Home
Resource
Surprising suspensions: the epistemic value of being ignorant
PDF
PDF format is widely accepted and good for printing.
Plug-in required
PDF-1(7.65 MB)
Citation & Export
View Usage Statistics
Staff View

Citation & Export
Hide

Simple citation

Willard-Kyle, Christopher. Surprising suspensions: the epistemic value of being ignorant. Retrieved from https://doi.org/doi:10.7282/t3-w6fc-bs27

Export

Click here for information about Citation Management Tools at Rutgers.

Statistics
Hide

Description

TitleSurprising suspensions: the epistemic value of being ignorant
NameWillard-Kyle, Christopher (author); Sosa, Ernest (chair); McGrath, Matthew (internal member); Schellenberg, Susanna (internal member); Lackey, Jennifer (outside member); Rutgers University; School of Graduate Studies
Date Created2021
Other Date2021-01 (degree)
SubjectIgnorance, Knowledge, Infallibility, Assertion, Inquiry, Position to know, Delayed gratification, Norm of assertion, Moorean paradox, Philosophy
Extent1 online resource (viii, 190 pages)
DescriptionKnowledge is good, ignorance is bad. So it seems, anyway. But in this dissertation, I argue that some ignorance is epistemically valuable. Sometimes, we should suspend judgment even though by believing we would achieve knowledge. In this apology for ignorance (ignorance, that is, of a certain kind), I defend the following four theses:

1) Sometimes, we should continue inquiry in ignorance, even though we are in a position to know the answer, in order to achieve more than mere knowledge (e.g. understanding) while minimizing the effects of confirmation bias.

2) It’s false that we should believe every proposition such that we are guaranteed to be right about it (and even such that we are guaranteed to know it) if we believe it.

3) Being in a position to know is the norm of assertion: importantly, this does not require belief or (thereby) knowledge, so proper assertion can survive speaker-ignorance.

4) It can be permissible and conversationally useful to tell audiences things that it is logically impossible for them to come to know: Proper assertion can survive (necessary) audience-side ignorance.

Cumulatively, this project suggests that, properly understood, ignorance has an important role to play in the good epistemic life.
NotePh.D.
NoteIncludes bibliographical references
Genretheses, ETD doctoral
Persistent URLhttps://doi.org/doi:10.7282/t3-w6fc-bs27
LanguageEnglish
CollectionSchool of Graduate Studies Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Organization NameRutgers, The State University of New Jersey
RightsThe author owns the copyright to this work.
Version 8.5.5
Rutgers University Libraries - Copyright ©2024