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When perception bypasses truth: attention, bias, and the structure of social stereotypes
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Baker, Anna Austin. When perception bypasses truth: attention, bias, and the structure of social stereotypes. Retrieved from https://doi.org/doi:10.7282/t3-hg8a-0b49

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TitleWhen perception bypasses truth: attention, bias, and the structure of social stereotypes
NameBaker, Anna Austin (author); Egan, Andrew (chair); Schellenberg, Susanna (internal member); Guerrero, Alex (internal member); Mandelbaum, Eric (outside member); Firestone, Chaz (outside member); Rutgers University; School of Graduate Studies
Date Created2019
Other Date2019-10 (degree)
SubjectPhilosophy, Philosophy of mind, Perception
Extent1 online resource (viii, 70 pages) : illustrations
DescriptionIs perception accurate? How wide spread is inaccuracy in perception and under what conditions do our perceptual capacities undermine our ability to accurately perceive? This dissertation examines two examples of perceptual inaccuracy: attention altering perceptual phenomenology (making attended to stimuli appear bigger, brighter, and higher in spatial frequency) and social stereotypes impairing low-level perceptual judgments. There is a prevailing assumption in philosophy and cognitive science that perception is--and functions to be--truth oriented. However, I herein argue that our perceptual faculties often fail to deliver truth. Moreover, understanding how our cognitive architecture gives rise to systematic perceptual inaccuracy can provide us with insight into just how much our experience of the world is shaped by our social categories and computational limitations.
In chapters 1 and 2, I consider the way social stereotypes shape perceptual judgments. We know social stereotypes influence many of our judgments. Women, for example, are deemed less likely to succeed than men in especially intellectually demanding tasks (Bian et al. 2018). This suggests that higher-order judgments about qualities like 'brilliance' or 'genius' can be shaped by our gender stereotypes. But might stereotypes be so cognitively entrenched that they could affect more basic perceptual judgments as well? For example, would harboring the stereotype 'doctors are men' make it more difficult to visually process a female doctor? These chapters empirically and philosophically consider this question and its larger social ramifications. I argue that my empirical work with Jorge Morales and Chaz Firestone suggests that stereotyping has a considerably wider scope of causal influence than has been appreciated in the philosophical and psychological literature, which can shed light of larger patterns of discrimination.
In chapter 3, I take on another, more basic, facet of perceptual inaccuracy--the phenomenological effects of voluntary and involuntary attention. I argue that much of the empirical evidence supports the interpretation that attention inaccurately distorts many aspects of our perceptual experience. On the face of it, these findings appear to be difficult to reconcile with the view that perception functions to furnish us with accurate representations of the world. However, rather than claim that our perceptual systems are constantly in the process of malfunctioning, I argue that perception instead functions to guide action and that this can satisfactorily explain many examples of perceptual inaccuracy.
NotePh.D.
NoteIncludes bibliographical references
Genretheses, ETD doctoral
Persistent URLhttps://doi.org/doi:10.7282/t3-hg8a-0b49
LanguageEnglish
CollectionSchool of Graduate Studies Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Organization NameRutgers, The State University of New Jersey
RightsThe author owns the copyright to this work.
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