Staff View
Stepping in, stepping out: the dynamic relationship between interlocking directors and CEO compensation

Descriptive

TitleInfo
Title
Stepping in, stepping out: the dynamic relationship between interlocking directors and CEO compensation
Name (type = personal)
NamePart (type = family)
Chen
NamePart (type = given)
Su
NamePart (type = date)
1994
DisplayForm
Su Chen
Role
RoleTerm (authority = RULIB); (type = text)
author
Name (type = personal)
NamePart (type = family)
Feng
NamePart (type = given)
Jie
DisplayForm
Jie Feng
Affiliation
Advisory Committee
Role
RoleTerm (authority = RULIB)
chair
Name (type = personal)
NamePart (type = family)
Fulmer
NamePart (type = given)
Ingrid
DisplayForm
Ingrid Fulmer
Affiliation
Advisory Committee
Role
RoleTerm (authority = RULIB)
internal member
Name (type = personal)
NamePart (type = family)
Han
NamePart (type = given)
Joo Hun
DisplayForm
Joo Hun Han
Affiliation
Advisory Committee
Role
RoleTerm (authority = RULIB)
internal member
Name (type = corporate)
NamePart
Rutgers University
Role
RoleTerm (authority = RULIB)
degree grantor
Name (type = corporate)
NamePart
School of Graduate Studies
Role
RoleTerm (authority = RULIB)
school
TypeOfResource
Text
Genre (authority = marcgt)
theses
OriginInfo
DateCreated (qualifier = exact); (encoding = w3cdtf); (keyDate = yes)
2021
DateOther (type = degree); (qualifier = exact); (encoding = w3cdtf)
2021-01
Language
LanguageTerm (authority = ISO 639-3:2007); (type = text)
English
Abstract
Combining literature on CEO pay-setting process, board processes, and group dynamics, this study explores the influence of interlocking director changes on subsequent CEO pay raises. Particularly, I focus on two types of interlocking director changes—the decrease and increase in the number of interlocking directors—and consider their different impact on CEO pay raises. Furthermore, I hypothesize that the relationship between interlocking director changes and subsequent CEO pay raises is contingent on the CEO relative pay (of the changing interlocked firms vs. the focal firm), female board representation, and the interaction between CEO relative pay and female board representation. Based on 4,510 firm-year observations from 702 S&P firms over 10 years (2009-2018), I found that interlocking director decrease is negatively associated with subsequent CEO pay raises, yet there is no significant impact of interlocking director increase on subsequent CEO pay raises. The findings also support the moderating roles of the CEO relative pay and female board representation. This study provides a dynamic view for understanding the link between interlocking directors and CEO compensation as well as supports the value of female board representation.
Subject (authority = local)
Topic
Board dynamics
Subject (authority = RUETD)
Topic
Industrial Relations and Human Resources
RelatedItem (type = host)
TitleInfo
Title
Rutgers University Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Identifier (type = RULIB)
ETD
Identifier
ETD_11302
PhysicalDescription
Form (authority = gmd)
InternetMediaType
application/pdf
InternetMediaType
text/xml
Extent
1 online resource (v, 64 pages)
Note (type = degree)
M.S.
Note (type = bibliography)
Includes bibliographical references
Genre (authority = ExL-Esploro)
ETD graduate
RelatedItem (type = host)
TitleInfo
Title
School of Graduate Studies Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Identifier (type = local)
rucore10001600001
Location
PhysicalLocation (authority = marcorg); (displayLabel = Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey)
NjNbRU
Identifier (type = doi)
doi:10.7282/t3-xtzk-sw87
Back to the top

Rights

RightsDeclaration (ID = rulibRdec0006)
The author owns the copyright to this work.
RightsHolder (type = personal)
Name
FamilyName
Chen
GivenName
Su
Role
Copyright Holder
RightsEvent
Type
Permission or license
DateTime (encoding = w3cdtf); (qualifier = exact); (point = start)
2020-10-31 17:01:55
AssociatedEntity
Name
Su Chen
Role
Copyright holder
Affiliation
Rutgers University. School of Graduate Studies
AssociatedObject
Type
License
Name
Author Agreement License
Detail
I hereby grant to the Rutgers University Libraries and to my school the non-exclusive right to archive, reproduce and distribute my thesis or dissertation, in whole or in part, and/or my abstract, in whole or in part, in and from an electronic format, subject to the release date subsequently stipulated in this submittal form and approved by my school. I represent and stipulate that the thesis or dissertation and its abstract are my original work, that they do not infringe or violate any rights of others, and that I make these grants as the sole owner of the rights to my thesis or dissertation and its abstract. I represent that I have obtained written permissions, when necessary, from the owner(s) of each third party copyrighted matter to be included in my thesis or dissertation and will supply copies of such upon request by my school. I acknowledge that RU ETD and my school will not distribute my thesis or dissertation or its abstract if, in their reasonable judgment, they believe all such rights have not been secured. I acknowledge that I retain ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use all or part of this thesis or dissertation in future works, such as articles or books.
Copyright
Status
Copyright protected
Availability
Status
Open
Reason
Permission or license
Back to the top

Technical

RULTechMD (ID = TECHNICAL1)
ContentModel
ETD
OperatingSystem (VERSION = 5.1)
windows xp
CreatingApplication
Version
1.7
ApplicationName
Microsoft® Word for Microsoft 365
DateCreated (point = end); (encoding = w3cdtf); (qualifier = exact)
2020-11-17T11:21:32
DateCreated (point = end); (encoding = w3cdtf); (qualifier = exact)
2020-11-17T11:21:32
Back to the top
Version 8.3.13
Rutgers University Libraries - Copyright ©2021