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Signaling under threats: evidence of voluntary disclosure in corporate control contests

Descriptive

TypeOfResource
Text
TitleInfo
Title
Signaling under threats: evidence of voluntary disclosure in corporate control contests
Name (type = personal)
NamePart (type = family)
Lobo
NamePart (type = given)
Gerald J.
Affiliation
University of Houston
Role
RoleTerm (authority = marcrt); (type = text)
author
Name (type = personal)
NamePart (type = family)
Xie
NamePart (type = given)
Kangzhen
Affiliation
Seton hall University
Role
RoleTerm (authority = marcrt); (type = text)
author
Name (authority = orcid); (authorityURI = http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/identifiers/orcid.html); (type = personal); (valueURI = http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9129-4400)
NamePart (type = family)
Yan
NamePart (type = given)
Claire J.
Affiliation
Accounting & Information Systems, Rutgers University
Role
RoleTerm (authority = marcrt); (type = text)
author
Name (authority = RutgersOrg-Department); (type = corporate)
NamePart
Accounting & Information Systems
Name (authority = RutgersOrg-School); (type = corporate)
NamePart
Rutgers Business School-Newark and New Brunswick (RBS)
Genre (authority = RULIB-FS)
Article, Refereed
Genre (authority = NISO JAV)
Submitted Manuscript Under Review (SMUR)
Note (type = peerReview)
Peer reviewed
OriginInfo
DateCreated (encoding = w3cdtf); (keyDate = yes); (qualifier = exact)
2019
Abstract (type = Abstract)
We investigate voluntary disclosure strategies in contested takeovers and the associated economic consequences. Using a difference-in-differences research design and propensity score matching, we find that relative to friendly takeovers, target management in contested takeovers provides more earnings guidance and conveys more good news during the takeover. Moreover, voluntary disclosure helps contested targets negotiate a better offer and the results are stronger for targets with more information asymmetry. Collectively, targets adopt voluntary disclosure and alter their strategies under the threat of contested takeover to enhance their bargaining power. Voluntary disclosure by contested targets serves as a negotiation tactic that potentially benefits target shareholders.
Language
LanguageTerm (authority = ISO 639-3:2007); (type = text)
English
PhysicalDescription
InternetMediaType
application/pdf
Extent
1 online resource (42 pages)
Subject (authority = local)
Topic
Voluntary disclosure
Subject (authority = local)
Topic
Contested takeover
Subject (authority = local)
Topic
Takeover consequences
Extension
DescriptiveEvent
Type
Citation
AssociatedObject
Name
Journal of Accounting Auditing & Finance
Type
Journal
Relationship
Has part
RelatedItem (type = host)
TitleInfo
Title
Yan, Claire J.
Identifier (type = local)
rucore30270400001
Location
PhysicalLocation (authority = marcorg); (displayLabel = Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey)
NjNbRU
Identifier (type = doi)
doi:10.7282/t3-ekc4-kq81
Genre (authority = ExL-Esploro)
Preprint
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Rights

RightsDeclaration (AUTHORITY = FS); (TYPE = [FS] statement #1); (ID = rulibRdec0004)
Copyright for scholarly resources published in RUcore is retained by the copyright holder. By virtue of its appearance in this open access medium, you are free to use this resource, with proper attribution, in educational and other non-commercial settings. Other uses, such as reproduction or republication, may require the permission of the copyright holder.
Copyright
Status
Copyright protected
Availability
Status
Open
Reason
Permission or license
RightsEvent
Type
Permission or license
AssociatedObject
Type
License
Name
Multiple author license v. 1
Detail
I hereby grant to Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (Rutgers) the non-exclusive right to retain, reproduce, and distribute the deposited work (Work) in whole or in part, in and from its electronic format, without fee. This agreement does not represent a transfer of copyright to Rutgers.Rutgers may make and keep more than one copy of the Work for purposes of security, backup, preservation, and access and may migrate the Work to any medium or format for the purpose of preservation and access in the future. Rutgers will not make any alteration, other than as allowed by this agreement, to the Work.I represent and warrant to Rutgers that the Work is my original work. I also represent that the Work does not, to the best of my knowledge, infringe or violate any rights of others.I further represent and warrant that I have obtained all necessary rights to permit Rutgers to reproduce and distribute the Work and that any third-party owned content is clearly identified and acknowledged within the Work.By granting this license, I acknowledge that I have read and agreed to the terms of this agreement and all related RUcore and Rutgers policies.
RightsEvent
Type
Embargo
DateTime (encoding = w3cdtf); (point = end); (qualifier = exact); (keyDate = no)
2022-11-11
DateTime (encoding = w3cdtf); (point = start); (qualifier = exact); (keyDate = no)
2019-11-11
Detail
Access to this PDF has been restricted at the author's request. It will be publicly available after November 11, 2022.
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Technical

RULTechMD (ID = TECHNICAL1)
ContentModel
Document
CreatingApplication
Version
1.5
DateCreated (point = end); (encoding = w3cdtf); (qualifier = exact)
2019-11-11T10:56:56
DateCreated (point = end); (encoding = w3cdtf); (qualifier = exact)
2019-11-11T10:56:56
ApplicationName
Microsoft® Word 2016
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