Description
TitleEssence, definition, and scientific inquiry in Aristotle
Date Created2020
Other Date2020-05 (degree)
Extent1 online resource (iv, 79 pages)
DescriptionIn his Posterior Analytics, Aristotle articulates a theory of ‘science’ (epistēmē) according to which each science is organized around certain indemonstrable principles (archai) concerning the kinds studied by that science. The most prominent of the three types of principles discussed by Aristotle are definitions (horismoi). In this dissertation, I clarify Aristotle’s account of how we can come to know what the definition of a kind is. I examine three existing interpretations of Aristotle’s views on this issue, namely, the Intuitionist Interpretation (defended by Frede, Irwin, and Ross), the Explanationist Interpretation (defended by Bolton, Charles, and Lennox), and the Socratic Interpretation (defended by Bronstein). I argue that the Explanationist Interpretation is superior to its competitors. In doing so, I provide new arguments against the Intuitionist Interpretation and a serious challenge to the Socratic Interpretation, addressing in particular the as of yet unchallenged arguments which David Bronstein provides in support of the Socratic Interpretation and against the Explanationist Interpretation in his 2016 book, Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning: The Posterior Analytics. Finally, in my last chapter, I defend the need for a refined version of the Explanationist Interpretation. In contrast to leading Explanationists like Robert Bolton, David Charles, and James Lennox, I argue that Aristotle in fact proposes two different but complementary accounts of how we can come to know what the essence of something is. Consequently, I develop what I call an ‘Enriched Explanationist Interpretation' which takes into account both of these distinct elements in Aristotle’s epistemology of essence.
NotePh.D.
NoteIncludes bibliographical references
Genretheses, ETD doctoral
LanguageEnglish
CollectionSchool of Graduate Studies Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Organization NameRutgers, The State University of New Jersey
RightsThe author owns the copyright to this work.