DescriptionFor decades, social scientists and legal academics have debated the desirability of strong courts in democratic systems of government. In these debates, however, sweeping claims about the impact of judicial intervention in politics frequently obscure the very different roles that judiciaries play cross-nationally. Moreover, these claims are seldom accompanied by rigorous empirical evidence. Taking these debates as my point of departure, I argue that the institutional context in which judiciaries operate conditions their impact on the democracies they serve. In particular, I distinguish between high courts whose judicial review merely constrains government action and high courts whose judicial review can also mandate the government provide material goods and services. Drawing on original survey experiments in Colombia and Chile, South America, elite interviews, and qualitative case comparisons of the two countries, I find that when courts practice judicial review that constrains government action, it negatively impacts the political participation of ordinary citizens and can lead to increased support for violations of democratic norms. I find no such ill effects when courts practice judicial review that mandates the government provide material goods and services. In neither case do I find evidence that judicial review leads to decreased judicial legitimacy, contrary to the implications of arguments made by many skeptics of judicial power.