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theses

ETD doctoral

This dissertation broadens the diversionary theory of war to account for both lower-levels of foreign conflict and the breadth of possible diversionary actions for authoritarian regimes. First, I present a theory of diversionary choice that argues a particular regime-types available institutions and necessary centers of political power are going to be the main determinant in choosing a potential diversionary action. I posit that the more institutionalized a regime is, the severity of a chosen diversion will be inversely correlated with said institutional strength and complexity. As authoritarian regimes are not automatically prone to pursue the archetypical “rally-round-the-flag” effect due to the lessened influence of the broader population on governing stability and continuity, chosen diversions will make most use of extant institutions in order to enhance or preserve the critical segments of political power. Greater institutionalization allows for the exploitation and manipulation of smaller diversions to derive political benefits, while weaker institutions require a direct-effects approach or more grand and engaging spectacles.

I then produce a framework of commonly accepted nondemocratic regime-types classified along institutional lines. Single-party regimes with their compartmentalized and bureaucratic nature are considered the most institutionally complex. Military Juntas represent a moderately institutionalized regime with robust institutions supporting the armed forces, but weak institutions in the civilian sector. Personalist regimes represent the least-institutionalized regimes, with the centralization of power around a single individual causing the decay and weakening of autonomous institutions.

I then test my theory qualitatively with three rigorous case studies, two of which are historical, one of which is ongoing at the time of this dissertation. I analyze the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis and the tenure of Mao Zedong for personalist regimes, whereupon repeated failures of social engineering and widespread discreditation of Stalinism served to weaken Mao personal prestige, necessitating a violent diversion to compensate for the institutional malaise resulting from Mao’s weakness. I then look at the invasion of the Falklands by Leopoldo Galtieri as an attempt to reaffirm the status and continued relevance of the military even in light of worsening economic conditions and a potential return to civilian rule. My final case study focuses on the ongoing ownership dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku islands. The current institutional complexity and strength of China allows for the aggrandizement of even small-scale diplomatic disputes and the extraction of political benefits.

ETD_11418

Ph.D.

Includes bibliographical references

doi:10.7282/t3-1hbh-5941

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