these points outlined by *Ulcaman* (digital ID) (2003a, 2003b), Choi (2003) writes, “*Ulcaman* argues that the activists and their coalition failed to understand the styles of information sharing, parlance, as well as emotions of netizens, I contend in reverse that it was *Ulcaman* and people supporting “netizen ideology” who failed to appreciate the materiality of the street, *Gangwhamun* [where protesters frequently gathered in downtown Seoul]. ... They wanted to “open bulletin board(s) in the street” as if they were still referring to the cyberspace. This is how I understand their demand to hold “many small-sized protests” (available in Korean at <http://www.pssp.org/bbs/view.php?board=journal&category1=34&nid=1116>).

police. Posts mocking the barricade outpoured across digital platforms as well. Some urged to climb over it in order to march towards the Blue House, which was only half an hour away on foot. Opponents insisted that the participants should hold their position, preferring to firmly uphold moral legitimacy and recognition as nonviolent and law-abiding protesters. Hours of the debates reached the conclusion to plant the flags of the various online communities and organizations involved on the top of the barricade, nicknamed the MB Wall.

The decision of June 10 was followed by aftershocks. Candlelight protesters engaged in incremental arguments over tactics and claims. Passionate debates questioned whether collective decisions must be made at the cost of possibly suffocating free-floating discussions and tactical choices. On one hand, some implored participants to adopt militant tactics and stand firmly by others in solidarity. Rebuttals to the hardliners underscored that there was no reason to prioritize aggressive tactics to accomplish short-term goals related to the beef trade issue, particularly at the cost of the more powerful legacy that such a vast number of people had successfully protested without resorting to violence. Again, no definitive decision was made. Some hardliners continued to confront the police to march to the Blue House. Others continued to hold tranquil congregations in small groups. In the last week of June, after the Lee administration forced the new sanitary standards to take effect, the police completely enclosed one of the most popular protest sites in central Seoul by parking police buses back to back. The site was reopened for public masses by religious leaders in support of the candlelight protesters. After the masses, the turnouts of street protests rapidly decreased. Police raided the offices of multiple SMOs affiliated with the National Committee, based on allegations of

organizing illegal and violent protests. U.S. beef products were approved to enter the Korean market under the new sanitary standards on July 1.

This dissertation notes the aforementioned moments for two reasons. Firstly, this observation indeed poses a puzzle about solidarity among candlelight participants, defined as “the ability of actors to recognize others, and to be recognized” (Hunt and Benford 2004:439) in the context of coordinating acts. Under the assumption that digital media users remain individuals without being cognizant of the entire entity created by their aggregation, the organization and live broadcasting of the May 16th meeting would appear to have been an unnatural course of action. This meeting signaled that candlelight participants were conscious of methods to organize their acts collectively, both on digital platforms and in the streets, by contemplating participants as a whole, the meeting did not produce agreed conclusions regarding the future repertoires of the Candlelight Protests. About one month later in June, the decision made on the streets in front of the cargo containers and the subsequent debates online also reveal that the candlelight participants envisioned themselves as a collective based on dissent rather than consent.

Another indicator that exhibits solidarity among candlelight participants is that they largely remained non-disruptive and non-violent. According to nonviolence scholars, the opposite would have been more likely to happen: the more cohesive the participants of collective action remain, the less likely they are to turn to violent tactics (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013; Chenoweth and Stephan 2012; Lawson 2015; Nepstad 2011, 2015). In other words, the overarching format of large-scale protests based on online communication can be susceptible to violent actions due to the lack of a collectivity consciousness that binds people into a cohesive group.

To verify the actual events, the patterns of arrests presented in Figure 1.1 and Table 1.2⁴ can be used as proxies to estimate the degree of violence. According to Table 1.2, the most frequent charges pertained to traffic disruption, which accounted for half of the total number of arrests, compared with about 100 people in total with charges for violent misconduct (Minbyun 2016: p. 23).⁵ Only for eleven days out of the fifteen weeks of protests did the number of arrests exceed the daily average of arrests at 13.6 people (Minbyun 2016: p. 27-8, see Figure 1.1). On June 10, when the MB Wall enraged the candlelight protesters, only four people were placed in police custody among about 400,000 people in central Seoul that day (Minbyun 2010: p. 283).⁶ More importantly, before the May 2 street gathering, the massive volume of digital interactions already debated laboriously over the rationales and tools to prevent violence on the side of potential protesters (see Chapter 4 for details). What, then, made the candlelight participants, who were merely loosely networked, perform highly orchestrated non-violent repertoires?

A second inquiry that this dissertation extracts from the aforementioned two vignettes of the Candlelight Protests is whether online networks inherently encompass inclusivity as a trait originating from being weakly networked (Bennett and Segerberg 2013; Castells 2012). To some extent, this assertion appears self-explanatory: Publishing a post is up to its author's decision, as repliers voluntarily decide to offer comments to it

⁴ Using the number of arrestees and their charges as a proxy is not the best approach. The practice of law enforcement in and of itself does not reside beyond political and social conditions. In the current discussion, my interpretation of the data is restricted to offering a general sense of the interactions between the police and candlelight protesters.

⁵ In addition, according to Minbyun's (Lawyers for a Democratic Society) "Report on the Candlelight Protests of 2008" published in 2016, most arrestees were in their twenties (2016, p. 25).

⁶ The police and the media estimated about 80,000 participants (Minbyun 2010, 283).

and agree on the content of the post. And yet, this hypothetical idea that online communication promotes greater inclusivity in collective action does not hold firm ground. As described above, the intensified interactions with the authorities, for instance, pressed the candlelight participants to further discuss the relationships between values, tactics, and goals that they wished to accomplish as the outcome of the Candlelight Protests. Anticipating and facing aggressive repression, online communication often turned into internal strife, which in turn escalated to verbal disputes that pressured others to pick a side (further discussion in Chapter 5). In extreme cases, people denounced their opponents as moles secretly serving the police or propagandistic inciters, which harmed the sense of being connected, not to mention inclusivity. Moreover, certain ideas were recognized as more popular and accepted, while other ideas were rejected and even castigated as harmful to the Candlelight Protests. How, then, is inclusivity achieved, other than the baseline condition that anyone can submit their ideas?

It is difficult to suitably explore these inquiries that pertain to the very process behind the coordination of action and how certain messages become more prominent than others, insofar as individuals' networking eclipses other factors that are emergent and constraining in a study of digital interactions as a crucial agent of large-scale protests. The following section also argues that the lack of attention to interactions and their dynamics needs to be redressed.

Digital Media Users and Their Networks

Recent large-scale protests initiated by individuals without organizational affiliations have highlighted the capabilities of individuals, particularly those exercised by networked individuals via various digital platforms, to initiate movements. As presented Table 1.1, this feature relates to multiple proposals for denoting individuals loosely tied to others online, named “networked individuals” (Bennett and Segerberg 2013), who proved their strength in coordinating actions temporarily (Gladwell 2010; Shirky 2011). boyd (2010) proposes a notion of “networked publics” to indicate possible social relations via social networking sites, and Tufekci (2017) employs the notion of “networked publics” in reference to Habermas’s public sphere. Rainie and Wellman (2012) use “networked individualism,” which stresses multifaceted changes brought about to the ways in which people connect and communicate through in-depth involvement in digital media. Castells (2012) suggests the notion of “mass self-communication,” which is forged through a massive volume of communication oriented to many people whose boundaries are not predetermined nor completely controlled by the government and the mass media (6-7).

Protesters seemed even more effective and capable while staging protests in the digital space, as well as in the street, than their counterparts, which were led and organized by SMOs (Bennett and Segerberg 2013; Bimber 2001; Castells 2012; Earl and Kimport 2011; Gerbaudo 2012; Howard and Hussain 2013; Juris 2008; Tufekci 2017). More interestingly, their connections yielded unprecedentedly large networks, whose boundaries—not only regarding the scope but also the start and end points—became known only when they stopped growing. This section reviews two strands of recent theory that aim to specify the roles of online communication for organizing protests. On

one hand, some researchers have underlined the seamless relations between micro actions by individuals and macro events that result from the aggregation of the former. Referring to the idea that a large-scale network tends to be comprised of weaker bonds, this line of theories has indicated the formation of a collectivity is not a necessary step in staging collective action. This approach can be broken into two separable but highly related schools, depending on their interpretive emphasis on either individuals or their networks. Criticizing the two schools, some researchers have sought to revisit cultural aspects in identifying the formation of solidarity through ongoing involvement in communicative interactions (Gerbaudo 2012; Gerbaudo and Treré 2015; Kang 2016)

Table 1.1. Two Analytical Approaches to Effects of Online Communication on Protests

	Individual-oriented Approach	Network-oriented Approach
Characteristics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large-scale protest without collectivity • Relatively autonomous from political conditions • Short-lived and episodic • Bennett and Segerberg 2013; Bimber, Flanagan, and Stohl 2005; Castells 2012; Earl and Kimport 2011; Tufekci 2017 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Forming networks to organize protests • Strength of weak ties • Emergence of new domains for public issues • Bennett and Segerberg 2013; boyd 2010; Castells 2012; Lee 2013
Merits	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emphasis on ‘agency’ in communication and technological affordances (Benkler 2006; Bennett and Segerberg 2013; Earl and Kimport 2011) • Spillover effect of collective action into coordinated action pursuing non-political issues (Earl and Kimport 2011) • Emergence of new repertoires of contention (Earl and Kimport 2011; Mattoni 2013) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emergence of communication networks • Diffusion and emergent structures of communicative networks (González-Bailón and Wang 2016) • Affinity with quantitative and computational text analysis (Bail 2012, 2014a; Bennett and Segerberg 2013; Lotan et al. 2011; Ramage, Dumais, and Liebling 2010)
Challenges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of discussion over structural and communicative constraints (Dolata and Schrape 2014; Evans et al. 2017; Hepburn 2013) • Presumed consensus among protesters over claims and repertoires • Unexplained relations between online and offline domains of protests (Dupont and Passy 2011) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of interpretation towards the meaning of ties in networks (Fuhse 2009, 2015a; McLean 2007, 2017; Mische 2003, 2011) • Difficulties in drawing network boundaries and reflecting multiple networks • Online-only accounts
Alternative Approaches	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interpretive analysis (Gerbaudo 2012, 2015; Gerbaudo and Treré 2015; Shifman 2014) • Search for collectivity (Gerbaudo 2015; Kang 2012) • Political contexts (Howard 2010; Howard and Hussain 2013) 	

Self-Motivated Individuals

Table 1.1 profiles two schools of thought that attribute the formation of large-scale protests via online communication to either individuals or their networks, though the distinction between the two are often blurred. A manifest reason is that contemporary protesters hardly fit the image of isolated and atomized individuals because of their digital media usage. Technological affordances enable individuals to utilize online communication for various purposes to the point that many organizing tasks can be carried out simultaneously (Earl and Kimport 2010, 2011). Though technological affordances as a theoretical notion have been debated in communication studies regarding their substantive value as a concept (Evans et al. 2017), in the literature on social movements, they have unequivocally constituted versatile tools that enhance an individual's agency.

Thus, it is not surprising that theoretical efforts have been channeled to identify how the enhanced agency transforms the mobilization of collective action. Among such efforts is Bennett and Segerberg's (2013) work, which brings to the fore the individual and the sharing nature of their unitary action in the digital space. Their main argument is that coordinated acts by networked individuals deviate from the existing theory on mobilization, which has implicitly and explicitly absorbed Olson's treatise (1965) on the collective action problem in a critical sense. According to Olson, individuals will not take part in the production of collective goods unless they are compensated for their personal contributions, given that the desired collective goods disregard proportional access by differential commitment to the desired goods. Bennett and Segerberg contend that Olson's work has reverberated through major theories such as the resource mobilization

theory (McCarthy and Zald 1977), the political process theory (McAdam 1999; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001), and the framing alignment theory (Snow et al. 1986), which focus on the roles of SMOs to manage the collective action problem (ref. Clemens and Minkoff 2004; Piven and Cloward 1992, 1978). SMOs are supposed to identify a collective (or a group) and the claim reflecting its interests, incentivize members to join the collective action, and persuade them to take up the frames and worldviews suggested by SMOs. If social movement researchers had regarded SMOs as a solution to reduce the possibility of free-riders (Marwell and Oliver 1993; Marwell, Oliver, and Pahl 1988; Oliver, Marwell, and Teixeira 1985), Bennett and Segerberg argue that technological affordances have removed the issue itself.

In reference to Benkler (2006), Bennett and Segerberg argue that online networks stem from a completely different logic of social relations, which emphasizes individuals' autonomy and voluntariness. According to Benkler, through online communication, individuals pursue their needs, which are satisfied by peer production in the "networked information market" (2006: p. 2–7). In such a market, information at every stage of market transactions comprises valuable goods that are neither exclusive, nor private (Bimber 2001). Moreover, the networked information market is rarely monopolized. When many individuals become both producers and consumers, the scope of the market expands, which in turn increases the probability that individuals encounter more individuals. The more familiar individuals become with the new market, Benkler (2006) argues, the more capable they become in terms of (1) meeting their needs by and for themselves, (2) handling loose connections, and (3) in turn, coping more effectively with institutionalized organizations that are often constraining (p. 8–9). This enhanced

capability, or “enhanced autonomy” (2006: p. 8), eventually permits individuals to “increase the range and diversity of cooperative relations people can enter, and therefore of collaborative projects they can conceive of as open to them” (2006: p. 9).

Employing Benkler’s arguments on enhanced individual capacities, Bennett and Segerberg (2013) accentuate the following specific points in terms of organizing protests through online networks. Networked individuals’ activities intrinsically operate as personal rewards. In online communication, collective interests are not distinguished from the interests of each participating individual. In addition, those networked individuals do not have to be reached and persuaded by SMOs. Individuals decide independently whether to join a coordinated action event or not, and they present their own stories, which resonate with those of others. Therefore, they do not transform their own perspectives to fit into a particular frame of collective action. Moreover, these networks do not demand strong bonds among the connected individuals. Lastly, networked individuals benefit from their involvement in the large-scale information market, as described in Benkler (2006) (ref. Rainie and Wellman 2012: p. 132).⁷

To rephrase, the notion of collective action for Bennett and Segerberg (2013), which has set out major inquiries about the mismatch between individuals’ pursuit of private interests and the provision of a collective good for a group, loses its ground. Using digital media, individuals wield personalized politics, speaking directly to their

⁷ Rainie and Wellman outline a similar point by writing “[T]hus, size matters. Although some might think that smaller networks will have higher-quality relationships—quality compensating for the lack of quantity—in fact, quantity goes along with quality. Not only do larger networks provide more support, but each person in a larger network is likely to be supportive. We do not know why, but we suspect that social capital breeds more social capital in a positive feedback cycle. A large, active, specialized and resource-filled set of ties is an important resource in its own right” (2012: p. 32, and chapter 5).

own issues. Their coordinated action pertains less to the acceptance of the collective action frame through which they come to share collective goals. Instead, individuals are able to present and share their own action frames. Bennett and Segerberg refer to this type of new collective action as “connective action,” which also appears in the title of their monograph.

Bennett and Segerberg’s (2013) theoretical gambit can be understood better, when juxtaposed with other theories that also focus on online networks in different ways (Castells 2009, 2012; Rainie and Wellman 2012). Rainie and Wellman (2012) indeed share many points with Bennett and Segerberg, as well as Benkler. For instance, Rainie and Wellman propose the notion of “networked individualism” as a new operating principle governing the structures of social networks in societies. According to them, networked individuals eventually engage in looser connections with others, instead of being embedded in tightly-knit groups. In this sense, Rainie and Wellman also underscore that networked individuals become more capable of solving problems (e.g., soliciting assistance, coordinating actions, etc.). A noticeable difference from Bennett and Segerberg’s position arises from Rainie and Wellman’s introduction of structural effects, which might constrain the enhanced capabilities of networked individuals. For instance, they suggest that information circulated and communicated through networks is more likely to be uncertain in terms of its validity as peer production relies on other individuals rather than on experts backed up formal institutions (2012: p. 15), which is not explicit clear at the point of Bennett and Segerberg’s discussion.

With a more narrow focus on collective action than Rainie and Wellman (2012), Castells (2012) argues that communication with respect to power involves meaning-

making and its distribution: Eventually, online communication, or “mass self-communication” in his vernacular, occurs through the large-scale and unmediated transactions of messages by individuals (2012: p. 6–7).⁸ He finds that the meanings of social affairs stem from decentralized and horizontal networks without the influence and domination of established power institutions. Establishing communication venues that are not subjugated by the mass media, Castells argues, permits a great number of individuals to communicate their thoughts and emotions directly to others, which enables those individuals to advance their own collective actions.

In sum, the first theoretical strand delving into the relations between online networks and collective action has centered on: (1) the individual with enhanced autonomy thanks to online communication, (2) the nature of ties that directly link individuals with no mediation of the existing institutions, and (3) the magnificent scale of online communication that allows individuals to manage multiple networks simultaneously, encompassing diversity. These theoretical points on networked individuals have partially guided formal network analysis, which has grown in line with the advancement in computational analysis on one hand (DiMaggio 2015; Hampton 2017; McFarland, Lewis, and Goldberg 2016; Mohr, Wagner-Pacifici, and Breiger 2015), and with a focus on structural traits of online communication on the other hand (Bennett

⁸ The ways in which Castells underscores individuals’ autonomy also pertains to messages and the construction of their meanings. He states, “It is mass communication because it processes messages from many to many, with the potential of reaching a multiplicity of receivers, and of connecting to endless networks that transmit digitized information around the neighborhood or around the world. It is self-communication because the production of the message is autonomously decided by the sender, the designation of the receiver is self-directed and the retrieval of messages from the networks of communication is self-selected” (2012:6–7).

and Segerberg 2013; González-Bailón and Wang 2016; Lewis, Gonzalez, and Kaufman 2012; Tremayne 2014; Walgrave et al. 2011).⁹

Network-Oriented Approach

Employing computational analysis, formal network analysts tend to examine the operation of the internal structure of large-scale online networks during a given collective action. For instance, González-Bailón and Wang's (2016) analysis of Twitter networks during the Occupy Movement of 2011 investigates whether communication networks are indeed decentralized, as theorized in Castells (2012). Hypothesizing that decentralized networks would not have relatively densely connected components in them, González-Bailón and Wang find that various patterns of individuals' involvement in online networks in fact generate high-density components in them. This finding echoes the typology delineated in their preceding work: A communication network is comprised of distinguishable clusters whose members exhibit similar patterns of communication. Some members tend to largely only send messages, whereas others both send and receive messages (González-Bailón, Borge-Holthoefer, and Moreno 2013).¹⁰ Bennett and Segerberg (2014) point out that online networks typically follow a power-law function, which has a tiny segment of highly influential nodes though the majority of its nodes have few ties, perhaps no followers, whereby they become relatively invisible. A set of visualized networks showing that multiple centers existed when networked individuals

⁹ In-depth discussion on these two topics can be found in Chapter 2.

¹⁰ In referring to Castells (2009, 2002), González-Bailón and Wang argue that their analysis disproves Castells' theory that contends communication networks, comprising individuals on an equal term, are also decentralized because those equal individuals without hierarchical organizing principles can in fact generate multiple centers.

joined popular protests in the Middle East during Arab Spring also echoes the claim that online networks have certain structural features (Faris et al. 2016).

This thread of formal network analysis makes the following common points.

Firstly, reconstructed communication networks are regarded as a proxy for the structure of a given protest. Individuals' communication and involvement patterns within those networks shape the structure of information diffusion and aid the understanding that different individuals (i.e., nodes) play different roles by taking different positions in the given networks. Secondly, the reconstructed communication networks are regarded unproblematically as reflecting only the online component of a studied movement, leaving out its non-digital component, which indeed raises a question regarding the ways in which the online and offline components of a given collective action are intertwined (Dupont and Passy 2011; Eggert and Pavan 2014; Pavan 2014a). In a similar vein, those reconstructed networks are deemed to stand independently without reference to political and social institutions (ref. Earl 2010; Earl and Kimport 2011).¹¹ Thirdly, in this line of analysis, communicated messages have often been relegated to analytic cues in order to identify individuals connected to relevant movements. In so doing, most network analysis assumes that information available in the network has the same meaning to all participants in all generically understood situations. It thereby leaves little room for

¹¹ One of the salient features that differentiates collective action via online communication from conventional format is that cases of the former contain diverse collective action. It includes cases in which participants target conventional political and social institutions. And yet, more importantly, individuals involved in online communication have adopted online communication for non-political issues. Earl and her colleagues have noted the adoption of this type of tactics as "e-tactics" (2011), a key trait being that e-tactics chiefly exist online. Although formal network analysts reviewed above specifically mention it, their interpretation of communication networks as relatively independent of other co-existent networks beyond the digital space has often neglected to consider that (1) large-scale protests have rarely remained online only, and (2) the co-existence of online and offline domains in a protest should be reflected in the analysis of either domain (Dupont and Passy 2011; Eggert and Pavan 2014; Tufekci 2014; Tufekci and Wilson 2012).

bringing internal contention or varying interpretations to light and incorporating them into our theorizing (ref. Mische 2003).

Collectivity Through Interactions

Researchers including Gerbaudo (2012) refute the idea that online communication manifests in coordinated actions that are devoid of the leadership and collective identity that can arise from the process of networking, or interacting. This strand of scholarship, presented as “Alternative approaches” in Table 1.1, criticizes the overemphasis on individuals, who are depicted as autonomous, and networks that are portrayed as an aggregation of those individuals. According to Gerbaudo (2012), the recent popular protests might seem to lack a leadership structure on the surface, only when expecting to find the same style of leadership undergirding brick-and-mortar organizations. He points out that different styles of leadership, specifically naming “soft leadership,” operate to reflect the ways in which people communicate in online domains. Such leaders certainly operate more broadly than launching a website or sending out a message, by consistently encouraging social media followers to maintain their commitments, and managing unexpected and contingent situations. A salient difference between soft leaders and conventional activists lies in the former’s relative inconspicuousness at the forefront, just as choreographers rarely step onto the stage to direct performers’ movements.

By extension, Gerbaudo and his colleagues go on to argue that online-based activism cannot be completely devoid of a collective identity, by focusing on the development of collective identity as an outcome of online communication (Gerbaudo and Treré 2015; Kavada 2015; Milan 2015, 2015; Monterde et al. 2015; ref. Polletta and

Jasper 2001). Gerbaudo and Treré (2015) argue that it is questionable whether online networks prioritize personalized action frames through personal stories, which are deemed to resonate with the stories of others. In contrast, Gerbaudo and Treré assert that, even if cultural schemas or narratives insinuating collectivity are not available as a springboard for mobilization, interactions among social media users serve as fertile grounds for the development of shared collectivity, through which personal stories and commitment gain meanings and generate collective identity (Milan 2015; Monterde et al. 2015). Gerbaudo and Treré (2015) take a step further by mentioning that the neglect of cultural aspects in the current research trends is deeply related to the unbalanced preference paid to computational analysis, disregarding qualitative analysis on the contents of online communication in a local platform, which requires an ethnographic approach.

Digital Platforms, Digital Interactions and Protests

The following points summarize the theoretical review above. The strength of a strand of research invoking network analysis lies in its appreciation of the large scale of direct ties among individuals. Following the verbal cues, network analysis helps to reconstruct the structure of the ties as a proxy for the structure of protests that evolves. These ties are weaker and less sustainable than social bonds (e.g., organizational membership), but sufficient enough to generate coordinated actions. The main task accomplished by these communication ties is to send and receive information and search for like-minded people. Criticizing this approach that translates online communication into snapshots of networks aggregating innumerable ties, other researchers have proposed to further investigate the

threads of dialogues occurring among a relatively smaller number of individuals on a specific website. In doing so, they have argued that unlike popular beliefs, mobilization initiated from the digital space is generally led by organizers with communication skills that are well-adapted to inspire a new practice of leading people and organizing a collective (Gerbaudo 2015).

To develop a refined analytic point that employs network analysis and recognizes the potential for solidarity to form, this section contends that two challenges have been overlooked in the leading approaches (see Table 1.1): (1) Is online communication completely constraint-free? And (2) can communication networks be reduced to a pipeline used purely for the purpose of delivering messages? I argue below that online communication entails its constraints that are imposed on the ways in which digital interactions form communication networks, thereby requiring an understanding of the nexus of culture and networks.

Digital Platforms: Online Communication and Netizens

Social movement researchers have long wrestled with the challenge to identify the structural factors, i.e., constraints, of online communication, and incorporate them properly into a theory of collective action (Hepburn 2013). Another potential line of inquiry is how analysis of collective action can link online communication and activities outside of digital platforms formed by the former (Dupont and Passy 2011). Intermediary solutions have highlighted the influence of the historical backgrounds of politics and communication environments that must have influenced the emergence of a notable protest (Howard 2010; Howard and Hussain 2013).

Some researchers investigated the identity of protesters who gathered on the streets in line with their involvement in online communication. It is noteworthy that the Candlelight Protests have been examined in the context of this question. The first strand of research focused on specifying the socio-demographic characteristics of netizens, referred to as modern web browser users (Hauben and Hauben 1997; Rheingold 2002), which carries no normative connotation of existing social boundaries in itself. To name a few, Cho and Park (2008) report that most participants were relatively affluent and well-educated, with some possessing more than college education, and skilled in internet usage for the purpose of obtaining information.¹² Kim et al. (2010a), in their study of teenagers surveyed during the Candlelight Protests, find that those students were not significantly different from fellow students who did not participate in street events. Mothers and younger females were also often reported as a stand-out demographic in the Candlelight Protests through their activities in various online communities (Yong Ok Kim 2009).

The second strand showed how netizens fall beyond a topology of collective action, which had focused on the positions and roles of participants. Netizens refer to the large numbers of individuals, whose active and voluminous reactions, i.e., replies, made opinion leaders influential in the first place. During the Candlelight Protests, the term “netizen” intensified normative connotations as well. Netizens excluded actors with institutionalized positions and roles such as politicians, the media including digital media conglomerates, civil officials, and corporations.¹³ In a similar vein, organized groups

¹² Cho and Park also point out that most participants were active political actors via voting in elections and partaking in social movements, cherishing post-materialist lifestyles.

¹³ Netizens portrayed themselves as ordinary people, who had no other recourse but digital platforms to make their voices heard. In addition, netizens were praised as candid, open-minded, impartial, and engaging in public issues in the digital space. By extension, netizens also denoted a source of new and innovative ideas, whose validity is judged by other netizens rather than by experts stems from formal and

such as labor unions and social movement organizations (SMOs) were not regarded as regular netizens because their online activities often remained confined to their own websites, which were aimed at managing organizational tasks and promoting their causes.¹⁴

Despite the importance of their findings, these approaches are not suitable for exploring how digital interactions are shaped in one specific way rather than others. Two points can be drawn on this matter: (1) The layout of digital platforms can help construe social relations on digital media, which may result in ambiguous status structures (ref. Gould 2003), and (2) multiple digital platforms exist.

Digital platforms have undergone major structural changes, leading to the incorporation of social media utilizing techniques of the so-called Web 2.0 (Blank and Reisdorf 2012; Earl and Kimport 2011; Song 2010a). Social media differs from preceding platforms (e.g., online communities) in their emphasis on users' abilities to communicate directly with others through their own domains (Rainie and Wellman 2012; Rheingold 2002). Instead of sending and receiving information through traditional mediating platforms (e.g., broadcasting networks and newspapers), social media users

legitimate institutions. And yet, they were very often degraded as gullible and emotional digital mobs readily swayed by a vortex of false information and propaganda and overwhelmed by the sheer number of replies and views attached to a post.

¹⁴ In the book, *Why Did You Turn Out the Candlelight?* (2009), published a year after the Candlelight Protests, its contributors claimed that those who enthusiastically participated in the Candlelight Protests willingly extended their social and political status to a shared one as citizens. The contributors also asserted that the protests neglected to sufficiently include workers and union members, as well as part-time workers whose social status has become more vulnerable than ever. To some extent, the authors argued that the socio-economic demographics of the Candlelight Protests can be parsed out with class lines. On a slightly different standpoint, the above point was met with the criticism that it was a failure of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), one of the largest unions in Korea, that it did not join the Candlelight Protests by declaring a general strike much earlier than it did. Also see "As Latecomer, Reflecting the Disappearance of the Union's Initiative on Social Movements," *Redian*, June 26, 2008 (available in Korean at: www.redian.org/archive/21208).

can gain greater power to control their own media. By contrast, pre-Web 2.0 techniques mainly envisioned shared spaces such as online communities¹⁵ and discussion boards. Self-presentation techniques are set by the platforms themselves (e.g., anonymizing users on a spectrum from complete anonymity to using pseudonyms). As these shared spaces tend to entail a boundary defined by certain criteria (e.g., topic, age, etc.), Rainie and Wellman (2012) associate online communities to group-like entities, compared to social media users as constituencies of networked individualism. Thus, in Rainie and Wellman's discussion, online communities are already based on a certain level of commonality, which binds their constituencies into groups, thereby signaling that online communities are based on a relatively high level of solidarity. Though I agree with this type of comparison between the layouts of digital platforms, my take on digital platforms draws on Gould's discussion on conflict (2003) to consider the complexity of groupness exhibited online.

According to Gould, conflict and violence at both interpersonal and inter-group levels tend to appear when the distribution of social status, which characterizes and defines social relations, becomes equivocal. When Person A's dominance over Person B is questioned, the two may engage in conflict. Inter-group conflict is likely to occur when members of a group reveals that its solidarity is unstable. A conflict between Groups C and D may surface when members of Group C are under attack by Group D's

¹⁵ As discussed by many researchers, the notion of community in sociology has its own connotations by alluding to high-level cohesion and homogeneity among members of a community (Cavanagh 2007; Gould 2003; Rainie and Wellman 2012:chapter 2; Simmel 1955). In this dissertation, an online community indicates a service offered by web portal companies, called online *cafes* in Korean, which accommodate a group of people who share the service. Also, anonymous discussion boards studied in this dissertation refer to bulletin boards allowing access to anyone with a user account with the host site. These two services are provided for free by portal companies in Korea.

constituencies, fail to be backed up by fellow members, and such failure becomes known to Group D. A point worth noting is that Gould prioritizes neither individuals nor their groupness as a driving factor in the onset of conflict. An interpersonal conflict whose parties belong to groups in contention cannot be completely extended to the latter's, and according to him, nor the vice versa. This is because group solidarity is rarely complete and perfect.

Gould's discussion does not specifically address online communication, nor large-scale protests as its product. Nevertheless, his theory offers insight to envision the conditions under which digital media users shape solidarity, with which they recognize one another as partners in coordinating collective action. Firstly, digital media lay out social relations by twisting the distribution of prestige outside digital media. An opinion is assessed not by its author's social status, but by a quantified system measuring popularity (e.g., the number of "likes" it receives). In this regard, a less popular opinion outside digital platforms can be a dominant one. Digital media orient attention to what is written, without completely ignoring who writes it, when their users talk to one another.

In this regard, the effect of anonymity on digital media is intriguing and important. Anonymity can be established by forcing users to use pseudonyms consistently or inconsistently. Anonymity can also be an emergent factor when a post becomes viral, so that it gains replies and reposts by an immense number of people.¹⁶ Understanding anonymity as a factor redefining social relations differs from appreciating

¹⁶ For this point, Figure 1.2 that features the growth of ANTI-MB, an online community whose posts will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, makes an interesting example. It grew to an enormous community with about 140,000 members by April 24, compared to about 18,000 members on April 10 and to 4 members at its humble beginning on December 19, 2007. This rapid growth in membership can introduce an effect that its "members" come to see each other "strangers," despite their membership to the same community.

it as an equalizer to assist underrepresented and marginalized opinions to be heard (Farrall 2012; Nissenbaum 1999). If the marginalized voice gains popularity online, it is less because they deliver an inherently resonant and righteous viewpoints, or because it is written by the marginalized. In a similar vein, a social issue that does not diminish in importance compared to others is not always developed further as a cause for collective action. As a result, large-scale protests like the Candlelight Protests do not occur frequently. In other words, digital platforms enable social relations where the content of texts draws more attention than the author.

Secondly, social status becomes ambiguous on digital platforms because the shared standards for distributing prestige for text are not easily available because of the co-existence of multiple digital platforms. This may initially seem to be a less than compelling argument, given that digital platforms eventually place any incoming posts on a ladder of popularity by automatically generating metrics such as numbers of views and replies: The more a post is viewed, the more influential it becomes, whereby the more viewers it can persuade. Though this view cannot be completely rejected, it is only partially true, if it does not recognize the co-existence of multiple platforms that may rank the same opinion differently. This inconsistency itself is a natural, or even ideal, outcome of digital interactions since it demonstrates that people present their own ideas.

At this point, it is necessary to identify the conditions for the multiple standards that can coexist on digital platforms to turn into a battlefield of competition. This question implies that online communication involving protests is not always based on consensus among like-minded people. Within an online community or discussion board, users are free to express themselves. For them, prioritizing and selecting messages can be

a challenge, unless the community itself sets specific criteria. The same applies to inter-community relations. Hyperlinks, for instance, are a representative technological affordance that allows the swift distribution of information from one platform to another. When are hyperlinks sent from one platform to another subjected to a thorough investigation as to its value and importance? To make this question more complex, under what condition does the task of deciding the importance of hyperlinks become crucial? In addition, this investigation is less likely to produce an agreed-upon conclusion online because it is impossible to ignore the availability of different and competing ideas that refer to varying values and norms.

To summarize, the layout of digital platforms exerts its own structural and communicative effects on digital interactions by introducing social relations, which direct attention to the content and interpretation of texts. This is why the following section and Chapter 2 focus on the nexus of culture and networks, i.e., how the meanings of a message are generated. How should communication network analysis advance its conventional parlance of viewing networks as a fixture through which messages flow, when the identity of authors becomes unknown and ambiguous?

Digital Interactions: Meanings and Communication Networks

Network analysis, as discussed in Table 1.1, needs to depart from its simplified assumption that messages flow from one spot of a network in place to another. My argument here is that messages are shaped and modified through interactions that constitute communication networks on local digital platforms (Fuhse 2009, 2015a; McLean 2017; Mische 2003). In other words, an online communication network is

emergent rather than remaining static. And a major factor that leads this dynamic is meanings that are generated while digital posts are written and replied to.

To identify my point, the existing literature on the recent protests must be modified. Firstly, communication networks are formed through interactions. Referring to research that has examined the nexus of culture and networks, it pertains to the ways digital media users narrow down or expand the scope of topics they communicate through multi-threaded dialogues, which will be discussed in depth regarding its operationalization in the following chapter (Bail 2014b; Crossley 2010; Fuhse 2015a; Fuhse and Mützel 2011; Godart and White 2010; McLean 1998, 2017; Mische 2003, 2011; Mohr et al. 2013),

The formation of ties through interactions is constituted by the ways in which cultural cues, symbols, frames are arranged and adjusted in relation with perceived relations among the sender and receiver of messages. In digital platforms, according to Rainie and Wellman (2012), tie formation, relationally speaking, would become more complicated because online communication inherently comprised of a great number of individuals, in addition to the fact that their communication can be multithreaded. These communicative conditions urge interacting individuals to utilize their capability of interpretation, from which messages are forged in various ways. Therefore, the necessary topic of study regarding digital interactions is the process through which messages and claims are forged amid a variety of cultural ideas practiced by a great number of individuals.

A benefit of probing how messages are generated via digital interactions with regard to large-scale protests is that it offers a vantage point to study the process of claim-

making, which has been rarely studied in the literature on social movement studies (Buechler 2004; McAdam 1999, 2003; Walder 2009). Most descriptive narratives of the recent large-scale protests begin with the most popular post that is recognized to have initially triggered the entire event. Questions related to how the initial call was further developed in certain ways over others have not been posed so far. In a similar way, accepting the existence of multiple competing interest groups and chronic grievances, the question of mobilization has received predominant attention by keeping at bay how ideas and opinions (as well as emotions and grievances) are turned into claims and associated with organizational forms and tactics (Blee 2012). In his discussion of the enduring drawbacks in the network analysis of social movements, McAdam (2003) points out that actual practice of network analysis has neglected to ask how SMOs, as the established social settings for mobilizing collective action, have come to become the establishment as they have in practice.

Another benefit extracted from asking the process of claim-making and selecting tactics is its aid in avoiding the reification of the relationship between online and offline domains, whose intertwined co-existence should indeed be considered (Dupont and Passy 2011; Earl and Kimport 2011; Pavan 2014b; Tufekci 2017). As portrayed in the previous sections, contingent clashes with the police resulting from the foreseen repression by police and the Lee administration during the Candlelight Protests heavily influenced discussions in digital platforms over the claims and tactics of the protests. In particular, the street protests of the Candlelight Protests were depicted as a political topic, whose conventional social relations between the authorities and protesters were not manifest in social relations available in digital space (Emirbayer 1997; Emirbayer and Goodwin

1994; Gould 1995, 2003a; McLean 2017; Mische 2011). How do individuals who barely know their communication partners decide to take the risk of participating in a street protest? Or, how do the contents of the preceding digital interactions assist them in making decisions to join street protests? With regard to this matter, this dissertation tests out the idea that the answer to the above question depends on the ways in which those individuals link or demarcate familiar social relations in the different domains of online and offline. To reshape, the analytic frame employed in this dissertation focuses less on whether online networks remain horizontal and decentralized. Rather, it draws attention to the analysis of communication networks to identify how individuals resolve the existing difference in online communication and street protests, whose general formats and risks are already known.

Research Questions

Drawing on the above discussion, the following three questions are investigated:

- (1) How does the layout of a digital platform affect claim-making for a protest?

Recent large-scale protests involving online communication has tended to disregard the dynamics of claim-making by presupposing that protest claims are not formulated, but diffuse instead. Thus, it has rarely been explained how the initial call to action is developed through an intricate process of online communication to define an issue, explain it, and emphasize its meaning. By investigating digital posts produced before the first street gathering of the Candlelight Protests, I examine how the beef trade issue became a protest claim, and how its meaning was constituted. To meet my goal, this

chapter employs topic modeling, whose outputs identify topics that were discussed and their constituting terms. Topic networks, defined as connections among the specified topics by shared terms among them, help to understand the joint emergence of a protest claim and its context.

(2) How are online and street activities connected? How are protest repertoires shaped?

This question seeks to understand how digital interactions are connected to activities performed on the streets. According to the observations of the early occasions of the Candlelight Protests, participants drew attention by their novel repertoires that emphasized orderliness and voluntary participation. With this question, I examine the development of the idea as to how to coordinate action on the street, i.e., choosing protest repertoires, arranging them, and adapting them to contingent situations. To answer the question, I focus on how different online communities processed their diverging views on “writing alone” online and “working together” on the streets.

.

(3) How do emergent situations affect formulated protest repertoires?

This question aims to identify how a protest repertoire changes in relation to online communication and accumulated experiences of street events. To answer the question, digital posts produced in an online community in the first month of the Candlelight Protests are examined. The collected digital posts are divided into three periods of time in order to examine the transition of government reactions from lenient to stringent. I use

dynamic semantic analysis to trace changes in the meaning of “avoiding potential illegal and violent protests” over time.

Chapter Outline


Chapter 2 refines analytic tools suitable to capture the interactive dimensions of online communication—communication that is often mistakenly regarded as solitary acts unprompted by anything except the actor’s personal motivations. It discusses the characteristics of the digital data collected and analyzed in this dissertation with a focus on the dynamics of digital interactions. After introducing the data, this chapter adumbrates the analytic strategies I will use to capture semantic structures and meanings, through a combination of computational text analysis and network analysis.

Chapter 3 demonstrates the online claim-making process of the Candlelight Protest using digital posts produced ahead of the first street gathering. Employing topic modeling combined with network analysis, it identifies the process of making claims, which was far from being a simple unfolding of unambiguous, straightforward and cohesive claims. This chapter finds that the protest against the importation of U.S. beef products, considered widely to be the core claim of the Candlelight Protests, is better understood as a ‘brokering’ issue that linked other issues that could have remained independent of one another, whereby it was shored up as a comprehensive cause for collective action. In other words, the beef issue ignited attention to other issues and connected them into a more comprehensive protest movement.

Chapter 4 conducts content analysis to discuss intense disputes over the preferred formats of street protests before the first street gathering of the Candlelight Protests, which eventually set the tone of street gatherings. It reports that the initial online organizers' disputes over protest repertoires eventually resorted to the Assembly and Demonstration Act (ADA), while competing over interpretations of the competency of interactions on the layouts of digital platforms at the time. This chapter argues that those sites became viewed as a highly institutionalized space, where aggregates of individuals were framed as a collective regardless of their self-identification, although no firm conclusions were drawn from the disputes. I demonstrate how the idea of "voluntary participation" was formed in relation to the desired vision of upcoming street gatherings .

Chapter 5 traces the further development of the legality discourse in reference to the ADA, which successfully set in motion street gatherings. Using a collection of digital posts produced in May of the Candlelight Protests, this chapter discusses the outcomes of a dynamic analysis of semantic networks that focuses on how the notion of illegality formed different meanings by being associated with different sets of terms over time. Findings reveal that the legality discourse left a strong imprint in firsthand accounts that meticulously matched their understanding of a legal protest with their experiences in the streets. A conspicuous modification comes from a temporal extension by recalling personal memories of past protests during the democratization movements in the 1980s, whose aggressive and combative repertoires contributed to reinforcing the legality discourse. Chapter 6 briefly reports findings of this dissertation and proposes questions for future research.

Figure 1.1. Arrests during the Candlelight Protests of 2008




Note: Minbyun 2016, p. 27-28, Recited.

Table 1.2. Charges of Those Found Guilty at Trials

Traffic Disruption	Marching on the road, while chanting or picketing	206	559*
	Marching on the road	336	
	Marching on the sidewalk, while chanting or picketing	1	
	Marching on the sidewalk	15	
	Piling sandbags in front of a police bus	1	
Violation of the Assembly and Protest Act	Participating in a protest after sunset (and midnight)	325	432
	Participating in a violent protest	41	
	Disobeying police instructions to disperse	17	
	Organizing an unreported protest	1	
	Destroying police buses, etc.	7	
	Obstructing law enforcement (assault, intimidation)	28	
	Destroying public goods	3	
	Detention	5	
	Causing injury	3	
	Fleeing the police	2	
		991	

Note: Redrawn based on data from Minbyun 2016, p. 25-6.; *: This number was corrected from 589, which is printed in the original source.

Figure 1.2. ANTI-MB Profile from December 2007 to September 2008



Note: The upper left graph shows the number of registered members, the upper right graph shows the number of active members. The bottom left graph shows the number of posts, and the bottom right graph illustrates the number of page views. All numeric information used for the four graphs was taken as natural logarithms. Although the membership base of ANTI-MB increased exponentially in April, the number of people who actually write seem to decrease after May.

Chapter 2 Dynamics of Digital Interactions and Meaning

This chapter introduces a compilation of digital posts as data for this dissertation and an analytic strategy that reflects the semantic and structural traits of digital interactions discussed in the previous chapter. My strategy aims to identify how digital media users involved in blind communication generate meaning to be shared, and how, once developed, meanings become reproduced or transformed. I argue that it is crucial to study communication networks, which are ostensibly inconsistent and full of “noise,” in order to identify the process through which claims are made and tactics are selected. The following section introduces the data used in this dissertation, comprised of digital and non-digital materials. The second section addresses three traits of digital platforms: the architecture of digital platforms, challenges posed by the lack of information on the socio-demographic attributes of digital media users, and the characteristics of digital posts as texts. The third section discusses how the addressed characteristics can be considered for semantic network analysis. The fourth section presents methods for analyzing digital posts, combining computational tools and social network analysis, in light of the above discussion over the nexus of communication structure and meaning.

Data

Primary Data

The primary data of this dissertation are comprised of posts collected from three digital platforms: the free discussion boards of Agora and ANTI-MB and the anonymous free discussion board of 82cook.com (henceforth referred to as 82cook) (see Table 2.1).¹⁷ The selection of these platforms reflects the popular layouts of digital architecture that were pervasive in 2008 in South Korea (Kern and Nam 2011; J. Lee 2013), characterized by the combination of (1) anonymizing users when they write and encounter others, and (2) reducing constraints on topic selection to various degrees, as illustrated further below.¹⁸

For a digital post, the following common markers were collected in addition to its body text: (1) its author's platform-specific username; (2) the title; (3) its publishing date and time; (4) the number of views, and (5) the number of replies it received (see Table 2.1). The collections of ANTI-MB and 82cook posts also contain replies associated with a post. The Korean language was retained as the linguistic origin throughout the process of computational text analysis such as natural language process and topic modeling.¹⁹ Analysis was conducted with R, offering an integrated environment for a range of requirements for this research such as collecting digital materials, text mining, natural language process, topic modeling, as well as social network analysis for static and

¹⁷ Posts collected from 82cook are used to offer comparative features in understanding Agora and ANTI-MB, not for its substantive analysis in the rest of this dissertation. Plans to utilize the 82cook dataset will be discussed in the conclusion to this dissertation.

¹⁸ There was a digital platform named Cyworld, which was the 2008 equivalent to today's social networking sites. Its users were provided some amount of data and templates to build their personal space, referred to as a "mini-homepage (minihompi in Korean)" for free. Such mini-homepages were organized into multiple directories reflecting their owners' interests. A crucial feature that should be mentioned is that Cyworld users connected with their acquaintances in "degrees of relationship," imitating "degrees of kinship." Users in one-degree relationships had mutual access to their mini-homepages. It is well known that in the very early period of the Candlelight Protests, Cyworld users also utilized their mini-homepages as a route of expressing their rejection of the new inspection standards, which must have influenced the ways in which potential candlelight participants saw the issue through their existing social relations. Despite the importance of Cyworld as a digital platform, it is not discussed in this dissertation because Cyworld was already in significant decline with a rapidly diminishing user base at the time of data collection for this dissertation project.

¹⁹ All translations are done by the author unless otherwise noted.

dynamic networks.²⁰ All posts were collected several years after the Candlelight Protests, which is certain to have resulted in the loss of some posts.

The first collection consists of posts from Agora, a bulletin board with sub-directories on topics like politics, society, etc., that is serviced by Daum, a Korean portal site. Though Agora's sub-directories have undergone changes in layouts since their introduction in the early 2000s,²¹ its free discussion board, a target platform for this dissertation, has remained generally unchanged as an open space for communication without topical constraints. This dissertation analyzed approximately 16,000 posts that appeared in the free discussion board (henceforth referred to as Agora) from April 16, 2008 through May 3, 2008, to investigate whether collective claims leading to the Candlelight Protests emerged after the public announcement on April 18 about beef trade with the United States, and if so, how it progressed for approximately 15 days prior to the first street gathering on May 2.

[Table 2.1 to be inserted here]

[Figure 2.1 to be inserted here]

Agora played a role as the hub in which users continued protesting on a 24/7 basis, consistently marking record-high daily traffic during the Candlelight Protests. The combined effect of topical openness and anonymity on digital platforms, however, should not be reified as a predetermined and inflexible trait. Figure 2.1 shows four word clouds generated from Agora posts, respectively produced on April 16, 21, 26, and May 2. In a

²⁰ R 3.4.0 released in April 2017 was used at the point of finalizing all data collection and analysis.

²¹ Daum's Agora is known to have been launched around 2004. Its service was terminated in January 2019.

word cloud utilizing term frequency in a given corpus, frequently-used terms are typeset closer to the center and in larger fonts. The observable number of tiers in a word cloud can be used as a reference for comparison.

On April 16, two days prior to the Lee administration's announcement of upcoming modifications to beef import inspection standards, the U.S. beef trade issue was almost invisible, at least on Agora. This inconspicuousness completely changed five days later, as seen in the April 21 word cloud, where four terms—i.e., “Lee Myung-bak (이명박),” “Beef (쇠고기),” “Imported from the United States (미국산),” and “Mad cow disease (광우병)”²²—evolve at the center, persisting until April 26. The word cloud for May 2, the first day of street gatherings, reveals that Agora users predominantly employed the same set of the four terms found in the April 21 word cloud, surrounded by “we (우리가),” “Naver (네이버, a Korean portal site),”²³ “Properly (제대로),” among others. Despite the apparent limit of quantifying texts using term frequency (see Chapter 3 for more detailed analysis), the presented word clouds demonstrate the importance of dynamics in terms of how topical coherence would become disarrayed or incoherent, which resultantly transformed the anonymous discussion board into a communicative center.

A second collection of digital posts was pulled from ANTI-MB, which is also hosted on Daum. Unlike Agora, which is under the technical administration of Daum,

²² As noted here, Korean words often do not have precise English translations. For instance, although in English a person's name consists of two separate words with a whitespace between the first and last names, names in Korean are often written with no space in between the first and last names.

²³ Naver is a Korean portal company, whose market share has surpassed Daum. And yet, throughout the Candlelight Protests, Naver was suspected to be manipulating the operational algorithms of its search engine to influence users' opinions in a particular manner.

online communities like ANTI-MB have exclusive authority to decide how to organize themselves. For instance, ANTI-MB enforces certain membership rules defining accessibility to its sub-directories. New members might have limited access to writing and reading in some directories. Nevertheless, ANTI-MB has often been regarded as an open community, because its free discussion board (studied in this dissertation) is managed exactly in the same way as Agora.

[Table 2.2 to be inserted here]

The ANTI-MB collection is comprised of approximately 10,600 posts produced from mid-April 2008 through mid-August 2008. To obtain this sample, this author utilized Daum's built-in search engine for online communities. Firstly, 21 keywords were selected, which pertain to widely-recognized claims and issues, particularly those relevant to suggestions about tactics and strategies throughout the Candlelight Protests (see Table 2.2 for the selected keywords). Each term returned posts that contain the selected terms either in the title or the body. Although the search engine gave the total number of posts satisfying the search conditions (indicated as total posts (TP) in Table 2.2), it only returned a maximum of 1,000 posts with three sorting options: (1) chronological order, (2) relevance, and (3) the number of replies.²⁴ I chose to sort by relevance in order to make the ANTI-MB collection (1) represent the entire period of the Candlelight Protests, and (2) with variations in the numbers of replies. After compiling 21 search outcomes, duplicate posts were removed, which eventually returned about 10,600 posts.

²⁴ It is not known that search outcomes are re-sorted after the selection of the first criterion. When sorting by relevance, for instance, it is possible to apply either the date of the post or the number of replies.

As shown in Table 2.2, the ANTI-MB collection apparently underrepresents posts containing the most frequently-used terms. For instance, posts that contain the term “leftist” had a 62% chance of being selected into the ANTI-MB collection, whereas it appears only once, in comparison to twelve posts with “Lee Myung-bak” or nine posts with “protest.” Despite the unfavorable outcome, two points should be considered. Firstly, the 21 terms are not exclusively used in posts. More frequently-used terms are also more likely to appear again in the posts selected for less frequent terms. For instance, 44% and 47% of posts that include the term “candlelight girl” also contain the terms “Lee Myung-bak” and “police” respectively, while 33% and 14% of posts that include the term “nonviolence” also contain the terms “Lee Myung-bak” and “illegal” respectively. “Lee Myung-bak” and “candlelight” appear in 30.2% and 35.3% of posts respectively in the ANTI-MB collection (see the final column of Table 2.2). In other words, although the ANTI-MB collection remains unsatisfactory in terms of its statistically-sound representativeness, the co-occurrence of terms needs to be considered carefully.

[Table 2.3 to be inserted here]

[Figure 2.2 to be inserted here]

Secondly, the ANTI-MB collection was intended to focus on interactions to be measured by replies. A post and its author are connected to their counterparts who leave replies. For digital interactions that take place among strangers without physical co-presence and repeated encounters, replies are an indicator to estimate the resonance of the topics being discussed. In her research on online communities for organizing volunteer projects prior to the Candlelight Protests, Lee (2009) points out that replies epitomize the crucial nature of online communication to the extent that negative replies are considered

to be better than no replies because ‘no replies’ could mean ‘being ignored.’ In Kang’s research on the Candlelight Protests of 2002 (2016), it was shown that people gained a feeling of practical confidence by receiving and posting replies. Utilizing this idea, Chapter 5 incorporates replies as part of semantic analysis.

Before analyzing the contents and forms of reply networks, it is important to scrutinize an overview of replies at least quantitatively. For instance, applying a power law, it has been found that only a few posts dominate public attention, whereas most easily fall below the radar of attention (Bennett and Segerberg 2014). Verifying this notion requires reference to Table 2.3 and Figure 2.2, which report the descriptive statistics of the number of views and replies by month from mid-April through mid-August. As intended, the ANTI-MB collection contains posts produced throughout the Candlelight Protests with 80.5% of the posts produced in May (4,163 posts) and June (4,401 posts). In terms of the number of views, i.e., posts that are read, the ranges are quite broad. For instance, for April, it ranges from eight views to 4,939, although the median is 149 views. This collection contains about 166,000 replies in total, and each post has 11 to 12 replies on average regardless of when it was produced, though outliers with many more replies exist. Note that the observed consistency in the median values of replies over time indicates that there is a pattern in the ways in which a post facilitates interactions regardless of the resonance of topics.

A third collection of digital posts was drawn from the anonymous discussion board of 82cook, widely known as a women-dominant online community. This community was selected (1) to reflect women’s salient participation in the Candlelight Protests mainly through online communities, and (2) to include a digital platform whose

main topic is not politics. In addition, 82cook is suitable for this study because of its independence from Daum. 82cook has multiple sub-directories for selling and buying secondhand goods, group purchase of food and home appliances, sharing experiences and information on everyday life issue, etc. Among them is its anonymous discussion board, in which users were required to anonymize themselves by improvising platform names whenever they post. From 82cook, I collected about 42,000 posts and about 298,000 replies produced from April 18, 2008 through August 15, 2008 (see Table 2.1).

Table 2.3 and Figure 2.3 exhibit the descriptive statistics of the 82cook collection in the same format as the ANTI-MB collection. For the 82cook collection, posts produced in June and July appear most frequently, accounting for 54.5% of the entire collection. Table 2.3 also shows that a post on 82cook entails four to five replies on average, which is about half of its counterparts in the ANTI-MB collection, although the range of the number of replies is narrower than that of the ANTI-MB collection. It indicates that, compared with the ANTI-MB collection, 82cook posts tend to be read by more people, and receive fewer replies.

Although the data collection process for 82cook did not consider keyword distributions as with ANTI-MB, a keyword search in the 82cook collection shows a slightly different pattern from that observed in the ANTI-MB collection. Among the 21 keywords (see Table 2.2) “candlelight” and “beef” were most frequently used, appearing in about 11% and 10.8% of posts respectively, followed by “protests” for 8.04%, “Lee Myung-bak” for 7.93%, “Mad Cow disease” for 6.8%, “demonstrations” for 6.77%, and “violence” for 2.97%.

Secondary Data

The makeup of secondary materials includes documents in print and digital platforms produced by various entities involved in the Candlelight Protests, some of which are available via digital platforms. First, a collection of news articles was gathered through BIGKinds, an online service operated by the Korean Press Foundation to provide news contents from about 40 news organizations alongside interactive textual analysis tools. Although BIGKinds does not disclose the operating algorithms of these tools, the following discussion will use it to enrich the analysis of digital posts.

Secondly, a large component of secondary materials consists of various documents issued and published by the National Committee and its allied civil organization, Lawyers for a Democratic Society (henceforth referred to as Minbyun). At the time of data collection, the website of the National Committee was unavailable, but its materials are available on the digital archive of the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (henceforth referred to as PSPD). In addition to web-based materials, two reports were published by the National Committee, which were released upon its formation and a year after the Candlelight Protests, respectively. Minbyun's first report from 2010 mainly contained its own statements with a focus on providing legal services for both arrested participants as well as educational sessions to ensure awareness of candlelight participants' legal rights throughout the Candlelight Protests. Its second report in 2016 contained updates on trials protesters who were summoned to court on criminal charges.

Thirdly, this dissertation collected and studied books and pamphlets published by those engaged in the Candlelight Protests. Volunteer Agora users compiled posts to record Agorians' involvement in an edited volume, titled *Agora, the Encyclopedia of Republic of Korea* (2008). In the same vein, Kyunghyang Shinmun, a liberal-leaning daily paper, published a compilation of its own news articles.

Three Challenges in an Analysis of Digital Posts

In analyzing digital posts, no clear answers are available yet regarding how the impact of the architecture of digital platforms can be substantively incorporated into semantic network analysis. In the recent advances in social movement studies on online communication, the subject of digital architecture has been put aside. A likely reason is that the studied cases have largely shared the same platforms, i.e., social media such as Twitter and Facebook (Hepburn 2013). Therefore, prevalent features of social media explored by communication and media scholars have been regarded sufficient (boyd 2010; boyd and Ellison 2007; Song 2010b). For instance, social media users are remarkably autonomous in their ability to connect themselves to, or disconnect themselves from, a certain thread of communication (boyd 2010; Dolata and Schrape 2014). Or, social media tends to make users remain within a limited scope of social relations, which can eventually reduce opportunities for encounters with new people and novel ideas (boyd 2010). And yet, these characteristics have been seldom addressed in terms of their substantial impact on digital interactions, which eventually leads to a lack of discussion on structural factors of digital interactions and collective action as their outcome.

[Figure 2.4 to be inserted here]

For my analysis below, I examine two aspects of digital platforms, namely topical openness and anonymity, which constitute a two-dimensional space where diverse digital platforms can be placed, as illustrated in Figure 2.4. Instead of considering the disclosure of user identity as social media users do by default, I suggest that it should be regarded as one end of a scale of anonymity instead. Anonymity is construed here as a communication setting that allows its participants to redefine their routines and expectations during interactions. For example, Agora arranges anonymity in an unbalanced way by limiting the ability to write posts to Daum users with platform-specific names, while removing restrictions on reading posts. Regarding the act of writing, platform names do not grant complete anonymity. The trajectory of a user's in-platform activities is searchable by platform names without being associated with the real-life identity stored by Daum. Law enforcement officials could request to retrieve a user's private information with a court order.²⁵ In terms of readership, Daum users had access to larger and broader audiences. Undeniably, Agora has largely been perceived as an open and anonymous space with little concern for social repercussions of speech, though its contents are generally somewhat distrusted in terms of their validity and reliability.

The second dimension in Figure 2.4 differentiates digital platforms by the degree of topical openness. According to Menchik and Tian (2008), online communication

²⁵ In the very early period of the Candlelight Protests, for instance, police officers in a small city visited a high school to investigate students who were accused of spreading false information regarding the upcoming candlelight gatherings. Had it not been the case that portal sites collected and stored personal information such as Residential Registration Number (RRN, equivalent of Social Security Number in the United States) at the point of users' registration, this action could not have been taken legally.

appears to possess immanent traits that enable multiple topics to become disarrayed, even if focal topics are already determined by a group of people who regularly congregate in person to reaffirm their desired topics. In Agora, users are able to select specific subject matters for their posts.²⁶ Thus, it is hardly surprising on Agora to see a post soliciting public attention for personal misfortune (e.g., being the victim of a criminal act) followed by another on a celebrity's scandal or on nationalist sentiments prior to international sport matches. Topical openness arguably contributes to higher incoherence in contents discussed on digital platforms. As such, Agora is prone to disappoint a user who aims to utilize it as a space for spreading a coherent message, contrary to the popular belief that a topic is more likely to spread widely on a high-traffic digital platform. ANTI-MB's free discussion board can be placed at a lower point vertically than Agora in Figure 2.4 for its additional membership guidelines. In terms of the degree of topical openness, however, the free discussion board of ANTI-MB presumably displays a higher degree of topical coherence than Agora, given that its members shared the goal of impeaching President Lee months before the beef trade issue came into public view (see Figure 2.4).

Though Figure 2.4 currently contains digital platforms that will be discussed below, it is also possible to place Western social media such as Facebook or Twitter. A Facebook profile does not engage in anonymous social relations, therefore it can be roughly located on the lower part on the vertical axis, but on the right side on the horizontal because its owner can choose the content to publish. By contrast, a Facebook page devoted to a group project on a specific issue should be placed at the left bottom corner of Figure 2.4. Websites of social movement organizations (e.g., National

²⁶ For instance, one can consider the automatic deletion of pornography as an example.

Committee and Minbyun in Figure 2.4) can be generally placed on the left side on the horizontal axis since they often possess their own cause for activism, whereas their website administration styles can lead them to be positioned in different spots depending on the degree of anonymity.

Figure 2.4 echoes observations that collective action organized through online communication is comprised of multiple centers. In addition, Figure 2.4 helps us construe how such multiplicity can be substantively incorporated into an analysis of digital interactions. For instance, the same topic can gain different connotations in different platforms, depending on their openness to topics that are not easily aligned with topics to which those platforms are originally dedication. Depending on those platforms' routinized communication styles, coordinating action itself can have different meanings and protocols. By extension, it can be conceived that multiplicity can lead to more dissent in the course of both communicating online and arranging different tactics.

A second obstacle relates to an unidentifiable link between digital posts and their authors, i.e., social actors. In studying large volumes of digital posts, as in this dissertation, it is exceedingly rare for the authors' socio-demographic attributes to be known and accessible. Moreover, even if they are available as in social media settings, the ethical and practical questions involved demand answers regarding the extent to which personal information is unobtrusively collected. There are other issues that should be considered, indeed more seriously. On certain digital platforms, users write and are read by others without knowing the socio-demographic attributes of their potential communication partners and without disclosing their own. It is helpful to imagine the case of YouTube, in which users' videos can be enjoyed without first knowing who

produced them. In the same vein, it is surprisingly difficult to discern from reading a post if it was written by a young female in her twenties or a 15-year-old school boy. In addition, even if authors disclose their personal identity truthfully, the setting in which they do so can change the practical validity of that information. Moreover, in many cases, online communication networks are not embedded in a hierarchical structure that reflects existing social positions based on a well-defined set of relations, as is typically true in the research on communication networks (ref. Gibson 2010, 2003, 2000). In other words, the ways in which digital interactions tend to take place have less to do with the interacting parties' personal attributes and social positions, and more with contingent features emerging out of interactions in motion.²⁷

The third impediment in the study of digital posts bears on the traits of digital posts as texts in terms of using conventional content analysis and mapping semantic networks (Carley 1994; Carley and Kaufer 1993) without ruining the unspoken tenet as to the selection of textual materials eligible for social scientific research. Blurred genres and mixed styles in writing digital posts seemingly discourage a uniform application of content analysis, that designed in line with the conventional traits of genres. Narrative analysts, influenced by literary scholars, have developed interpretive and quantitative methods to break down a narrative's plot in to the beginning, middle, and ending of an

²⁷ Note here that the discussion never denies the importance of knowing the socio-demographical attributes of digital media users. For instance, according to Jinsoo Lee (2013), the largest user base of many anonymous and free discussion boards serviced by portal companies in South Korea consists of males in their thirties and forties with college education, more than other groups. It is valid to highlight the influence of such a demographical factor. By referring to the notion of the digital divide (DiMaggio et al. 2001) and the governmental survey of information usage reports in Korea, Yoonkyung Lee (2013) argues that the public sphere made available via digital platforms is generally dominated by well-educated male users in white-collar occupations. Lee's inquiries should not be disregarded in examining online communication, although they do not fall precisely on the focus of this dissertation.

event, as well as the characters involved (Bearman and Stovel 2000; Franzosi 1998; Polletta 2006; Somers 1994; Tilly 2005). Examining in-person interactions, researchers have probed the details of the interaction at the nexus of contingent cultural practices and the setting in which the interactions take place (Blee 2012; Eliasoph 1998; Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003; Fine and Kleinman 1983; Gibson 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008; McLean 1998, 2017; Mische 2003; de Nooy 2009, 2015).²⁸ Despite their varied interests, social movement scholars have tended to choose certain types of focused (pseudo) documents, which reflects the themes of social movements and are associated with the existing and potentially projected relationships among social movement participants (Fernandez and McAdam 1988; Gould 2003b; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Passy 2003; Passy and Monsch 2014).

A collection of digital posts, however, is not a conventional dataset of study. Firstly, writings produced by a multitude of people are unlikely to be homogenous. In addition to their inconsistent styles, digital posts are often inconsistent in their contents as well, even if they are implicitly bounded by a shared interest. Posts presumably contain their author's intentions and desired meanings, which are independent of other posts. Nevertheless, these posts, as Lessig (2008) and Shifman (2014) point out, are subject to heterogeneous interpretations by others, which results in the reproduction, mutation, extension, or reduction of the meaning intended by the initial post. This transformation,

²⁸ A noticeable point in the studies that focus on interactions regardless of their preferable methodological tenets is that in-person interactions are inherently seen as micro events. Interactions in a high school classroom and conversations among activists in South Korea, for instance, differ from each other in terms of the contents of the interactions. Therefore, the efforts to theorize interactions have concentrated either on (1) the relationships between observed interactions and social settings in a broad sense (e.g., institutions or events) (Eliasoph 1998; Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003; Ewick and Silbey 1998; Polletta 2006), or (2) the forms of interactions, which can be formalized and generalizable without embracing the messiness of what people talk (Gibson 2000, 2003, 2005).

which occurs parallel with the emergence of communication networks, can result in suspicion as to whether a certain digital post is convincingly relevant and germane to a pertinent protest. Should a collection of digital posts maintain sole focus on the protests, perhaps going as far as to delete a post about going to an amusement park on a national holiday, if it is in between posts encouraging more participants in upcoming street events on the said holiday? How can the thematic relevance be determined before data collection, particularly if it is conducted on digital platforms with a high level of topical openness? Does this kind of filtering properly reflect the ways in which the themes in focus are developed via online communication?

On another level, it is more difficult than might be assumed to draw a boundary of where digital posts end or close, which is relevant in interpreting strands of posts. Structurally speaking, digital posts can be broken down into two classes, the initial post and the subsequent replies.²⁹ Replies supersede the initial post in chronology. Therefore, it is intuitive to envision the relationship between the two kinds of posts as a directed star network, if all replies are directed to the initial post.³⁰ It merits further discussion, however, that the star network always places its author (or ego in network analysis) at the center, even when the reason for the presence of a vast number of replies is a debate that happened among alters. And yet, except for the first person who replies to the ego, all alters implicitly reply to the ego after reading the preceding replies. In other words, the

²⁹ In Anglophone countries, replies to digital posts are usually referred to as “comments.” Throughout this dissertation, the author will use the term “replies” (댓글, pronounced *daetgeul* in Korean), given its widespread use in South Korea.

³⁰ In reality, a star network can take multiple forms. An initial post’s author, for instance, is unable to return to the thread of interaction by replying back to others who comment. Or, those who reply can choose to reply to others who also replied rather than the initial post’s author. More detailed cases are studied in Chapter 5.

structure of a string of digital interactions can be quite unclear because semantic references that affect replies are difficult to specify. If so, what would be a better way of studying digital posts, which are frequently open-ended and whose meanings are in the process of being made?

All things considered, the three obstacles converge to an inquiry of how networks and culture in online communication can be studied without demoting each other to a residual status. In the research tradition of prioritizing networks, communication networks drawn by first specifying the connected people and entities (e.g., who consults whom, who reports to whom, who recruits whom into a campaign, etc.), despite the reputed achievements, have mechanized interactions as sending, receiving, or refusing to do either. In such models, communication starts as one is supposed to send or receive information depending on their position. And yet, digital posts are not generated from such a structure. The structure that identifies the value of information is not already in place, but rather in the making, which involves highly active interpretations as well as well-tuned reactions, that adjust the direction of the exchange in turn (Fuhse 2015b; Gibson 2000, 2003, 2005; McLean 2007, 2017; Mische 2003). Moreover, specifiable positions among interacting parties are not predetermined but emergent, however transitory (Gould 2003a).

Digital Platforms

To sum, the digital data set of this dissertation contains about 26,000 posts collected from three digital platforms.³¹ This section probes the importance of the inclusion of digital platforms in the analysis of posts for three reasons, which hopefully reinforce the goal of this study. This dissertation project (1) prefers to examine interactions that are more effectively observed in local settings rather than in an overall network; (2) clarifies the distinction between interactions and relations in the study of online communication; and (3) suggests a redefinition of contexts, considering the noise in digital platforms due to anonymity and topical openness.

Local Settings vs. Overall Network

Focusing on digital interactions, this study does not pursue the overall communication network representing the Candlelight Protests in their entirety. The task is simply impossible. Although the current dataset appears to be ‘big’ enough, it surprisingly consists of tiny fragments only obtained from certain platforms, as observed in this dissertation. It should not be underestimated that the environment of online communication in 2008 was a patchwork of multiple platforms.

Beyond the practical and straightforward impossibility, reconstructing an entire communication network is not the goal of this study. Rather, this dissertation joins the academic camp focusing on interactions and local settings in order to learn the generative

³¹ As this dissertation exclusively focuses on the first two months of the Candlelight Protests, April and May, only part of the collected posts was used for this dissertation.

dynamics of social networks (Fine and Kleinman 1983; Fuhse 2009, 2015a; Kitts 2014; McLean 1998, 2007, 2017; Mische 2003; de Nooy 2009, 2015; White and Godart 2008; Yeung 2005). In line with this camp, this study discards the presumption that digital media users are given reinforced agency with fewer constraints. Instead, digital platforms in this dissertation are identified as local settings vis-à-vis global networks. As discussed in the previous section, ANTI-MB and 82cook show different patterns in the number of posts, with the former reaching its peak in May rather than June, when 82cook had the most number of posts in the latter month (see Table 2.3). Moreover, the patterns of replies differ between the two online communities. In other words, it is reasonable to hypothesize that people would experience different types of interactions with the same topics in view, depending on the choice of digital platforms. Therefore, throughout this dissertation, my analysis will center on how local communication networks are generated and transformed.

According to Rainie and Wellman (2012), digital platforms, i.e., online communities, are similar to a group. These venues have boundaries, as ANTI-MB and 82cook have membership rules distributing their resources, i.e., writing versus reading. Both have a primary subject matter, which guides its users' expectations and norms for communication in the venues. Moreover, the two communities are familiar with a certain type of coordinated acts. ANTI-MB had been staging picket lines on the streets at a scale of around twenty participants on average since months before the Candlelight Protests. For 82cook members, it would have been a natural response to contribute money to buy water bottles for their fellow protesters, given that they had often engaged in such collective purchases. All these descriptions may reaffirm the similarity between an online

community and a social movement organization, i.e., a group based on solidarity, and distance to networked individuals in Rainie and Wellman's terminology. Networked individuals, in their description, are rather like an aggregate of individuals who band together for a cause and eventually disperse. In other words, one can see that the Candlelight Protests benefited from the existence and popularity of online communities before the surge of social media.

It may be undeniable that the mobilization conducted through online communities benefited the development of the Candlelight Protests, which resultantly makes those communities and social movement organizations alike. Nonetheless, this is not the point that deserves attention. Rather, this dissertation focuses more on how different types of digital platforms became involved in the Candlelight Protests without defining the relations among people associated with the platforms, which reverses the direction of conventional mobilization, i.e., from activists to their friends. Thus, this study investigates the relations between transient interactions and social relations in digital platforms. In other words, how are instant interactions, which are activated often for a variety of everyday issues, turned into more focused communication to address the interest of a group of people whose substantive features are only made palpable in limited ways by the volume of digital interactions or encounters with protesters on the street? This study examines the ways in which such topic-driven communication settings extend (or narrow) the range of their topical interests by judging the relevance of a newly-emerging issue, which would in turn facilitate or hamper the emergence of certain norms and expectations, i.e., social relations.

In pursuit of this point, I distinguish interactions from social relations (White and Godart 2008:p. 573). The main brunt of the distinction is that digital platforms do not preset social relations. Above all, the digital interactions themselves are transitory in nature. Considering a sudden spike in the membership of ANTI-MB (see Figure 1.1), exchanging replies with the exact same users would be a rare occurrence. And yet, the current dataset can be used to test the ways in which a relationship could emerge and the type of relationship it would comprise. My hypothesis is that it would be a topical focus that emerges from and is shared by people due to the setting, which enables interactions to be viewed by other people who are not directly involved. Some links between topics are repeated to some extent, and those repeated topics are associated with the idea of drawing a boundary in collective action, which may be interpreted as the emergence of a relationship based on shared meanings. In addition, similarities and disparities that occur among online communities in the process of forming a relation should be examined. Also, in closing this discussion, the following section should be included.

Noise in Digital Platforms

Similarly to sociologists in other fields, social movement researchers require well-organized and pre-processed data. Qualitative data are no exception. Widely-studied texts include SMOs' internal and public documents, newspaper articles, interviews with leading activists as well as ordinary participants, archived prosecutorial dockets, memoirs, etc. Even after collection, some texts, such as interviews, are not used if they seem irrelevant to the issues of interest to researchers (Johnston 1995). Well-structured and focused textual data, however, serves automated analysis effectively. By

investigating common terms and expressions found in SMOs' public documents, Bail (2012) draws an ecology of political discourses. Mohr, Wagner-Pacifici, and Breiger (2015) develop a research protocol, particularly for those studying the motives embedded in a set of documents, by combining conventional parsing-out techniques with probabilistic topic models. DiMaggio et al. (2013), while using topic models, argue that computational text analysis has the capacity to identify ambiguity and multivocality in a studied corpus, in their case consisting of newspaper articles on art policies over a period of five years in the 1980s. Newspaper articles are not mixed with interviews, and each of them must be cleaned for analysis. In other words, conventional text materials used for a study of collective action have been free from noise.

By contrast, digital posts are full of noise. Firstly, when collective action is prepared via online communication, it is not known in advance how a proposed idea for collective action is understood and interpreted by digital media users. As discussed above, every topic is open to various interpretations depending on the digital platform. For many activists participating in the Candlelight Protests through the National Committee, the ongoing resistance movement was an extension of the anti-FTA movement of 2006-2007 as resistance against neoliberalism. The contexts preferred by early members of ANTI-MB were laid out as part of the resistance against then-President Lee. For some digital media users, the beef trade issue was the tip of the iceberg as to the failing bureaucratic system since 2003, when the beef inspection standards came into public view for the first time (Song 2008). Moreover, it is difficult to rule out a potential interaction effect among topics that happen to appear together in platforms with high topical openness like Agora. Complaints initially intended to address discontent on the

beef trade issue may be enhanced because it happens to be presented with dissent to other policies. If so, how can such emerging flow of digital interactions be incorporated into semantic network analysis without hampering the quality of data?

Therefore, it becomes intriguing to examine how noise is converted into relevant or irrelevant focused topics, through which claims and tactics obtain meaning and gain ground within discussions. Thus, this study examines how digital media users come to be assured to share the ways through which they perceive an issue and how they otherwise fail to do so, by regarding contexts as not objective and extraneous to digital media users' interactions.³² This point will be discussed in chapters to come with the tools introduced in the following section.

Digital Posts as Digital Interactions

This section accomplishes two goals. The first part provides an overview of quantitative and computing techniques employed in this study. The second part illustrates parts of an analytic protocol in the examination of digital interactions as communication networks, using replies.

³² Baldassarri and Bearman's (2007) study on political polarization is relevant here. They probe existing unparallel views on political polarization as either entrenched or non-existent. The authors consider as explanatory factors (1) homophily (i.e., people interact with those who have similar attitudes, though they also interact with others with different attitudes from their own), and (2) issue preference (i.e., people like to communicate topics they like, although their interests range over multiple topics). Using simulation, for instance, they find that when an issue dominates discussion in a group, group members tend to become polarized by taking opposite views on the issue. The trigger of such a dominant issue is not found in individuals' attributes but in the factors that contextualize interactions. Thus, the authors argue that their findings redirect the research focus of social movement studies from asking the conditions that defy free-riders and/or nurture more collaboration, to developing "a model of social influence in which individuals' attitudes, social structure, and the public interest itself are not fixed, predefined aspects rather they are shaped in interaction sequences" (808). A further discussion will be continued in Chapter 5, where the dynamics of digital interactions will be presented in the analysis of reply networks.

Computational text analysis pursues the quantified interpretation of documents to investigate large volumes of texts, which is difficult to achieve by manual analysis. A simple version would focus on term frequency with the implication that terms with a higher frequency would deliver a more important meaning to a given text, as visualized in Figure 2.1. The simplicity of frequency-based methods will serve the data-cleaning process.

Another branch of quantitative approaches concentrates on the syntactic roles of words in a sentence, and in a document. To do this, sentences are parsed out to a subject (actor), verb (act), and object (actor), whose outcomes are often visualized as a map of words (Bearman and Stovel 2000; Franzosi 1999, 2004, 2010; Tilly 2005; Vicari 2010). This method is compelling because: (1) it prevents the loss of the original information in syntax;³³ (2) it benefits from attribute information attached to the documents regarding their authors, i.e., actors; and (3) it probes events described from the perspective of the author. As previous studies have shown, this method will be applied for secondary materials in my data collection because their authors are identifiable (e.g., the National Committee, Minbyun, and newspapers), and their documents introduce their own viewpoints on the Candlelight Protests. More importantly, this project utilizes topic models in combination with network analysis.

³³ The meaning of a sentence, e.g., “Lee Myung-bak would risk the health of beef consumers,” is likely to be preserved, so that it would not be mistaken for “Beef consumers risk Lee Myung-bak” when they only have the terms after pre-processing, which remove whitespaces and stopwords.

Topic Modeling

In comparison with the parsing method that focuses on the actual documents, topic modeling (Blei 2012; DiMaggio, Nag, and Blei 2013) is a generative model devised to process a disorganized collection of documents by identifying the hidden structure of the documents based on subject matter (technically referred to as topics, as in ‘topic modeling’). In essence, topic modeling outcomes reorganize the collection of documents by topics to which those documents and their terms are assigned. Presupposing that individual topics are comprised of a set of terms that are more likely to be used together intentionally than by chance, topic modeling heavily relies on the relationship among the terms used across documents within a given collection. In other words, terms make up a topic, and a set of documents consists of a number of topics distributed unevenly across documents.

It is important to point out the traits of topic modeling. First, topic modeling does not offer a single, perfect solution to a given corpus concerning its hidden structure of topics. Rather, it suggests a possible generative structure, as if every researcher can always draw a different set of suggestions. More precisely, topic modeling based on the latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA)³⁴ is conditioned with two parameters such as the number of topics and a probability that a certain topic appears in a given set of

³⁴ There are various branches of topic modeling algorithms that reflect the different ideas regarding the relations between documents and terms that constitute the documents. The LDA model assumes that topics are independent, whereas the correlated topics model (CTM) presupposes the correlations of the proposed topics. The structural topic model (STM) satisfies social scientists’ interests in possessing tools to verify the validity of the topic models. In addition, the STM offers techniques to study the relationship between a studied corpus and its metadata. These different algorithms are tested and compared in chapters based on topic modeling.

documents.³⁵ For instance, the baseline topic model (referred to as an unsupervised topic model) assumes no prior knowledge of a corpus so that its practitioner relies on her choice of parameters. Let us suppose that one limits a topic list to 10 topics and sets a possibility for the 10 topics to appear to investigate 10,000 documents. For some, these parameters are too narrow to cover all the documents, and they may choose to cluster 20 topics for the same corpus. Or, others may consider introducing a subset of documents to the corpus by referring to the known characteristics of the documents, because the corpus is too large to be summarized in 10 topics. They may propose the division of the corpus into 10 subsets of documents, with each document subset containing only 1,000 documents and presumably 10 topics. All in all, these different boundaries created to define a corpus may or may not result in different outcomes, or cause a different set of parameters to be used. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that there is only one solution to summarize a given corpus.

In addition, according to linguists and computer scientists who have worked on the natural language process, predecessors of topic models have clung to strict assumptions, such as that a term must be used for a single topic, or a document must connote a single topic (Steiyvers and Griffiths n.d.; Steiyvers and Tenenbaum 2005). Topic modeling is free from such restrictions. Documents are regarded as mixtures of multiple topics. The same terms can be assigned to multiple topics as long as they simultaneously occur in different topics with probabilistic significance. That said, an outcome of topic modeling that shows topic columns with terms can be interpreted in the following ways:

³⁵ A widely-recommended value for this probability (α) is 50 divided by the number of topics, which is decided by a researcher in advance (Griffiths and Steiyvers 2004). When α gets larger, it is less likely for a topic from a certain document to be predominant. The smaller α becomes, a certain document tends to reflect fewer topics strongly.

(1) Each topic conveys a relatively distinguishable subject with different sets of terms; (2) some topics, however, can share terms, (3) with different probabilities. For my analysis, the three tenets of topic modeling serve as the basis for network analysis by taking each topic modeling outcome as a daily network of topics. This combination allows the utilization of network analysis measures such as centrality and community detection by focusing on the changing relationships among topics on a daily basis and over time.

Downside of topic modeling and the perspective of this study

These benefits also entail some drawbacks. Topic modeling is firmly grounded on a notorious assumption referred to as the bag-of-words assumption, which ignores all syntactical features of terms, and does not offer a standardized protocol to verify the validity of its performance. To begin with, the algorithm of topic modeling mainly concerns documents as the focal unit. All terms in a document can be mixed up regardless of their syntactic roles. Even worse, when documents are preprocessed (e.g., removing whitespaces, pronouns, and stopwords, de-capitalizing letters, etc.), terms easily lose their idiosyncratic and linguistic values. What, then, would topic modeling do for research projects that need to preserve the subtle nuances and tones often embedded in a sequence of words and capitalized letters? What if one is interested in shifts in the connection between subjects and verbs in describing an event in order to distinguish the subject and object?

Two principles are applied for preprocessing the three collections of digital data in this study, which are written in the Korean language. Some preprocessing recommendations for the Korean language are not used; for instance, separating

prepositions from nouns.³⁶ Unlike the English language, in which a word has its own independent grammatical meaning and is therefore placed between whitespaces, the Korean language can create a word by combining two different grammatical units (e.g., nouns and postpositions). For instance, “I” in English is translated into “나는”, which combines “나 (I)” and “는,” which is roughly equivalent to a preposition in English. Or, whereas the word “book” in English carries no connotation about its syntactical role unless it is accompanied by a full sentence that includes it, in the Korean language, expressions such as “책은” (책 book + 은) and “책을” (책 book + 을) generally attach the equivalent noun to a preposition without a space between them, to instead make one word and thereby specify its role within a sentence (the former is a subject within a sentence, whereas the latter is an object). Despite some potential drawbacks, I decided to retain terms as whole words including prepositions, in order to be able to infer the roles of words in a sentence.³⁷

My second principle of preprocessing is to retain two plural pronouns (“we,” “they,” and their derivatives), though this decision is rarely recommended because of the

³⁶ In the Korean language, prepositions do not count as an independent word, as they are always attached to nouns.

³⁷ Another example would be helpful here as well. In the case of “from the United States,” preprocessing usually deletes “from” and “the,” because they are devoid of meaning by themselves without accompanying nouns. In Korean, the same phrase is translated as “미국으로부터” in one word that consists of “미국 (the United States)” + “으로부터 (from).” This case was considered as a single word in the analysis. Potential problems of this decision include words that differ only in the kind of prepositions, but are nonetheless counted as different from one another. For instance, I distinguish the following—“미국은 (the United States) + 은 (subject preposition),” “미국이(미국 + 이 subject preposition), “미국에게 (미국 + 에게 to),” and “미국과 (미국 + 과 with)” although they all include “미국” in common. Other researchers might decide to delete all prepositions in order to concentrate on the emphasis on “미국.” On this matter, the Korean language has multiple prepositions to make a noun the subject of a sentence. For instance, one of “은, 는, 이, 가” must be chosen based on the pronunciation of the preceding word, even though all of them have the same function. In this case, I unified them as into one by replacing all others with it.

bag-of-words assumption. The reluctance is valid, given that pronouns taken out of context do not convey any meaning information. Nevertheless, I decided to retain first- and third-person plural pronouns for two reasons. To begin with, those pronouns are major symbolic and strategic indicators of collectivity, not only in the literature on social movements in general (Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003; Gamson 1991; Melucci 1989; Polletta and Jasper 2001), but also in case studies utilizing the idea of personalized politics, as discussed in the Introduction (D. Gerbaudo 2015; Gerbaudo 2012; Gerbaudo and Treré 2015). This is an area requiring further study, given the dearth of existing research investigating the period preceding the advent of large-scale popular protests fomented by online communication. The rationale in retaining the said pronouns against the bag-of-words assumption is as follows: If such pronouns for identifying a side prevail in the collection being examined, the pronouns can be captured as a relatively independent topic that can contain not only such pronouns but also terms that are more likely to be associated.

The above decisions were made historically in order to ensure the most suitable preprocessing for addressing the research question, linguistic specificities and the characteristics of a given corpus. Nevertheless, topic modeling has been under suspicion concerning its validity. This is because topic modeling does not offer its own validity checkers as other frequency-based statistical models do with confidence indicators (McFarland and McFarland 2015). Instead of conducting simulations to evaluate the significance of topic modeling outcomes, this study ran multiple models with different parameters, for which the outcome is recommended to be interpreted with caution.

Semantic Networks

Multiple versions of semantic network analysis have been practiced in pursuit of grasping the meaning structure of texts (Doerfel and Connaughton 2009; Kok and Domingos n.d.; Roth 2006; Steyvers and Tenenbaum 2005). Among them is Carley's mapping of a focal term, which places the term in relation to others (Carley 1994, 1995, 2001; Carley and Kaufer 1993). Instead of paying attention to all terms in documents, she suggests that a focal term can be selected and examined by considering how it is used in relation with other terms (Carley and Kaufer 1993). Once term networks are drawn, a term's degree (e.g., how many terms are connected to or from it) can be utilized to specify the term's characteristics. For instance, a term can be seen as an ordinary word, according to them, if its three values are all low, whereas a buzzword would be connected to many words with low consistency regarding the types of terms to which it is connected (Ibid. 191-196).

Carley and her colleague's suggestion can be helpful in the tracing of terms used in digital interactions. To begin, semantic networks can be employed to identify whether the same terms appear alongside different sets of terms and whether a specified trend changes over time. And yet, to identify more elaborate semantic networks emerging from digital interactions, it should be how to incorporate digital interactions, which are comprised of a sequence of digital posts.

Replies as bipartite networks and their dynamics

Digital posts with replies are identified as interactions, initiated by an ego whose post invites alters, who will add their own texts to it. In lieu of envisioning the interactions as a star network (for the reasons mentioned in the previous sections), this dissertation draws a reply network as a bipartite network with two sets of vertices, (1) a set of actors (including an ego and alters) and (2) a set of terms used by the actors.³⁸ In projected one-mode networks, the actors are connected by using the same terms, and the terms are linked by actors using them together.

Table 2.4 is a matrix of a test bipartite, drawn from a post from the ANTI-MB collection. From this post, I selectively coded 15 terms (ego in the first column, and T1 through T15 in light blue). The selected terms include nouns, verbs, and adverbs, with repeated terms counted only once. Ego used the 15 terms, indicated as 1s. The ego received replies from 15 alters. Some repeated the ego's terms (e.g., A, C, E, K, and M), while others introduced new terms, as indicated from T16 through T22 (in orange), which the ego did not mention. Therefore, 0s appear in the ego's row from T16 through T22.

In this post, the ego seems to have a husband participating in a street protest when she wrote the post at home. Mentioning a high possibility of a violent clash between protesters and the police, she emphasizes her hope that her husband would not fall for the police tactic of inciting protesters to resort to violence. She ends the post by pointing out

³⁸ On this matter, Gibson's conversational analysis (2000, 2003, 2005) provides contrasting points between in-person interactions and digital interactions. His study has inspired research on interactions as the core factor of network dynamics. For instance, the notion of participant shifts (2003) offers 13 possible shifts in interactions among a speaker, a target by the speaker, and unspecified people in present (i.e., the group among which the interactions take place). These shifts are aptly translated into directed networks. For instance, when person A talks to person B, person B can respond to person A, address the group, or direct the conversation to person C. Stark contrasts between Gibson's observation of face-to-face conversations and digital interactions facilitates interesting research questions regarding topics to be discussed and shifts that occur not only in order of speaking, but also in the insertion of new ideas, i.e., terms and phrases.

that the Candlelight Protests should remain peaceful for the benefit of public perception. The first person to reply to the ego, henceforth referred to as A, repeated only a single term from the ego's post and added a new term (T16). Person B added two more new terms (T17 and T18). C did not introduce any new terms and used one term from the ego's (T7) and B's terms (T18).

Figure 2.5 exhibits two one-mode networks projected from the matrix (Table 2.4). In (a), a striking difference from a would-be star network is that the ego is positioned at the margin of the network with links to only A, C, M, and K. Instead, B sits at the center, so that the entire network can be divided into two subgroups if B is removed. Also, compared to a star network, which would be completely connected, (a) has a dyad (I and G) that is independent of the others because of their sharing a term (T21), which is not shared by other alters. (b) in Figure 2.5 shows a hairball consisting of the ego's terms, some of which have new connections to the terms used by the alters with an isolate, T21.

The post used for this tentative examination happens to include isolates and an unconnected dyad. To see how the links of the terms changing as more replies become available, Figure 2.6 displays two networks drawn without the ego from the original matrix. For the actors' networks ((a-1) in Figure 2.6), there is no manifest difference from (a) in Figure 2.5, which results in only an isolate, referred to as K. In contrast, (b-1) tells an interesting story. Unlike (b) in Figure 2.5, (b-1) shows that most terms in light blue, i.e., the ego's, are now isolates, except for three: "on the street (T7)," "husband (T1)," and "violence (T6)." The terms in orange and connected with the light blue are: "worries (T18)," "suppression (T20)," "listen (T16)," "safely (T17)," "tears (T19)," and "nonviolence (T22)."

Let us interpret (b-1) in Figure 2.6 to see how meaning was generated while replies were added. The ego's post conveys multiple stories: (1) Her husband is now on the street and she is at home; (2) The police suppression would incite violence by angering protesters; and (3) No violence should be used in the spirit of democracy. The responses to this post somewhat distort the delivered stories, with the terms "safely (T17)," "worries (T18)" and "tears (T19)" newly brought up by B and D, alongside the ego's term "husband (T1)." The alters expressed their concerns (1) about the ego's husband on the street, wishing that he would listen to his wife; (2) related to police suppression of street protests; (3) for the safety of the protests; and (4) that violence is left to be linked only with nonviolence. While the ego more specifically linked the police's aggressive attitudes towards protesters, the alters express their concern by mentioning police suppression instead of violence. Ego's other terms, which would have moved the story in another direction, i.e., regarding the principles of democracy, were abandoned from the core of their interactions. In addition, more emotional terms strongly link the terms "husband" and "on the street."

These reply networks indicate the following points. To begin, alters' replies tend to introduce new terms. A likely reason is simple, in that they would rather avoid the simple repetition of the ego's terms, as they might do in in-person interactions. They interpret the ego's terms and react selectively. As new and more varied interpretations become available, the alters end up modifying the intended meaning of the original post. These changes reflect the trait of digital interactions, which are not limited to a micro-setting where the interaction contents are exclusively preserved, but rather viewed by many others who modify the content of communication prior to their own engagement. In

other words, digital interactions cannot be shrunk to direct connections only between an ego and alters, while largely ignoring how meanings are generated.

Conclusion


This section presents the data set in line with methods that are inseparable from theoretical points with highlights on the dynamics of digital interactions. The main argument is that they should be analyzed with an enhanced theory and analytic tools, whose conventions are not optimal, although compelling for non-digital interactions. In chapters where specific methods are employed, brief accounts of the text pre-processing process and analytic strategies will be mentioned to verify the validity of the analysis.

Table 2.1. Digital Posts

	Platform	Target Directory	Number of Posts (Number of Replies) ¹	Period	Types of Anonymity			Collected Posts	Sampling Methods
					Reading	Writing	Platform names		
Agora	Bulletin board	FDB ²	16,000 (n/a)	4/16/2008 – 5/3/2008	Anyone	Daum users	On Daum	w/o replies	Availability
ANTI-MB	Online community	FDB	10,633 (166,288)	4/16/2008 – mid August, 2008	Anyone	ANTI-MB members	On Daum	w/ replies	Keyword based sampling
82cook ³	Online community	ADB ⁴	42,731 (297,377)	4/16/2008 – mid August, 2008	Anyone	82cook members	Improvised upon writing	w/ replies	Availability
National Committee	SMO's website	Archive	n/a (n/a)	5/3/2008 – mid August, 2008	Anyone	n/a	n/a	w/o replies	Availability

Note: 1: Replies were collected for the ANTI-MB and 82cook collections only. 2: Free discussion board; 3: Data from 82cook is only used to offer a comparative perspective on ANTI-MB, as a digital platform with similar characteristics. 4: Anonymous discussion board.

Figure 2.1. Word Clouds of April 16, 21, 26 and May 2 (clockwise)



Note: The digital posts used here were collected from Agora's free discussion board. In these word clouds, more frequently-used terms are placed closer to the center and in larger font sizes. In the top left image, terms present at the center (in black) are “이명박” (Lee Myung-bak, the then President of South Korea), “뉴타운” (New Town, a policy of rebuilding residential areas), and “한나라당” (Grand National Party, the then ruling party). In the rest of the word clouds, “광우병” (Mad cow disease) and “소고기” (Beef) are top-ranked, followed by “미국산” (Imported from the United States) as the second, and “이명박” (Lee Myung-bak) continued to stay at the center, though their frequency changed on occasion.

Table 2.2. Search Terms Used to Generate the Collection of ANTI-MB posts


	Term	Total Postings (TP)	Collected Postings (CP)	CP/TP (%)
1	LeftistEx (좌빨)	339	338	100
2	Candlelight girl (촛불소녀)	355	355	100
3	National committee (대책위)	1524	1000	66
4	Leftist (좌파)	1626	1000	62
5	Nonviolence (비폭력)	2212	1000	45
6	Moles (알바)	2778	1000	36
7	Cow infected with vCJD (광우병소)	3133	1000	32
8	Democracy (민주주의)	3298	993	30
9	vCJD (광우병)	3454	1000	29
10	Altogether (다함께)	3740	1000	27
11	Cultural event (문화제)	3836	1000	26
12	Illegal (불법)	4632	1000	22
13	Cho-jung-dong (조중동)	5782	1000	17
14	Violence (폭력)	6500	1000	15
15	Crazy beef (미친소)	11394	1000	9
16	Police (경찰)	12309	1000	8
17	Demonstration (집회)	15137	1000	7
18	Protest (시위)	16374	1000	6
19	Beef (소고기)	16462	1000	6
20	Candlelight (촛불)	19013	1000	5
21	Lee Myung-bak (이명박)	20040	1000	5
TOTAL		153938	19686	-
			10633	

Note: 21 search terms of the author's choice are presented in the number of available posts on ANTI-MB from lowest to highest. Daum's built-in search engine only displays up to 1,000 posts (CP), although it also shows the total number of posts satisfying the search conditions (TP). Due to the quantity constraint, some search terms are seemingly overrepresented in the ANTI-MB collection (CP/TP). And yet, the actual distribution of the 21 terms in the ANTI-MB collection (resultant ratio in the table) is slightly different because the terms do not appear to be exclusive and independent to one another.

Table 2.3. Descriptive Statistics of the Collections of ANTI-MB and 82cook from April through August 2008


	ANTI-MB							82cook						
	Views			Replies				Views			Replies			
	Posts (%)	Min	Median	Max	Min	Median	Max	Posts (%)	Min	Median	Max	Min	Median	Max
April	292 (2.75)	8	149	4,939	0	11	372	2,904 (6.80)	113	788.5	12,336	0	4	95
May	4,163 (39.2)	3	192	6,329	0	12	420	9,238 (21.62)	97	699.5	10,744	0	4	167
June	4,401 (41.39)	3	167	5,864	0	12	302	13,508 (31.61)	14	544	25,283	0	4	347
July	1,398 (13.15)	5	148	2,902	0	11	278	10,055 (23.53)	121	517	36,782	0	5	132
August	379 (3.56)	6	131	1,861	0	9	105	7,026 (16.44)	107	542	11,540	0	5	180
Total	10,633 (100)							42,731 (100)						

Figure 2.2. Distribution of Replies Over Time (ANTI-MB)




Note: Using the same data presented in Table 2.3, the distribution of the number of replies was graphed by month. Despite the apparent difference in the dispersion of outliers (i.e., the number of posts that received numerous replies) and despite the difference in the total number of posts by month, the median of the number of replies remains stable over time. This corpus excludes two postings whose views exceed 10,000. One post produced on May 1 was viewed 15,307 times and received 420 replies, and the other uploaded on June 1 received 30,805 views with 62 replies with an embedded link for a live-stream of street protests.

Figure 2.3. Distribution of Replies Over Time (82cook)



Note: Using the same data presented in Table 2.3, the distribution of the number of replies was graphed by month. In the entire 82cook collection, posts with more than 200 replies only appear in June. The median number of replies per month, between 4 to 5, remains consistent over time.

Figure 2.4. Digital Platform by Topical Openness and Anonymity




Note: This conceptual map illustrates the three digital platforms in two-dimensional space, consisting of the level of topical openness and built-in anonymity. Compared to the three digital platforms placed toward the upper right side of the figure, the National Committee, a coalition of civil and social movement organizations, and Minbyun can be placed in the lower left part of the figure, given their documents were published under real names with a well-defined focus.

Table 2.4. A Matrix of an ANTI-MB Post

	Husband	Online cafe	Post	Anger	Never	Violence	On the street	Home	Dude	Incitement	Today	Definitely	Our country	Democracy	By the world	Listen	Safely	Worries	Tears	Suppression	Please	Nonviolence
	T1	T2	T3	T4	T5	T6	T7	T8	T9	T10	T11	T12	T13	T14	T15	T16	T17	T18	T19	T20	T21	T22
EGO	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
B	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
C	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
E	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
G	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
H	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
J	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
K	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
L	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
M	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
O	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
P	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0


Note: T1 through T22 indicate terms extracted from a string of online communication, starting with an ego's post. A through P indicate alters who responded to the ego. Terms from T1 through T15 (in light blue) come from the ego's post, whereas the terms from T16 through T22 (in orange) indicate terms newly added by the replies. This matrix was created using an ANTI-MB post.

Figure 2.5. Tentative Reply Analysis



Note: These two networks are drawn from a matrix presented in Table 2.5. Instead of conceiving it as a directed network, the post and its replies were displayed as a bipartite network with a set of actors ($n=16$, including ego) and a set of terms ($n=22$). (a) and (b) are two one-mode networks created from the bipartite network. In (a), the individuals are tied by the terms they shared. In (b), terms in light blue ($n=15$) are used by the ego, and terms in orange ($n=6$) by the 15 alters.

Figure 2.6. Tentative Reply Analysis (2)



Note: These two networks are outcomes created by eliminating the ego from Figure 2.5. As a result, (a-1) has an isolate (K) and a dyad (G and I). When removing ties related to the ego's terms from (b) in Figure 2.5, (b-1) displays the connected components comprised of "husband," "at the site," (in light blue) "suppression," "worries," "safety," and "tears (noun)," (in orange), and "violence" (in light blue) and "non-violence" (in orange).

Chapter 3 The Fifteen Days: Building Contexts and Claims

A week before the candlelight protest on May 2, 2008, my fellow activists asked me, “What’s with the upcoming protest? Something seems out of place.” “If you don’t know,” they made fun of me, “that means you’re already a dinosaur.” ... On May 2, I went out to Cheonggye Plaza, where the protest was supposed to take place. It was crowded with so many people. No protest could be more beautiful than that day’s. ... Standing at the edge of the square, I looked around and recognized only a few acquaintances from the participants sitting there. My fellow activists were simply standing or wandering around the square like myself. The other participants were absolutely strangers to me, which was new—I was used to running into old friends and acquaintances at protests (Ahn Jin-geol, May 2, 2016).³⁹

Digital Interactions and the Candlelight Protests

In May 2016, Lawyers for a Democratic Society (henceforth Minbyun), hosted a conference to announce the publication of a second report on their eight-year legal battle to defend protesters who were indicted during the Candlelight Protests, including Ahn. Ahn was arrested in mid-June 2008 under allegations of his coordinating role in the National Committee of Activists Resisting the Importation of U.S. Beef at the Risk of Mad Cow Disease (henceforth the National Committee), which was formed on May 6, 2008 by about 1,500 allied organizations nationwide.

At Minbyun’s 2016 conference, Ahn, whose trial was still underway at the time, recalled the astonishment and unfamiliarity that he felt upon his first encounter with the Candlelight Protests. According to him, few activists had thought of the planned beef trade policy change as a cause for protest mobilization. The outburst of a large-scale

³⁹ The full livestreamed video of this conference is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V1Nm_FgEpLA (accessible as of January 17, 2016).

protest, therefore, forced them to face the deep discrepancy between activists and non-activists in terms of implementing calls for action. For instance, the National Committee's website, which was originally intended to be an organizing hub of the Candlelight Protests, failed to achieve the same degree of popularity as other anonymous bulletin boards. This sense of unfamiliarity was pervasive in various aspects. Conventional activists' tactics to express solidarity were received as too outdated, too rigid, or too didactic to benefit the Candlelight Protests, as they frequently generated internal conflicts among the protesters. Indeed, the National Committee often fell prey to circumstantial disputes due to snap decisions that resulted in sharp and prompt critiques in defiance of its self-proclaimed representative mandate, a role that the National Committee had reluctantly taken up. For Ahn, his fellow activists, and academics, the May 2 protest came as a surprise and raised a set of challenges.⁴⁰

For the participants, however, their collective action was the consequence of a quotidian habit, namely using the Internet. To numerous reporters asking about their reasons in attending the protest, the protesters invariably pointed to the same answer: "the Internet." This response was often interpreted in two ways. Above all, the Internet was a source of information. Many participants expressed disappointment and even outrage toward the silence in mainstream media, particularly against conservative news outlets, about the implications of the new beef trade policy. According to the participants, the media framed the beef trade agreement as a shining example of President Lee's diplomatic accomplishments early on during his term (Agora users 2008, 274-281).

⁴⁰ There was a deluge of publications—by academics and social pundits, as well as protesters themselves—past the first month of the 2008 Protests, with the aim of expressing the astonishment they felt and observed from the eruption of weekly protests and special events that coincided with public holidays. These publications will be further analyzed in Chapter 4.

Suspicious of such flattery, the protesters crowded digital platforms in search of alternative perspectives.

And yet, this trend was not merely about the act of hunting and gathering information online. To candlelight participants, the Internet also connoted certain organizing principles: the protesters asserted that they had no hidden assistance, support, instructions, and manipulation from activists. This claim appeared as reactions to conservative mass media and senior government officials, including President Lee's remarks that urged the police to investigate whether behind-the-scene organizers had offered financial incentives for the candlelight protesters.⁴¹ Alluding to the downsides of digital anonymity, these allegations denounced the Internet as a hotbed of rumors and conspiracies, and portrayed candlelight protesters as gullible citizens manipulated by agitators who exploited their innocence. The protesters ridiculed such responses as anachronistic misconceptions that essentially demonstrated the inability of senior government officials to adapt to social changes caused by digital media, as well as their failure to respect the sovereignty and political rights of citizens.

Considering these rather abstract impressions surrounding the role of digital interactions, this chapter examines how digital media users established their claim to stop U.S. beef importation. To answer this inquiry, I analyze around 16,000 posts uploaded to the bulletin board Agora by approximately 5,000 unique authors over 17 days from April 16 to May 2, 2008 (see Table 3.1). My goal is to show how the claim to force the withdrawal of the new beef inspection standards became conspicuous, in addition to its

⁴¹ "President Lee asks, 'Whose money paid for these candles?'" Kim Sung-hwan. *The Hankyoreh*, June 1, 2008. http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/290959.html.

constituted meaning. The underlying idea of this question pertains to the characteristics of the digital platform from which the studied collection was drawn: Its setting can be less advantageous to circulate a clear-cut call for a protest because of its high degree of topical openness (i.e., any topic can be published) in serving anonymous users (see Chapter 2). For instance, its users may have referred to different reasons for discussing their shared concerns over mad cow disease. Or, the beef trade issue may not have attracted significant attention because of other pressing issues. In other words, this chapter seeks to demonstrate how the beef trade issue was forged as a protest claim by being discussed by many users collectively. To accomplish this goal, topic modeling is employed to specify discussed topics as a set of terms for each day. These clustered terms are then visualized as daily topic networks showing how the terms are shared by topics.

In the following section, I introduce the digital post collections used in this chapter, and illustrate the process of constructing topic networks. Then, I introduce my view on topic modeling to identify networks of topics by utilizing its relational principle. Interpreting topic modeling outcomes as topic networks, I discuss how the meaning of a protest claim was constructed while forging its contexts. I conclude this chapter with a discussion over the relations between claim-making and contexts in relation to digital interactions.

Topic Modeling and Constructing Topic Networks

Employing topic modeling (see Chapter 2), this chapter assumes that 10 topics would be appropriate to capture the flow of online communication in Agora, after multiple attempts

using a number fewer or more than 10.⁴² This chapter translates topic modeling outcomes into topic networks, showing how topics are connected by sharing the same terms. This idea relies on the model's logic, which allows terms to appear in multiple topics (DiMaggio et al. 2013). This characteristic differentiates topic modeling from similar existing techniques of semantic analysis by allowing the investigation of the notion that the same term can gain different meanings depending on how it is used, i.e., how it is arranged in relation to other terms. In this approach, topics can remain entirely separate from one another, if no term is shared. Variations may emerge, depending on the extent to which terms are shared among topics. Employing this idea, topic networks are built per daily corpus below. This practice allows the identification of shared terms, and how the shared terms can add layers to the context in which linked topics are discussed. It can be assumed that terms indicating major themes would continually appear as shared terms over time. In other words, it is possible that there is a growing build-up of protest-related ideas alongside less relevant and even unrelated themes simultaneously.

[Table 3.2 to be inserted here]

Using the *lda* package's gibbs sampler in R, I chose top 30 terms from the 10-topic model outputs for the entire daily corpora, with which I generated two sets of topic networks with 15 terms and 30 terms. Table 3.2 presents the April 16 topic list, whose labels were decided in reference to clustered terms.⁴³ This table confirms the text pre-

⁴² This fixed number may not be suitable for a corpus that contains topics with significant overlap in constitutive terms. For instance, topic networks that present posts published nearer the first street gathering are more likely to show low topical diversity than topic networks of earlier days. The 10-topic model was chosen after examining the April 16 network, included as a starting point that presumably shows digital interactions before the formal announcement of the beef trade issue, and returned a relatively distinct topic list.

⁴³ A period was used in the labels, if clustered terms contain different connotations.

processing procedures employed in this chapter. No numerals are included, but non-Korean words are.⁴⁴ The list also presents that pronouns, people's names, and various suffixes are retained, as intended. This output offers some noteworthy points. Although the 10-topic model yielded a decent output regarding its content-related compartmentalization of a corpus, its degree of decency may vary across the clustered topics, depending on how many top terms are considered. Considering all 30 terms, topic *SchoolEducation*, for instance, presents terms in a more consistent way than topic *Housing.brib* that presents terms related to housing policy as well as a bribery scandal (see Table 3.2). In addition, terms that have the same root with different suffixes appear to be redundant both within a topic and between topics, because of the text pre-processing strategies chosen for this chapter.

Reflecting these characteristics, the decision was made to build topic networks with 15 terms and 30 terms for the entire daily corpora, which is presented in Table 3.3. Given that this chapter aims to reveal the hidden structure of meaning, terms that appear multiple times with different suffixes in a topic and between topics were counted as the same to reduce redundancy in the topic networks. Thus, as presented in Table 3.3, each topic network contains fewer terms than 150 terms for 15 term networks, and 300 terms for 30-term networks.⁴⁵ In addition, some estimates generated by the chosen topic modeling such as the quantity of documents assigned to a specific topic were not incorporated into the topic networks, although they could have been used as the basis of

⁴⁴ This decision reflects characteristics of the Korean language. It is not generally recommended, but the Korean language has a relatively liberal standard concerning the usage of non-Korean words, if the words are used in their Korean pronunciation without translation. Though the use of non-Korean words is not predominant in writing, the retention of non-Korean words could have affected the topic modeling outcome. Future research should consider this issue.

⁴⁵ These text pre-processing procedures require a more careful and systematic approach in future research.

weighing ties. This is due to the uncertainty of how my text pre-processing procedures affected the likelihood with which each term appears in a topic.

For a more informed interpretation, this chapter employs community detection using cluster walkstrap and calculates the modularity of the daily topic networks. Modularity is often used to detect cohesive subgroups or communities that form strongly connected nodes in comparison with their connections to other nodes. It calculates the proportion of the strength of intra-group connections to that of inter-group connections as a single point score for a given network as a whole. Higher modularity indicates the presence of strong cohesive subgroups whose inter-community connections are less salient, whereas low modularity implies fewer cohesive communities or stronger connections among distinguishable communities. This procedure has two objectives. Firstly, it will help to cluster topics depending on the similar characteristics of their connections to other topics. Secondly and more importantly, modularity scores can be used as a point of comparison in the structure of topic networks. For instance, it is possible to identify patterns in terms of which topics tend to be connected more strongly to some topics than to other topics, and cluster topics by the specified patterns.

A total of 15,634 posts were extracted from Agora, a bulletin board for free discussion serviced by the Korean portal site Daum, which were produced from April 16 to May 2, 2008. Table 3.1 profiles all daily corpora by the number of posts, authors, and terms that are used to create data-term matrixes.⁴⁶ There were 4,496 unique contributors. After text pre-processing as described in Chapter 2, 564,149 terms were used to create

⁴⁶ The current corpus contains only initial posts without replies.

data-term matrixes. The data was collected several years after 2008, which signifies that some digital posts may have been removed by their authors. As seen in Table 3.1, the quantity of posts has remained stable up to April 27, and rapidly increased until May 2.

Topic Networks before the Candlelight Protests: April 16 and May 2

Figure 3.1 shows the networks of topics for April 16 (a and b) and May 2 (c and d) in two versions, which respectively mark the beginning and ending point of the time period studied in this chapter. April 16 was two days before the first state summit between President Lee Myung-bak and President George W. Bush of the United States on April 18, and May 2 was the first day of the protest that was later deemed to be the first occasion of the Candlelight Protests on the beef trade issue. At first glance, the two semantic networks for the two days appear noticeably different in terms of the forms of the relationships among the presented topics.

[Figure 3.1 to be inserted here]

In Figure 3.1, each label represents a topic, which consists of 15 terms for panels (a) and (c), and 30 terms for panels (b) and (d). Second, the color bubbles around the nodes—ten bubbles in (a), and four in (b)—indicate communities whose member topics are tied to one another more strongly (black lines) than to nodes outside the community (red lines).

Compared to Figure 3.1(a), Figure 3.1(b), which shows the 30 terms for April 16, presents more ties regardless of their characteristics, either intra-community or inter-community. Given that neither topic modeling nor community detection offers

conventional significance indicators, it is worth mentioning my approach to these differences between the metrics of the two topic networks. Assuming that the 10-topic model is reliable, an increase in the number of assigned terms that are used to build different topic networks may alter the likelihood of direct and indirect ties among nodes. And yet, the increase does not show a specific direction, so it is difficult to discern whether it mainly increases the strength of “intra-community” ties, and more importantly, its impact on the meaning of the topic networks. This may indicate a high level of noise, which should have been controlled in pre-processing texts. Or, it can reflect a relatively low-level of coherence in digital posts. For instance, one can concatenate many different well-known issues and events in order to conclude how the political has been broken down in rather general, abstract, and subjective comments. Considering all these possibilities, it is important to focus on the patterns of intra- and inter-community relationships to comprehend the process of claim-making among individuals without a salient agenda-generating group (e.g., activists). Therefore, to appreciate shifts in the topic networks over time, I plotted modularity scores that can be calculated by each topic network as seen in Figure 3.2. Before the discussion on the observed patterns, the following section examines how drastically the contents of digital interactions at the starting and ending points changed.

Topic Network for April 16

On April 16 (see Figures 3.1(a) and 3.1(b)), the scope of issues ranges from education reform for secondary schools (*SchoolEducation*); an outbreak of avian flu (*avianFlu*); a proposal for health insurance reform (*privatization*); a redevelopment plan for several

districts in Seoul (*Newtown*); to predictions of political topics likely to be raised by President Lee on his first visit to the U.S., including beef trade negotiations (*beef*). There is no intrinsic connection among these extracted topics. In this regard, it is instructive to identify the terms shared among topics. The common terms linking topics in the April 16 network (Figure 3.1(b)) are as follows: (i) abstract or general terms in reference to policy areas or politicians, such as “the economy,” “the president,” “President Roh,”⁴⁷ “politics,” “Participatory Government”⁴⁸; (ii) adverbs that indicate the timing, quality, or manner of action, such as “from now on,” “to what extent,” “properly,” and “vigorously”; (iii) pronouns such as “for all of us,” “to you,” “of oneself,” “we”; (iv) perspective-based and value-based terms such as “problems”; and (v) conservative newspapers such as “Chosun Ilbo,” and “Munhwa Ilbo.”

These shared terms are intriguing both in terms of their contents and the structure of topic networks. The various topics in the April 16 network imply that Agora users were somewhat skeptical about the extent to which Lee’s new economic and political policies would be implemented satisfactorily in multiple policy areas. In making predictions to this end, Agora users frequently compared Lee with his direct predecessor, the late President Roh Moo-hyun, in recognition of their contrasting political stances, whereas those who did not support Lee went as far as to speculate over the possible turn of events had Moon Kook-hyun, one of Lee’s rivals in the 2007 presidential election, won the election instead. In addition, Agora users show a tendency to appeal to the audience by using collective pronouns such as “(to) you,” “for all of us,” or “we”

⁴⁷ President Lee’s predecessor.

⁴⁸ The nickname of President Roh’s government.

regardless of the topic at hand, and it is difficult to discern whether these pronouns carry the same connotations across the network. These shared terms indicate that all 10 topics are connected, but the substantive meaning of their connections remain rather abstract. The 15-term network (Figure 3.1(a)), for instance, presents topics *privatization*, *avianFlu*, and *CSEditorial* are tied together by the term ‘politics,’ which provide a weak ground for interpretation except for that these three issues were discussed as a matter of ‘politics.’

This observation urges more careful attention to which terms connect which topics, and whether there are “star” terms or not. In the April 16 network, for instance, connected topics share different terms, which means that they may have connoted different meanings through their usage in different contexts. In Figure 3.1(b), the topics *beef* and *economy* share the term “the economy.” For topic *beef*, the term “economy” contextualizes beef importation from the U.S. in relation to inequality in food supply, alongside other terms such as the “working class,” who might welcome cheaper U.S. beef products in spite of the risk to consumption caused by the possibility of mad cow disease. In contrast, topic *economy* concerns the politico-economic dimension of the Grand Canal Project, an initiative proposed as a key election promise by President Lee to build a large-scale waterway connecting major rivers in Korea.

In other words, although some Agora users had noted and addressed the beef trade issue even before the actual catalytic event on April 18, the issue was generally not in the spotlight. Even though some topics were somehow connected, the semantic connections were weak. The shared term “the economy” only implies that the Grand Canal Project and the beef trade issue were both seen as economic issues. In this sense, it is unlikely that Agora users on April 16 foresaw the possibility of collective action on the beef trade

issue, which was then simply one among myriad topics that momentarily commanded the interest of Agora users.

Topic Network for May 2

The May 2 topic networks (Figures 3.1(c) and 3.1(d)) demonstrate a different trend. First of all, beef trade-related topics prevail in the networks. As seen in Figures 3.1(c) and (d), seven out of ten topics address U.S. beef importation in a nuanced manner: (1) topic *beef.privatization* discusses imported beef products in relation to Lee's political drive to privatize many once-public sectors; (2) topic *mad.citizens* points out that netizens (a general term denoting Internet users) are aware of the possible danger of consuming U.S. beef products, which are processed from cattle raised on animal-based feeds that could cause abnormal proteins such as prions; (3) topic *mcd* concerns how conservative politicians of the ruling party ignored public anxiety over the resumption of U.S. beef imports; (4) topic *lit.candles* mentions online communities whose members proposed street rallies on the beef trade issue, encouraging participation in the candlelight protests in downtown Seoul and signing *Andante's* petition⁴⁹ as discussed previously; (5) topic *beef.import* describes the poor handling of the beef trade issue by the Korean government in its negotiations with the U.S.; (6) topic *government* concerns the neglect of Lee's presidency; and (7) topic *mcd.nation* blames government officials for their insincere responses to citizens' anxieties and concerns. Moreover, these seven topics, assigned to

⁴⁹ Andante, Agora user whose actual identity, a high school student, was revealed to the public later, wrote an online petition on the petition section of Agora on April 6, 2008, asking to push the National Assembly to impeach President Lee for his "already unacceptably irresponsible" governance for the two months after inauguration. Although the petition did not gain popularity at the moment of its writing, it eventually received more than a million signatories soon after first two to three candlelight protests in early May.

the same semantic community (Figure 3.1(d)), share multiple terms such as “beef,” “produced in the U.S.,” “mad cow disease,” “U.S. beef,” and “crazy cow⁵⁰,” which results in highly dense connections as the thick black ties in the figure demonstrate. In sum, Agorians on May 2 were predominantly occupied with the beef trade issue in diverse aspects, to the point of redundancy.

Despite the preponderant presence of the beef trade issue in the May 2 semantic network, what makes the May 2 network of topics truly intriguing is the remaining three topics relatively distant from the seven described above: Among the three, topic *Dokdo* concerns the Japanese government’s distortion of history through their secondary school history textbooks and territorial claims over the Dokdo Island, while topic *benefit* criticizes economic exploitation as an abstract concept. Lastly, topic *our* is a term that explicitly divides society into two classes: one group (we, our, us, and citizens) against U.S. beef importation, and the other (they, their, them, and the President) in favor of it. The emergence of topic *our* significantly differentiates the May 2 network from the April 16 network, as those same pronouns never played a mediating role to link different topics, nor became categorized into an independent topic.

The comparative interpretation of the two semantic networks for April 16 and May 2 offers the insight that Agora users came to envision a popular protest as a collective of netizens with the capacity to also join online communities. There were no indicators on April 16 showing that these online communities and individuals would later publicly announce their opposition against President Lee by May 2. As discussed, the

⁵⁰ Crazy and mad in English are often used interchangeably in Korean.

topics addressed by Agora users on April 16 are relatively independent of one another because they share a smaller number of terms, while those shared terms do not serve multiple topics. In contrast, the predominance of topics on U.S. beef on May 2 creates a substantial semantic community whose constituent topics share multiple terms together. The emergence of new topics or denser inter-community connections requires the investigation of semantic networks as developments over time rather than a point-to-point comparison, which can mistakenly lead to the conclusion that there should be a linear progression in the meaning-making process. A noteworthy point is that topic *lit.candles*, which contains highly specific information and tactics of the upcoming street rallies and includes the names of participating online communities, is also connected to topic *our*. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the events that occurred during the 15 days.

Contexts and Claims Investigated Through Topic Networks Over Time

The topic networks for two temporal points, April 16 and May 2, portray a drastic change in the range of topics discussed by Agora users, which can be succinctly captured with modularity scores. Figure 3.1(a) with 15 terms has a modularity of about 0.3, whereas Figure 3.1(b) with 30 terms has a modularity slightly larger than 0.1 (see Figure 3.2). These individual modularity scores provide a sense of cohesiveness in the network examined. However, in order to obtain a comprehensive view, I focus more on the pattern of the modularity scores from April 16 to May 2 by classifying all networks into two groups whose modularity scores are either greater or lower than 0.2 for the 15-term

networks.⁵¹ Despite the arbitrariness of the decision, this chapter places greater emphasis to the networks produced from the 15-term topic network to maintain a rather conservative approach to the likelihood of increasing the presence of ties, while points where the pattern of modularity does not agree shall be discussed later.⁵²

[Figure 3.2 to be inserted here]

Figure 3.2 illustrates that modularity scores fluctuate, rather than moving in a consistent way over time, which merits discussion in the context of the research question of the current chapter: a claim-making process in digital platforms without thematic centers. The fluctuation on the surface implies that Agora users did not develop topics that create strong ties between them. Or it can be said that the diversity of topics resulted in weak connections defined by shared terms. Topics that appear to be close and relevant on one day can easily be separated on another day, not because of the intrinsic values or meanings of the topics, but because of the ways in which Agora users discussed those topics using common terms. Given that Agora is an open discussion board, without any boundaries regarding its topics, this fluctuation could become more salient and accelerated than in other types of digital platforms where thematic unity is the norm.

For instance, it has been rarely mentioned or analyzed whether digital interactions prior to and during the Candlelight Protests may have been influenced by the publication of *Who's Who: Traitors during the Japanese Colonial Period* by the Presidential Committee on the Settlement of Past Public Affairs, which had worked for several years.

⁵¹ This pointer 0.2 is somewhat arbitrary as well. However, it was chosen as the median value of the range of modularity scores of the 15-term networks (see Figure 3.2).

⁵² For instance, the blue and red lines of Figure 3.2 between April 22 and April 23 change in the same direction, whereas the two lines between April 28 and April 29 change in the opposite direction.

The beef trade issue is neither topically nor temporally connected in an intuitive sense to the settlement of social conflicts surrounding the history of Japanese colonialism.

Nevertheless, this issue appeared repeatedly during the Candlelight Protests and the impact of its continuance requires further investigation. It may simply represent noise that must have been removed from the current discussion, if this topic is taken at face value. What should be considered is that the topic tends to be mentioned with other topics that are more directly related to the beef trade issue, whereby it could become part of contexts in which the beef issue was discussed.

Considering high modularity and low modularity in relation to each other allows insight into the dynamic relations between claim-making and context-building in large-scale protests, particularly those in which activist groups are absent from the outset. It would be helpful to repeat my analytic points and arguments before I turn to topic networks. First, I do not see a claim forged from digital platforms as generically symbolic and inclusive, traits that are often interpreted to be beneficial towards mobilizing the broader population. Judging whether a claim is inclusive or exclusive can actually distort how digital interactions take place, as discussed in Chapter 1. Moreover, it is not guaranteed if such a trait is favorable for mobilizing the broader population. This assessment cannot be part of the definition of its explanatory subject.

Secondly, a claim is formed through various discussions in digital platforms, which differs from conventional activists' preparation for a protest in the sense that they rarely reveal the process to the public. As Blee (2012) shows, activists utilize a similar process as non-activists and the key difference rather emerges from whether their

communication starts from a shared and focused topic, which can be used to include or exclude topics of communication in focus.

Thirdly, I argue that the relational approach is pivotal to study the claim-making process in crowd-enabled protests: A claim and its surrounding contexts are forged through relations among topics that are created by the communication participants. In other words, it can be assumed that different platforms could have different pathways of developing the claims of the Candlelight Protests. And such relations are subject to changes over time, which highlights certain patterns in the changes. Classifying topic networks by their high or low modularity, I will try to explain patterns of claim-making and context-building.

Lastly, a final point regarding the interpretation of topic networks with modularity is that structural indicators—degree of high/low modularity, number of ties, etc.—are not a key to understanding the meaning-making process. For instance, the appearance of cohesive topic communities may have no relevance to the development of the beef trade issue as a political claim. In other words, I would not argue that cohesive topic groups mechanically demonstrate the emergence of a cohesive claim. Rather, my interpretation will focus on how those relatively cohesive topics are related to other topics.

In the following two sections, I discuss topic networks with low and high modularity using the threshold of 0.2, as presented in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. Analysis of those two cases focus on the connections both within and between communities with regard to topics related to the beef trade issue. As mentioned above, this discussion will focus on topic networks drawn from 15-term topic models. The width

of black and red lines (showing intra- and inter-community connections, respectively) are determined by weighted edges (e.g., thicker lines for topics sharing more terms).

Low Modularity

[Figure 3.3 to be inserted here]

In Figure 3.3, the common trait across all six topic networks, April 18, 19, 21, 26, 30, and May 2, is that they have either more red lines (linking different topical communities) or thicker red lines despite the presence of thicker black lines. One of the most intriguing elements of Figure 3.3 is that it contains the May 2 network, which was the first day of the Candlelight Protests.⁵³ The structure of the May 2 network confirms the importance of caution in interpreting modularity score. First, it has a stronger subgroup (colored in green in Figure 3.3) compared to the red community. And the green community's member topics explicitly relate to the beef issue, i.e., topics *mcd*, *mcd.netizen*, *beef.privatization*, *government*, *mcd.citizens*, and *beef.import* (see pages 92-93 for the description). Second, tactic-relevant terms are clustered into topic *lit.candles*, which addresses its street protest (e.g., “Cheonggyecheon stream”), some slogans (e.g., “Heaven after impeachment,” “Hell with Myung-bak”), and online communities and other digital platforms (“OURKOREA,” “Anti-MB,” “Agora,” “Naver”). In other words, this topic contains no terms that are directly linked to the beef trade issue. In a similar way, topic *our* does not carry any terms denoting U.S. beef or mad cow disease. It mainly contains

⁵³ Its low modularity scores are almost identical between two topic models with the different number of terms (see Figure 3.2).

various expressions of collective first-person pronouns (“we,” “our country,” “our”).⁵⁴

Instead, the cohesive semantic community that strongly binds all beef trade-related topics together does not contribute toward increasing its modularity score, because other components of collective action such as tactics and dispositional terms lead to the creation of a sense of collectivity.

Topic networks with low modularity tend to exhibit strong inter-community connections. The April 21 topic network has three communities colored in green, red, and purple, respectively. The biggest community has five topics: (1) *CSEditorial* (critique of the conservative newspaper Chosun Ilbo’s editorials outlining its perspective on Korea’s diplomatic approaches towards the U.S. and North Korea), (2) *strategic.alliance* (shifts in military alliances), (3) *beef.inspection* (inspection issues surrounding the importation of U.S. beef not through bilateral trade but under regulation by multilateral institutions), (4) *beef.policy* (in relation to health insurance), and (5) *U.S.Korea* (concerning the opening of the Korean market to the United States through a Free Trade Agreement). In other words, this community contains the beef trade issue, but it leans towards the context of diplomatic relations between the United States and South Korea in terms of military alliances and economic relations.

In the April 26 topic network (Figure 3.3), there are eight communities, only two of which contain two topics: one community includes topics *beef.products* and *beef.import*, and the other consists of topics *government.the nation* and *policies*. Alongside topic *beef.ingredients*, topic *beef.import* refers to the Ministry of Agriculture,

⁵⁴ Topic *our* in the 30-term topic modeling also contains terms “imported from the U.S.” which aids the interpretation that this pronoun-dominant topic is related to the beef trade issue.

Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and the Blue House that promoted the beef negotiations; topic *MI.privatization* describes the widespread confusion caused by limited information on potential changes in the medical industry between provided by conventional media (e.g., TV news) and online portals; topic *beef.ingredient* addresses the concern that seemingly unrelated products such as cosmetics and seasoning may contain imported bovine products and may be indiscriminately available for sale to children; topic *government.the nation* establishes the relationship between Korean citizens and the government concerning the duty of the government towards the lives of its citizens in general; and topic *impeachment* mentions that the online community ANTI-MB demands the impeachment of President Lee from office. All of these terms are tied to one another in chains, but it is topic *beef.ingredients* whose potential severance would result in weakening the connectivity of other terms.

The April 30 network in Figure 3.3 shows an isolate (topic *oil.spill*), which addresses an environmental accident that happened in winter 2007 on the western coast of the Korean Peninsula, which caused a serious contamination of mud flats with oil. Except for the said isolated topic, all topics were clustered into three cohesive groups. The blue community exhibits consistency and coherence concerning the beef trade issue as it consists of strong ties among topics *beef*, *mcd.thenation*, *mcd.import*, and *mcd.fta*, which all contextualize beef importation in relation to the risk of mad cow disease from U.S. beef products and the ongoing negotiations over the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.

The green community contains topic *mcd.symptoms* that delineate the graveness of the vCJD threat in reference to a TV show that aired on April 29, alongside two other

topics *Agora* and *pro.japanese*, which again appear to be irrelevant to the beef trade issue. Topic *Agora* carries terms such as “you,” “Grand Canal Project,” “petition,” “Naver,” and “Agora,” which seemingly appear to be unrelated to the beef trade issue at face value. However, the links notably adumbrate the field of public discussion on the beef trade issue in the digital platforms of Naver and Agora, where the former’s search engine was under suspicion of technical manipulation to hide increasing public interest in the beef trade issue. In contrast, topic *pro.japanese* contains plural pronouns such as “their,” alongside terms such as “Japanese,” “now,” and “achievements and drawbacks.”⁵⁵ In other words, topic *pro.japanese* neither carries nor shares terms such as “U.S. beef” or “mad cow disease” at all. Its connection to other topic communities is that the topic itself is comprised of the dueling and boundary-making languages of “we” (indicating Korea or the Korean people) and “they” (indicating Japan or the Japanese people). In this sense, this part of the connection should not be overemphasized in order to avoid misinterpretation of the pronouns that clearly serve different social and political contexts. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that similar topics continue to appear and reappear across all topic networks throughout the 15 days.

Topic networks with low modularity scores can be summarized as follows. They tend to have many communities because their member topics stand independently. Beef trade-related topics focusing on various aspects, such as mad cow disease, its human variant CJD, KOR-US economic and military relations, and domestic policies proposed by President Lee since his presidential election campaign, tend to grow into cohesive

⁵⁵ The same topic *pro.japanese* also includes terms such as “pro-Japanese collaborators,” “history,” “pro-Japanese,” “apologies,” “the Korean Peninsula,” etc. in its outcome of the 30-term topic modeling.

topic groups over time as demonstrated in Figure 3.3. And yet, their connecting points, in terms of semantics, continue to change through alignment with different topics. These heterogeneous connections show that the beef trade issue was widely discussed through multiple backgrounds.

Another salient point concerning low modularity networks is that they tend to have variations in discussed topics. It is notable that beef trade-related topics themselves started as a weakly-connected element, as evident in the April 16 network (Figure 3.3), which was tied to a cohesive topic community on April 19 by sharing terms related to the FTA. For pundits or activists who opined that the Candlelight Protests were less focused on any economic issues and more precisely on the KOR-US Free Trade Agreement, these topic networks would be surprising, because the April 19 network and others show that the economic background of the beef importation issue continued to serve as the topic of discussions among Agora users. A matter of particular interest in the April 26 topic network is that topic *beef.ingredient* is less tightly connected to other beef trade-related topics, but instead constitutes a cut-off point, without which the April 26 network would disintegrate into disconnected islands. In May 2, it is also interesting to see that topic *lit.candles*, which appears for the first time as an independent topic containing terms mainly describing protest logistics, joins the network as a new topic. In the current context, it can mean that beef trade-related topics served to connect different topics together, which may be interpreted as the simultaneous occurrence of the claim-making process with the context-building process.

High Modularity: Cohesive Topical Communities as a Claim

[Figure 3.4 to be inserted here]

Figure 3.4 presents topic networks with high modularity that formed through cohesive topical communities.⁵⁶ After Lee's summit on April 18, topics directly mentioning U.S. beef importation started to appear consistently on Agora. Such topics present multiple cohesive topical communities with variations in the strength of their inter-community connections. In the April 23 network, two communities are connected through beef trade-related issues such as topics *beef.protein* (concerning prions as the culprit of mad cow disease in cattle, alongside terms such as "health care"), *beef.inspection* (concerning the World Organization for Animal Health), and *Dokdo*.

In the blue community, U.S. beef is mainly discussed in the context of prions alongside their concerns over potential changes in the health insurance system in Korea. Similar cohesive subgroups continue to appear in the networks of April 24, April 27, and April 28, where thicker black lines connect all beef trade issues quite exclusively. In the April 24 network, the beef trade issue is presented in connection to how the newly-proposed inspection process would fail to prevent mad cow disease (in the purple bubble); in the April 27 network, the beef trade issue is closely related to the context of mad cow disease and vCJD. Here, topic *mcd.vcjd* (regarding mad cow disease in cattle and vCJD in humans) is the most important node connecting the other subgroup whose content-wise composition is quite heterogeneous: topics *online.press* (concerning online

⁵⁶ One controversial and intriguing network is the April 29 network, whose two modularity scores (presented in Figure 3.5) starkly contrast with each other not only in the score but also in the direction of change. This issue will be discussed later, while the focus on the 15-term modeling will be maintained as decided previously.

communication through “replies” showing individuals’ political orientation); *C.Olympic* (a conflict between Tibetan and Chinese communities in Korea before the 2008 Olympic Games held in China); *civil.society* (terms related to the legacy of labor and civil movements that led social changes throughout modern Korean history); *history* (terms such as “our,” “country,” “the army,” “history”); *press.nuclear.weapons*, (ongoing civil wars in other countries related to North Korea); and *LMG.policies* (negative remarks on the Lee administration’s policies).

In the April 28 network, topics related to U.S. beef importation show a similar pattern of connections as seen in the April 27 network. In the April 29 network, topical diversification appears with a relatively greater number of topical subgroups (6 communities) for other networks categorized together as the cases of high modularity. For instance, topics that are more closely related to mad cow disease and the public response thereof are separated from the economic context of beef importation, as shown in the green bubble encompassing topics *mcd.fta* (containing terms such as “mad cow disease,” “fta,” “Mexico,” “our country,” “citizens”), and *mcd.economy* (“beef,” “economy,” “MB,” and “what the hell,” etc.). The May 1 topic network has three strongly-connected topical communities: one mainly focuses on the risk of importing U.S. beef at a quality that poses risk of a lethal disease such as vCJD; one on relevant state-level offices such as topic *theAFF* (carrying terms “Grand Canal Project,” “mad-cow cattle,” “president,” “the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries”), *president* (“president,” “our,” “economy,” “people,” “Naver”), and *thenation* (“country,” “citizens,” “you,” etc.); the third topic community on topics *mcd.fta*, *rallies* (“political,” “our,” “election regulations,” “your,” “social,” etc.), and *OURKOREA*

(“protest,” “Our Korea (an online community that organized initial protests),” “vCJD,” “Chosun Ilbo” (popular conservative Korean newspaper).

These six topic networks raise the salient issue that topic networks are not only rearranged to change distances among different topics, but also that topics become more substantively rearranged. Although these terms had continually appeared before, in the April 27 network, they comprise different relationships to one another. In the topic *press.nuclear.weapons*, for example, Agora users discuss international military conflicts in light of the substantial or potential involvement of multiple nations and mainstream media coverage of the conflicts. Topics *online.press* and *civil.society* in the April 27 network reflect contentious dialogues that link “Roh fanatics” and “the Internet.” The term “Roh fanatics” is a derogatory term for the cohesive solidarity among supporters of former President Roh, whose political stances are in opposition to President Lee’s supporters. Interestingly, the term “Roh fanatics” does not appear alongside terms related to beef imports or Lee’s policies at all.

In contrast, the presence of terms indicating Internet or online community users become more salient after April 27. On April 28, topic *US.beef* contained all four major terms of “mad cow disease,” “Lee Myung-bak,” “beef,” and “U.S. imports,” alongside other terms such as “impeachment” and “petition.” Topics *mcd.fta* and *mcd.economy* from the April 29 network carry the term “Agora” alongside the aforementioned four major terms, along with derogatory expressions lampooning President Lee, such as “MB-

mouse”⁵⁷ and “2MB.”⁵⁸ Then, from April 30 to May 2, all semantic networks began to contain more explicit terms showing the growing involvement of digital interactions across online communities and web portal sites in the ongoing debate on the beef trade issue. Topic *Agora* in the April 30 semantic network suggests that some Agora users began to proactively persuade people to sign an online petition to demand Lee’s impeachment, a demand which is also briefly mentioned in topic *mcd.import*. On May 1, topic *OURKOREA* refers to legislation on collective action and protests that prohibit protests from being held in public spaces at night⁵⁹, while notifying that potential rally participants would need to bring candles.

Topic *rallies* in the May 1 network contains terms such as “rallies” and “protests,” and on the day of the first street rally that took place on May 2, topic *lit.candle* carried the following terms: “Naver,” “Hell with Myungbak,” “Heaven after impeachment,” “Cheonggyecheon,”⁶⁰ “petition,” “Agora,” “Our Korea,”⁶¹ “internet.” In particular, the slogans “Hell with Myungbak” and “Heaven after impeachment” were often used to encourage public participation in the impeachment petition posted to Agora. Also, the online communities “Our Korea” and “ANTI-MB” were the most active in staging the street event on May 2, although the political differences between the two soon resulted in an online dispute. On that day, people also gathered at Sora Square, a public space constructed alongside the Cheonggye Stream, with lit candles in a gathering titled “A

⁵⁷ Candlelight protesters often derisively likened Lee Myung-bak’s outward appearance to that of a mouse.

⁵⁸ 2MB stands for Lee Myung-bak’s initials, expressing his surname using the number 2, which is homonymous with “Lee” in Korean. Candlelight protesters used this term satirically to allude that Lee Myung-bak’s intellectual capacity is as small as 2 megabytes.

⁵⁹ The Constitutional Court of Korea has since ruled this law partially unconstitutional as of 2010.

⁶⁰ A stream running through downtown Seoul. Candlelight protesters started their events in a public square by this river, called Sora Square.

⁶¹ Online community launched to stage street rallies against beef imports.

Cultural Event with Lit Candles” in order to avoid the police intervention that would follow an overt political rally. This also signals that “netizens” in particular became prominent in digital interactions over the beef trade issue, instead of the abstract concept of citizens or the nation.

Another key topic is *privatization*. In the April 16 network, it is one of the major topics used in discussions in reference to beef importation. Unlike the U.S. healthcare system, Korea has developed a universal health insurance (UHI) system while allowing private insurance companies. For costly medical treatments that are not covered under UHI, individuals have the option to choose private insurance coverage. On the other hand, all hospitals are made available for anyone covered by UHI, which means that healthcare consumers do not have to consult whether a certain hospital accepts universal health insurance. Patients may visit any desired hospital, and the hospital does not have the authority to accept patients selectively.

In 2008, President Lee alluded to a policy to allow for-profit hospitals that can refuse patients with universal health insurance. The rationale for this policy mainly focused on the expected economic benefits that for-profit hospitals would create in the future. Arguments against for-profit hospitals and private health insurance had been a mainstay on Agora before the beef negotiations took place, and Agora users linked beef trade-related news to their concerns over the privatization of the healthcare industry. This rhetorical connection became stronger and more consistent to the extent that Lee’s policies were predicted to result in a sequence of undesirable outcomes, namely that lower-income classes of the Korean public would be more likely to purchase cheaper U.S. beef products, thereby causing the spread of vCJD since the new inspection standard

would allow specified risk materials (SRM, tissues carrying cells with abnormal proteins known to cause mad cow disease in cattle) to enter the Korean food supply system. vCJD is notorious for its unusually long latency, so that patients with vCJD are often diagnosed at a point where a full recovery is impossible. Even if vCJD is discovered, most hospitals, especially for-profit hospitals, would charge unrealistically high treatment fees, which would further diminish the chance of a successful recovery by financially deterring patients. Such contexts raised by topics related to privatization become overshadowed due to the growing prevalence of mad cow disease-related topics, although they reappear in the May 2 network.

Some of the semantic and relational traits described above can be summarized as follows. First, the beef trade issue did not appear on Agora with a clean-cut claim in its complete or inclusive form from the outset. Rather, it was constituted through a process of communication. Second, new issues that were seemingly not directly connected to beef imports continued to appear and disappear alongside other topics; some continued to be presented in conjunction to the beef trade issue and policy changes regarding healthcare programs and medical systems, whereas others temporarily emerged and disappeared. Third, the position of topics related to the beef trade issue changed over time. Lastly, expressions denoting collective boundaries such as “we” versus “they,” “the nation,” “citizens,” and “netizens” appear from time to time, yet it is difficult to postulate a formal theory or principle that accounts for this empirical phenomenon.

The popularity of an issue on an anonymous discussion board develops through the way in which its users link together heterogeneous and diverse topics, which may subsequently lead to a call for collective action as an entity greater than the sum of its

individuals. More interestingly, the claim-making process occurs concurrently with the process of context-building that inscribes multiple layers into the claim of resistance against U.S. beef, which offers specific styles and tones discussing the beef trade issue, regardless of the extent of outward visibility. As the following chapter outlines, these inscribed semantic layers change over time, yet also set the tone for the choice of tactics, while presenting presumed Agora users as a collective whose boundary is not entirely inclusive at all.

Discussion: Contexts, Claims, and the Candlelight Protests on the April 29 network

So far, my analytic points have placed a relational focus at the center, starting from topic modeling and then combining it with network analysis. In this regard, I have highlighted the importance of the patterns of arranged topics over time. Another notable aspect is the April 29 network. According to Figure 3.2, its modularity shows a drastic discrepancy across the two topic models, which stems from the number of assigned terms (the solid blue line shows a model with 30 terms, whereas the red dotted line shows a 15-term model). The discrepancy does not simply originate from the scale of the scores, but rather the direction. Compared to the modularity of the April 28 network, the blue point of the April 29 rises, whereas the red line plummets.

[Figure 3.5 to be inserted here]

Figure 3.5 presents the two topic networks for April 29. The first tier is the same type of visualization as I have used above, whereas the second tier of images portrays the same networks expressed with terms instead of topic labels. The difference in the two

networks is likely because the 30-term topic model for April 29 increases the chance of shared terms. For instance, topic *BH.press* in the left section of Figure 3.5 remains isolated, whereas the same topic in the right-hand side is now part of the biggest community (green), having multiple intra-community ties as well as outgoing ties with topic *C.Olympic*. The same logic goes for topic *pro.japanese.who'swho*, which is now linked to topic *C.Olympic* in the right side of Figure 3.5 through the shared term “Who’s Who.”

In regard to the case of April 29, it must be stated that the role of digital communication should not be assumed before substantive investigation, particularly without the presence of salient activists. Setting aside the topic network, April 29 may be a significant date for observers of the Candlelight Protests as the day when the popular social affairs TV program *PD Notebook* produced an episode on the potential risks of the new beef trade policy. The show aired an interview with the parents of an American woman who was diagnosed with vCJD. Superseding other concerns, the interview significantly impacted the flow of public opinions on the risk of vCJD, and the show’s producers were later sued by the government for the intentional dissemination of false information, although they were eventually exonerated. The show’s impact is seen in the April 30 topic network where the term “PD Notebook” is shared by the topics *mcd.symptoms* and *mcd.fta*, which addressed the beef trade issue in the context of fear and concerns linked with vCJD. Although the background significance of April 29 cannot be underestimated, and its impact will be discussed later in the following chapters, it was not the most potent impetus for the public to stand against the government with regard to the beef trade issue.

Conclusion

This chapter explored a collection of digital posts produced on Agora's free discussion board for the 15 days prior to the Candlelight Protests to examine the formation process of the claim associated with a protest. It has demonstrated that digital communication has more layered and nuanced structures forged through the repetitive (re)arrangement of topics, which are defined as clusters of terms that are more likely to occur concurrently than by random chance. In other words, the protest's cause and goal was co-constructed with contexts that are established in relation to the claim of resistance against the importation of U.S. beef.

The findings of this chapter provide a set of significant points for further discussion regarding the employed methods and the reliability of the argument developed. The discussed topic networks cannot be interpreted without considering the conditions in which the studied text materials were generated. By extension, it can also be suggested that different platforms present different types of semantic development. For instance, concrete logistics of organizing and participating in a street event appeared prevalently nearer to the planned event, while related discussion could have taken place in other platforms and spread to Agora's free discussion board. In other words, it implies that studying the local networks of a large-scale protest network and their connections can enhance our understanding of the role of digital interactions in recent large-scale protests.

Moreover, the ways in which protest claims are shaped urge further study on frequently-observed online phenomena that pertain to a certain type of diffusion beyond popular protests. Firstly, a numeric increase in the presence of terms that directly indicate concerns over mad cow disease, for instance, does not properly capture the importance of such terms. Rather, their relational roles in topic networks can be of more importance: These terms tended to be found at brokering positions within the topic networks, which implies that those ‘major’ terms came to set the tone of the ongoing digital interactions.

Secondly, the structures of the topic networks also suggest that the process of claim-making can be influenced by issues that are concurrently discussed but can be logically or intuitively irrelevant. At the outset of the Candlelight Protests, the beef trade issue was not merely about public fear and concern over the risk of contracting vCJD. The issue was aligned with multiple and heterogeneous topics and occasions involving people who made contributions to the digital communication examined in this chapter. Moreover, the development of such claim and its contexts did not follow a linear format. Rather, topics continued to be tied more strongly on one day, and separated and rearranged with other topics on another day. Topics that directly address multiple facets of the beef trade issue gradually formed as cohesive semantic subsets, although new dimensions were added continuously.

Finally, this chapter’s findings urge the development of more sophisticated tools for semantic network analysis, in order to reflect the specific characteristics of text materials. This chapter exclusively focused on texts, disregarding the impact of authors (e.g. whether terms gaining more presence tended to be used by ‘frequent’ authors or not). It also did not introduce another standard to classify the characteristics of texts (e.g.

are the texts in question intended to deliver ‘information’ or ‘sentiment’?). Also, it can be asked whether it was sufficient to reflect the topic modeling outputs when all terms were treated as if carrying the same weight in the corpus. In addition, it would also be meaningful to design a comparative study that investigates digital posts collected from different platforms.

The following chapter investigates digital interactions that took place in an online community with a question of how the Candlelight Protests took place in the way that they did.

Table 3.1. Profile of the Collection of Digital Posts for Topic Modeling

Date	Number of Posts	Number of Authors (Number of Unidentifiable Authors ¹)	Number of Terms ²
April 16	295	188 (23)	18,251
April 17	433	251 (39)	24,872
April 18	435	246 (31)	25,697
April 19	418	239 (35)	22,934
April 20	399	229 (29)	23,265
April 21	491	245 (38)	20,630
April 22	580	327 (38)	27,533
April 23	403	236 (30)	23,540
April 24	460	260 (22)	22,066
April 25	606	322 (39)	30,600
April 26	474	250 (58)	23,440
April 27	437	257 (45)	22,820
April 28	818	469 (42)	33,086
April 29	924	523 (94)	45,574
April 30	1,909	866 (122)	48,448
May 1	2,475	1,137 (152)	68,375
May 2	4,209	1,742 (169)	83,018
Total	15,634	7,787 (1,006) ³	564,149

Note: ¹ This indicates posts whose authors are left blank.; ² These terms are included in a document term matrix.; ³ The number of unique authors for the entire collection is 4,496.

Table 3.2. Top 30 Terms of the Topic Modeling Result of the April 16 Collection

	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4	Topic 5	Topic 6	Topic 7	Topic 8	Topic 9	Topic 10
	SchoolEdu	avianFlu	RMH.Munhwa	privatization	economy	Newtown	AllianzUnion	CESditorial	beef	Housing.brib
1	우열반 (honors class)	사람은 (person)	정청래 (Chung Cheong-rae)	한국의 (Korean)	얼마나 (how much)	한나라당 (Grand National Party)	알리안츠생 명 (Allianz Life)	이명박 (Lee Myung-bak)	경제를 (the economy [OB])	아파트 (apartment)
2	교육의 (educational)	진보의 (progressive)	노무현 (Roh Moo-hyun)	미국에 (to/in the US)	경제가 (the economy)	뉴타운 (New Town)	합의권 (right to negotiate)	혁신도시 (Hyuk-shin Dosi (innovation City))	소고기 (beef)	무조건 (unconditionally)
3	학교에서 (at school)	브루셀라 (Brucellosis)	문화일보 (Munwha Ilbo)	적어도 (at least)	한반도 (Korean Peninsula)	오세훈 (Oh Se-hoon)	회사는 (a company)	홍재희 (Hong Jae-hee)	앞으로 (in the future)	이한정 (Lee Hang-jung)
4	자율화 (school privatization)	소리가 (sound [S])	그들의 (their)	이명박 (Lee Myung-bak)	만들어 (being made)	문국현 (Mun Gook-hyun)	조합원 (union member)	가운데 (in the middle of)	국민들 (the people)	전화를 (a phone call [OB])
5	대통령 (President)	소리를 (sound [OB])	저들의 (of those people)	열심히 (diligently)	단순히 (simply)	문국현의 (Mun Gook-hyun's)	가능한 (possible)	사장의 (the owner's)	말하는 (speaking)	전화가 (a call [S])
6	공교육의 (of public education)	행사장 (event site)	의원님 (dear representative of the Korean National Assembly)	제주도 (Jeju Island)	문제는 (problem)	국회의원 (Representative of the Korean National Assembly)	회사가 (a company)	조선일보 (Chosun Ilbo)	모르고 (without knowing)	생각합니다 (think)
7	학생들 (students)	참으로 (truly)	그들이 (they)	외국인 (foreigner)	밝혔다 (revealed)	민주당의 (the Democratic Party's)	일방적으로 (unilaterally)	방상훈 (Bang Sang-hoon)	정상적인 (normal)	봅시다 (regard)
8	학생들의 (students')	없었다 (was missing)	군대를 (the military)	민영화 (privatization)	만명이 (ten-thousands of people)	정치적 (political)	노동조합에 (to a labor union)	조선사설은 (Chosun Ilbo's editorial [S])	모르는 (not knowing)	유시민 (Rhyu Si-min)
9	아이들 (school children)	감사합니다 (thank you)	모두가 (everyone)	정치를 (politics)	중간에 (amid)	아래로 (below)	노동법과 (with the labor law)	주장하고 (claiming)	미광우병위험인 자 (Risk materials of Mad Cow Disease in US beef products)	KTF (KT Freetel Co., Ltd)
10	잘하는 (competent)	시작했다 (started)	행태에 (at such deeds)	우리의 (our)	정권을 (the regime)	매국노 (traitor)	노동조합 (labor union)	정치를 (politics)	돈많은 (wealthy)	아직도 (still)

11	학생들이 (students)	브루셀라에 (Brucellosis)	장점을 (merits)	우리는 (we)	홍준표는 (Hong Jun-pyo)	무식한자 (fool)	바랍니다 (wish to)	지역의 (local)	죽이고 (killing)	문제가 (problem)
12	진정한 (sincere)	ai 가 (ai)	홍준표의 (Hong Jun-pyo's))	그들의 (their)	미워하는 (hate)	일본앞잡이 (pro-Japanese informer)	지점장 (local branch chief)	수도권 (Seoul metropolitan area)	건강을 (health)	의무를 (obligation)
13	스스로 (independently)	확실히 (surely)	존경하는 (respecting)	사람들을 (people)	앞에서 (in front of)	미국사대주의 자 (today in favor of the US)	노동부의 (Ministry of Labor)	정권의 (the regime)	부자가 (the rich)	그리고 (in addition)
14	중요한 (important)	필요한 (needed)	수많은 (immense)	운하를 (Canal)	따르면 (according to)	말했다 (said)	성과급제 (performance-based pay system)	공기업 (public company)	싶습니다 (want to)	저에게 (to me)
15	법인세 (corporation tax)	직원이 (staffer)	바랍니다 (wish to)	문제는 (problem)	개만도 (lowly)	당 선자 (the elected)	노동자의 (worker's)	보인다 (seen)	제대로 (thoroughly)	연합뉴스 (Yeonhap News)
16	경쟁을 (competition)	했더니 (did)	수구는 (radical conservatives)	그들을 (them)	우려가 (worries)	비례대표 (proportional representative)	임금체계 (pay system)	정권이 (the regime)	기사를 (news article)	나라에서 (the state)
17	부가서비스 (additional services)	자신이 (one's own)	학부모 (students' parents)	자신의 (one's)	부가가치의 (added value)	서울시장과 (Mayor of Seoul)	단체협약 (collective agreement)	효과가 (effect)	국민들은 (people)	억천만원 (monetary unit)
18	원하는 (want)	아무리 (no matter how)	나에게 (to me)	나오는 (coming out)	경남일보 (Kyungnam Ilbo)	국도를 (national highway)	지점장들은 (local branch chiefs)	보고서를 (report)	생각이 (thought)	당사자의 (of the person concerned)
19	어차피 (anyway)	판데믹 (pandemic)	단점을 (drawback)	관심을 (interest)	과정에서 (through the process)	공약에 (election campaign promises)	임금체계를 (pay system)	mb 의 (mb's)	어느정도 (to some extent)	이제는 (now)
20	학교에 (to/at school)	인플루엔자 가 (influenza)	전적으로 (completely)	전북대 (Jeonbuk University)	자신의 (one's)	거수기 (voting machine)	지점장들의 (local branch chiefs')	교장과 (with the principal)	생각하는 (thinking)	얼마나 (how much)
21	만들면 (make)	사람을 (person)	문화일보와 (with Munhwa Ilbo)	인터넷 (internet)	대운하 (Grand Canal)	창조한국당 (Creative Korea Party)	단체협약을 (collective agreement)	시장은 (mayor)	미국산 (made in the USA)	이름으로 (in name of)
22	교육에 (education)	우리는 (we)	조선일보의 (Chosun Ilbo's)	목사님들 (pastors)	투자를 (investment)	참여정부와 (Participatory Government)	이유는 (reason)	정부에 (government)	등록금 (tuition)	아무런 (without any)
23	부족한 (insufficient)	사람과 (with people)	제대로 (properly)	말아드실지 (ruining)	말한다 (speak)	교수는 (professor)	여러분께 (to the people)	감사원의 (Board of Audit and Inspection)	가난한 (poor)	땅값이 (value of land)


24	멍청한 (stupid)	자신도 (of oneself)	반드시 (definitely)	대통령 (president)	길바닥 (street)	내용을 (content)	언론에 (news organizations)	선출하는 (elect)	여러분 (You [pl])	진실은 (truth)
25	자들이 (people [derogatory])	백병걸 (Paik Pyung-gul)	비난을 (criticism)	노무현 (Roh Mu-hyun)	가격을 (price)	총선을 (General Election)	원칙을 (principle)	참여정부의 (Participatory Government's)	서민을 (working class)	되어야 (must be)
26	아이들을 (kids)	나아가 (furthermore)	당장의 (for now)	지금의 (now)	반대하는 (opposing)	대국민 (to the public)	잘못된 (wrong)	문화일보는 (Munhwa Ilbo)	같은데 (seems like)	의해서 (by something)
27	자율화를 (school privatization)	걱정이 (worries)	오로지 (only)	중국에 (to China)	a 씨는 (person a)	당선된 (elected)	당연히 (for sure)	역할을 (role)	신문이 (newspaper)	모두를 (all)
28	이제는 (from now on)	시대를 (the era)	심지어 (even)	마음을 (mind)	재산을 (wealth)	국회의원이 (national assembly representative)	차례의 (in order)	재검토 (reassess)	아고라의 (Agora)	기본이 (base)
29	교육은 (education)	안으로 (internally)	대의를 (cause)	고기를 (meat)	무엇인지 (what)	kbstv 뉴스 (KBS news)	노동부 (Ministry of Labor)	정부가 (government)	어려운 (challenging)	아무튼 (regardless)
30	방법을 (methods)	성공을 (success)	마음이 (mind)	철저하게 (thoroughly)	멋대로 (as one pleases)	sbs 시 (SBS news)	양측이 (both sides)	지방의 (local)	열심히 (hard-working)	개지역 (some regions)

Table 3.3. Quantity of Terms Used in Topic Networks


	15-term Topic Network	30-term Topic Network
April 16	132	271
April 17	133	279
April 18	125	275
April 19	120	283
April 20	124	276
April 21	124	290
April 22	125	285
April 23	128	277
April 24	119	285
April 25	120	269
April 26	124	285
April 27	121	278
April 28	123	281
April 29	120	275
April 30	120	279
May 1	116	284
May 2	123	276

Note: The quantities of terms that were used in building topic networks are fewer than 150 for the 15-term network and 300 for the 30-term network, because terms that have the same origin and differ only in their suffixes were treated as the same.

Figure 3.1. Networks of Topics of April 16 and May 2




May 2: Semantic Communities



(c)


May 2: Semantic Communities



(d)


Note: (a) and (b) represent the networks of topics of April 16, and (c) and (d) for May 2. (a) and (c) are produced by the topic modeling outcome extracting 15 terms for each topic, whereas (b) and (d) use a topic modeling parameter of 30 terms. Colored bubbles show relatively cohesive groups depending on their ties. Black and red lines respectively indicate intra-community and inter-community connections. The difference in the number of terms results in differences in community structures.

Figure 3.2. Modularity Scores of Topic Networks
from April 16 to May 2, 2008




Note: Modularity is a network value showing the strength of cohesive subgroups by comparing their intra-community ties to inter-community ties. In theory, high modularity signifies that a network has cohesive communities whose inter-community relations are relatively weaker, whereas low modularity indicates a slightly differentiated structure. Blue (and solid) line represents modularity scores from topic networks that have 15 terms, whereas red (and dotted) line shows those from topic networks with 30 terms. Using the 15-term networks, topic networks with a modularity score greater than 0.2 are classified as low-modularity networks.


Figure 3.3. Low Modularity in Topic Networks



Note: These six topic networks have lower modularity scores below 0.2. Red and black lines, weighted by their strength, represent intra-community and inter-community links, respectively. Color bubbles are randomly assigned by R, and there are no meaningful relations between all red bubbles across the six networks.


Figure 3.4. High Modularity in Topic Networks





Note: These six networks of topics all mark higher modularity scores greater than 0.2. Red and black lines, weighted by their strength, respectively present links within communities and inter-community links. Color bubbles are randomly assigned by R, and there are no meaningful relations between all red bubbles across the six networks. High modularity indicates intra-community ties are much stronger than inter-community ties.

Figure 3.5. Topic Networks for April 29, 2008



Chapter 4 Outsourcing Solidarity: Voluntariness and Legality

Introduction

According to the topic modeling outcomes discussed in the preceding chapter, the logistics of the upcoming street gatherings were revealed on Agora only a few days prior to their designated dates. The catalogued information spans from the time and location of the gathering, items requested for the participants to bring, to the names of multiple online communities such as ANTI-MB, OURKOREA, and MICHINSO, which became known as the organizers of the advertised events in the succeeding days. First-person plural pronouns such as “we” or “our” are also found in the topic modeling outcomes. And yet, their meanings remain equivocal to judge whether they have demonstrative values pointing to a collective that has already emerged through online communication, and if so, who would be associated with it. It is equally obscure whether the pronouns are wishful calls to promote such a collective. The subject of this chapter is how candlelight participants came to shape their repertoires over the course of their activities. This chapter introduces subtle inconsistencies in writings posted online and actual action on the streets.

The street gatherings that were eventually held in early May drew intensive media attention to the following characteristics. Firstly, visible diversity in the participants’ socio-demographic profiles stimulated questions of how such diversity was achieved. Secondly, despite the observed diversity, participants at the gatherings behaved in an orderly manner to the extent that it seemed as if they were directed by certain scripts.

Thirdly, festivity and joy became registered as the language of the scripts, sidelining hardline political chants based on anger and frustration. Lastly, linked to the previous point, the gatherings seemed to be full of vigor and yet insusceptible to violence and disruption. These observations were often attributed to teenaged participants who soon became the most salient participant group for their testimonies about being self-mobilized, as shown in the following excerpt from a news article, published online four days after May 2:

According to my [a news reporter] observation, it was adolescents who accounted for half of participants of the recently-held Candlelight Protests [...]. In regard to this fact, two claims have collided: one argues that adolescents' participation comprises 'voluntary and potent resistance,' whereas the other frames it as 'an incited outcome.' Upon observing [the protests] and listening to those students, I found that they had joined the protests voluntarily. Some students took to the streets as members of groups such as extracurricular clubs and celebrity fan clubs.⁶² But the group-based participation was indeed voluntary, far from being politicized as groups mobilized for electoral campaigns. ... With the fear of mad cow disease and anger at the market opening to imported beef products, students exhibited a sense of prudence in distinguishing '*social movements*' from '*protests*.' They refrained from the large-scale banners of social movement organizations on the streets. They even called such banners 'propaganda flags.' The students were not swayed by politicized claims such as *impeaching President Lee, which lacked direct relevance to the claims on the beef importation policy. It seems somewhat unlikely that someone would have set up these standards of judgment and modes of behavior [for the students].* The students temporarily gathered together for the shared goal through *loose connections*. They were determined, but being determined never ruined their festivity and joy, as it often did in conventional protests. As a result, a new type of resistance resembling a festival emerged (Byun, *No Cut News*, 5/6/2008; italics added).⁶³

The above excerpt questions whether voluntariness presented by the students resulted from the construction and practice of the 'standards of judgment and modes of

⁶² The membership of these clubs was known to consist of female teenagers predominantly.

⁶³ Byun, Sang Wook. "Avoid 'Propagandistic Flags' ... What is the true nature of teenagers in the Candlelight Protests?" (<http://www.cbs.co.kr/nocut/show.asp?idx=819481>). Accessed on October 30, 2010.

behavior.’ Above all, the voluntariness argument is attested by the observation that the students decided to join the events of their own volition. Even if the students were mobilized through their club membership, the reporter underscores that the group-based participation remained voluntary, as their mobilization process starkly differed from that of election rallies. These voluntary participants were non-partisan. In addition, the students refused to be led and instructed by activists. They utilized their own judgment on social movements and were eager to keep their protests from being tarnished by politicized claims such as a call for the impeachment of President Lee. Referring to these collective acts performed by teenaged students, the reporter concludes that they invented a new mode of protest repertoires. These repertoires were political only to the point that they signaled their solidarity based on a shared goal. Skepticism toward an idealized model of collective behavior may have been directed in advance, as the above excerpt attributes the students’ voluntariness to their own will, which was less politicized but nonetheless determined.

However, this narrative appears at odds with the influence of *Andante*’s petition discussed in previous chapters. To make its claim, the petition addressed a variety of issues such as the beef trade issue, President Lee’s diplomatic attitude, concerns over policies on education, privatization of public services, and health insurance, and the president’s criminal record and allegations.⁶⁴ It initially took some time for the petition to attract substantive endorsements. And yet, immediately following the noticeable uptick in the number of signatures, the petition became the most representative and popular

⁶⁴ These issues appear as topics linked to the beef trade issues, which certainly showed a degree of consistency prior to street gatherings (see Figures 3.3 and 3.4).

indicator measuring how widely the beef trade issue had been diffused. As the date of the street gatherings approached, many posts encouraged readers not only to join the upcoming street gatherings, but also to sign the petition to publicize disapproval of President Lee. It eventually obtained more than one million signatures around May 5 (Kyunghyang Shinmoon 2008), when the third street gathering was held.

The petition had no legal basis since replies to the petition were also counted as signatures. These responses were informal and lacked the required information of petitioners that were necessary to file a formal impeachment motion through the National Assembly. In other words, it remains nebulous how seriously the impeachment petition was regarded as part of the claims of the Candlelight Protests. Nonetheless, its popularity and symbolic presence stresses an unanswered question of how the young students ended up considering chants of impeachment shouted on the street as ‘politicized claims’ because of its irrelevance to the beef trade issue, though its relevance was made clear online.

It is equally noteworthy that the reporter chooses the expression ‘protests’ to portray the street gatherings up to May 6 as collective and political. What is muted here is that the gatherings addressed in the news article were referred to online as ‘Candlelight Vigils’ or ‘Cultural Events with Candles’ by participants and organizers, as events that are separate from ‘Candlelight Protests.’ As discussed below in this chapter, the notion of ‘Candlelight Protest’ was deliberately suppressed to prevent the perception of the street gatherings as political congregations. The gatherings obviously pursued policy changes, targeting the Korean government, as clearly implied in the aforementioned excerpt on the teenaged students. Nevertheless, there were also massive efforts to mask the political

nature of the proposed gatherings. ANTI-MB members were especially eager to do so, which did not pass without criticism. Many questioned what justifies the boundary between political and non-political, as well as between legitimate and illegitimate.

Simply put, it is uncertain what made the pro-impeachment chants become perceived as excessively politicized, though the same chants evidently invigorated public awareness of the emerging Candlelight Protests. Moreover, it is equally puzzling how voluntary participation became associated with non-politicized action on the streets. I argue that these ostensible inconsistencies help in understanding how digital media users formed solidarity through disputes over what makes street gatherings different from actions orchestrated online. Customary understandings of online communication and protests were juxtaposed against each other with varying emphases on two different, but intertwined, relationships: oppositional solidarity against the target, on one hand, and internal solidarity among digital media users, on the other. This chapter demonstrates that the clashes were only barely resolved by outsourcing the standard of judgment to the concept of a legal protest in reference to the Assembly and Demonstration Act (ADA), which had rarely been referenced in a favorable light by protesters in the past. Voluntary compliance with the ADA became a core principle in dealing with anonymous communication online and the coexistence of multiple groups on the streets, which jointly drove the dynamics of protest repertoires.

The following section develops a framework to analyze the construction of protest repertoires in the case of street gatherings organized by digital media users. I present relational perspectives that are compelling in incorporating the inconsistency and contradictions in the development of protest repertoires both against the target and in the

pursuit of solidarity. The third section carries out content analysis of discursive clashes that occurred throughout the process of transposing online communication into the format of protests, and vice versa. The goal of this section is to demonstrate how the idea of legal protests energized and drove the dynamics of protest repertoires.

Protest Repertoire: Anonymity and Collective Actors

Coordinating Actions in Online and Offline Domains

How do digital media users stage protests outside digital platforms? How do they behave as crowds congregating at a public site and why? These questions fall under the jurisdiction of research on repertoires of collective action. Protest repertoires are defined as a limited set of expressive acts employed by collective actors to form and present claims on a given target (Earl and Kimport 2011; Steinberg 1998, 1999; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004; Tilly 1993, 1995, 1997, 2008). Protest repertoires are limited in their scope, in the sense that a gamut of available sources is bound in social, political, and cultural contexts. Despite the conventional tendency of collective actors to develop certain affinities with particular repertoires, repertoires hardly belong to their practitioners (Tilly 1993), just as language practices associated with certain subgroups do not exclusively belong to the said subgroups. Instead, repertoires gain meanings in relation to targets, which makes repertoires relational and dynamic, or specifically, oppositional (Steinberg 1999). Moreover, repertoires are practiced through interactions between collective actors and their targets, where the oppositional pair becomes involved in language practices filled with ambiguity and multivocality (Polletta 2006; Steinberg 1998, 1999), and jointly forges alternative discourses (Steinberg 1998).

The growing significance of online communication in collective action has increased research interest in digital media users' tactics in online and offline domains. With regard to online domains, a consensus has emerged that online communication has enormously enlarged the scope and variability of tactics by making routine online tools viable means to diffuse information, bring people together, communicate, and coordinate actions without requiring a formal organization. Key to this versatility is that the digital environment lays out collective actions as uniform acts that can be performed identically and repeatedly by an unlimited number of individuals. Prominent means include benign acts such as online petitions and mailing lists (Earl and Kimport 2010), memes (Shifman 2014), avatars (Gerbaudo 2015b), online donations, formation of blogs or communities (Kang 2016), and communication based on replies to posts. More abusive and occasionally unlawful forms of such actions include trolling, cyberattacks, and hacking (Fuchs 2015). These communication tools have precipitated debates over whether uniform acts conducted for a shared goal by a collective of individuals without prior relations constitute collective action (Earl et al. 2010; Earl and Kimport 2011). The debate is still ongoing across multiple disciplines. Some have examined whether online communication exerts any impact on the quality and form of various coordinated actions (Gerbaudo 2015a; Gerhards and Schafer 2010; Castells 2012). Some have theorized by developing a typology of different types of social movements based on the actors' media usage patterns (Bimber et al. 2005; Bimber, Flanagin, and Stohl 2012; Chadwick 2013; Flanagin, Stohl, and Bimber 2006).

With regard to in-person events involving digital media users, the subject of research has been their interactions with other participants. In the case of the Candlelight

Protests examined in this dissertation, the emphasis was placed on socio-demographic landscapes and specific categories such as teenaged students (Kim et al. 2010; Lee 2008; Yun and W. Y. Chang 2011), young mothers pushing babies in strollers (Young Ok Kim 2009), online communities implementing their own tactics (Park 2011; Yoo 2012), etc. For cases where social media were employed, such as Occupy Wall Street of 2011 that occupied a public park on Wall Street, New York, and rapidly spread to other countries, observations have pointed out that occupiers developed proxies for communities to embrace and implement direct democracy (Cammerts, Mattoni, and McCurdy 2013; Gerbaudo 2012; Gitlin 2012; Kreiss and Tufekci 2013; Tufekci 2017). Decision-making processes in the movement often included open debates and discussions (Gerbaudo 2012; Gitlin 2012; Tufekci 2017). Participants volunteered their services to maintain the occupied space. Once the occupation began and persisted, the differences between the occupiers in the park and those remaining solely online were revealed and highlighted (Gitlin 2012), and these distinct behavioral cues and modes were often attributed to occupiers' familiarity with (and embrace of) equal and horizontal relationships. Some researchers, however, have urged caution against largely attributing this distinct feature to online communication, suggesting that online communication could have exacerbated existing grievances as opposed to creating grievances (Howard and Hussain 2013).

These findings, however, have nonetheless offered widely agreed answers to how the transition from online communication to offline collective action takes place (Dupont and Passy 2011; Eggert and Pavan 2014). Instead of accepting that digital media users joining the same collective action on the streets remain constituted merely as individuals, some research has found that online communication entails collective dimensions in

specific forms. In online communities, the same symbols and signs used in patterns foster unity (Kang 2016, 2017), and first-person plural pronouns are found to envision an ordinary individual rather than a social category writ large (P. Gerbaudo 2015a; Gerbaudo and Treré 2015). Endless modifications of popular images and footages became a way of rhetorically expressing solidarity and unity (Kang 2016). Similar patterns of language usage would become much more salient on digital platforms, setting the impression that plenty of others share the same ideas. In other words, uniform acts with the nuance of rhetorical formats and rhythms would not be so entirely individualistic and personalized as earlier research emphasized.

Protest Repertoires in Dynamics

An unresolved question concerns the origin of the inconsistencies and multiplicities that are present in online communication and street gatherings without collapsing the intended act of resistance, as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. How did participants of the early candlelight gatherings envision protest repertoires, which depended on being online or sitting with other participants on the streets? What factors should be addressed in the transition from communicating online to coordinating activities on the streets? On this matter, the literature on protest repertoires presents an instructive point in its emphasis on the relational dimensions of protest repertoires, though its narrow focus on oppositional dynamics against targets needs be adjusted to incorporate the collective impact of interactions among potential constituencies online.

It is also valuable to note Tilly's and Steinberg's works. Analyzing secondhand accounts of collective actions that took place in Britain for about 80 years in the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Tilly argues that protest repertoires are influenced by political structure, whereby claims are situated and interlocked within a specific set of political entities as claimants and targets. Tilly points out that the centralization of power on the British parliament led the observed changes in protest repertoires. As the center of politics moved to the national level, where Parliament's roles became salient and important, claimants tended to address and orient their claims to the same political level. For Tilly, protest repertoires are relational in the sense that claims come to be placed within oppositional relations between claimants and targets in accordance with the power structure, alongside which frequent types of physical acts and verbal descriptions are similarly selectively aligned.

In contrast to Tilly's orientation toward political structures as a source of long-term transformation in protest repertoires, Steinberg (1998, 1999) examines discursive fields where oppositional claims are shaped. He contends that collective actors themselves are not immune to hegemonic discourses in the process of forging their resistance claims. Grievances and resistance are verbalized through tactful involvement in dominant discourses. A main tool of developing claims is interactions between claimants and targets in discursive fields to unsettle the prevailing line of thinking, which leads targets' discourses to become part of the claim-making process. In so doing, he stresses the use of language that leads the complexity of meaning-making, drawing on the Bakhtinian school. The meanings of discourses rarely remain fixed and coherent, nor solely controlled by the dominant discourse. Rather, various discursive media such as symbols, signs, stories, and discourses carry their own multivocality, originating from linguistic features (Polletta 2006). Underscoring semiotic processes in conjunction with

the social effect of interactions, Steinberg argues that claim-making is neither voluntarist nor strategic in the sense that contenders are able to mobilize and arrange an array of repertoires to win potential advocates and generate counterarguments against targets. Its contentious power is reaped through the interplay of the languages of contenders and targets.

Tilly's and Steinberg's studies on protest repertoires are worth discussing at length despite their evident absence of interest in online communication and their own theoretical differences, due to their shared emphasis on relationality as a factor in making protest repertoires dynamic. For the two, building and performing protest repertoires pertains to claim-making, which is intended to carry and perform certain meanings. These meanings are the joint product of interactions between claimants and targets, keyed to the structural positions of the two within the given political structure and discursive fields. It is rare that coherent and strategic repertoires are presented to targets and potential constituencies from the outset. Rather, repertoires are comprised of a range of acts that (1) for Tilly, specify contentious relations by delineating who presents claims on whom within the context of a bigger political structure, and (2) for Steinberg, manage the appropriation of meanings that are susceptible to multiple interpretations.⁶⁵

Nonetheless, the relational approaches proposed by Steinberg and Tilly cannot be simply applied to a question of protest repertoires that aims to consider interactions in both online and offline domains simultaneously. The unsuitability of certain repertoires

⁶⁵ It should be noted, however, that Tilly's structural approach, which employs text analysis, is quite different from Steinberg's view on discourse analysis. For Tilly, language is assumed to convey the same meaning irrespective of its practical usage in various settings, which is refuted by Steinberg. Drawing on the Bakhtinian circle on language, Steinberg firmly stresses that the meanings of claims cannot be captured without careful consideration of ambiguity inherent in language as symbols.

stems from their commonality in treating collective actors as a group, whose intragroup differences are less prominent, compared to the importance of oppositional relations against targets (Gould 2004, Mische 2008). In other words, the question of how collective actors come to exist falls beyond the purview of their discussion. In Tilly's work, contenders such as 'local residents' or 'inhabitants' are delineated as groups that are conventionally recognized as separate categories by contemporaries of a given historical time. Steinberg's cogent argument could have not been developed further without the assumption that class defines shared interests among people who are positioned within the same class. An analytic focus for the current discussion is not predicted upon the existence of a group that has already developed a shared claim and is ready to mobilize its collective action. Thus, it becomes imperative to consider how digital media users come to develop a sense of belonging to the group, which can be differentiated from grievances directed against their target.

Some relevant ideas are already available. For online domains, social relations are portrayed with a focus on how digital media users exercise agency by maintaining personal networks as well as creating multiple networks of acquaintances and strangers (Benkler 2006; Cavanagh 2007; Hauben and Hauben 1997; Lee 2009; Rainie and Wellman 2012; Rheingold 2002). In merging, compartmentalizing, and creating those social relations, digital media users are at liberty to produce, consume, and evaluate information. In addition, communicative relations in which digital media users are involved, at least against the backdrop of collective action in the making, can have normative dimensions. To begin, their intentions to communicate with others are purported to be benign, not malicious. Manipulating others' opinions, either indirectly by

rigging the digital infrastructure or directly by cajoling others, can become an issue that can cause destructive and detrimental effects. In a similar vein, publishing posts and replying to others should not be paid work. Moreover, digital media users frequently originate from multiple discursive communities, whose different subcultures can increase the possibility of disputes. In addition to these rudimentary ideas, the next section discusses anonymity as a main factor crucial for digital media users to envision solidarity.

Anonymity and Collective Actors

Firstly, digital media with a high level of anonymity technologically sets people to perceive other interacting parties as equal, whereby their interactions are recognized as acts that carry the same communicative standing. All posts are treated equally, whether written by a female high school student or a middle-aged male professor. This is not because online communication fundamentally erases the power differentials based on social categories (e.g., gender, age, social prestige) that influence both online and offline domains. It is rather because one user cannot discern the identity nor physical location of the other within the platform. When one's social identity and status is detached from their posts in a digital platform, it can be assumed that the posts are evaluated on their own merit. The complexity of new ranking systems varies based on multiple factors such as the architecture of digital platforms, one's involvement in activities that are quantitatively ranked, and transferability of one's engagement in one community to another. In this regard, anonymity requires close attention as a factor that removes the social status associated with communicative routines and rules.

I contend that anonymity provides a communicative setting where expressed ideas are treated on equal terms at least and it becomes difficult to assess which opinions are more compelling, legitimate or important than others. More importantly, there is no substantial pressure for competing opinions to arrive at a consensus. People can agree on a protest claim, but completely disagree on tactics, and vice versa. Even if some agreements are believed to be made, there is still a possibility that those agreements are not based on consensus regarding the reasons and conditions for which people agree with others. In other words, a group of individuals who are in favor of or are currently holding street protests to address the beef trade issue definitely perceive it a challenge to defeat other people's adherence to remain online instead of taking to the streets, even if the ultimate goal of both groups is to nullify the beef trade. To summarize, when anonymity is seen as a conditioning factor, the issue no longer concerns whether going anonymous itself is constructive or destructive toward the quality of communication. It requires attention to how potential constituencies perceive and utilize the similarities and differences between the ways they communicate online and the ways they would go on to communicate and interact on the streets.

To investigate how protest repertoires of the Candlelight Protests were forged with inherent inconsistencies, the following section investigates a thread of debates between two online communities, ANTI-MB and OURKOREA, in terms of their own proposed street gatherings that happened to target two consecutive dates.

Incitation and Solidarity

Confusion, Disputes, the Assembly and Demonstration Act

The online communities (or online “cafes” in Korean) ANTI-MB and OURKOREA planned to hold street gatherings on May 2 and 3, respectively. In late April, ANTI-MB set a street event for May 2 and scheduled a membership meeting on the next day. For ANTI-MB, these two events were not spontaneous arrangements swayed by heightened public interest in the beef trade issue, demonstrated by an exponential growth in membership. Rather, they saw the two events as part of regular activities that would have been conducted regardless of contingent situations. In contrast, OURKOREA was a newly-launched café with the aim to channel grievances and anger into protests, especially aiming to hold simultaneous events in multiple cities across the country on May 3. The two dates and the two groups connoted different meanings to potential constituencies, despite the shared claim. This was possibly a positive sign of the depth and width of public anger. However, it stirred up ANTI-MB’s free discussion board.

*JHJ0258*⁶⁶ posted on April 28 as follows:

May 2? May 3? Clarification in Need

How confusing would it be for ordinary people who obtain information through posts and replies online, considering my own confusion despite my involvement in [online cafes]? Although I’ve been spreading [information for a street gathering] under the title ‘*Cultural Events with Candles*’ for May 2, it seems that another online café will be holding a gathering on May 3. Also, I’ve heard that you, ANTI-MB, were planning to have a national membership meeting on May 3. What is going on here? Isn’t this going to have the detrimental effect of splitting participants? [...] (emphasis mine)

⁶⁶ Citation of digital media users relies on their preference on creative commons. Most posts on ANTI-MB allow citation when they are used for non-commercial purposes without changes to the contents and with credit to the author.

For *JHJ0258*, the two schedules meant divided attention and energy, which otherwise could fully mobilize a single, united gathering. One minute later, *Sonagui*, ANTI-MB's admin, offered a concise fact-checking reply, "As per the announcement, [...] a *candlelight vigil* for May 2 and a nationwide regular membership meeting are planned for May 3. Others [irrespective of ANTI-MB] will hold a street gathering for May 3" (emphasis added). In another post preceding *JHJ0258*'s question, *Sonagui* wrote at length on the importance of the membership meeting in consideration of the recent influx of new members into ANTI-MB:

The national membership meeting was arranged in response to the recurrent issue of low turnout in street rallies and protests. Although our members live in different parts of the country, their activities have been largely confined to online communication. Also, most street events have been concentrated in Seoul, which led to participation by fewer members. [...] It is undeniable that the commitment of people from all different regions of the country is necessary to complete the voice of the nation (*Sonagui*, April 25).⁶⁷

This rationale exhibits the challenges ANTI-MB had grappled with in establishing a reliable, dual-track structure of resistance in both online and offline domains to maintain a firm grip on the bold political goal of impeaching the sitting president. Using the membership meeting as a foothold to substantially increase participation in regular street rallies, ANTI-MB's administrators maintained the café's own pace and direction despite rapid developments whose lasting impact was beyond accurate prediction.

Within a couple of hours following *Sonagui*'s reply to *JHJ0258* came a plea written by another ANTI-MB admin, *Hanpan*, titled "Emergency Announcement: The

⁶⁷ <https://cafe.daum.net/antimb/HXck/15289>.

May 3 Street Gathering Would Be Illegal. You May Be Placing ANTI-MB in Danger.” It reads:

Dear Members,

I’d like to make an emergency announcement regarding a problem that may be potentially destructive to our café. Before jumping into that topic, however, let me remind you that there have been schemers in the past who intended to shut down our café, which has rapidly grown with daily increases in membership recently.

The [upcoming] May 3 street gatherings to be held in multiple cities at the same time look very suspicious. Their host café, SOULDRESSER, is unidentifiable because of its limited privacy settings to the public. Moreover, the host has not submitted a report to the police for the events.

I’m writing this announcement out of concern over the danger if such an unidentifiable group deliberately incites violent and unlawful protests from within our café to escalate public fear and insecurity, which would lead to immediate suppression by the authorities. Don’t be stirred. Please, remain calm.

Your involvement in an illegal protest would result in putting both you and ANTI-MB in danger. Our café can be shut down promptly, as MB [President Lee] wishes.

I urge you to think twice before [joining] a street gathering, if its host is not recognizable and the gathering has not been notified to the local police. You should remain vigilant in order to protect yourself and our café.

ANTI-MB has always held perfectly safe, peaceful, legal, and democratic street gatherings to guarantee safety. You don’t have to be too worried about this alert. If our allies hold events that comply with the law, we will announce our own participation after reviewing them. Always act after checking announcements [...] (*Hanpan*, April 28).⁶⁸

This post was read by more than three thousand people and triggered about 250 replies within two days for its allegation that another group’s protest might be illegal and violent, and hosted with potentially malignant intention. Its controversy stemmed from two points. First, *Hanpan* presupposes that online communication lowers credibility by allowing online cafes to remain translucent at best. This assessment is surely at odds with

⁶⁸ <http://cafe.daum.net/antimb/HXck/16073>.

the popular understanding that deems online communication a booster for the potential constituencies of protests. Without mentioning this fact, *Hanpan* drastically draws on a new context in which the upcoming protest would inherit the flaws of online communication. Protest organizers, according to *Hanpan*, should be transparent and identifiable. The two components assure the safety of participants and more fundamentally shield the participants collectively from the authorities. Hinting at ANTI-MB's experiences of holding street rallies under close monitoring of the authorities in the recent past, *Hanpan* points out that online communities and their communication never infringe upon political institutions, particularly regarding collective action. *Hanpan* insinuates that intelligence agents, possibly masked as digital media users, must have been on alert to break down ANTI-MB as well as upcoming protests from within.

In addition, *Hanpan* spotlights the ADA as a standard to assess the procedural legitimacy of protests. The ADA, enacted in the 1960s and amended several times subsequently, has the dual goals of protecting the right to organize and protest if carried out in lawful ways and protecting the nation from unlawful protesters and resultant inconvenience and disturbances (Article 1). It has long been criticized for its potential violation of the Constitution and past cases of political oppression.

A major element of the ADA referenced by *Hanpan* is that organizers of outdoor collective events are required to report to the police by submitting specified information to the local police near the site at least 48 hours before the event. The information includes the purpose of the event, the name and occupation of the organizer, organizational affiliation, name of the organization's representative, and contact information, including the estimated number of participants and the names of

participating groups, and the methods of protesting (Article 6). Also, the ADA bans any collective action held at a public site before sunrise and after sunset (Article 10). A failure to notify can incur penalties to both organizers and participants, such as voluntary or forceful dispersion of the event, fines, and arrest (Articles 20, 22, and 23). Underscoring these points, *Hanpan* asserted that it is nonsensical for any organizer of collective action to be ignorant of the law and jeopardize everyone involved, regardless of their good cause.

From *Hanpan*'s point of view, coordinated actions that are feasible and successful in online domains can never be easily transposed into collective actions on the streets. Protests entail their own institutional routines and anchors. Compared with posts written under anonymity that can ignite a remarkable degree of public awareness online without disclosing the author's real identity, crowds taking to the streets have no such luxury. Lawful collective action, regardless of how they are organized, requires at least one person to submit personal information to the police as the representative organizer. Moreover, Korea's history of oppression and repression of democratization movements up to the first half of the 1990s, implicitly renders *Hanpan*'s narrative on surveillance plausible. If the allegation of state surveillance is true, as *Hanpan* implies, the usefulness of online communication is significantly reduced. Without trust and transparency between digital media users and organizers, their underorganized resistance would only be used as a justifiable pretext for suppression by the authorities. It was never mentioned that the ADA was institutionally backward and failed to keep up with changes in how individuals formed a group to express a shared cause in the current era.

Hanpan's post received scathing replies, perhaps unsurprisingly. Most point out *Hanpan*'s intransigent conception of how people behave collectively online. Compared to ANTI-MB, which had been dedicated to a political movement from the outset, SOULDRESSER was a popular café of about eighty-thousand women that shared information about fashion trends and products. Therefore, SOULDRESSER's policy to maintain its affairs could be different from ANTI-MB's in deciding the extent to which its directories should remain members-only or publicly accessible. ANTI-MB's shrewdness in terms of political grammar, including knowledge of the ADA, surpassed that of SOULDRESSER, which, nevertheless, could not be used to paint SOULDRESSER as suspicious to the authorities. Some pointed out that, without respect for differences rooted in methods of communicating online, ANTI-MB's rigid attitude belittled others' efforts and distorted their sincere enthusiasm as potential threats. Moreover, what if those other groups were indeed capable of contributing to diversify protest strategies and tactics, which would eventually help the overall cause? Some argued that stubborn rejection of SOULDRESSER and other online groups would only accelerate internal fractions and fissures among people, who otherwise would never perceive any problem and entertain options of how they would want to participate. From the perspective of these opinions, the harder ANTI-MB pushes its assertion, the more self-contradictory it becomes.

Hanpan's divisive post was quickly circulated in digital space, and *Sisyph*, one of OURKOREA's admins, swiftly posted a rebuttal:

You posted an embarrassing warning that urged your [ANTI-MB] members to stay away from our May 3 street gatherings [...] because they look illegal and violent. [...] One thing that bothered me was that this accusation traveled all over DAUM Agora⁶⁹ rather than staying private between us. On top of that, you're aware that a protest is not illegal if a notification is made to the police at least 48 hours before the actual event. [...] As you indicated, we have not yet done this. How can it be dangerous to distribute an announcement for the gathering while handling the legal requirements at the same time? [...] Frankly, I am not interested in building a massive membership for my online café. If you want, we can even merge OURKOREA and ANTI-MB. [...] Does it matter with which online cafes you collaborate with? Why are you slandering ordinary citizens like me who simply want to achieve something together? You know what? It doesn't matter whether a misunderstanding caused all the fuss [because] I am not fighting you, ANTI-MB. I'm fighting the Lee regime" (*Sisyph*, April 28).

Sisyph's argument is that the focus of the upcoming events should be about how to establish an oppositional boundary between people and the Lee administration, which is seemingly absent in ANTI-MB's aforementioned posts. *Sisyph* emphasizes that there have been only sincere and high-spirited ordinary citizens online who voluntarily rose against an unjust policy decision, in contrast with *Hanpan*'s allegations, who expressed concern over the activities of inciters online. For ANTI-MB, identifying oneself as ordinary citizens is insufficient to foster the internal solidarity that would be necessary and sufficient to meet the conventional requirements and support the conventional routines of protests. *Sisyph* contended that ANTI-MB creates internal conflicts and fissures, which the OURKOREA admin condemned. What is noteworthy, however, is that the authority of the ADA is not challenged.

⁶⁹ Daum Agora is a discussion board, on which Daum account holders have access to post, though all posts are open to non-account holders as well. Chapter 3 used posts collected from Agora's free discussion board.

Illegality and the Assembly and Demonstration Act

The dispute between the two online cafes had reached a stalemate with no clear-cut conclusion in sight. ANTI-MB admins withstood a barrage of demands to issue a public apology to OURKOREA and SOULDRESSER along with a new announcement rescinding its previous allegations. Instead, ANTI-MB's admins turned to a new strategy by encouraging its members to modify its original announcement for the May 2 event, which had already spread online, by adding a new line: "It's Not a Political Protest but a Cultural Event ^^."⁷⁰ This tactic stemmed from an interpretation of Article 15 of the ADA that designates exceptions to the application of the Act, if a given event pertains to "academic, art, sports, religion, rituals, social, entertainment, the four ceremonial occasions of coming of age, wedding, funeral, and ancestral rites, and national ceremonies hosted by the state." Presupposing that it would be impossible for all potential constituencies to comprehend the detailed provisions of the ADA, ANTI-MB proposed the May 2 event not as a political event, but a cultural one. If the event was recognized as a cultural event, it would reduce the potential for violations of the ADA, given that events using candles were supposed to start in the early evening and progress into the nighttime and address political issues. The trade-off was that participants would be restricted from political chants and other activities signaling that the gathering was indeed political. ANTI-MB's posters for upcoming events were published with statements that read: "Not a protest. A peaceful cultural vigil. Come at ease."

ANTI-MB's strategy, thus, resulted in inconsistencies, which required caution in its implementation on the streets. Its events obviously pertained to political issues, not to

⁷⁰ ^^ is a Korean emoticon that indicates a smile, equivalent to ':-)' in the English-speaking world.

mention the original cause of impeaching President Lee. Nevertheless, the actual performance of the issues on the streets had to be regarded as less or not at all political, but cultural, and held safely and lawfully. Chants of “impeachment,” for instance, had to be avoided because law enforcement officials assessed the political inclination of an event by verbal expressions, despite the inevitable ambiguity. In other words, potential constituencies had to adopt apolitical or cultural tactics in order to continue without hindrance to engage in oppositional politics against the Lee administration. Violent behavior was also strictly prohibited at all times. To prevent forceful dispersion and arrests by the police, participants had to be sensitive to what actions might be construed as politicized and political despite the inevitable ambiguity of ‘less political’ or ‘not political.’

In the meantime, *Sisyph* had completed the police notification process for the May 3 event. When it was posted online, it was attached with a document titled ‘Parental Consent Form,’ which reads, “I give consent for my child’s participation in the protest to be hosted by OURKOREA in front of Building A, Serin-dong, Jongno-gu, Seoul on May 3, 2008.” The document was supposed to be signed by parents or guardians of teenaged students to allow their participation in the event. It is impossible to estimate the extent of this document’s circulation among adolescents. Subsequently, indirect measures for greater adolescent turnout were found in online posters advertising street gatherings. A post published on May 6 hosted by ANTI-MB, for instance, contains a sentence that reads “Adolescents should voluntarily return home by 10 pm.”⁷¹ It is not difficult to find posters that carry asterisked points reading “Attention: To maintain order against

⁷¹ cafe.daum.net/antimb/HXck/27445.

schemers, please be aware that we want no chants, no flags, and no pickets”⁷² or “The use of political chants and pickets will categorize the event as a protest, not a cultural event. (Only candles can go up above the head).”⁷³ Later in an interview, *Sisyph* remarked, “A police officer lied to me that the parental consent form was necessary for teenaged students who might want to take part in our vigil [because they were not legal adults]. At that time, I had no idea that the officer was lying to me.”⁷⁴

The thread of disputes over the first two gatherings of the two online cafes reveals that it was never an easy task to produce protest repertoires. People gathered together voluntarily on digital platforms and on the streets. But being voluntary had to be performed in some ways. Before the actual events, discussions and debates proliferated online regarding what should be considered to channel grievance and eagerness from the online space to a physical space. ANTI-MB’s adherence to the ADA was not welcomed in the first place because it was readily interpreted as a pretension to mask its desire to monopolize the credit for the overall movement as the leading group. *Sisyph*’s rationale on the power of people echoed widely not only for its recognition of ordinary citizens’ willingness to participate, but also for its agreement with the widespread perception of online communication, which celebrates unidentifiability as a key condition of group formation. During these debates, few rejections were voiced against the augmented influence of the ADA. The consequence of such heavy reliance on the ADA was greater than expected. Fine lines were drawn to conceal street protests as lawful events in keeping with the constraining conditions set out by the ADA, which required a political

⁷² cafe.daum.net/antimb/HXck/27445 and cafe.daum.net/antimb/HXck/25813.

⁷³ cafe.daum.net/antimb/HXck/25813.

⁷⁴ An interview in “*Shall We Protest?*” Minari and Hae k. 2009.

event to be non-political. The meaning of voluntary participation, therefore, was substantiated with the idea of abiding by the ADA, which can never be achieved without each candlelight participant's explicit effort.

These inconsistencies, however, planted the seeds for another round of major debates on ways to identify overt politicization, which could be both propagandistic and manipulative. These seeds were about to sprout as the street gatherings took off, which did not neatly follow prior expectations and online discussions, but instead catalyzed further debate and contention in on online communication.

Diversity Across Participating Groups in the Streets

When participants congregated on May 2, they appeared to be fully aware of what they were about to do as a group despite their visible heterogeneity. It is useful to briefly examine their outward appearance in reference to videos and descriptive newspaper articles. Firstly, people sat down while carrying materials made by hand or printed out from digital platforms that they frequented. A few flags were present. Audio facilities were evidently insufficient to cover the radius of the day's crowds because of the unexpectedly overwhelming turnout. The majority of participants of the gatherings in the first week of May consisted of teenaged students, especially female students. A highlight of the gatherings was speeches by participants who voluntarily stood up in front of the seated participants and were given several minutes to present their opinions.

Various stories intensified excitement and reaffirmed the belief that all participants there were on the same side with respect to the cause of the day. A man

talked about his kidney disease that had incurred expensive treatment costs even under the current national health insurance program. He said that if President Lee strongly pushed a bill to privatize health insurance, the only option left for him would be death. A middle-aged woman said that it was her mistake to have voted for Lee, believing he would make her wealthier by raising the value of her real estate.⁷⁵ A male high school student shouted that there would be no future for him because he would almost certainly die before reaching adulthood, by either Mad Cow disease contracted through the school meal plan or by a super-competitive and oppressive education system.⁷⁶ More speakers and diverse personal stories reassured and fostered solidarity among the participants. Intermittently they sang songs, which were not the conventional protest songs. The failure of the audio facilities rather encouraged people to form smaller groups and converse with one another. It was this street event format that became typical of cultural events that accompanied the subsequent candlelight vigils.

At that time, candlelight vigils were still in the making. It was mainly because there were many groups and individuals who had only just marked their presence on the streets. Conspicuous incidences included interactions between candlelight participants and activists affiliated with social movement organizations (SMOs), as described in the news article introduced in the beginning of this chapter. The following is a blog post reporting on the May 3 candlelight vigil:

Some activists were soliciting for their weekly newspaper. [...] Frankly, it was bothersome. [...] Also, others were collecting cash [for the street gathering] [...] instead of providing a bank account to accept donations. [...] After 8 pm, police officers began to encourage people to go home, by saying “You are participating in an ILLEGAL gathering. Go home, NOW!” Also, the police banned chanting. [...]

⁷⁵ Quoted from “*Shall We Protest?*” Minari and Hae k. 2009.

⁷⁶ Quoted from “*Shall We Protest?*” Minari and Hae k. 2009.

After I got back home, I learned that MICHINSO didn't get police permission for today's gathering. Yes, it was illegal. [...] What the hell is MICHINSO doing? It was my fault that I had not checked out whether [today's] rally had police confirmation. ANTI-MB and OURKOREA have been known to observe the law. In the future, I will definitely check the online communities of the hosts beforehand (emphasis original).⁷⁷

This post displays the penetration of the disputes between ANTI-MB and OURKOREA, which was discussed previously. The author of the blog post is highly conscious of people who behaved like activists as well as the police that stringently sought to disperse the event by labeling it as illegal. Using the standards of the ADA, according to the author, ANTI-MB and OURKOREA are now firmly recognized as the organizers of lawful gatherings, in contrast with MICHINSO's recklessness. It is not seriously considered whether MICHINSO had different claims and goals in contrast with the other two hosts. A more important aspect is MICHINSO's failure to guarantee procedural legitimacy. After verifying the meeting's police approval status, the author concludes that participants should be vigilant to avoid unpleasant consequences.

These tensions and sensitivity among candlelight participants since May 2 culminated on May 6, when two separate candlelight vigils took place simultaneously in Seoul.⁷⁸

There will be two candlelight vigils at Cheongye Plaza and Yeouido, under different hosts. The Cheongye Plaza vigil will be run by MICHINSO, whereas the Yeouido vigil will be run by ANTI-MB. First of all, it is impossible to hold the candlelight vigil at Cheongye Plaza because of the City of Seoul's "Hi Seoul Festival." If we hold any meeting there, it would be flagged as illegal, which would lead to clashes with the police. We should expect legal consequences. The Yeouido vigil is a legal event

⁷⁷ Quoted from a blog, "The Diary of Kongbaguni, 'Hooked by MICHINSO Report back on my second participation in the Candlelight at Sora Square" at <http://kongbaguni.tistory.com/entry/MichincowNet>, accessed on June 12, 2012.

⁷⁸ Posted on May 5, 2008 at bbs1.agora.media.daum.net/gaia/do/debate/read.

with police permission, which removes any association with demonstrations and protests and allows us to convey our claims under truly peaceful circumstances. Therefore, I'd like to inform you that holding the gathering at Yeouido is only intended to protect all participants of the Candlelight Vigil rather than a sign of internal conflict and division (*MaybeToday*, May 5).

On May 6, ANTI-MB held its own vigil in front of the building of the Korean National Assembly at Yeouido, while OURKOREA and MICHINSO gathered together at Sora Square, where the May 2 rally had previously taken place (Lee and Oh, *Chosun Ilbo*, May 7, 2008).⁷⁹ As a symbolic resistance against 'political and propagandistic class,' participants in the ANTI-MB vigil wore a white mask marked with a large X in black tape, signifying their silenced voices. They remained completely silent and only held lit candles. The candlelight vigil at Yeouido signaled their objection not only to the beef trade but also to other candlelight vigil hosts. In other words, people who participated in the very early period of the Candlelight Protests continued to explore whether their fellow participants and hosts could be trusted. They were yet to find ways to realign and coordinate their behavior under the circumstances where new groups continued to join.

For instance, adolescents were portrayed in conflicting ways. No laws in Korea prohibit adolescents' political rights to organize and take part in political events such as candlelight vigils. The Candlelight Protests of 2002 were initiated by female students in the city of Uijungbu, which later developed into one of the earliest candlelight vigils in Korea. Nevertheless, the recommendation that adolescents should leave the gathering by

⁷⁹ Lee, King Sung and Oh, Hyun Seok, "Let's Hold Pickets" "Never!". Split in the "Candlelight" at http://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2008/05/072008050700001.html. Accessed on March 1, 2011.

10:00 pm resonated with the commonsense idea of safety for the youth. Adults expressed their remorse and gratitude to teenaged students for their courageous initiation of the early gatherings without hiding or suppressing their indignation to social injustice. And yet, adults urged that the streets would not be a good place for students to congregate. They were instead urged to stay home and study hard for their chance at a better life.

Many students joked about the suggestion by claiming that they had to stay outside later than 10 pm for school work regardless. Teenager activists denounced adults for framing adolescents as minors in need of absolute protection and guidance by adults. ASUNARO, a student activist group, released an announcement on May 8 titled “Our concern, as human rights activists for adolescents, over the current protest against US beef”:

Recent street demonstrations revealed problematic attitudes toward adolescents by treating them not as equal political actors but those who must be protected. For instance, a popular chant, “Let’s Protect Our Children from Mad Cow [Disease]” signaled that grownups are entitled to decide what is safe on behalf of adolescents because of our ‘immaturity and weakness.’ [...] On top of that, groups or organizations that have hosted recent street rallies have frequently announced, “Minors could be placed in police custody if they did not bring a parental consent form” or “[We recommend] adolescents to voluntarily return home at 10 pm.” Of course, adolescents can exert their political rights without a parental consent form. Moreover, they can remain at the street rally after 10 pm if they want” (ASUNARO, May 8).

Alongside teenagers, various organizations and social groups added another layer to street gatherings from the very beginning of the Candlelight Protests. On May 6, about 1,500 activist groups, e.g., SMOs, civil society groups, non-governmental/non-profit groups (NGOs/NPOs), grassroots groups, including online communities (e.g., OURKOREA, ANTI-MB, etc.) and political parties, launched a national coalition in

favor of the candlelight vigils against the beef trade issue. The National Committee formulated a steering committee, taking over practical tasks for organizing and hosting candlelight vigils from May 9. Leaders of college student councils from 35 universities also formed their own coalition (Kyunghyang Shinmun 2008, 43-4). On May 12, a Korean housewife living in Atlanta, Georgia, participated in a discussion that aired nationwide, on the topic of whether US beef is safe to consume as stated by the Lee administration, and her presence was followed by an endorsement from Korean-American housewives (Ibid. 57-8).⁸⁰ Other overseas Korean associations also began to hold their own rallies with lit candles in their respective towns.

This heterogeneous composition of protesters, which are clearly discernible by sight, affected the ways in which candlelight protesters accepted ‘named’ groups, i.e., SMOs, on the streets. When the activist group ALTOGETHER handed out materials printed with its organization’s name and emblem on May 2, protest participants interpreted them as ‘propagandistic’ and ‘excessively political,’ which had to be avoided. As street events continued under the National Committee’s leadership, ALTOGETHER removed or minimized the size of its logos and branding from all materials. It also redesigned its promotional materials by imitating NANEUM’s designs, which protest participants more easily accepted as less political and more moderate. NANEUM, as a relatively less aggressive civil organization, introduced a set of ‘red-colored’ hand-held

⁸⁰ There was also a group that supported President Lee, named the Korean-American Federation of Los Angeles. A number of housewives reacted against its president, Mr. Nam, by releasing a statement: “Some Korean-American associations, which declared that US beef consumed by Korean-Americans is perfectly and unconditionally safe, distorted facts and public opinion [in Korea] by pretending to represent all overseas Koreans” (Lee, Kyung Tae. “Korean American Federation Distorted the Safety of US beef,” May 9, 2008. http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/view_at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0000896719&PAGE_CD=N0560, accessed on February 19, 2011).

signs that contained softened political expressions that militant activists would not have chosen. Further, its materials seemed to represent the desired message of teenaged students, such as “The Children Are Innocent. Shame on You [adults],” “Don’t Fool Me Because I Am Young. I’m a Citizen, Too!” Other SMOs began to distribute protest materials following NANEUM’s designs. And when candlelight participants held them in the street, it introduced visual uniformity to the gathering.

After the National Committee became the main host of candlelight vigils from May 9 onward, the early disputes over the legality of candlelight vigils diminished significantly, and the format of candlelight vigils became more routinized. Also, collaborating with local branches of SMOs, it became possible for simultaneous multi-city gatherings to be held on May 9 and onwards, alongside a large-scale gathering in Seoul (Kyunghyang Shinmoon 2008, 47).

In sum, the initial format of the 2008 Protests as candlelight vigils did not emerge in its final form at the outset. Nor was it straightforward in its developing process. The communication process online regarding the format of street gatherings alerted potential participants to seriously consider ways to align their commitment to different anonymous organizers of the gatherings, whose political stances and organizing tact were yet to be widely known. Instead of developing internal solidarity among different organizers as SMOs would do in the coalition-building process, such conflict between online communities was claimed to be resolved by invoking an exogenous factor, i.e., legality, in organizing and participating in collective action. As discussed above, however, the notion of legal protest materialized as candlelight vigils resulted in ambiguous outcomes involving politically ambivalent participants. It was powerful in reducing the threshold of

joining a street gathering by promising lower risks, but it also produced ambiguous frames that concatenated heterogeneous behavioral protocols such as being apolitical, cultural, and legal. In this regard, the emergence of the National Committee, which undertook the role of hosting candlelight vigils at a large scale, was helpful in reducing internal tension among different vigil organizers and stabilizing the format of candlelight vigils.

Albas online

And yet, the National Committee's role also came with unexpected outcomes, both positive and negative. On one hand, the National Committee's involvement won over a larger and broader range of individuals and groups, under the assumption that the National Committee's vigils would be legal as well as nonviolent. The scale of its vigils gradually grew bigger to include a variety of programs for participants. Although the National Committee did not claim to be the leader of the entire movement, over time they were often regarded as such by being called "the organizing party." On the other hand, the National Committee differed from the previous organizers because of their style of online communication and organizing. Compared to ANTI-MB, where the whole community was open to its members as well as outside observers, the National Committee's internal communication process, mainly in its steering committee, was closed to candlelight participants. The steering committee mainly announced and distributed information on upcoming candlelight vigils such as the date and location, and brief description of activities for participants. From the perspective of online communication enthusiasts who continued to discuss the future direction of candlelight

vigils, this closed communication complicated matters in terms of when and how to adopt new tactics in order to cope with changing situations over time.

On top of that, anonymous communication was facing a new challenge, as street gatherings continued. Firstly, compared to the vigils where participants had more chances to foster a sense of solidarity, anonymous communication remained the same as it was before. It was open to anyone, i.e., both opponents and proponents of the Candlelight Protests. For those who wished online communication to afford constructive deliberation over the candlelight vigils, anonymity was not a significantly positive factor, particularly in cases of getting involved in disputes. As the dispute between ANTI-MB and OURKOREA had not reached its conclusion, online communication still lacked a definitive decision-making process. Amid this concern, some digital media users were referred to as *alba*, defined as individuals who fake their support for the Candlelight Protests while distributing unproductive and unconstructive ideas. Although the term *alba* in Korean usually connotes a part-time worker, this new online slang earned a derogatory note by implying that some people were posting for a paid agenda, as opposed to participating sincerely. *Nonick*'s post on May 4 on Agora,⁸¹ after the first two candlelight vigils, expressed such concerns:

Nine Ways to Identify *Alba*

One who deliberately abuses specific terms such as lefty (*jwa ppal*), Roh fanatics (*Roh ppa*⁸²), and commies, on news articles on against the beef [trade].

One who disparages *candlelight protests* as meaningless because the majority of participants are kids (school kids) who know nothing.

⁸¹ Available at <http://bbs1.agora.media.daum.net/gaia/do/debate/read?bbsId=D003&articleId=519018>.

⁸² Roh fanatics is a derogatory term to denote avid supporters of the late President Roh Moo-hyun, the predecessor of President Lee.

One who refers to *regional resentment*⁸³ with the aim to divide people.

One who asserts the safety of U.S. beef with no reasonable reasons.

One who claims crowd psychology or internet hysteria to be more frightening than Mad Cow disease.

One who says that they eat U.S. beef because Korean beef is not safe from Mad Cow disease either.

One who deviates from the discussion by clinging to trifling issues such as “SRMs (Specified Risk Materials) will be removed from cattle older than 30 months,” or “the beef trade would not be completely opened to foreign markets.”

One who requests scientific evidence to disprove the safety of U.S. beef (very similar position to No. 4).

One who calls for attention to posts claimed to be written by a former *alba* hired by the Grand National Party⁸⁴ (*Nonick*, May 4).

In terms of ways to avoid a post written out of malicious intention to impede the integrity of candlelight protesters, *Nonick* mentions five rhetorical points (numbers 1, 2, 3, 5, and 9 on the list). According to *Nonick*, candlelight opponents downplayed and disparaged candlelight participants by associating them with existing political frames. Supporters of the late President Roh and progressives were derided as Roh fanatics and leftists. Regional resentment has long been the backbone of political power games in Korea, as it associated people’s birthplace with their political attitudes to categorically draw oppositional lines among the Korean population. In addition to those preexisting

⁸³ In Korea, one of the long-lasting regional resentments include a tendency to stigmatize people from Jeolla-do in contemporary politics at least since the May 18 Democratization Movement of 1980 against the military dictatorship, which was brutally suppressed by airborne troops dispatched under martial law after blockading Gwangju, the capital city of Jeollanam-do, and by announcing to the rest of the country that armed forces from North Korea had incited a riot to destroy South Korea. In extension to anti-communism and anti-North Korea sentiments as part of collective memory since the Korean war, the Democratization Movements of the 1980s has been at the center of Korean politics concerning regime changes, as well as political and cultural rhetoric.

⁸⁴ The Grand National Party was then the ruling party in Korea in 2008.

political slangs, *Nonick* mentions that *alba* often portray candlelight participants as people who are easily manipulated by unreliable rumors circulated online. *Nonick*'s point is that posts including the listed traits should not be taken seriously, because such posts are only intended to incite and humiliate candlelight participants.

This concern was not resolved easily. Rather, similar alerts proliferated. A list of suspicious users based on their post history was circulated, and disputes between ordinary users and those labeled as *alba* continued to appear. And yet, the very need to single out suspicious parties in anonymous communication demonstrated an emerging sense of internal solidarity, or at least the increasing importance thereof, across digital platforms, although exposing suspect users was not the optimal method to this end.

Conclusion

This chapter has found that, astonishingly, non-violent, less politicized, and orderly street gatherings stemmed from dissents on whether coordinating acts online and offline would be similar in its process. OURKOREA saw few disparities in online and offline domains as social spaces for collective action. Gathering together on the streets was supposed to be nearly indistinguishable from logging in on a digital platform. Candlelight proponents would attend the street gatherings, and they would behave in a way to make their claim seen and heard publicly. A concern would be how to encourage people to show up on the streets, instead of posting alone at home.

OURKOREA's approach displayed unacceptable naivete to ANTI-MB. Unlike digital interactions, protests have long occupied a place in institutionalized frameworks

such as law and politics, which can be imposed on any occasion of street gatherings regardless of their cause. ANTI-MB leaders explicitly advocated compliance with the ADA. Instead of arguing the ADA's potential unconstitutionality in hampering citizens' rights to assemble and demonstrate, ANTI-MB leaders embraced the limits set by the ADA as the behavioral standards for candlelight participants. It was thought that the objectives of candlelight events were better served by remaining lawful and securing their public presence outside digital platforms. Such decision partly stemmed from their own past experiences with the police as a small group presenting an unpopular cause, before the beef trade issue suddenly granted it a greater membership base. Growing into one of the most influential online communities at the transitory moment of the Candlelight Protests, however, transformed its repertoires and priority of its original cause. And, ironically, ANTI-MB became eager to sow and spread the idea that candlelight participants should exercise caution in deciding their collaborators on the streets, and by extension, on digital platforms. Voluntariness did not mean one's complete self-motivation, whose discretion would be acknowledged as a result. Rather, voluntariness was aligning with others by being alert to fellow participants to protect themselves and their coordinated acts.

This chapter's findings present a few takeaway points. Firstly, the analysis of the disputes between the two online communities requires more attention to the role of dissent in the course of coordinating action via digital interactions. This point has been frequently neglected due to the emphasis on voluntary participation in its lexical meaning in conjunction with another preposition that the formation of in-group relations relies on agreement and consensus rather than disagreement and dissent. Therefore, it is not

surprising to find that oppositional relations between contenders and their target or between contenders and their opponents have received more attention in the literature of social movement studies (Gould 2003a). And yet, as discussed above, to understand the role of digital interactions in the course of forming collective action requires different sets of questions as to how in-group relations are forged, particularly through loose connections one can easily create, join, and leave. Moreover, those involved in digital interactions can never be assumed to have the same level of attachment to fledgling in-group relations, and the same type of rationales to appreciate the meaning of the emerging relations. In other words, the analysis in this chapter urges further research on the formative process of in-group relations, which require the same amount of attention to both inter-group and interpersonal interactions.

By extension, this discussion also urges further research on the roles of the layouts of digital platforms regarding how disagreements and dissents are understood, which grounds further actions. Regarding this matter, I regarded anonymity as a core constitutive factor upon which digital platforms are based. With the absence of cues that could be used as a reference for evaluating the quality of the opinions, quantified ranking systems such as the number of views and replies became a technical replacement to forge and distribute prestige only partially.

It should be considered here is that the same logic is applicable to digital platforms as well. The distribution of attention on an issue is less likely to be comprehensive across digital platforms because of the mere fact that there is a diverse array of digital platforms at almost all times, whose constituencies would have paid less attention to opinions that are extremely predominant somewhere else. Differences can

remain as differences, unless the differences are framed as an issue awaiting certain decisions. In other words, ‘different opinions’ proposed by ANTI-MB and OURKOREA turned into disputes in part because the former began to urge that certain evaluative decisions should be made in relation to the task at hand, i.e., street gatherings. In this regard, ANTI-MB’s appeal was stronger due to its invocation of the law, with which it could link each prospective member’s rights and duties as citizens, which resultantly made the upcoming protests legitimate exercises of citizenship. OURKOREA’s appeal to digital media users’ sincerity did not have a counterargument to ANTI-MB’s invocation of legality, even though this did not necessarily mean that OURKOREA supported illegal and violent tactics.

In this regard, the Candlelight Protests were in the middle of building protest repertoires, which was “outsourced” to the law. How, then, were the repertoires implemented on the streets, where contingencies were often a possibility, as ANTI-MB asserted? This is a task for the following chapter.

Chapter 5 Internal Strife and Illegal Protests

Introduction

In the previous two chapters I demonstrated that the claims and repertoires of the Candlelight Protests were shaped by dissonance, diversity, and debates in different digital platforms over what protests should look like. The claims of the Candlelight Protests were rarely fixated on concerns over mad cow disease and vCJD, despite their ostensible presence in protest chants. Its salience and breadth cannot be comprehended without reference to its role as a thematic broker of other issues. Voluntary participation had emergent contexts beyond its lexical meaning, self-directed participation, neither being forced nor manipulated by propagandists. This connotation was pervasive, and yet, it shored up solidarity when it was anchored at the intersection of individuals' anonymity, shaping digital interactions and their palpable presence on the streets as a presumed collective. Voluntariness expressed through digital anonymity was initially a source of prolific suggestions. Dissents on protest repertoires for fledgling street gatherings thus disclosed a tension between what it should look like and how it should be prepared. This rift was alleviated by adopting the idea of lawful resistance, which imbued voluntary participation with a normative basis, cognizant of the prudence of acting within the terms of the ADA.

This chapter examines how the legality discourse changed in the first month of street gatherings. On this occasion, my analysis uses dynamic semantic analysis of digital

interactions to specify the changing understanding of legality as a core concept of the candlelight repertoire. In so doing, I limit the analytic scope to digital posts generated on ANTI-MB for May 2008. Adopting this constraint warrants an explanation.

ANTI-MB is by no means representative of the numerous digital platforms involved in the Candlelight Protests. In addition, my investigation of a collection of posts on ANTI-MB does not assume that its contributors arrived at a unanimous consensus on various matters. The reason it makes a good case is that it deliberately grafted legality onto the core logistics of street gatherings by deliberately deferring its own political cause, i.e., impeaching the sitting president, from the outset of the Candlelight Protests. This was mainly due to the lack of conviction in the degree of solidarity among digital media users, whose resilience and political attitudes were unknown at the time. To preclude any unpredictable disruptions from within, ANTI-MB set the initial tone of the Candlelight Protests as political action by crowds without being political. Given that ANTI-MB was well known as the home of the legality repertoire at the outset of the Candlelight Protests, this chapter traces its collection of digital posts on the matter (see Chapter 2 regarding this collection for more details).

In addition, this chapter focuses on May 2008 as a crucial period of the Candlelight Protests in terms of how the idea of a legal protest was translated into practical activities at the intersection of digital interactions and street gatherings. In May, protesters developed the legality repertoire that had previously existed as ideas online. As soon as street events were held, they were subject to immediate self-assessment on the extent to which those were commensurate with their expectations. They also began to react to and predict the actions of the authorities. These talks pertaining to organizational

tasks related to growing interests in projecting goals and methods. Two episodes from May 2008 epitomize these developments. The first episode reveals how candlelight participants scaled up their prior perception of themselves on the streets as the actual protests unfolded. The second episode more directly concerns disputes over the employment of aggressive tactics, confronting negative reactions from the target, i.e., the Lee administration. Brief vignettes of the two episodes will help to clarify the research question of this chapter.

A Steering Meeting on May 16

On May 16, candlelight celebrities affirmed their commitment to digital interactions by convening before a camera to online stream their meeting, titled “Netizens Discuss New Activism Beyond Candlelight Vigils.”⁸⁵ Most participants went by their digital platform usernames. Mr. Paik of MICHINSO and *Sisyph* of OURKOREA moderated the meeting, monitoring a live chat room for viewers. The meeting was also attended by a staff member from the National Committee. The agenda was to brainstorm the future of the 15-day-old candlelight gatherings, reflecting on their strengths and weaknesses. Many counted the very first vigil on May 2 as the ideal model that should be revisited.

Theindependencearmy, a middle-aged man associated with an online community that had expressed its interests in the legislative dimension of policymaking, stated his opinion as follows:

⁸⁵ https://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/mov_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=ME00005587. This link is no longer available as of 2015. I transcribed and translated the meeting for the duration of approximately an hour.

[Protest] Finance has been a dire challenge. Every candlelight vigil roughly costs ten to twenty million Korean won (the equivalent of ten to twenty thousand US dollars). There is no other way but to solicit donations from participants [on the site]. [...] [Current] programs are designed to install one large-scale stage [as the focus of attention], equipped with audio and lighting facilities.... I think this format is problematic. It is costly. It makes people passive [audiences]. It confines people to a planned direction of movement and alienates them. [...] People took to the streets voluntarily, so they should have been able to enjoy the candlelight vigils under full exercise of voluntariness. [...] Why don't we have multiple one-ton pick-up trucks with a moderator and provide an amplifier each for seven to eight lines of people? ... If they're decentralized enough, the candlelight protests will ward off suspicion from the police and conservative news organizations, which have frantically sought to identify hidden indoctrinators or propagandists behind our movement, or cast doubts about [the transparent use of] donations. ... I wish to have a protest that is not costly, enables citizens to act more voluntarily, and allows more interactions. Such a protest would not require a "lead opinion" [representing the protests], which I think should not even exist when people take to the streets voluntarily (*Theindependencearmy*, May 16).

Theindependencearmy's opinions are neither optimistic nor complimentary. He expresses concerns over a paradox that transforms voluntary participation into passive attendance. This phenomenon stems from the centralization caused by the format of street gatherings, which market "protests" similarly to an outdoor music concert. To serve the audience's experiences at a concert, metaphorically speaking, the organizers must tend to the quality of the equipment, which imposes the burden of costs, should the audience enjoy the event for free and appear reluctant to make monetary contributions. Singing songs together, sharing personal stories and opinions on the stage, and shouting chants together have become a distinct program for protests. When programs are run as planned, audiences (i.e., protesters) remain calm on the ground with candles to be lit during the gathering. Physical movements of the audiences are largely limited by engaging with programs and the civil decency of being mindful against dripping wax that can damage others' belongings or burn their eyelids. Calm and respectful audiences, so the idea goes, are not

likely to incur penalties for violations of the ADA. However, here is the problem: protests orchestrated this way are likely to be less effective as a means of resistance due to the enforced docility and passivity of the audience.

To conclude, *Theindependencearmy* advocates a return to the initial stage, with greater focus on voluntariness and diversity. Diversity can be materialized with multiple smaller stages in the street, which would also alleviate financial burdens.⁸⁶ Moreover, those multiple centers of activity would guide participants to interact by transitioning from one activity to another, which would encourage new discourses. A tradeoff would be the loss of the representative and coherent claims of the Candlelight Protests as a whole. *Theindependencearmy* asserts that such thing should never have been part of a protest of voluntary participants from the outset.

Theindependencearmy was not alone at the meeting in voicing such an opinion. Many others also pointed out the diminishing voluntariness and liveliness of the street gatherings. It was mentioned that the excessive frequency of gatherings within a short period of time may have caused fatigue among participants. A consensus thus emerged on the urgent need to devise new programs to reinvigorate existing, worn-out programs. Some proposed to diversify the kinds of tactics carried out by individuals regardless of their whereabouts. Some urged equal attention to the legislative process to reap substantial outcomes through votes in the Korean National Assembly. Boycott campaigns targeting conservative newspapers seemed to present a promising route to follow. Some

⁸⁶ According to the report published by the National Committee in 2009, there were civil lawsuits filed by businesspeople whose stores were in the vicinity of candlelight vigils, demanding monetary compensation amounting to about three million dollars. The Seoul District Police also sued the National Committee to compensate for injuries and material damages caused by the Candlelight Protests. The City of Seoul charged about twenty thousand dollars as the fee for using Seoul Square (National Committee, 2009, 5).

minor suggestions deserve attention as well. One suggested abandoning the act of holding candles, should it erode the sacrosanct commitment to voluntariness. The possibility of employing more aggressive tactics was raised. In addition, a lawyer from Lawyers for Democratic Society (Minbyun) mentioned the unconstitutionality of the ADA itself. However, these voices remained ambient ideas without further resonance.

Street Marches on May 24 and 25

On the day following the steering meeting, a candlelight vigil was held in Seoul in the very format rejected by *The Independence Army* and others, recording an unprecedented level of participation by sixty thousand people (National Committee 2009). This gathering influenced President Lee's special speech delivered on May 22, whose equivocally apologetic voice offered a lukewarm apology for the public discontent expressed on the street against his new administration with a roundabout rejection of the expressed discontent. The speech was interpreted as a repudiation of the claims presented at the gathering. Two days later, on May 24, candlelight participants were placed under arrest for the first time:

Over the weekend, 'street demonstrators' who marched across central Seoul rose as the eye of the storm. The police arrested those who left the vigil to occupy the road while shouting anti-government chants until dawn. This scene starkly contrasted with the May 2 vigil. The Lee administration appeared to instigate hardline protesters by signaling that there would be no renegotiation [on the beef trade issue with the United States] [...] Despite the split between those who stayed and held candles as usual and those who occupied the road, it was incomparable with past violent protests that saw wooden bars and Molotov cocktails [in protesters' hands]. [...] A quarrel involving about 3,000 people started in the afternoon on May 24. Some contended that nothing could be achieved with candles alone. At 9:00 pm, about 500 people took to their feet, flocked into the road, and marched until 4:00 am of the following day. They were

dispersed forcefully with 37 people arrested. In contrast, those who remained at the vigil voluntarily dispersed [much earlier] as usual. [...] On May 25, the National Committee, which led the preceding vigils until then, reiterated, "It's a situation we [the National Committee] can do nothing about." A halfhearted decision was made, if it could even be called a decision; "March if you want. Stay if you want" (Kyunghyang Shinmun 2008, 77-78).

According to the above excerpt from a progressive newspaper article, the candlelight protesters of May 24 reached no collective decision through which they could have aligned in pursuit of a uniform action. Some joined an expedient street demonstration aimed at the Blue House, located half an hour away on foot. The demonstrators were halted, detained, and dispersed by the police. Others at the vigil site ensured a controlled event, as usual. In between the two groups of participants, the National Committee, having assumed the role of representative organizer for the candlelight gatherings, neither expressed its own position nor supported the demonstrators, though they were pressured to do both. There was no group or individual that could have stepped into the dispute, willingly and/or with legitimacy, to make decisions on behalf of the protesters. At this moment, the ADA seemed to lose its restraining force, at least in relation to those who outspokenly promoted greater aggression with rebukes of the candlelight vigils.

These two episodes demonstrate that the candlelight participants became exposed to various situations that were clearly at odds with their own ideas prior to the gatherings. The preclusion of illegality in collective action seemed to newly develop a relationship among leaders (i.e., online communities) and the led. Diversifying protest repertoires was quickly framed as internal strife, though few solutions emerged to coerce certain decisions from all participants. In the rest of this chapter, I trace the semantic trajectory

of the notion of ‘illegality,’ as a proxy for measuring changes in the meaning of legal protests. The selected notion of ‘illegality’ reflects the discussion in Chapter 4 that the emphasis on ‘legal protests’ was often expressed in preventive tones and expressions. The following section introduces dynamic semantic network analysis at length as well as a periodization scheme to create sub-collections of digital posts. The third section reports the subsequent findings quantitatively and qualitatively, which demonstrates how digital interactions that reflected both ongoing protests and experiences of past democratization movements contributed to the divergence in the meanings of the legality repertoire. This chapter concludes with the suggestion of semantic network analysis as a tool to investigate the intersection of online and offline domains.

Analytic Strategies: Digital Interactions and Semantic Analysis

This section introduces the analytic framework employed in this chapter, which aims to generate semantic networks that are specialized presenting word clusters that are added to a focus term over time. This approach utilizes the technique of extracting a forward path in dynamic network analysis to identify the process of network formation by examining the addition of new nodes and ties over time.⁸⁷ The intended analysis can be likened to the following hypothetical situation: When a group of people starts a conversation on Topic A, how it might end is often open-ended. Topic B may be triggered while discussing Topic A. Then, Topic C can enter the ongoing conversation because it is

⁸⁷ This technique is also good to zoom in at a specific node, i.e., the focus term in this chapter, by allowing to cluster newly added nodes to it directly and indirectly within a given period of time. In other words, the technique helps to find and cluster terms, whose distance from the focus term are the same, i.e., terms placed at the structurally same position.

relevant to Topic B. The conversation can eventually result in a temporal patchwork of Topics A, B, and C that emerge over time. Topic C would have not appeared if Topic B had not been mentioned earlier, for instance. The transition from Topic A to Topics B and then C may simply be a distraction. Or, it can be how the diffusion of ideas takes place, where diffusion is defined not as transferring an idea “in its original content and form,” but as a transformative and interpretive process (e.g., extension or reduction) of the original idea. If so, it would be interesting to specify Topic B as a broker between Topics A and C, which creates an interpretive turning point in the conversation.

This analytic strategy can be translated as a substantive research question pursued in this chapter: How was the legality repertoire further developed as street gatherings were taking place? Using the above hypothetical conversation, Topic A is set as the legality repertoire, while Topics B and C are emerging topics. I chose the notion of ‘illegality’ as a representative term of the legality repertoire. This is because the repertoire was often mentioned in precautionary and even preventive tones to preclude certain acts and ideas, as discussed in Chapter 4. Intended semantic networks in this plan will help to identify (1) what terms are directly associated with the focus term; (2) whether those terms change over time, reflecting the unfolding situations on the streets and the flow of communication online; and (3) what terms are used as “brokers,” as in Topic B, which will be referred to as link terms. In so doing, semantic networks are visualized as an emerging structure on an ordinal scale of time in a given time interval.

To achieve the sophistication of semantic networks, which outline the paths forward from a focus term within a given period of time (see Tables 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 with Figures 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9), the remainder of this section unpacks each step that was

followed. Firstly, I present how a single post consisting of an initial post and its replies can be constructed into a dynamic semantic network. Secondly, I introduce how multiple sets of posts can be investigated simultaneously. Thirdly, I discuss how link terms can be specified and interpreted in light of this chapter's goal to explain the development of the legality repertoire.

A Single Sequence of Digital Interaction

A post consists of terms, and receives replies (RPs) from other users. Given that the first post is replied by others, I label it as an initial post (IP), and an IP and RP consists of a sequence of interaction. To construct the sequence as a semantic network, terms are extracted from an IP or a RP respectively. The terms are considered be tied to each other if they are used in the same post as either an IP or RP. The different between an IP and its RPs is the timing of their appearance: RPs cannot precede an IP. To reflect time stamps, each term was tagged with information extracted from its origin, such as (1) a full time marker with date and time, (2) author, (3) post number that indicate a set of an IP and its RPs from other sets, and (4) whether it comes from an initial post (IP) or replies (RP). Each term ends up having two timestamps that mark their presence and ending, which can be flexibly adjusted. Firstly, it has its own presence point using the original time marker. Secondly, its ending point is indexed by the time of the last reply, which was assigned to all terms that are incorporated into the same semantic network.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ This coding scheme assumes that terms that come later are influenced by terms that come earlier. This coding scheme reflects common practices in digital interactions, where people tend to read posts published earlier before replying to others and writing their own posts. In other words, semantic networks developed here are sensitive to a boundary, which determines how many posts are considered (i.e., a single post or multiple posts) and what is the unit of time (i.e., a day or several days), because of the ending point.

A set of an IP and its RPs is considered as an evolving network that gains terms as nodes over time. Nodes that are co-present in an IP or in a RP were directly tied to one another.⁸⁹ Then, RP's terms are added to the IP in order of time. If a first RP shares a term with the IP, it is directly linked to the IP via the shared term, which now makes the IP as a network representing the IP and the first RP. A second RP can be linked to the new network, if it shares terms with either the IP or the first RP. This process is repeated until RPs are exhausted (also see Table 2.4, Figures 2.5, and 2.6).⁹⁰ Note that this additive process does not drop terms that are never shared with other terms that are already available. To understand this analytic strategy, it is helpful to review two semantic networks presented in Figure 5.1, which depicts two digital posts.

[Figure 5.1 to be inserted here]

A post portrayed in Figure 5.1(a) received fifteen replies, fourteen of which were posted within five minutes after the publication of the initial post, while the last reply was posted in an hour. The first interval of time ($t=1-2$) encompasses the terms of the initial post, which are completely linked to each other, creating an inextricable intertwinement. In the next interval ($t=1.75-2.75$), this intertwinement expands by gaining a new reply that shares a term with it, and four replies that do not share terms with either other replies

⁸⁹ To reiterate, my coding strategy can be described as follows. An initial post is published at time 1, and its replies will be published at different times after time 1. In other words, the origins of nodes can be distinguished by their time stamps.

⁹⁰ It may seem uncertain how a term that has already appeared in a post is used later in another post. In constructing a network, terms shared in a given set of digital posts were identified first, preventing their categorization as different terms (also see Table 2.4, where terms are arranged in chronological order). This will be discussed at length in the following section, where link terms are discussed.

or the newly annexed part. Thus, the two-component intertwinement in Figure 5.1(a) can develop continually, should later replies contain terms that have already been used by the IPs or earlier replies. The semantic network of Figure 5.1(a) ultimately contains a growing intertwinement with islands. At time interval 2.5- 3.5, newly-added replies change the structure of the existing network to a hairball that combines three components with five islands. At time interval 4.75-5.75, the hairball resembles a tree, which indicates that newly-added terms from replies share terms with earlier replies, not with the IP. Figure 5.1(b) shows another group of an IP and ten RPs that intermittently appeared over the duration of nine and a half hours. Unlike Figure 5.1(a), Figure 5.1(b) contains more vibrant interactions among the replies than between the replies and the initial post. In sum, these two semantic structures illustrate a sequence of interaction between an IP and RPs by tracing shared terms in chronological order.

Despite its illustrative stage, Figure 5.1 shows challenges and potentials in drawing a semantic network. Firstly, the degree of overlapping words between an initial post and its replies can vary. The ratio is often surprisingly low, which resultantly generates isolates. It depends on the terms brought in by repliers to lace their understanding of earlier posts into their interpretation, which yields various communicative outcomes such as reinforcement, misunderstanding, repetition, approval, and more. This feature demands caution in translating sprawling digital interactions into semantic networks configured through a specific analytic scheme. Isolates in Figure 5.1 thus do not signify the absence of any semantic contribution. Rather, they indicate different types of contributions, which are undervalued in the current coding scheme. Therefore, the islands in Figure 5.1 do not indicate that some repliers go off topic

completely. Instead, they visualize the features of a chosen analytic scheme (see Chapter 2 for more details).⁹¹ For the analysis below, I retained all of the islands.

Secondly, the structure of a semantic network can also vary depending on how terms are shared. Structurally speaking, Figure 5.1(a) and 5.1(b) appear quite different. The initial post of 5.1(a) depicted at time 1-2 results in a relatively massive component whose branches continue to spread. It indicates that later repliers semantically joined the ongoing communication by using other repliers' terms that were already tied to the initial post (see the change from time 4-5 to time 4.75-5.75). Figure 5.1(b), however, shows a different development of a semantic network. Its initial post at time 0-1.1 does not change structurally until time 6-7.1, though replies continue to be posted. Then the change at time 6-7.1 to the initial post remains until the last reply is posted at time 10.5-11.6. In other words, an initial post can demonstrate varying semantic structures depending on how repliers respond to it as well as other repliers.

Thirdly, the analysis of a single sequence of digital interactions presented in Figure 5.1 is not fully suitable for the aim of this chapter, since it overlooks the vibrancy of digital platforms: There are many initial posts published at a similar point of time. Repliers who are about to react to Post A may have already read other initial posts, which can affect their word choice, which is oriented to Post A. For instance, a user who writes a reply about illegal tactics may refer to individuals who tended to participate in street gatherings, which she would garner from reading other posts. In other words, it is crucial

⁹¹ For example, replies might have their own templates. Repeated numerals in replies (e.g., 22222, 33333), indicating the order of one's expression of agreement have been used as a concise expression of approval and agreement to the initial post to which these intend to respond. Or, one might consider a 'like' button in the same semantic function, which conveys a certain meaning but it is difficult to code for the purpose of analysis.

to incorporate multiple sequences of interactions in semantic networks simultaneously, using refined methods yielding enhanced interpretability.

Multiple Digital Posts

To accommodate multiple threads of digital interactions simultaneously and enable a more focused interpretation, I devised a two-dimensional semantic field presented in Figure 5.2. The X-axis indicates time in order to register the appearance of terms over time horizontally, and the Y-axis charts how terms are shared over time as discussed with Figure 5.1. A stark difference between Figure 5.1 and the semantic field is that it has a focal point where the X and Y axes meet on the bottom left. It reflects my substantive goal for this chapter, aiming to discern how the notion of illegality was used at different point of time and extended further. Figure 5.2 schematizes three possible cases.

[Figure 5.2 to be inserted here]

[Figure 5.3 to be inserted here]

In Figure 5.2, Case [A] has an initial post that contains the focus term, which places its IP at the left bottom, though its replies do not. Those replies, i.e., the terms extracted from the replies, are only connected to the focus term via their initial post. For Case [C], one can consider a sequence of digital interactions where both the initial post and replies contain the focus term. Therefore, all terms are placed at the closest distance from the focus term, but they are distributed widely along the X-axis. Case [B] shows a

hypothetical initial post that does not contain the focus term, whereas one of its replies does. This is the reason Case [B]’s initial post should appear on the far left on the X-axis but at a higher position than the reply on the Y-axis.

Figure 5.3 presents a segment of a semantic network, which is fully explained below, and shows all Cases [A], [B], and [C]. Its X-axis registers the passage of time from left to right, in chronological order. To reiterate, Figure 5.3 shows terms appeared from a 400th to 500th time interval, which is from May 7 at 18:32 pm through May 10 at 13:21 pm, if they are linked directly or indirectly to the focus term. The numbers attached to IPs and RPs indicate their origination from the same sequence of interactions, and do not reflect their time stamps.⁹² The Y-axis shows how terms are linked back to the focus term by placing them at different steps. Steps indicate whether presented terms are used with the focus term in the same post. Terms placed higher than Step 1 are terms that are added because they are linked to terms from the same post containing the focus term.⁹³ For instance, IP48 is placed at the farthest point from the focus term, compared to its own replies that are found at Steps 2 and 3. This can happen if these replies share terms with other posts to which they did not intend to reply.

Another difference from Figure 5.1 that should be mentioned is time stamps. For Figure 5.1, a time unit was taken from time 1 when an initial post was published, and the time when the last reply was posted. Once terms are used, they all have the same ending

⁹² In other words, rp93 appears earlier than ip53, though its numbers may seem to indicate the opposite. The numbers indicate a post number.

⁹³ Returning to the hypothetical conversation setting mentioned in the previous section, terms that are placed at Steps 1 and 2 can be likened to Topics B and C, which are triggered in the course of the conversation on Topic A. Those topics are expressed with certain sets of terms. In this regard, Figure 5.3 shows which terms extracted from Topic B were used by Topic C.

point, reflecting the fact that repliers can read all earlier posts. In a similar vein, to draw Figures 5.2 and 5.3, its time scale was recoded to take the initial point from the first post in a given corpus, and the last point from the last post. Therefore, the current semantic analysis remains an insufficient tool without elaborating on a concrete collection of digital interactions, whose boundaries can enormously influence the structure and content of the resultant semantic networks.

This schematic dynamic analysis underscores three points. Firstly, the meaning of the notion of illegality can be interpreted depending the time of its appearance. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 place the focus term at the axes' intersection, assuming it as the initial point of time. Then, terms that occur with it in the same post are presented at Step 1 on the Y-axis at different points on the X-axis. Although it may seem nonsensical to place the focus term at Step 0 and the terms originating from the same post as it does at 1, it is valid because, other than that, it is difficult to mark different points of time when the focus notion is used.⁹⁴ In other words, this presentation of semantic networks may provide insight on whether the focus term meant something different depending on the time of its appearance.

Secondly, terms placed at the same step have the same “distance” from the focus term. In terms of the Y-axis, steps are no longer limited to a single sequence of an IP and RPs. It is because now terms can appear at the same point of time in Figure 5.3 and at a different point on the Y-axis regardless of the origins of the terms, if they are linked to

⁹⁴ The distinction between Steps 0 and 1 is quite intuitive, if one envisions a network of people. If Person A's network is of interest, Person A should be placed at Step 0, then Person B, who directly interacts with her, would be placed at Step 1. Person C interacts with B, then he would be added to Person B, which establishes his indirect connection to Person A. In this hypothetical network, the three people are independent of one another, but may appear confusing with regard to terms.

the focus term directly or indirectly. A noteworthy effect of this is that the presented terms along the Y-axis can tell us a semantic structure, particularly what terms “mediate” the legality repertoire and other topics. Given that terms were initially coded to contain their original post, the outputs interpreted below contain lots of word clusters as seen in Figures 5.5 and 5.6(a). This idea allows the examination of, for instance, what terms were closer to the notion of illegality during the first week of May compared to later in time to specify changes to the meaning of the legality repertoire over time.

Thirdly, this analysis provides greater insight into link terms, alongside which the focus term extends its breadth of meaning: Which terms contribute to the extension of the meaning of “legality”? I suggest to cluster link terms by their co-presence on steps. For instance, terms (or posts) are clustered as a combination if they all appear exclusively at Steps 1 and 2, rather than at Steps 1, 2, and 3. An underlying idea behind this clustering is as follows: Terms that appear together on a particular step are structurally similar, and therefore potentially semantically similar, in the sense that their connections originate from a sequence of an IP and replies. This clustering, found in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, as well as Figures 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9, will assist the comprehension of the implication of link terms. The following section introduces a collection of posts used for the semantic analysis.

Periodization

As usual in network analysis, the boundary of a given network requires close attention, as it becomes more important in an analysis of dynamics in the evolution and transformation of networks. For this chapter, collections of posts were created in two ways. Firstly, daily

semantic networks were created for the 31 days of May 2008 in the same way as conducted in Chapter 3. In addition, the month was split into three periods, using reactions from the Lee administration as dividers. The first divider is the postponement of the official schedule to implement the new inspection standards, which was originally set to May 15. The second is President Lee's special speech on the ongoing candlelight protests on May 22. The periodization scheme presumes that reactions from the target affect how protesters adjust repertoires accordingly (Steinberg 1998, 1999). This section summarizes all three periods in reference to daily papers, a report published by the National Committee in 2009, and two reports published by Lawyers for Democratic Society (Minbyun) in 2010 and 2018.

[Figure 5.4 to be inserted here]

May 1 ~ 14: Growth of the Candlelight Protests

During this period, the Candlelight Protests grew rapidly in size and were attended by thousands of people on average. This quantitative growth is in part attributable to the National Committee as it took over logistical tasks related to hosting street gatherings since May 6, which in itself brought about 1,800 civic and social movement organizations on board. The National Committee also opened a website, through which press releases were regularly published and schedules of gatherings were announced ahead of time. The takeover was partial, however. Many allied groups of the National Committee, including online communities, were able to host their own events independently or in coordination with other groups. The cargo drivers' union announced

solidarity with candlelight participants by announcing its refusal to transport U.S. beef products. Its participation was about a month earlier than other national labor unions. Teenaged students, especially female students, eagerly attended street gatherings, which triggered more conspicuous intervention from the Ministry of Education to more actively deter student participation than the police. Mothers with younger children consistently participated in the gatherings alongside other participants with their family members.

In facing an unusual type of collective action that spanned across the Internet and the streets, the Lee administration became preoccupied with provisional solutions implemented through various government agencies. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) released factsheets to correct misinformation and rumors among widely-circulated information on mad cow disease and vCJD. Gong Jeong-taek, head of the Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education, denounced political instigators who Gong alleged to have spread incendiary words targeting secondary school students under the cloak of digital anonymity to entice them to street gatherings. On May 8, Minister Hahn Seung-soo delivered an address on the beef trade issue, saying

We will request a meeting for renegotiation [with the United States on the beef trade], should new circumstances emerge. In the meantime, we will monitor beef trade negotiations between other countries and the United States (re-cited from Kyunghyang Shinmoon, 2008. p. 44).

In addition, Mr. Hahn mentioned that any illegal protests fomenting social disruption and unrest should be strictly punished (Ibid. 45). An envoy was sent to the U.S. to inspect a number of slaughter houses and meat packing facilities whose products were supposed to be imported into Korea. To this point, the Lee administration did not officially consider

postponing the implementation of the inspection standards, originally set to May 15. However, it was reluctantly forced by the MAFF to respond to 334 opinions and questions regarding the impending policy change according to the law (Ibid. 55). This change was also interpreted as a gesture to respond to a scandal debunked on May 11 that the MAFF made mistakes in translating the US Federal Register into Korean.⁹⁵

May 15 ~ 21: Consecutive Street Gatherings and Selective Repression

During the second period, which started with the official postponement of the beef policy, street gatherings developed into routines to some extent and received more rebukes, suspicion, and disparagement from conservative politicians and pundits including right-leaning news organizations as well as law enforcement officials. These adverse reactions targeted younger students and adolescents, who were also avid digital media users. Some students were investigated by police officers, as well as at school for their participation in street gatherings. When the police announced their intent to interrogate *Andante*, the author of the impeachment petition mentioned in Chapter 4, digital media users started a self-surrender campaign by claiming that they were all *Andante*. To discourage and deter, if possible, the engagement of secondary school students, teachers were dispatched to public transport stations near gathering sites to turn the students back home on the days of candlelight gatherings. Schools sent out text

⁹⁵ “The [Korean] government explained that “Cows younger than 30 months old cannot be used as animal feed if they fail to pass slaughter inspection” in the “Q&A regarding the safety of U.S. beef products” released at the press conference on May 2. However, according to the U.S. Federal Register, it is stated that “Cows younger than 30 months old can be used for animal feed without the removal of the brain and spinal cord.” This implies that the [Korean] government presented a completely opposite interpretation regarding the policy on the ban on animal feed issued by the United States” (Kyunghyang Shinmoon, 2008. 52).

messages or letters to parents in order to request their assistance in preventing their children's involvement in the Candlelight Protests.

It was also during this period that protest tactics became diversified. On May 15, several families in the city of Gacheon were featured in newspapers for a banner that they displayed from the balcony of their homes, reading "Our family opposes the importation of beef at the risk of mad cow disease," which soon spread across many cities and towns. The brainstorming meeting discussed in the introduction to this chapter was held during this period as well. As a program separate from the May 17 candlelight vigil, ANTI-MB hosted a march from Yeouido to Cheonggye Square with about 2,000 participants (Ibid. 62).

The Lee administration during this period stressed the perspective of international trade through the words of high-profile officials from Korea and the United States. On May 16, Carlos Gutierrez, then U.S. Secretary of Commerce, remarked at a meeting, "There are actions that sovereign countries can take to protect their citizens' safety, but I don't think there is a need for renegotiation [regarding the beef trade] to the point of going against WTO regulations" (Kyunghyang Shinmoon, p.60).⁹⁶ On May 20, Kim Jong-hun, Minister for Trade, mentioned at a press conference that the Korean government would take action to protect public health. And yet, his comment was not different from Gutierrez's earlier interview. The National Committee denounced Kim's remarks, arguing that the sovereignty of quarantine could not be secured without rescinding damaging clauses in the ROK-USA FTA (Ibid. 67).

⁹⁶ This is a re-interpretation into English of his translated comment in Korean.

May 22 ~ 31: First Arrestees and Clashes with the Police

On May 22, President Lee delivered a special speech to the nation to alleviate the tension pervading the population due to the beef issue. Candlelight participants had been frustrated because of the lukewarm and provisional solutions announced to the point. The envoy sent to the U.S. to check on the sanitary conditions of American slaughterhouses returned without the clear solutions that candlelight proponents demanded. In his speech, President Lee says,

I am aware that many citizens have had concerns about the governance of this administration ... To the administration, it was upsetting to see the spread of 'Rumors on mad cow disease. Above all, I had a heartbreaking feeling to see many citizens including young students participate in candlelight protests held at Cheonggye Square, which I had restored with immense efforts (Kyunghyang Shinmoon, 2008, p.72-3).

His speech, however, led to an opposite outcome by fueling candlelight participants. The Korean Confederation of Trade Union (KCTU) started a general strike, demanding a bill to prevent human variant mad cow disease and the sacking of Mr. Chung of the MAFF (Kyunghyang Shinmoon, 2008. p.73), though it failed to secure a majority vote at the National Assembly on May 24. In addition, farmers affiliated with the National Farmers' Association held a rally in Seoul (Ibid. 73). A researcher at a national research center debunked on May 23 (Ibid. 76) another claim by the Lee administration on the Grand Korean Waterway project, one of President Lee's electoral promises.

On May 24, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, scores of participants were arrested under the charge of participating in an illegal protest and violating the ADA

and traffic law. They shouted slogans such as “Down with the dictator” and “MB out,” which had been absent earlier in the month. To prevent such clashes from rising to massive arrests, mothers pushed their children in strollers at the frontline of the rallies. Young men in army reserve uniforms stood alongside the mothers with their arms folded, confronting the police and protecting the protesters. In the last week of May, some protesters resolutely confronted the police, who deployed water cannons to disperse them forcefully. Voluntary medical personnel showed up on the street to treat injuries. Minbyun lawyers became more active at the gathering site as human rights advocates, focusing on easing violent clashes and unreserved crackdowns. Minbyun lawyers also held on-site briefings for candlelight protesters to explain their rights in the case of being detained under police custody. Compared to these professional proponents, whose contributions were immediately recognized by other participants, the National Committee itself faced rebukes regarding its failure to lead the Candlelight Protests.

To summarize, the first period of May was successful to some extent, including forcing the Lee administration to postpone albeit temporarily its original plan to enforce the new beef inspection policy. The second period can be identified with the authorities’ reactions, however provisional, compared to the third period, where protest suppression resembled conventional protocols starting with stigmatization of crowds and collective action as violent and illegal. Below I examine how the legality discourse rearranged protest repertoires during these three periods in accordance with both the state’s reactions and self-reflection by the protesters on their own coordinated action.

Analysis

A Quantitative Overview of Dynamic Semantic Networks

As profiled in Table 5.1, the findings of this chapter are based on 230 posts produced in April and May,⁹⁷ which contain the notions of legality, illegality, protest, cultural vigil, and candlelight. These posts have 9,523 terms and were written by 857 authors in total. This does not include posts published May 24.⁹⁸ The ratio of the number of posts to that of authors, organized by period, suggest that the first period of May had the greatest number of authors, each of whom contributed more than one initial post. The ratio of initial posts to replies was quite stable throughout all periods, though the second period of May marked a relatively higher rate than the others. Most terms originated from initial posts, though in April replies supplied three times as many terms as initial posts, implying intensive interactions among repliers. In considering that replies were initially shorter in length than initial posts, it can be postulated that the dynamics between initial posts and replies in both April and the second period of May might differ from those in the other two periods.

[Table 5.1 to be inserted here]

[Table 5.2 to be inserted here]

⁹⁷ Posts produced in April were included as a comparative tester. This April subset spans only April 23, 28, and 30.

⁹⁸ Posts published May 24 could not be incorporated into this dataset because of the size of the network data for the machine used for this study. It was caused by posts with an excessive number of replies, which in turn forced the creation of a vast term matrix.

Table 5.2 outlines the outcome of the dynamic semantic analysis for each path from the focus term with the number of terms and link terms per step. The total number of terms for each period does not precisely match the number presented in Table 5.1 because this semantic analysis took only a forward direction from the focus term. Terms placed on the same step are at the same distance from the focus term. The farther a term is placed from the focus term, the more terms it needs to be traced back to the focus term. With regard to the distribution of terms on each step in Table 5.2, it shows a tendency that the greatest number of terms appear at the second step from the focus term throughout the three periods, though in the second period all terms are distributed within short distances from the focus term. This pattern recurs in the distribution of link terms as well. Though the exact number of link terms varies from period to period, the highest number of link terms is commonly found at Step 2. At a glance, the first and third periods of May present similar patterns qualitatively and structurally, with the second period conspicuously deviating from them. The semantic structure of the second period exhibits the lowest number of terms, which can be attributed to a couple of scenarios. Intuitively, it covers a shorter number of days compared to the other two periods.

[Figure 5.5 to be inserted here]

[Figure 5.6 to be inserted here]

Besides these two possibilities, another scenario is plausible. The relative idleness in the semantic field of May with respect to the theme of illegality may stem from the current analysis that aggregates digital interactions over seven days into one collection.

Thus, it is possible that each day may contain a well-developed semantic structure, where the focus term is diverged into multiple paths, though such divergence is cancelled out when merged into a period collection. Figures 5.5 and 5.6 exhibit that this last scenario may be a likely reason for the semantic network for the second period of May. Figure 5.5 displays the semantic networks of three days in April. Compared to April 23 and 30, where the semantic networks were extremely small and simple, the April 28 network delivers a semantic structure that is similar to those of the first and third periods of May. When these three sub-collections were aggregated, however, the intricacy of the April 28 network disappears and leaves only three link terms, “impeachment,” “member(s),” and “mobilizing,” as presented in Figure 5.6. It is difficult to assess the drastic dissimilarities between daily collections and a period collection based on their absolute superiority. On one hand, in the April 28 network presented in Figure 5.5, complex semantic networks aptly demonstrate enhanced details of digital interactions, but with the tradeoff of being difficult to interpret. On the other hand, a period semantic network as featured in Figure 5.6 should merit caution in the interpretation of link terms, given the dearth of referable terms in an absolute sense, despite its refined interpretability. To this end, it is important to examine link terms that shape the structure of a semantic network.

Interpretation of the Semantic Networks of the Three Periods

Applying the Illegality Discourse to Street Gatherings in Firsthand Recounts: The first period of May (May 1 to 14)

Table 5.3 and Figure 5.7 lay out link terms that configure the semantic network of the first period of May. It is conspicuous that ANTI-MB users posted their firsthand

observations of street gatherings in reference to illegality. According to Figure 5.7, Combination C arrives first at the time-step dimension, followed by B and A, alongside Ds, Is, Es, and Fs up to May 5. Combination C—containing link terms such as “Candlelight Protest,” “ashamed,” “teenagers,” “mad cow disease,” and “violence” at Step 1 and “person” and “impeachment” at Step 3—retains descriptive terms for delivering onsite experiences and observations, especially at Step 1. Regarding the attendance of many adolescents at the street gatherings, adult participants expressed their shame at having essentially delegated their social responsibilities to address injustices upon younger generations. In addition, they reinforced the legality discourse by underscoring the need to ensure the safety of those teenagers. The overall nuance of Combination C is quite similar to Combination A, which contains descriptive terms alongside multiple issues addressed as claims at the gatherings (e.g., privatization of health insurance) and subjective sentiments, as well as detailed descriptions of the gatherings (e.g., location, items carried by participants, demographics of participants).

[Table 5.3 to be inserted here]

[Figure 5.7 to be inserted here]

Compared to Combination C, Combination B contains terms at Steps 1, 2, and 3 and conveys a slightly different tone of the extended trajectory of the focus term. It is collocated horizontally with link terms such as “Korea,” “president,” “judicial,” at Step 1, “power,” “Grand National Party (ruling party)” at Step 2, and “democratization,” “Lee Myung-bak,” “illegal protest,” and “participation” at Step 3.

Table 5.3 traces link terms by step. Link terms at Step 1, appearing in the same post with the focus term of illegality, do not directly pertain to subjective descriptions of the street gatherings. Rather, they are terms that situate the candlelight gatherings against institutional politics (e.g., “Korea,” “president,” “protest,” “Grand National Party,” “Candlelight Protests,” “violence,” “mad cow disease,” “teenagers,” “leading,” “process,” “now,” and “system”). Step 2 contains terms that describe the street gatherings, including “chants” and “1,500 organizations” (which indicates the National Committee), as well as “emotion,” “atmosphere,” “being incited,” and “Blue House.” Posts classified into Step 3 mostly exist independently rather than being combined with other terms placed at other steps (see Combination I), which contain a variety of terms linked to various claims of the gatherings “Grand Canal Project,” “period 0 in high school,” “education,” “health insurance” and “National Assembly.” Also, as mentioned above, Step 3 contains similar terms referring to institutional political entities (“Grand National Party,” and “Lee Myung-bak”), alongside “democratization” and “impeachment.”

To summarize, during the first period of May, digital interactions on ANTI-MB showed that the focus term was predominantly used as a yardstick to measure how street gatherings matched up to expectations, since expectations had been formed in digital interactions prior to their real-life execution. Those expectations often took the form of concerns over the risk of attending street gatherings organized by unidentified groups, which would only jeopardize the legitimacy of their goals. *Justgo* wrote on May 4,

Frankly speaking, ordinary citizens simply joined without considering whose events they were attending, like today. ... I was near the conch statue and kept hearing “MICHINSO” and “illegal” from a loudspeaker. I simply assumed that it was the

work of *alba*, thinking to myself that “I’m participating in OURKOREA’s event, aren’t I?” ... Upon returning home, I found that it was not a cultural event, but a protest, which was even labeled as illegal. ... Everyone joined in for the sake of our country, only to find it framed under the label of “illegal.” ... (May 4)⁹⁹

As *Justgo* mentions, many posts shared concerns over the possibility of joining an illegal gathering and facing police suppression. This was a constant possibility because most candlelight participants were entirely unaware of the risk. When *Justgo* found only later the very gathering was condemned by the media and the police, it left bittersweet feelings. And yet, this user’s voice does not completely represent the posts in the first period of May. *Cheonanyuwija* wrote a reply to *AlwaysGoodThought*, who implored that MICHINSO’s gathering must be announced as illegal to prevent people’s participation:

The Korean police must prioritize citizens’ safety and security. They cannot forcefully quash a gathering unless it threatens the nation pursuant to the ADA. So, please join a cultural event (even if it had not been notified to the police in advance) with your mind at ease. Nevertheless, let’s not divide street gatherings by legality, saying that ours is legal but theirs is illegal. There are no divides in a situation like this. Aren’t we all on the same side? Let’s not divide each other. (May 5).

As in April, individuals including *CheonAnYooWeja* strived to put the participants at ease and temper the legality discourse, which continually induced people to be highly conscious of distinguishing lawful gatherings from illegal ones. *CheonAnYooWeja* particularly draws attention to the underlying meaning of the ADA, which aimed to protect citizens’ rights to organize themselves and express a shared cause, instead of its formal authority to identify specific procedures for citizens to exercise their protected rights. However, there were dissenting voices as well:

⁹⁹ cafe.daum.net/antimb/HXck/24150.

This is not a protest... (I'm now at Cheonggyecheon with my laptop)

I joined today's protest. ... But it's not serious, it's more like a festival. ... I don't know if it is a protest with a serious aspect or if it has become some kind of cultural festival... If the festivities were performed deliberately, it poses a serious problem. [Consider] the request for donations, the stage host, and the breakdancing performance. In terms of claims, [there are problems as well] some make anti-FTA claims, and others sing unification-themed songs [with North Korea]... It's full of inconsistencies. I wonder what others think of this situation, if they're currently participating while posting on a laptop as well. I simply speak for myself, but this is not what I had imagined. (*HealthyboyofKorea*, May 9).

Such personal complaints on the protest repertoire were linked to the legality discourse through replies, pointing out that outward appearances could shield the candlelight gatherings from being labeled as illegal (*Weepme*, *TwoCats*). The gatherings could easily turn violent, which would make them inappropriate for teenagers (*DoveofPeace*). In addition, "people are enjoying themselves in these cultural events, but everyone knows that it is indeed a protest, which has been completely influential" (*ZARD*).

The first period of May on ANTI-MB registered and extended the focus term of illegality as a point of reference against which ongoing situations were assessed and interpreted. Thus, its link terms mainly relate to identifying the gap between how street gatherings were performed in practice and how they were supposed to be implemented. Comparisons and judgments heavily relied on personal accounts containing subjective feelings and opinions. There were also deviating interpretations and assessment of the legality discourse. Nevertheless, such divergent ideas were not potent enough to alleviate the heightened sense of alert that the street gatherings were vulnerable from both potential suppression from the outside and disputes from the inside. The third period of

May, whose semantic structure may appear similar at a glance, nonetheless brings to the fore different sets of ideas.

Illegality, Internal Split, and Recounts of Past Protests: The third period of May (May 22 to 31)

The third period starts with Lee's special address to the nation regarding the ongoing candlelight gatherings, followed by the aggressive suppression of participants in unreported street marches on May 24 and 25. In Table 5.4, most link terms are clustered into either Combination A, spanning across Steps 1, 2, and 3, or Combination C, which only ranges from Step 1 to Step 2, which presents a simpler and more coherent structure than that of the first period of May. Referring to Figure 5.8, these two combinations alternate throughout the entire period, interspersed with Combination Fs, whose terms appear at one step at a time. As the news coverage cited in the beginning of this chapter showed, the focus of this period largely falls on street demonstrations, whose participants refused to remain passive.

[Table 5.4 to be inserted here]

[Figure 5.8 to be inserted here]

The most salient feature of Table 5.4 and Figure 5.8 is that street demonstrations were discussed in the context of the ADA. Is it illegal or legal to march in order to pressure the Lee administration? Would it not lead to mishaps committed in the spur of the moment, which would go on to justify suppression by the authorities? Are street demonstrations a tool to recalibrate the cause of the Candlelight Protests? Myriad debates

and opinions on these questions appeared throughout this period, retrieving the blurred line between the political and legal. And these blurred between political and legal appear in the tone of link terms, compared to those of the first period of May. The notion of impeachment, which was found at Step 3 in the network of the first period, is placed at Step 1 with an immediate horizontal connection to the focus term alongside “internal split,” “participation,” and “groups.” The link terms “democracy” and “street demonstrations” are found at Step 3, which can be traced back to the focus term via terms such as “candlelight protests,” “violence,” “law enforcement,” “illegal protests,” “Constitution,” “non-violence,” “traffic law,” etc. This semantic network contains terms indicating the multi-pronged claims of the Candlelight Protests as observed in the network of the first period of May. Nevertheless, compared to the latter, this period’s link terms lean more towards concerns over the maintenance of legality in a dichotomous frame of either being violent or non-violent, which is in turn linked to proponents and opponents of the demonstrations themselves. This tendency is more evident at Step 2, where the following link terms are found: “non-violence,” “authorities,” “arrest,” “justification,” and “Korean National Student Council (KNSC, referenced to as *Jeondaehyeop*)”. These terms also share Step 2 with terms from Combination A such as “contaminated,” “absence of the law,” “judicial,” “unjust law,” “violence,” and “police report.”

To unravel this semantic connection, it is instructive to examine *Dongseung*’s post on the street demonstration of May 24 published on May 25:

Most conservative news media and some online community members have remained silent except for *The Hankyoreh*, the only daily newspaper reporting our truth as it

did during the June Uprising of 1987. Many news outlets and a couple of people from some online communities (including Fans of Park Geun-hye) assert that the demonstrations yesterday [May 24] resulted from the joint efforts of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) and the Korean Teachers and Education Workers' Union (KTEW), which mobilized people to occupy the roads. And yet, we netizens and the nation know that the demonstrations did not take place through the machinations of those organizations. In reality, they were voluntarily organized by people of the 386 Generation who called for action on Daum Agora. Throughout the past seventeen candlelight vigils, which increasingly became more and more frustrating, participants likewise felt more and more outrage. As a result, they occupied the streets, violating the Act on Demonstration and Assembly, an incomparably minor violation compared to Lee's violation of the Constitution through his meekness over the beef trade negotiations. They were tired of passively watching the National Committee's candlelight festivals, while someone so unqualified resides at the Blue House. And yet, ironically, neither the KCTU nor the KTEW were there last night. No one from the National Committee was there, even though they should have stood at the frontlines of the beef trade issue in the past. (*Dongseung*, May 25)¹⁰⁰

According to *Dongseung*, demonstrators were not the usual leftist organizations that had frequently been stigmatized as employers of violent tactics and labeled as illegal and violent organizations. Whereas many of these organizations had joined the National Committee, according to *Dongseung*, they were not part of the demonstrations of May 24 and 25. Instead, the real demonstrators were digital media users of a certain age group (i.e., the 386 Generation), who retrieved and contributed their firsthand experiences to reset the repertoires of the Candlelight Protests. The post mentioned by *Dongseung* reads as follows:

[I'm] Looking for people to lead demonstrations. *DangunHuson* is now making an urgent call to mobilize a vanguard for demonstrations. We're waiting for anyone who were members of *Jeondaehyeop* and *Hanchongryron*, or those who belong in the 386 Generation, and those in the army reserves in their 20s and 30s. ... If the Cheonggyecheon gathering tomorrow is no different from today's gathering, we will take over the leadership of the gathering ... (May 23, *KwonTaeRoWoonChang*, cited

¹⁰⁰ <http://cafe.daum.net/antimb/HXck/48893>.

from Agora users 2008, p.79).

By targeting a specific social group, this post created a new wave in comparison to earlier digital interactions, where personal accounts almost exclusively focused on the ongoing street gatherings. Compared to the first period of May, collective memory and experiences immediately introduced past organizational repertoires highly geared towards a hierarchical, combative, and male-dominated structure, in response to authoritarian regimes. On the surface, the organizational logic predominant in the collective actions of the 1980s were distinctively different from that of the Candlelight Protests, where individuals and groups who were generally not members of tightknit organizations comprised a core decision-making unit and rank-and-file participants.

Recollecting past demonstrations, however, did not lead to convergence onto a unified form of organizing that was applicable to the context of the ongoing street gatherings. Some extrapolated the known reactions of the military regimes of the 1980s against demonstrators at the time to the responses of the Lee administration.

URGENT!! URGENT!! URGENT!! Peaceful and Nonviolent Protests Until Lee Returns. PLEASE READ. (DON'T BE INCITED BY *peurakchi*¹⁰¹!)

I am in between the 386 and 486 Generations, too. I was a college student in the Yushin period under Park Chung-hee and joined and lived through demonstrations against Roh Tae-woo's military dictatorship. Based on my experiences, we currently face a crucial moment. ... Under the military or authoritarian regimes of the past, there used to be meetings to discuss measures to crack down on demonstrations, particularly while the president was overseas on diplomatic trips. This was because aggressive crackdowns can cause unexpectedly catastrophic situations (deaths caused by police brutality or self-immolation as a protest method) and create accountability issues. Since Lee Myung-bak left the country, we should be really careful about

¹⁰¹ The term *peurakchi* originates from the Russian term *fraktsiya*, translated as "faction" in English. In Korea, the concept has indicated undercover police officers or intelligence agents who pretended to be college students in order to arrest activists and disorganize their efforts to mobilize democratization movements since the late 1970s.

candlelight protests. Under no circumstances should violence be allowed. (Please emphasize this point when you write on Agora). Violence from protesters will lead to the use of aggressive suppression methods, and provide a pretext for criminal prosecution, which in turn will diminish the number of protesters in the streets. Major conservative news outlets would publish negative headlines against the violence, and frame the protests as riots instigated by communists, exacerbated by New Right groups' false-flag dissemination of North Korean propaganda. ... Photos of rabble-rousers who intend to cause violence at the protests will help us to expose the truth when we face attacks by the conservative media. Chants in support of nonviolence would be warmly received by foreign press and easily spread on the internet. ... The new tactic, "chicken coop bus," may instantly nullify their suppression strategies. In order to continue the candlelight protests of thousands or tens of thousands of people and keep the demonstrations going, I would like to suggest that more people from the candlelight vigils voluntarily join in practicing the chicken coop bus strategy (*Pusuri*, May 27).¹⁰²

Pusuri's logic is that candlelight protesters should avoid disruptive and violent tactics completely, to protect the ongoing resistance movement, reflecting past experiences when massive suppression and crackdowns took place against democratization movements when the president was out of the country. At the time, President Lee was scheduled to embark on a diplomatic trip, which was argued as a warning sign for all participants. To prevent such crackdowns, *Pusuri* underscored the need to stay calm without violence. Participants were also asked to remain sensitive to avoid intentional manipulation by agitators. On one hand, they were encouraged to reject suspicious instigators who could provoke ordinary participants into violence in a momentary spur. On the other hand, *Pusuri* suggests that vigil participants could coordinate with demonstrators by starting a voluntary self-surrender campaign, the so-called "chicken coop bus tour." Making light of being arrested and detained on police buses with metal-barred windows by likening it to a field trip, the coordinated act had the potential to create a synergic effect by allowing

¹⁰² cafe.daum.net/antimb/HXck/55411.

participants to choose their preferred tactics.

Pusuri's argument firmly adheres to the legality discourse in order to avoid strategic flaws. The lesson from past demonstrations was not to lose legitimacy, nor allow potential outside agents. Embracing diversity among candlelight participants, *Pusuri* urged that there may be people who are aiming to sow dissent among candlelight participants from the inside. This part of the argument is quite similar to the way in which the legality discourse was initially forged in consideration that some people would intend to break down the Candlelight Protests from the inside in April, as discussed in Chapter 4.

This concern regarding an internal split among candlelight participants had another connection with the focus term of illegality, which directly positioned proponents of street demonstrations against those of candlelight vigils. The focal point of distinction was the unshakable frame that demarcated legal and illegal protests, under the assumption that street demonstrations are highly prone to violent and illegal actions. Examining the democratization movements of the 1980s as a representative case where demonstrators overcame the nominal interpretation for the violation of the law, some lashed out against ANTI-MB for its stubborn attitude in pursuing the ideal form of legal collective action. In particular, ANTI-MB's frequent refusal to collaborate with the National Committee and other online communities was criticized for its black-and-white approach to the law.

To summarize, the semantic network of the third period of May was arranged under the pressing issue of how to situate street demonstrations within the existing

legality discourse. And yet, the ways in which illegality was rendered differed from those in the first period of May. Firstly, concrete claims of the Candlelight Protests diminished, compared to their salience in the first period. Instead, street demonstrations were linked more closely to impeachment, argued to be the most comprehensive and urgent cause by its proponents. Secondly, collective memory of democratization movements against the authoritarian regimes of the 1980s resurfaced through personal accounts in proposing tactics to respond to potential crackdowns by the Lee administration. Thirdly, the semantic connection between street demonstrations to impeachment had slightly modified the legality discourse that was tightly linked to candlelight vigils. Concerns that were prevalent online prior to the street gatherings highlighted that street demonstrations revived the same issue in the context of various past collective actions. Lastly, it is difficult to discern whether such points created a new basis for solidarity. The heterogeneous extrapolation of those past experiences may or may not have served to reinforce the legality discourse, as even people on the same side had different focuses.

Divergence into Two Strands of Personal Recounts: The second period of May (May 15 to 21)

A lingering question from the last period of May regards the origin of the influx of vignettes from past demonstrations, which was not merely an accelerating factor of solidarity that likened the current affairs to past resistance against authoritarian regimes. Rather, they were used by and large as guidance in anticipating institutional reactions from the Lee administration. The inflow significantly changed the ways in which the focus term of illegality was conceived, compared with the first period. The following

sections examines events in the second period, which contains a somewhat sparse semantic field as outlined above.

Figure 5.8 profiles link terms in the second period of May. As presented in Tables 5.2, the number of posts that contain the focus term is relatively low in this intermediary period that led the less complex semantic structure. With only three steps from the focus term, the link terms include “impeachment,” “candlelight,” “mad cow disease,” “science,” and “democratization” at Step 1, and “signing the impeachment petition” at Step 2. Such a small number of terms makes it difficult interpret Figure 5.8. A further investigation of the second period with daily semantic networks exhibits a divergence in the usage of the focus term in digital interactions.

The daily semantic networks of this period show that there were two currents at work, which established distinct spheres of communication on the notion of illegality and resultantly led to a relatively sparse semantic structure. On one hand, ANTI-MB users during this period were eager to propose new tactics, and practice and comment on them by discussing the legality of the new tactics. On the other hand, the focus term was met with personal accounts that appear similar to those in the third period of May. And yet, in this case, those accounts were mainly related to the May 18 Democratization Movement of 1980, whose 38th anniversary happened to fall in this period.

Are the New Tactics Legal?

As hinted in the May 16th meeting, which was arranged to reorganize candlelight repertoires to revitalize the liveliness and voluntariness of the gatherings, new tactics

were reported to gain a broader spectrum of participants. When a banner, reading “Our family disagrees with the importation of U.S. beef products,” that was first showcased in a residential area in the city of Gacheon, located an hour away from Seoul, it was mentioned not only for novelty. It was discussed on whether it is legal to hang a banner at one’s residence with the purpose to express a political stance. On May 16, when high school students planned to launch a school boycott by sending out text messages en masse, people also talked about whether it would be treated as an illegal tactic. Would it be unlawful if one posts pamphlets and handouts along the streets in order to share their concerns with people who are less likely to be online? What if those walls belonged to private premises or a public space? Is it lawful and legitimate if police officers come to school to investigate students for their alleged participation in candlelight gatherings during school hours?

Most discussions were limited to a specific tactic, which reduced the likelihood of developing more link terms. Reactions to these inquiries varied in a relatively stable framework. Such tactics could be labeled as illegal, subjecting their practitioners to legal penalties such as a fine or police investigation, depending on the local police response. Some thought the question itself—legal compliance of the new tactics—was too passive by merely accepting the nominal legitimacy of the ADA. Citizens had the right to express their political stance, the right to personal property, and the right to assemble collective action. At times, tactics such as the school refusal received dubious responses, depending on one’s opinion on whether there should be a limit on political participation by younger citizens. Would it be acceptable for those students to prioritize political participation over

their normative role as students? This wide spectrum of tactical themes proves the influence of the legality discourse, regarding which tactics could be used in the streets.

Democratization and the Legality Discourse

The link term of democratization also stands out. During this period, both the government and law enforcement authorities continuously signaled that ongoing candlelight gatherings could be framed as illegal at any moment. Outside of digital platforms, adolescents were mainly targeted by this message, in the form of pressure from parents and teachers, some of whom even received police visits. Teachers were sent to gathering sites to discourage young citizens' participation. On digital platforms, candlelight proponents sought to prevent the police from identifying *Andante*, who wrote the impeachment petition and was later identified as a high school student, by launching a self-surrender campaign that temporarily overwhelmed the website of the Seoul Metropolitan Police. In this context, the notion of democratization could have implied another emerging claim on re-democratizing and strengthening democracy beyond the thematic claims revolving around specific policy issues.

Posts related to the notion of democratization, however, exhibit distinct contexts.

On May 18, *Sapo* wrote:

Time to take up Molotov cocktails

I had a great time thanks to MB, waving lit candles, singing, and laughing. Now, I'm beginning to get fed up with it. When they said, "This is illegal," we responded, "Well, we won't do that then." When they said, "That's also illegal," we responded, "Alright, we won't do that either." Is this really a protest when we simply go along with how they frame us? Are they really acting lawfully? ... It's been ingrained in me that it's important to observe our convictions through nonviolent and nonresistant ways. Nevertheless, I am becoming skeptical. It makes me sick, as if I were riding an

extremely slow bus. I get headaches when I look at Mangwol-dong,¹⁰³ which was placed under heightened security [for Lee's visit]. The regime has audaciously survived through decades of Molotov cocktails, rocks, self-immolation, and political martyrdom. We cannot defeat them by holding candles that might only singe a few eyelashes. I don't know why I'm becoming more and more angry, the more I try to be patient (*Sapo*, May 18).¹⁰⁴

Sapo's post makes a reference to the May 18 Democratization Movement in 1980 by mentioning Mangwol-dong, a national cemetery to commemorate its victims. Thirty-eight years ago, the city of Gwangju, a small city about 167 miles southwest of Seoul, was occupied by airborne troops deployed to violently suppress anti-government and democratization movement participants. The troops initially targeted college student activists, but soon indiscriminately assaulted and murdered ordinary citizens. The city was completely isolated from the rest of the country for ten days. The unbearable brutality was disguised as efforts to root out agents from North Korea, which resulted in the restoration and acknowledgement of the event becoming another protracted democratization movement. On the same day in 2008, *Sapo* made a post under a provocative title including the term "Molotov cocktail," an iconic makeshift explosive that was popular in the past during the democratization movements against the military authoritarian regime, though it was explicitly prohibited at candlelight gatherings.

Besides its implied rejection of the legality discourse, *Sapo's* post was interpreted as a reminder of one of the goals of the Candlelight Protests that had been neglected for

¹⁰³ Mangwol-dong in the city of Gwangju, about 167 miles south of Seoul, is the location of a national cemetery for victims of the 1980 Gwangju Democratization Uprising, often referred to as May 18 (Korean: *Oh Il Pal*). On May 18, 1980, airborne troops were deployed to the city of Gwangju under a state of martial law in the face of large-scale democratization movements led by college students. The city of Gwangju was completely blockaded from the entire country for ten days, while the troops killed college students who participated in democratization movements as well as ordinary citizens.

¹⁰⁴ cafe.daum.net/antimb/HXck/41900.

some time, namely impeachment. By mentioning that Mangwol-dong was placed under high-level security for President Lee's visit, *Hanginggyeol* replies that the heightened security reveals that the Lee regime would not easily yield to candlelight participants who have adhered to peaceful and nonviolent tactics. *Hanbinggyeol* also mentions that "candlelight vigils won't get us any closer to impeachment."

This thread of dialogues demonstrates thematic augmentation in reference to past collective actions, which had no immediate and direct connections to ongoing cases. References to the democratization movements broadened the scope of personal accounts that had focused on candlelight vigils at the time. Instead of limiting the focus to the current matter, candlelight vigils became conceived as a potential case that could or should have risen to a higher level of political events. Candlelight vigils were widely identified as an apolitical and cultural disguise adopted in order to present political claims in a safe way. It is not discussed what makes impeachment a collective goal that is more politically comprehensive than other claims. As *Sapo* and *Hanginggyeol* demonstrate, the reference to the democratization movement pulls the impeachment claim closer to the center.

Sapo delivers no concrete suggestions. The following post written by *Indongcho* takes a step further by arguing that candlelight vigils should be reevaluated because of their politicization in favor of specific political groups, namely the National Committee. *Indongcho* posits,

[MUST READ] Thoughts on Street Demonstrations in Yeouido¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ cafe.daum.net/antimb/HXck/41644.

I read a post in Agora criticizing today's march [on May 17] in Yeouido. I can understand its points. ... Police permission is not always given. Under the previous administration, the KCTU and civil organizations were labeled as violent groups because of their aggressive and violent demonstrations. ... I spread the word on today's march across Agora for the past two days. It looked like it was ardently welcomed by many Agorians online, predicting an immense turnout. My anticipation was turned into disappointment. ... Firstly, there is an amorphous fear of marches and demonstrations. ... We have become accustomed to violent demonstrations by interest groups and workers' unions in the past, which were always punished by the authorities. In other words, we have ended up fearing marches and demonstrations themselves. ... Marches and rallies are legal protests protected by the ADA. If they are hosted by a group without any record of ADA violations, the police cannot justify refusing permission. The low turnout in today's march in Yeouido resulted from ignorance of the law, for one. Secondly, people have placed excessive emphasis on candlelight vigils. I also joined the vigil after the Yeouido march, only to find myself disappointed. A host from the National Committee roused the participants into holding candles until renegotiations on the beef trade are guaranteed. The National Committee is benefiting from the candlelight vigils to block the ROK-USA FTA, as well as to solidify their own political positions. They are hardly concerned about Lee Myung-bak, not even a little bit. Impeachment was never called for at today's vigil. ... The impeachment slogan should have invigorated the vigil with so many people together. And yet, the National Committee merely repeated "You can eat all the mad cow!" Their position is not consistent with ours. ... Why don't they ever propose a daytime march and demonstration, and only rely on the vigils? I wonder if they see the withdrawal of the new inspection standards as the ultimate goal. I am deeply concerned that the candlelight vigils have been led astray, and I oppose their exploitation for political gains [of the National Committee] (*Indongcho*, May 18).

Indongcho juxtaposes two separate events, a candlelight vigil and a street demonstration, which were held on May 17 in two different locations in Seoul. On one hand, both candlelight vigils as cultural events and street marches as political events can be legally conducted, although many participants have ingrained fear against the latter. This is mainly because past marches during previous administrations were led by organized groups that tended to violate the ADA. Such violations resultantly spread and reinforced the public perception of marches and demonstrations as inherently illegal and dangerous events. *Indongcho* argues that marches can be carried out within the boundary of the law, if hosted by groups without a record of violent collective action. In this argument, the

legality discourse is neither defied nor criticized. Rather, in order to fully utilize the law, protest participants had to first comprehend the law thoroughly and overcome their ungrounded fear.

In addition, *Indongcho* problematizes the question of which claim should have priority, by associating gathering formats with completely different claims. Candlelight vigils, hosted by the National Committee, decided upon the beef inspection standard and other policy areas such as public health and the ROK-USA FTA. Demonstrations mentioned in *Indongcho*'s post were specifically aimed at Lee's impeachment. Averting from the urgent claim, the National Committee maneuvered the candlelight proponents toward their own political goals. In this regard, *Indongcho* argues that the candlelight vigils have been degraded and politicized against the original intent of their participants. By directing criticism against the National Committee, this post makes the claim that candlelight proponents can be bolder and refuse to be manipulated within the boundary of the law. This post obtained seven replies, one of which pointed out that *Indongcho*'s understanding of the National Committee's strategy results from inadequate comprehension of the ROK-USA FTA, wherein the beef inspection issue is not simply about beef products but about the health of every citizen, whose importance is no less than impeachment.

The second period demonstrates diversity in the various conceptions of illegality. In this regard, this period reinforces the legality discourse as its counterparts did. And yet, the bolstering effect emerged when heterogeneous ideas and contexts appeared within the legality discourse. New tactics were subjected to scrutiny as to their legality through a short sequence of replies. The retrieved collective memory of the

democratization movements of the 1980s annexed both the contents and the methods of personal accounts in digital interactions.

Conclusion

This chapter aimed to trace the legality discourse after street gatherings began. Focusing on May as a prime period of the Candlelight Protests that set forth and established the format and routines of congregation outside digital platforms, I analyzed digital interactions that contain the focus term of illegality using the conceptual and methodological framework of semantic networks. To incorporate temporality in digital interactions, those selected posts were used for dynamic semantic analysis, designed to reveal configurations of semantic networks and sets of link terms (see Table 5.5) to reveal how the focus term was extended by being linked to other terms over time. The thirty-day month of May was divided into three periods, to examine the effect that the different reactions of the Lee administration had on the legality discourse.

The legality discourse that was initiated and spread prior to street gatherings was reinforced throughout all three periods, with variations. Firstly, it was contextualized through personal accounts. In the first period, digital interactions mainly matched their firsthand experiences of candlelight vigils against their appreciation of the legality discourse, without mentioning the political or institutional implications of the ADA. In the third period, similar types of personal accounts were predominant. And yet, they were more oriented toward recollections of past democratization movements as a prism through which the ongoing candlelight gatherings were analyzed. Those accounts failed

to reach a consensus beyond the point that the ongoing candlelight vigils phenomenon was beginning to falter because of its rapid routinization and limited scope of claims that mainly focused on the beef trade issue. Targeting adults who lived through the 1980s and fought against the military regime as college students and young adults, this segment of candlelight participants frequently framed the National Committee as a politicized group, against which it proposed a new direction to the Candlelight Protests. The difference in terms associated with the focus term between the first and third periods began in the second period, where a variety of accounts emerged for novel tactics as well as a blueprint of ongoing gatherings with regard to claims and repertoires.

Secondly, the semantic networks also reveal that the legality discourse tended to trigger disputes regarding ways to identify the political features of the Candlelight Protests. The legality discourse imposed responsibility upon both individual participants and those who hosted the street events, including the National Committee and ANTI-MB. The idea of impeaching the sitting president was one of the claims that had been steadily conceived as a political claim that candlelight participants could have pursued outright. For those upholding this position, other issues addressed in chants and digital interactions were merely secondary issues, simply constituting the reasons why President Lee had to be impeached.

A dilemma faced by this position was its promotion of marches, while demonstrations were placed along a blurred line demarcating violence from non-violence, as well as illegal protests from legal ones. Retrieved memories of past democratization movements, where the illegality of collective action could be put aside to achieve a more crucial political goal, failed to offer a unified direction. The candlelight vigil format was

a tactic that demoted active protesters to passive audiences, who were roused by the National Committee, whose political stance was not congruent with the goals that the participants would have truly wished to achieve through political participation. This emerging argument debuted the notion of internal splits, whose dynamics in the digital space were expressed as urgent alerts for people to avoid being incited. It is crucial to note, however, that the legality discourse remained in place and in effect. Street marches and demonstrations, marred by negative connotations, could be held in lawful ways, if their hosts were properly prepared and not part of civil and social movement organizations. It was difficult to set a concrete line between the legality discourse and political action without a comprehensive discussion over the factors that made impeachment more political than the beef trade issue.

Table 5.1. Profile on Digital Interactions on the Term of Illegality


	April	May 1 ~ May 14	May 15 ~ May 21	May 22 ~ May 31	Total
Posts	11	110	23	86	230
Authors (in total)	59	413	74	311	857
Initiators (I)	11	87	22	70	
Repliers (R)	57	374	61	268	
I/R (%)	19.3	23.3	36.1	26.1	
Terms	990	4,219	1,273	3,041	9,523
Initiators (I)	303	2,362	1,000	2,025	
Repliers (R)	690	1,857	273	1,017	
I/R (%)	44	127.2	366.3	199.1	

Table 5.2. Terms by Distance from the Notion of Illegality

	May 1 ~ 14			May 15 ~ 21			May 21 ~ 31		
	Term	Post (%)	Link term (%)	Term	Post (%)	Link term (%)	Term	Post (%)	Link term (%)
Step 1	191	35 (31.81)		194	17		356	68	
Step 2	760	72 (65.45)	23 (12.04)	346	18	18 (9.28)	1,001	82	52 (14.61)
Step 3	915	87 (79.09)	64 (8.42)	15	1	3 (0.87)	438	76	63 (6.29)
Step 4	327	65 (59.09)	51 (5.57)				35	27	16 (3.65)
Step 5	36	9 (8.18)	9 (2.75)				18	14	1 (2.86)
Step 6	1	1 (0.90)	1 (2.78)						
Total	2,230	110	1494 (6.68)	555	22	21 (4.14)	1847	86	132 (7.26)


Figure 5.1. A Sequence of Digital Interaction in Time

(a)




Note: This panel shows how an initial post (at time 1-2) undergoes structural changes as replies are added at different points of time. In the second slice at time 1.75-2.75, this post earned five replies, only one of which was directly connected to the existing initial post. Other four replies remained isolated because they did not share terms with other replies. The following time slices indicate that the initial post and replies change structurally, depending how terms of incoming replies are added to either the largest component or the islands surrounding it. For instance, five islands observed in the fifth slice ($t=4-5$) became four in the next slice, because it was added to the largest component because of a new reply, whose terms were shared by both the largest component and one of the replies.

(b)




Note: This panel shows another post, whose development was sliced into nine windows. Compared to a post presented in (a), it shows more active changes among replies over time. No terms were added to the large hairball (the same as in $t=0-1.1$) till the fifth window, whereas one of the three replies in the third slice was connected to a new reply in the fourth. In a similar vein, all the subsequent slices show that there are more structural changes among replies.

Figure 5.2. Semantic Networks in Dynamic Analysis




Note: This figure charts hypothetical cases of how multiple posts can be presented in two-dimensional space. The X-axis indicates time, and the Y-axis registers terms by their distance from the focus term (illegal). Case [A] indicates that an initial post contains the focus term, whereas its replies do not. Case [B] shows that a RP contains a term closer to the focus term, though its initial post does not contain it. Case [C] presents an IP and its RPs contain the focus term, which makes all terms placed at the same step close to the focus term.

Figure 5.3. Semantic Networks in Dynamic Analysis (2)



Note: This figure draws from a semantic network obtained from the first period of May from May 1 to 14. The X-axis marks the chronological order of time when terms are added to this semantic field. The Y-axis shows distance from the focus term. The numerals associated with IP/RP (initial posts/replies) indicate a post number, not their temporal order.


Figure 5.4. Timeline of the Candlelight Protests, May 2008




Note: Posts from April were included as a comparative tester. Clockwise from the top left, each reports a daily semantic network, focusing on distance from the focus term. Compared to April 23 and 30, April 28 (bottom) has more posts that contain the focus term. Though the notion of illegal was placed at the axes' intersection, their vertex numbers were different depending on the daily corpus.

Figure 5.6. Paths from the Notion of “Illegality” in April 2008

(a)




(b)



Note: (a) presents an output obtained from the April corpus, and (b) simplifies it. These two panels show that A in (b) contributed more to the development of the presented network because it was used by three posts (C, D, and E) that came later.

Figure 5.7. Link Terms by Post at Multiple Steps (May 1 ~ 14)




Note: Letters in this figure indicate clusters of link terms by their commonality in appearing at the same distances. Clustered link terms are listed in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3. Link Terms Spanning on Multiple Steps (May 1 ~ 14)

	Combination	Post	Link Term by Step
A	Steps 1+2	13, 24	1: child (아이), 당하, 2: beautiful (아름), high school (고등학교), gathering site (집회장), Da-ham-ge (다함께_), told (이야기하), privatization of health insurance (의보민영화), 다해, stern (단호하), Sora Square (소라광), distributed (나누), paper cup (종이컵), shouts (함성), the World Cup (월드컵), issues (사안), mind (가슴), distributing (나눠), how (어떻), somehow (나름대), solution (해법), saw well (잘보았)
B	Steps 1+2+3	2, 7, 15	1: korea(n) (한국), president (대통령), protest (시위), future (미래), situation (상황), goal (목표), judicial (사법) 2: power (세력), the Grand National Party (한나), (그렇), in panic (공황상태), free (자유), talked (얘기하), sorry (아쉬워), thinking (생각해), 3: democratization (민주화), The Ohmynews (오마이_뉴스), the Grand National (informal) (판나), Lee Myung-bak (이명박), preparation (준비), our country (우리나), maybe (아무래), illegal protest (불법집), participation (참가)
C	Steps 1+3	1, 18, 32	1: Candlelight Protest (촛불집), ashamed (부끄럽), Mad Cow disease (광우병), violence (폭력), tears (눈물), teenagers (10 대) 3: person (사람), (가지), (그래), impeachment (탄핵), said (말한), like (좋아)
D	Steps 2+3	3, 26, 31	2: chants (구호), check (확인해), (아무런) 3: pseudo-emoticon (ㅋㅋ), (그런), of course (물론), animal (동물성), consumption (소비), calling for (모집), (아우성)
E	Steps 3+4	17, 43	3: fine (괜찮), running short of (부족하) 4: the nation (범국민), scarifying (희생하)
F	Steps 2+3+4	21, 46	2: clogged (답답), 1500 organizations (1500 여개)

			3: cases/examples (사례), identical (똑같), health insurance (의료보), this struggle (이싸움), understanding (이해해) 4: 386 Generation (386 세대)
G	Steps 2+4	41	2: built (세웠), recently (근래) 4: sorry (아쉬움)
H	Steps 1+2+3+4	35	1: concession (인정), leading (앞장), process (과정) 2: diplomacy in disgrace (굴욕외교) 3: ousted (쫓겨나) 4: opposing (반대한)
I	Step 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5	8, 11, 40, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 19, 20, 22, 27, 28, 33, 37, 12, 16, 23, 25, 29, 30, 36, 38, 42, 44, 47, 49, 34, 39, 45, 48	1: now (지금), one person (한사람), thinking (생각한), system (시스템), supporting (응원해) 2: emotion (감정), the Blue House (청와대), female students (여학), culture (문화), in what sense (무슨), atmosphere (분위), thoroughly (제대로), possibility (가능성), (어쩔), originally (원래), figuring out (파악), public opinion (여론), Cheonggye Square (청계광), never (절대), speaking (말씀해), being agitated (휘둘릴), looking closely (살펴보), leading (앞장서), protecting (보호해), having been made (만들어놓), education (교육), speak (말씀드), allowed (용납하), fearful (두렵), moving (움직이), 3: participating (참석하), certain (확실하), the National Assembly (국회의), entering (들어오), the Grand Canal project (대운하), stress n. (스트레스), fee (사용료), capturing (잡아), class period zero (in high school) (0 교), oriented/towards (향해), food(먹거), angry (화나), righteous (올바른), professional (전문가), (어찌), anachronism (시대착오), (있는데), December (12 월), attached (달린), building (건물), experienced (경험해), (그만) 4: many (여러개), rumors (유언비), child (어린이) 5: ways (방식대)

Figure 5.8. Link Terms by Post at Multiple Steps (May 15 ~ 21)




Note: Letters in this figure indicate clusters of link terms by their commonality to appear at the same distances.

Table 5.4. Link Terms Spanning on Multiple Steps (May 21 ~ 31)

	Combination	Post	Link Term by Step
A	Steps 1+2+3	1, 3, 7, 25	<p>1: crawl (기다), privatization (민영화), Mad Cow disease (광우병), Lee Myung-bak (이명박), child (어린이), insistence (고집), justly (마땅), animal (동물성), ban (금지), Korea (한국), (마련), being scheduled (예정), person (사람), (무슨), impeachment (탄핵), internal split (분열), participation (참가), doing wrong (잘못하), originally (원래), being reversed (뒤집), forces of group (세력), Cheoygye Square (청계광), university (대학), during (사이), safety (안전하), hair (머리채)</p> <p>2: Candlelight Protest (촛불집), of course (물론), (어떤), violence (폭력), received (받아), the Grand National Party (한나), hosting (개최), risk (위험성), unjust law (악법), concept (개념), police report (신고하), difficult (어렵), possibility (가능성), fine n. (벌금), gathering (모아), speaking (말씀하), judicial (사법), sneakers (운동화), absence of law (무법), contaminated (변질되), checking (확인하), standing up (일어서)</p> <p>3: going back (돌아가), inducing (유도해), police station (경찰서), being beaten (맞지), (보내달), sieged (포위되), one more time (다시한)</p>
B	Steps 2+3	21, 26, 30	<p>2: hello (안녕), saying like that (그런말씀), dangerous (위험하), sitting (앉아있)</p> <p>3: arrested (연행되), speech (말씀), together (함께해), oriented/ towards (향해)</p>
C	Steps 1+2	2, 4, 5, 9, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 28, 29, 32	<p>1: child (아이), health insurance (의료보), foreign countries (외국), Korea (대한민국), caught (잡아), wrong (그릇), register (장관), concession (인정), (그런), now (지금), (그래), (아닌), herding (몰아), mind (가슴), pseudo-emoticon (ㅋㅋ), process (과정), closed (비공개), education (교육), important (중요하), request/asking (부탁)</p>

			2: pamphlet (유인물), situation (상황), (생각해), the Korean Constitution (헌법), distorted (왜곡해), dubious (의심스), (보더), crowded (채워), nonviolence (비폭력), law enforcement (공권력), arresting (연행하), never (절대), emotion (감정), (한충련), returning (돌아오), report (제보), (공안정국), justification (정당화), (벌어지), (강하), (어찌), (되나), (수입위), (들어오)
D	Steps 1+3	13	1: at best (기껏) 3: (그렇)
E	Steps 2+3+4	27	2: in the same way (마찬가) 3: (어떤가) 4: (예비)
F	Steps 1, 2, 3	6, 19, 33, 35, 10, 11, 12, 31, 36, 23, 20, 34, 24, 14, 8	1: chants (구호), sorry (죄송스), journalists/reporters (기자), declaration of (선전포) 2: how (어떻), atmosphere (분위), impossible (불가능하), felt (느꼈), freedom (자유), illegal protest (불법집), open (공개), Shinchon (신촌), traffic law (도로교통법), efficiency (효율), fast protest (단식농성), phoning (전화하) 3: marching/rallies (가두시위), democracy (민주주의), being arrested (잡혀가)

[illegible]

Note: Letters in this figure indicate clusters of link terms by their commonality to appear at the same distances. Clustered link terms are listed in Table 5.4.

Table 5.5. Selected Link Terms, May 2008

0	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
April	Impeachment (탄핵) Mobilizing (모아서) Members (회원님들)		
May 1 ~ 14	Violence (폭력) Candlelight Protest (촛불집회) Situation (상황) Judicial (사법의) Protest/demonstration (시위)	Chants (구호) Culture (문화) Groups/forces (세력)	Impeachment (탄핵) Illegal protest (불법집회) Democratization (민주화)
May 15 ~ 21	Impeachment (탄핵) Culture (문화) Democratization (민주화)	Signing impeachment petition (탄핵서명)	
May 22 ~ 31	Impeachment (탄핵) Chants (구호) Internal splits (분열)	Violence (폭력) Candlelight protest (촛불집회) Illegal protest (불법집회) Nonviolence (비폭력) Law enforcement (공권력) The Korean Constitution (헌법)	Arrested (연행되) Rallies/Marches (가두시위) Democracy (민주주의)

Chapter 6 Conclusion

Summary of Findings

This dissertation has demonstrated that solidarity was formed through digital interactions in the Candlelight Protests. It has underscored how digital interactions semantically and structurally shape the process through which ideas are presented and interpreted and actions are coordinated. Anonymity on digital platforms with a high level of topical openness resulted in enriching communicated messages. Simultaneously, however, those messages often resulted in disharmony without a consented decision-making process. The co-existence of multiple digital platforms, whose constituencies had different appreciations of how to communicate and work together, contributed to the emergence of dissent over the desirable meaning of orchestrating actions involving people with shallow ties. As a result, I demonstrated that voluntariness, which is frequently interpreted as an attribute of each digital media user, was relationally constituted and understood. To demonstrate these points, I have argued that the development of a protest repertoire cannot be explained without accounting for different perspectives in methods of working together online and on the streets. This section summarizes findings by briefly recapitulating how claims and repertoires of the Candlelight Protests were forged and transformed.

Chapter 3 demonstrated that the presence of concerns over mad cow disease and critiques of President Lee's policies became gradually manifest both by its growing frequency and by being placed at the brokering position in topic networks. The topic

networks presented in this chapter imply three points. Firstly, concerns over mad cow disease, which was later conceived as the most conspicuous claim of the Candlelight Protests, had more emergent meanings than its nominal meaning, spanning a variety of policies and social issues. It was linked to multiple topics such as public health policies and shortcomings of the secondary education system. In a similar vein, complaints targeting the sitting president appeared alongside a wide array of topics. The discursive relevance among those linked topics only emerged because they were mentioned together repeatedly. In other words, the meanings of mad cow disease were generated through the contents that people associated with it.

Whereas the first implication is based on what was observed in the topic networks, it is intriguing to consider aspects that were conspicuously absent despite expectations. On one hand, it is noteworthy that the topic networks extracted from an anonymous discussion board only included a few topics directly addressing methods to organize and participate in street events. Those topics appeared only one or two days prior to the actual street gathering, which implies that each platform had its specialized topics regarding the Candlelight Protests. On the other hand, the discussed topics did not receive equal attention on the streets, particularly in the very early period of the Candlelight Protests, despite their connection to the beef trade issue. The focal point was the opposition against beef products at risk of mad cow disease, which was predominantly expressed in non-political and cultural ways. These two points led the following chapter's analysis of how a repertoire of the Candlelight Protests was formed.

Chapter 4 demonstrated how the idea of legal protests became a main repertoire of the Candlelight Protests. It investigated a thread of disputes over the desired format of

street gatherings between two online communities that mobilized initial street events that were separately planned to take place on two consecutive days. The disputes reflected disparate understandings of the potential and limits of anonymous communication in terms of coordinating actions on the streets. Emphasizing expressive voluntariness and dispersed physical locations of digital media users, an online community proposed that street events should be held simultaneously in multiple cities. Voluntariness, however, was interpreted as vulnerability by another community. It prioritized the conventional grammar of protests by referring to the Assembly and Demonstration Act (ADA) that authorizes the police to punish illegal cases of collective action. To avoid being labeled illegal, participants encouraged each other to express themselves in non-political and cultural ways. Without a unified online community representative of all participants, anonymity was a challenge that had the potential to ruin the integrity of a fledgling resistance movement from inside by allowing manipulative incitation by the opposition.

Findings of this chapter imply that the desired format of street events was not an issue that could be easily resolved by consensus, nor left to each participant's voluntary discretion. Given that the online communities lacked a decision-making process and a shared criterion to validate an argument, actual behavior in the streets was never formally decided on the behalf of protesters. Nevertheless, claims supportive of law-abiding protests became more salient, which also enhanced the critical discernment against potential manipulation. Embracing the idea of legal protests as a core repertoire, discussions on topics that incorporated various policies and political issues gradually became diminished. Relatively 'political' claims such as a call for an impeachment motion against President Lee became less conspicuous in chants on the streets as well as

on digital platforms. In other words, protesters at street events were not left to their own devices to recognize fellow participants, nor was it determined by a representative group on behalf of the participants. Rather, it emerged from disputes over how to mobilize and coordinate actions collectively in the streets. Voluntariness was performed alongside the purview of the discussed merits and limits of anonymous social relations.

Chapter 5 traced how the pre-protest discussion of legal protests, which often took on preventive tones, changed in the three given periods of May. In the first fifteen days of May, illegality was a yardstick to verify whether ongoing street gatherings were in line with their vision of the desired format of legal protests. In the last week of May, it elicited a new debate over the employment of more aggressive tactics to promote a more politicized claim, i.e., an impeachment motion against the sitting president, which had been held back previously. During this last week, street protesters were arrested on charges of employing violence and joining illegal protests. Therefore, differentiations in the semantic usage of the notion of illegality seem solely attributable to reactions of the state.

And yet, a turning point was found in the second period of May, during which the state did not fully mobilize the police to suppress street gatherings. On one hand, the notion of illegality drove discussions over whether prospective tactics would be in compliance with the ADA. On the other hand, the same notion was incorporated in personal recollections that compared the ongoing street events of the Candlelight Protests with the May 18 Democratization Movement of 1980, which shared few organizational characteristics with the former. Nevertheless, the recalled past strengthened arguments

that demanded the reevaluation of the legality discourse and claims of the Candlelight Protests in consideration of their future.

Closing remarks

This section addresses the implication of this study with the following three points: (1) What insights can the legality repertoire of the Candlelight Protests offer to our understanding of similar protests that took place later in time and in other countries?; (2) How can the semantic network analysis of digital interactions be advanced?; and (3) How does this study engage in relational sociology with a focus on the nexus of culture and networks?

Legal Protests and Their Implications

The legality repertoire, discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, seemingly pertains to the rejection of established politics and institutionalism, which has been observed in similar cases of collective action that took place later in time and in other countries. Particularly, the discussed development process of the legality repertoire reveals that activists affiliated with organizations were labeled using umbrella terms such as propagandists or instigators, viewing them as part of established politics. Like politicians, SMOs and their activists were portrayed as interest groups, whose political agendas served organized activists and excluded non-activist citizens. As street gatherings continued, candlelight protesters who favored aggressive tactics hardened this view by lashing out the National Committee's unyielding adherence to the format of candlelight vigils. Like the Lee

administration that drew protests for its irresponsiveness to citizens' concerns over public policies, existing SMOs and experienced activists were also viewed as part of conventional politics. As recalled by Ahn (cited in Chapter 3), an experienced activist, some activists publicly admitted that professionalism in activism may have set their efforts apart from ordinary citizens. In this regard, the Candlelight Protests can be viewed as a prototype, where conventional civil society actors became shunned by the masses, whose constituencies became able to mobilize themselves rather than remain silent and aloof.

Despite these resonating observations, I would like to suggest examining how parties involved in collective action alter their actions to align with each other. Though substantial answers to this question cannot be offered at present, it would be helpful to catalogue analytic points that can be taken for further research.

Firstly, how would activists react to protesters who refuse to coordinate acts with them, and why? Some observations reveal a more complex relationship between activists and protesters. As mentioned in Chapters 4 and 5, the National Committee largely took over the logistics of street gatherings from the second week of May without taking the leadership position. Indeed, the Candlelight Protests cannot be explained without activists. In addition, the National Committee was much less homogenous a coalition than it was portrayed and labeled. Some organized groups did not face obstacles in interacting with fellow protesters, though some were unable to change their initial impression. For the latter case, activists were also called *Undongkwon*, whose roots can be traced back to the democratization movements of the 1980s and have long been labeled as violent, illegal, and anti-government groups.

Moreover, it should be noted that activists can yield some achievements regardless of how they are perceived. Activists and Minbyun, a lawyers' civil organization, achieved amendments to the ADA by filing a motion to the Korean Constitutional Court for its judgment on the unconstitutionality of the ban on political collective action in open-air public spaces after sunset (Minbyun 2016). This achievement deserves attention, given that the activists were paradoxically criticized because of their stubborn adherence to the legality repertoire that evidently complied with the aim of initial street gatherings to block propagandists' influence. In other words, the Candlelight Protests prove that it would be less productive to assume that changes to civil society can be solely attributable to digital media users' detachment from the existing activist groups. Rather, it should account for how activists cope with changing relationships with non-activists.

Secondly, it is important to emphasize the way in which the state changes its repressive tactics in accordance with changes in methods of organizing a collective action via digital media, though this question has often been neglected for overemphasis on the liberating effects of online communication. This missing point regarding the state reaction, however, can deter a more comprehensive understanding of interactions between protesters and the state in an era of digital media. For instance, if protesters are able to photograph and document police brutality at any moment, the state can also document "illegal" activities by protesters with its institutional power. Moreover, it has been rarely discussed how the legal system can be mobilized as a tool to reshape repressive techniques, especially during a period where institutionalized measures to handle privacy and data protection had yet to be fully established. During and after the Candlelight Protests, many protesters who had been arrested were imposed fines. Those

who refused to pay were taken to court, which began legal proceedings that lasted several years (Minbyun 2016). The Lee administration particularly drew on the legal system to handle collective action participants, which later erupted as a corruption scandal, where judges were placed under undue pressure regarding their rulings on candlelight protest cases (Minbyun 2016). In sum, I would like to urge further research on how the state, whose role is often invisible in online-based mobilization for large-scale protests, changes its methods of repression in accordance with technological advancement.

How Can Semantic Network Analysis Be Developed Further?

The substance of the semantic network analysis employed in Chapters 3 and 5 deals with clustering terms by changes in their relations with other terms over time. Topic modeling outputs, i.e. clusters of co-occurring terms, were used to draw term networks, whose structures depend on the extent to which terms are shared across topics. The semantic networks presented in Chapter 5 trace a focus term's changing relationship with other terms by introducing distance from it. Those networks, which are presented in a slightly unconventional format, reveal both direct ties to the focus term and indirect ties that connect terms via terms placed at closer distances. These approaches assume that (1) a term's meaning is not fixed, but rather constituted by how it is arranged by many people who happen to use the same term in different ways, and (2) the structural positions of a term can show its semantic effects in relation to other terms. In other words, this study has explored the micro-level process of interactions to gain insights on collective actions at the macro level. Particularly, it has examined multiple threads of interactions that appear simultaneously among different individuals on different topics.

Despite their usefulness for my research question about how claims and tactics are made and change through interactions without pre-determined boundaries and thematic coherence, there are some issues that should be addressed for more general application. Firstly, my approach deliberately pursued the chaotic nature of digital interactions without preliminary filtering topics that happen to appear simultaneously. Therefore, it is possible to inquire into ways to separate noise from focused interactions, particularly in terms of topic modeling outcomes in Chapter 3. In many strands of content analysis irrelevant themes are usually dropped before substantive analysis. Deviating from this conventional protocol, my analysis does not offer answers to how effectively noise can be eliminated in computational text analysis, which often applies variations of clustering based on similarities in focus.

It appears unlikely that there can be a clear-cut solution for this issue. To begin, clustering as a method of exploring similar attributes requires criteria that are informed theoretically and the researcher's deep understanding of the text to be analyzed. In addition, given that topic modeling outcomes are inherently sensitive to parameters chosen by researchers, multiple parameters need to be pursued to identify the appropriate ones for a given corpus, with which topics are compartmentalized with substantive themes. And yet, more fundamentally, it appears that noise itself needs to be carefully defined depending on the expected degree of thematic coherence in a corpus. A set of documents that are written by a single author whose topics have a consistent range cannot be handled in the same way as a collection of documents written by multiple authors whose thematic boundaries are not clear. Documents with time stamps also need a careful

approach, as the passage of time itself can be a useful filter to create subsets as demonstrated in Chapter 3.

Secondly, the semantic analysis introduced in Chapter 5 indeed begs the question of how much it realized its analytic goal. The most significant challenge therein is that my analysis conflates direct ties among terms that appear in the same post with ties that are considered to exist in various subsets of digital posts. A set of an initial post and its replies can be considered independent of another set. Nevertheless, I explored multiple possibilities of semantic networks by allowing terms from different posts to be linked if they share the same term. This decision stemmed from the consideration that the selection of terms in replies (and initial posts) is not limited to the post to which they intend to reply. Rather, their choice of terms can be influenced by posts that they merely read. In this regard, one might find the usefulness of Gibson's conversational analysis (2005, 2011), which introduced network analysis to identify structures of interactions: In a setting of interactions among people, one can directly respond to people who talk before them by specifying to whom they are responding. And yet, simultaneously, one can often address the group in general. My analysis in Chapter 5 considered these two possibilities together by allowing terms that have their own home in an actual initial post-reply set to be connected semantically with terms from other set of posts, if they share the same term in their chronological order. Though this approach helped me to specify how new ideas are introduced and transform messages, it needs further clarification, which can begin in future research by considering the effect of authors.

Lastly, my findings indicate the importance of both comparative and conjectural approaches to enhance our understanding of digital interactions. My study has explored a

small number of digital platforms, which were slightly more active than others and well-recognized during the Candlelight Protests. And yet, I do not think that the studied platforms are truly representative of the Candlelight Protests, nor do I argue that studying more platforms in an additive way would be helpful to understand the whole picture of the vibrant digital interactions that constituted the Candlelight Protests. To reiterate, I do not assume that the aggregation of digital platforms would complete the whole picture. Rather, I think that it would be more promising to view the coexistence of multiple digital platforms relationally: How are those different platforms semantically connected or disconnected? Questions in search of how semantic connections among platforms change over time would help our understanding of how ‘micro’ interactions among many people generate messages that can travel across multiple platforms with variations in their meanings.

Relational Sociology and Digital Interactions

This dissertation project has been influenced by and aims to contribute to relational sociology with an emphasis on the intersection of culture and social networks (see Chapters 1 and 2). Studying digital interactions can shed light on relational sociology because of their source of dynamics, namely replies to posts. This point may deviate from the popular understanding that the primary merit of digital interactions is that anyone can initiate a meaningful communication. In digital platforms, I argue, replies are one of the sources that diffuse, generate, and transform the meanings of communicated messages, which are not completely dominated by initial posts.

It would be helpful to briefly consider the sudden rise and fall of school-girls as a main driving force of the Candlelight Protests. The fame that they earned as the most salient participant group was evident from the very outset of the street gatherings. They related their own agendas regarding the education system that pushed them to extreme competition to their objection to the pending beef inspection standards. An intriguing point is that those claims and agendas that once presented the Candlelight Protests as both a collective affair and an important segment of participants quickly almost disappeared. This does not mean that those early vanguards suddenly stopped participating. Rather, they continued to participate enthusiastically. It also does not mean that their issues were decided to be put on hold. How can these emergent dynamics be explained, and what are their implications?

More nuanced data is necessary to provide a reliable answer to these specific questions, but it can be suggested that online communication often ends up creating power differentials, even though all parties involved can be heard and promote their ideas equally. By extension from the discussion in Chapter 5, I postulate that discursive points were pushed towards brainstorming on methods of protest, whose process was more in favor of past experiences of organizing and participating in collective actions, which unexpectedly reduced the room for younger generations to present their own input. In other words, outcomes of digital interactions are not simply an aggregate of individuals whose agency has been enhanced uniformly in an era of digital media. The process through which digital interactions form contexts allows certain narratives or groups to gain a better position to push forward their own ways of retrieving past experiences in

projecting future events, which resultantly leads them to prefer a specific course of action over others in the present (Emirbayer and Mische 1998).

I hope that our understanding of digital interactions through relational sociology is helpful to develop more nuanced theories that do not overweigh either positive or negative perspectives on digital interactions. On one hand, research on online-based collective action has emphasized the extraordinary potency of digital interactions as a factor to expand opportunities for diverse voices to speak. On the other hand, the research on political and social polarization has tended to express concerns over the lack of substantive communication that eliminates common ground and resultantly compels people to live in their own isolated bubbles. Meanwhile, the research on the expansion of surveillance systems has warned that every digital footprint can be mobilized systematically to infringe one's freedom, privacy, and security. As pointed out in Chapters 4 and 5, eagerness to initiate and maintain collective action by making one's contribution explicitly during the Candlelight Protests also resulted in boundary-making, which often simplified one's position vis-à-vis others as either being on the same side or being suspicious of each other. One's effort to diffuse 'right' and 'precise' facts to assist others' decision-making contributed to the emergence of relatively dominant voices, which unintentionally eclipsed other voices that would have become equally dominant otherwise. To comprehend such generative features of digital interactions, it is necessary to study how individuals who write alone comes to connect their ideas to the art of working together.

Appendix

List of Abbreviation

ADA	The Assembly and Demonstration Act
ANTI-MB	Solidarity for Impeaching Lee Myung-bak
BSE	Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
KCTU	Korean Confederation of Trade Unions
MAFF	Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries
MOE	Ministry of Education
Minbyun	Lawyers for a Democratic Society
National Committee	The National Committee of Activists Resisting the Importation of U.S. Beef at the Risk of Mad cow disease
OURKOREA	Solidarity Against Policies
PSPD	People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy
ROK-US FTA	Korean-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
SMOs	Social Movement Organizations
SRMs	Specified Risk Materials
vCJD	variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease
UHI	Universal Health Insurance

Acknowledgement of Previous Publication

As per Rutgers graduate school guidelines, I acknowledge that a close version of Chapter 3 has been under review for publication.

Bibliography

- Agora users. 2008. *Agora, The Encyclopedia of the Republic of Korea*. Seoul: Yeouwadurumi.
- Bail, Christopher A. 2012. "The Fringe Effect: Civil Society Organizations and the Evolution of Media Discourse about Islam since the September 11th Attacks." *American Sociological Review* 77(6):855–879.
- Bail, Christopher A. 2014a. "The Cultural Environment: Measuring Culture with Big Data." *Theory and Society* 43(3–4):465–82.
- Baldassarri, D. and P. Bearman. 2007. "Dynamics of Political Polarization." *American Sociological Review* 72(5):784–811.
- Bearman, Peter and Katherine Stovel. 2000. "Becoming a Nazi: A Model for Narrative Networks." *Poetics* 27:69–90.
- Benkler, Yochai. 2006. *The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Bennett, W. Lance and Alexandra Segerberg. 2013. *The Logic of Connective Action: Digital Media and the Personalization of Contentious Politics*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Bennett, W. Lance and Alexandra Segerberg. 2014. "Three Patterns of Power in Technology-Enabled Contention." *Mobilization* 19(4):421–39.
- Bimber, Bruce. 2001. "Information and Political Engagement in America: The Search for Effects of Information Technology at the Individual Level." *Political Research Quarterly* 54(1):53.
- Bimber, Bruce, Andrew J. Flanagin, and Cynthia Stohl. 2005. "Reconceptualizing Collective Action in the Contemporary Media Environment." *Communication Theory* 15(4):365–388.
- Bimber, Bruce, Andrew J. Flanagin, and Cynthia Stohl. 2012. *Collective Action in Organizations: Interacting and Engagement in an Era of Technological Change*. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Blank, Grant and Bianca C. Reisdorf. 2012. "The Participatory Web: A User Perspective on Web 2.0." *Information, Communication & Society* 15(4):537–554.
- Blee, Kathleen M. 2012. *Democracy in the Making: How Activist Groups Form*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Blei, David M. 2012. "Probabilistic Topic Models." *Communications of the ACM* 55(4):77–84.

- boyd, danah. 2010. "Social Network Sites as Networked Publics: Affordances, Dynamics, and Implications." Pp. 39–58 in *Networked Self: Identity, Community, and Culture on Social Network Sites*, edited by Z. Papacharissi.
- boyd, danah m. and Nicole B. Ellison. 2007. "Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship." *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication* 13(1):210–30.
- Buechler, Steven M. 2004. "The Strange Career of Strain and Breakdown Theories of Collective Action." Pp. 47–66 in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi. Malden, Oxford, and Victoria: Blackwell Publishing.
- Cammerts, Bart, Alice Mattoni, and Patrick McCurdy, eds. 2013. *Mediation and Protest Movements*. Bristol, UK and Chicago, USA: intellect.
- Carley, Kathleen. 1994. "Extracting Culture through Textual Analysis." *Poetics* 22:291–312.
- Carley, Kathleen M. 1995. "Communication Technologies and Their Effect on Cultural Homogeneity, Consensus, and the Diffusion of New Ideas." *Sociological Perspectives* 38(4):547–71.
- Carley, Kathleen M. 2001. "Computational Approaches to Sociological Theorizing Computational Approaches to Sociological Theorizing." Pp. 69–84 in *Handbook of Sociological Theory*, edited by J. Turner. New York, NY: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.
- Carley, Kathleen M. and David S. Kaufer. 1993. "Semantic Connectivity: An Approach for Analyzing Symbols in Semantic Networks." *Communication Theory* 3(3):183–213.
- Castells, Manuel. 2009. *Communication Power*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Castells, Manuel. 2012. *Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age*. Malden, MA: Polity Press.
- Cavanagh, Allison. 2007. *Sociology in the Age of the Internet*. New York, NY: Open University Press.
- Chadwick, Andrew. 2013. *The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Chenoweth, E. and K. G. Cunningham. 2013. "Understanding Nonviolent Resistance: An Introduction." *Journal of Peace Research* 50(3):271–76.

- Chenoweth, Erica and Maria J. Stephan. 2012. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. Reprint edition. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Cho, Kisook and Haeyoon Park. 2008. "Politics of Square and Cultural Collision: An Empirical Study of the 2008 Candlelight Protests." *Korean Political Sciences* 42(4):243–68.
- Clemens, Elisabeth S. and Debra C. Minkoff. 2004. "Beyond the Iron Law: Rethinking the Place of Organizations in Social Movement Research." Pp. 155–70 in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi. Malden, Oxford, and Victoria: Blackwell Publishing.
- Crossley, Nick. 2010. "Networks and Complexity: Directions for Interactionist Research?" *Symbolic Interaction* 33(3):341–63.
- DiMaggio, Paul. 2015. "Adapting Computational Text Analysis to Social Science (and Vice Versa)." *Big Data & Society* July-December:1–5.
- DiMaggio, Paul, Eszter Hargittai, W. Russell Neuman, and John P. Robinson. 2001. "Social Implications of the Internet." *Annual Review of Sociology* 27(1):307–336.
- DiMaggio, Paul, Manish Nag, and David Blei. 2013. "Exploiting Affinities between Topic Modeling and the Sociological Perspective on Culture: Application to Newspaper Coverage of U.S. Government Arts Funding." *Poetics* 41(6):570–606.
- Doerfel, Marya L. and Stacey L. Connaughton. 2009. "Semantic Networks and Competition: Election Year Winners and Losers in U.S. Televised Presidential Debates, 1960-2004." *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology* 60(1):201–18.
- Dolata, Ulrich and Jan Felix Schrape. 2014. *Masses, Crowds, Communities, Movements: Collective Formations in the Digital Age*. University of Stuttgart, Institute for Social Sciences, Department of Organizational Sociology and Innovation Studies.
- Dupont, Cédric and Florence Passy. 2011. "The Arab Spring or How to Explain Those Revolutionary Episodes?: The Arab Spring." *Swiss Political Science Review* 17(4):447–51.
- Earl, Jeniffer and Katrina Kimport. 2011. *Digitally Enabled Social Change: Activism in the Internet Age*. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The MIT Press.
- Earl, Jennifer. 2010. "Dynamics of Protest-Related Diffusion on the Web." *Information, Communication & Society* 13(2):209–25.
- Earl, Jennifer and Katrina Kimport. 2010. "The Diffusion of Different Types of Internet Activism: Suggestive Patterns in Website Adoption of Innovations." Pp. 125–39

- in *The Diffusion of Social Movements: Actors, Mechanisms, and Political Effects*, edited by R. K. Givan, K. M. Roberts, and S. A. Soule. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Earl, Jennifer, Katrina Kimport, Greg Prieto, Carly Rush, and Kimberly Reynoso. 2010. "Changing the World One Webpage at a Time: Conceptualizing and Explaining Internet Activism." *Mobilization* 15(4):425–446.
- Eggert, Nina and Elena Pavan. 2014. "Researching Collective Action Through Networks: Taking Stock and Looking Forward." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 19(4):363–368.
- Eliasoph, Nina. 1998. *Avoiding Politics: How Americans Produce Apathy in Everyday Life*. London, GB: Cambridge University Press.
- Eliasoph, Nina and Paul Lichterman. 2003. "Culture in Interaction." *American Journal of Sociology* 108(4):735–794.
- Emirbayer, Mustafa. 1997. "Manifesto for a Relational Sociology." *American Journal of Sociology* 103(2):281–317.
- Emirbayer, Mustafa and Jeff Goodwin. 1994. "Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency." *American Journal of Sociology* 99(6):1411–1454.
- Evans, Sandra K., Katy E. Pearce, Jessica Vitak, and Jeffrey W. Treem. 2017. "Explicating Affordances: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Affordances in Communication Research." *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication* 22(1):35–52.
- Ewick, Patricia and Susan S. Silbey. 1998. *The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday Life*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
- Faris, Robert, John Kelly, Helmi Noman, and Dalia Othman. 2016. "Structure and Discourse: Mapping the Networked Public Sphere in the Arab Region." available at <https://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepose:28552579>.
- Farrall, Kenneth. 2012. "Online Collectivism, Individualism and Anonymity in East Asia." *Surveillance & Society* 9(4):424–440.
- Fernandez, Roberto M. and Doug McAdam. 1988. "Social Networks and Social Movements: Multiorganizational Fields and Recruitment to Mississippi Freedom Summer." *Sociological Forum* 3(3):357–82.
- Fine, Gary Alan and Sherry Kleinman. 1983. "Network and Meaning: An Interactionist Approach to Structure." *Symbolic Interaction* 6(1):97–110.
- Flanagin, Andrew J., Cynthia Stohl, and Bruce Bimber. 2006. "Modeling the Structure of Collective Action." *Communication Monographs* 73(1):29–54.

- Franzosi, Roberto. 1998. "Narrative Analysis—or Why (and How) Sociologists Should Be Interested in Narrative." *Annual Review of Sociology* 24(1):517–554.
- Franzosi, Roberto. 1999. "The Return of The Actor. Interaction Networks Among Social Actors During Periods of High Mobilization (Italy, 1919-1922)." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 4(2):131–149.
- Franzosi, Roberto. 2004. *From Words to Numbers: Narrative, Data, and Social Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Franzosi, Roberto. 2010. *Quantitative Narrative Analysis*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Fuchs, Christian. 2015. "Anonymous: Hacktivism and Contemporary Politics." Pp. 88–106 in *Social Media, Politics, and the State: Protests, Revolutions, Riots, Crime and Policing in the Age of Facebook, Twitter and Youtube*, Routledge Research in Information Technology and Society, edited by D. Trottier and C. Fuchs. New York and London: Routledge.
- Fuhse, J. A. 2015a. "Networks from Communication." *European Journal of Social Theory* 18(1):39–59.
- Fuhse, Jan A. 2009. "The Meaning Structure of Social Networks." *Sociological Theory* 27(March):51–73.
- Fuhse, Jan and Sophie Mützel. 2011. "Tackling Connections, Structure, and Meaning in Networks: Quantitative and Qualitative Methods in Sociological Network Research." *Quality & Quantity* 45(5):1067–1089.
- Gamson, William a. 1991. "Commitment and Agency in Social Movements." *Sociological Forum* 6(1):27–50.
- Gerbaudo, Daniel. 2015. "Populism 2.0: Social Media Activism, the Generic Internet User and Interactive Direct Democracy." Pp. 67–87 in *Social Media, Politics and the State: Protests, Revolutions, Riots, Crime and Policing in the age of Facebook, Twitter and Youtube*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Gerbaudo, Paolo. 2012. *Tweets and the Streets: Social Media and Contemporary Activism*. 345 Archway Road, London N6 5AA: Pluto Press.
- Gerbaudo, Paolo. 2015a. "Populism 2.0: Social Media Activism, the Generic Internet User and Interactive Direct Democracy." Pp. 67–87 in *Social Media, Politics, and the State: Protests, Revolutions, Riots, Crime and Policing in the Age of Facebook, Twitter and Youtube*, Routledge Research in Information Technology and Society, edited by D. Trottier and C. Fuchs. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Gerbaudo, Paolo. 2015b. "Protest Avatars as Memetic Signifiers: Political Profile Pictures and the Construction of Collective Identity on Social Media in the 2011 Protest Wave." *Information, Communication & Society* 18(8):916–29.

- Gerbaudo, Paolo and Emiliano Treré. 2015. "In Search of the 'We' of Social Media Activism: Introduction to the Special Issue on Social Media and Protest Identities." *Information, Communication & Society* 18(8):865–71.
- Gerhards, J. and M. S. Schafer. 2010. "Is the Internet a Better Public Sphere? Comparing Old and New Media in the USA and Germany." *New Media & Society* 12(1):143–60.
- Gibson, David R. 2000. "Seizing the Moment: The Problem of Conversational Agency." *Sociological Theory* 18(3):368–382.
- Gibson, David R. 2003. "Participation Shifts: Order and Differentiation in Group Conversation." *Social Forces* 81(June 2003):1335–1380.
- Gibson, David R. 2005. "Taking Turns and Talking Ties: Networks and Conversational Interaction." *American Journal of Sociology* 110(6):1561–1597.
- Gibson, David R. 2008. "How the Outside Gets In: Modeling Conversational Permeation." *Annual Review of Sociology* 34(1):359–384.
- Gibson, David R. 2010. "Making the Turn: Obligation, Engagement, and Alienation in Group Discussions." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 73(2):132–151.
- Gibson, David R. 2011. "Avoiding Catastrophe: The Interactional Missile Crisis." *American Journal of Sociology* 117(2):361–419.
- Gitlin, Todd. 2012. *Occupy Nation: The Roots, the Spirit, and the Promise of Occupy Wall Street*. NY: HarperCollins Publishers.
- Gladwell, Malcolm. 2010. "Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted." *The New Yorker*, October 4.
- Godart, Frédéric C. and Harrison C. White. 2010. "Switchings under Uncertainty: The Coming and Becoming of Meanings." *Poetics* 38(6):567–86.
- González-Bailón, Sandra, Javier Borge-Holthoefer, and Yamir Moreno. 2013. "Broadcasters and Hidden Influentials in Online Protest Diffusion." *American Behavioral Scientist* 57(7):943–965.
- González-Bailón, Sandra and Ning Wang. 2016. "Networked Discontent: The Anatomy of Protest Campaigns in Social Media." *Social Networks* 44:95–104.
- Gould, Roger V. 1995. *Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Gould, Roger V. 2003a. *Collision of Wills: How Ambiguity about Social Rank Breeds Conflict*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

- Gould, Roger V. 2003b. "Why Do Networks Matter." Pp. 233–57 in *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action, Comparative Politics*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Griffiths, Tom and Mark Steyvers. 2004. "Finding Scientific Topics." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 101:5228–35.
- Hampton, Keith N. 2017. "Studying the Digital: Directions and Challenges for Digital Methods." *Annual Review of Sociology* 43:167-188.
- Hauben, Michael and Ronda Hauben. 1997. *Netizens: On the History and Impact of Usenet and the Internet*. Los Alamitos, Calif: Wiley-IEEE Computer Society Pr.
- Hepburn, Katharine. 2013. "Introduction." Pp. 3–19 in *Mediation and Protest Movements*, edited by B. Cammerts, A. Mattoni, and P. McCurdy. Bristol, UK and Chicago, USA: intellect.
- Howard, Philip N. 2010. *The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
- Howard, Philip N. and Muzammil M. Hussain. 2013. *Democracy's Fourth Wave?: Digital Media and the Arab Spring*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hunt, Scott A. and Robert D. Benford. 2004. "Collective Identity, Solidarity, and Commitment." Pp. 433–57 in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi. Malden, Oxford, and Victoria: Blackwell Publishing.
- Johnston, Hank. 1995. "A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata." Pp. 217–46 in *Social Movements and Culture*, edited by H. Johnston and B. Klandermans. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Juris, Jeffrey S. 2008. *Networking Futures: The Movements Against Corporate Globalization*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.
- Kang, Jiyeon. 2009. "Coming to Terms with 'Unreasonable' Global Power: The 2002 South Korean Candlelight Vigils." *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 6(2):171–192.
- Kang, Jiyeon. 2016. *Igniting the Internet: Youth and Activism in Postauthoritarian South Korea*. Hawaii: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Kang, Jiyeon. 2017. "Internet Activism Transforming Street Politics: South Korea's 2008 'Mad Cow' Protests and New Democratic Sensibilities." *Media, Culture & Society* 39(5):750–61.

- Kavada, Anastasia. 2015. "Creating the Collective: Social Media, the Occupy Movement and Its Constitution as a Collective Actor." *Information, Communication & Society* 18(8):872–86.
- Kern, Thomas and Sang-Hui Nam. 2011. "Citizen Journalism: The Transformation of the Democratic Media Movement." in *South Korean Social Movements: From Democracy to Civil Society, Routledge Advances in Korean Studies*, edited by G.-W. Shin and P. Y. Chang. London and New York: Routledge.
- Kim, Chul-kyoo, Hae-jin Lee, Sunup Kim, and Cheol Lee. 2010a. "Changing Social Attitudes of Teenager Participants of 2008 Candlelight Vigil: What Happened to Them After a Year?." *Economy and Society* 85:265–90.
- Kim, Yong Ok. 2009. "Candlelight Rallies and Political Subjectivity of Women from the Feminist Perspective." *The Journal of Asian Women* 48(2):7–34.
- Kitts, James A. 2014. "Beyond Networks in Structural Theories of Exchange." *Advances in Group Processes* 31:263–98.
- Kok, Stanley and Pedro Domingos. n.d. "Extracting Semantic Networks from Text Via Relational Clustering." 1–16.
- Kreiss, Daniel and Zeynep Tufekci. 2012. "Occupying the Political: Occupy Wall Street, Collective Action, and the Rediscovery of Pragmatic Politics." *Cultural Studies-Critical Methodologies* 13:3. available at SSRN:<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2147711>.
- Kyunghyang Shinmoon. 2008. *Candlelight: A Report on 65 Days*. Seoul: Kyunghyang Shinmun.
- Lawyers for a Democratic Society. 2010. *Minbyun's Report on the 2008 Candlelight Protests*. Seoul: Lawyers for a Democratic Society.
- Lawyers for a Democratic Society. 2016. *Minbyun's Report on the 2008 Candlelight Protests II*. Seoul: Lawyers for a Democratic Society.
- Lawson, George. 2015. "Revolution, Nonviolence, and the Arab Uprising." *Mobilization* 20(4):453–70.
- Lee, Hae-jin. 2008. "The Candlelight Protests and Teenagers: Participation Experience and Subject Formation." *Economy and Society* 12(3):68–108.
- Lee, Jinsun. 2009. "New Power in Action: Internet Activism in the Contentious Politics of South Korea." Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey.
- Lee, Jinsun. 2013. "The Netizen Movement: A New Wave in Social Movements of Korea." Pp. 123–42 in *Contemporary South Korean Society: A critical perspective*, edited by H.-Y. Cho, L. Surendra, and H.-J. Cho. London and New York: Routledge.

- Lee, Yoonkyung. 2013. "Digital Opportunities and Democratic Participation in Tech-Savvy Korea." *Korea Observer* 44(4):545–67.
- Lessig, Lawrence. 2008. *Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy*. London: The Penguin Press.
- Lewis, Kevin, Marco Gonzalez, and Jason Kaufman. 2012. "Social Selection and Peer Influence in an Online Social Network." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 109(1):68–72.
- Lotan, Gilad, Erhardt Graeff, Mike Ananny, Devin Gaffney, Ian Pearce, and others. 2011. "The Revolutions Were Tweeted: Information Flows during the 2011 Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions." *International Journal of Communication* 5:31.
- Marwell, Gerald and Pamela Oliver. 1993. *The Critical Mass in Collective Action: A Micro-Social Theory*. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Marwell, Gerald, Pamela E. Oliver, and Ralph Prahl. 1988. "Social Networks and Collective Action: A Theory of the Critical Mass. III." *American Journal of Sociology* 94(3):502–34.
- Mattoni, Alice. 2013. "Repertoires of Communication in Social Movement Processes." Pp. 41–56 in *Mediation and Protest Movements*, edited by B. Cammerts, A. Mattoni, and P. McCurdy. Bristol, UK and Chicago, USA: intellect.
- McAdam, Doug. 1999. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*. 2nd ed. University of Chicago Press.
- McAdam, Doug. 2003. "Beyond Structural Analysis: Toward a More Dynamic Understanding of Social Movements." Pp. 281–98 in *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, edited by M. Diani and D. McAdam. New York: Oxford University Press.
- McAdam, Doug and Ronnelle Paulsen. 1993. "Specifying the Relationship between Social Ties and Activism." *American Journal of Sociology* 640–667.
- McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. *Dynamics of Contention*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory." *American Journal of Sociology* 82(6):1212.
- McFarland, Daniel A., Kevin Lewis, and Amir Goldberg. 2016. "Sociology in the Era of Big Data: The Ascent of Forensic Social Science." *The American Sociologist* 47(1):12–35.
- McLean, Paul. 2007. *The Art of the Network: Strategic Interaction and Patronage in Renaissance Florence*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

- McLean, Paul. 2017. *Culture in Networks*. London, UK and Malden, MA: Polity.
- McLean, Paul D. 1998. "A Frame Analysis of Favor Seeking in the Renaissance: Agency, Networks, and Political Culture." *American Journal of Sociology* 104(1):51–91.
- Melucci, Alberto. 1989. *Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society*. London: Hutchinson Radius.
- Menchik, Daniel A. and Xiaoli Tian. 2008. "Putting Social Context into Text: The Semiotics of E-mail Interaction." *American Journal of Sociology* 114(2):332–70.
- Milan, Stefania. 2015. "From Social Movements to Cloud Protesting: The Evolution of Collective Identity." *Information, Communication & Society* 18(8):887–900.
- Minari and Hae k. 2009. *Shall We Protest?* Available at https://archive.org/details/Shall_we_protest_-_Chotbul_Documentary.
- Mische, Ann. 2003. "Cross-Talk in Movements: Reconceiving the Culture-Network Link." Pp. 258–280 in *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, edited by M. Diani and D. McAdam. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mische, Ann. 2008. *Partisan Publics: Communication and Contention across Brazilian Youth Activist Network*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mische, Ann. 2011. "Relational Sociology, Culture, and Agency." Pp. 80–98 in *The Sage Handbook of Social Network Analysis*, edited by J. Scott and P. Carrington. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Mohr, J. W., R. Wagner-Pacifici, and R. L. Breiger. 2015. "Toward a Computational Hermeneutics." *Big Data & Society* 2(2):1–8.
- Mohr, John W., Robin Wagner-Pacifici, Ronald L. Breiger, and Petko Bogdanov. 2013. "Graphing the Grammar of Motives in National Security Strategies: Cultural Interpretation, Automated Text Analysis and the Drama of Global Politics." *Poetics* 41(6):670–700.
- Monterde, Arnau, Antonio Calleja-López, Miguel Aguilera, Xabier E. Barandiaran, and John Postill. 2015. "Multitudinous Identities: A Qualitative and Network Analysis of the 15M Collective Identity." *Information, Communication & Society* 18(8):930–50.
- Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. 2011. "Nonviolent Resistance in the Arab Spring: The Critical Role of Military-Opposition Alliances: Nonviolence, Mutiny, and the Arab Spring." *Swiss Political Science Review* 17(4):485–91.

- Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. 2015. "Nonviolent Resistance Research." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 20(4):415–26.
- Nissenbaum, Helen. 1999. "The Meaning of Anonymity in an Information Age." *The Information Society* 15(2):141–144.
- de Nooy, Wouter. 2009. "Formalizing Symbolic Interactionism." *Methodological Innovations Online* 4(1):39–51.
- de Nooy, Wouter. 2015. "Structure from Interaction Events." *Big Data & Society* July–December:1–4.
- Oliver, Pamela, Gerald Marwell, and Ruy Teixeira. 1985. "A Theory of the Critical Mass. I. Interdependence, Group Heterogeneity, and the Production of Collective Action." *American Journal of Sociology* 522–556.
- Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press.
- Park, Yi-Jong and Arum Suh. 2011. "Politicization of Internet Communities and the Candlelight Demonstration of Year 2008." *Hanguk Sa-hoe Kwahak* 33:25–48.
- Passy, Florence. 2003. "Social Networks Matter. But How?" Pp. 21–48 in *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, edited by M. Diani and D. McAdam. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Passy, Florence and Gian-Andrea Monsch. 2014. "Do Social Networks Really Matter in Contentious Politics?" *Social Movement Studies* 13(1):22–47.
- Pavan, Elena. 2014a. "Embedding Digital Communications within Collective Action Networks: A Multidimensional Network Approach." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 19(4):441–455.
- Piven, Frances Fox and Richard A. Cloward. 1978. *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail*. New York, NY: Vintage.
- Piven, Frances Fox and Richard A. Cloward. 1992. "Normalizing Collective Protest." Pp. 301–25 in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, edited by A. D. Moriris and C. M. Mueller. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Polletta, Francesca. 2006. *It Was Like a Fever: Storytelling in Protest and Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Polletta, Francesca and James M. Jasper. 2001. "Collective Identity and Social Movements." *Annual Review of Sociology* 27:283–305.

- Rainie, Lee and Barry Wellman. 2012. *Networked: The New Social Operating System*. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: MIT Press.
- Ramage, Daniel, Susan Dumais, and Dan Liebling. 2010. "Characterizing Microblogs with Topic Models."
- Rheingold, Howard. 2002. *Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution*. Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus Publishing.
- Roth, Camille. 2006. "Binding Social and Semantic Networks." 1–12. available at camille.roth.free.fr/travaux/reseaux.060505.pdf.
- Shifman, Limor. 2014. *Memes in Digital Culture*. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The MIT Press.
- Shirky, Clay. 2011. "The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political Change." *Foreign Affairs* 90(1):28–41.
- Simmel, Georg. 1955. *Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations*. New York, NY: The Free Press.
- Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steve K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. 1986. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micro-Mobilization and Movement Participation." *American Sociological Review* 51:464–81.
- Somers, Margaret R. 1994. "The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network Approach." *Theory and Society* 23(5):605–649.
- Song, Felicia Wu. 2010a. "Theorizing Web 2.0." *Information, Communication & Society* 13(2):249–275.
- Song, Kiho. 2008. *Kop-Ch'ang-Ŭl Wi-Han Pyŏn-Lon*. Seoul: Pressin Book.
- Steinberg, Marc W. 1998. "Tilting the Frame: Considerations on Collective Action Framing from a Discursive Turn." *Theory and Society* 27(6):845–872.
- Steinberg, Marc W. 1999. "The Talk and Back Talk of Collective Action: A Dialogic Analysis of Repertoires of Discourse among Nineteenth-Century English Cotton Spinners." *American Journal of Sociology* 105(3):736–780.
- Steyvers, Mark and Tom Griffiths. n.d. "Probabilistic Topic Models." in *Latent Semantic Analysis: A Road to Meaning*, edited by T. Landauer, D. McNamara, S. Dennis, and W. Kintsch. Laurence: Erlbaum.
- Steyvers, Mark and Joshua B. Tenenbaum. 2005. "The Large-Scale Structure of Semantic Networks: Statistical Analyses and a Model of Semantic Growth." *Cognitive Science* 29(1):41–78.

- Taylor, Verta and Nella Van Dyke. 2004. "'Get up, Stand up': Tactical Repertoires of Social Movements." Pp. 262–93 in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi. Malden, Oxford, and Victoria: Blackwell Publishing.
- The National Committee of Activists Resisting the Importation of U.S. Beef at the Risk of Mad cow disease. 2008. *The National Committee's Launching*.
- The National Committee of Activists Resisting the Importation of U.S. Beef at the Risk of Mad cow disease. 2009. *The National Committee's Report*.
- Tilly, Charles. 1993. "Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834." *Social Science History* 17(2):253.
- Tilly, Charles. 1995. *Popular Contention in Great Britain 1758-1834*. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press.
- Tilly, Charles. 1997. "Parliamentarization of Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834." *Theory and Society* 26(2-3):245–73.
- Tilly, Charles. 2005. *Identities, Boundaries and Social Ties*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
- Tilly, Charles. 2008. *Contentious Performances*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Tremayne, Mark. 2014. "Anatomy of Protest in the Digital Era: A Network Analysis of Twitter and Occupy Wall Street." *Social Movement Studies* 13(1):110–26.
- Tufekci, Zeynep. 2014. "Social Movements and Governments in the Digital Age: Evaluating a Complex Landscape." *Journal of International Affairs* 68(1):1–19.
- Tufekci, Zeynep. 2017. *Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Tufekci, Zeynep and Christopher Wilson. 2012. "Social Media and the Decision to Participate in Political Protest: Observations From Tahrir Square." *Journal of Communication* 62(2):363–79.
- Ulcaman. 2003a. "The Politics of Netizens (1): The Politics of 'Copy and Paste.'" Retrieved March 4, 2016 (http://www.ddanzi.com/?mid=ddanziNews&document_srl=608384).
- Ulcaman. 2003b. "The Politics of Netizens (2): Propaganda Has Expired." Retrieved March 4, 2016 (<http://www.ddanzi.com/ddanziNews/608459>).
- Vicari, Stefania. 2010. "Measuring Collective Action Frames: A Linguistic Approach to Frame Analysis." *Poetics* 38:504–25.

- Walder, Andrew G. 2009. "Political Sociology and Social Movements." *Annual Review of Sociology* 35(1):393–412.
- Walgrave, Stefaan, W. Bennett, Jeroen Van Laer, and Christian Breunig. 2011. "Multiple Engagements and Network Bridging in Contentious Politics: Digital Media Use of Protest Participants." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 16(3):325–349.
- White, Harrison C. and F. Godart. 2008. "Meaning Emerges in Relation Dynamics." *Online Verfügbar Unter Http://Www. Relational-Sociology. de/White. Pdf, Zuletzt Geprüft Am 30:2009.*
- Yeung, King-To. 2005. "What Does Love Mean ? Exploring Network Culture in Two Network Settings." *Social Forces* 84(1):391–420.
- Yoo, Young-chul. 2012. "Information Transmission, Encouragement of Civic Participation, and Decision on It: Participation in Candlelight PRotests and Online Communities." *Journal of Korean Association for Regional Information Society* 15(2):103–20.
- Yun, Seongyi and Woo Young Chang. 2011. "New Media and Political Socialization of Teenagers: The Case of the 2008 Candlelight Protests in Korea." *Asian Perspective* 35(1):135–62.
- Yun, Seongyi and Woo-Young Chang. 2011. "Political Participation of Teenagers in the Information Era." *Social Science Computer Review* 29(2):242–49.