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Stepping in, stepping out: the dynamic relationship between interlocking directors and CEO compensation
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Chen, Su. Stepping in, stepping out: the dynamic relationship between interlocking directors and CEO compensation. Retrieved from https://doi.org/doi:10.7282/t3-xtzk-sw87

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TitleStepping in, stepping out: the dynamic relationship between interlocking directors and CEO compensation
NameChen, Su (author); Feng, Jie (chair); Fulmer, Ingrid (internal member); Han, Joo Hun (internal member); Rutgers University; School of Graduate Studies
Date Created2021
Other Date2021-01 (degree)
SubjectBoard dynamics, Industrial Relations and Human Resources
Extent1 online resource (v, 64 pages)
DescriptionCombining literature on CEO pay-setting process, board processes, and group dynamics, this study explores the influence of interlocking director changes on subsequent CEO pay raises. Particularly, I focus on two types of interlocking director changes—the decrease and increase in the number of interlocking directors—and consider their different impact on CEO pay raises. Furthermore, I hypothesize that the relationship between interlocking director changes and subsequent CEO pay raises is contingent on the CEO relative pay (of the changing interlocked firms vs. the focal firm), female board representation, and the interaction between CEO relative pay and female board representation. Based on 4,510 firm-year observations from 702 S&P firms over 10 years (2009-2018), I found that interlocking director decrease is negatively associated with subsequent CEO pay raises, yet there is no significant impact of interlocking director increase on subsequent CEO pay raises. The findings also support the moderating roles of the CEO relative pay and female board representation. This study provides a dynamic view for understanding the link between interlocking directors and CEO compensation as well as supports the value of female board representation.
NoteM.S.
NoteIncludes bibliographical references
Genretheses, ETD graduate
Persistent URLhttps://doi.org/doi:10.7282/t3-xtzk-sw87
LanguageEnglish
CollectionSchool of Graduate Studies Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Organization NameRutgers, The State University of New Jersey
RightsThe author owns the copyright to this work.
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