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The true and the good
Descriptive
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Title
The true and the good
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Black
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David
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David Black
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author
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Husak
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Douglas
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Douglas Husak
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Advisory Committee
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chair
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Sosa
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Ernest
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Ernest Sosa
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Advisory Committee
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co-chair
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Fitelson
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Branden
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Branden Fitelson
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Advisory Committee
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internal member
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Fricker
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Miranda
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Miranda Fricker
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Advisory Committee
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Rutgers University
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School of Graduate Studies
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theses
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2019
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2019-10
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English
Abstract
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Ethics and epistemology are both normative fields. Philosophers talk about what we should do, what we have reason to believe, whether truth or pleasure is the ultimate good. Since they are both normative, we should expect that there are structural and substantive analogies between the two fields. In this dissertation, I develop and explore four of those analogies.
In “Epistemic Punishments”, I argue that an aspect of our epistemic practice looks a lot like the informal, social punishments we impose on each other. Moreover, epistemic punishments can be justified in the same way that the more familiar social sanctions are. “Liberal Neutrality and False Beliefs” argues against a core tenet of liberalism. Though the state need not respect disagreement about fact, liberal neutrality says that the state must respect disagreements about value. Because of the similarities between action and belief evaluation, liberal neutralists cannot maintain this asymmetry.
In “Praiseworthiness (and Knowledge) from Falsehood", I present a counterexample to the claim that an action is praiseworthy when it is done for the right reasons. This counterexample runs parallel to an epistemic one. Cases of knowledge from falsehood show that you can know p even if you don't believe p for the right reasons. I conclude that both knowledge and praise require only
that your reasons are “good enough”.
Finally, “Moral Swamping” poses a moral version of an epistemic problem. The swamping problem challenges us to explain why it's good to form justified beliefs. A true belief, based on good evidence, is no more true than the same belief based on superstition. A false belief, based on good evidence, is no less false than one picked from a hat. I argue that there is a similar puzzle in explaining the value of freedom. An agent who pursues the good freely need not do a better job than one who is compelled. An agent who pursues the bad freely won't necessarily perform better than one in the grips of addiction, manipulation, or irrationality. Why, then, should we care about freedom at all?
In “Epistemic Punishments”, I argue that an aspect of our epistemic practice looks a lot like the informal, social punishments we impose on each other. Moreover, epistemic punishments can be justified in the same way that the more familiar social sanctions are. “Liberal Neutrality and False Beliefs” argues against a core tenet of liberalism. Though the state need not respect disagreement about fact, liberal neutrality says that the state must respect disagreements about value. Because of the similarities between action and belief evaluation, liberal neutralists cannot maintain this asymmetry.
In “Praiseworthiness (and Knowledge) from Falsehood", I present a counterexample to the claim that an action is praiseworthy when it is done for the right reasons. This counterexample runs parallel to an epistemic one. Cases of knowledge from falsehood show that you can know p even if you don't believe p for the right reasons. I conclude that both knowledge and praise require only
that your reasons are “good enough”.
Finally, “Moral Swamping” poses a moral version of an epistemic problem. The swamping problem challenges us to explain why it's good to form justified beliefs. A true belief, based on good evidence, is no more true than the same belief based on superstition. A false belief, based on good evidence, is no less false than one picked from a hat. I argue that there is a similar puzzle in explaining the value of freedom. An agent who pursues the good freely need not do a better job than one who is compelled. An agent who pursues the bad freely won't necessarily perform better than one in the grips of addiction, manipulation, or irrationality. Why, then, should we care about freedom at all?
Subject
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Topic
Philosophy
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Truth
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Topic
Good and evil
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Rutgers University Electronic Theses and Dissertations
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ETD_10169
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1 online resource (x, 162 pages)
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Ph.D.
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Includes bibliographical references
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School of Graduate Studies Electronic Theses and Dissertations
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rucore10001600001
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doi:10.7282/t3-831e-9c82
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ETD doctoral
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Rights
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The author owns the copyright to this work.
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Black
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David
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Permission or license
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2019-08-15 11:41:44
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David Black
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Rutgers University. School of Graduate Studies
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Author Agreement License
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I hereby grant to the Rutgers University Libraries and to my school the non-exclusive right to archive, reproduce and distribute my thesis or dissertation, in whole or in part, and/or my abstract, in whole or in part, in and from an electronic format, subject to the release date subsequently stipulated in this submittal form and approved by my school. I represent and stipulate that the thesis or dissertation and its abstract are my original work, that they do not infringe or violate any rights of others, and that I make these grants as the sole owner of the rights to my thesis or dissertation and its abstract. I represent that I have obtained written permissions, when necessary, from the owner(s) of each third party copyrighted matter to be included in my thesis or dissertation and will supply copies of such upon request by my school. I acknowledge that RU ETD and my school will not distribute my thesis or dissertation or its abstract if, in their reasonable judgment, they believe all such rights have not been secured. I acknowledge that I retain ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use all or part of this thesis or dissertation in future works, such as articles or books.
Copyright
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Copyright protected
Availability
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Open
Reason
Permission or license
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2019-08-15T11:17:59
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2019-08-15T11:17:59
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