MAKING THE RESISTANCE FRENCH:
BUREAUCRACY, MEMORY, AND SPACE IN POSTWAR MARSEILLE

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Making the Resistance French:

Bureaucracy, Memory, and Space in Postwar Marseille

by Julia A. Buck

Dissertation Director:
Judith Surkis

This dissertation examines postwar state recognition of resistance during the Second World War in France from below and the margins. It focuses on the postwar commemorative politics regarding the resistance and liberation of the Mediterranean port city of Marseille, a place with a long history of challenging French universalist claims. To understand how state power and national belonging was instantiated locally, I analyze the bureaucracy that arose in postwar France from laws establishing an official definition of resistance as well as a formal process for applicants to prove past involvement in wartime underground movements that left virtually no records of membership. One such category was the *combattant volontaire de la Résistance* (CVR). The resulting bureaucratic encounters also played an important, if ambivalent, role in the consolidation of state power during the Cold War and decolonization, as a means of bringing local commemorative cultures in line with dominant French narratives and coopting potentially threatening political actors. However, instead of putting commemorative conflict to rest, the state opened up a new battlefield regarding the memory of anti-Nazi resistance both within and in rejection of the applications for official recognition. Contradictions and disputes arose regarding the status of colonial soldiers in official commemoration of the war,
as did the question of how to distinguish between "true" and "fake" resistance in the wartime underground. The very administrative framework that sought to erase their involvement actually preserved the stories of many people who otherwise left few archival traces. Furthermore, the state commemorative narratives helped provoke a vibrant commemorative counterculture. This critical re-reading of French bureaucratic sources has far-reaching implications for how historians of the Second World War might approach this major archive, for understanding the uneven geographies of state power, and how to think about commemoration with and beyond the nation-state. Furthermore, it seeks to recover the political possibilities and challenges of a heterogeneous antifascist movement that was only made in France’s image after the fact.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not have been possible without the intellectual support and friendship of a great many people. The errors result from my own obstinacy or inattention. I am grateful beyond words to Dawn Ruskai. Rutgers faculty inspired me whether I took their class, read their work, or worked for them as a teaching assistant, including Tuna Artun, Alistair Bellany, Carolyn Brown, Leah DeVun, Marisa Fuentes, Jochen Hellbeck, Samantha Kelly, Jennifer Mittelstadt, and Jeffrey Shandler. Temma Kaplan was the reason I came to Rutgers. When I dropped out of undergrad, it was her book *Red City, Blue Period* I carried with me to a squatted castle outside of Barcelona. When I was finally sitting across from her in my first class of graduate school, I could barely speak above a whisper. She has spent the years since helping me find my voice. Yael Zerubavel ignited my interest in memory studies. She balances careful, precise analysis with a type of creativity that I will continue to work to emulate. Her thoughtful pedagogy brought some of the best work out of me and the ease with which she can shift from talking about traditional scholarship to ceramics practices revealed a place for me in academia that I did not know existed. Henry Rousso’s intellectual work as well as his dedication to his students and colleagues demonstrates a type of historical engagement whose positive effects resonate out beyond the academy’s walls. His thoughtful approach to politically charged and taboo themes is a model to which I aspire. Judith Surkis might not realize how influential even a joking reference in passing to a text as representing a "lacuna turn" set off months of private discussion with classmates about how to most productively punch holes in the historiography. Her intentional
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DEDICATION

For Emma Deboncoeur
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<tr>
<td>AD BdR</td>
<td>Archives départementales des Bouches-du-Rhône</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>Agrupación de Guerrilleros Españoles</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHTIS</td>
<td>Association pour l'histoire des tirailleurs sénégalais</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEF</td>
<td>Afrique-Équatoriale française</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOF</td>
<td>Afrique-Occidentale française</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>Archives nationales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCVR</td>
<td>Association nationale des combattants volontaires de la Résistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Armée secrète</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Centre américain de secours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFL</td>
<td>Corps francs de la Libération</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFLN</td>
<td>Comité français de libération nationale</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGT</td>
<td>Confédération générale du travail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRA</td>
<td>Centre international de recherches sur l’anarchisme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNR</td>
<td>Conseil national de la Résistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNT</td>
<td>Confederación Nacional del Trabajo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTE</td>
<td>Compagnies de travailleurs étrangers</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVR</td>
<td>Combattant volontaire de la Résistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB</td>
<td>Division blindée</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Division d’infanterie algérienne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIR</td>
<td>Déporté et interné de la Résistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>Emergency Rescue Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAI</td>
<td>Federación Anarquista Ibérica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFC</td>
<td>Forces françaises combattantes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFI</td>
<td>Forces françaises de l’intérieur</td>
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<tr>
<td>FFL</td>
<td>Forces françaises libres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Front national (1941-1944)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTPF</td>
<td>Francs-tireurs et partisans français</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTP-MOI</td>
<td>Francs-tireurs et partisans – main-d’œuvre immigrée</td>
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<tr>
<td>GTE</td>
<td>Groupement de travailleurs étrangers</td>
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<tr>
<td>JO</td>
<td>Journal officiel</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRP</td>
<td>Mouvement républicain populaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Milices socialistes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUR</td>
<td>Mouvements Unis de Résistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONAC</td>
<td>Office national des Anciens Combattants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORA</td>
<td>Organisation de résistance de l’armée</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCF</td>
<td>Parti communiste français</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCE</td>
<td>Partido Comunista de España</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRL</td>
<td>Parti républicain de la Liberté</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>Partido Socialista Obrero Español</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDA</td>
<td>Rassemblement Démocratique Africain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIF</td>
<td>Résistance intérieure française</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RN</td>
<td>Rassemblement National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTA</td>
<td>Régiment de tirailleurs algériens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFIO</td>
<td>Section française de l'internationale ouvrière</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHD</td>
<td>Service historique de la Défense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNCF</td>
<td>Société nationale des chemins de fer français</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SONACOTRA</td>
<td>Société nationale de construction de logements pour les travailleurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STO</td>
<td>Service du travail obligatoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDSR</td>
<td>Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNE</td>
<td>Unión nacional española</td>
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Introduction

Power lives off stolen goods. It creates nothing; it coopts.

—Internationale Situationniste #8

Madeleine Baudoin wrote that during the Second World War in Marseille, "geography itself was turned upside down." Baudoin bore witness to the transformation of her hometown, first as a militant in the underground struggle against the Vichy regime and German occupation, and then as a historian who documented resistance during this period from below. When the dust settled after the liberation of Marseille in August 1944, rubble covered a large, central area where the working-class Jewish and immigrant neighborhood of Saint-Jean once stood. Twisted metal of the once famous Pont Transbordeur, Marseille's engineering marvel, now cut a jagged line across the mouth of the port. By comparison, Notre Dame de la Garde, the iconic fortress-basilica overlooking the city, managed to emerge relatively unscathed from one of the final battles in the liberation of the city, but bullet holes pocked the basilica's outer walls, and daylight peered through holes in the stonework of its portico. The SNCF and port installations contended with extensive repairs that left Marseille tenuously

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3 French police had forcibly evicted 20,000 residents from their homes in this neighborhood in January 1943. German forces then dynamited nearly every building, save the fifteenth-century Hotel Cabre, an ironic preservationist nod to French architectural patrimony. See Jean-Lucien Bonillo, et al, Marseille, ville et port (Marseille: Parenthèses, 1992), 22-32; and Sheila Crane, Mediterranean Crossroads: Marseille and Modern Architecture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 158-165.
4 German forces had destroyed that as well, in order to block sea access to the city in 1944.
connected to the broader region by rail and sea. These were among the tangible wounds the German occupation and liberation battles had inflicted on the physical spaces of cities in France, where one in four buildings had been razed and roughly one million families were homeless. However, unlike in other cities contending with wreckage in the fall of 1944, lawmakers saw an opportunity in disguise to rebuild Marseille in harmony with French ideals of patrimony that they believed was lacking in the port city.

Urban planning and construction was but one element that concerned provisional government officials in establishing a new state, which required attending to both material and less tangible projects. In order to consolidate power, state-builders would have to take charge of security as well as conceive of a connective ethos that could bind the people residing in French metropolitan and colonized territories together. They would have to convincingly present themselves as the legitimate authorities to citizens and subjects, either through consensus or force, as well as to the Allied governments who might wish to occupy metropolitan France as they did in Germany if the new state was not adequately stable. To build a new state, officials would have to break with the Nazi collaborationist Vichy past while still ensuring there would be enough government personnel to carry out essential functions. The wartime resistance to Vichy and the German occupation became a panacea for these myriad concerns.

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7 Crane, Mediterranean Crossroads, 13.
French officials mobilized the memory of the World War II resistance to confer legitimacy, as the grounds for sovereignty, to underscore the illegality of Vichy and therefore the legality of the new state, and to reconstruct the meaning of national belonging. Ordinances, decrees, laws, and their attendant administration allowed for intimate, everyday interactions between the state and people emerging from clandestine lives who might pose a threat. In this way, the state could instantiate official narratives about the resistance that people might otherwise only passively hear in speeches and radio broadcasts. De Gaulle and his allies initiated the process by declaring certain kinds of resistance to be both legitimate and above legal sanction in 1943 from Algiers. By summer of 1944, three days after the Normandy landings, the provisional government issued ordinances that characterized the *Forces françaises de l'intérieur* to be an integral part of the French Army. This legally underwrote the French military command's efforts to "whiten" the French armies by removing soldiers from sub-Saharan Africa from the front and replacing them with select participants in the resistance. On May 15, 1946, the first government of the Fourth Republic passed a law to formally recognize a new category of soldier, the *combattant volontaire de la Résistance*. The CVR laws and administration that developed over the next seven decades became an important means by which the state disseminated and negotiated the narrative that the resistance was French, and that the foundation of the French nation was the resistance. This bureaucratic memory process involved over 600,000 applicants, thousands of functionaries, thousands of people in resistance and veterans' associations, and hundreds of lawmakers.
The question of who could lay claim to the legacy of the resistance shaped postwar politics. Postwar state-builders staked their legitimacy on the narrative that the true, eternal France was the France of the anti-Nazi resistance, not the humiliating Nazi collaboration. Scholars have discussed the myth of the "true France" at length as it manifested in speeches, monuments, and textbooks, but comparatively few detailed studies examine the "vector" of French bureaucracy as it behaved and was experienced, rather than as it was legislated. I analyze the vast administration that arose from postwar laws establishing an official definition of resistance as well as a formal process for applicants to prove past involvement in wartime underground movements that left virtually no records of membership. These efforts produced archives that form an important body of sources for both historians of the Resistance and local officials serving on monument commissions, but have been subject to surprisingly little critical analysis. I argue that the resistance accounts in these bureaucratic forms had implications even beyond the construction of the past in recent historiography and public commemoration since the records became available to the public under the Fifth Republic. Bureaucratic encounters also played an important, if ambivalent, role in the consolidation of state power during the first postwar years, the Cold War, and decolonization, as a means of bringing local commemorative cultures in line with dominant French narratives and coopting potentially threatening political actors. This project took on special significance in Marseille.

In order to detail this history, I focus on a localized study of the Mediterranean port city of Marseille, which has a long history of challenging French
universalist claims. Seen as a dangerous place filled with foreigners and criminals, administrators feared that it could not be assimilated into French patrimony after the war. Local French citizens who applied for formal recognition as resisters included mobsters of the "French Connection," anarchists, working class women with suspect sexual mores, and others who administrators were hesitant to honor as part of the foundation of the postwar republic. Many other members of the "French Resistance" in Marseille did not have citizenship rights at all. They were Armenian refugees, Spanish Civil War exiles, and central European Jews and Communists. Additionally, soldiers from across the French Empire comprised the main force that liberated Marseille, and were largely sidelined by the state's whitewashed commemorative narrative for their efforts. Each chapter reconstructs the administrative process, logic, and criteria by which the state attempted to sort their stories into discrete categories of commemorative inclusion and exclusion, and the limitations of and challenges to this project.

Instead of putting commemorative conflict to rest, I argue that the state opened up a new battlefield regarding the memory of anti-Nazi resistance both within and in rejection of the applications for official recognition. My dissertation shows how the very administrative framework that sought to erase their involvement actually preserved the stories of many people who otherwise left few archival traces. I also show how the official narrative provoked a vibrant commemorative counterculture that denaturalized national frameworks for remembrance and linked the local to the transnational. This critical re-reading of French bureaucratic sources has implications for how historians of World War II
might approach this major archive, for understanding the uneven geographies of state power, and how to think about commemoration with and beyond the nation-state. Furthermore, it seeks to recover the political possibilities and challenges of a heterogeneous antifascist movement that was only made in France’s image after the fact.

**Postwar Marseille**

The conditions on the ground in Marseille in the years immediately following World War II reaffirmed its stereotype as an unruly city par excellence from a national and state perspective. De Gaulle viewed the entire region through an apocalyptic lens, believing it was "on the brink of secession." The foreign communists of the FTP-MOI had assumed a central role in seizing the Prefecture, and continued to occupy the building with their French comrades when representatives of the provisional government began to arrive. Libération-Sud leader Emmanuel d’Astier de la Vigerie recounted the scene in September as "the living images of 1793... In the room in which had gathered what might have passed for a Committee of Public Safety, everyone was emaciated, ill-clothed, and exultant." Note the leap of his historical analogy: over the Revolution of 1789 and straight to the Terror. De Gaulle appointed Raymond Aubrac as the provisional commissioner of Marseille in 1944, and soon became concerned with what he saw as an excessive tolerance for left revolutionary politics. De Gaulle’s mid-September

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visit to Marseille, as recounted by Lucie Aubrac, appeared to have exacerbated his culture shock and security concerns:

There was a tremendous parade of Maquisards, wearing pretty tattered civilian clothes—real sans-culottes!—most of them with open collars, for it was a very hot day, and with flowers tied to their rifles. And they dragged along a German armoured car, and on top of it were a lot of young Marseilles women in somewhat frivulous and not quite modest summer dresses, screaming and waving flags—a really nice bit of Mediterranean exuberance. And, do you know, de Gaulle took it very badly indeed; he sat there glumly, muttering: Quelle mascarade, quelle mascarade!"\(^{10}\)

Although this account featured most of the schematic elements for non-Marseillaise descriptions of Marseille—sun, poverty, noise, and sex—it represented a very real set of fears the ruling class in Paris held regarding Marseille as a threat to national integrity and unity.

De Gaulle removed Aubrac from his post after only four months, unhappy with what he saw as a failure to implement the postwar program that Paris preferred. Local outcry had compelled Aubrac to carry out harsher sentences than de Gaulle wished during the purge trials. Also contributing the decision was that during Aubrac’s tenure, former resisters had begun to collectivize factories that were owned by Vichy or Nazi collaborators, fifteen of which they seized between 1944 and 1948 in a project that involved 15,000 workers.\(^{11}\) Labor militancy spilled over beyond the collectivized factories, and the state violently repressed a wave of strikes at the port in 1947.\(^{12}\) These years represented an aperture in many ways,

\(^{10}\) Quoted in Reid, “Resistance and Its Discontents,” 100.

\(^{11}\) Les Réquisitions de Marseille, directed by Luc Joule and Sébastien Jousse (Montreuil: Les Productions de l’oeil sauvage, CNRS Images/Média FEMIS-CICT, France 3 Méditerranée, Cannes TV, 2004).

during which time French sovereignty in Marseille appeared tenuous and the course that popular political expression, state, and nation would take was not guaranteed.\textsuperscript{13}

More visible than the presence of de Gaulle’s idealized "true France" that resisted, the Marseille region played host to demobilization camps for the colonial soldiers who liberated Provence. They hailed from Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Madagascar, and other colonized places. They had suffered many casualties, as well as rapidly compounding indignities and exploitation that provoked protests and uprisings in 1944 and 1945. These metropolitan rebellions of colonial soldiers waiting to return home, in some cases explicitly to claim a place for themselves in the whitewashed commemorative narratives that were beginning to unfold, are less well known than the infamous massacres in African transit camps like Thiaroye.\textsuperscript{14}

For different reasons, the local American garrison provoked tensions in Marseille, as the memory of U.S. aerial bombardment that killed over 2,000 civilians in the final days of the war in Marseille was still fresh. Furthermore, unrest threatened to boil over in local communities of Southeast Asian work brigades that, at the end of this war and before the beginning of the Vietnam War, were already under heavy surveillance to root out anti-colonial agitators.\textsuperscript{15} Roughly four thousand Southeast Asian workers travelled from labor camps on the outskirts of


\textsuperscript{15} See "Correspondance au départ du ministère du bureau de Marseille (1941/1948)," SLOTFOM XIV 2; "Journaux en vietnamien et en français (1945/1949)," SLOTFOM XIV 6A; and "Journaux, brochures, tracts et papillons (1941/1950)," SLOTFOM XIV 6B, ANOM, Aix-en-Provence, France.
the city to march in May Day demonstrations in Marseille in 1945.\textsuperscript{16} Local resisters threatened to form an alternative pole of power that could harm the national government’s ability to repress these myriad movements and populations, so cooptation became key in maintaining a metropolitan, statist ideal of law and order.

The cooptation or assimilation of Marseillaise resisters into the state took a variety of forms that eventually included the CVR title. One of the earliest measures was incorporating men of the armed resistance into the regular French Army as regions were liberated in 1944. By design, commanders dispersed the members of resistance organizations across different units to facilitate their submission to regular military discipline and break any radical, clandestine political alliances. Transforming the FFI from irregular fighters in movements with a variety of politics and internal structures into regular military combatants was challenging. For the armed resisters in Marseille who did not join the regular Army, Aubrac created the mostly communist \textit{Forces républicaines de sécurité}, a policing force that could be charged with maintaining order since the existing police force was tarnished by collaboration. 3000 former resisters were enticed to join the FRS instead of forming a revolutionary militia.\textsuperscript{17} This measure, piloted in Marseille, was so successful that the Interior Ministry decided to implement it on a national scale. Once again, cooptation and containment, rather than direct confrontation, were the key strategy.

The CVR was a longer-term process of assimilation that began with re-establishing the state’s monopoly on violence and went on to manage the memory of


\textsuperscript{17} Chapman, \textit{France’s Long Reconstruction}, 32.
wartime resistance. All those who participated in crafting the CVR’s legal and administrative framework as well as those who entered into the application process on a very basic level were taking part in a state-building project by shrinking the parts of human experience that fell outside the law and submitting it to the gaze of the administrative state.

**From Ville-sans-nom to la planète Mars**

Since Louis XIV cemented the French possession of Marseille by crushing a local uprising against the Paris-appointed governor and occupying the city in 1660, a series of spectacular disciplinary attempts seemed to underscore the kingdom, then the nation’s tenuous grasp of Marseille, even as that grasp tightened.\(^1\) The inaugural words of Louis XIV, inscribed on fort Saint-Nicolas, read, "In fear that the faithful of Marseille, too often preyed upon by the criminal agitations of some, shall lead the city and the kingdom to its destruction, either by the ardor of the boldest or by too great a passion for freedom."\(^2\) This criminalization of political dissent and fear of excessive freedoms would haunt the relationship between the central powers and the city. In the First Republic, for a short time in 1794, the Jacobin-led National Convention in Paris punished Marseille for its perceived support of the Girondins by taking the city’s name, rebaptizing it "Ville-sans-Nom." Marseille could not be trusted with its own political culture, or local identity.

More recent events in Marseille continued to unsettle officials in Paris. Under

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the Third Republic, the 1934 assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and French Minister of Foreign Affairs Louis Barthou on the Canbière,²⁰ a devastating fire at the Nouvelles Galeries four years later and roughly 500 meters away, and a general sense of corruption and scandal prompted the national government to restructure the local police, reorganize the local firefighters' union under the Navy, eliminate the city's mayoral elections, and place Marseille under the administration of a Paris-appointed tutelle d'état.²¹ In the Fourth and early Fifth Republic, Marseille gained international notoriety yet again for trafficking more heroin than any other city in the world. The 1971 film, The French Connection, further popularized this story. That same year the French Interior Minister replaced key figures in Marseille's narcotics brigade in response to rumors of corruption.²² This push and pull between the capital of France and the "Capital of Crime" entrenched the city's outsider and outlaw reputation.

Local journalist and author Bruno Le Dantec took up the theme of Marseille's reputation according to those who wish to rebuild the city. His "inventory of short, murderous phrases," from the moment the city became a part of France to the Euroméditerranée redevelopment project in the early 2000s, "emanate the odor of prejudice, fear, and contempt. All the symptoms of a phobia, irrational certainly, but which, among decision-makers, has turned into an obsession: Marseille must be

radically changed, Marseille is not the city that it should be."23 In the pages that follow, he collected five centuries worth of invective heaped on Marseille by the national and local ruling classes. These were not just idle words, but rather guided policy and administrative decisions.

The extraordinary level of state preoccupation with the people and space of Marseille risks presenting power as moving in a single direction, imposed by the supposed center on the supposed periphery. In response, recent scholarship has developed multi-scalar models for understanding twentieth-century Marseille a place formed through the negotiation of distant and proximate as well as "high" and "low" politics and culture. This research on Marseille turns the mirror on France as a whole, reflecting the mechanics of a state that may be powerful but nevertheless lacks coherence and uniform authority, not as an exception to a universalist rule but as part of its regular function. In the chapters that follow, I approach this theme by exploring the ways in which state bureaucracies attempted to take charge of local World War II memory as a means of producing the nation and extending national sovereignty over the potentially subversive corners of local space.

**Memory**

Memory has special significance in Marseille as one of the first worrying signs that the city felt little allegiance to Europe or to France. Commentators remarked on what they thought was missing, rather than what forms of remembrance they encountered. Victor Hugo found the European past to be absent

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during his visit to Marseille, writing, "Of the Greek city nothing remains; of the Roman city, nothing; of the Gothic city, nothing. Marseille is a mass of houses under a beautiful sky, and that is all." He was not the first or the last to describe the oldest city in France as a place with no memory.

The state's preoccupation with national memory was a major guiding force behind architectural choices in postwar Marseille, which sought to establish a visual link between a French past and present. Officials were disturbed by Marseille's inassimilable heritage-scape, fearing "the city could not easily be incorporated into the emergent national patrimony. Without monuments onto which historical narratives could be projected, Marseille seem[ed] to be doomed to an exceptional state of amnesia."25 This supposed amnesia was a problem because memory, specifically French memory, was such an important part of recreating the nation in the aftermath of Vichy.

Historian Jennifer Allen showed that "the nation posed a 'living problem,' one that necessitated continual maintenance."26 The solution? "Commemorative practices and objects [that] made 'the nation'... into something one could see and experience."27 Far less grand but no less consequential for everyday life than imprinting official memory on Marseille's urban landscape was the role of bureaucracy in fashioning resistance memory. This was a place, as I discuss in chapter two, where lawmakers, administrators, and applicants for formal

24 Quoted in Crane, Mediterranean Crossroads, 11.
25 Crane, Mediterranean Crossroads, 12.
27 Allen, "National Commemoration in an Age of Transnationalism."
recognition as resisters could develop a common discourse about the past. Moreover, the bureaucratic setting imposed constraints on the shapes this discourse could take. It would have to reflect what the state found to be legible, which entailed "two acts of dissociation" central to national memory:

First, it required the displacement of local identities... At the same time, the nation ran up against powerful, preexisting identities that already transcended the local. Displacing these translocal affinities became the second great ambition of the nationalist project.28

Although local and diasporic identities eclipsed national identification for many in Marseille, the call to participate in a process of formal recognition of the resistance was compelling, and Marseille-based resisters participated widely. The resulting mountains of paperwork had the power to obscure patterns of commemorative inclusion and exclusion from the applicant, but paradoxically made those patterns plain to anyone approaching the archive it produced in a systematic fashion.

**Bureaucracy**

Over the past two decades in particular, an increasing number of scholars are approaching the grand state projects of Republican France from below, paying particular attention to political behavior at the administrative level rather than an exclusive analysis of political speech at the state’s upper echelons. Rather than a unitary, coherent power directed only from above, "it is through the practices of those who represent it in their various capacities that the state gradually takes

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28 Allen, "National Commemoration in an Age of Transnationalism."
form." This is the approach that Ben Kafka adopts, which I discuss in chapter one, which opens a space to consider the mundane and material in state-building, specifically the role of paperwork.

After World War II, the French state expanded dramatically with a vast array of new agencies, commissions, and an army of functionaries to staff them. In 1945, de Gaulle inaugurated a new school specifically tailored to train future functionaries, the École nationale d'administration. This expansion was, "not just one more expression of an eternal French statism," nor was it an "inevitable, linear process," but rather involved several innovations that were rooted in contingent historical contexts with particular spatialized security concerns regarding control of French territories. The CVR administration was one such innovation, which grew out of post-World War I welfare institutions that managed veterans' pensions and support for war orphans. However its operations departed in important ways from administration of the carte du combattant for veterans of the regular army. This new administration pulled from the politically heterodox resistance underground to staff its committees. These committees would then evaluate the resistance accounts of thousands of their neighbors to determine whose wartime opposition was legitimate, who was merely a victim, and who should not be included among the nations' heroes at all. The CVR and the paperwork it produced fit into a process that

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Alexandra Steinlight also tracked, "Incarnating the state functioned as a claim to authority... and recourse to documentary material strongly bolstered that claim."  

Scholars who study Marseille have been attentive to the ways in which state bureaucracies do not represent the unadulterated will of the lawmakers in Paris, but rather are mediated locally. For example, Minayo Nasiali presents management of Marseille's postwar housing as an example of French efforts to "discipline unruly spaces of French cities," but reminds the reader that state efforts to reconstruct Marseille's neighborhoods were not a direct reflection of national trends, instead emphasizing local, dialogic management of urban space structured by its colonial and postcolonial hybridity.  

Similarly, in her comparative history of interwar immigrant rights in Marseille and Lyon, Mary Lewis' findings refute the idea that the state functioned "as a unitary entity pursuing a single clear objective." Instead, immigrant rights "were not simply implemented locally but in important respects constructed locally—through the interplay of national expectations and conditions on the ground." As we will see, Marseille was not the amnesiac, empty vessel into which the nation could pour its mythologized version of the resistance. Local frameworks for memory, particularly local negotiations of the distinction between crime and resistance, complicated the state's plans for the city.

34 Nasiali, Native to the Republic, 14.
36 Lewis, Boundaries of the Republic, 10.
Space

The mutually constitutive processes of reconstructing a centralized French state and assimilating the memory of a clandestine movement as a patriotic myth were not free-floating phenomena. State-building and memory work were located in space, and developed unevenly across different geographies. The oldest city in France is uniquely suited to drawing out the contradictions and unevenness of this project, as a place with a storied history of clashes with central state authority. Marseille has long been imagined as a city on the peripheries, or even outside of, French national space, a porous boundary between the colonial empire and the metropole. It is from this position, where the city is so obviously contested, that we can best apprehend the social production of space in Henri Lefebvre's terms: "not [as] a thing but rather a set of relations between things." 

Contradictory memories of the resistance helped define local space in postwar Marseille. Lefebvre understood space as the product of three interrelated phenomenon: spatial practices or perceived space which arose through the experience of everyday life in the city, representations of space or conceived space which was the product of lawmakers and technocrats visions for a locale, and representational space or lived space which could be structured by the unexpected, subversive, and creative imaginaries of ordinary people and their symbolic understandings of their surroundings. Taking the preoccupations of postwar

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37 For general discussion of differences in state reconstruction efforts and authority in the north versus the south, see Chapman, France's Long Reconstruction, 29-30.
38 Sophie Biass and Jean-Louis Fabiani, "Marseille, a City Beyond Distinction?" Nottingham French Studies 50, number 1 (Spring 2011): 83.
memory as the social process: perceived space related to the postwar urbanism and housing practices that sought to emulate a European style of patrimony. Its economic processes related to the involvement of more and more people in close relationship with the state either as employees or as petitioners for recognition. Conceived space encompassed the CVR project and the marginalization of the Army of Africa. These official mnemonic narratives delimited national belonging. Finally lived space in Marseille was represented in the alternative imaginaries about what the resistance meant locally. It included how people remembered their transit through the city as well as their wartime solidarities and connections with other cities. This Marseille of representational space might signify the demobilized and stranded colonial soldier’s struggle for recognition of his material needs and commemorative value. Or it might imagine the Marseille of Spanish and Italian antifascist exiles, part of a transnational and transcultural radical network.

Historians have adopted a variety of approaches to understanding local space in Marseille. There are echoes of Lefebvre’s model in many of their works. Sheila Crane calls Marseille a "node" and a "fulcrum:'

As a port city situated at the very border between the metropolitan center and the colonies, Marseille occupied a liminal space that defied... absolute oppositions, particularly insofar as it was repeatedly described in overtly orientalizing terms as a foreign country marked by the visible presence of immigrants from all corners of the world. ...Marseille might best be understood as an interior colony of France and of twentieth-century architecture... Potent images of Marseille as a dangerously cosmopolitan city riddled with criminal networks and prostitution rings served as fodder both for [postwar] new urban plan[s] and for the decision by Nazi occupying authorities to systematically dynamite an extensive area of the city center in early 1943.41

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40 Crane, Mediterranean Crossroads, 7 and 69.
41 Crane, Mediterranean Crossroads, 10.
Here, Crane draws a subtle distinction between how Marseille functions economically (as a port and important point of transit between colony and metropole), and how Marseille is represented (as a stereotyped and orientalizing dangerous place). These two layers interacted with each other to produce the postwar city. Minayo Nasiali also theorizes the types of relationships that came to define the city after the war:

Rather than reinforcing the discursive binary between metropole and colony, I show how Marseille’s position as a port city suggests a new way of thinking about the space of the imperial nation-state. Rather than a linear site of transmission, Marseille is a hybrid, mediated place where people from all over the empire were part of the post-World War II project to better manage and modernize the populace.\textsuperscript{42}

Similarly, Simon Kitson’s history of Marseille’s police demonstrated that in spite of the appearance of clear hierarchies, ”any loyalty to the central government was filtered through the prism of local politics.”\textsuperscript{43} In Marseille, more than other cities in France, scholars are sensitive to the relational, hybrid, and co-constitutive elements of their object of study.

Crane, Nasiali, and Kitson use various other techniques to situate Marseille: as a hybrid or contested space, as a colonial space, and/or as a node in a global network. These authors disrupt spatial models of center and periphery, imagining Marseillaise space as the product of a relationship between multiple layers of everyday use, national prescriptions, and local imagination. Their work reveals the ways in which a detailed local study has both national and global implications.

\textsuperscript{42} Nasiali, \textit{Native to the Republic}, 9.
\textsuperscript{43} Kitson, \textit{Police and Politics}, xvii-xviii.
Making the Resistance French

This dissertation argues that the relationship between the resistance and the French nation was negotiated more than imposed, and required ongoing rearticulation in order to be maintained. I approach this process of official memory from below and the margins, where its contradictions, inconsistencies, paradoxes, and incoherence can best be appreciated. As such, the chapters that follow do not devote proportionate attention to groups that composed the wartime resistance. I pay particular attention to the commemorative work of anarchists, who made up a small ratio of the local resistance, because they offer unique critiques of official memory in the service of the state and alternative visions of local space. Discussion of colonial forces is limited to one chapter despite their overrepresentation in Marseille’s liberation due to limitations of time and expense of accessing relevant archives.

There are several important local figures that could shed light on the questions I raise who simply do not appear. Jane Vialle, born in Ouesso (today the Republic of Congo), was a Black feminist and anti-colonialist journalist and resister in the Combat network who was arrested in Marseille, interned in Brens and Baumettes, survived, and went on to serve in the French Senate.44 She is absent in the pages that follow only because I learned about her after I returned from my final research trip. Lisa Fittko, Varian Fry, George Rodocanachi, and Gilberto Bosques, who all played vital roles in escape networks, do not get their due because they did not apply for CVR cards. They also raise questions about two additional dimensions

of commemoration—the mnemonic distinction between civil and armed resistance as well as issues of multi-scalar and transnational circulation of memory—that I did not have the time or space to properly address. Spanish anarchist exile Julia Viñas and French-"Senegalese" anarchist Armand Maurasse appear fleetingly only because their presence in anarchist accounts is limited to their association with André Arru and I could locate no other references in state archives, memoirs, or secondary sources. (Nor when I asked Arru’s postwar partner, Sylvie Knoerr-Saulière.) There are very few gaullists in the pages that follow, not because they were absent or unimportant in Marseille’s resistance, but because they represent a commemorative norm that the state attempted to make invisible, a process that I attempt to track primarily from the outside in rather than the inside out.

So what is in the dissertation? Chapter one tracks the development of national legal code defining resistance from 1943 to the present. The trajectory of legislation reveals shifting concerns, from a desire to associate the resistance with the state and the nation, to concerns regarding sovereignty and counterinsurgency, to the politics of commemorative disputes in the Fifth Republic. The chapter goes on to analyze the formation and composition of the Marseille-based committee tasked with evaluating local applications for a CVR card. Chapter two shifts focus to the applications themselves and the commemorative logic supporting national inclusions and exclusions. Chapter three examines how colonial troops were excluded from the notion of the "exterior resistance" through a combination of military practices and bureaucratic definitions written into or practiced by bureaucracies charged with recognizing and compensating resisters and liberators.
It shows how these soldiers and their supporters fought back. Finally, it posits a way of thinking about multiple forms of exclusion as well as the push and pull between official erasure and grassroots activism as a form of "contested erasure."

The final two chapters focus on the places where state efforts to define resistance broke down or faced alternative conceptions of the wartime underground. Chapter four looks at the built-in paradoxes in the process of legally recognizing clandestine resistance. The core problem of separating crime from resistance preoccupied former resisters as well as the state. In Marseille, the question was thrown into sharp relief by sensational stories of the Corsican mob and heated disputes between different political tendencies in the Spanish exile diaspora. However, multiple levels of society grappled with how to distinguish "true" from "fake" resistance. Chapter five tracks the development of a thriving grassroots culture of local resistance memory from the 1960s to the present. The three associations I consider in this chapter rejected official narratives, especially in relation to Marseillaise spatial imaginaries and the place of the nation in resistance memory. On the horizon of their work, however, lies the risk of new forms of cooptation, this time represented by neoliberal capitalism rather than the nation-state.

I designed this project at the intersection of multiple methodologies in the hopes of locating a Marseille of "excessive freedom," political possibility, and non-national solidarities. Commemorative and spatial questions speak to each other in what outside observers like Hugo, urbanists, technocrats, and national lawmakers pigeon-holed as an amnesiac city. Particularly with regards to the state project of
making both the city and the resistance "French," I found Lefebvre's quip to be true: "State-imposed normality makes permanent transgression inevitable."\textsuperscript{45} I offer the seed of a historiographical intervention in the scholarship unpacking Marseille's reputation for permanent transgression by showing how bureaucratic commemorative practices attempted to bury the Republican logic of "difference" under piles of official papers. Finally, in Baudoin's city that the war turned upside down, I gesture toward the ways in which the administrative state, former resisters, colonial veterans, and memory workers seized on the question of "who resisted?" to different ends, creating new urban imaginaries in the aftermath of destruction, dispossession, and displacement.

\textsuperscript{45} Lefebvre, \textit{The Production of Space}, 23.
CHAPTER ONE

OuiNon: National legal code and the *combattant volontaire de la Résistance* in Marseille

Before the law sits a gatekeeper. To this gatekeeper comes a man from the country who asks to gain entry into the law. But the gatekeeper says that he cannot grant him entry at the moment. The man thinks about it and then asks if he will be allowed to come in later on. "It is possible," says the gatekeeper, "but not now." At the moment the gate to the law stands open, as always, and the gatekeeper walks to the side, so the man bends over in order to see through the gate into the inside. When the gatekeeper notices that, he laughs and says: "If it tempts you so much, try it in spite of my prohibition. But take note: I am powerful. And I am only the most lowly gatekeeper. But from room to room stand gatekeepers, each more powerful than the other. I can't endure even one glimpse of the third." The man from the country has not expected such difficulties: the law should always be accessible for everyone, he thinks... The gatekeeper gives him a stool and allows him to sit down at the side in front of the gate. There he sits for days and years.

-Franz Kafka

In a letter of January 3, 1981, Madeleine Rose Baudoin asked the Ministry of Defense to send a certified extract of the administrative decree that approved her rank in the *Forces françaises de l’intérieur* during the Second World War. She had spent the war years in Marseille as an armed resister, and was thus entitled to a military pension after completing the necessary paperwork. Her 1981 letter aimed only to confirm the state's recognition of her successful application. The shape of

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47 Correspondence from Madeleine Baudoin to the Minister of Defense, 3 January 1981, GR 16 P 3884, Service Historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France.
two words written over each other in brilliant red ink in the margins of Baudoin’s request, most likely by a functionary in the government’s Resistance Office, epitomizes the sometimes paradoxical, often absurd, and undeniably tangled bureaucracy that emerged in post-World War II France to transform the clandestine Army of Shadows into regular military pensioners. *Oui* and *non*. *YesNo*. *NoYes*. Perhaps the correct equipment could detect whether that red pen affirmed or negated first, but the naked eye cannot.

Although they were supposed to be in charge of expertly processing requests of this nature, the Resistance Office’s initial befuddled response to Baudoin could easily be owed to the web of legal code their legislative colleagues had been spinning since before the Liberation in 1944. Not satisfied with medals and monuments, lawmakers decided to codify their selective adoption of the vast array of underground organizations and individual actions against the German occupation and collaborationist French State as the work of a special class of patriot. Unlike any other soldier, these individuals could only be recruited to the French military *after* their service: under the title *combattant volontaire de la Résistance*. Successful applicants got a green CVR card, a military pension, and other state benefits reserved for veterans.

Confusingly, the state might recognize a resister with medals and monuments, then deny them a CVR card, or vice versa. Agreement concerning what it meant to be a volunteer combatant in the Resistance never paralleled public commemorative narratives exactly, opening fissures in what we mean by official memory, and never lasted for long. Nor did agreement over the necessary criteria to
legally prove past involvement in an illegal movement, in order to be a CVR card-carrying veteran of a nearly recordless clandestine life.

Almost every year, usually multiple times per year from the end of the war to as recently as 2014, an ordinance, decree, administrative decree, or law redefined legitimate WWII resistance or the rights of legitimate WWII resisters. Each change was then transmitted to all the departments of France in the form of ministerial circulars, memos, and instructions. Departmental prefects reviewed the recommendations of committees comprised of local resistance leaders from different and sometimes mutually hostile political tendencies, who were in charge of applying national definitions to local applicants seeking recognition. Above them were regional committees. Then a national review office. Official study commissions to analyze the CVR bureaucracy formed and disbanded. The legal battle over what the state should recognize as true resistance continued for at least seven decades.

Baudoin’s Defense Department dossier alone refers to six laws, six decrees, ten ministerial decrees or instructions, and two ordinances. It includes correspondence and paperwork spanning almost four decades. Though many of the mutations of the law were small, the fact that the terms of the CVR card are still up for debate when most potential cardholders are no longer living suggests the persistently troubling nature of the question, "who resisted?" The prospect of an undefined, or improperly defined resistance taking shape in public memory disturbed those involved in building and defending a state concerned with recasting

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Vichy's ungovernable "Army of Crime" into the foundation and expression of postwar law and order.

The application of this legal and administrative tangle in Baudoin's hometown of Marseille illuminates the pervasive, everyday gatekeeping work of state memory. The levels of administrative review arranged in a hierarchy with the national level at the top evokes Kafka's parable. The petitioner comes from the underground, enticed by the hope of gaining admittance to law, waiting for days and years for recognition. Instead, the petitioner's path is blocked by a series of gatekeepers: the local committee, the prefect, the Interior Ministry. However despite a procedural design that would suggest ever increasing levels of power to prune the definition of resistance as paperwork made its way to the national center of Paris, in practice this bureaucracy worked in a more ambivalent way to orient the outsider city of Marseille in relation to the metropole using World War II memory. Rather than definitively closing battles over resistance memory, the questions that the CVR raised actually opened up a new battlefield before the gates of the law for the competing memories of petitioners and the state's abstract ideal of resistance.

Suitably, another Kafka, professor of media history Ben Kafka, took an interest in theories on power through the study of French bureaucracy. His work challenged patterns of thought that he identified in philosophy and political theory, which he argues "has always preferred the voice of power over its written traces, the great discourses of kings and legislators over the obscure scrivenings of
functionaries and clerks." Instead, Kafka makes a convincing case for the centrality of paperwork as simultaneously a tool of control, "to extend the power of the sovereign across space and time," as well as a threat to "sovereignty's unity and integrity." While the "voice of power," epitomized in Charles de Gaulle's proclamations, has been a rich resource for students of the founding mythologies of the eternal, true France that resisted, it only shows the power of a master commemorative narrative flowing in one direction, from the mouth of the general to the ears of the populace. A turn to everyday, tedious, tortured bureaucracy reveals the mechanics of a more complex relationship between narratives about the past, state power, and local space. It offers a means of historicizing official memory as multiple, fragmented, inconsistent, and grounded in contingent geographies, like the seat of power from which it emanated, rather than unitary and consistently coherent. These multiple facets and fractures in the work of the administrative state should not be understood as an indication of its lack of power. In fact, in certain ways this created the illusion of access to the law that made it very difficult to think beyond or outside of the state even in the first postwar years when the state's power was at its least absolute.

It is precisely the question of how CVR paperwork moved along a spectrum of discipline and subversion—across **space** and **time**—that guides this chapter. By tracing the permutations in the legal code taking shape on the national level, to the

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51 Furthermore, de Gaulle's post-war proclamations raise similar questions for memory scholars today as his famous call to arms from London did, mainly: who actually heard him at the time and acted accordingly, and was the retrospective attention inflated beyond his contemporary influence?
local context of its application in Marseille, to the composition of the review committees, to the applications themselves (covered in the next chapter), we can begin to theorize how the state mediated and instantiated the power of official memory across space. Thus, this chapter is concerned with the architecture of official memories of resistance in France in their material form, articulated across thousands of pages of legal code, haphazardly implemented by the obscure scribes in national and local administrative bodies, which applicants navigated not only to collect a pension, but also in hopes of fixing the reflection of their war years in Marseille in the official commemorative record.

**CVR permutations**

France's notoriously vast and complicated administrative apparatus pervades everyday life there. It is the basis for much of the humor in the television series *Au service de la France* (A Very Secret Service), set during the Cold War and decolonization, including a recurring sequence in which a secretary behind a large stack of paperwork ritualistically chants, "tamponné, double-tamponné" ("stamped,
double-stamped") again and again as she brandishes a stamp in one hand and takes each paper passed down a chain of five colleagues for their signatures with the other.\textsuperscript{52} I remembered this scene when I encountered a page in a CVR dossier entirely covered in overlapping police seals, date stamps, and signatures (see above) that seemed to serve no purpose: the automatic writing of the surrealists in the language of the French bureaucrat.

Perhaps it is for this reason that French scholars, who may be more attuned to the vexations and importance of administrative questions, have conducted the small number of detailed academic studies of the CVR, which has escaped the gaze of Anglophone historians for the most part despite both making use of the vast archive it produced.\textsuperscript{53} Even with the great benefit of existing historiography, it is a challenge to narrativize the seven decades and counting of debates and changes to the CVR legislation. Historians tend to focus on the disputes over criteria defining resistance and how to establish proof of resistance that took place on the national level. But there were also dozens, if not hundreds of changes to the administrative process that were transmitted in harder to locate inter-ministerial circulars and negotiated in correspondence between departmental functionaries and national bureaus. I hope further study will venture to offer a summary of what is undoubtedly a rich and illuminating seven decades of inter-ministerial correspondence. Bureaucracy, in

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Au service de la France}, season 1, episode 10, "Le Code Taupe," directed by Alexandre Courtès, written by Jean-François Halin, Claire Lemaréchal, and Jean-André Yerles, aired November 12, 2015. (4:20'-5:20', 7:40'-9:10'.)

\textsuperscript{53} In the U.S., the poor, the disabled, and the incarcerated are subjected to the greatest levels of bureaucratic scrutiny and few among their numbers have surmounted the barriers to participation in developing this historiography. In France, everyone is subject to complex bureaucracies.
particular, seems to strain against narrativization with the full weight of the millions of pieces of official paper it leaves behind.

French historians have primarily approached the *carte du combattant volontaire de la Résistance* by asking how the law grappled with criteria for and proof of legitimate resistance over the course of the postwar years.\(^{54}\) Or they consider how transparent a window the applications are to the course of the resistance in a particular region.\(^{55}\) However, before taking the overall project as a forgone conclusion and asking *how* the state defined resistance, we must turn to the paradox of legalizing illegal dissent to understand *why* the state began defining clandestine resistance in formal military terms in the first place. This approach is necessary in order to properly understand the stakes of the project that later formed the category of the CVR. Instead of beginning with the "voice of power," as the existing historiography does with Charles de Gaulle's decree of 1944, the ordinances of 1945, or the law of 1946, this story of assimilating the underground has deeper roots that reach at least to the summer of 1943, and an ordinance issued in Algiers that these later legal texts cite. In this ordinance, the Comité français de Libération nationale (CFLN) tied the legitimacy of lawbreaking under the aegis of the resistance to recognition by the nation as a citizen.

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In 1943 the "exterior Resistance," or those opposed to the Nazi occupation of France based primarily in England and Africa, underwent restructuring to consolidate geographically and ideologically disparate movements. At this time, French anti-Nazi voices spoke without the force of formal state power behind them, but with territorially derived legitimacy in the form of their newly recaptured foothold in French colonies in northern Africa. Historian Driss Maghraoui wrote, "The success of de Gaulle’s call for colonial support or ralliement was at the centre of his claim to legitimacy." The promulgation of laws soon followed, complete with the publication of a Journal officiel to mimic pre-war juridical processes, by unelected committee members to rule over what was still, at the time, an aspirational colonial nation-state.

On July 3, 1943, a month after merging de Gaulle's Free French based in England with Henry Giraud's armed forces in Algeria, the CFLN issued the following ordinance from Algiers:

> Considering it important to proclaim that citizens have risked their liberty, their lives, and their property to carry out acts supporting the cause of the liberation of France deserve that the legitimacy of these acts be affirmed and that justice be delivered to their unjustly condemned actors.

... 

> Article 1: All acts performed after June 10, 1940, for the purpose of serving the cause of the liberation of France, even if they constituted offenses under the legislation in effect at the time, are declared legitimate.

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58 JO CFLN Alger - Ordonnance du 6 juillet 1943. CFLN commissioners Jules Abadie, socialist André Philip, and René Pleven, cofounder of the UDSR, proposed the ordinance and signed it along with de Gaulle.
Despite being issued in north Africa which shifted from Vichy to Allied control with the success of the U.S. invasion in November 1942, the language of this ordinance does not appear to allow for the possibility of legitimizing autochthonous anti-Vichy activity in French colonies. Instead, it refers to resistance activity carried out by "citoyens," a designation that would exclude most colonized people—who the law rendered as subjects, not citizens—along with the thousands of exiles and refugees without legal status in France who nevertheless participated in resistance activity across the French imperial nation-state. The July 3 ordinance’s framing of the resistance as a primarily metropolitan struggle for national liberation rather than an international struggle against fascism, or the multitude of other ways resisters thought about their political activity, persisted in future iterations of what would become the CVR laws. Although non-citizens were permitted to apply for the later CVR title, they faced an uphill administrative battle for recognition in the postwar years, as we shall see in particular in the following chapters with the cases of Jewish resisters, Spanish Civil War exiles, and members of the Forces françaises libres from colonized lands.

The ordinance of July 3, 1943 derived its legitimacy from a legal code of the exterior resistance’s own making, distinguishing itself from the many other claims of the legitimacy of the resistance. Indeed, much resistance propaganda described the German occupation as criminal and the resisters as pursuing justice.\(^{59}\) However, these arguments tended to be ethical arguments or appeals to Republican tradition rather than legal arguments. The CFLN, on the other hand, assumed the authority of

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a state in presenting an alternative code of law in which penalties resulting from resistance would be overturned, and set up a nascent administrative mechanism within the old system of colonial authority. The right-wing heads of the colonial administration would later be tasked with overturning Vichy-era legal actions against resisters, measures which many of them were sympathetic toward if they had not outright helped craft them in the first place.

The CFLN ordinance was more revealing in terms of what it suggested about emerging state power than what it necessarily did for resisters in North Africa. It could be read as an attempt to break with some of the lingering Vichy sympathies of Giraud's right-wing colonial interim government, which had imprisoned the resistance leaders who ushered U.S. armies into Algiers only months before. At the same time, the ordinance did not push so far back against Giraud as to include all

60 See Ethan Katz, "Jewish Citizens of an Imperial Nation-State: Toward a French-Algerian Frame for French Jewish History," *French Historical Studies* 43, no. 1 (February 2020): 63-84; and Robert Gildea, *Fighters in the Shadows: A New History of the French Resistance* (London: Faber and Faber, 2015), 251-253. The city of Algiers, where the CFLN crafted this ordinance, was taken by U.S. forces in a matter of hours—rather than the long days of intense fighting as in other parts of North Africa—in part due to the local insurrection of Algerian resister José Aboulker and the roughly 800 local members of his predominantly Jewish Algerian resistance organization Geo Gras. The Vichy regime had overturned the Crémieux Decree, which granted French citizenship to Algerian Jews while excluding all other non-settler Algerians. When the Allies retained the extreme right-wing Vichy collaborator, Admiral Darlan, as the supreme commander of French armed forces in Africa, he refused to reinstate the decree. An anti-Vichy monarchist assassinated Darlan on Christmas Eve in 1942. The Allies turned to another right-wing military figure, General Giraud, to assume command. Giraud appointed Marcel Peyrouton, Vichy's former Interior Minister responsible for the first *Statut des Juifs* and overturning the Crémieux Decree, as governor-general of Algeria. Shortly after, Giraud's regime arrested the leaders of the anti-Vichy insurrection, including José Aboulker and his cousin and fellow resister Raphaël Aboulker. Even the extreme-Right resister Henri d'Astier de la Vigerie, a member of *Action française*, was arrested. Facing international pressure, Giraud released the resisters in February 1943. A month later the Aboulkers regained French citizenship with the reinstatement of the Crémieux Decree. However, given the experience of Algiers' Jewish resistance over the previous five months, it would be understandable for them to doubt their position before the law in "liberated" Algeria. Raphaël Aboulker described the political constellation of the Allied seizure of North Africa as "a right-wing revolution made by left-wingers... Those in power looked like the American wing of the National Revolution." (Quoted in Gildea, 253) It is unclear to what degree the July 3 ordinance protected citizen resisters in Algeria from further repression by the resurrected Vichy collaborators of the interim government.
resisters, regardless of their nationality. Perhaps more importantly, it legally tied
the concept of resistance to the liberation of national territories, allowing for a
concrete end date to permissible lawbreaking. Thus, the insurrection against the
regime of collaborationist Admiral François Darlan qualified as resistance, while
Darlan’s assassination in December 1942, after the Allies seized control of Algeria,
did not. This political context casts a very different light on the legal origins of the
CVR than the provisional government's later decrees in metropolitan France. Unlike
the later CVR, it cannot be analyzed for its effect or application, phrased as it was in
terms of an intangible and vague declaration of the legitimacy of resistance by
citizens seeking to liberate France. However, the question it raised about the nature
of legitimacy was instructive.

The ordinance emerged as the product of a legitimizing chain in which
colonial (re)conquest allowed for a "sovereignty base," a partial territorial home for
the aspiring statebuilders of the external resistance. This territorial base, in turn,
granted the new legal code the power to reinscribe relationships between the past
acts of resisters living outside Vichy law and the emerging state. Although it is true
that Félix Éboué, governor of Chad, rallied the majority of French Equatorial Africa
(AEF) to the Allies in 1940, the French colonial spatial imaginary considered AEF as
a place to materially exploit, not exploit and settle. Sub-Saharan Africa, in this
figuration, was crucial to the war effort and could contribute to a Free French sense
of prestige, but would not serve as an adequate territory from which to establish
sovereignty. To establish the law, de Gaulle needed citizens protected by it to rule
over, not subjects. Before the North African landings, de Gaulle could declare acts of
resistance to Vichy not only legitimate but also legal no more convincingly from his offices in England than Marseille's resisters could from their secret rendezvous sites. In this way, despite the CVR's structural appearance and goal as a highly centralized and universalizing force, its foundations lay in Free France's dependence upon colonized North Africa for legitimation, even as it denied legitimacy to colonized actors.

The next year, in 1944, the provisional government continued to take both military and juridical action in tandem to govern the metropolitan resisters in the course of the Liberation. That year, one ordinance and two decrees grew out of the CFLN's July 3, 1943 ordinance. Days after the D Day landings in Normandy, the first of these three statutes stated in clear language that not only would resisters not be prosecuted as the previous year's ordinance promised, that they were in fact a part of the emerging state. The ordinance of June 9, 1944 assimilated a sector of resistance, the Forces françaises de l'intérieur (FFI) as an "integral part of the French Army, benefiting from all the rights and benefits attributed to soldiers by the laws in effect." This ordinance underwrote the efforts of the French armed forces to absorb armed resisters into their units as they advanced through different regions. The application of the June 9 ordinance was particularly important in the south, where resistance groups were deeply rooted in communities and played a larger role in liberating territories than in the north. Indeed, some scholars estimate that


nearly a third of these southern zone resisters were Spanish antifascist exiles, many without any legal status in France, and exiles of other national origins also participated in the resistance in the French Midi. The decrees of September 19, both related to the FFI, continued in the same vein, ordering anyone wishing to join in efforts to liberate France after D Day +3, the date of the decree, who was unaffiliated with military units (including having already taken part in armed resistance) to remain in their homes. In doing so, it helped establish a monopoly on armed action. It undercut the potential threat that armed, non-state actors represented to the emerging French government.

The provisional government issued these decrees in the context of ongoing efforts to conceptualize the basis of the legitimacy of the new state, and how it related to both the current incarnation and the future legacy of the resistance. Debates in the Assembly on December 28, 1944 elaborated on this theme. Assemblyman André Philip explained the central problem the state builders faced, particularly in the French Midi, and his speech merits quoting at length:

Our Government has been, from the start, an insurrectionary government. General de Gaulle’s first act, on June 18, 1940, when he invited the French to continue the fight, was not that of a general calling only soldiers to follow him; it was the act of a politician who, in the name of the nation and of the French Republic, made the political decision to continue the fight. From that moment on, he assumed governmental responsibilities in the legal vacuum that resulted from Pétain and the men of Vichy’s seizure of power...

Today, we are at the moment when the authority of the State must be rebuilt, when government sovereignty must be reestablished in a certain and unmistakable way in a Republic, one and indivisible, where the central power is responsible for the general direction of government affairs and decisions...

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63 Eduard Pons Prades, Republicanos españoles en la Segunda Guerra Mundial (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2003), 18.
64 Chapman, France’s Long Reconstruction, 19.
Restoring the authority of the State, the problem is not easy, especially in the former Southern Zone... [which finds itself in] a psychological state that is genuinely anarchic, in the true sense of the term; where the very foundations of the authority of the State, which are the respect of the nation and the people for its administration, were destroyed...

We do not want this conception inherited from Napoleon of an entirely centralized bureaucracy of red tape, where all decisions, even the smallest details, must be taken in Paris and where it appears, under these conditions, that officials do not have any other role than to write reports for the purpose of transmitting them to a higher authority which in turn forwards them to those above it, ultimately with a considerable waste of time and a total lack of a sense of responsibility.

The problem facing us today is none other than that of restoring central authority in matters of government and carrying out the first measures of decentralization and deconcentration in matters of administration.65

The project of defining resistance appeared to be tailor made to address this concern with restoring the authority of a centralized state while delegating certain tasks to the provinces in a way that reaffirms Philip’s vision of the resistance roots of legal authority. It would also fall into the tangle of red tape and opaque bureaucratic complexities that Philip recognized as part of the repertoire of French state political culture. Assemblyman Georges Gorse responded, indicating his agreement with Philip, and added, "There cannot be any sort of conflict, opposition, or even divergence between the Resistance, on the one hand, the Government, on the other, and the rest of the country, since the one proceeded from the other." This abstract notion of perfect alignment between resistance, state, and nation would have to be cultivated centrally, and constantly rearticulated across the metropole.

65 “Débats de l’Assemblée du 28 décembre 1944,” Journal officiel de la République française (December 29, 1944): 626-627. https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k96176654/f4.item.r=%22r%C3%A9sistance%20exterieure%22.zoom
In the spring of 1945, as Western Allied forces were converging with Soviet forces in Germany, de Gaulle issued two additional ordinances that further formalized the position of select resisters within the military by establishing pension rights for those who could prove their involvement, and certain categories of exclusion. The first of these ordinances pertained to certified members of the FFI. The second introduced a more vague category, not yet defined by a formal administrative process: member of the resistance. This ordinance provided the first attempt to formally define resistance that organized outside the French armies and the FFI.⁶６ These early categories, and the highly subjective distinctions between them, forecast what would soon become five umbrella categories for resisters recognized under the CVR: the Forces françaises de l’intérieur (FFI), Forces françaises combattants (FFC), Résistance intérieure française (RIF), the deported and interned of the resistance (DIR), and Forces françaises libres (FFL). Only members of officially recognized groups and movements within these categories could expect their applications to be successful. The law created an exception for resisters who were deported and interned, who were subject to less stringent criteria in terms of their group membership, but more demanding paperwork. That year, new French political parties clamored to clarify the ordinance of the previous summer. Three proposed laws came from the Union démocratique et socialiste de la

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Résistance (UDSR), de Gaulle's Mouvement républicain populaire (MRP), and the Parti républicain de la Liberté (PRL).67

On May 15, 1946, the phrase "combattant volontaire de la Résistance" appeared in French legal code for the first time. On this day, the first elected government of post-World War II France passed the first law to establish a formal process for officially recognizing the resistance as another category of war veteran.68 It defined a resister as "any person who... for more than three months under the occupation, belonged to either the FFI, the FFC, or a military formation or group recognized by the CNR [Conseil National de la Résistance]." This concession of authority to the communist-dominated CNR granted the body a degree of control over which resistance formations would be recognized as legitimate. The state would not apply the three-month minimum to individuals who were deported, executed, previously cited, wounded, or killed in the course of acts of resistance. The Ministry of Veterans and Victims of War would take charge of processing applications and establishing, by decree and in coordination with the Ministry of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Finance, an administrative body to handle them on at least the departmental and national level. Recipients of the CVR title would get a card, which would later be called a "green card" for its color, and a medal. Beneficiaries would have to petition for a "fictional rank" in the resistance that corresponded with the duties they carried out in their organizations. Dizzying

arrays of administrative bodies were responsible for different components of the application and different types of resistance. Applicants would have to find out which specific process best suited their individual situation. The profoundly unrealistic legal timeline gave the Ministry of the Armed Forces three months to develop relevant statutes governing this process and six months to fulfill any requests they received.

The 1946 law excluded certain classes of applicant, namely functionaries and public officials in the Vichy government and anyone charged with "indignité nationale," or "national unworthiness," a new, and temporary, category of crime. Given that the administrative personnel and procedures were not yet in place, not to mention the massive reconstruction that was just beginning, the first elected government of the Fourth Republic was wildly optimistic in their requirement that all applications be submitted within nine months of publication of the new law.

The Fourth Republic took the time to debate and churn out additional pieces of legal code related to the CVR over the course of the next three years as it dealt with a number of urgent issues, from rebuilding French cities and towns to rationing to colonial demobilization and rebellion. I have not located evidence that the new CVR administration began to accept applications anytime in 1946. In 1947, administrators solicited early versions of the CVR application from certain prominent resistance leaders, including Jean Comte and Gaston Defferre in Marseille (discussed in chapter two), who the state entrusted to verify the resistance accounts of lesser-known applicants. That year, another round of debates regarding the CVR

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raged between the SFIO, communists, USDR, and veterans of FTP zone sud.\textsuperscript{70} Rank-and-file resisters began to apply en masse in 1948, but the full series of multi-level administrative bodies to handle these applications were not yet fully staffed. It was not until 1951 that functionaries attributed the first CVR card to a rank and file applicant.\textsuperscript{71}

Doubt about the process reigned before the process went into effect. In 1948, a communist amendment failed which sought to publish the names of all CVR applicants in the local press in the place of their last known address during the occupation in the form of a poster on the wall of their local city hall.\textsuperscript{72} The proposal signaled the widely held anxieties about applicants manipulating a closed process to paper over their misdeeds during the war with the official legitimation that the CVR card would confer. Disagreement arose only in terms of how to best weed out false claims.

Debate continued in 1949. On March 25, lawmakers established a clearer decision-making structure in what came to be known as the "definitive law." This structure involved the creation of departmental committees of former resisters from different movements, serving under the departmental prefect, which would make a recommendation to a national committee that would be made up of five members of the government and six former resisters. The following year, additional decrees specified that of the resisters in the national committee, two should be from the FFC, two from the FFI, and two from the RIF, presided over by the general

\textsuperscript{70} Barcellini, "Les Résistants dans l'oeil de l'administration," 144.
\textsuperscript{71} Barcellini, "La Résistance française à travers le prisme de la carte CVR," 154.
\textsuperscript{72} Barcellini, "Les Résistants dans l'oeil de l'administration," 146.
director of the *Office national des anciens combattants*. This decision-making structure was subject to several changes in the decades that followed, sometimes giving more power to the departmental prefects, sometimes delivering that power back to the departmental committees. In France, prefects are appointed by the national government and are the state’s representatives in the departments. They represented centralizing state policy while the departmental committees, at least in theory, more closely reflected local attitudes and politics.

The laws of the 1950s centered on deadlines for submission and approval of CVR applications, until de Gaulle shut down the whole administrative mechanism at the end of the decade. They also coincided with the years in which the Assembly debated the amnesty laws regarding former collaborators, which passed between 1951 and 1953. Taken together, these debates mark the point at which the French political center (and right) felt that legal, judiciary, and administrative interventions to recalibrate the moral universe of the war ceased to be so urgent. The state had consolidated its power, and the nation's mythologized linkages with the resistance might prove problematic in the intensifying Cold War and anti-colonial struggles. "Legal oblivion," how French law defines amnesty, could prove expedient to certain political sectors, in tandem with closing debates about the nature of legitimate resistance.73

While debates over application deadlines might appear tedious or inconsequential, they drew a massive number of state figures, veterans' associations, and ordinary people into conflict over how to evaluate the recent past.

The disputes signal a number of important things. First, that lawmakers understood the work of the CVR according to two different general principles: either as primarily a means of allaying their security concerns regarding the resistance as a separate pole of power or as an ongoing way to assert their party as centrally important to the survival of the nation. Both camps were united in their desire to coopt the resistance to secure their political position. The lawmakers wishing to set a limit on the acceptance of new applications belonged to the first camp. They saw the CVR as a useful tool for redirecting the political energies of the resistance toward the state in the earliest years of postwar rebuilding, rather than as a long-term way of honoring resisters. The more conservative veterans’ associations closest to de Gaulle and the exterior resistance adopted this line, while the communist-dominated associations representing the interior resistance opposed the deadlines. Second, the deadline debates indicated that the provisional government could expand its bureaucracy quite easily, but struggled mightily to dissolve what they had created. Once a legal category to formally recognize resistance emerged, it could not be suppressed upon fulfilling its initial functions of consolidating state power, conceptualizing the postwar nation, and retaining a monopoly on violence at the end of the war and beginning of the postwar. De Gaulle only forced the bureaucracy to go temporarily dormant in the waning days of the Fourth Republic. He did not put an end to the debate over formal recognition of the resistance, which served evolving political needs, nor could he dismantle the administration to arbitrate this debate.

Although the applications I consider in the following chapters are limited to this earlier period, the CVR dispute resurfaced in the Fifth Republic. The metropolitan protests for Algerian independence in the early 1960s and the mass movements of May 1968 ushered in a return of debates about the relationship between resistance and nation, and a partial re-opening of the application process.\textsuperscript{75} Pressure continued to mount in subsequent years to fully reopen the application process.\textsuperscript{76} At the same time, certain leaders regarded resistance memory as a threat to Franco-German economic cooperation and the emerging European Common Market.\textsuperscript{77} It was in this context that President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing issued the provocative declaration that the state would no longer commemorate, starting in 1976, the German capitulation of May 8, 1945. Memory scholar Jennifer Allen attributed the decision to a desire "to avoid reckoning with the inconsistencies in the French myth of resistance raised by the younger generation in the 1960s. If France could not put forward a unified commemorative program, it would offer silence."\textsuperscript{78} Giscard's approach to dispensing with these inconsistencies by dispensing with the commemoration of May 8 entirely rested on the interpretation of the World War II as a "fratricidal war which amassed victims and destruction" across Europe and that a peaceful future on the continent required a certain degree

\textsuperscript{75} See, for example: Hervé Hamon and Patrick Rotman, Les porteurs de valises: La Résistance française à la guerre d’Algérie (Paris: Albin Michel, 1979); and Kristin Ross, May '68 and its Afterlives (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 58.


of collective forgetting. Political distinctions and the Nazi genocide disappeared in the neutralizing language of fratricide. Justice and reckoning were positioned at odds with peace. The argument closely mirrors the fears underpinning the official policy of silence and forgetting that would begin to unfold mere months later across the Pyrenees in Spain, with the death of the Francisco Franco on November 20, 1975. However, unlike in Spain emerging from four decades of dictatorship, Giscard’s announcement faced tremendous backlash from nearly all sectors of society. Giscard did not consult the Prime Minister or the ministry of veterans affairs before proclaiming the end of official May 8 celebrations, provoking forty-five proposed laws and "questions écrites et orales" related to this unpopular move in the next six years. The attempt to suppress commemorative conflict backfired spectacularly. This was the backdrop for the August 6, 1975 decree to reopen CVR submissions in a limited fashion, followed by the May 17, 1976 ministerial instruction to reopen applications more broadly, leading to 40,000 new requests between 1974 and 1981.

The '80s and '90s saw changes to the criteria for legitimate resistance and the process to obtain the CVR that were relatively minor but nevertheless hotly debated. The minimum age of involvement in the resistance was lowered to 16 from 18 in 1982, for instance. The number or required testimonies was reduced from two to one in 1989, to account for the shrinking population of surviving resistance leaders. The most recent revision of the laws pertaining to the CVR in 2014 was a

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79 Lewis, "Giscard Ending of V-E Day."
minor adjustment to the window of time for administrative processing of applications.

The explicit attempts to contain illegal resistance within the law and order universe of the burgeoning state did not begin with the creation of the category *combattant volontaire de la Résistance*. The earlier creation of a legitimizing apparatus within the colonial administration in 1943 and subsequent restructuring of armed resistance cells in 1944 offers a more instructive context for understanding the fascinating process in which legal and mnemonic elements were fully enmeshed. Serge Barcellini, historian and former director of *Office national des anciens combattants*, wrote that these small green cards "crystalized the totality of debates regarding the Resistance, its concept, its authentication, and its uses since 1945."82 The implications of the CVR debates extend well beyond the disputed commemorative terrain of the resistance itself. In the early years, the CVR offered a means of consolidating state power by containing threats to it and empowering those who might wield it. Its origins might have spoken in past tense, but was equally concerned with the future of law and order of the colonial nation-state. The CVR became significant grounds upon which lawmakers, administrators, veterans associations, and applicants renegotiated belonging to and exclusion from the imagined national community, by way of postwar France’s central national myth.

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82 Barcellini, "La Résistance française à travers le prisme de la carte CVR," 151.
Marseille’s CVR Committee

Madeleine Baudoin's file was far from being alone among the paperwork with curious marginalia revealing the multiple minds of French functionaries charged with implementing the CVR statutes. In late 1949 or 1950, the prefect’s office reviewed short dossiers on former resisters who were under consideration for the departmental administrative body that would soon review applications for the CVR card. In colorful pen and pencil, functionaries at the prefecture of Marseille marked, "yes" or "no" next to the names of potential CVR committee members. In some cases, the yes was crossed out and no written below or vice versa. In others the no was simply crossed out. Presumably some intra-office debate was behind these reversals and nullified negatives.

The prefecture of Marseille, like those across the country, had to select four to six representatives of different resistance movements. These included Combat, the Front national, the Armée secrète, the Francs-tireurs et partisans françaises, and the Milices socialistes. Selecting the committee was important work. Members would have to come from a wide enough range of political backgrounds to elicit the trust of applicants in the legitimacy of the process, while avoiding troublemakers that were exceedingly militant. For many departments, these committees crystallized the shaky balance of power between the French Communist Party and politically centrist or right-wing gaullists.

This administrative structure took longer to establish than the legal code. Different offices encouraged each other to hurry, frequently, over the course of the first decade of the application of the CVR. What initially was supposed to take a
matter of months, stretched into years, with the first CVR cards awarded in 1948 by prefectural decisions. Soon after, committees of former resisters composed an additional layer of review in light of article six of the definitive law of March 25, 1949, which was elaborated the next year in decree number 50.358 of March 21, 1950. The applications of Marseille’s resisters would be reviewed by a local committee, then a regional committee based on military zones (Marseille was in the 9th), and finally the national committee. The local committees became the first "gatekeeper" in charge of reviewing and giving a recommendation on the vast majority of CVR applications before they were dissolved decades later.

When a list of candidates for the local committee finally made its way to the desk of the Commissaire Central in Marseille, the sous-préfet of Bouches-du-Rhône wrote to politely urge a speedy investigation, "In order to clarify this choice, I would be grateful if you would proceed very quickly with a discreet but thorough investigation regarding the morals and political affinities of the candidates under consideration. Thank you very much in advance."\(^83\) Successful candidates would be entrusted with arbitrating the central national myth of the postwar. These former resisters might not have received the state’s official training in how to be a functionary, but they operated as a key part of the bureaucracy’s legitimizing function. The short biographies that administrators provided offer a window into the types of men that local officials considered to be suitable for the job. Central authorities, however, were not always in agreement with these local

\(^{83}\) Correspondence from the sous-préfet to the Commissaire central, 25 October 1950, 148 W 417, Departmental Archives of Bouches-du-Rhône, Marseille, France.
recommendations. The correspondence that followed showed which of these men passed muster at the national level.

Eighteen candidates appeared on the list. Of the eighteen candidates, ten were born in Marseille with two others hailing from other towns in Bouches-du-Rhône. There were six candidates from communist groupings and ten from gaullist groupings. Twelve were married, three were widowed, and three were single or had no mention of their status in the paperwork. Their ages ranged from 30 to 62, with the majority from the generation that came of age in World War I. In the end, officials selected Nanni representing the CFL, Poisson representing the FTPF, Pelas representing the Milices Socialistes, Combe representing the ORA, and Chartier presiding over the rest to serve on the local CVR committee, with substitute members as needed. Nanni and Poisson did not form part of the original list of candidates, and Nanni only appeared with a skeletal biography on the secondary list that the prefect requested, unsatisfied with the eighteen candidates originally presented to him.

At the time of the original inquiry in 1950, Léon Jules Chartier was a fifty-three year old math teacher, married with two children, who had received the Medal of the Resistance five years earlier. He was born in Braux, a small village near the Italian border that might have been in Provence but was a world apart from Marseille, and settled in one of Marseille’s southern suburbs by the time of the report. During the war, he commanded 1,800 members of the Armée secrète (Corps Franc de la Libération) and he survived arrest and a four-day imprisonment by the Gestapo. In 1946, he ran as a member of Gauches Républicains but was not elected
and did not attempt a second bid for office. The probe affirmed that "his conduct and his morals were favorable" according to his fellow teachers.\(^{84}\)

Joseph Elie Roger Combe was a thirty-five year old, married father of three, born and raised in Marseille. He had been working for a year as a quality controller at the port. Combe’s expertise was in communications as a career officer from 1935 to 1948, and held the titles of the Croix de Guerre and the Médaille de la Résistance for his clandestine activity. The state investigator was not able to determine his political sympathies with certainty, but relayed that it seemed like they lay with the Communist Party. This would be in keeping with the politics of many of the port workers at the time, but would be in stark contrast with the far-right politics of his former resistance organization. He had no criminal record and good conduct and moral character.

Elie Samuel Pelas, age fifty-eight, was born elsewhere in the department, served as a municipal employee in Marseille at the time of the report, and lived in the northern quarter of Mourepiane, near the famed artists’ haunt of l’Estaque. He had a child from his first marriage and was married a second time. Pelas was a veteran of the First World War, after which he held both the Croix de Guerre and Chevalier of the Légion d’Honneur. During the Second World War, he led the Milices Socialistes du bassin de Séeon for which the postwar state awarded him the Croix de Guerre a second time. His political background was mostly in the SFIO, with which he served in the 7th Canton in 1946. The investigator noted "excellent" evidence of

\(^{84}\) Report from the Commissaire central, 9 November 1950, 148 W 417, Departmental Archives of Bouches-du-Rhône, Marseille, France. Following paragraphs of committee candidate dossiers also cite this report.
his conduct and morals among friends and coworkers alike. While the first two candidates, Combe and Chartier elicited no marginalia, a bright blue "oui" graced Pelas' dossier, underlined for emphasis.

Albert Auguste Chaix, next on the list, was not so lucky, marked as he was with an underlined "non" of equal size. Chaix was a forty-three year old tramway worker, born and raised in Marseille, and an apparent bachelor. The dossier was comparatively thin, and offered no information about his wartime activity, only that upon the close of the war, he was nominated Secrétaire-Adjoint of the CGT, served as president of the Commission d'épuration, and was a militant cégétiste. The ambivalent investigator noted that the "evidence collected regarding his morals was not unfavorable, and that he was well regarded by his various managers."

Alfred Bizot’s dossier was more extensive, but he suffered the same fate of the blue cursive "non" marginalia. Bizot was a thirty-two year old teacher, married without children. He served in the military until the defeat in 1940, and then joined the Marseille section of the FTPF, codename "Captain Roubaud." He was awarded the Croix de Guerre for his activity, and his professional qualifications were matched by his good personal conduct and morals. He served numerous times in local offices as a member of the Communist Party.

The anonymous functionary also nixed forty year old Antoine Henri Félix Pierangeli’s bio. The navigator was born in Tunisia, held French nationality, and was married with three children. He served in the Navy at the outset of the war, and joined the FFI after the French defeat, for which he was awarded the Croix de Guerre and the Médaille de la Résistance. Pierangeli was a member of the French
Communist Party and the sailors’ union within the CGT, which he served as undersecretary. The investigator noted that a month prior, Pierangeli went to trial for hanging posters of "a subversive character." Further marks against his candidacy came from the mixed evidence of his character: "impulsive, rather violent, but sincere in his political and union convictions and honest in fulfilling his union’s mandate."

Twelve additional thumbnail portraits of the personal lives, perceived morals, and political commitments of former resisters and possible future committee members can be found in this file. After local officials took the trouble to investigate these eighteen men, the prefect of Bouches-du-Rhône asked for a supplementary list because he did not find a sufficient number of suitable candidates among the dossiers he received. Historian Catherine Lacour-Astol observed that because the power of the departmental commission broke with the centralizing Jacobin tradition, these commissions "were the object[s] of unwavering attention on the part of the Minister, who sought to guide [them]. This is evidenced by the profusion of texts emanating from the central administration... and the repeated instructions for silence and vigilance." After months of delays arising from this level of micromanagement, Antoine Nanni and several others appeared on this secondary list, requested by the prefect.

Despite the apparent relinquishment of some degree of control to local administrators, it is interesting to note that Combe was the only committee member

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86 Lacour-Astol, La genre de la Résistance, 253.
born and raised in Marseille. Nanni, who was born in Corsica, like many of Marseille’s inhabitants, could also claim authority as a local representative particularly because he participated in the liberation of the city. Pelas was the next closest, born elsewhere in Bouches-du-Rhône. However these three men were all military men of the World War I generation. Perhaps the prefect noted Combe’s service as a career military man, which suggested a greater internalization of national, republican values than he might have imagined of other Marseillais candidates on the original list. Nanni was a reserve officer in the colonial infantry and held the Medal of Verdun from the First World War. Pelas was a veteran of the First World War and a member of the Legion of Honor. There are a total of 45 men with the surname Poisson who held the CVR title, and while I was unable to verify their service records, none of them were born in Bouches-du-Rhône. As for Chartier, hailing from the French Alps, he was the right age to be called up near the beginning of the First World War, although the file makes no mention of his military history.

The demographic background of these men had more in common with that of Charles de Gaulle than the majority of the local resistance, which tended to be younger, of many national origins, civilian-dominated, and not exclusively male. While this does not foreclose the possibility that the committee worked hard to be fair arbiters of the application process, it is suggestive of a certain kind of patriotic mentality regarding national service born out of military training. At a minimum, it showed whom the state entrusted with the legacy of the resistance. In the years that

87 CVR Dossier for Antoine Jean Nanni, GR 16 P 4397 61, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France.
88 CVR Dossier for Antoine Jean Nanni, GR 16 P 4397 61, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France.
followed, these men met regularly to evaluate the validity of thousands of CVR applications, including the majority of the dossiers in the next chapter.

**Conclusion**

Franz Kafka claimed, "The chains of tormented [humankind] are made out of official papers." If this is the case, the massive CVR bureaucracy that developed after World War II produced prodigious chains to bind the state-formulated memory of resistance. As of 2008, 262,730 individuals had been awarded a CVR card, among them very few women and even fewer resisters from the French empire, of the roughly 600,000 applications submitted by petitioners. The CVR worked on the past to define resistance in patriotic terms in the service of the present, with a view to secure the future of its narrow definition in the archive it left behind.

State paperwork has been neglected as an illuminating component of the process by which official memory takes shape and is perpetuated across space and time. When scholars do address bureaucratic processes like the CVR, the approach is often from the top down, highlighting evolving legislation and criteria for defining resistance. This approach risks falling into the trap of understanding official memory as singular, the product of either gaullist or communist successes in the halls of government. This perspective can provide important insights into certain

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90 "Dossiers administratifs de résistants," Service historique de la Défense, accessed February 13, 2018 http://www.servicehistorique.sga.defense.gouv.fr/?q=content/dossiers-administratifs-de-r%C3%A9sistants.

changes over time, but assumes a sort of internal coherence that can shed little light on the far more fragmentary and contingent ways in which administrators applied the CVR laws and petitioners navigated the administration.

Approaching the interaction between applicants, administrators, and lawmakers during the application process from the bottom up allows researchers to analyze bureaucracy's unique disciplinary effects in action. The comparatively sporadic historical treatments of the CVR from below have yet to reach a synthesis, and no wonder: the sheer volume and complexity of documents required to do so is a warning against this approach. It is an effective strategy of power to make itself invisible in this way. This study is a small, provisional contribution to this emerging literature, conducted in hopes of reorienting scholarly approaches to the state project of defining resistance in several respects. The CVR's disciplinary effects are not simply produced on the level of fostering a sense of "imagined community" that is standard issue in official national memory. Rather, particularly in the early postwar years, the CVR became a key instrument of expanding state sovereignty to manage, surveil, rank, materially reward, include, exclude, and confine anti-state law breaking to a circumscribed historical period, while inviting the public to participate in the project. It was a project for mass society. As such, it is unique among French war medals and honors.

The bureaucratic process worked in subtle and pervasive ways to contain and coopt the dangerous political potential of underground movements. However, paperwork "refracts power" as a medium, Ben Kafka observed. Thus, the possibility

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92 Chapman, France's Long Reconstruction, 30.
was left open of structuring memory in very different ways—on the level of local committees or in applicants’ submissions to the archive itself—than the centralized state might hope. Communists and gaullists in government alike were constantly on guard against such a possibility.

As we will see in the following chapter, the bureaucratic medium is particularly suited to explore the durability, disciplinary effects, and mutually constitutive elements of narratives about the resistance not just over time, but across space. At its most effective, CVR application forms trained applicants to write a certain kind of narrative, reproducing a template for legitimate struggle within a narrow, statist political imaginary. At its least effective, Marseille’s resisters exposed contradictions in this narrative or refused to participate, pursuing alternative commemorative practices that challenged the prevailing view of the city as a place without memory.
CHAPTER TWO
Official Resisters, Victims, and Rejects

The habit of language insisted upon in the letters of remission and the roles in which supplicants were required to present themselves were among the civilizing mechanisms of the early modern French state, reminding people subjectively of the locus of power, even while never silencing competing modes in which they dramatized their actions...
—Natalie Zemon Davis

Human beings participate in history both as actors and as narrators.
—Michel-Rolph Trouillot

Four centuries before applicants produced their accounts of wartime clandestinity to French authorities for retrospective legitimation, a different genre of outlaw crafted personal narratives to present to the state in the form of stamp, seal, and signature studded paperwork. They pursued not recognition but reprieve. These records formed the basis of historian Natalie Zemon Davis' monograph Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and Their Tellers in Sixteenth Century France.

While the sixteenth century supplicants, who sought the king's pardon after being sentenced to prison or death for crimes that remained illegal, were different in many ways from the twentieth century applicants for the carte du combattant volontaire de la Résistance (CVR), the type of information their appeals to power convey about the period bears striking similarities. Both are rich sources for exploring the disciplining work of the bureaucratic medium, storytelling as a site of exchange between official and popular culture, and how these processes strengthened sovereignty by pushing the jurisdiction of the state "beyond the

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law.” And, as historian Alexandra Steinlight observed, "once the state expands, it tends not to contract." The administration of the carte du combattant volontaire de la Résistance was a case in point.

The mere fact that the state successfully encouraged over 600,000 people to detail their wartime lawbreaking to the authorities demonstrates a fascinating set of popular attitudes regarding the postwar political order. Unlike Davis' subjects, nearly all CVR applicants faced no legal sanction for their wartime activities after the summer of 1944; some were entirely unknown to French officials before submitting their dossiers. Applicants were confident enough in what Davis called a "common discourse," in this case regarding the distinction between punishable crime and commendable resistance, to present their activities for official scrutiny. The line separating the two categories should not be taken for granted. These activities ranged from distributing anti-Vichy tracts to falsifying official documents to robbing city halls of ration cards to sabotaging rail lines to killing Germans and French collaborators. Their narratives indicate that applicants trusted that the state would not use their accounts against them, at least for the details they chose to include.

The trust from applicants across a broad political spectrum was remarkable for at least two major reasons. First, France undeniably entered into the Cold War with socialist Paul Ramadier’s expulsion of the Parti communiste français (PCF) from

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95 Davis, Fiction in the Archives, 58.
98 Davis, Fiction in the Archives, 112.
ministerial positions in 1947, a year before the CVR administrative apparatus was in place to process applications. Uncertainty about the realignment of the national government was perhaps moderated at the local level, since communists did serve on most CVR committees. Among them were Poisson of the *Francs-tireurs et partisans français* (FTPF), Antoine Nanni who represented the CFL but had served in the FTPF, and possibly—according to his dossier—Joseph Combe of the otherwise decidedly anti-communist *Organisation de résistance de l’armée* (ORA) for Bouches-du-Rhône.\(^99\) Second, purges of Vichy authorities were uneven in nature: most thorough amongst individuals in prominent leadership roles, but less so for rank and file civil servants and law enforcement.\(^100\) The applications of three members of the Bloch family of Sedan illustrate the limits of the *épuration*, noting that the officer responsible for their arrest and eventual deportation, Marcel Petit, still worked for the Judicial Police after the war.\(^101\) As we will see below, when considering ambiguities in their dossiers, administrators called on the surveillance powers of the French police to provide information on the criminal and sometimes moral (read: sexual) histories of CVR applicants, who were perhaps unaware that applying opened them up to such investigation. Nevertheless, in the first decade after the

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\(^99\) See CVR Dossier for Antoine Jean Nanni, GR 16 P 439761, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France; and Report from the *Commissaire central*, 9 November 1950, 148 W 417, Departmental Archives of Bouches-du-Rhône, Marseille, France.

\(^100\) François Rouquet and Fabrice Virgili, *Les Français es, les Français et l’Épuration: 1940 à nos jours* (Gallimard, 2018), 223-231.

\(^101\) Annie Huguette Bloch disappeared after her arrest, internment in Drancy, and deportation towards Auschwitz, her application lists officer Marcel Petit as the cause of her arrest and notes he still worked for the Judicial Police. Jeanne Renée Bloch, née Dreyfuss (likely her mother) shared her twenty-year-old daughter’s fate. Her application was filled out in the same handwriting with the identical note about Officer Petit. CVR Dossier of Annie Huguette Bloch, 20010318/2, AN Pierrefitte, Pierrefitte, France; and CVR Dossier of Jeanne Renée Bloch née Dreyfuss, 20010318/2, AN Pierrefitte, Pierrefitte, France. See Simon Kitson, *Police and Politics in Marseille, 1936-1945* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), regarding purges of the Marseilleaise police.
war, between 1948 and 1954, committees issued 76,529 CVR cards with an unknown total number of applicants during this period, representing nearly a third of the attributions up to the present day. For applicants who took the added step of supplying lists of other resisters they knew in a section of the form that many others left blank, faith in the goodwill of the government "born of the Resistance" appears to have been particularly strong.

Storytelling is also of central importance to this chapter. Replace a few actors, and Davis’ observations about the co-constitutive dynamics of her subjects' storytelling apply neatly to the CVR process:

The movement of the pardon tale has also shown us how information, values, and language habits could flow across lines of class and culture. These stories were circulated and debated by people who knew the principals, and were further heard and spread by notaries, clerks, chancellery officials, attorneys, judges, courtroom sergeants, and sometimes by the king himself and his council. The remission encounter was also a way—through the secretary’s pen or the lawyer’s advice—for literary constructions and royal wording to influence people who could not read. We have here not an impermeable "official culture" imposing its criteria on "popular culture," but cultural exchange, conducted under the king’s rules. The stakes were different for supplicants, listeners, and pardoners, but they were all implicated in a common discourse about violence and its pacification.

The CVR archive can be read for its contemporary implications, as Davis reads her sixteenth-century sources, as well as its commemorative weight across different periods and regions. First, the administrative process represented what sociologist

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104 Davis, Fiction in the Archives, 112.
Maurice Halbwachs called a "social framework of memory." Administrative encounters might not be the first place one would look for a social framework, but they were just as important as a neighborhood, exile community, or veterans' association. Especially in the early years after World War II, rank and file resisters often lapsed into silence, either traumatized or unable to find a resonant narrative in the heavily mythologized and reductionist Résistancialisme of gaullist and communist politicians. They also had to live side by side with close to an equal number of former collaborators as former resisters, which could have a silencing effect. Thus, the application process was an early, privileged framework for recollection, "conducted under the king's [or rather the administrative state's] rules." Second, the process of memory construction did not only matter for the development of narratives and consciousness of the past at the time these records were created, but held importance for the shape of historical and commemorative narratives to this day. Historian Catherine Lacour-Astol described the CVR's historiographical role: "The population recognized by the attribution of the combattant volontaire de la Résistance (CVR) statute conventionally forms the basis of any monograph devoted to the Resistance. It was unthinkable to deny this function." Her argument is that, regardless of the fact that individual dossiers

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105 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 38: "...we appeal to our memory only in order to answer questions which others have asked us, or that we suppose they could have asked us. We note, moreover, that in order to answer them, we place ourselves in their perspective and we consider ourselves as being part of the same group or groups as they."


were sealed for decades, the CVR’s negotiation of a hierarchy of merit and value contributed to shaping the contours of social discourses after the war. Lacour-Astol spoke particularly with regards to sex and the resistance in her study, but further study might reveal parallels for the formation of other postwar commemorative and social categories of inclusion and exclusion as well.108 The CVR project provided one point of focus for the postwar debates over the wide variety of official and counter-narratives of resistance. Furthermore, Administrators were not only processing the business of the day as they evaluated accounts of resistance past, but were also producing an archive to project the contours of their narrative into the future. In fact, after several reorganizations and eventual absorption by the Service historique de la Défense in 2013, one important duty of this body (which formerly included the Resistance Office before its dissolution) since the turn of the twenty-first century has been its public commemorative duty, which draws heavily on this archive.109

The state’s employment of the CVR to expand its jurisdiction into yesterday’s wartime underground attempted to render a complex set of movements and local actors legible within a law and order framework. Political theorist James C. Scott argues that legibility, or arranging "the population in ways that simplified the classic state functions of taxation, conscription, and prevention of rebellion," is a "central problem in statecraft."110 The long bemoaned "weakness" of the state in Marseille, viewed from a different angle, can be understood as the local population’s illegibility

108 Lacour-Astol, La genre de la Résistance, 27.
from the perspective of national government. Officials seized on the opportunity of postwar rebuilding to make Marseille legible, from housing to commemoration. Setting out early modern standardization measures taking place during the same period that Davis studies, Scott describes the tension between the local and the state that could also apply to postwar memory politics in Marseille:

[L]ocal practices of measurement and landholding were "illegible" to the state in their raw form. They exhibited a diversity and intricacy that reflected a great variety of purely local, not state, interests. That is to say, they could not be assimilated into an administrative grid without being either transformed or reduced to a convenient, if partly fictional, shorthand. ... Backed by state power through records, courts, and ultimately coercion, these state fictions transformed the reality they presumed to observe, although never so thoroughly as to precisely fit the grid.

Unlike the French military, organized from the top down, the resistance grew from the ground up in response to local exigencies. State efforts to retrospectively make resisters fit the mold of military veterans could never be fully successful.

State attempts to make phenomena legible also affect later, non-state efforts to restore complexity. Since early histories and commemorative narratives about the resistance, including the CVR, so often prioritized its masculine, military, and metropolitan elements that were decontextualized from a much more pluralistic milieu, historians and memory activists frequently address the resulting gaps by focusing on individual excluded groups. A consequence of this work to address the marginalization of the histories of colonial troops (which we will cover in the

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112 Scott, Seeing like a State, 24.

next chapter), women, Jews, rescuers, Spaniards, and other exiles and refugees is that it reinforces the boundaries that the state laid out in its initial efforts to selectively commemorate resisters and resistances. The resulting discrete categories were retrospectively imposed. Wartime activists themselves, despite facing distinct prejudices, risks, and material deprivations that should not be minimized, did not necessarily segregate themselves in such a way.

The Marseillaise resistance was particularly heterogeneous, not just among but within groups, yet the legacies of resisters who struggled side by side in life have been bound separately in monographs. The resulting commemorative narratives impede understanding internal group dynamics between members from different backgrounds. A close look at the patterns of acceptance and rejection of applications for the CVR provides a glimpse into one process, among many, by which the postwar state contributed to creating a fragmented hierarchy of Resistance memory that replicated hierarchies in the broader postwar society. Furthermore, it reveals the extent to which the imposition of a series of categories in a vertical order of legitimacy remained stable in Marseille. This chapter offers a close reading of CVR dossiers to demonstrate the ways in which administrators categorized applicants versus the applicants' own presentations of resistance.

As of December 31, 1994, there had been 16,877 requests for the CVR card in Marseille’s department of Bouches-du-Rhône, 8,231 of which were successful.114 The department’s rate of acceptance, 48.77%, was on the low end compared to other metropolitan departments, which, apart from the extreme outlier of Bas-Rhin

114 Barcellini, "La Résistance française à travers le prisme de la carte CVR," 169.
at 3.99% acceptance, ranged from 32.15% in Ardèche to 84.9% acceptance in Seine-et-Marne.\textsuperscript{115} However, CVR card attribution was towards the higher end in terms of percentage of the 1946 population at .72% (as of 1992).\textsuperscript{116} Crucially, applicants usually submitted their dossiers to the departmental commission in their postwar places of residence, making the volume of CVR applications in any given locale an inexact representation of the number of resisters in that place during the war.

Quantifying the resistance, however, is not of primary concern in this study. Since I am interested in the instantiation of state power and memory on the local level from above and below, or how the Marseille-based administrators handled applications as well as how those active in Marseille's resistance narrativized their clandestine struggle, I took a hybrid approach to my sources. First I compiled a list of names of individuals from secondary sources, memoirs, and oral histories related to the resistance in Marseille and searched the catalogue of the Service historique de la Défense in Vincennes to find out if they applied, and if so, to locate their dossiers. This approach allowed me to find and compare mnemonic narratives for individuals who were already part of the public commemorative landscape in some fashion, like those of Madeleine Baudoin, Daniel Bénèdite, and Gaston Defferre. Second, I made my way across Paris to the National Archives in Pierrefitte to consult boxes of rejected CVR applications from the Fourth Republican period that were organized alphabetically. I combed through each one to locate applicants who either described wartime resistance in Marseille or whose applications were reviewed by the Marseille-based departmental committee. Finally, I accessed a smaller number of

\textsuperscript{115} Barcellini, "La Résistance française à travers le prisme de la carte CVR," 169-172.
\textsuperscript{116} Barcellini, "La Résistance française à travers le prisme de la carte CVR," 174.
approved applications of rank and file resisters in the Departmental Archives of Bouches-du-Rhône in Marseille. The geography of these three sets of applications fell within a Venn diagram whose largest field was made up of applicants who both discussed resistance in wartime Marseille and whose applications were reviewed in postwar Marseille. I examined both successful and unsuccessful applications. Including this range of sources allowed me to access the accounts of people who might not have left behind any other public record of their wartime recollections. This is particularly important for understanding the bureaucratic engagement of working-class women and working-class people without French citizenship and the memory politics resulting from this engagement. It also proved vital for fine-grained analysis of patterns of rejection to understand the points at which official and grassroots narratives about clandestine resistance came into conflict with one another.

"La vrai France"

If General de Gaulle’s liberation speech in Paris articulated a mythic narrative in which the true, eternal France liberated itself, the CVR bureaucracy spent seventy years populating this narrative with representatives of the true France. As the previous chapter outlined, communists and gaullists made minor adjustments to the CVR criteria and administrative process over the course of the postwar that might benefit militants of one group over the other, but the core of the category retained certain key features. As historian Olivier Wieviorka pointed out, the CVR engaged in a mnemonic strategy that used legal language pertaining to World War I veterans to
broadly comprehend the phenomenon of World War II resistance. This military framework favored men, who were more likely to engage in armed resistance than women, and those active in organizations that conceived of their roles first and foremost in terms of patriotic national defense, rather than antifascist or antiauthoritarian ideals. Furthermore, it used the logic of the formal military to simplify and make legible a vast array of underground groups that engaged in many different types of activity, from rescue to propaganda to sabotage to armed engagement, and that had many different types of internal structures that had to be rewritten in terms of military hierarchies to make bureaucratic sense. As we will see below, this affected the type of information CVR applicants included or left out of their dossiers, whose applications received special scrutiny, and ultimately what the state chose to self-servingly validate as the most effective clandestine work.

General Pierre Dejussieu-Pontcarral was a career military man who served an important role in setting up the early CVR bureaucracy. He encapsulated the French military continuity the CVR sought to establish with his experience in the regular armed forces in the First World War and interwar North African campaigns as well as his leadership role in the resistance as head of the Armée secrète. His survival of Buchenwald further sealed the legitimacy of his position. Unlike General de Gaulle, he could not be accused of any distance from clandestine struggle and personal risk.

Before administrators began processing rank-and-file CVR applications, Dejussieu-Pontcarral solicited an application from the man who would soon go on to

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serve a thirty-year term as mayor of Marseille: Gaston Defferre. On November 8, 1947, two days before municipal elections returned a mayoral victory for the gaullist MRP candidate Michel Carlini in alliance with the SFIO over the PCF’s Jean Cristofol triggering massive wildcat strikes, Dejussieu-Pontcarral wrote to Defferre, "The General Delegation of the FFCI [Forces françaises combattants de l'intérieur] is currently resolving the military situation of the former leaders of la France Combattante’s networks." Defferre would be the CVR’s ideal in terms of a leader "widely known as a resister" as both a former head of the Brutus Network from late 1943 to the end of the war and a rapidly rising star in local and national government. Due to his position and proximity to the levers of state power, his application appeared to be little more than a formality.

Defferre worked as a lawyer before the war. In 1935, a turbulent year in local politics, he and Andrée Aboulker married: she, a communist, he, a socialist. They were geographically separated during the war, but both joined the resistance, survived the war, and went on to serve in the Assembly of the Provisional Government. Between the liberation of Marseille in August 1944 and his receipt of Dejussieu-Pontcarral’s letter in November 1947, Defferre kept busy. He served a short appointment as mayor and president of the délégation municipale, seized control of the newspaper Le Petit Provençal (renaming it Le Provençal), and assumed leadership of the SFIO all beginning in 1944. In 1945 he and Aboulker divorced; she went on to marry her cousin José Aboulker, leader of the Algerian Jewish resistance group Geo Gras mentioned in the previous chapter. That year Defferre was elected to

118 CVR Dossier of Gaston Defferre, GR 16 P 164635, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France.
the National Assembly. The following year he began serving in several high-ranking appointments, as Secrétaire d'État à l'Information and as Sous-secrétaire d'État à l'Outre-mer.

The affidavits that Defferre supplied to support his application for recognition as part of the Forces françaises combattantes (FFC) bore none of the narrative qualities of the CVR applications below. Instead, they were forms, which included his name, date of birth, resistance network, if he was arrested or deported (no), dates of engagement as an FFC agent class P2 (October 1, 1942 to September 30, 1944),\textsuperscript{119} position (leader, first class), and fictional rank (lieutenant colonel, a senior officer). The two forms only differed in their signatories: Colonel de Belenet and Lieutnant-Colonel Canonne. The application form accompanying the affidavits contained few additional details. Though Defferre wrote and spoke about his participation in the resistance elsewhere, his dossier conserved at SHD in Vincennes never called for a narrative account of the details of his involvement.\textsuperscript{120}

The file of Jean Comte, the leader of Madeleine Baudoin’s resistance group, at Vincennes is even sparser.\textsuperscript{121} It contained a mere four sheets of paper, less than half the size of a standard A4 page each: a fiche de renseignements, a sheet with his dossier info, a single affidavit form that was also signed by de Belenet (before he

\textsuperscript{119} The classification of FFC agents dates back to an even earlier Free French ordinance than the previous chapter discussed, in 1942. There were three categories, "O" for occasional activity, "P1" for essentially part-time resisters who also worked a regular job, and "P2" for resisters to who dedicated the entirety of their time to the resistance. See Michel Blondan, "Déterminer et valoriser le statut des agents FFC: Du décret 366 du 25 juillet 1942 à la série GR 28P 11 du SHD," page 13, Musée de la Résistance en ligne, accessed February 24, 2021, http://museedelaresistanceenligne.org/media10222-Michel-Blondan-DA.


\textsuperscript{121} CVR Dossier of Jean Comte, GR 16 P 139892, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France.
rose from Lieutenant-Colonel to Colonel), and a *fiche d'identification*. The affidavit form was a similar style, but this version contained even less information than Defferre's. Appearing above de Belenet's signature were only Comte's name, date of birth, the dates of his service as an FFC agent class P1 (December 1, 1943 to September 30, 1944), and his resistance network (FYR, whose scope and political orientation is not present in the paperwork, nor is any mention of the network in Comte's personal account of his work with the MUR archived in Aix-en-Provence). Perhaps the FYR network, which other forms indicated was linked with the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), was his highest-ranking role.\(^{122}\) Could the FYR have been associated with the *Groupes francs* that Comte led and in which Baudoin militated? If so, there was no indication in the paperwork. Whatever may have been the case, it is a prime example of what James C. Scott called the shorthand of the state. In the process of making Comte's resistance role simple and legible for the purposes of the state, to grant an appropriate pension, it became inscrutable for the purposes of local resistance memory. If a narrative account penned by Comte exists in the CVR administrative paperwork somewhere, it has not been archived in the same collection.\(^{123}\)

Charles Poli's dossier, in contrast, numbered over fifty pages and included a series of documents rich with narrative detail, dating as early as November 8, 1944,

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\(^{122}\) Further information on FYR might be available in the collection "Guerre de 1939-1945. Archives de la Fédération des amicales de réseaux Renseignements et Évasion de la France combattante (FARREFC)." 72A]/2362, 72A]/2364, and 72A]/2416, AN, Pierrefitte, France. With thanks to Henry Rousso for this archival reference.

\(^{123}\) Instead, Comte wrote a narrative account of his resistance group for his required memoir when he was in colonial officer training school after the war, a parting of ways with Baudoin who recorded the history of their group as well, as she was assisting the Algerian independence struggle. See J. Comte Mémoire ENFOM, FM/3ECOL/51/d3, May 28, 1945, AN d'Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence, France.
years before the CVR committees began processing the backlog of requests.\footnote{CVR Dossier of Charles Poli, GR 16 P 484237, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France.} Poli was a militant communist in Comte and Baudoin’s resistance organization. Poli describes engaging in "individual resistance" and sabotage from November 1941 to November 1942. The following year, he joined the FTPF and was arrested and imprisoned at the Chave Prison after attacking a train with explosives that was carrying German servicemen. He escaped prison, along with several others, with the help of Baudoin, in a controversial episode that I will describe in greater detail in chapter four. After his escape, Poli describes engaging in the work of various maquis groups in the Marseille region, before leading the "Marseillaise Battalion" in the insurrection to liberate Marseille.

Poli’s first application in 1944 was a request for recognition as an officer in the FFI. The application asked for much of the same information as the CVR forms, with the notable exception of a fascinating request for notation of the "expressed desires of the applicant." Poli responded, "My desires are to liberate France and bring back our prisoners and deported as soon as possible." Desires for the future are perhaps an unorthodox demand in bureaucratic paperwork, and raise questions regarding how the state instructed functionaries to evaluate these responses they received. Poli’s answer could not have counted against him, as the state awarded him the fictional rank of Captain. He was still a junior officer, but three grades above Baudoin who began her resistance activities before him, participated in numerous armed campaigns during the year he spent in prison, helped orchestrate his escape from Chave Prison, and engaged in all the armed actions he did after his escape.
With his official rank in the FFI in hand, Poli had little trouble in successfully obtaining a CVR card in 1951.

Daniel Bénédite’s file provided more narrative detail still, at over one hundred pages, and included official correspondence regarding the construction of a monument to one of the resistance formations in which he served. Bénédite, born Daniel Ungenmach, fled the German invasion of 1940 to Marseille, where he worked with the Centre américain de secours, or Emergency Rescue Committee as its United States-based counterpart was called, in the first year of Vichy rule. He became an indispensible colleague of Varian Fry, who directed the CAS/ERC until his expulsion from France in 1941. In that time, they helped roughly two thousand avant-garde artists, writers, and leftist political figures escape from Nazi occupied Europe, including André Breton, Remedios Varo, Wifredo Lam, Jacques Lipschitz, Oscar Dominguez, Max Ernst, Jaqueline Lamba, Marc Chagall, Victor Serge, Consuelo de Saint Exupéry, and Anna Seghers.

Bénédite’s account in his CVR application describes how after authorities shut down the legal work of the CAS, he continued to assist with clandestine crossings into Spain, and worked as a liaison with the FTP of Lyon, among other activities. At this point the police in Marseille had arrested Bénédite numerous times with subsequent imprisonment on board the Sinaia docked in the port during Pétain’s visit, the château Saint Loup, and the Chave Prison. (In fact, the CVR

125 CVR Dossier of Daniel Ungemach (Bénédite), GR 16 P 581034, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France.
application mentions that Gaston Defferre served as Bénédite's defense attorney in 1941 and, with the help of pressure from the U.S. consul, succeeded in having him released from Chave.) He had also been arrested several times near the Spanish border, and by the end of 1942 was actively sought by the authorities. The document explained that this helped precipitate Bénédite’s departure from Marseille, after which he joined the maquis of Pelenq in the summer of 1943 until his arrest by the Gestapo in May 1944, who eventually sent him to the Baumettes Prison in Marseille where he remained until the liberation of the city.

Bénédite presented his trajectory from June 1940 until the Liberation in just over two pages of bullet points, written in the third person. His narrative style departed substantially from other resistance accounts, and was uncommon in affirming the active role his wife took by his side:

- Assumed with his wife the continued legal and illegal work of this organization [the CAS] until a new arrest, following a raid in June 1942. Released after a 7-hour interrogation and 2 days of detention in the Château Saint Loup in Marseille.
- This affair put an end to the legal activities of the CAS (its funds and materials were seized). But his clandestine activity continued: in particular the passages to Spain and Switzerland until 1944 under the supervision of the applicant WITH AMERICAN FUNDS ILLEGALLY TRANSMITTED through Switzerland.

Unlike Defferre and Comte’s skeletal accounts that focused on armed resistance, Bénédite includes narrative information on a wide array of activities from money laundering to militant action with the maquis. He included details that emphasize the risk involved in civil resistance and the consequences he faced. This dossier preserves a record of resistance that transcended the category that sought to contain it.
The affidavits, on the other hand, more closely resembled spirit of the CVR. Battalion leader Orsini, for example, begins his testimony with "[Bénèdite's] activity had a military character starting on June 15, 1943 and can be summarized as follows..." Ultimately, it was this service in an armed group, the maquis of Pelenq, that CVR administrators recognized as legitimate, using Orsini's account to identify the start date to Bénèdite's resistance in 1943, despite his years of underground work prior to that summer.

The correspondence in Bénédite's dossier between the Association Nationale des Combattants Volontaires de la Résistance (ANCVR) and the Ministry of Defense's Resistance Bureau in 1993 indicates one way in which bureaucratic memory had a life beyond the state archives. This paperwork also reproduced its narrative in the physical commemorative landscape. On June 14, 1993, Colonel Gérard Dupont, the president of the ANCVR, wrote to Commandant Armengau, head of the Resistance Bureau, in order to provide "proof that there was indeed a Maquis in Pelenq." Dupont explained that the departmental president of the association in Var "undertook to erect a stele on each site where concrete acts of struggle against the enemy took place." The picturesque village of Régusse, known for its twelfth and thirteenth century windmills, was one such site of a proposed monument to the maquis of Pelenq that Bénédite joined after leaving Marseille. Dupont explained the memory conflict that would require official paperwork to resolve:

The Authorities are in favor [of the stele] and the Prefect of Var has delegated his power to the Departmental Director of the ONAC. Now, with everything in

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128 Correspondence from Colonel Gérard Dupont to Commandant Armengau, CVR Dossier of Daniel Ungemach (Bénèdite), June 14, 1993, GR 16 P 581034, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France.
order, a person who lived in the area objects to the designation of "maquis" for what she calls forestry work. Our section president persists, relying on two apparently indisputable documents. One is a statement of the service record of Lieutenant François Abiven, which mentions his visit to the Maquis of Pelenq, which he commanded from May 1, 1943 to August 25, 1944. The other is the certificate number 267/FFI of January 22, 1946, prepared by the Toulon Subdivision of the FFI Office on behalf of the Commission d'Homologation and signed by its president, Battalion Commander Pustaud and the members of said Commission.129

Dupont’s dismay is almost palpable as he describes how his civic memory association convinced the prefect, the state’s local representative, to grant authority to the departmental director of veteran’s affairs to handle the monument, only to be foiled on the brink of success by the complaint of a neighbor. The only way forward would be to go back up the chain of command to produce documentation of formal, national recognition of the maquis of Pelenq.

The Resistance Bureau obliged soon after. On July 9, 1993, Commandant Armengau explained that yes, forestry work was carried out at that camp in the forest of Pelenq, but that the site served as a refuge beginning in the summer of 1943 for deserters from the STO and the Todt Organization. By October of that year, the group had organized themselves militarily under the command of Bénédite. Armengau specified that while Lieutenant Abiven had been active in the resistance earlier, he only began to command the maquis of Pelenq in the spring of 1944 after Bénédite’s arrest. Apart from that minor factual correction, Armengau affirmed that "nothing seems to stand in the way of putting a stele in place" for the maquis.130

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129 Correspondence from Colonel Gérard Dupont to Commandant Armengau, CVR Dossier of Daniel Ungemach (Bénèdite), June 14, 1993, GR 16 P 581034, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France.
130 Correspondence from Commandant Armengau to Colonel Gérard Dupont, July 9, 1993, CVR Dossier of Daniel Ungemach (Bénèdite), GR 16 P 581034, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France.
Armengau attached photocopies of relevant official documents to support Dupont's case. Today, Bénédite is honored with a stele in Régusse, where he spent under a year, but no marker in Marseille bears his name.

**Women, Paradoxes, and Administrative Scrutiny**

A granular examination of women's applications for a CVR card suggests a pattern of differential treatment compared against the applications above, which include men serving in the same groups and networks. Well-known or well-connected women recipients of multiple official honors and medals such as Madeleine Baudoin or Elise Rivière, although they did not receive the same degree of scrutiny as other women, still opened up legal paradoxes when they achieved military rankings through the bureaucratic process that they could not legally rise to if they enlisted. In unmarried women's applications, evidence of extra scrutiny into their sex lives—sometimes coded as "morals"—was plain, while married women faced a general dismissiveness of their accounts of resistance as simply helping their husband or a male family member. This differential treatment, often occurring in the 1950s, before most women wrote their memoirs and before historians reached out to many women to provide oral histories, offers an important context of official commemorative marginalization that has largely been neglected in scholarly attempts to understand the memory of women's resistance.

There are a number of explanations for the disproportionate underrepresentation of women in official commemorations of the resistance. One is
the distinction dominant narratives imposed between "civil" and armed resistance, which favored the overrepresentation of men in armed roles. Yet this understanding of the composition of armed groups only works if there is an unspoken distinction between important and unimportant participants in armed struggle. Without the liaisons, safehouses, suppliers of food, arms, and information—who were often women—the maquis would not function. They were an integral part of the armed group, even if they did not carry a gun themselves. A second theory is that women viewed their work as "women's work," which they differentiated from resistance. Margaret Collins Weitz observes that "Unlike their male counterparts, many French women involved in Resistance activities did not seek official postwar recognition for their voluntary participation," but goes on to assert, "Women did not see themselves as veterans. They simply did 'what had to be done.'" Lacour-Astol also sought to understand the consciousness of women in the resistance, asking:

What does the consciousness of resistance mean for women, whose testimony strikes contemporaries and historians alike with its modesty? If participation in the resistance is evidence of extraordinary behavior for women formerly left at the gates of the City, how does one pose resistance practices as transgressive that often did not stand out from everyday life (sheltering, nourishing, caring)?

It is clear that these roles were undervalued, but the CVR dossiers suggest that perhaps the ordinariness of "women's work" was a category that the state helped impose, rather than something that originated solely with women's initial conceptions of their wartime activities.

131 Weitz, Sisters in Resistance, 7.
132 Lacour-Astol, Le genre de la Résistance, 21.
Resisters’ stories were met by gendered scrutiny on the part of state agencies, which may have been the sole interlocutors at the time for some applicants. CVR officials often rejected the framing of women’s wartime activities as resistance by depoliticizing their work. Thus, the "modesty" or ordinary "women’s work" that Lacour-Astol and Weitz describe based on interviews that were often conducted in the 1970s or later may have been learned through their earlier contact in a social environment for resistance memory, French officialdom, rather than a timeless or enduring conception of their own roles. Time and time again women detailed their work as liaisons or rescuers in the section of their dossiers describing a chronology of their resistance activity. It was the administrators who sometimes responded by rendering them "civil victims" or helpmates to their husbands or male relatives, not true resisters. Historian Michèle Gabert suggested that it was not women’s reticence to declare themselves resisters so much as the severity of the departmental CVR committee that accounted for the gendered imbalance of official recognition in Isère, the department she studied in her monograph. The question remains that can only be answered by further local studies: which departmental committees were not disproportionately severe in their evaluation of women’s applications?

Madeleine Baudoin, whose case introduced the previous chapter, successfully applied for a CVR card. She began the process in 1948, filling in the

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133 See CVR Dossier of Marguerite Beaubernard, 20010318/1, AN Pierrefitte, Pierrefitte, France and CVR Dossier of Adèle (B)Ribon, 20010318/1, AN Pierrefitte, Pierrefitte, France.
roughly half-page provided on the official form with a condensed narrative version, in triplicate, emphasizing the military-like engagements of her four years of resistance.\textsuperscript{135} She starts her story near the end, on the March 22, 1944, with sentence fragments about her participation in breaking twelve detained resisters out of the Chave prison in Marseille. The next episode takes place on May 16, when she was shot in the right arm as she transported guns from Toulon, which resulted, a doctor’s note in her file confirmed, in a 55\% loss of mobility. Undeterred, on July 23, she helped rob the city hall of Allauch (a town neighboring Marseille) of 7,000 ration cards to distribute to social service groups in the region. Six days later she participated in the grenade attack on a militia post at the Lycée Thiers, killing several \textit{miliciens}. On August 10, a week after her 23rd birthday, she disguised herself as an intern and helped seven detained resisters escape the Salvator hospital in Marseille. She mentions that three of these people were in the FTP and one in the Intelligence Service, but does not mention that her act rescued them from probable death sentences. Her narrative ends with the words, "Battles in the liberation of Marseille. Two engagements."

Although the form did not provide sufficient space for her to talk about her work as a liaison agent, or when she stole a gun from a Nazi officer—in a later interview she explained the trick was to apply pressure on his upper back on the crowded tram so he wouldn’t pay attention to what was happening in his holster, below\textsuperscript{136}—it did earn her a fictional rank in the FFI. The state created a system of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[135] CVR Dossier of Madeleine Rose Baudoin, GR 16 P 38844, Service Historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France.
\end{footnotes}
"fictional ranks," assigned after the fact, to members of resistance groups with various structures that often did not make use of formal military hierarchies. In this respect, the paperwork compelled Baudoin to do something that, her diary indicates, she did not particularly relish doing. In a diary entry of October 1944, two months after the liberation of Marseille, she wrote, "I hope we're not going to become so ridiculous as to create a title of FFI Marshal or the rank of FTP Admiral of the Fleet."\textsuperscript{137} This sentiment seems to reject the formalization and legitimization of the resistance through military hierarchies, a project that was ongoing at the time for those claiming membership in the FFI to gain a CVR card. And yet, Baudoin's acquiescence shows that even some dissenting resistance veterans were caught in this process of subordination before the law. That a woman so daring—who went on to participate in the Algerian independence struggle—could be compelled by the state to do anything speaks to the idiosyncrasies of bureaucracy, a medium that, according to Ben Kafka, "makes everyone, no matter how powerful they may be in reality, feel so powerless."\textsuperscript{138}

After filling out the forms, gathering more than the two required testimonials from "people well-known for their activity in the Resistance," gluing a passport sized photo to each copy, then waiting for the departmental, regional, and national committees to make a decision, she attained the fictional rank of \textit{Aspirant}, a type of officer, retroactively awarded as of May 1, 1944.\textsuperscript{139} This legal fiction made necessary

\textsuperscript{137} Quoted in Kitson, \textit{Police and Politics in Marseille}, 251.
\textsuperscript{139} "Extrait Certifie Conforme,\textquotedblright January 28, 1981, CVR Dossier of Madeleine Baudoin, GR 16 P 38844, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France.
by the CVR bureaucracy opened up a contradiction in French law, which did not
grant women the same military status as men until 1972. In fact, it was only in 1938
that women were permitted to fulfill civilian roles in the military, and 1940 when
they entered the field as ambulance orderlies for the first time.\textsuperscript{140} Except in
exceptional circumstances, they could not serve as, let alone command armed
troops during World War II. Perhaps this is what confused the functionary who
wrote "oui" and "non" on top of each other in the margins of her request, or maybe it
was the typo in the administrative decree that listed her military region as the
second, rather than the ninth. Paperwork can be fickle. Moreover, the bureaucratic
exigencies designed to foreclose challenges to postwar law and order through
legitimizing memory work had the potential to introduce internal contradictions in
French law in other respects.

Elise Louise Rivière née Chauvet similarly attained a "fictional" officer class
rank that the gendered roles of the French armed forces would not otherwise
permit. General Bonneau, head of the France combattante network, retrospectively
promoted Rivière to sous-Lieutenant of the Alliance network, led by far-Right,
Marseille-born Marie-Madeleine Fourcade, on May 22, 1946. That autumn, Rivière
received the Médaille de la Résistance. However, it was not until sixteen years later
when she was living on New York’s Upper East Side and working as a milliner that
Rivière applied for a CVR card. Since she provided copies of her carte de déporté
résistant, her carte de service in the Forces françaises combattantes, and her
membership in the Association Amicale "Alliance," signed by Fourcade, she did not

\textsuperscript{140} See Élodie Jauneau, "Images et représentations des premières soldates françaises (1938-1962),"
have to provide two affidavits which addressed her activity in the resistance. Her 1962 resistance account in the section of the form, which now asked for a "brief summary of professional or military activity from June 10, 1940 to the date of arrest" contained no details about her clandestine life, instead focusing on the time after her arrest:

Liaison agent, attached photograph of forces françaises combattantes. Arrested January 31, 1943 in Marseille for a political crime of collecting intelligence against Germany. Arrested by the Gestapo. Sent to St. Pierre then to Fresne (Paris)
Interned at Romainville June 27, 2943. Interned on August 19, 1943 at Ravensbrucht [sic] then at Meubrandenburg [sic], freed April 40, 1945 [sic] sent to Waren, Germany by the English.141

Her lack of detail and unsolicited chronology of the two full years she spent in prisons and camps did not seem to count against her case, balanced with the documentation she provided that demonstrated her previous successes in proving resistance participation for three separate bureaucratic and associational processes.

Hélène Agnes Amphoux née Latournerie was not so lucky. The conserved remnant of her dossier in the National Archives indicates partial success: the national CVR committee granted her the sous-officier fictional rank of Adjutant. The regional committee, however, rejected her application. Amphoux described herself as serving the movement Combat (M.U.R.) "under the direction of" and in collaboration with her late husband, who died after deportation. In her words, she was:

Collaborator with my husband in his Resistance activity from the first call [to action] of June 18, 1940 by General de Gaulle. In particular, I typed a number of propaganda documents and leaflets, which I myself slipped into certain

141 CVR Dossier of Elise Louise Rivière née Chauvet, GR 16 P 124696, Service Historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France.
mailboxes. I have also frequently transcribed most of the *Radio de Londres* broadcasts. With my husband, we then created a summary, which I typed in a large number of copies with the aim of sending them anonymously to different addresses. I myself slipped them into various mailboxes, with clandestine newspapers, to spread the message of *la France Libre*. I was arrested by the Gestapo at the same time as my husband, on April 17, 1943, at his office, 36 rue Saint-Jacques in Marseille, where I had been lured into a trap. I was incarcerated at the Saint-Pierre Prison in Marseille, and placed in solitary confinement in the most sordid cell of the women’s quarter, where I experienced a particularly severe regimen.\(^{142}\)

Amphoux worked as a secretary and stenographer at the time she submitted her application in the spring of 1948, but she gave no sign that the continuation of many of the same, typically gendered duties caused her to view her war years as anything short of resistance, contrary to some of the women that Weitz interviewed.

Amphoux’s language describes both working for and working in collaboration with her husband. She emphasized her active role, repeating twice that she, herself, would slip different types of banned materials into mailboxes around Marseille. Even though she could not legally claim benefits for both herself and her late husband, and an application on behalf of her late husband might have made a stronger case according to the criteria of the CVR, she chose to make her own case for recognition.\(^{143}\)

CVR administrators at every level rejected Antoinette Garibaldi née Ducamp’s account as a liaison for the Communist Party and its affiliate, the *Front National*, as recognizable resistance. She dated the start of her resistance in July

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\(^{142}\) CVR Dossier of Hélène Agnes Amphoux née Latournerie, 20010318 /1, AN, Pierrefitte, France.

\(^{143}\) Her application is also fascinating due to her response to the prompt, "Indiquez ceux qui sont la cause de votre arrestation ou celle de camarades." She wrote, "J’ai été attirée dans la souricière par un coup de téléphone de Blanche Di MEGLIO, la Secrétaire de mon mari. Cette fille, que j’ai fait arrêter après la Libération, a été condamnée à mort par le Tribunal; mais sa peine a été commuée en 20 ans de travaux forcés." Unverified secondary sources indicate Di Meglio was the mistress of infamous Gestapo torturer Ernst Dunker, and that she helped spy for him.
1940, a "resister of the first hour" like Amphoux. Garibaldi described working as a liaison between *maquis* in the heavily forested department of Lozère and Mediterranean coastal cities, recruiting, distributing propaganda, organizing communist meetings, and aiding Allied troops. On May 7, 1943, she wrote that the Gestapo arrested her and took her to Baumettes Prison. State requests for information listed the reason for her arrest as "unknown." By contrast, there is no indication that postwar officials investigated the many arrests of Daniel Bénédite.

The state did not only look into her wartime arrest. An unsigned summary of the investigation into her personal life, sexual mores, work and economic situation, service awards, and criminal history merits quoting in full:

Antoinette Duchamp, widow of Garibaldi, was born on June 20, 1897 in Marseille, daughter of the late Isidore and Marie Balmelle, holding French citizenship, lived in Marseille at 1A Rue Parmentier. She married Baptiste Garibaldi on April 23, 1921, who died in Marseille on April 15, 1952. A daughter was born from this union, first name Emilie, on September 8, 1922, who is not currently married.

[M. sic] Ducamp was separated from her spouse since 1930 and currently lives conjugal with Antoine Galas, a painter, who provides for all her needs. From January 2, 1943 to April 30, 1952 she was employed as an assistant cleaning lady at the nursery school on rue Ste Catherine, with a monthly salary of 15,200 francs. She was laid off without pay due to a work accident. She has no personal wealth.

The applicant holds the *médaille commémorative de la guerre 1939/1945* awarded on August 20, 1947 in application of the ministerial decree number 46.1217 of May 1946. She was registered with the FTPF under the number 78599 at the association's headquarters.

She has no known criminal record.144

Not every applicant has a record of this degree of scrutiny on file. Most glaringly, although investigating officers made note of their status as married or single and any children (within marriage), I have found no evidence of official interest in men's

144 CVR Dossier of Antoinette Garibaldi née Ducamp, 20010318/12, AN, Pierrefitte, France.
sexual habits, nor if their daughters were unwed. The closest levels of scrutiny that working class women like Garibaldi were subject to was reserved for the small group of men on the CVR committees themselves, but even these investigations made no mention of lovers, only legal marriages and children born in wedlock. Also remarkable were the multiple forms of official commemoration that did not always overlap. In Rivière’s case, the carte de déporté résistant, her carte de service in the Forces françaises combattantes, and her membership in the Association Amicale "Alliance" was enough when she applied in the 1960s. For Garibaldi, her commemorative medal for serving France in the war and her membership in the FTPF association did not help her meet state standards for the CVR card roughly a decade earlier. Part of this might have been a result in shifts in the CVR administration—by the sixties far fewer applications were being processed, the standards were relaxed in certain respects. However the class and political differences between Garibaldi, a working class communist, and Rivière, a wealthier woman associated with right-wing, powerful forces in postwar resistance memory (Fourcade).

Although it was the sub-committee of the Seine department that considered Marie Dominique Casanova's application, and she never claimed to be part of an organized resistance movement, her case met with similar scrutiny to Garibaldi’s. Inspector Taxil of Marseille, where Casanova lived immediately after the war, conducted the investigation:

The subject Marie Casanova, born October 7, 1913 in Sarténe (Corsica), has not lived at 48 Avenue Félix Zoccola in Marseille, for about 18 months. She was vainly sought in all relevant places of our city.
Her former landlord, in this case Mr. Ramacio, declared that when she left, the respondent expressed the intention of going to settle in Corsica, without further details regarding her forwarding address. According to information gathered in the vicinity of her former home, this woman was living in a conjugal relationship with subject Campana, who was allegedly killed in an episode of score settling. Her arrest, during the German occupation, would have taken place in Paris, while she was in the company of her concubin. Subject Marie Casanova is unknown to our Regional Archives as well as to those of General Information. No other information, on the account of this woman, could be collected in our city.145

Like Garibaldi, administrators rejected Casanova’s application with the explanation, "resistance activity not demonstrated." There were no visible indications of how the state factored the myriad of personal details unrelated to opposing Vichy and the German occupation into their final decisions. Furthermore, the legal code itself did not specify that these types of personal histories would be under investigation, nor did it set a standard regarding how administrators were to use this information. If standards existed on paper at any time, they could have been in the interministerial correspondence that was closed to the public at the time, unlike the Journal Officiel.

It is worth noting that in both Garibaldi and Casanova’s cases, the investigations were carried out before their applications were complete. Both lacked affidavits or alternate "proof" of resistance in the form of a fictional rank in the FFI, carte de déporté de la Résistance, or medical records from wounds suffered in the course of resistance activities. Even if the investigations found them to be ideal patriots, they still would not receive the CVR card.

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145 CVR Dossier of Marie Dominique Casanova, 20010318/6, AN, Pierrefitte, France.
Erasure by Elision: Recategorizing Resisters as "Civil Victims" or "Racial Deportees"

In public, before the Eichmann Trial, French lawmakers were notable for their neglect of the specifically antisemitic character of the Nazi genocide. The logic behind this silence was multifaceted, and in part stemmed from a conception of French Republican tradition that upheld an abstract, undifferentiated nation and understood even the documentation of discrimination based on religion, ethnicity, or race to constitute a threat to republican values. This reasoning formed the basis upon which Minister of the Interior Edouard Depreux ordered the destruction of "all wartime dossiers and records in which the category 'Jew' had been used as a basis for discrimination," in December 1946. Almost 7,000 kilos of "useless" paperwork were destroyed in Paris in 1948. This dramatic, symbolic rupture by flattening representations of the population in bureaucratic archives might have done more to obscure than to hinder elements of continuity in French administration.

Soon after, CVR functionaries seemed not to hesitate to recognize antisemitic arrests, which, in many cases, they instrumentalized to further devalue the contributions of Jewish resisters. The CVR committees demonstrated a pattern of

146 I specify French lawmakers here, because historian Françoise Azouvi has made a compelling case for interpreting the memories and silences of civil society regarding the Holocaust and antisemitic persecution in wartime France with greater nuance, see François Azouvi, Français, on ne vous a rien caché. La Résistance, Vichy, notre mémoire (Paris: Gallimard, 2020), 17-18.
rejecting the applications of some Jewish resisters precisely because they were arrested for being Jewish.\(^{150}\) Likely due to the archival destruction, functionaries sometimes had to work quite hard to produce evidence that the applicant was Jewish, going so far as to request German paperwork at times.\(^{151}\) Further research might indicate if CVR committees and investigators made international requests for files in their deliberations over non-Jewish applicants, but so far I have not found an example of this. Across metropolitan France, administrators recategorized Jewish applicants as "racial deportees," which the state presented as evidence intended to preclude the possibility of Jews' involvement in the resistance, depoliticizing the circumstances of their arrests and prior activities.\(^{152}\)

For a number of Jewish resisters who were active in and around Marseille, there is evidence of a similar pattern of rejection, with perhaps the seemingly fine distinction that committees sometimes used the term "civil victim." This term doubly decontextualized the repression of Jewish resisters by denying both the

\(^{150}\) Since there were no sections of the CVR in which one could self-identify as Jewish, it is difficulty to say with certainty how the state perceived some applicants as Jews and if functionaries operated as though this was a religious, cultural, or racial category or otherwise. The examples I located were based on a combination of factors: first or last names that were often Jewish as well as some mention of the applicant being Jewish, belonging to a Jewish-majority resistance group or being arrested because they were Jewish. Since I read applications in full only after a traditionally Jewish name signaled my attention, this approach likely left out much additional evidence of how administrators treated applicants who they perceived to be Jewish. Though imprecise, names suggested information to functionaries that they could not collect legally.

\(^{151}\) See for instance, a note in the rejected CVR dossier of Alexandre Alexandrowicz, which documents a French request for an incarceration certificate from the Allied Commission in Germany. CVR Dossier of Alexandre Alexandrowicz, 20010318/1, AN, Pierrefitte, France.

\(^{152}\) See dossiers that reclassify otherwise strong cases in other parts of France for Yamila Eskinazy, Danièle Baumezweig, Sonia Arnaud, Gisele Atlan (Algerian Jewish surname), Rosa Baillon, Fanny Abramowicz, Annie Huguette and Jean Renée Bloch, Jeanne Madeleine Casenave (arrest on Spanish border for "racial" reasons). CVR Dossiers, 20010318/1-6, AN, Pierrefitte, France. This practice was not universal, see Joseph Georges Bass, founder of the Andre group and recognized member of the FFI (CVR Dossier of Joseph Georges Bass, GR 16 P 36695, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France) and Rabbi René Paul Hirschler recognized as a member of the RIF (CVR Dossier of René Paul Hirschler, GR 16 P 294144, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France). I could locate no other dossiers for members of the Andre group.
possibility of political struggle and antisemitism as motivating factors for their arrest, deportation, and death. Although this manner of reclassification as "civil victims" occurred with non-Jewish applicants as well, analysis of the rejected applications of Jews reveal that CVR committees sometimes gave greater weight to the context of the arrest or assassination (in the case of posthumous applications by family members) of the applicant, than potential years of clandestine activity leading up to that moment.

César Jean Baruchi (or Barucchi) died one month before the liberation of Marseille, shot by Germans on the Rue Folletière in Draguignan, halfway between Marseille and Nice. His widow, Olga Arrigucci, applied on his behalf in 1950 to the departmental committee of Alpes-Maritimes where he was born and worked as a farmer, and where she continued to live. Since she had remarried after his death, she was not entitled to Baruchi’s pension, but their daughter, Renée, would be. A strong letter of support from Louis Ravet, former mayor of Saint Laurent du Var and the leader of Baruchi’s section of the resistance movement Combat, attested to Baruchi’s involvement from December 1942 to his death on July 22, 1944. In his affidavit, Georges Foata, section leader for the ORA of Alpes-Maritimes, described Baruchi as courageous, and that "he has always shown dedication and selflessness worthy of praise." The state awarded Baruchi the Croix de Guerre 1939/40 with a bronze star posthumously for his service in the regular armed forces before the Armistice. Baruchi’s widow’s application met with initial success. Administrators in

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153 See: CVR Dossier of Pierre Fourment, 20010318/14, AN, Pierrefitte, France; and Joseph Caprini, 20010318/6, AN, Pierrefitte, France.
154 CVR Dossier of César Jean Baruchi, 20010318/2, AN, Pierrefitte, France.
Alpes-Maritimes classified Baruchi as "Mort pour la France - Qualité R.I.F. reconnaue." On March 21, 1952, the regional committee was in agreement, citing a period of resistance that exceeded the minimum ninety days.

The subsequent investigation into the circumstances of Baruchi's death undermined an otherwise strong application that met all the criteria the CVR laws laid out. A letter from Division General Molle, commander of the ninth military region based in Marseille, to the prefect of Alpes-Maritimes called for an investigation. Molle observed, "It does not appear in the documents produced that the person concerned was killed as a combatant, and his case should be distinguished from that of civilian victims of the war." Investigators interviewed Raphael Rossi, who drove the truck in which Baruchi rode when killed along with Rossi's son, and Ravet. Both mentioned they were not aware of Baruchi taking part in a resistance mission at the moment of his death. The investigator, armed with this absence of evidence (rather than evidence of absence,) wrote that the Germans fired their machine gun upon the truck for no apparent reason, and, "According to information collected... Mr. Baruchi was not on duty at the time [of his death]. He was likely trafficking food, but it was not possible to shed light on this case. In summary, Mr. César Baruchi was a resister but his death did not happen while on duty for his group." The investigator offered no evidence to support his assumption that Baruchi participated in the black market, a serious charge during this time. Furthermore, the language the investigator used to make Baruchi's death legible for state purposes, "on duty," applied formal military logic that did not fit the situation of resisters. Finally, missing from the text of the investigation was any mention that
the day the Germans shot Baruchi and Rossi’s son, they were carrying out a coordinated action against the *maquis* in Var that claimed the lives of ten others as well.\(^{155}\)

The national committee rejected the application, characterizing Baruchi as a "civil victim" on May 27, 1952. The regional committee reversed their approval on June 11. It is unclear what role, if any, a possible perception of Jewishness (or Italian roots) played in the allegation of black marketeering or the extra scrutiny Baruchi’s application received. However, the reversal instigated by the military authorities in Marseille and the national CVR committee indicates their preoccupation with the manner of death was strong enough to outweigh his eight months of undisputed resistance activity. It fit into a larger pattern of elision for resisters who were perceived as Jews: one could not be both a resister and a "civil victim" or a "racial deportee."\(^{156}\)

When French administrators rejected his application in 1951 and again in 1952, Alexandre Alexandrowicz (also rendered as Alexandrovicz), held Austrian nationality, was living in Brussels, Belgium, and reported working as a merchant.\(^{157}\)

He was born in the summer of 1902 in the Galician town of Gorlice, a once oil-rich

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\(^{157}\) CVR Dossier of Alexandre Alexandrowicz, 20010318/1, AN, Pierrefitte, France.
area that protracted battles and occupation by opposing armies in the First World War left in ruins. When he was sixteen years old, in 1918, national borders were redrawn and Gorlice changed hands once again from Austria to Poland. At the beginning of the Second World War, like many other refugees who had made their way to France, Alexandrowicz joined the 308e CTE. He recalled his subsequent participation in the resistance in his CVR dossier:

I joined the Belgian resistance at the beginning of 1941 under the orders of Mr. Raymond Leurquin, Belgian High Commissioner in Agen and, between 1941 and the end of 1943 at the time of my arrest, I executed numerous missions commuting between Nice, Marseille, and Agen. I provided Mr. Leurquin with false IDs and other documents he needed for Belgian resistance fighters and réfractaires. I was arrested by the SD in Agen during one of my missions. Affidavit by Mr. Leurquin attached.\textsuperscript{158}

After Alexandrowicz’s arrest, officials held him in Agen, Toulouse, and Compiègne before deporting him to Buchenwald where he spent the remainder of the war.

Although Alexandrowicz supplied the two requisite affidavits, by Aspirant Albert Cohen on behalf of Honorary Captain Pierre Loeb of the Organisation Juive de Combat on official FFI letterhead and by Raymond Leurquin, a former Belgian consular agent and resistance veteran, the national CVR administrators rejected the application on the grounds of "resistance activity not demonstrated" and "incomplete dossier." Unlike Baruchi, it would be difficult for administrators to render Alexandrowicz a "civil" deportee after inter-ministerial correspondence noted the motive for his arrest as "political (According to Certificate of Incarceration

\textsuperscript{158} CVR Dossier of Alexandre Alexandrowicz, 20010318/1, AN, Pierrefitte, France.
Instead, Lieutenant-Colonel Pate of the Bureau FFCI in Agen wrote in December 1951 to tell Alexandrowicz his dossier was incomplete. To continue the application process, he would need to send a certified copy of his carte de déporté ou interné de la Résistance or rewrite his account of wartime resistance with unspecified additional details, in chronological order, as well as supply the names and addresses of the individuals he liaised with in and around Agen, despite having supplied the names of two such individuals already.

The question of level of detail in resistance accounts was highly subjective. As we will see below, administrators accepted many applications that lacked a response in the section for names and addresses of other resistance contacts. Similarly, many acceptable accounts were skeletal at best, which administrators tended not to penalize, particularly if such high-ranking officials supplied affidavits as they did in Alexandrowicz's case. As for the certified copy of the deportee card, this added hurdle was not necessary for applicants who did not endure internment or deportation of course, in which case the two affidavits would suffice. Further research could indicate the ways in which the partial destruction of Vichy-era dossiers on Jews in the late 1940s might have made the process of applying for a deportee card difficult or impossible for Jewish applicants in the 1950s. Either way, obtaining this card would involve yet another onerous bureaucratic process that might be particularly difficult to complete for those living outside France after the

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159 Although this did happen in some cases in which functionaries chose to disregard the motif d'arrestation that records called "political," to put forward the "civil" or "racial" characterization of the arrest, undermining the chances of being awarded a CVR card.
war, and disproportionately impacted Jews, especially foreign Jews like Alexandrowicz, primary targets for deportation.

**Spanish Counter-Memory and Official Boundaries of Resistance**

At the end of the Spanish Civil War in 1939, roughly half a million Spaniards crossed the Pyrenees into France to avoid reprisals by the Franco dictatorship. Unknown thousands of these exiles joined the French *Compagnies de travailleurs étrangers* (CTE) and were sent to reinforce the Maginot Line. With the German invasion, tens of thousands of exiles joined the resistance. Their memory of a long, transnational struggle against fascism is well documented in memoirs and collective commemorative activities. However, the CVR paperwork provides a unique window that has yet to be examined regarding how Spanish applicants rejected the spatial and temporal limits of official French definitions of resistance in direct conversation with the state that was trying to entrench these commemorative boundaries.

Vincent Alba’s file tells what would be a familiar story of the Spanish exile in postwar southern France. He applied for the CVR in 1948 at thirty-six years old. At the time, he was living in the shadow of Marseille’s iconic Notre Dame de la Garde, reported working as a docker (one of the most iconic local trades), and still was a Spanish national, despite entering France nearly ten years earlier at the close of the Spanish Civil War in 1939. He listed himself as both an "independent resister" engaged in propaganda work and as part of the *Front national*, offering the following "chronology of resister activity" required by the form:

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160 CVR Dossier of Vincent Alba, 20010318/1, AN, Pierrefitte, France.
Entered France 1939. Joined the French Foreign Legion September 8, 1939, volunteer for France from 1939-1940, taken prisoner June 20, 1940 in Epinal. Interned in [illegible] and Stalag 11B for roughly two and a half months, deported to Mauthausen September 5, 1940. Taken by the Gestapo, after reviewing all my papers and seeing I had volunteered for France, they decided to deport me and for five years I worked in the quarries. Very hard work. Very little food, and a great deal of suffering for myself and for my comrades, victims like me for the same reason: volunteers for France and Resistance. Freed by the Americans May 5, 1945. Arrived in Paris June 20, 1945.

Alba condensed six years and at least 4,340 kilometers into a few short centimeters available on the form. His phrasing suggests a sense of outrage: repeatedly identifying his service to France as the reason for his internment and tortuous forced labor. He endured these conditions for five years alongside roughly 7,100 Spanish Republicans who also entered Mauthausen's gates, his "comrades, victims like [him]." Although the position and treatment of Spaniards in Mauthausen was privileged in comparison with Jews, Poles, and Soviet soldiers interned there, only about 2,400 Spaniards would survive the camp. 162 Though the administrative CVR form attempted to individualize resistance and punishment, Alba invoked a collective struggle. Was he using the legal form to insist upon the moral debt that many Spanish volunteers believed France owed? Alba might already have known that his application would not meet the legal criteria for formal recognition, and there is no indication that he appealed the administrative decision against him.

As a moral demand directed at French administrators, Alba’s identification of Spanish volunteers in formal military units with resistance predictably fell on deaf

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161 CVR Dossier of Vincent Alba, 20010318/1, AN, Pierrefitte, France. USHMM - Mauthausen identification card.
162 For discussion of these statistics (which would not include any Spaniards killed upon arrival in the camp, the number of which is unknown), see: Sara J. Brenneis, Spaniards in Mauthausen: Representations of a Nazi Concentration Camp, 1940-2015 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018), 17-18.
ears. In the space for the national committee’s recommendation, a functionary offered three reasons for the rejection of the dossier: he was a prisoner of war (thus not a sufficiently "political" prisoner), he was arrested on June 20, 1940—two days before the armistice with Germany which marked the earliest possible resistance activity by law—and because his activity "does not fall within the R.I.F. [Résistance intérieure française]." However, as a message to future readers on behalf of himself and his Spanish exile comrades, Alba's brief series of sentence fragments offer a compelling countermemory of resistance in France that reframed the Civil War exiles as a politically engaged collective, rather than abject individual cases of misery and random victimization.

Three men of the Casabona family from Monegrillo and Sariñena, Spain were similar cases. \(^{163}\) Julio Casabona was born in 1882 and worked as a veterinarian before the exile. He lived in Marseille with Antonio Casabona, a laborer born in 1909. Julio Cesareo Casabona, a mechanic born in 1919, lived separately in the northern quarters of the city. Their 1948 applications were nearly identical and written in the same hand, all listing their nationality not simply as "Spanish" but as "Spanish refugee," reflecting the liminal status of people who could not return to Spain but were not embraced by France. They received the same three reasons for the denial of their CVR applications as Alba. Like Alba, Germans arrested them all before the Armistice, on June 4, 1940, and both generations of the Casabona family spent the next five years interned in the Mauthausen concentration camp where

\(^{163}\) CVR Dossier of Julio Casabona, 20010318/6, AN, Pierrefitte, France; CVR Dossier of Julio Cesario Casabona, 20010318/6, AN, Pierrefitte, France; and CVR Dossier of Antonio Casabona, 20010318/6, AN, Pierrefitte, France.
Alba was also breaking rocks in the quarry. At the time of their arrest, the Casabonas reported that they were "constructing fortifications with the French Army on the Franco-Belgian border." The Casabona men were likely part of the CTE, a body of perhaps not forced, but at a minimum coerced labor that recruited heavily from France's own internment camps for Spanish exiles in 1939 to reinforce the Maginot Line.¹⁶⁴

One could read these applications in a number of ways, perhaps most cynically as a self-interested bid for financial support from the state. However, the unstated context for the Casabona dossiers is crucial for understanding how they might have seen their manual labor as a form of resistance. France had treated with hostility the roughly half a million Spanish Civil War exiles who crossed the Pyrenees, bombed by Mussolini's forces and pursued by Franco's armies along the way, in the winter of 1939. The state herded hundreds of thousands of people into improvised camps, often with no protection from the elements and little food.¹⁶⁵ The largest of these camps was Argeiès-sur-Mer, where over 100,000 Spaniards were trapped on the beach without shelter, encircled by barbed wire, beginning in February 1939. Many, but not all, women, children, and elders escaped the fate of the camps, only to face prison-like conditions—or sometimes literal prisons from the Middle Ages—in the refugios that the state hastily established across the country. There were limited paths out of the Third Republic's internment camps and

refugios. Politically engaged Spaniards were unlikely to opt for repatriation to Spain—which the French government pushed for to the point of forced removal in some cases.\textsuperscript{166} Many Spaniards who had fought fascism in Spain for the previous three years wished to continue fighting in France, but were turned away from joining the military; Alba was a rare exception. Instead of languishing with substandard food and fatally negligent conditions in French camps, waiting behind French barbed wire for the advancing armies of the Third Reich that had supported Spain’s dictator, some Spanish men opted to join the Compagnies des Travailleurs Étrangers (CTE). Some wished simply to escape the camps; others saw it as a quicker path to reunification with their families who had been separated at the border or shortly thereafter along the lines of perceived political danger, gender, age, and ability; still others hoped to help the war effort in the only way they were permitted; and doubtless many were motivated by a mixture of these reasons.\textsuperscript{167} Thousands of Spanish workers were on the front lines when German troops swept through northeast France. Sections of the CTE were simply dissolved and reformed as the GTE (Groupes de travailleurs étrangers) under Vichy and the occupiers and their labor repurposed to serve the German war effort.\textsuperscript{168} However, exiles in captured CTE units, like the Casabonas, were among those who were deported to concentration camps in the east.

\textsuperscript{167} Soo, \textit{Routes to Exile}, 126.
There is a clear conflict in how French administrators and Spanish survivors of German concentration camps viewed the resulting arrests. Each Casabona identified himself as a "political prisoner." The French state, on the other hand, stripped both politics and choice from exiles' work in the CTE by labeling them "prisoners of war." That status, whose differences might seem insignificant outside bureaucratic processes, could not possibly fall within the legal category of resistance.

Unlike Alba, the three Casabonas left the "chronological summary of resistance activity" section of their dossiers blank. They listed their resistance "movement or group" alternately as "Unión Republicueue" [sic], which was both misspelled and non-existent in the secondary literature, and "P.S.O.E.," the Partido Socialista Obrero Español which was a Spanish political party that certainly produced resisters, but was not a resistance organization itself. I have not located a record that documents their motivations for laboring on French fortifications during their first year of exile, and perhaps they knew their wartime actions would not qualify them as combattants volontaires de la Résistance. Although their applications were not successful in claiming the title of CVR, they added to Spanish exile countermemory in France by registering discontent with the erasure of Spanish involvement in the Battle of France, whether as workers like the Casabonas, or soldiers like Alba. For working class, war exile, non-citizens who left few material traces of their lives, the CVR opened up a space to create a record that would be preserved within the very system attempting to cultivate a contradictory historical memory of resistance.
Finally, the case of Esteban García illustrates another conflict in official memory and Spanish counternarratives that battled it out in the paperwork. Only four years older than Alba, García was also a Spanish-born Marseillaise docker who had not gained French citizenship ten years after his exile in France began. García claimed to be a resister of the first hour. His four short explanatory lines read:

- Contacted in August 1940 by the doctor of Cabreses (Lot)
- Left for the Maquis in August 1940
- Guarded the Malaterre Armory Depot
- Received parachute drops

He reported being denounced by a former comrade in the maquis, arrested, and deported to Dachau, where he spent a year. In August of 1950, two and a half years after applying, his application was still being processed. Administrators requested affidavits from the leader of his resistance organization. He replied that Dr. Joubert of Lot had been killed by the Germans.

A letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Collignon who presided over the Commission FFCl in Lot further undermined García’s case with the insistence, “There were no Maquis in Lot or even elsewhere in August 1940. The Resistance was not yet envisaged at that time in Lot.” Collignon’s confidence in his total knowledge of the existence or non-existence of underground activity in an entire department is remarkable. However, the narrow definition supplied by the CVR laws perhaps bolstered this confidence since it limited officially recognizable resistance to involvement in armed groups officially known to the postwar state that were generally hierarchical and led by French men. Socially, administratively, and

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169 CVR Dossier of Esteban García, 20010318/15, AN, Pierrefitte, France.
often spatially segregated, Spanish exile acts of resistance might not register and the state disregarded their alternative perceptions of "political" engagement.

Misspellings and misidentification of streets and villages also eroded García's case. In one case, he substituted an "S" for a "Z" in a place name and the administrator asked if he could possibly be referring to the same site. Officials did not appear to notice an even more important potential misspelling: García spelled the name of the man who recruited him as "Doctor Joubert," when he likely was referring to the communist former mayor of Neuilly-sur-Marne, Theophile Gaubert. Gaubert led the nurses' section of his local CGT, made his way to Lot after the Armistice, and was arrested on October 11, 1942 with fifty kilograms of resistance propaganda.170 Contrary to García's report, he survived his internment in Saint-Sulpice.171 For Spaniards who had recently arrived in France from all class and educational backgrounds, lack of fluency in French posed a major obstacle in dealing with French bureaucrats. Here we see a built-in mode of gatekeeping that historian François Marcot identified as well:

Obtaining the CVR card is not very easy. It requires an aptitude for justifying one's activity in writing and to trouble comrades to testify on one's behalf, also in writing. It requires the ability to put together a relatively complex file with knowledge of how to cleverly take into account the regulations in effect. All this presupposes an intellectual competence and self-assurance that requires a [bureaucratic] cultural knowledge which is unevenly distributed in society. Who would pretend that in this arena farmers are as skillful as bosses, workers as doctors, bakers as lawyers? This terrible bias upon which

the sociology of the CVR depends is the sociology of the "mapping of the mappable." 172

Furthermore, many of the exiles' own surnames were misspelled in administrative records and oftentimes their first names were given typical French approximates, like Vincent for Vicente and Jean for Juan. This undoubtedly led to complications in tracking down arrest and deportation records, which were key elements in assuring the validity of certain CVR applications.

In some dossiers, there is evidence of continuity in the same French suspicions and perceived dangers of Spaniards, or foreigners in general, that guided the Third Republican turn to mass internment of those fleeing fascism in their home countries before the official start of the Second World War. In the dossier of a different Marseille-based applicant, one official described the FTP-MOI as categorically untrustworthy, "made up of foreigners and French elements that no longer have the full confidence of their leaders." 173 It is possible that this attitude also formed part of the unwritten criteria that informed official scrutiny of García's dossier.

While the CVR statutes established a definitive start date for the resistance that began with the Armistice, CVR dossiers and personal recollections indicate that many Spaniards viewed the chronology of resistance in more expansive terms. Neus Català, a communist militant in the Spanish Civil War, resister in the Dordogne region in World War II, and Ravensbruck survivor wrote in her collection of Spanish résistante testimonies:

173 CVR Dossier of Pierre Marius Fourment, 20010318/14, AN, Pierrefitte, France.
Our war ended in March of '39 and World War II began in September of the same year. When France was occupied by the Nazis, a new abyss opened before us. For many French who had listened to the reactionary siren songs with delight or nonchalance, it was a late and terrible awakening. For antifascists, near and far, it was not a surprise. We knew it was coming, and knew it would be nothing more than a new battle against international fascism.174

Politically active Spanish exiles, like Català, viewed "Resistance" in terms of antifascist engagement, not patriotic opposition to an invading army. For them, this struggle spanned the long period from the beginning of the Spanish Civil War in the summer of 1936 to at least the Nazi defeat in 1945. For some, the period of "resistance" continued until Franco's death in 1975. The patriotic framework that French administrators adopted to understand the resistance depoliticized the experiences of Spanish antifascists in the Third Republican camps and in the early war effort during the drôle de guerre. The republican government's treatment of those who had escaped Franco in their first year of exile bred a simmering resentment. Anarchist veteran Eduard Pons Prades described his role in the French resistance as "with the Bad, against the Worse."175 Indeed, as Vichy took over those very same camps that, in turn, fed the Nazi concentration and death camps in the east, Spaniards had good reason to understand their resistance on French soil as beginning over a year before the Armistice, with their banned political organizing and internment in 1939.

174 Neus Català, De la resistencia y la deportación: 50 testimonios de mujeres españolas (Barcelona: Península, 2000), 16.
175 In his monograph on Spaniards in the resistance, Eduard Pons Prades estimates autonomous groups of Spaniards operated in 35 departments, were integrated into units of mixed nationality in an additional 15 departments, and engaged in sabotage or cooperation with French Resistance forces in an additional 13 departments. These estimates exclude the activities of unarmed forms of resistance. Eduardo Pons Prades, Republicanos españoles en la Segunda Guerra Mundial (Barcelona: Planeta, 1975), 62.
Conclusion

The implicit promise of the CVR is to make simple a complex and varied phenomenon of resistance. It was designed to extract a standard set of details about the past according to a standard set of criteria that should offer ready comparisons and uncomplicated national heroes. It was a means for the state to regularly entrench its vision of belonging to the central postwar national myth, using a process that could theoretically adapt to that myth’s ongoing rearticulation by lawmakers much more easily than a static monument or a recorded victory speech. However, the narrative content of the applications betrayed their banal and antiseptic format. These applications drew people from all walks of life into protracted and intimate negotiations with local and national functionaries over painful memories of the war that they might not have otherwise shared. The deceptive allure of standardization, as James C. Scott so aptly demonstrates, was only ever effective at imposing its categories of legibility up to a point.

These CVR dossiers show the extent to which applicants allowed the administrative state in to their clandestine lives, and what types of accounts they offered up for judgment. They reveal differing popular and official perspectives as to what constituted political engagement and resistance. Within popular resistance consciousness, the CVR applications can help track shifts over time in comparison with later sources, such as women’s interviews and Spanish memoirs. The dossiers open up a space between public proclamations of French officials and the commemorative narratives embedded in the quotidian work of governance, particularly in regards to Jews (only recognizing Jewishness in a negative way to
depoliticize or cast doubt on Jewish resistance, while failing to acknowledge the disproportionate risk and antisemitic repression Jews faced) and women (in regards to hyper-scrutiny and legal fictions in terms of rank that they could not attain in reality at the time) who applied for recognition. Finally this body of paperwork suggests troubling paradoxes that plagued the state project of distinguishing between patriotic lawbreakers and opportunistic criminals. Various administrators’ ideas about criminality and perceived sexual moral failings injected doubt into the processing of applications by women and non-French applicants as categorically suspicious, and people known to French police services in particular as being less trustworthy in their accounts.

The CVR committee based in Marseille handled a diverse array of applications, helping to establish a commemorative hierarchy amongst individuals who often worked side by side in the war years. Reading the applications closely for the state’s attempt to impose retrospective distinction upon people from a multitude of backgrounds who made Marseille their home during the Second World War gives us a sense of the postwar state’s role was in fomenting divisions in postwar resistance memory. It provides a window into how ordinary applicants defined themselves to the state, sometimes answering in the state’s own language, sometimes in outright defiance of it. The piles of brittle, yellowing application forms, covered in stamps and signatures formalizing the state’s acceptance or rejection of the account within, offer the best vantage point from which to appreciate the contradictions of the CVR project, and the many conflicting commemorative narratives it preserved in spite of itself.
CHAPTER THREE

Contested Erasure: Colonial Soldiers in the Liberation of Provence

_C'était bizarre, si loin de mes souvenirs._ -Roger Lamchan

In 1962, the year Algeria gained independence from France, veteran of the _3ème Régiment de Chasseurs d’Afrique_ and literary journalist Jacques Robichon published a monograph on the lesser-known Allied landing in France near the end of the Second World War, in which he, himself, had taken part. Two months and a week after the Normandy landings, Allied forces launched an attack on the Axis in Provence known as Operation Dragoon. Robichon set the scene of the early morning hours of August 15, 1944 on France’s Mediterranean coast in this way:

_Thousands of human beings awaited this moment—not only the combatants of assault brigades, the air force battalions, the General Staff, or the sailors of the battleships, but also the men and women of Provence who put their hopes in the day about to dawn. Yet, whatever their hopes or fears were, few_

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waited with as much pride, eagerness, and anxiety as the soldiers of the French divisions, the bulk of the invading army, craning their necks offshore and impatient to return home after four years of absence. And in the silence of the night of war, broken only by the sound of the surf on the beaches, the first Allied soldier who would approach the coast of Provence would rightly be a Frenchman—as was the first man killed.177

Robichon’s heavily embellished description of the liberators of Provence vividly illustrates the symbolic importance of Operation Dragoon for French command. U.S., Canadian, and British troops protagonistized the Normandy landings, but August 1944 would be an opportunity to reassert a sense of prestige for the French armed forces while securing the southern ports, essential to ensure the supply of Allied troops as they pressed east. However, this narrative was predicated on the erasure of colonial soldiers who made up the majority of the French Army. Robichon, in line with official commemorative narratives, presents his protagonists as French citizens, "impatient to return home," when in fact August 15, 1944 was the first time many of the troops fighting under the French flag had set foot on metropolitan soil. The word "French" does heavy commemorative lifting, eliding the geographic origins and lack of French citizenship rights of the majority of rank-and-file colonial soldiers who landed on the beaches of Provence.178  As historian Driss Maghraoui wrote, "It is

178 Likely due in part to issues with recordkeeping that I discuss below, and in part due to studies that focus on soldiers from specific colonized regions (such as West Africa or North Africa) rather than the specific composition of troops in the liberation of Marseille for example, the overall statistics vary. In general, out of a total force of about 120,000 soldiers in the invasion of Provence, 10 to 20% came from West and Central Africa and about 50% came from North Africa. The North African totals include pied-noirs, who represented a minority faction who were overrepresented in officer positions compared to colonial subjects who were overrepresented on the front lines. See Ruth Ginio, "African Soldiers, French Women, and Colonial Fears during and after World War II," in Africa and World War II, eds. Judith A. Byfield, Carolyn A. Brown, Timothy Parsons, and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 324; Elizabeth Schmidt, "Popular Resistance and Anticolonial Mobilization: The War Effort in French Guinea," in Africa and World War II, eds. Judith A. Byfield, Carolyn A. Brown, Timothy Parsons, and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 448; Myron Echenberg, "'Morts Pour la France,' The African Soldier in
under the umbrella of a homogenous discourse about France and Frenchmen that colonial troops were instrumentalised to rebuild a national feeling weakened after the fall of France.\footnote{Maghraoui, "The gouriers in the Second World War," 572.}

The actions of the interior resistance dominate the memory of the liberation of Marseille, despite the fact that more colonial soldiers died in the battle than the total number of metropolitan resisters who participated.\footnote{"De Lattrey would later write... 'On our side 2700 Frenchmen, including 100 officers, were killed or wounded'. But if we look closely at the number of casualties, we see that the 'Frenchmen' who were either killed or wounded were 62 French officers and 608 gouriers; the remainder of the casualties were Algerian, Moroccan, and Senegalese tirailleurs." Maghraoui, "The gouriers in the Second World War," 583.} There were 10,000 Moroccan infantrymen alone who took part in these battles, while an estimated 800 metropolitan resisters joined the insurrection.\footnote{Maghraoui, "The gouriers in the Second World War," 572.} The French forces that liberated Marseille included the Third Algerian Infantry Division (DIA) under General Monsabert, the Seventh Algerian Tirailleurs Regiment (RTA) under the command of Colonel Chappuis, the Third RTA's group of Moroccan Tabors under General Guillaume, "combat command" number one of General Sudre, the First Armored Division (DB) with units of the Second Cuirassiers Regiment, the Third Zouaves Batallion, the Ninth African Chasseurs Regiment, the 68th African Artillery Regiment, and the Third Algerian Spahis Regiment. Although the names of these units designated them Algerian or Moroccan, for instance, the soldiers hailed from many places, including present day Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, Mali, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, and other parts of the French empire. Pied-noirs and
metropolitan servicemen who made their way to Africa during the war also served in these units. Members of the officer class were usually white, French citizens. By 1944, the majority of the rank and file soldiers were colonial subjects who, at the time of the disembarkation, had not yet gained citizenship rights. Robichon’s elision, whitewashing the military as "French," exemplifies one of the most common methods of official commemorative erasure. Veterans and memory activists began to challenge this narrative as soon as—one poster announced unironically—"the colonies liberate[d] the metropole."\footnote{See Figure 1 in: George Fujii, "Editor’s Note," H-Diplo Roundtable on La France libre fut africaine (January 26, 2015), https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/58946/h-diplo-roundtable-la-france-libre-fut-africaine#reply-59184.}

The postwar memory of the liberators of Provence offer a case study in what could be called contested erasure. This chapter explores instances of contested erasure in two senses. First, the veterans themselves challenged attempts to erase or marginalize their contributions to the Allied war effort, often manifesting in conflict over state denial of earned pay and benefits. Contestation here refers to meeting official silence or material neglect with vocal protest that asserted that France must remember the "\textit{dette du sang}" it owed to the colonial veterans.\footnote{Philippe Dewitte, "La dette du sang," \textit{Hommes et Migrations} 1148 (November 1991): 8-11.} Second, I consider a more complex relationship between different official processes that attempted to erase, marginalize, and establish commemorative hierarchies. Contestation in this sense refers to how these state strategies to encourage forgetting were sometimes at odds with one another. In both cases, the paradoxical result was more attention to the story that French officials were trying to silence.
This chapter provides an introductory overview of the role of bureaucracy in shaping the contours of this official forgetting during the postwar years.

The issue of contested erasure can be approached through what memory scholar Liedeke Plate called "amnesiology," or the study of the production of forgetting. Plate asserts that forgetting is not a "lapse of memory, nor memory's flipside, but... something actively produced."\textsuperscript{184} Unlike memory, a state cannot simply order a society to forget, because the very command calls forth that which it hopes to obscure. Because commands to forget cannot be direct, the state can maintain a plausible deniability about the mnemonic (or amnesiatic?) consequences of its actions, sometimes more easily than others. State processes of forgetting colonial troops included not recording their names, homogenizing all troops as "French," deploying them at a disproportionate rate on dangerous missions where they were likely to be killed, denying them free choice through conscription then creating bureaucratic categories of resistance incumbent upon free choice, \textit{blanchissement} or "whitening" of the liberation forces, exclusion from victory parades and commemorative ceremonies, creating near-impassible bureaucratic mazes to gaining state recognition as a veteran, and discriminatory compensation that impoverished veterans. These processes often came in conflict with the goal of erasure: "whitening" the army resulted in large concentrations of demobilized veterans in the Marseille region, administrative exclusions produced mountains of paperwork, frontline service sometimes produced transnational solidarities that later contended with discriminatory pension laws. This "materiality of the socio-

\textsuperscript{184} Liedeke Plate, "Amnesiology: Toward the study of cultural oblivion," \textit{Memory Studies} 9, no. 2 (2016): 144.
historical process [set] the stage for future historical narratives,” as well as commemorative narratives.\textsuperscript{185} French administration had a special, paradoxical role as both acting as a tool of erasure and keeping records of state attempts to produce forgetting.

Bureaucracy attempted to paper over the violence of dislocation and dispossession that colonial soldiers endured. It displaced blame on the petitioner for failing to navigate a process designed to block them, rather than the state that envisioned that process. It also created a paper avatar of the real person bearing only the qualities the state wishes to document. As Foucault said of this "encounter with power" in a very different set of archives:

[W]ithout that collision, it’s very unlikely that any word would be there to recall their fleeting trajectory... All those lives destined to pass beneath any discourse and disappear without ever having been told were able to leave traces—brief, incisive, often enigmatic—only at the point of their instantaneous contact with power. So that it is doubtless impossible to ever grasp them again in themselves, as they might have been "in a free state"; they can no longer be separated out from the declamations, the tactical biases, the obligatory lies that power games and power relations presuppose.\textsuperscript{186}

These contacts with state power, preserved in administrative channels, document many attempts to repress, marginalize, and forget the role of colonial soldiers in the war effort. However, the abstract representation of soldiers of the Army of Africa in official files, unlike the "infamous men" Foucault wrote about, was not the only trace that remained, though it was the most likely one with which researchers in France

would come in contact. Veterans also contested their own erasure, sharing their memories in many forms and organizing collectively to leave a mark.

**Prequel to Forgetting: Demobilization, Protest, and Erasure**

Colonial soldiers endured the consequences of several administrative decisions during and after the war that reinforced the sense that the state wished to forget them entirely. Particularly prominent choices of the military administration included the progressive "whitening" of the combat units and a lengthy period of demobilization during which the French command subjected them to unequal access to food and clothing, sporadic episodes of violence of officers and French soldiers, and denial of a place in the metropolitan celebrations of their victory. Colonial soldiers reacted or rebelled against these efforts to sideline their memory and deny their central role in the liberation of Provence in the form of insubordination, rebellion, and collective letters of protest. These controversial and often tragic episodes have not found easy purchase in postwar official memory, which offers uncomplicated, triumphant, and heroic narratives about the Free French, or at a minimum seeks to displace conflict out of the metropolitan frame to colonized places like Thiaroye, Sétif, Guelma, and Kherrata. To place colonial protest back in a metropolitan frame would raise troubling ethical and political questions, particularly in that it would provide another context for thinking about French bystanders to racialized repression.\(^{187}\)

The protests of colonial soldiers at the end of the war were informed by the first wave of demobilization after the French defeat of 1940. Haphazard logistics placed enormous burdens on French soldiers returning to the colonies. Historian Gregory Mann notes, "Given the very rudimentary transport networks, men returned home on foot after traveling as far as possible by boat or train, just as their fathers had done. Men to be demobilized near Bobo-Dioulasso were still expected to walk there from Segu, a distance of several hundred kilometers."188 Large groups of soldiers engaged in sometimes violent, impromptu requisitions of food and other goods in the cities and towns on their way home, creating rifts not just between colonial authorities and the soldiers, but between townspeople and the soldiers as well.189

Conflict regarding the demobilization of colonial soldiers after the French defeat in 1940 forecast the even more widespread protests at the end of the Second World War. After an uprising of demobilized soldiers in Kindia, a large garrison town in Guinea, demanding the bonuses that they had not yet received, administrators moved to change the status of soldiers under the law in hopes of making them easier to control.190 First, a week after Kindia, the government of French West Africa (AOF) issued a decree that specified half the soldier's bonus would be paid at the last garrison on his way home and the other half by his local

189 Mann, Native Sons, 113-114.
commander. In 1941, administrators withdrew the special legal status that soldiers had gained on September 4, 1939, that exempted them from local criminal, civil, and commercial justice systems and placed them under French law. By restoring local, colonial jurisdiction, lawmakers hoped to shed some responsibility of the central authorities for dealing with the conflicts that arose from demobilization logistics that did not plan for promised compensation or the basic needs of the returning soldiers. It also established combustible conditions—of lacking wages and legal exception—for the demobilization of 1944.

In the years that followed, De Gaulle’s decision to engage in a process of "whitening" threw demobilizing soldiers, particularly those from West and Central Africa, into further deteriorating conditions. In 1944, for example, French command abruptly sent roughly 20,000 West and Central African troops who had just liberated Provence to join the 5,000 to 10,000 African former prisoners of war in demobilization camps in southern France. De Gaulle replaced these troops with young French military men and men of the internal resistance. In one fell swoop, French command was able to submit internal resisters of varying politics to what it saw as the salutatory patriotic discipline of the military, insert White Europeans into the role of the military heroes of the liberation, deny Black colonial soldiers the prestige of the French army’s victory, and potentially drive a wedge between different colonized populations who had served side-by-side in mixed units by

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191 Mann, Native Sons, 115. Mann notes that this set the stage for the later rebellion at Thiaroye in 1944.
192 Mann, Native Sons, 115.
193 Echenberg, "Morts Pour la France," 373.
retaining greater numbers of North African soldiers while sending away their colonial brothers-in-arms. De Gaulle personally visited various regions to oversee the process. He arrived in Marseille on September 15, where "he took a series of measures: sending FFI units to the front who wished to participate in the battle, dissolving those units who wished to remain in place. A regiment of Algerian tirailleurs was sent to Marseille to 'facilitate things.'" The report does not specify what exact role the North African tirailleurs took in this transfer of arms and authority. However, it does suggest that military authorities mobilized various armed groups in such a way that mutually reinforced colonial hierarchies in the emerging power structure. The deployment of Algerian troops to monitor this process suggested the degree to which French authorities viewed their own veterans as a security threat. On the most practical level, the result was that demobilized West and Central African soldiers were thrust very suddenly into conditions of extreme material scarcity. They had to return their uniforms—since the United States had armed, provisioned, and even clothed many of these troops on the frontlines—and wait through the winter in southern France for transport home before receiving the benefits they were owed.

A combination of state repression, newspaper censorship, and dislocation conspired to suppress the memory of the ensuing colonial soldiers' rebellions in

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196 See Ebenhag, "Morts Pour la France." 374; Schmidt, "Popular Resistance and Anticolonial Mobilization," 448 for discussion of conditions in southern France demobilization camps, where soldiers were forced to return uniforms; and Mann, Native Sons, 111-115.
southern France in 1944 and 1945. Military administrative records discussing these events only began to be accessible to researchers in the late 1980s. A partial picture has emerged in the decades since of protests and uprisings in the context of the chaotic and clearly unequal conditions of demobilization of the liberators of Provence, which were exacerbated by a variety of factors including several attacks on and murders of colonial soldiers, authorities failing to pay colonial soldiers their earned wages and bonuses, as well as exclusion from several victory celebrations.

French paperwork euphemistically referred to the wide variety of conflicts involving colonial soldiers as "incidents," which could range from "raids, collective insubordination, material complaints, clashes with the forces of order, [and] brawls with civilians." Administrators made note of three unspecified "incidents" involving the Sixteenth Regiment of Senegalese Tirailleurs alone in Marseille in the period of a month in 1944, on November 6, November 26, and December 8.

The much more thoroughly documented uprising of 300 to 400 colonial soldiers from the nearby garrisons of Saint-Raphaël and Fréjus of August 1945 illustrates several ways in which administrators based in and around Marseille tried to establish conditions for forgetting. The soldiers themselves contested these erasures at the time. On the evening of August 19, 1945, a military patrol killed a West African soldier in Saint-Raphaël. Word quickly spread amongst the roughly two thousand returning POWs and remaining African liberators of Provence who

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197 Echenberg, "'Morts Pour la France,'" 375.
were garrisoned nearby, and hundreds headed to the neighborhood of Arènes to protest and mourn. Over the next few hours, protesters destroyed property, confronted French military personnel, and killed a gendarme and two civilians.\textsuperscript{200} Two days later, General Secretary Mercury of the police for the Marseille region conducted an inquiry. He concluded the same day that the murder of the West African soldier was accidental.\textsuperscript{201} No trial took place afterwards. Instead, Lieutenant-Colonel Danjaume, commander of the military camp Galliéni in Fréjus, conducted a limited inquiry into the soldiers' rebellion that followed the murder, unsuccessfully attempting to root out colonial agitators. The language of the report mirrored closely the persistent logic of state policing and counterinsurgency: suggesting outside agitators were responsible and that the crowd was passively led rather than active agents. A later investigation by the Permanent Military Tribunal of Marseille in March 1947 into the actions of the protesting colonial soldiers, but not the murder that sparked the protests, left as many questions open as it resolved. In particular, these reports never take the care to properly document the identity of the murdered West African soldier who military authorities alternately named Kona Kong, Kona Kona, and Kona Konal in administrative reports.\textsuperscript{202} However, a death certificate bearing the name Daola for the day in question appears to refer to the murdered soldier.\textsuperscript{203} A West African soldier awaiting demobilization and who witnessed the protests, Ousmane Aliou Gadio, described Daola as Ivorian, while

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\textsuperscript{201} Croset, "Tirailleurs sénégalais," 11.
\textsuperscript{202} Croset, "Tirailleurs sénégalais," 5.
\textsuperscript{203} Croset, "Tirailleurs sénégalais," 5.
press accounts and officials commonly flattened all West African soldiers as "Senegalese." Many historians have referred to these events since the seminal work of historian Myron Echenberg in the 1980s, who based his account on newspaper articles. However, it was high school history and geography teacher Françoise Croset of the Association pour l'Histoire des Tirailleurs Sénégalais (AHTiS) who consulted oral histories and the military archives, which had opened since Echenberg's work on the subject, and offered the most complete account in the annual bulletin of the Société d'Histoire de Fréjus et de sa Région in October 2019. She meticulously analyzes the bureaucratic reports, the conflicting accounts at the time, and the many lacunae that remain.

The soldier's rebellion in Saint-Raphaël was catalyzed by the murder of Daola, but steadily mounting anger at their treatment by French command formed the backdrop. Although African soldiers marched in victory parades in Marseille after liberating the city, unlike Paris, before national authority was restored, some of these same troops, still waiting transport home, were denied a place in the celebrations of the first anniversary of the liberation the following year. There was an important commemorative event on August 15, 1945 on the beach of Dramont in Saint-Raphaël that local and governmental authorities attended along with the residents of the surrounding area, but West African troops were excluded. What was more, demobilization transports back home had stalled the

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204 Oubliés et trahis - Les prisonniers de guerre coloniaux et nord-africains, directed by Violaine Dejoie-Robin (Grenade productions, 2003), referenced by Croset, "Tirailleurs sénégalais," 5.
previous month. Authorities also cancelled colonial soldiers' leaves and increased surveillance. It was one of these additional patrols that was responsible for Daola's murder. Croset presented the variety of second hand accounts of the circumstances leading up to the murder. These ranged from a schematic insinuation playing on racialized fears that the victim was with two other African soldiers who directed lewd comments at women walking with a French officer, to the more widely-held belief among both protesting soldiers and several French investigators that Daola had refused to salute a French officer, who then sent a military patrol after him.

Daola was not the only colonial soldier to be killed in the Midi after the liberation by French military personnel. French soldiers also murdered an African sergeant who interrupted their attempted burglarization of the colonial troops' barracks, sparking protest in Antibes. Many other violent classes occurred in the region over food, clothing, repression, and commemorative exclusion. In November 1944, two West African soldiers opened fire from the upper part of a mess hall in Hyères on their European officers eating below. They intentionally aimed high to avoid killing anyone, but many people were injured in the resulting brawl. In January 1945, colonial soldiers garrisoned in Sète reportedly hurled invectives at their French officers over the delays in demobilization, and refused to salute a colonel, sparking a brawl. Colonial soldiers then attempted to break into the armory,

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210 Echenberg, 378.
211 "Etat d'esprit des troupes noires consécutif à la guerre 1939-1944," Paul Ladhuie, page 17, 3/ECOL/53/d9, ANOM.
the designs of which a French soldier reported as, "To knock sense into the whites in town." In the aftermath, military reports called for heavy sanctions, arguing that "the whole detachment should be arrested or sent away from Sète." Calm was only restored after an unspecified incident involving colonial troops in Toulon, according to Paul Ladhuie, in training to become a colonial officer, upon the arrival of "senior staff and all the white personnel." Furthermore, in 1946, roughly 4000 Southeast Asian workers, who were trapped in France during the war and still waited in labor camps in Marseille for transport home like the soldiers in Saint-Raphaël, joined in May Day protests in Marseille. The state has entirely marginalized these collective actions in official commemoration, aided by military authorities newfound sense of urgency to quickly dispatch home the majority of the people involved soon after the events took place. These protests have faded into relative obscurity in popular memory in Marseille as well, outside the work of a small number of historians and memory activists. Further research could analyze the rich history of metropolitan collective protest of colonized actors in the Marseille region in the years following the liberation.

For different reasons, the "incidents" involving French soldiers has also largely faded from memory. Military authorities reported that a group of about two hundred French soldiers attacked several nightclubs in Marseille only two weeks

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212 "Etat d'esprit des troupes noires consécutif à la guerre 1939-1944," Paul Ladhuie, page 18, 3/ECOL/53/d9, ANOM.
after the rebellion in Saint-Raphaël. Croset noted that they sacked the clubs for alcohol and money, yelling, "We're the lads of Leclerc's Army!"\textsuperscript{216} These violent and multi-sided episodes in the aftermath of the war do not fit easily into commemorative narratives about the "true France." In the eyes of military officers, the soldiers were needed to establish French sovereignty, but by the same token their rebellions, particularly those of colonial troops, "put [French] sovereignty into question."\textsuperscript{217}

A month after the uprising in Saint-Raphaël, a group of colonial soldiers penned a collective letter to de Gaulle on behalf of themselves and their comrades-in-arms in Fréjus, Nîmes, and Marseille: "Having nobly accomplished our duty we are today forgotten, hated... The seven years spent in the army in the service of France are rewarded by insults, kicks, bullying, deprivation, even assassinations. And all this because we are Black."\textsuperscript{218} The acts of symbolic, bureaucratic, and physical erasure led some colonial soldiers to the conclusion that French authorities wished to confine them permanently in the camps as "undesirables," and create the conditions that would end in their deaths.\textsuperscript{219} The urgency of their protests reflects historian Annette Joseph-Gabriel's analysis of the stakes of the project of colonial erasure:

[S]ilencing as an active verb and strategy has been a long, deliberate process of disenfranchisement that is not always captured in the facility with which

\textsuperscript{216} Croset, "Tirailleurs sénégalais," 19.
\textsuperscript{219} Croset, "Tirailleurs sénégalais," 17.
we use the word. ...The emptiness and alienation it creates is also about the total destruction and erasure of the person, the human.²²⁰

Unlike most instances of erasure of the interior resistance, a level of exterminatory violence was the scaffolding upon which the commemorative erasure of these fighters of the exterior resistance was built. Although the metropolitan repression of colonial protest was far less bloody than its counterpart across the Mediterranean, they were of a kind. Like the CVR’s instantiation of official memory, the commemorative erasure of the names, fates, and contributions of colonial troops was not a singular event but an ongoing process. However, it was this very sequence of erasure, then protest, then repression that produced a wealth of paperwork ensuring that some register of the colonial soldiers’ contributions to the war effort and discontent at their treatment would remain.

The "External Resistance," Free Choice, and Bureaucratic Recognition

During the Second World War, exiled opponents of the German occupation of France developed a dual concept of resistance with "internal" and "external" component parts. The "internal" resistance is perhaps what most people think of when they think of antifascist resistance: the underground opposition to the Vichy regime and the German occupation, discussed in the previous chapter. Less apparent is the meaning of "external" resistance. Historically, the phrase emerged out of de Gaulle’s circles in London who used it to present himself as the leader of a France that refused to surrender in 1940. In this formulation, the "internal"

resistance was simply an appendage of his movement long before substantial coordination occurred. Historiographically, the term could refer to any groups based outside metropolitan France who leveraged hard (military) or soft (usually cultural) power against the German occupation of France. Within the legal sphere of the CVR, the external resistance was limited to the Forces françaises libres (FFL) from the beginning of the German occupation until 1943, or, after 1943, the Forces françaises combattantes (FFC). Where did that leave colonial soldiers?

The inconsistencies in French administrative memory of colonial soldiers were even more dramatic than its treatment of the interior resistance. These commemorative practices tended towards exclusion and erasure, but resulted from sometimes diametrically opposed logics. This provoked confusion on the part of administrators and protest on the part of colonial veterans and civilian political activists who sought veteran support. Moreover, the new juridical field that opened up with state attempts to coopt the resistance tended to highlight colonial double

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221 Recent scholarship has sought to expand the scope of studies on the exterior resistance to include women and cultural advocacy, as is evident in the special journal issue of the European Review of History 25, no. 2 (2018). Still, as Muracciole pointed out in 2009, the historiography of the external resistance is far more limited than that of the internal resistance. Jean-Françoise Muracciole, Les Français libres: L’autre Résistance (Paris: Éditions Tallandier, 2009), 21.

222 On July 13, 1942, De Gaulle and the Comité national signed a document that defined La France Combattante as "Ensemble des ressortissants français où qu’ils soient, et des territoires français qui s’unissent pour collaborer avec les Nations Unies dans la guerre contre les ennemis communs; et symbole de la Résistance à l’Axe de tous les ressortissants français qui n’acceptent pas la capitulation et qui, par les moyens à leur disposition, contribuent, où qu’ils se trouvent, à la Libération de la France par la victoire commune des Nations Unies". A circular of July 29, 1942, De Gaulle further detailed the practical implications of the name change from La France Libre to La France combattante. The move indicated the growing reach of his networks within the metropole. While the FFL referred specifically to forces operating in France’s colonial empire and abroad, the FFC was a broader designation that encompassed these forces as well as the resistance networks under De Gaulle’s authority within the Hexagon. The FFL designation would continue to be used for French colonial territories that, at the time of the circular, were not under the control of Vichy or the Germans. On August 28, 1942, de Gaulle’s committee released the first issue of the Journal Officiel de la France Combattante, which more formally authorized the change. https://www.france-libre.net/france-libre-combattante/.
standards and exploitation whenever administrators attempted to preserve colonial hierarchies, particularly in the face of the increasingly apparent unequal burdens of risk in the liberation of France.\textsuperscript{223} To attempt to sweep aside these contradictions, lawmakers and administrators developed a notion of what it would mean to freely choose to resist that, by definition, would exclude the vast majority of colonial subjects who were often conscripted or coerced.\textsuperscript{224}

The problem with how to recognize metropolitan exterior resisters while marginalizing the role of colonized people was an issue from early in the war. War medals, honors, and benefits outline this story. From Brazzaville, the Order of the Liberation emerged as an early honor on November 16, 1940, and continued to be one of the highest honors of the postwar. During the war, five civilians from AOF, and eleven soldiers from Chad, Oubangui, Mali, and Senegal received the honor during the war out of over one thousand total recipients.\textsuperscript{225} New compagnons were not accepted after 1946. The African recipients of this high honor, like rank and file soldiers in the Army of Africa, were subject to pension crystallizations upon independence, which I will discuss further below. Historian Eric Jennings noted that the last living African compagnon, Dominique Kosseyo, received only 2.25 francs per

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\textsuperscript{223} Myron Echenberg, "'Morts Pour la France,'" 364. \\
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day prior to his death in 1994, an improvement from 1960 when he received no
benefits at all.\textsuperscript{226}

In November 1941, a decree attempted to formulate a postwar bonus system
for Free French volunteers in the form of a plot of land in the colonies or
protectorates. It attempted to disqualify colonial subjects by specifying, "soldiers
rallied by force of circumstance would be excluded."\textsuperscript{227} French military authorities
had different approaches to raising their armies in different colonized regions that
tended to coincide with racial and juridical hierarchies. The majority of soldiers
from sub-Saharan Africa were conscripted by force. A smaller percentage was made
up of career military men or volunteers. This ratio flipped in North Africa, but there
were different policies governing recruitment in each country. In Morocco, soldiers
joined voluntarily. In Algeria and Tunisia, when the number of volunteers did not
meet a quota, military authorities would draw lots to make up the difference.\textsuperscript{228}

However, even in regards to volunteers, coercion was not absent and the pressures
of poverty compelled untold numbers of men to join the army. The French
Command’s use of conscription later became the basis upon which to deny colonial
troops the honors and benefits accorded to their metropolitan and settler
counterparts who were thought to have freely chosen to join the Allies. Thus their
commanders could be seen as a part of the exterior resistance, while a large portion

\textsuperscript{226} Jennings, \textit{Free French Africa}, 265-266.
\textsuperscript{227} Quoted from ANOM Cab 63, London, November 21, 1941, in Eric T. Jennings, \textit{Free French Africa in
World War II}, 257.
\textsuperscript{228} Magali Morsy, "La part des troupes maghrébines dans les combats de la Libération suivi d’une
1986-36-144_05.pdf.
of men fighting on the front lines under Free French orders were not remembered as such.

When the Médaille de la Résistance was created in 1943, it sought to exclude colonial veterans along similar lines, denying that an active choice was involved in their role.²²⁹ As a result, very few Africans in AEF and Cameroon received nominations for the medal: Jennings located only three such nominations in his archival work in Brazzaville, and also fewer than ten from Cameroon.²³⁰ Furthermore, much of the administrative correspondence regarding the medal incorrectly suggested that citizenship was a prerequisite for nomination.²³¹

The CVR opened further contradictions. Jennings found evidence suggesting that the office of veterans' affairs in AEF granted the title en masse to veterans from AEF and Cameroon.²³² The question merits further study. However, this would have been an extraordinary measure that would not affect most colonial soldiers.

Instructions to CVR administrators that the Ministry of the Armed Forces issued on July 29, 1953 helped produce exclusions of colonial troops. It limited the formal definition of the FFL to soldiers who were active between June 18, 1940, four days before the armistice, and July 31, 1943, when de Gaulle and Giraud combined forces. French agents classed as P1 and P2 who were affiliated with the CNF before that date also counted, as did individuals who escaped France and joined an FFL or ex-FFL unit "even after July 31, 1943 for cases of force majeure, such as incarceration

²²⁹ Jennings, Free French Africa, 258.
²³⁰ Jennings, Free French Africa, 258.
²³¹ Jennings, Free French Africa, 258.
following their escape." The people escaping France after 1943 to join ex-FFL units were the only exception to the cut-off date. This loophole mostly applied to French citizens, and among them, mostly men. Apart from that exception, after the cut off date only members of the FFC could gain the formal recognition of the CVR. This window of time closed on the colonial conscripts and volunteers of 1943 and 1944.

In spite of official definitions of the FFL and FFC, colonial participants in the liberation of Marseille did attempt to gain recognition as resisters. Yet even the process of retrieving details about how they navigated this bureaucracy is marked by erasure. The archival organization of the CVR applicant files by name presents a number of problems. First, as critical as administrators were about spelling errors by applicants, as we saw in the case of Spanish exile Esteban García, their own files were rife with careless misspellings of applicant names, particularly of names that were not traditionally French. This makes it difficult for researchers to confirm identities and presumably for veterans themselves to access the required paperwork to claim the benefits. I will discuss the issue of French recordkeeping in further detail below. Second, since official public commemoration of the armies of liberation treated colonial soldiers as an undifferentiated mass, there are no individual names from public markers in Marseille to look up in the archives, and few individual names of rank and file soldiers appear in the historiography. Soldiers were in a commemorative double bind *vis a vis* the archive, of having to be known already in order to be knowable. Instead, the veterans joining together in lawsuits

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against the French government, grassroots memory workers, and journalists in and around Marseille have done essential work to present a human face of the Army of Africa to the French public. Here is another example of contested erasure: the reason most of these veterans were granting interviews was to reassert their place in the commemorative record. The state’s attempt to marginalize them provided a powerful motivation for speaking out. One of these men was Samba Diallo, a veteran of the liberation of Provence who joined a group of veterans from across the former French empire to sue for increased pensions in 2002.

Samba Diallo was born in 1917 in Nioro du Sahel, present day Mali. On January 28, 2002, he filed a case in administrative court in Paris to increase his pension, along with twenty-two other veterans from different African countries, to confront the unequal treatment that persisted over half a century after the war’s end. At the time, Diallo’s pension for serving in the campaigns of Morocco, Tunisia, and Italy, before taking part in the 1944 landings in Provence and fighting his way to Marseille, was thirty-nine euros each trimester.\(^{234}\) Diallo’s case exemplifies the erasures built into administrative processes. There were four people named Samba Diallo who applied for CVR recognition and whose dossiers remain at Vincennes. Two were successful in claiming membership in the FFL, while administrators rejected the applications of the other two. It is unclear which of these applicants, if any, is the Samba Diallo of the lawsuit.

The CVR application of the first Samba Diallo, Samba Diouma Diallo, listed his birthplace as the Mamou canton of Guinea and birth year as 1918, making it an unlikely candidate for the paperwork of the Diallo above. The man worked as a farmer in Djibouti at the time of his application, and had served in the French military from 1938 to the first year of the war, during which time he passed through Marseille like many other colonial soldiers. He re-enlisted on February 15, 1943, and departed from Djibouti to fight in the Suez before being medically discharged to AEF on September 24, 1943. Diallo's activity fell within the legal period for recognition, and administrators approved his application.

Did he end up settling in Djibouti because he was stranded by the French military? Because he connected with the place or the people? Or did he return there after going home to his parents in Mamou first? Answers to these questions would have been outside the scope of any CVR dossier, but in combination with the lack of space to explain his engagement in the war, leaves little to understand the person behind the dossier. Whatever his memory of the war and his postwar trajectory, it appeared that this was not the same man as the plaintiff in 2002.

A single slip of salmon-colored paper is the extent of the contents of the second Samba Diallo's file. It is possible that he is the man of the 2002 lawsuit, but there is almost no information to go on. A functionary had written "foreigner" on the outside of his grey archival file folder, for reasons that are difficult to imagine.\footnote{CVR Dossier of Samba Diallo, GR 16 P 184034, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France.} Could the functionary have believed that only citizens could receive CVR cards, as some erroneously believed regarding the \textit{Médaille de la Résistance}? The double-
sided form, which appears to have been filled out by a functionary and not the applicant, does not list his birthday or birthplace. It lists his nationality as "Indigène," a colonial legal term that provided administrators a way to signal race in order to establish unequal rights and benefits without directly mentioning it. In case the functionary had chosen a more neutral-sounding term—such as "French subject" like the abovementioned Samba Diouma Diallo is listed—a few lines down there is a spot to indicate religion. It is blank here, but it offered administrators another way to determine race without directly asking, inexact though it may have been. The request for religious affiliation only appears in the paperwork regarding FFL and FFC applicants; members of the internal resistance had no such obligation to disclose religion.

On the reverse side of the form, instead of a narrative account of the applicants' wartime service as in the forms for metropolitan resisters, there is a space to list the military campaigns in which the applicant fought. This Diallo is recorded as being in active service as early as January 3, 1943, but does not provide information on his whereabouts after September of that year. Did he die in the Italy campaign and was a child or widow applying on his behalf? The official statistics collected by the Ministère des Armées regarding number of deaths and wounded of colonial soldiers were inexact and rounded to the nearest thousand. Might his death have gone unrecorded? Did he escape before being sent across the Mediterranean? Ultimately, his application for official recognition was not successful.

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236 Morsy, "La part des troupes Maghrébines," 155.
The third Samba Diallo served in Marseille, but other biographical details do not match the postwar interviews. Like the previous man, his grey archival folder is marked in blue pencil with the word "foreigner," and his nationality is listed as "Indigène" on the salmon colored form. Unlike the previous man, the file contains an additional form entitled "Fiche documentaire de position pour indigènes." This form does, in fact, ask for his race, along with "dialect," in addition to other biographical details. A footnote indicates that by race, officials are looking for an answer along the lines of "Bambaras, Toucouleurs, etc," rather than Black, Arab, or white, but this would convey the same information.

According to his dossier, Diallo was born in 1912 in Labe, Guinea, and lived in Diourbel, Senegal where he worked as a blacksmith at the time of his application. A long list of military units stretching back to 1932 indicates that he was a career soldier and shows that he spent time in Marseille before the war starting in 1937, and was mobilized there again at the beginning of the war. The application details that he "rallied to the Forces françaises libres combattantes" on February 15, 1943, before the window closed for CVR recognition. Administrators approved this painstakingly detailed application for recognition as part of the FFL. The Diallo of the twenty-first century interviews described being conscripted by force in 1940, and while this dossier shows a "re-enlistment" at the beginning of World War II, the weight of these biographical details suggests that these were two different men.

The salmon-colored form and the brand of "Indigène" appear again in the dossier of the fourth Samba Diallo. The form lists his birthdate as 1917, but unlike

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\(^{237}\) CVR Dossier of Samba Diallo, GR 16 P 184035, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France.
the twenty-first century plaintiff, documents his birthplace as Garayas [Garaya], Guinea. This Diallo, who worked as a farmer upon his return to civilian life, is listed as having served in the French military throughout the war. His involvement began on December 9, 1939. He was deployed in Guinea, France, and Algeria during the first year of war alone, and in other, unspecified locations afterwards. The minimal paperwork in his file—just two sheets, partially filled out—suggests that Vichy's colonial authorities conscripted him for a period of three years beginning on the second full day of spring in 1941. The chronology continues, noting that Diallo "deserted" his post on June 7, 1943, and joined the FFL that same day, for reasons that this form does not provide space to document. There is no indication of the FFL campaigns in which he fought.

In fact, even documentation of his name is shaky. Researchers would find it in the archival catalogue under Samba Diallo. However, the first page in his file, an interministerial note, refers to the veteran as Sampa Diallo. The FFL document itself shows his name originally written as Samba, which someone then altered by writing a "P" over the "b" in a different handwriting. Like Madeleine Baudoin's "ouinon" or "nonoui," the document itself offers no indication of what the functionary concluded. However Sampa was not a common boy's name in Guinea, but rather a name given to Bemba girls in Zambia, or the names of towns in Ghana and Burkina Faso with origins in a combination of the Nafaanra words for "go" and "come." Could inaccurate and contradictory record keeping of Diallo's name have been the reason administrators rejected his CVR application? Or was it the lack of information

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238 CVR Dossier of Samba Diallo, GR 16 P 184036, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France.
regarding his service to the FFL? If it was the latter, did Diallo neglect to mention his
campaigns beginning in the summer of 1943, or did the functionary who,
presumably, copied this information from a source text that is not in the Vincennes
dossier simply leave out these crucial details? We may not know the answers to
these questions, or the reasons why in either scenario, but we can evaluate the
effects of this lacuna.

Ultimately, while researchers can access narratively rich and varying degrees
of complete applications for CVR hopefuls of the internal resistance, it seems that
many external resistance applicant files at Vincennes contain only administrative
summaries of the original application materials, most often in the shape of that half-
filled out salmon colored form. This obscures both the minimal details about their
personal war experiences that FFL applicants might have provided, as well as how
French bureaucrats responded to their original requests. The National Archives
cannot save every piece of paper that passes through its collection, but the choices
regarding which materials to organize in the same series of documents—the "16 P"
series for the CVR—and which records to destroy has political and commemorative
ramifications. Here, we see a double erasure: of colonial applicants’ original
interactions with the bureaucracy, and of the bureaucracy’s initial responses to
these applicants. Instead, the four Diallos’ files only show summaries of wartime
campaigns and final decisions to grant or deny—without explanation—the CVR
card.

Perhaps the Samba Diallo of the 2002 lawsuit never applied for recognition
under the CVR. It is true that despite having the tenacity to pursue other avenues for
formal recognition well into their 80s, there is no record of a CVR dossier for the majority of colonial veterans of the liberation of Marseille that I located through lawsuits, oral histories, and interviews in French newspapers. For instance, in 2004 Jacques Chirac decorated Abdelhadi Ben Rahalat with the Legion of Honor at 81 years old as part of a larger ceremony to honor 300 African veterans. Ben Rahalat was a liberator from Morocco’s Rif valley who enlisted at age 16 with two of his brothers and went on to fight in the Italian campaign, Marseille, and Alsace where he lost his right hand in battle, but there is no evidence of a CVR file in his name. He remembered, "During the war, Moroccans were ordered to go to dangerous fronts, but later the medals were awarded to the French. In Morocco, under the French protectorate, we suffered from racism. The pensions were not sufficient and they refused to grant us visas for France." Antandou Somboko from Mali, another veteran of the liberation of Marseille, was conscripted by force. Extremely rare among colonial veterans, Somboko was awarded with the Croix de guerre, the médaille coloniale, the médaille de la France Libre, the médaille commémorative de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, and the médaille coloniale de Tunisie for his service. Despite this exceptional array of honors, there is no record of a CVR application in his name. The same is true for veterans Gilbert Beurier and Tidiane Dieng. A CVR file possibly corresponds to Ivorian veteran Issa Sesse (also written Cissé in newspaper accounts), but French administrators recorded no first name and

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240 Le blanchiment des troupes coloniales, directed by Jean-Baptiste Dusséaux (France Télévisions/Chengyu Prod, 2016).
ultimately rejected the application.\textsuperscript{241} The CVR's exclusionary criteria and administrative practices conspired with the even more basic problem of French recordkeeping to produce commemorative exclusions, which reinforced national exclusions.

**Nonexistent Records and Pensions**

The French military command frequently referred to colonized people in the abstract as a resource that could be exploited for military or labor purposes. In keeping with this deindividualizing logic, the numbers of conscripts, recruits, and volunteers were more important than their names. As a result, military officials took little care to keep a proper record of the individual soldiers from French colonies fighting under Free French command. As with the policy of immigrant family separation in the United States that garnered increased attention during Donald Trump's presidency, the vast omissions in recordkeeping raises the question of if French authorities ever intended to ensure soldiers received their promised compensation or commemorative inclusion in the first place. The incorrect and absent names in French paperwork did not only affect surviving soldiers or war widows' ability to apply for CVR recognition, which always had an outside chance of success due to exclusionary criteria, but also to obtain their *carte du combattant* which was needed to claim the promised benefits and pensions owed to regular soldiers. Many of the soldiers that were successful in navigating the bureaucratic maze to obtain their benefits would discover an unequal, patchwork juridical regime.

\textsuperscript{241} CVR Dossier of Sesse, GR 16 P 546628, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France.
that linked the amount of money they would receive to what the French government recognized as the cost of living in their place of recruitment.\textsuperscript{242}

The arrival of Moroccan troops in Corsica in July 1944 to prepare for the Provence landings exemplified these French administrative practices. Since the U.S. military would be provisioning the French colonial forces, they required a record of the men under French command. French authorities, however, did not have this information ready, if they had even collected it in the first place. As a result:

American quartermasters had a hard time getting the \textit{goums} and their 1200 mules ashore, because they required that the name of each \textit{goumier} be recorded prior to landing. To save time, French officers invented names for their soldiers and in an \textit{ad hoc} fashion—thus the many Moha ou Hammou-s or Hammou or Mouha-s who took part in the invasion of southern France in 1944 at Sainte-Maxime, Saint-Tropez, and Calvaire. French officers were less worried about the individual identities of their soldiers and more concerned about their inclusion \textit{en bloc} as part of the French force.\textsuperscript{243}

The aftereffects of practices like this extended well into the postwar.

The absent names in French records were a recurring source of conflict between veterans and administrators. In 1945, a rule that offered bonuses of 1000 francs to any soldier for frontline service with the Free French before November 8, 1942 (Operation Torch) sparked protest for two main reasons. First, it would exclude many African troops "of the first hour"—including entire units from Congo, which the military command retained in the rearguard as part of its practice of

\textsuperscript{242} See Schmidt, "Popular Resistance and Anticolonial Mobilization," 454. Other veterans were entitled to the same pensions as metropolitan soldiers under the law of March 31, 1919, including inhabitants of Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, the "Quatre Communes" of Senegal, and the "old colonies" of the Antilles, Reunion, and Tahiti. See Camille Evrard, "Du gel au dégel des pensions des anciens militaires subsahariens des armées françaises. Histoire politique, combat juridique et difficultés actuelles," \textit{Études de l'IRSEM} 57 (May 2018): 17.

\textsuperscript{243} Maghraoui, "The goumiers in the Second World War," 582.
Second, administrative records would not necessarily help verify which soldiers were eligible due to the many absences of identifying information regarding the participants in specific campaigns. In response, French functionaries sent instructions to Brazzaville and Douala,

The circular is to be applied leniently. Tirailleur paperwork and files were shoddily maintained between 1940 and 1944, and many have disappeared, which renders verifications difficult. In these conditions, all you need to establish is that the native in question has served for at least three months outside of his group of colonies.

Theoretically, this rule—resulting from soldiers’ contestation of their earlier erasure from both the campaigns themselves and the paperwork—would expand access to bonuses. However, even producing documentation of regional deployments would prove difficult for many veterans and administrators, in practice.

The silences of French paperwork continued to surface as activists and African political parties organized for pension parity amongst all veterans who had served in French armies. Particularly active on the ground was the anti-colonial and pan-Africanist Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), an alliance of political parties from Cameroon, Togo, and West and Central Africa. The alliance recruited heavily amongst veterans around the issue of pension rights. African politicians of all political persuasions soon picked up on the issue. In the spring of 1947, Fily Dabo Sissoko of Soudan and Ouezzin Coulibaly of Upper Volta introduced two separate bills in the Assembly of the French Union to equalize pay between colonial and French soldiers. In the summer of 1947, Assemblyman Jules Ninine who was born in

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245 Translated by and quoted in Jennings, *Free French Africa*, 259.
Guadeloupe and represented Cameroon, spoke in the National Assembly, "If the 'blood tax' should be the same for everyone, it is beyond dispute that the 'blood price' should also be the same for everyone... without distinction of race or color, legal status or religious belief."246 The following year, the RDA and French communists presented another resolution to the Assembly of the French Union, calling for "an end to the shocking inequalities existing between the pensions paid to military veterans of metropolitan origin and those paid to [veterans] from the Overseas Territories."247 In the spring of 1949, the issue returned to the National Assembly when Hamani Diori, of the RDA in Niger, introduced an amendment that would guarantee pension equality, followed by additional proposals from the RDA two months later to establish equal compensation for veterans in all monetary matters, not just pensions.248 Although all of these bills failed, French administrators recognized how pension rights had become an important mobilizing cause for politically active World War II veterans, and sought a piecemeal solution to retain their support. The law of August 8, 1950 establishing partial equality between African pensions and those of the metropole was finally successful. However it contained a provision that loss of French nationality would mean the suspension of pension rights, the ramifications of which would become apparent in less than a decade.249 Most urgently, these debates made clear that French administrators did not know how many veterans were eligible for such pensions in AOF and AEF.250

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246 Quoted in and translated by Mann, Native Sons, 123.
250 Mann, Native Sons, 123.
historian Gregory Mann noted of one West African colonial administrator who was carefully monitoring the debates over equal pensions, "Liger considered the anciens combattants' difficulties to be a political problem with a bureaucratic solution."  

Administrators attempted to mobilize paperwork to solve the problem of veteran support for empire in an uneven fashion. For example, Commandant Liger embarked on a mission from 1948 to 1952 in AOF to "make contact with veterans, examine their paperwork, and establish their rights to receive pensions and other benefits," as part of an attempt to extend French patronage to the World War II veterans, a politically engaged bloc that was being actively courted by independence movements. Liger and other functionaries taking part in this mission examined roughly 175,000 veterans dossiers by the mid-1950s. The campaign, in conjunction with the 1950 law, proved effective at siphoning veteran support away from the RDA. However, the scale of the administrative problems was such that Liger found the bureaucracies governing the veterans continued to be "paralyzing." Liger was not alone in this sentiment. The head of the Office des Anciens Combattants in AOF himself criticized the "useless complications" of the bureaucracy in a strongly worded report. The construction of additional maisons du combattant starting in 1950 where veterans would have a local point of contact with the administration could only partially ameliorate the situation.

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251 Mann, Native Sons, 130.
252 Mann, Native Sons, 126.
254 Quoted in Mann, Native Sons, 126.
255 Quoted in and translated by Mann, Native Sons, 125.
Despite Liger's intervention, the attempt to mobilize the bureaucracy to purchase the loyalty of the veterans it had made enemies of, by its own neglect at best and by design at worst, left many veterans out. Furthermore, the multi-year, in-person canvass across the territory with official documents in tow was not replicated in all colonized regions. Even in the places Liger visited, among the excluded were not only ordinary conscripts from rural zones but also prominent career soldiers and their families, including war widow Ma Diarra. She had not received a pension despite losing both her husband, Captain Charles N’Tchoréré who was the "best-known African hero of the Second World War," and her son, Corporal Jean-Baptiste N’Tchoréré, on the Somme. Similarly, in San, veteran Lassina Traore was not successful in obtaining his earned benefits as of 1947 despite being part of a politically important family, and Mann noted he was also unsuccessful in obtaining the carte de combattant later that was necessary to receive a pension. In spite of the fact that Traore got a French army general to sign several documents certifying his service in 1947, "In 1998, [Traore] still carried copies of the papers with him, wrapped in a plastic sack, as he sold used bottles in San's marketplace."

As with CVR card applicants, soldiers in the regular army had to study the requirements and submit paperwork to receive their carte du combattant in order to begin receiving benefits. This proved to be an arduous task for even metropolitan veterans of the Army of Africa whose names were not omitted or improperly

257 Mann, Native Sons, 128
259 Mann, Native Sons, 128.
recorded. Veterans associations played an important role in explaining what could be a confusing process to their members.

For example, one Paris-based association that focused on the metropolitan members of the Moroccan *goumiers* began issuing a biannual bulletin in 1956. Named *La Koumia* for a type of Moroccan knife, one of the first articles in the first issue offered advice for applying for the *carte du combattant*. It noted that many veterans of the *goumiers* did not yet have their cards, and that they would need to assemble a dossier and mail or deliver it to their departmental offices *des Anciens Combattants* in their place of residence. The article included a list of all the certified copies of official documents that the applicant would need, including photos, birth certificates, demobilization paperwork, service record, and specific documents if the applicant was injured in battle or received a medal, among other documents that might vary by case. The article advised that "It is recommended to carefully read the form that the Departmental Office [of Veterans Affairs] will give you, to write very legibly, to carefully strike out any unnecessary mentions, to not neglect to fill out the table on page 2, and to sign the request." For colonial soldiers who had managed to navigate these obstacles to obtaining a *carte du combattant*, the administration would soon freeze their benefits in place in the colonial hierarchy of differential compensation.

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260 See *La Koumia* Bulletin 2 (August 1956) p 2, detailing the organization welcomed all officers and non-commissioned officers, who were generally French citizens, not colonial subjects. https://lakoumia.fr/les-bulletins?start=60.

Pensions, Indemnities, and Decolonization

The French government had constructed a system of administering colonial veterans’ benefits based on a future that would not come to exist. The reality of decolonization reduced the bureaucracy to its most absurd, vindictive, and impenetrable form. Upon independence, the French government reversed itself once again in its administrative marginalization of colonial veterans by freezing their pensions and substituting them with an indemnity. On December 26, 1959, Parliament passed the law that would "crystallize" the civil and military pensions of all formerly colonized subjects of France upon independence, when they set the budget for 1960. The law had uneven effects across former French colonies, resulting in yet another complex economic hierarchy. Obstacles for pension recipients multiplied as administrators handling veterans' affairs withdrew from many formerly colonized regions, resulting in circuitous rerouting of paperwork. After decades of protest and an increasing number of legal challenges in the early 2000s, the state offered piecemeal reforms. The practice of "crystallization" would not end, by law if not in fact, until the approval of the 2011 budget, when the state would finally align formerly colonized people’s pensions with their French citizen counterparts.

Beginning in 1960, the veterans in newly independent countries would receive an annual "indemnity" instead of a pension, which would be permanently fixed at a rate determined at the time they ceased to be a part of the empire. There would be no adjustments for inflation or changes in cost of living. Furthermore, no new claims could be opened, and rights to the indemnity could not be transferred to
a spouse or children in the event of the veteran’s death. The new rules took effect in three rough phases between 1960 and the mid-1970s: first affecting Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, Cambodia, Vietnam, Guinea, Togo, Cameroon, and Mali; second affecting Mauritania, Niger, Dahomey (Benin), Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), and the Ivory Coast; and finally affecting Madagascar, Congo, Comoros, Senegal, Chad, the Central African Republic, Gabon, and Djibouti. In subsequent decades, a minimum of forty-eight decrees modified the original law as individual countries negotiated veterans’ benefits as part of their diplomatic relations. However, the state did not publish these decrees in the Journal Officiel, and so veterans and their families could not use these legal texts if they wished to bring a complaint before the administrative courts.

The physical location of veterans’ paperwork complicated matters further. On January 1, 1961, the Federal Office for Veterans and War Victims’ Affairs in Dakar closed and the National Office in Pau, France would be tasked with managing West African cartes des combattants. The veterans’ files were transferred from Dakar to each country that allowed some vestiges of the French bureaucracy to remain, such as Guinea, which very suddenly received large shipments of paperwork in 1961. However, the leaders of other countries, such as Mali, wished for all French administrators to depart upon independence. Thus, the French ambassador arranged for a secret transfer of 20,000 Malian carte du combattant.

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files to be sent to Pau. An already complicated bureaucracy was made even more impassible to anyone hoping to navigate it due to the fact that local Offices of Veterans' Affairs from the colonial period, where they still existed, held some files and managed social assistance, but the French Embassy handled indemnity payments through processes that varied country to country. However, veterans would have no recourse at the embassy from which they received their indemnity. Rather all communications would have to be directed either to the record-keepers in Pau or the military pensions tribunal in Bordeaux.

The migration of veterans' files underscores the links between paperwork and state sovereignty, and how difficult it would prove to escape the colonial relationships cemented into the bureaucracy. Conflict over where to send administrative archives related to the carte du combattant was part of a much larger phenomenon. France shipped hundreds of tons of documents across the Mediterranean in the 1960s as African countries gained independence, and destroyed other paperwork that it feared, "if one-sidedly exploited, could be deleterious to the interests of France." Unlike the potentially more damning police files and archival material related to the past, veteran paperwork was designed to tend to a more subtle, ongoing state project of reciprocal—if asymmetrical—loyalty that suddenly lost meaning upon decolonization. Although French archivist reports beginning in 1962 drew a distinction between "archives of

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sovereignty," which related to past history and should be "repatriated" to France, and "archives of administration," which related to the day to day operations of government and could remain in the former empire, these reports seemed to overlook the ways in which administrative functions were a means by which France exercised some degree of sovereignty in an ongoing fashion over colonized people and territories.\textsuperscript{269} This was the crux of the issue for African leaders, who had to decide to what extent they would grant France space to continue to cultivate a direct, though extremely unequal, relationship with a section of their countries' citizenry who had proved politically unreliable during decolonization struggles. At the same time, it presented an economic problem for countries that had large populations of World War II veterans, some living with war wounds and all who would approach retirement age in the coming decades. In the matter of their economic fate, the French state seemed to hold all the cards.

Veterans from the former colonies did not accept this state of affairs. They launched protests at French embassies and penned collective letters to de Gaulle in the 1960s. Pressure mounted at they asserted their place in World War II memory and their rights as liberators. The result was a French commission in the 1970s to study the issue, however little of substance came out of it. Decades later, French veterans who had served with colonial soldiers began organizing in solidarity with their counterparts across the Mediterranean. In 1993, they formed the \textit{Conseil national pour les droits des anciens combattants d'outre-mer de l'armée française} with the goal of attaining equal rights for all veterans, providing emergency material

\textsuperscript{269} Shepard, "Of Sovereignty," 876-877.
aid, and to promote the memory of colonial soldiers. In the 1990s, a cohort of Moroccan veterans hoping to assert their rights followed the bureaucracy to the seat of the military pensions tribunal in Bordeaux. Charitable organizations such as Diaconat, Secours catholique, Secours populaire, the Société de bienfaisance israélite, the SAMU Social, and Doctors Without Borders took an interest in the small community and began to advocate for the veterans, corresponding with a boom of media attention to the issue of "crystallization" and the role of colonial veterans in the liberation. In order to "sideline local NGOs that the state suspects of being behind the media frenzy," the state took charge of regularizing the veterans' legal status and finding them accommodation through Adoma (formerly SONACOTRA), which imposed severe restrictions on the veterans' contact with researchers and journalists, according to one scholar.

The following years saw increasing pressure from both within and outside the metropole for equal pension rights, in combination with memory activism to contest the erasure of colonial veterans in the liberation of France. In 2001, the state partially lifted the moratorium on accepting new applications for the indemnity, and in 2002 began to accept petitions from surviving spouses and children of veterans. That winter, when lawmakers set the budget for 2003, they increased minimum payments for veterans from former colonies, but tied the rates to their local cost of living. Veterans associations pressed back against the discriminatory properties of the law. When president Jacques Chirac staged the 2004 ceremony

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270 Evrard, "Du gel au dégel des pensions," 33.
272 Evrard, "Du gel au dégel des pensions," 34.
273 Evrard, "Du gel au dégel des pensions," 34.
aboard the *Charles de Gaulle* anchored off the coast of Toulon to honor 300 veterans from the former colonial empire, including Abdelhadi Ben Rahal, Antandou Somboko, Issa Sesse (also written Cissé), and Samba Diallo (mentioned above), veterans gave press interviews asserting that commemoration and compensation must go hand in hand, "We can’t eat a [military] medal. French retirement payments resemble a drop of water in the sea." Additional pieces of legislation continued to reform the rules governing benefits for veterans from the former colonies in an incremental fashion, notably including the law setting the budget for 2007, which granted equal rights for certain categories of veteran, but only for those who applied, and without retroactive implementation. However, the state did not thoroughly communicate these legal shifts to eligible veterans, and a 2010 study found that 90% believed their benefits continued to be "crystallized" and that 57,000 eligible cases remained under the old rules from the earliest years of decolonization.

On December 29, 2010, when lawmakers set the budget for 2011, they finally repealed all of the provisions that had led to the "crystallization" of pensions fifty years earlier. However, they only took into account some of the criticisms of the 2007 budget law. The 2011 budget law could apply to all veterans and their successors, but only at their express request, and only if they made a formal request

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276 Evrard, "Du gel au dégel des pensions," 36.
before December 31, 2014.\textsuperscript{277} It could not be retroactively applied to recover decades of lost compensation. France’s efforts to alert eligible people to these changes were more widespread than four years before, but were still haphazard and varied by location. As of 2015, a year after the deadline to submit a request for full rights and pensions, 12,500 applications remained to be processed; the average time it took for functionaries to process a request was 400 days.\textsuperscript{278} Furthermore, starting in 2015, France began to require veterans from the former empire to present themselves regularly to consular agents to prove they were still alive: every six months for those under 85 years old and every five months for those over 85.\textsuperscript{279} Needless to say, this extraordinary measure required a great deal of cost and energy for those living far from major cities. The outrageous demands of the few living veterans of World War II, now in their 90s, betrayed the continued process of forgetting and marginalization built into the systems of official recognition.

**Placing memory in Marseille**

Over the last thirty years in particular, surviving resistance veterans, educators, and artists have been increasingly successful in promoting the memory of colonial soldiers in the Liberation of Marseille. These emerging commemorative narratives are divided over messaging. This final incarnation of contested erasure has unfolded around the dispute over what that erasure says about France, and whether official memory can be reformed or if it should be dismantled.

\textsuperscript{277} Evrard, "Du gel au dégel des pensions," 37.
\textsuperscript{278} Evrard, "Du gel au dégel des pensions," 44.
\textsuperscript{279} Evrard, "Du gel au dégel des pensions," 46.
Some groups stress the contributions of colonial soldiers to the Allied war effort as a way of creating a more capacious French patrimony in which the postcolonial diaspora in France can find a reflection of themselves. While this narrative does not shy away from discussion of the state’s violent repression and commemorative erasure of colonial soldiers, it ultimately sees these as historical episodes that can be prevented in the future through reform, rather than part of the fundamental structure of the state. Organizations in Marseille like the Groupe Marat and AncrAges, which I will discuss further in chapter five, adopt this line. They use documentary film to disseminate information to public schools and adult audiences in Marseille. In a similar vein, Bouchareb’s 2006 historical drama *Indigènes*, in English *Days of Glory*, brought the issue to the attention of international audiences and reignited outrage over frozen pensions for veterans from former colonies that eventually led to change for the few remaining qualified veterans.

A second, though not mutually exclusive narrative, focuses on French repression as a means of situating the soldiers’ experiences as part of a long-term project of colonization. Veterans of the French Army are not the main protagonists of this story, but rather colonized people more broadly. This commemorative narrative tends to eschew rhetoric about creating a pluralistic French patrimony, and instead seeks to highlight continuities between the World War II era and persistent neo-colonial mentalities, which demand militant opposition. This current of commemorative politics was evident in 2019 during a protest in Marseille framed as an alternative to the city-sponsored anniversary celebrations of the end of World War II in Europe on May 8. The city organized an official commemoration of the
Liberation with a nostalgic "Bal Patriotique," reminiscent of the swing era in the United States, in Marseille's Vieux Port complete with an American tank and a trio of young men in military uniform giving media interviews who were Black, Maghrebi, and White to symbolize the liberating army. Across town, a small group of activists gathered to remember "the other May 8:" the massacres at Sétif, Guelma, and Kherrata in Algeria that gave the liberation of France a different meaning, of fracture and oppression rather than unity and celebration.

To this day, no names of individual World War II soldiers from colonized places appear in public commemorative markers in Marseille. There are plaques dedicated to whole regiments of tirailleurs, but the specific names that appear are of the white officers with French citizenship rights like Lyautey and Monsabert. There is also a Rue des Goumiers that winds through the poor and working class northern quarters of Marseille, but no streets named after individual goumiers who fought in the liberation of Marseille. At best, official commemoration treats colonial veterans as an undifferentiated mass.

French lawmakers announced in June 2020 a proposal to honor individual soldiers from the Army of Africa for the first time, in the context of massive, militant, worldwide protests against the racism and xenophobia embedded in policing. While this commemorative move is not inconsequential, the timing suggests that the state is putting energy towards pluralizing World War II memory seventy-five years late in lieu of addressing the substance of contemporary demands of the grassroots rebellion. It signals an emerging mnemonic shift that recognizes instead of suppresses the heterogeneity of Marseille's liberators' identities, only to subsume
their vastly different material circumstances and motivations in a universalist, patriotic narrative. France can thus continue to claim colorblind universalism: this time instead of violently universalizing whiteness, the state presents a fantasy of equal access to the national patrimony without racial distinction. By embracing the street-naming plan, lawmakers and administrators have maneuvered themselves into a position to exert control over memory once again; control that they began to lose in recent decades as alternative, grassroots commemorative narratives became too loud to ignore. Some of the state's critics of yesterday will become its "community partners" of tomorrow. Time will tell how effective the state's stratagem will prove. Activists themselves will not forget that French officials had to be dragged to this point over the course of seventy-five years of African activism and a multi-racial global uprising against police brutality to pass a resolution pledging to name individual names—at an undetermined later date—in public commemoration of colonial veterans who died fighting the German occupation.
CHAPTER FOUR

The Army of Crime or the Army of Shadows?

In the spring of 1944, Nazi administrators papered the walls of Paris with thousands of copies of the *Affiche Rouge*, a bright red poster denouncing the so-called “Armée du Crime.” The propaganda blitz intended to divert public outrage at the torture and execution of twenty-three members of the Manouchian Group, a resistance cell made up entirely of people who were not French citizens.\(^{280}\) The text accompanying the photographs of group members spun a web of associations between foreigners, the unemployed, professional criminals, Jews, and antifascists: supposed foot soldiers and strategists in the "Army of Crime," proclaiming,

Here’s the proof
If the French loot, steal, sabotage and kill...
It is always foreigners who command them.
It is always the unemployed and professional criminals who carry it out.
It is always Jews who inspire them.

This is
THE ARMY OF CRIME
against France

Banditry is not the expression of wounded Patriotism, it is the foreign plot against the lives of the French and against the sovereignty of France
IT IS THE PLOT OF THE ANTI-FRANCE!...
IT IS THE GLOBAL DREAM OF JEWISH SADISM...

STRANGLE THEM
BEFORE THEY STRANGLE US
US,
OUR WIVES
AND OUR CHILDREN!

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\(^{280}\) Armenian Missak Manouchian led this cell which formed a part of the *Frans-tireurs et partisans* - main-d’œuvre immigrée (FTP-MOI), an armed Communist resistance network composed of foreign-born women and men whose French counterparts were the *Frans-tireurs et partisans français* (FTP or FTPF).
This piece of propaganda intended to politically isolate the resistance by representing them in antisemitic terms as a chimerical threat to the nation. To do so, it first establishes certain identities as metonyms for "criminal." Second, it elides the act of resistance with "banditry" or "crime." Finally, it sets up this wide array of actors and actions as being in fundamental opposition to the true France. The "Army of Crime" was the anti-France.

The *Affiche Rouge*’s characterization of the resistance as an essentially criminal movement was a major preoccupation of resisters who depended upon the trust of local populations for provisions and support. The narrative became, in some ways, a foil against which postwar memory was defined. While many scholars approach resistance memory by way of the gaullist-communist partisan divide, the two camps were united by a more fundamental preoccupation with distinguishing resistance from crime. The postwar state adopted a narrative of Resistance in the abstract as the connective, patriotic thread that carried the spirit of French Republicanism and the French nation through the *années noires* of Vichy. The collaborationist French State could be then dismissed as an aberration. This idea of the resistance took different shapes for the gaullists and communists who wielded electoral power in postwar France, but advanced toward the same end of laying the

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281 The operational logic of Langmuir’s discussion of "chimerical antisemitism" is evident here, using "the abstraction of the group label primarily to point to all members of the outgroup. Since the attributed quality is unobservable, its attribution cannot be contradicted by an observation of differences between individual members." See Gavin Langmuir, *Toward a Definition of Antisemitism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 337.

282 In fact, the April, 1947 Spanish law which targeted anti-Franco guerrilla activity was called the *Ley para la represión del Bandidaje y el Terrorismo*, the "Law for the repression of Banditry and Terrorism." In the press, political opponents of the dictatorship were often called "bandits."

283 See, for example an exchange in Ophuls’s *The Sorrow and the Pity* in which two resisters remember having a bad reputation, "People called us terrorists, bandits, or profiteers..." and another former resister adds, "But there were some people who said they were in the resistance to loot and steal." *La Chagrin et la Pitié*, directed by Marcel Ophuls (1969), Part 2, 41:40'.
groundwork for transforming the Resistance from the “anti-France” of the Occupation to “the only France, the true France, the eternal France” of the Fourth Republic.\textsuperscript{284}

As the Army of Crime became the Army of Shadows, criminalization of certain individuals, political groupings, and tactics continued to be a common feature of both postwar official memory and non-state countermemory, which interacted in complex ways. Commemorative actors from both camps were often locked in one of the following triangles of commemorative tension. Some of these commemorative disputes occurred when two different branches of the state came into conflict with each other over whether to regard certain wartime figures as criminals or resisters.\textsuperscript{285} In other cases, an aggrieved party and the alleged criminal resister called upon either the state or the public to arbitrate their commemorative conflict. Both models of commemorative conflict often received significant press attention. What is more, the bureaucratic process guaranteed that conflicts of this kind would occur and threaten to delegitimize the process itself. And as the previous chapters indicate, the official commemorative narrative did not leave behind all the prejudices of Vichy. CVR administrators continued to treat the resistance claims of foreigners and Jews with suspicion.


The state’s selective use of criminality as a way to dismiss some claims demonstrates the disjuncture between those who break the law and those who are labeled criminals. All resisters broke Vichy law, and many of them engaged in tactics and political traditions that the state criminalized in the Third and Fourth Republics. This may have been an uncontroversial fact in official commemoration had the state not staked its legitimacy on being "born of the Resistance," and had lawmakers not created *combattant volontaire de la Résistance* as a legal category to which anyone could apply. The governments of many other countries reserved the decision to selectively commemorate anti-Nazi resisters for themselves, rather than opening up the process to the general public.\(^{286}\) They thus sidestepped the need for a universal definition and the troubling gray areas that a formal definition of resistance produced for the re-establishment of republican law and order. By contrast, the postwar French state had to find a basis for not just the moral right, but the *legality* of the resistance while at the same time confining its insurrectionary tactics, expropriations, and flouting of national borders to an exceptional, historical period. In the French bureaucratic review process of these applications, lawmakers and administrators had to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate acts of rebellion in a way that would not threaten the foundations of the state.

The stakes were different for non-state actors’ descriptions of wartime actions or people as criminal. Defining the boundaries of "crime" was sometimes a

\(^{286}\) Germany was notable in its extensive bureaucracy for processing reparations claims, which rivaled France’s CVR bureaucracy. However the specific question of establishing a universal definition of resistance was a subset, not a central question, to this project. See Dustin E. Stalnaker, "The Long Shadow of Fascism: German Resistance through the Spanish Civil War and Its Legacy in West Germany, 1933-1989," PhD diss., Rutgers-The State University of New Jersey, 2021.
way of encoding prejudices or political rivalries in palatable language. Labeling
some claimants as criminals also worked to shield the accuser's own law breaking
from that charge. Usually accusations of crime occurred along partisan lines,
particularly between anarchists and communists, and the right—both traditional
and revolutionary—and the revolutionary left. The urgency and frequency with
which both former resisters and the state engaged with the term "crime" and its
cognates underscores the necessity of interrogating the concept of criminal and how
it was deployed by different actors to differentiate the memory of shifting groups of
subjects.

The history of the resistance in Marseille brings this dynamic into focus.
What was an obsession regarding Marseille, so called "Capital of Crime," was a blind
spot for Paris: one could write a Resistance history of Paris that does not breathe a
word about criminals except to dismiss Nazi epithets directed at resisters, like the
*Affiche Rouge*. The same is not possible for Marseille. “Marseille Chicago” has been
characterized as a place where vice, *la combine*, and popular violence are timeless
forces of nature as solid as the *calanques* and as pervasive as the *canicule*, with a
gravitational pull that shapes not only visitor narratives but the administrative
structure of the city. Because “crime” was the beginning and the end of so many
explanations for the differential literary, administrative, and historical treatment of
Marseille, it is crucial to interrogate crime as a historically constructed category of
analysis rather than to simply tag and marginalize the criminal as part of the
peculiar local scenery. The city's reputation brings “crime” into the discussion,
which arguably should feature more prominently in other hexagonal Resistance histories.

Rather than taking charges of criminality as self-evident, I aim to show how and why the concept was used by the state and grassroots in relation to the commemoration of wartime resistance. In order to do so, I examine cases in which commemorative actors struggled to establish a clear line between resistance and crime in Marseille. The case studies below explore two situations: those in which resistance effaced criminal charges and others in which perceptions of criminality led to marginalization of the person’s past resistance. The former include the cases of the Corsican mob and anarchist André Arru. The latter include the cases of the so-called faux résistant René Coustellier and the Comintern-aligned Unión Nacional Española. I argue that taking for granted the preeminence of the conflict between gaullist and communist memory neglects to acknowledge a more fundamental question of state insiders and outsiders. Gaullists and communists in power both engaged in this through their attempts to assimilate the resistance and wrest territorial control away from many competing resistance groups. These groups pushed back and against each other by mobilizing the same language in order to present their lawlessness as commendable, not threatening. Together they reveal the importance of the state’s security preoccupations, with how best to retain a monopoly on violence and protect private property, on the development of commemorative narratives in the grey area between crime and resistance.
**Faux Résistants, Political Factions, and the State**

Crime is a partisan affair. The politics of aspiring state-builders seek to simplify the controversial memory of crime and resistance by establishing two absolute categories that do not intersect. Marxist, socialist, liberal, traditionalist right, and revolutionary right wing theories each adhere to their own criteria to define the category, but are generally dismissive about what constitutes "crime" and how "crime" operates in the context of a broader social struggle. These tendencies saw it as fundamentally anti-social and working against their political project. However, crime itself is generally not portrayed as political. Among these currents, Marx's analysis of the lumpenproletariat is most willing to see crime and politics as not mutually exclusive, but he still ultimately concludes that this class works against its own interests, forming reactionary alliances with the bourgeoisie. We can see this conflation of lumpen-criminality, anti-patriotism, and reactionary bourgeois politics in evidence below, in Charles Poli's decision to leave anarchist resisters locked in their cells while he escaped prison. This logic allows resistance memory to be cauterized of anything deemed criminal. But sometimes, like the *années noires* in France, the relationship between self-interest and political struggle, or crime and resistance, were not so straightforward. This ambiguity was most evident in disputes over "true" and "fake" resistance.

The development of narratives concerning faux résistants or maquis noirs has yet to be fully explored by historians of the resistance. Allegations of this kind suggested that the so-called "fake" resister merely justified illegal acts for personal

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gain by claiming they were acts of resistance against the occupation. The accusation, as well as the reality, did not apply solely to the Marseillaise resistance, of course. Indeed, some of the most infamous examples of deception occurred elsewhere, such as the case of the maquis Lecoz of Indre-et-Loire. Marseille was, however, unique among French cities in that being Marseillais was enough to call one’s motives into question both during the war and after, as we will see below in the case of René Coustellier.

World War II historian Fabrice Grenard describes the phenomenon of “fake” resistance as a product of the period spanning the last two years of the war through the early months of Liberation. In his account, several factors gave rise to true fake resistance, a separate-but-related phenomenon from accusations of fake resistance. As the tides of the war began to shift against the Axis in late 1942 and 1943, bad actors went from impersonating police or supporters of the occupation to posing as resisters to reduce the likelihood of struggle during robberies. During the same period, when the Vichy regime instituted the Service du travail obligatoire (STO) on September 4, 1942, large sectors of the French population which had previously not taken steps to oppose the French State had to choose between losing the young men of their families to forced labor in Germany and living in clandestinity. Grenard estimates only about ten percent of the young men who went into hiding to avoid the STO ended up engaging in resistance that went beyond non-compliance with the forced labor program. These maquis of all stripes needed food, shelter, and clothing.

288 The maquis Lecoz, or affaire Lecoz, (also spelled Le Coz and Lecoze) refers to an officially recognized maquis grouping that engaged in racketeering and several assassinations, see Estelle Berthereau, "L’affaire du maquis Lecoz: vécue et perçue en Touraine et en Anjou de 1944 à nos jours," PhD diss., Bordeaux III/Bordeaux IV, 2002.
which they could not access through legal means. Widespread theft of provisions to survive was the result.\footnote{\textit{Grenard, Maquis Noirs} 14-16.}

\textit{Maquis} attached to the resistance hierarchy in some way devised various methods of gaining compliance to obtain provisions with a minimum of force. Some even issued "bonds" that could be reimbursed upon Allied victory by the recipient whose goods were seized. The unaligned \textit{maquisards} in atomized forest camps and abandoned buildings who were hiding until the end of the occupation, however, sometimes resorted to violence and seizing goods from private individuals who were also on the verge of starvation.

As the French State disintegrated with the German retreat, the provisional government had not yet consolidated power in all spaces of the Hexagon. A power vacuum formed in many areas. During this time, different non-state groups attempted to exercise various types of authority, from ordinary policing to what is now viewed as the \textit{épuration sauvage}. The \textit{épuration sauvage} involved summary killings of presumed collaborators, score settling unrelated to the war, and expropriations, sometimes for personal gain through the black market. The \textit{épuration sauvage} is set in binary contrast to the \textit{épuration légale}. This statist formulation set law in opposition to savagery, a division that permeates both commemorative narratives and historiography. These conditions—war fortunes, the formation of the STO, and the liberation power vacuum—produced what Grenard called a "boom in criminality."\footnote{\textit{Grenard, Maquis noirs},165.}
Since the illegal behavior of "true" and "fake" resisters was often identical, including executions and expropriations, the commemorative politics of distinguishing one from the other reveal the remembering person or institution's sense of strategic necessity, communal belonging, and vision for the postwar order. Some reprised the Vichy "Army of Crime" narrative. A notable example was Abbé Jean-Marie Desgranges' 1948 pamphlet, "Les crimes masqués du résistantalisme," which presented the bulk of the resistance as a cover for degenerative criminality. This commemorative narrative about an essentially criminal resistance had traction at various points after its initial publication. A wave of traditional extreme Right narratives nostalgic for Vichy found a hospitable political climate in the aftermath of the Algerian War and, unintentionally, in the commemorative reevaluation of the war ushered in by the mass movements of 1968. In the 1990s, a new wave of extreme Right narratives, this time defined to a greater extent by its reaction against the proliferation of resistance memory and buoyed by the rise of the National Front and counter-cultural neo-Nazi groupings, republished earlier texts that criminalized the resistance. Most notably, Philippe André Duquesne's extreme Right publishing houses Dualpha and Déterna reprinted Desgranges' pamphlet in 1998, 2003, and 2010. Déterna also republished the infamous antisemitic fake "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" in 2010. Duquesne, also known as Philippe Randa, had been a part of the violent, neofascist student organization *Le Groupe union défense* in the 1970s, ran as a candidate for the Front national, and wrote dystopian fiction about Europe being taken over by North Africans. He has collaborated on projects with neo-Nazis,

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292 For additional discussion see Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome*, 195-199.
third positionists, and identitarians for five decades at the time of writing. As these examples make clear, sectors of the French extreme Right were invested in inverting the official narrative of Vichy and the resistance in order to discredit antifascism and resuscitate the collaborationist regime’s values as foundational to the nation they wished to build.

Others leveled accusations of criminality against the communist resistance from the anti-authoritarian left. Anarchists, Trotskyists, and other opponents of Stalinism remembered how Comintern-aligned forces waged a war within a war in Spain to crush the anarchist-led revolution culminating in the May Days of 1937 in Barcelona. They also saw as a crime the continued communist campaign of reprisals during the Spanish exile and Second World War against antifascists to their left, supposed "social fascists." Below, André Arru and the Puig Antich Group adopt this line, the latter of which documented the extraordinary appeals of some anarchists to French officialdom to put an end to the Partido Comunista Español-affiliated exiles’ repressive campaign of assassinations targeting Spanish exile anarchists and socialists in the resistance.

In the longer durée, anarchist opposition to both the state and capitalism has provided space for radical critiques of the category of crime to develop. These critiques offer important historical context for patterns of French state responses to politics it deemed threatening. They also provide an alternative framework for evaluating the commemoration of illegal activities. Anarchist theory in the late

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nineteenth and early twentieth century interrogated notions of crime to distinguish between behavior that was anti-social or reactionary, from behavior that was simply anti-state.\(^{294}\) In France, the early twentieth century rise of the minority current of illegalist anarchism,\(^ {295}\) on the heels of "propaganda of the deed," received widespread media attention, particularly following the sensational robberies by Marseille-born Marius Jacob and the Bonnot gang.\(^ {296}\) This tendency never garnered widespread appeal, but did challenge discourses that sought to depoliticize crime, even petty crime, and their logical corollary: criminalizing political actors in order to dismiss their work as illegitimate. The state's response was swift and brutal in its attempt to isolate this political tendency as merely criminal and illegalists as outside the protection of laws regarding speech and association.\(^ {297}\)

Anarchists coming from collectivist politics, as opposed to the individualist anarchist illegalists, also embraced criminalized people as potential revolutionaries in Spain rather than seeing them as necessarily reactionary and anti-social. Perhaps most famously, the Iron Column during the Spanish Civil War saw the revolutionary potential of people already outside the law.\(^ {298}\) Anarchists had released prisoners in Catalonia at the beginning of the war, and these ex-prisoners formed their own militia to fight Franco's forces. This doubtless stoked the xenophobic anxiety of

\(^ {294}\) Examples are numerous. A fundamental building block of this argument that Pierre-Joseph Proudhon wrote about was that society would find order in anarchy, not the coercion of law. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, *Qu’est-ce que la propriété? ou Recherche sur le principe du Droit et Gouvernement* (Paris: Brocard, 1840), 235.

\(^ {295}\) Sébastien Fauré, "Ilégalisme," *L’Encyclopédie anarchiste* I (Limoges: E. Rivet, 1934)


\(^ {297}\) Anne-Sophie Chambost, "'Nous ferons de notre pire...'. Anarchie, illégalisme... et lois scélérates," in *Droit et cultures* 74 (2017), 65-87.

French presses at the end of the Civil War in 1939, though they likely did not need to resurrect the phantom of the Iron Column when they described the mass of Spanish exiles as "the dregs of the bottom reaches of the prisons," and wrote articles with titles like, "The Army of Crime is in France: What Are You Going to Do About It?" Furthermore, numerous prominent examples of pre- and postwar collectivist anarchist action could be classified as criminal: Durruti robbed banks before 1936 and Lucio Urturba Jiménez, a child during the Civil War who fled to France in the 1950s, also robbed banks and forged Citibank traveler's checks to fund various revolutionary organizations. The fact that Spanish anarchism did not produce major published works of theory on this tendency—which understood robbery more as a tactic to wage class war while funding mass movements rather than a revolutionary way of life in it’s own right like the illegalists—is not an indication of its lack of importance or influence on twentieth century underground movements.

The political culture of France after the First World War was significantly different from its neighbor across the Pyrenees though. Collectively-minded French movements were comfortable breaking the law, but tended not to organize along illegalist lines. In France, nearly the entire political spectrum, save for anarchists and anti-colonial groups, jostled for position as the party of law and order. There were significant numbers of French communists and socialists who were part of the republican state’s repressive apparatus. This was generally not the case in Spain,

whose police were largely of the right or apolitical, and the left tended not to frame their fight in favor of law and order but rather in terms of the emancipation of the working class.

Criminalization of the communist resistance from the right generally occurred on different terms. Gaullists and *vichysto-résistants* especially singled out the FTP and FTP-MOI as "criminal" out of sweeping anti-Communism, xenophobia, or more specific opposition to militant tactics. Communist resisters advocated for guerrilla warfare against the German occupation after Germany broke the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with the invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Gaullists, on the other hand, opposed attacks on German soldiers, arguing that the occupying authorities' reprisals against the French civilian population were too high a price to pay. Instead, gaullists generally advocated for producing propaganda, supplying Allied forces with intelligence, and waiting for the Allied invasion before engaging in armed confrontation. This strategic dispute helped shape the contours of wartime power struggles and postwar contested memory of the resistance record of René Coustellier.

**René Coustellier, Communist**

René Baptistin Marius Coustellier successfully obtained a CVR card while simultaneously coming under a series of criminal investigations into his actions under the banner of resistance. The conflicts over his tactics that began during the war spilled over into postwar commemorative battles in the press, in *memoirs*, and

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302 See CVR Dossier of Pierre Marius Fourment, 20010318/14, AN, Pierrefitte, France; and Grenard, *Maquis noirs*, 122-123.
in official commemorative ceremonies and programs. The case of Coustellier, codename "Soleil," indicates the extent and longevity of internecine rivalries as well as how Coustellier’s political opponents seized upon his Marseillaise origins to criminalize his wartime activity. Coustellier embraced the stir his origins caused, attributing his nom de guerre to fellow resister Max Lévy’s expression of surprise at hearing his Marseillaise accent, "But it’s the Midi’s sunlight that they’ve sent us!".

Coustellier was born in Port-Saint-Louis-du-Rhône near Marseille in 1920. He joined the resistance in the spring of 1941 in the Marseille region and was arrested for his activities in 1943. He escaped the Avignon prison and went on to lead the 5th battalion of the FTP near Dordogne, with roughly five hundred people at his command at the time of Liberation. During the last two years of the war, his group killed members of the Gestapo, collaborationists of the PPF, and German soldiers; helped imprisoned resisters escape; carried out acts of sabotage; and expropriated goods. His group liberated Villeneuve-sur-Lot and aided in the liberation of other towns in the region.

However, anti-Communists in the resistance and postwar regime suspected Coustellier’s methods and motives as being criminal and damaging to the war effort. Coustellier had come into conflict with the gaullist resistance for their broad strategic and ideological differences, but also due to more immediate material concerns. The Allies did not provision the Soleil group. In response, Coustellier and

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304 CVR Dossier of René Baptiste Marius Coustellier, GR 16 P 148586, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France.
305 Grenard, Maquis noirs, 125.
306 Grenard, Maquis noirs, 126.
his comrades seized multiple Allied parachute drops of arms and supplies intended for other groups, particularly the Armée secrète. Coustellier thought it was foolish to create stockpiles only to wait for the Allied armies, whereas he had an immediate need for weapons to carry out his missions.307

In May 1944, representatives of the Armée secrète met in Dordogne to plan the assassination of twenty-four year old Coustellier. The resister who claimed to be in charge of executing Coustellier described him in his memoirs as "a habitual criminal offender, a Marseillais thug who plundered and terrorized the entire region from Bugue to Villefranche-du-Périgord for many long months."308 After the war, Pierre Bertaux, the gaullist commissaire de la République for the Midi-Pyrénées region, continued to elaborate the narrative that Coustellier's roots in Marseille signaled the criminal nature of his resistance from his position of power in the postwar state. Bertaux wrote, "Soleil was the name of a gang leader... A Marseillais pimp, they said, he surrounded himself with companions who took advantage of circumstances, tried to set aside a little nest egg for a rainy day, and killed, on occasion."309 In his 1950 memoir, right wing anti-Communist resister Jean Lacipiéras, who had participated in pre-war nationalist leagues and claimed to have infiltrated the Gestapo in Nîmes during the war on behalf of the resistance, described what he called a "reign of terror" by Coustellier and international members of his group.310 These allegations of criminal behavior, as a convict, a thug,

307 The attitude is summarized in member of the maquis Soleil's memoir: Cardenac, Les combats d’un ingénû, 210.
308 Quoted in Grenard, Maquis noirs, 127.
309 Quoted in Grenard, Maquis noirs, 127.
310 Jean Lacipiéras, Au carrefour de la trahison (Paris: Self published, 1950), 139.
a looter, a gang leader, a pimp, and a terrorist, adopted a xenophobic rhetoric despite Marseille's geopolitical location within the Hexagon. In the last instance, Lacipiéras stresses Coustellier's association with Urbanovitch, a Yugoslav resister, to suggest foreign loyalties harmful to France. A military historian republished Lacipiéras' memoirs in 2017, reintroducing the narrative of an essentially criminal and foreign Communist resistance to a new generation, alongside the reissued Desgranges pamphlet.

Conflict regarding Coustellier's supposed proximity to crime did not end with the war and was not confined to resistance memoirs. Various branches of the postwar state also attempted to disambiguate Coustellier's memory. On the one hand, CVR functionaries approved of Coustellier's request for formal recognition as part of both the FFI and the FFC. On the other hand, Coustellier found himself ensnared in numerous postwar inquiries into the alleged crimes he carried out under the cover of the resistance. The Communist newspaper, *La Défense*, claimed that state investigators had questioned Coustellier a minimum of eighty-seven times between the end of the war and the date of publication in the spring of 1949.311

Coustellier was aware of the extreme Right uses of the past when he published his memoir in 1998. He meditated:

I found myself in a dilemma. On the one hand, my wartime comrades wanted me to recount what was the best time of our lives, without hiding anything about all the events that occurred. On the other hand, some thought that to

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311 Charles Desirat, "On a osé condamner le nouveau Bara!" *La Défense (hebdomadaire du Secours Populaire Français)* 22, no. 225 (May 27-June 2, 1949), 3: "On saura que Soleil (qui nourrit très modestement du produit de sa pêche sa femme, résistante elle aussi et ses deux si jolis bambins, peut-être trois à l'heure présente), a été interrogé 87 fois par divers juges d'instruction, sans compter visites d'inspecteurs ou de commissaires de police, sans compter les émissaires officieux lui offrant une « situation » s'il accepte de salir les actions de ses compagnons d'hier dans le plus immonde des hebdomadaires à gros tirage!"
fight against its detractors and potential enemies that it was not opportune to recall the lack of "unity" within the Resistance, and instead promote the recognition of all those, the villagers and peasants, who helped us.\textsuperscript{312}

Like André Arru below, state criminalization in the immediate postwar might have prompted articles in his defense in the Communist press, but did not provoke Coustellier to record his memories of the war. As he told it, the tipping point in weighing the desire to present his perspective and his comrades' hesitation to air dirty laundry came with public commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Liberation in 1994. "I was revolted!" Coustellier wrote.\textsuperscript{313} The desire to set the record straight overcame any doubts about publicly discussing wartime disunity. He set out a forceful critique, repeating allegations of "fake" resistance and deception back at his detractors. He was particularly critical of Malraux, who Coustellier clashed with during the war over his refusal to incorporate his FTPF group into the resistance hierarchy.\textsuperscript{314} According to comparative literature professor and Malraux scholar Jean-Louis Jeannelle, Coustellier's editors even took the extraordinary step of removing sections of his book, fearing litigation.\textsuperscript{315}

The state had not reached a clear verdict on the nature of Coustellier's involvement in the resistance, having awarded him the CVR while investigating allegations of ordinary crimes for personal gain. As such, official commemorative announcements on major anniversaries have been fairly circumspect regarding the

\textsuperscript{313} Coustellier, \textit{Le Groupe Soleil dans la Résistance}, 11.
\textsuperscript{314} Coustellier's former secretary, Michel Carcenac, recalled having to talk Coustellier down, along with Spanish exile resisters in the group, from killing Malraux. Evelyn Mesquida, \textit{Y ahora, volved a vuestras casas} (Barcelona: Ediciones B, 2020), 107-108.
Soleil group. Instead, commemorative contests have played out in life writing, interviews, and grassroots memorial association activities.

Jean-Réné Saulière, aka André Arru, Anarchist

Jean-Réné Saulière, also known as André Arru, was an anarchist and conscientious objector who formed a resistance cell in Marseille. During the war, Arru engaged in rescue work in opposition to the Vichy and Nazi regimes, supplying targets of the Third Reich with false documents needed to escape or hide after France fell to Germany in the summer of 1940. His collective also wrote, printed, and distributed antifascist propaganda and helped organize a clandestine meeting of anarchist organizers from across southern France in 1943. There are no physical markers dedicated to his wartime work. He received no honors from any government, collected no resister’s pension, and the sole posthumous monograph on his life is a 2004 biography by his partner, Sylvie Knoerr-Saulière. The Centre International de Recherches sur l’Anarchisme in Marseille, a research organization and independent archive that Arru worked with from the 1970s to his death in 1999, preserves some of his writings in their collection of the annual CIRA Bulletins. He was a passionate anti-Communist, faced lengthy postwar government scrutiny for criminalized politics, and engaged in extensive life-writing to rehabilitate the memory of his wartime activities which were tarnished by charges of criminality.

Jean-Réné Saulière left his birthplace of Bordeaux and birth name behind soon after France entered the Second World War, making his way to Marseille as

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André Arru. The twenty-eight-year-old, pacifist, individualist anarchist had refused to enlist, and would face prison if captured. The crime of conscientious objection—and the name he took of a medically exempt hometown man to get away with it—would stick with him long into the postwar. His widow, Sylvie Knoerr-Saulière who still calls him André, said he very rarely spoke about the war, much less his role as a resister. It must have been a rare lapse in the silence that enveloped Arru’s wartime years when he had to request letters attesting to his resistance activities for a military tribunal in May 1947, when his birth name of Saulière finally caught up to his clandestine identity of Arru.

That year, Arru went on trial for deserting the army in 1939 when he was drafted. His eighteen letters of support only partially effaced the stain of his initial charge of insubordination: Arru received a suspended sentence of five years in prison. Carrying the criminal charge like a badge of honor, Arru repeated over the course of more than a decade of testimonies and autobiographical writings that the state’s condemnation “Represented for me what the Legion of Honor was for others.”

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317 Arru liked to play with seemingly paradoxical terms, calling himself an *individualiste solidaire*, a *pacifiste militant*, and so on.
318 Sylvie Knoerr-Saulière, interviewed by Julia Buck and Sabrina Chebbi. Marseille, 27 July 2015. Also, an appendix in André Arru’s biography attempts to provide details on the subject, place, and context of many of his postwar public speeches and both anonymous and signed published articles. Ranging in theme from the individualist thought of Max Stirner to the works of the Marquis du Sade to pacifism, none approach his wartime activities until the mid-1970s.
319 The official charge in French is “INSOUSSION A LA LOI SUR LE RECRUTEMENT DE L’ARMEE EN TEMPS DE GUERRE.” A redacted copy of the official paperwork is available in Madeleine Baudoin’s papers: “André ARRU jugement,” 6 J 83, Archives départementales des Bouches-du-Rhône, Marseille, France.
Arru's quip spoke to an attitude that many anarchist resisters shared in regard to state legitimization of their political activity. Belgian anarchist Léo Campion, who faced deportation from France after the war, expressed a similar disdain for official state recognition in the testimony he shared with CIRA-Marseille. He wrote that the composer Erik Satie told Ravel after the latter refused the Legion of Honor that, "To refuse is good, but it would be better to never have earned it." This anecdote prefaced Campion's explanation for why he was a decorated for his role as a resistance liaison between Paris and Brussels:

This is how the leader of my [resistance] Network played a joke on me by having me decorated with the Croix de Guerre for the Resistance, without asking my opinion. Of course I never wore it. And when I told him off, he retorted that this distinction would facilitate the lifting of my deportation order.

Sure enough, we went together to the Prefecture of Police where the leader of my Network took out a pretty paper with the letterhead "Provisional Government of the French Republic, Office of General De Gaulle," on which he wrote the annulment of my expulsion order, signed it, and marked it with an official stamp with the Cross of Lorraine and all that mess.321

Like Arru, presenting himself as a resistance veteran to the state was a means of effacing other criminal penalties, not a type of retrospective legitimization that Campion respected on its own terms.

It was a different sort of criminal charge that shook Arru out of his silence on the war years once again, over two decades after the Liberation. In 1962 Madeleine Baudoin, a former member of the groupe franc of the Mouvements Unis de la Résistance (MUR) in Marseille, published a historical account of her organization's

activities in the department from late 1943 until the end of the war in France.\textsuperscript{322} The text was constructed around a series of interviews. One episode that she would later find out involved Arru narrated the story of the Chave Prison break on the night of March 22 to 23, 1944 from the perspective of communist resister Charles Poli.

Poli led a small group of incarcerated members of the \textit{groupes francs} in organizing the escape, which Baudoin called an “unfortunate affair” despite the successful liberation of members of her own network from the French State and Gestapo.\textsuperscript{323} These two pages were of intimate concern for Arru. He, fellow anarchist Etienne Chauvet,\textsuperscript{324} and a small number of others were left locked in their cells that night in March. The crime meriting their continued incarceration in the eyes of the escaped resisters? Anti-patriotism.

In his testimony of June 28, 1960 Poli told Baudoin he would do it again, given the chance. He clarified his role and motivations—both specific and general—regarding the anarchists in the following exchange, which she reproduced in her book:

Madeleine BAUDOIN. — Why didn’t the two interned anarchists escape? Charles POLI. — It was me who refused to open their cells so that they could escape with us. They were not patriots. But they did want to escape. M.B. — Were they resisters? C.P. — They served in the Resistance too. They fabricated false papers. But they were not patriots. When in the prison, we communists wore the tricolor

\textsuperscript{323} Baudoin, \textit{Histoire des Groupes Francs}, 119.
\textsuperscript{324} Chauvet asserts that his role in the Resistance was essentially non-existent. He was in hiding with Arru to avoid being deported for labor in the east with the infamous \textit{Service du Travail Obligatoire} (STO) when they were both arrested, along with Arru’s partner at the time, Spanish exile Julia Viñas. See ”Les Anarchistes et la résistance,” CIRA Bulletin 21-22 (1984), CIRA Archives, Marseille, France.
cockade for the national holiday, they wore the black insignia. They were not patriots; it was for this reason that I refused to let them escape with us. I would open the cell door of a royalist, but never for an anarchist.

M.B. — How did you get along in prison with the anarchists?

C.P. — We would say good morning, good night. The anarchists, you know, have no God or master. With them there is no such thing as money, they want to barter goods. In Marseille now, the anarchists are all rich people. There is not a single worker among them. In prison, when we sung *La Marseillaise*, they did not sing.

M.B. — Did you sing *L’Internationale*?

C.P. — No. We were the *Front national*.325 It was broad in terms of recruitment. One day, February 6, 1944, I wrote an article in prison. I spoke about the fascist Chiappe,326 but, so as not to displease a gaullist detainee, I deleted the term “fascist,” and put in its place “the man of February 6.” It was a question of framing. Contrary to the communists, the anarchists were not patriots, the communists, they, they loved France. One day, in the Chave Prison, a commission composed of Germans and accompanied by French came to interrogate us. The Germans asked us, “Do you love the Russians, do you love the English?” We responded, “We love France.” They brutally shut the door, saying “Filthy communists.”327

Poli’s words provide multiple reference points to reveal how he evaluated allies and enemies within the political terrain of the resistance; who deserved to stay locked away regardless of their contributions and whose resistance activities earned their freedom. The France that Poli loved appears to be constituted in this passage along similar lines as de Gaulle’s romanticized, eternal, and abstract nation. It was not the republican tradition that Poli loved, but France. Poli expressed willingness to release a hypothetical royalist from prison despite their hostility to the Republic, but not an actual anarchist resister. Poli revised a clandestine article in

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consideration of a far-right sympathizer despite the violent antiparlamentarian nature of the very subject of that article, but could not abide the anarchist black and red side by side with the tricolor in a joint protest on France’s national holiday. His interview suggests the notion that the essential element to transform an act of resistance from a criminal act to a legitimate one was patriotism. In Poli’s eyes, anti-republicans nostalgic for the monarchy had it and right wing ultranationalist rioters had it. Arru and Chauvet were not guided by a patriotic ethos so they were left behind with the injured, who could not escape, and the common law prisoners. Arru’s postwar military tribunal was willing to suspend his sentence on account of twenty-eight Resistance affidavits. Poli, by contrast, was fully aware of Arru’s record but took on the temporary role of his judge and jailer without hesitation when he made the choice to leave the cell door locked.

Baudoin was unwilling to reproduce the wartime criminalization of the anarchists in postwar commemoration. While she only allows herself a single adjective, “unfortunate,” to characterize the event portrayed in this testimony, her framing registered her disgust at Poli’s remorseless criminalization of the two anarchists and the gravity of his choice to leave them in the hands of Vichy and the Gestapo. Below Poli’s account, included virtually without comment, Baudoin presents a rebuttal in the form of an excerpted letter from Jean Comte, the former head of the groupes francs of Marseille, reacting to the story in the interview. The date of the letter is instructive: July 4, 1960, a mere six days after Baudoin conducted her interview with Poli. After meeting with him and recording his narrative on a Tuesday, perhaps she immediately transcribed Poli’s words. If she did
not have Jean Comte’s contact information already, she could not have delayed long in obtaining it, writing him a personal letter, including a copy of Poli’s transcript, and putting it in the post. Even if he lived in the same city as Baudoin and the mail came quickly, Comte could not have meditated for long on the contents of Baudoin’s letter before issuing his reply the following Monday. The urgency both former resisters must have felt to contextualize or confront Poli’s presentation of legitimate versus illegitimate is palpable, though it was sixteen years after the end of the war. This urgency highlights the importance many resisters assigned to the project of defining criminality in the postwar narrative, even if those exact terms went unspoken. How resisters defined criminality was intimately tied up with how they wanted their fight to be remembered. Perhaps even more suggestive of the sense of importance Baudoin and Comte assigned to setting the commemorative record straight was that at the time they were actively engaged on opposing sides of the Algerian independence struggle.

Jean Comte, a gaullist resister whose codename was Lévis, distances himself from Poli’s actions in the Chave Prison and identifies Poli’s categorical criminalization of anarchists as a destructive force. In her book, Baudoin included the following excerpt from Comte’s letter, right below Poli’s interview:

You asked me to let you know my point of view on the passage from Charles Poli’s statement relating to the escape from the Chave Prison. It is with great bitterness and indignation that I am learning about this sixteen years after the fact. The guard, Raffaèli [who assisted in the escape], and the escapees told us how they left, and maintained the story afterward that the two anarchists did not wish to escape. At the time I considered anarchists to be slightly eccentric people, and since this presentation of facts hardly surprised me I did not worry about digging into the details. I have clearly present in my memory, however, due to its slightly funny side, that Raffaèli would speak not of anarchistes but of “arnachistes.” There could be no hesitation on my part,
the idea of leaving these two anarchists in prison would not have occurred to me for a moment. For us it was not a question of ideology, if so why would we have not likewise abandoned the communists? We were fighting against a system of oppression and injustice, and whoever was against it was with us, whoever was the victim was our friend, be he “one who believed in Heaven, or one who did not believe” in the words of Aragon.

Thus, for six years after the end of the war in Spain, people like Poli remained with this ruthless blindness that had made them persecute the anarchists of Barcelona and had probably helped to drive Republican Spain to where we know it is today.

Comte’s intervention is pointed. His invocation of Aragon is of particular interest. Aragon was a founding surrealist poet, lifelong Communist Party militant, and World War II resister in Poli’s own National Front. His prominence and political power in the postwar reverberates to the present day: he is among the few authors whose words were inscribed in the Mémorial des Martyrs de la Déportation on the Ile de la Cité in Paris. By invoking an already vetted and officially embraced hero of the Resistance, who was also politically and organizationally close to Poli, Comte situates Poli’s actions as foreign to the true goals of his own resistance organization.

Furthermore, although Comte did not employ notions of crime to characterize Poli’s sentiments, he argued that Poli’s brand of communist ruthlessness was at least partially to blame for the 1939 fascist victory in Spain. At the same time, the criticism highlights the continuities of communist sectarianism while indicating that Poli was a "bad apple," violating the spirit of communist resistance.

328 Reference to the May Days of 1937 when Stalinists made a grab for power over the Republican camp, which included barricade fighting behind the front and coordinated attacks on anarchist and Trotskyist individuals and collectives, especially in Barcelona, which George Orwell documents in Homage to Catalonia. See also Helen Graham, “'Against the State': A Genealogy of the Barcelona May Days (1937),” European History Quarterly 29, no. 4 (October 1999): 485-542.
329 Baudoin, Histoire des Groupes Francs, 120.
330 Aragon split from the surrealists at the World Congress of Writers for the Defense of Culture in 1935. His falling out stemmed from arguments with André Breton about Victor Serge, who at the time was ideologically aligned with Trotsky’s Left Opposition.
Arru’s narrative would emerge after a chance meeting with Baudoin in the late 1960s or 1970. In a version of his remembrances of the war years, published in the CIRA Bulletin in 1984, Arru described how his path crossed with the resister-cum-historian at an exhibit on the Commune of 1871 put on by the Libre Pensée des Bouches-du-Rhône. “Arru remembered,

All of a sudden during the conversation, Madeleine Baudoin saw that I was one of the two anarchists that she talked about in her book, which she gave me... I found pleasure rereading some of the answers to Madeleine Baudoin from the person principally responsible for my “reimprisonment:” Charles Poli, communist, who went on to become the General Secretary of the Union of Seafarers of the Merchant Marine in Marseille (CGT) after the war.331

Arru doubtlessly noted and derived satisfaction from the sordid light Poli’s own words cast the now-successful union leader, and appreciated learning some background to his own history of which he was unaware. Almost fifteen years later, Arru describes the (sardonic?) “pleasure” he took in reading, but did he feel the same urgency that animated Baudoin and Comte after reading Poli’s words?

In Arru’s posthumous biography, Sylvie recounted that she found no less than fourteen autobiographical tracts in Arru’s papers, all of which covered either episodes during his childhood and youth until the war or his post-military tribunal reflections on diverse themes in the humanities and social sciences. He loved to muse on how he came to his convictions and how his convictions operated in the world at large, but Arru’s eight clandestine years under his alias remained in

shadow. Arru gave what may have been his first full account of his wartime activities on August 20, 1970, upon Baudoin's request.

Arru’s testimony provides some additional analysis about how others understood his resistance, as an anarchist, in relation to the category of criminality.

Upon arriving at the Chave Prison, he remembered:

In Chave, they placed us with the common criminals. As soon as I found out that there was an area where the political prisoners were assembled, I made a complaint to the warden, arguing the nature of our convictions: fabrication of false stamps with the goal of social subversion, falsification of French and foreign papers, antinational and anarchist propaganda. But he didn’t know anything about it, and so I had to write the investigating judge, with Chauvet’s agreement, for us to be transferred a fortnight after our arrival to the prison quarter named political.

The guard who took charge of us when we arrived asked, “What are you, communists or gaullists?” “Anarcho-syndicalists!” “What? Anarcho-syndicalists... well okay... good... Then sit down there,” and he let us into an empty cell, closing it behind us. Thereafter, we remained for many weeks two to a cell, which was absolutely forbidden by the rules.

In this passage, Arru makes two principle arguments: against the categorization of anarchists as common criminals, and against a constrictive understanding of resistance as an exclusively communist or gaullist phenomenon. His self-advocacy, which likely put him in greater danger in terms of the Gestapo, was limited in its success. Instead of validating their status as political resisters, prison personnel put the anarchists in a cell of their own, adjacent to but not integrated with other resisters.

Regarding the prison break, Arru and Poli’s accounts agreed on nearly every detail, only their ideas of legitimate action differ. Rather than nationalism, Arru

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332 Knoerr-Saulière, Jean-René Saulière dit André Arru, 369.
334 Text of Arru’s testimony for Baudoin in Knoerr-Saulière, Jean-René Saulière dit André Arru, 252.
appealed to internationalism in line with other anarchists. He added that had he been given the keys, he would have unlocked every cell door in the Chave Prison, not just of those of the incarcerated resisters. This statement conveys an expansive rejection of conventional notions of criminality, in stark contrast to Poli’s narrow sympathies. Although the portion of his testimony above attempted to create distance between his wartime criminal activities and the infractions of common criminals, he maintained the stance that the prison system represented a greater injustice than what the state understood as crime. Arru’s conceptions of and presentation of crime were at significant odds with mainstream commemoration of the Resistance. As such, his commemorative activities sought to denaturalize the boundaries of the category of crime that the state hoped to make incontestable and invisible.

**Spanish exile factions and the postwar state**

*Les Dossiers noirs d’une certaine Résistance: Trajectoires du fascisme rouge* is a work of countermemory of the Spanish anarchist resistance in the French Midi that defies genre. The published volume includes historical essays, testimonies of former resisters, copies of official French documents, photographs, historiographical notes, and news clippings. The varied source materials and large number of contributors were all geared toward recounting events forty years after the fact that the authors imagined their readers would find unbelievable. The book focuses on a series of accounts of crimes—assassinations, kidnappings, and false statements—targeting

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335 Arru in Knoerr-Saulière, Jean-René Saulière dit André Arru, 130.
anarchists by communist members of the Unión Nacional Española in 1944. In his testimony, Antoine Tellez (likely the Catalan anarchist exile and historian Antonio Téllez Solà) writes that he personally knew of fifty-six antifascists who were killed by the UNE in 1944. Tellez positioned himself somewhere between witness and historian, affirming that he could back up his claims "with a historical rigor that I am ready to demonstrate in detail."336 One way the authors supported their claims, ironically perhaps, is through references to state legitimation regarding the resistance and reproduction of official paperwork.

*Les Dossiers noirs* was one of several publications that CIRA-Marseille promoted or authored that situated the city in a broader region that was indelibly marked by the cross-border politics of the Spanish exile.337 The book deals mostly with events in the Franco-Spanish border region rather than the city of Marseille, with the exception of reproducing an excerpt of historian Henri Nogueres' book about Charles Poli and the Chave prison break.338 However, the *Dossiers noirs* circulated through Marseillaise anarchist and Spanish exile communities thanks to CIRA and the Fédération Anarchiste network, which offered alternative narratives of the resistance in the French Midi. The imagined cartography of the World War II resistance itself, in this chronological and spatial figuration, had important nodes where Spanish exile organizing was concentrated in Perpignan, Toulouse, and

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337 Although Spain has been largely absent in official commemoration until recent years, it is hard to overstate its importance, particularly in Marseille where, for example, a meeting of the SIA in 1939 drew 5,000 to 6,000 people. Scott Soo, *The Routes to Exile: France and the Spanish Civil War Refugees, 1939-2009* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 73.
Marseille, rather than the official French narrative's major cities of Paris, Lyon, and Clermont-Ferrand. Anarchists sketched a commemorative landscape of the resistance that could not be extricated from the political divisions or international solidarities of Spain's antifascist struggle from 1936 to 1939. They situated the major fault line dividing both resistance strategy and memory between the Comintern-aligned communists on one side and the anarchists, who were sometimes united with socialist, Trotskyist, and republican groupings, on the other.339

The intensity of these divisions changed over time. Comintern's "popular front" strategy saw short-lived electoral success in France and Spain in the 1930s. However, by the end of the Spanish Civil War, the Communist Party's violent repression of other anticapitalists, who they called "social fascists," within the fight against fascism eroded the credibility of their own myth of antifascist unity. For example, the communist issued camp bulletin in Saint Cyprien in 1939 proclaimed that unity "ought to be manifested by clearing out the bandits, saboteurs, traitors: anarchists and Trotskyites, old and new allies of the renegade Franco," which elicited the following response from the anarchist counter-bulletin:

The unity proclaimed by the Communist Party was not, is not, and never will be possible because it is an unreal unity, sectarian, which is detrimental to the sentiments and ideals of the workers who fought for the emancipation of their class, without distinction of creeds.340

Orthodox PCE militants continued their repressive actions against enemies on the left in the early days of exile, during the period of underground resistance, and at the beginning of the postwar period. In the previous section, Jean Comte saw Charles Poli’s behavior as a ruthless echo of the Spanish communists. Many anarchists characterized this repression as criminal, but a calculated criminal policy to achieve communist dominance rather than the "uncontrollable" or common law criminality with which the communists identified the anarchists.

Despite the conflict, the Liberation of France rekindled some hope amongst Spanish exiles that sufficient cooperation could be mustered to continue pushing south across the Pyrenees, with the support of the Allied powers, to finally defeat Franco and retake Spain. This hope produced certain commemorative silences in the early years after the war. One exile, writing only as "Flora," attributed the decision to inscribe misleading text on her brother’s grave marker in Montfort to this hope. Even though the communist-dominated Unión Nacional Española assassinated her anarchist brother and three other resisters in May 1944, the marble plaque read that they had been shot by fascists.

The political landscape had changed dramatically by the time the Perpignan-based Puig Antich Group published Les Dossiers noirs in 1984, in which Flora shared her testimony. Franco died in 1975 and the transition to a constitutional

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341 For an early example, PCE militants managed to gain control of the kitchen and mail in the French punishment camp of Vernet d’Ariège and withheld food and correspondence from anarchists also interned there. Similar incidents took place at Septfonds and other camps. See: Stein, Beyond Death and Exile, 100-102.
343 The group was named for Salvador Puig Antich, a twenty-five year old anarchist who Franco’s regime executed by garrote vil in 1974. The group was composed of members of the Fédération Anarchiste of Perpignon. Many members of CIRA were also members of the FA. Estève Ballester,
monarchy began in Spain. In 1977, the state held general elections. That same year, the Spanish Communist Party became legal again and parliament passed the controversial Amnesty Law, which both allowed for exiles to return to Spain but also prohibited the investigation and punishment of crimes such as sedition and human rights abuses during the Civil War and under the dictatorship. In not only legal but also cultural terms, the "Pact of Forgetting" was the result.344 The Spanish exile communities in France were influenced by events in Spain, but also responded to a divergent culture of memory in their adopted home.345 Exiles had a long history of seizing the opportunity to speak out that was denied to their counterparts living in Spain under the dictatorship, or in the uneasy peace-without-justice of the transition.346

Eulalio Esteban Fernández fought alongside Antonio Téllez Solà in the short-lived antifascist invasion of the Val d’Aran in 1944. In the years before, he was active in the Spanish resistance based in Perpignan, which established networks connecting southern France and Spain to oppose both Franco and Vichy.347 His

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346 Exiles established many newspapers, such as the anarchist Solidaridad Obrera and the communist Reconquista de España, and also created an exile publishing infrastructure to share historical and personal works on the Civil War and its aftermath. Ruedo Ibérico was one notable publishing house founded by exiles.

testimony in *Les Dossiers noirs* recounted the UNE’s attempt to consolidate power to form a Spanish government in exile. Esteban refuted what he saw as UNE attempts to present themselves as the sole protagonists of Spanish participation in the resistance to gain legitimacy. "They should not appropriate the glory of others to enrich their own," he wrote. Of the tens of thousands of Spanish resisters in southern France, "were all of these fighters from the UNE, communist?" he asked. Esteban answered his own question by citing a decree that the French republican provisional government issued on August 25, 1944:

**ARTICLE I:** The only Spanish forces which are attached to the FFI are those of the Agrupación de Guerrilleros [Españoles (AGE)] of the [Unión] Nacional Española.

**ARTICLE II:** All Spanish forces that are not part of the Agrupación will be disarmed and demobilized.

He considered the French state, particularly this additional elaboration of the laws governing who could legitimately be recognized as part of the *Forces françaises de l'intérieur*, as an important source of legitimation for the UNE. It also affected commemoration: allowing the UNE to claim an outsized resistance role for the Spanish communists and to marginalize Spaniards who organized unaffiliated resistance cells. After all, CVR functionaries would not recognize resistance that took place outside officially recognized groups, and the French communist-dominated CNR controlled which groups would receive official recognition (for certain types of CVR applications). Official French recognition mattered to the Spanish communists,

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and they used it to bolster their commemorative status. For instance, the Toulouse-based *Bulletin d'Information Intérieur* of the *Amicale des anciens guerrilleros espagnols en France* (F.F.I.) discussed the southern CVR committees in their first issue in 1977 and went on to devote a section of their paper to honors bestowed upon their members by the French government in subsequent issues, including lists of new recipients of CVR cards, through at least the 1980s.\(^{351}\)

To push back against the UNE attempts "to physically and morally liquidate as many anarchists as possible,"\(^ {352}\) Esteban remembered that exiles affiliated with the anarchosyndicalist CNT, himself included, played an important role in the resistance in Perpignan. He claimed, "the *guerrilleros* of the UNE were absent: when they arrived from the Prades region, Perpignan was already liberated... by heterogeneous groups of combatants, among them a large number of [CNT members] of this city."\(^ {353}\) Instead of continuing by offering a story of CNT daring, he then tempered his account by describing a moment on the eve of liberation with ironic humor:

> [On] the afternoon of [August] 18th, a few men stormed [the barracks of the *milice*]. The militiamen fled, leaving their weapons behind. Rummaging through the pile, a Perpignanais from the Saint-Mathieu neighborhood found a pistol and, handling it, he let off a shot. The bullet ricocheted off a stone... he was the first one injured in the liberation of Perpignan!\(^ {354}\)

Esteban's memory of this episode was a departure from the heroic solemnity of official state narratives.

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Former *maquisard* and Spanish exile Enric "Henry" Melich,\(^{355}\) codenames Ricardo and Sans Robert, also rejected the hagiographical style with which some militants remembered the invasion of the Val d’Aran at the end of World War II.

Melich turned 19 in 1944. He was one of the enthusiastic young Spanish exile anarchists who the UNE recruited that year, ahead of the ill-conceived communist-led attempt to retake Spain, culminating in the invasion of the Val d’Aran. When Melich remembered his role in the invasion, he wrote, "As far as I’m concerned, I admit it: I’m ashamed of having been so naive."\(^{356}\)

His testimony begins toward the end of fighting in southern France, which did not mark the end of resistance to fascism for many Spanish exiles and their supporters. Melich tells how he and his friend "Tambor" casually dropped in on a meeting right after the liberation of Narbonne. They did not realize it was run by the communist leadership of the UNE, and took at face value that this would be a heterogeneous group of political exiles. Soon after the meeting, Melich and "Tambor" agreed to join the UNE for a short period of combat training out of town.

In the training camp, communist leadership pulled Melich aside for an urgent mission. They sent him to the Spanish border with two days’ rations in a group of about twenty-five. Half were Spanish resistance veterans, the other half were Spanish youths on their first mission.\(^{357}\)


It soon became apparent that the UNE had misrepresented the nature and duration of the mission. Instead of a clandestine sabotage action, Melich and his companions were among a large number of small groups the UNE sent to various points along the border with France to spread out Franco's troops to draw fire away from the invasion of the Val d'Aran.\(^{358}\) It was a suicide mission.\(^{359}\) Melich describes the UNE liaisons disappearing when the Spanish Civil Guards attacked the group.\(^{360}\) Melich and several others were able to escape, and made their way through the mountains back across the border to France. The UNE tracked down several survivors, who they coerced to appear before a communist tribunal. They ended up executing thirteen people involved in this incident for "abandoning their post" in Spain or "treason," including Melich's friend Ramón Mialet and Mialet's brother-in-law.\(^{361}\)

In the window of time between Melich's return to when he was taken for judgment by the communist leadership, he described what happened to Jean Robert, his wartime commander in the *maquis*. Robert pulled strings to obtain official paperwork from the French government documenting Melich's membership in the FFI and granting him French nationality so he could join the 81st Régiment d'Infanterie Alpine to fight the retreating German armies.\(^{362}\) As he was waiting to depart at the train station, two UNE members intercepted him and took him to the communist tribunal. Once there, Melich produced his official documents and said:


\(^{359}\) Groupe Puig Antich, *Les Dossiers noirs*, 137

\(^{360}\) Groupe Puig Antich, *Les Dossiers noirs*, 135

\(^{361}\) Groupe Puig Antich, *Les Dossiers noirs*, 140 and 143.

'Now, I'll tell you one thing. I am a non-commissioned officer in the French army. I came with a mission, under the orders of Commander Jean-Louis. So let's not waste time. My absence could intrigue my superiors. You know, moreover, that relations between your unit and mine (FFI) are not the most cordial.' At that moment, I had the idea to take out my wallet and spread on the table my FFI card, where my 'French' nationality appeared, a mission order, and my license to carry a firearm.\(^{363}\)

This clever appeal to French citizenship and officially recognized membership in the FFI to manoeuvre the UNE captors into behaving like the legitimate arm of the law they claimed to be momentarily disrupted the power dynamic between the communist and anarchist exiles. At the same time, it revealed that despite the UNE’s proximity to the French state, they still understood the limits of whom they could target with retaliatory violence. French citizens were not among permissible targets in this case.

Not only did Melich present his FFI card to the UNE in 1944, he also reproduced it for the readers of Les Dossiers noirs.\(^{364}\) This document was one among numerous examples of the double role of French official documents in this collection of Spanish anarchist accounts. Additional French paperwork included the FFI card of Umberto Marzocchi, a former member of the International Brigades, WWII resister, founder of the postwar antifascist Comité Local Italien, and secretary of l'Internationale des Fédérations Anarchistes.\(^{365}\) A few pages later Benito Sanchez, who had participated in maquis groups led respectively by the UNE and by French communists of the FTP, supplied a copy of his Certificate of Membership in the

\(^{363}\) Groupe Puig Antich, Les Dossiers noirs, 141.
\(^{364}\) Groupe Puig Antich, Les Dossiers noirs, 144.
\(^{365}\) Groupe Puig Antich, Les Dossiers noirs, 104–105.
FTP. This official paperwork was meant to lend credibility to the exile resisters' accounts, and to affirm their own legitimacy as memory actors speaking as witnesses to crimes of the period. French documentation was not the only way contributors built credibility. It was notable that one resister reproduced his membership card in the Durruti Column, which conferred a different sort of status, legible to anarchist readers and sympathizers.

The Puig Antich Group’s accounts portray the state as reticent to characterize the murders taking place in Spanish exile communities as crimes. During several investigations in 1944 and 1945, Les Dossiers noirs reported that the French police attributed the murders to "Spanish score settling." Lucio Arroyo, whose friend Victoriano Vonilla was killed by the UNE alongside Flora's brother and two others, surmised, "I don't think the police conducted a serious investigation at the time. When the mayor of Montfort asked questions, [the police] replied, 'It's a matter between Spaniards..." Years later, the French police returned to question him about the affair. The officer produced the original inquest, in which Arroyo’s suspicions were confirmed. He found it was entirely based on an interview with UNE member Luis Delgado. It was also not until 1953 that French authorities arrested seven Spanish communists for the murders that Melich recounted.

367 See Soo, Routes to Exile, 196-201 for background on how UNE was viewed by the French state.
368 Groupe Puig Antich, Les Dossiers noirs, 161
369 Groupe Puig Antich, Les Dossiers noirs, 154: "Je ne pense pas que la police à cette époque ait fait une enquête sérieuse. Au maire de Montfort qui posait des questions, elle fit cette réponse: 'C'est une affaire entre espagnols'..."
371 Groupe Puig Antich, Les Dossiers noirs, 163-165.
Les Dossiers noirs reproduced several news clippings that detail ways in which the French press fumbled over how the characterize the murders: as political or criminal. One article by André Peyre included a subsection entitled "The Distinction between Politics and Banditry." Peyre wrote that the testimony of the Spanish exiles he interviewed for the article,

... is proof of the fact that if the crimes currently being unmasked by French justice were partly based on political reasons, they are far from garnering the approval of all Spanish emigrants. Just as the distinction is total between the true resistance of French patriots and the camouflaged banditry of certain foreigners, likewise the crimes and plunder of a single faction cannot be attributed to all Spanish republican refugees in our country.

We will see, moreover... that various crimes committed by these bands of guerrillas were often very far from relating to politics, and even less to patriotism.\(^{372}\)

Peyre sets up a series of dichotomies: between the heroic French justice system and resistance on one side and criminal foreigners on the other, between politics and crime, and between patriotism and crime. This press account replicates the classic divisions and prejudices of the official commemorative narrative.

Les Dossiers noirs takes a different approach to theorizing crime and resistance. The editors reject both the "score settling" dismissal of the French police as well as the apolitical-crime-by-unsavory-foreigners framework of some French presses.\(^{373}\) Although the anarchists considered the threats and assassinations to be crimes, they understood the UNE’s actions to stem from a deliberate policy of repressing political opposition, carried out with a "bureaucratic coldness" that

\(^{372}\) Groupe Puig Antich, Les Dossiers noirs, 165.

\(^{373}\) Groupe Puig Antich, Les Dossiers noirs, 204: "Pourtant, la personnalité des disparus ou celle des gens menacés, leur participation à des actes de résistance pour la plupart d'entre-eux, leur appartenance au mouvement ouvrier et au camp anti-fasciste espagnol, sont autant d'éléments qui écartent a priori l'idée que ces assassinats ou menaces puissent être rangés dans une relation de faits à caractère crapuleux ou de simples "règlements de comptes"."
sought to establish Stalinist hegemony.\textsuperscript{374} This was not the opportunism and spontaneity of the \textit{époque sauvage}, but calculated "political barbarism."\textsuperscript{375} At numerous points in the book, the authors take pains to recognize Spanish and French communist contributions to the resistance, but assert that this made the UNE leadership no less guilty. This capacious and overlapping notion of crime and politics represented an important anarchist intervention that rejected the statist foundations of most other commemorative narratives regarding "true" and "fake" resistance.

The transcultural political networks of \textit{Les Dossiers noirs}, CIRA-Marseille, and the \textit{Fédération Anarchiste} had an ambiguous relationship with the French state’s processes of formal recognition for resistance. At times anarchists could use official recognition as a shield against Spanish communist accusations of criminality. In other moments French legal and administrative decisions gave exiled communists more space to politically maneuver, including targeting their enemies on the left for assassination, and greater preference in formal commemoration of the resistance.

As for the status of anarchist memory of crime and resistance in Marseille, the \textit{Dossiers noirs} gestured towards a political and affective constellation that situated Marseille in close relation with southern French centers of Spanish exile activity, and cross-border underground opposition to fascism. There were many instances of this particular configuration of multidirectional memory. For instance, in the 1970s or 1980s, around the time the Puig Antich Group composed \textit{Les Dossiers noirs}, Yves Peirat was being politicized in meetings of Spanish republican

\textsuperscript{374} Groupe Puig Antich, \textit{Les Dossiers noirs}, 204-205.

\textsuperscript{375} Groupe Puig Antich, \textit{Les Dossiers noirs}, 205.
exiles in Marseille that he attended with his grandfather, an exile of the POUM.

Peirat went on to carry out a series of bomb attacks against gathering places of le Pen's Front National in Marseille in the 1990s, in the name of the foreign resistance fighters of the Manouchian Group, the FTP, the International Brigades, and Ibrahim Ali, a seventeen-year-old Comoran youth killed by the FN in 1995. Former FTP member Jacques Jurquet remarked, "I wasn't troubled by this appropriation of the title. When I was in the FTP, I blew up train tracks; it won me medals. Here is the difference: his timing was off."376 This variety of commemorative framing of the long, transnational fight against fascism in Spain and France was of ongoing importance in Marseille, and put the relationship of the French state and Spanish exile factions at the center of disputes about the distinction between crime and resistance.

The *milices socialistes*, the mayor, and the *milieu* of Marseille

In the fall of 1972, *Time* magazine published a sensational feature about the French Connection. "The Milieu of the Corsican Godfathers" alleged that the allegiances mayor Gaston Defferre had formed with members of the Corsican mob during the Second World War in the resistance accounted for why the most prolific heroin traffickers in the world at the time had evaded capture for so long.377 While

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the main thrust of the *faux résistant* accusation was that the resistance served as a
cover for criminality during the war, the international press’ fascination with crime
in Marseille produced the narrative that involvement in the resistance afforded
enough political capital to purchase a reprieve from prosecution long after the
liberation.

It is true that the postwar state decorated many of the characters in the *Time*
story as war heroes. Marcel Francisci and Dominique Venturi held the Croix de
Guerre and both received CVR cards.378 Venturi’s brother Jean was not a successful
applicant, but their uncle, Louis Rossi, was officially recognized as part of the FFI
through the CVR process.379 The postwar bosses Antoine and Barthélémy Guérini
did not receive CVR cards, but two of their brothers did and Barthélémy received a
war medal and several military honors.380

It is hard to track down solid evidence of whether or not the reputations of
these men preceded them into the CVR committees tasked with legitimizing
elements of the wartime underground. If committee members knew the names
Venturi, Rossi, and Guérini, it is even harder to say if that knowledge would result in

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378 Marcel Francisci’s card appears to be filed under Francischi: CVR Dossier for Marcel Francischi,
GR 16 P 232968, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France; CVR Dossier for Dominique
Venturi, GR 16 P588623, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France.
379 CVR Dossier of Jean Venturi, GR 16 P 588625, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France;
and CVR Dossier for Louis Rossi, GR 16 P 520966, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes,
France.
380 CVR Dossier of Pierre Guérini, GR 16 P 275195, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes,
France; and CVR Dossier of Pascal Guérini, GR 16 P 275192, Service historique de la Défense,
Vincennes, France.
a positive or negative outcome in terms of official recognition. Would the pressures of Paris to ensure undiluted patriotic bonafides through the CVR outweigh local inclinations to go along to get along? A clear pattern of acceptance or rejection of the CVR applications is not apparent. Regardless, their applications exposed paradoxes in CVR legitimization schemes, which intended to identify patriotic lawbreakers, like Madeleine Baudoin who stole and killed out of wartime necessity for the resistance, and draw a hard line between them and criminals who may have stolen or killed for other reasons.

Particularly perplexing in terms of the contradictory positions of the state is the case of Barthélémy Guérini, who was active in the resistance and decorated in 1947 with the *croix de guerre* with the Silver Star for his division and the Bronze Star for his brigade and regiment for his participation in the resistance. An unsigned form in his CVR file bearing the seal of the *Milices socialistes* recommended him for the awards in 1947, describing him as:

Magnificently courageous and daring resister and fighter, volunteer for the most dangerous missions. Wounded twice in the course of the battles for the liberation of Marseille, he also served as a model of absolute contempt for danger and a spirit of total abnegation in the street to street fighting against the enemy, entrenched at the Merlan Battery, which gained the admiration of his commanders and his comrades.

Mémé’s wartime activities included attacking and killing *miliciens* and Nazis, and providing a safe refuge for Jewish children. In his CVR application, he mentions having begun distributing clandestine press in 1942, and goes on to discuss working

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381 CVR Dossier of Barthélémy Guérini, GR 16 P 275182, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France.
as a clandestine radio operator, helping members of the Brutus network, and
transporting arms. He does not mention any direct acts of violence against the
occupation forces. The attestation on file from Fernand Trompette, commander of
the groupe Palud, reads almost identically. Trompette adds that Mémé "stood out for
his ardor in combat and his total disregard for danger." Nevertheless, in 1952 the
local committee, then the regional committee three days later, rejected Mémé's CVR
application for failing to produce a medical certificate attesting to the injuries he
sustained in the battles for the liberation of Marseille.

Like several of the cases in chapter two, Mémé found his attempt to gain state
recognition thrown out for lack of the additional paperwork that injury, internment,
and imprisonment called for, despite qualifying for recognition had he not been
shot. A case in point is his brother Pierre, whose application detailed involvement in
the Milices socialistes as well, a shorter period of resistance, a less active role in
several of the same battles, and contained a very similar testimonial letter from
Fernand Trompette. The only major differences were that the committee
processed the application a year earlier and Pierre was not wounded in battle.
Pierre's application was successful. The level of zeal administrators showed in terms
of rejecting claims for missing medical paperwork seemed to vary widely, although
it is difficult to say which was exceptional: when they were lax or when they were
punctilious.

383 "[Illegible] de notre organisation [des?] janvier 1944, que [illegible] ses appartenues pour
effectuer les liaisons radiographique avec les alliés. [Illegible] de [illegible] les agents de transmission
du réseau "Brutus." [Illegible] le logement et le ravitaillement d'Israelites traqués pour les allemands.
Participe début 1944 a des transports d'armes depuis nos terrains de parachutage jusqu'a notre
dépôt du jardin zoologique."
384 CVR Dossier of Pierre Guérini, GR 16 P 275 195, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes,
France.
Antoine Guérini’s involvement with the resistance and occupying authorities was far more ambiguous. Historian Simon Kitson writes that Mémé’s older brother "had kept his bars and night-clubs open during the war and had entertained German and collaborationist clients, generally carrying on business as usual, although at the same time sheltering British airmen." 385 In spite of this, he too was recommended for military honors, although the notes regarding his service to the resistance were considerably less effusive than those regarding his younger brother. 386 Antoine’s application was missing from his CVR dossier at Vincennes, but like Mémé, administrators denied him formal recognition.

Although the CVR committees only recognized half of them, the Venturis, Rossi, and the Guérinis had all been involved with the SFIO-linked Milices socialistes during the war to varying degrees. Gaston Defferre, who went on to serve as mayor of Marseille for three decades as well as numerous important Cabinet positions, was a leader in this network. Although the international press accounts made much of the resistance connections of the mayor and the milieu, like the Time article, this narrative began the story in the middle of the second act. In reality it was not particularly odd or uniquely sinister that Defferre and his resistance group recruited these men, who were mostly involved in fairly banal economies of gambling and prostitution until the postwar period. The connections between Defferre and the Corsican milieu stretched back to the pre-war period when Defferre worked as a lawyer and occupied minor roles in the SFIO. The Guérinis, for example, along with

385 Kitson, “Rehabilitation and Frustration,” 635.
386 CVR Dossier of Antoine Guérini, GR 16 P 275181, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France.
the Renucci brothers had served as electoral agents for Henry Tasso and the SFIO in the 1930s.\footnote{Kitson, "Rehabilitation and Frustration," 634.} During the interwar period, it was common for politicians in Marseille to hire men who had some experience in street fights to hang election posters, etc. Despite Marseille’s infamy for violent electoral contests, these practices were by no means exclusive among large French cities, or Mediterranean port cities, or cities in republics around the world at the time.

Due to Marseille’s reputation for crime and corruption, press accounts often adopted a conspiracist tone to understand these groupings. This perspective assumes that the state is a just entity that has been corrupted by bad actors. Reality was much more mundane. States enter into periodic association with non-state actors to carry out a variety of activities as part of their regular function. A similar logic undergirded the entire CVR project, which embraced the actions of ordinary people as the state’s work of national defense. (The only difference was that the CVR attempted to create this link after the fact through commemoration.) Any favors or protection from criminal prosecution afforded to the \textit{milieu} in Marseille can better be understood in terms of the preferential treatment given to any lucrative business until it comes in direct conflict with state interests.\footnote{See, for instance, the Portland Business Alliance’s relationship with the city of Portland, Oregon and its community courts.}

The \textit{Milices socialistes} included a large number of police officers as well, for whom more direct links to postwar good fortune was evident. Among them was Horace Manicacci, a MS leader who was married to the Guérini’s sister, Restitude,
and who was the president of the police purge commission in the postwar. Kitson noted that several police resisters selected code names like "l’incorruptible" and "le pur," which he read as suggestive of "a reaction against the corrupt image of the Marseille police in the 1930s and the hope that out of resistance would come a new clean police force." The reality of the shared histories of the police, the mob, and the mayor through the socialist party, was not uniquely Marseillaise, although Marseille’s reputation for corruption was uniquely terrible.

Edouard Rimbaud was at the convergence of all of these tropes: he was a former corrupt cop and a sometimes resister, who had a postwar link to the French Connection. In his remarkably sexist memoir, he described robbing Chinese merchants’ stock of black market penicillin to try his own fortune on the black market during the war. While a friend in the resistance tapped him to do reconnaissance work for the Allies, Rimbaud described himself as assenting because he was an adventurer, who nonetheless remained devoid of antifascist and patriotic sentiments beyond his sense of wounded masculinity at the sight of German soldiers with French women. He recounted with ironic humor an episode when he left the Marseille police force after the war and his colleagues toasted to him as a war hero. This literary self-presentation as an anti-heroic trickster did not stop him

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389 Kitson, *Police and Politics in Marseille*, 42.
390 Kitson, "Rehabilitation and Frustration," 635.
392 Rimbaud, *Doudou*, 46 and 50.
393 Rimbaud, *Doudou*, 65.
from seeking and obtaining a CVR card, formally recognizing membership in the
FFC. In 1969, police arrested him in New York with twenty-two kilos of heroin.
Rimbaud turned state's witness and lived the rest of his life in the witness
protection program in the United States, where he wrote his memoir. His account is
interesting in that while he freely admits to behaving as a stereotypical faux
résistant, there is no evidence that others accused him of such.

Many others engaged in underground work that interacted in some way with
the underworld without facing postwar accusations of fake resistance. Even
Marseille's most famous wartime hero, New Jersey journalist Varian Fry, and his
colleagues at the Emergency Rescue Committee/Centre Américain de Secours, forged
a connection to organized crime in 1940. This connection allowed them to
illegally obtain the gold necessary to fund the escape of roughly two thousand
avant-garde artists and thinkers who were being sought by the Nazis.

Despite its outsized reputation, Marseille is not alone in wrestling with
histories of this kind. Jo Attia, the infamous lieutenant of Pierre "le Fou" Loutrel in
Paris, survived Mauthausen and controversially received his CVR card on his
deathbed in the 1970s as the international press debated the La French-Resistance
connection. Indeed, people dipped their toes in both the economic underworld
and the anti-Occupation underground in many places other than Marseille. The
difference, perhaps, was that the illicit economies for which Marseille came to be
known were core elements of the city's reputation. What is more, these economies

394 CVR Dossier of Édouard Rimbaud, GR 16 P 5 11684, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes, France.
395 Varian Fry, Surrender on Demand (Boulder: Johnson Books, 1997), 45.
tapped into deeply entrenched cultural anxieties, like the French fear of interracial sex through prostitution, or drugs from Turkey and Afghanistan injected into the (white) body (politic), garnering more existentially threatening and salacious reputations than, say, gambling or robbing jewelry stores. The latter did not elicit the same nationalist panic that demanded a commemorative reckoning with the resistance record of an entire city.

The Corsican milieu represents some of the most sensationalized and stereotypical narratives about Marseille. However, the state’s recognition of several prominent figures as resisters either through the CVR, war medals, or both, exposes how slippery the commemorative distinction was between crime and resistance despite administrative efforts to render it simple and legible through the bureaucratic medium. The Guérinis, Venturis, Rimbaud, and Rossi also undermined official commemorative attempts to present patriotic service to the state as the overriding ethos of resistance during the Second World War. Their life stories showed that involvement in the wartime underground did not necessarily make one a model citizen in the postwar.

Conclusion

Jean-Pierre Melville’s resistance film *L’armée des ombres* was re-released in 2006. At the time, the dominant narrative among critics attributed the initial poor reception in 1969 by evoking the *Cahiers du cinéma* dismissal of the piece as a “gaullist film” in the wake of a decade of mass rebellions against De Gaulle’s

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ruthlessness in the Algerian War and his conservative metropolitan politics.\textsuperscript{398}

Mentioned far less frequently, however, was how audiences reacted negatively to what they perceived as the disturbing lack of distinction between crime and heroism in the film that broke down the national myth.\textsuperscript{399} Melville directed gangster films. He recorded* The Army of Shadows* in the same aesthetic language. The leading actor was Lino Ventura, who was Angelo Fraiser, Roger the Catalan, Abel Davos, and Gu Minda, not a national hero. One of the most memorable scenes takes place in Marseille, where three agonized resisters improvise a garrote from a tea towel and strangle to death a member of their cell who betrayed them. To acknowledge the discomfort that this slippage between crime and resistance provoked in France in the late '60s, and the physical place of Marseille as a metonym for this grey area as the French Connection and its resistance affiliations were increasingly discussed in the press, would be to complicate the primacy of the gaullist-communist divide as the main driver of postwar contested memory. The communists and the gaullists were not at odds in all commemorative battles. They engaged in a shared project, albeit on different terms, of articulating a commemorative narrative of the resistance that could be definitively separated from ordinary crime.

The takeaway from these struggles to differentiate crime and resistance for the official commemorative record should be that state security concerns bend the


\textsuperscript{399} Vincent Guigueno, "Le visage de l'histoire: 'L'Armée des ombres' et la figuration de la résistance au cinéma," in *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire* no. 72 (December 2001): 84. Pierre Ferjac's review in *Cols bleus: hebdomadaire de la Marine française* (October 18, 1969), 29, also hints at this uncomfortably antiheroic treatment (the first word in the review is "RUTHLESS," but the review concludes positively.
narrative around its values in ways that often appear invisible. However, approaching questions about crime and the resistance from the perspective of trying to understand what makes underground work vulnerable to repression—rather than what makes the state vulnerable to disorderly elements—resulted in very different commemorative narratives, as we can see from the Puig Antich Group's *Les Dossiers noirs*. Social movements challenge the statist orientation of official narratives by approaching memory from the vantage point of continued struggle for freedom, while the state often formulated memory in terms of national unity and counterinsurgency. Instead of pretending that bad actors and resisters were discrete categories, decentering the state project instead raises different questions. How did organized crime make resistance possible in some ways, as was the case with Varian Fry, and vulnerable in others? What role would political orientation play in an ethnography of the mob? Can the construction of narratives to rehabilitate the so-called "Army of Crime" and the "Capital of Crime" be understood as parallel processes?

The “Army of Crime” indeed played a major role in the Mediterranean port city, but the bulk of postwar intellectual energy seems to have been spent defining and marginalizing the supposed criminals, rather than interrogating how the category of “crime” functioned in commemorative disputes. During and after the war, narrative uses of “crime” sought to establish separate categories for the virtuous and the villainous, often along chauvinistic or ideological lines. Uses of the language of lawbreaking helped define the values of the interlocutors in relation to the values of the present, and were a meaningful indicator of how official mnemonic
culture took shape. Perhaps most importantly, “crime” shows us conceptual sites ripe for inquiry, points the way to simplistically masked histories of complex individuals, and marks the ground where historians should begin digging.
CHAPTER FIVE
Uncharted Trajectories of Memory from Below

All cities are palimpsests of real and diverse experiences and memories. They comprise a great variety of spatial practices, including architecture and planning, administration and business, labor and leisure, politics, culture, and everyday life... An urban imaginary marks first and foremost the way city dwellers imagine their own city as the place of everyday life, the site of inspiring traditions and continuities as well as the scene of histories of destruction, crime, and conflicts of all kinds... An urban imaginary is the cognitive and somatic image which we carry within us of the places where we live, work, and play. It is an embodied material fact. Urban imaginaries are thus part of any city’s reality, rather than being only figments of the imagination. What we think about a city and how we perceive it informs the ways we act in it.\footnote{Andreas Huyssen, \textit{Other Cities, Other Worlds: Urban Imaginaries in a Globalizing Age} (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009), 3.}

—Andreas Huyssen

On May 10, 2019, I stood in the courtyard of an apartment building in the North African neighborhood of Belsunce, Marseille, with an international group of about fifteen adults of various ages. We were listening to the \textit{Ancrages} team led by Samia Chabani discuss local sites related to the Algerian War as part of a "patrimonial walking tour" entitled, "\textit{Marseille, de capitale coloniale à la ville-monde, quels héritages?}"\footnote{"Balades patrimoniales," AncrAges, accessed February 25, 2021, \url{https://ancrages.org/mediation-culturelle/balades-patrimoniales/balade-patrimoniale-marseille-de-capitale-coloniale-a-ville-monde-quels-heritages/}.} The tour guides began speaking about a former World War II resister who should be familiar by now: Madeleine Baudoin.

Chabani spoke of Baudoin in a context that the postwar state preferred to repress. As Baudoin gathered oral histories from her World War II era comrades in the late 1950s and early '60s, she had immersed herself in another underground struggle. This time in solidarity with the Algerian independence movement. She understood her role in arming the FLN to oppose the French occupation of Algeria as the logical continuation of her opposition of the Nazi occupation of France during...
the Second World War. Instead of characterizing the WWII resistance as representative of the "true France" like the CVR attempted to do by assimilating the memory of select resisters into the story of the nation’s military, historian Martin Evans noted that for Baudoin,

The Resistance experience made her very cynical about French society. Right up to the Liberation, she remembered, the mass of French people were either Pétainist or chose to wait on events. Real Resistance, she went on to explain, was antifascist; a small minority, fighting international fascism, with little or no support from the rest of the populace.402

Baudoin framed her political engagement in both conflicts in international terms. She located the battle lines along ideological, rather than national, borders. The internal geography of Baudoin’s story of her role in World War II and the Algerian War created the conditions of possibility for the most optimistic outcome of what Michael Rothberg called "multidirectional memory," in which the entangled memory of two times and places serves as "a spur to unexpected acts of empathy and solidarity" and "the very grounds on which people construct and act upon visions of justice."403 AncrAges was one among several organizations in Marseille promoting these multidirectional values in challenging official commemoration of the resistance. This chapter explores the memory work of three local associations to understand how the spatial frame and political message of the mnemonic narrative were knitted together, and its implications for producing urban imaginaries of Marseille.

The organizations in this chapter require characterization beyond "grassroots." As we will see below, though they adopt varying degrees of independence from and confrontation with state narratives, they do not represent a kind of purely autonomous communal remembrance. Associational activities in France are organized from the ground up, but are not wholly separate from the state. Associations are legally defined entities that must officially register with the government and must include certain office-holders such as treasurer and secretary. Like 501(c)3s in the United States, associations may not earn profits. To form an official association in France, one enters into what is essentially a legal agreement with the state to obey the laws in effect, and to identify individuals legally responsible for the association should any laws be violated: "Title I of the law establishes the freedom of association, while specifying, however, that the integrity of the national territory and the republican form of government cannot be called into question without resulting in dissolution."\textsuperscript{404} Associational life thus exists in an ambiguous zone between their possible use as a vehicle for social control by institutional powers and as more potentially subversive bodies to promote collective expression.\textsuperscript{405} Their commemorative interventions regarding the resistance are an important site of inquiry into grassroots urban imaginaries, as well as the ways in which municipal authorities began to selectively assimilate these


\textsuperscript{405} See Martine Barthélemy, \textit{Associations : un nouvel âge de la participation?} (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2000).
narratives as Marseille underwent neoliberal rebranding. Would this prove to be James C. Scott’s métis in action? Or another form of "social straightjacketing?"406

The state conceives of associations as a circumscribed right with very specific connotations. The French government page for the history of "association" as a legal category is both grandiose and spectacularly ahistorical in its description. It reads, "Men and women have always needed to associate. Thus, we find in Egypt at the time of the construction of the pyramids, structures that can be considered as the ancestors of mutual aid associations."407 Already, the web page is off to a bad start with its equation of slave labor to construct monumental emblems of imperial power with mutual aid. The page goes on to describe the birthdate of official associations in France as 1901.408 What it does not say is that the law of 1901 came on the heels of post-Paris Commune laws of the 1890s to ban associations de malfaiteurs, targeting the free expression and association of anarchists. After heavy juridical repression underwritten by what were called the Lois scélérates, anarchist presses began to abandon illegalist lines in their articles.409 The 1901 law of associations then demarcated what sort of collective expression was legitimate, acceptable, and above repression.

There was, however, a more practical side to registering as a formal association. These bodies receive certain tax breaks for donations, can open a bank

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account, can apply for special grants, and can be an employer. While these economic incentives open the possibility of "political patronage," it would be going too far to suggest that associations must necessarily be in lockstep with the state. There still exists a dynamic tension between political conflict and integration. And sometimes people simply do not obey the law. As we will see below, particularly in the case of the Centre International de Recherches sur l'Anarchisme (CIRA), the legal prohibition on critiques of national territorial integrity and French republicanism appear to have little effect on their anti-national commemoration of the resistance.

However at the same time, the institutionalization of collective affiliation in the form of associations make them well positioned as a conduit between grassroots and state forms of commemoration. They are in the beginning stages of making these narratives legible for the state. While the first postwar decades were marked by the consolidation of exclusionary official narratives, the state's selective recognition of heterogeneous resistances in recent decades has demonstrated that certain kinds of commemorative plurality do not represent the same threat they once did. State and municipal cooption of grassroots narratives has proven remarkable nimble, multiplying the ways in which the resistance could be deployed in the present to retain power and national coherence. Historian Jennifer L. Allen had written about the trend which has been accelerating since the 1980s, as it applied to physical monuments and memorials,

States and nongovernmental organizations... have co-opted decentralized grassroots commemorative forms for use from above. Many have remained

mum on the inspiration for this stylistic shift. Whether they consciously imitated alternative memorials, however, seems immaterial. More important is their apparent willingness to amend their respective memory landscapes in ways that imitate designs and agendas produced from below, rather than the other way around.411

This is a particularly important consideration in a city like Marseille, so much of whose resistance memory proved inassimilable to French patrimony for so long.

**The Emergence of the Tourist City**

So how and why did certain grassroots narratives come to resonate with state officials, while others were never taken up? Part of this has to do with what memory scholar Andreas Huyssen talked about in terms of "urban imaginaries." For much of Marseille’s history, the very elements that CVR laws saw as expressions of anti-republican "particularity" and tried to excise from resistance memory were also at the core of urban imaginaries of Marseille. Starting in the 1990s, municipal government began to advance what AncrAges critiqued as an aestheticized and folkloric urban imaginary of Marseille’s ethnic "particularity" as part of its tourist brand.412 The result has been the musealization of living cultures in Marseille paired with the marginalization of the people producing that culture.

In the 1960s in Marseille, challenges to national myths regarding the Second World War began to coalesce thanks, in part, to anti-colonial organizing and a new generation’s workers movement. By the 1980s, distinct local commemorative

narratives regarding the war and resistance that pulled Marseille out of a purely national frame had expanded, and continued to do so in the following decades. So too did the commemorative conduits for articulating these narratives, particularly in the form of civic associations. These groups promoted, in particular, the memory of non-French European exiles in Marseille. During these decades, the city endured economic hard times, xenophobic violence, and an intensifying drug trade that might seem out of step with its flourishing grassroots memory culture. However, these very conditions made it easier to discard official narratives that bore little resemblance to the realities of life at the time.

During the period covered in this chapter, Marseille underwent tremendous changes, particularly in terms of how the state and investors viewed its pluralistic culture. This had significant ramifications for the reception of grassroots countermemory. The 1960s saw a large number of Algerians and pied-noirs migrate to the city at the end of the Algerian war.413 By the time they arrived, the Defferre system had become fully entrenched in Marseille and the collapsing port industries were replaced by petroleum-based industries requiring less labor. As proximity to the Old Port became less and less essential for the city’s working class with industry shifting to the northern ports, which handled petrochemicals, the city intensified its efforts to make the central neighborhoods cater more toward professional classes. The ’70s and ’80s saw rapid economic immiseration and a growing reputation for

crime and corruption.\textsuperscript{414} Media attention focused on the French Connection. The National Front, whose numbers included many pied-noirs that settled in the region with Algerian independence, established a strong and persistent foothold in the region. Disinvestment in the city made it ripe for property speculation, which accelerated in the 1990s and has massively transformed the city in the thirty years since.

From the 1990s to the present, Marseille's reputation underwent a massive transformation. Its many diasporas began to be hailed as a selling point for the city. As activist and writer Alessi dell'Umbria noted, "For most of the 20th century, Marseille was ill-thought of in France because of its 'métissage', its ethno-cultural mixing. More recently it became fashionable for the same reason—there has even been talk of a 'melting-pot à la marseillaise'."\textsuperscript{415} While the memory projects I will discuss below are emerging from an explicitly internationalist, anti-state, or at least pro-immigrant and working class politic, there is a persistent risk that they will be coopted by the neoliberal capitalist vision of the Marseille brand.

The commodification of Marseille's trans-Mediterranean and pluralistic culture means that a commemorative space has opened up in the city’s institutions for the selective assimilation of grassroots memory of the resistance. A good example of this would be the "Ici-même" project directed by historian Robert Mencherini that the city funded in conjunction with Marseille's anointment as a European Union "Capital of Culture" in 2013. The project involved spray-painting

\textsuperscript{414} Maha Messaoudene, \textit{Reconstruire des logements sociaux à Marseille : réactivité social et enjeu résidentiel} (Paris: Connaissances et Savoirs, 2016), 32.

short World War II histories on the ground, in the sites where the events had occurred. The selected sites were mostly concentrated in the central zones of Marseille. The public was invited to participate. In conjunction with the public program, the city and department co-sponsored several publications featuring these histories—which highlighted many previously glossed-over themes such as the contributions of foreign antifascists, local antisemite operations, and to a lesser extent colonial troops—that are sold at the city’s history museum. Mencherini has done excellent commemorative and historical work over the years, including providing the historical context for a 2004 documentary on the factory collectivizations of 1944 to 1948, however the Capital of Culture programming provided "Ici-même" with not only a major local platform but also an international audience for new articulations of official culture in Marseille.

Although the "Ici-même" project itself offers a form of commemorative repair for long-marginalized memories, it also fits into a larger project that uses culture—in this case cultural memory—to transform cities in ways that are often unwelcome to inhabitants. Locals adopted a variety of attitudes to the Capital of Culture programming, from embracing the In (official programming), to developing the Off (alternative programming that adopted an institutional approach as well), to responses that were "neither In nor Off but blatantly 'at war' with the notion of

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Particularly culture as a vehicle for exclusionary economic renewal. This neoliberal catering to tourists has gone hand in hand with the musealization of Marseille's diasporas. Although neoliberalism is definitely not the framework the particular memory activists in this chapter themselves would use to interpret their stories, it has provided a lens, albeit a distorted one, through which to read certain previously illegible aspects of the city's non-national heritagescape.

In Marseille the main thrust of the Capital of Culture programming, and indeed much of the twenty-first century redevelopment schemes, is geared toward touristification over gentrification, though gentrification is not absent. The difference is crucial for understanding the recent commemorative aperture for certain kinds of previously discarded memories of resistance. Relevant to the kinds of narratives that have found new purchase in Marseille is the work of sociologist Jorge Sequera and urban geographer Jordi Nofre, who have dug deeper into the production of the "Tourist City" than existing scholarship grounded in a "double dichotomy" of speculation-expulsion and gentrification-displacement. Instead, Sequera and Nofre describe displacement in a "Tourist City" geared toward upper-middle class tourists as the result of a process that favors "consumption of selective, really 'authentic' unspoiled places."

The type of authenticity that elite tourists increasingly seek out today in Marseille does not mirror exactly the consumption habits of local economic elites, who were championed by Defferre. Thus the

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420 Sequera and Nofre, Shaken, not stirred," 851.
touristification of Marseille might have more to do with shifting commemorative
narratives than the gentrification of Marseille (which might have resulted in local
elites redoubling the effort to bring local commemoration in line with national
commemoration). Elite tourists seek out difference, and not just any difference (an
avatar of authenticity), but difference that is fit to be consumed. Dell’Umbria’s
"melting pot a la Marseillaise" is an attractive product for tourists who care little for
the "French soul" of the resistance, but countermemory that emphasizes
revolutionary politics does not sell. This is, perhaps, part of the reason why the
national boundaries of official narratives about the resistance in Marseille have
begun to break down, at least locally, to a greater extent than the ideological
boundaries—specifically revolutionary anticapitalism, anarchism, and antifascism
continue to be subsumed to patriotic explanatory models. It also speaks to a global
trend in political realignment whereby neoliberalism is becoming attached to
"diversity" and populism is becoming attached to nationalism and xenophobia in the
upper echelons of electoral politics, with effects that resonate outwards into what
once might be seen as extremely strange bedfellows of social movements (like the
Yellow Vests). Internationalist visions of economic justice are increasingly marginal
in mass politics and this orientation of resistance memory has yet to be adopted by
the city.

This chapter analyzes three examples of resistance memory from below to
understand the varied shapes of local commemoration in relation to the statist
frame and neoliberal redevelopment of Marseille. Commemorative narratives
included citizens and non-citizens, wartime trajectories that crossed national
borders, and political solidarities that were defined by sometimes international, sometimes diasporic, and sometimes outright anti-national ideals, rather than the reductionist patriotism of the CVR formulation. These forms of commemoration were part of different urban imaginaries, that respectively see the city as a node in non-national anarchist networks, the site of transnational antifascist cooperation, and a microcosm of France’s pluralistic patrimony.

CIRA-Marseille

The Centre International de Recherches sur l’Anarchisme is an archive, lending library, bookstore, and gathering space with branches in Lausanne, Marseille, and Tokyo. René Bianco, a teacher and anarchist, co-founded CIRA-Marseille in 1965. Bianco was born in Marseille in the fall of 1941 to a working-class family. He became active in the local multigenerational anarchist milieu that included several World War II resisters, his seniors, and children of the Spanish Civil War exile, his juniors. These made up the early members of CIRA. In the 1970s, anarchist resister André Arru took a more active role in the research center, as did veteran Mujeres Libres secretary, Spanish exile, and resister Pepita Carpeña who became involved through one of CIRA’s numerous projects to promote the memory of twentieth-century anarchists in antifascist struggle. Particularly in the 1980s, CIRA articulated a plural narrative of the World War II resistance that placed it in the context of ongoing underground anarchist activity in opposition to fascism, hierarchy, and coercion in myriad forms. CIRA’s commemorative activities

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regarding the resistance were diverse. The collective conserved wartime anarchist propaganda, hosted public events, and published or promoted biographies and memoirs. Above all, the annual CIRA Bulletin became a conduit of oral history of this fight.

At the end of the war, anarchists in France and beyond were preoccupied with the future of resistance memory. Transnational dialogues unpacked some of the commemorative concerns that were beginning to unfold. For instance, in 1947 the New York-based anarchist monthly Resistance summarized an article in the French weekly, Le Libertaire, by anarchist former resister René Vivier as follows:

Vivier reflected on the betrayal of the resistance by those "in whose mouths the word liberty had quite a different sound, masking other appetites and unavowed intentions." Among them were the black market profiteers, chauvinistic fanatics, zealous party propagandists, mere adventurers, "the whole gamut of 'patriotism'." These gentry, for the most part, had joined the resistance at the last hour when the leaders of the official movements set up recruiting bureaus where "all could have their names inscribed in proper fashion," ready to swarm into positions held by the tottering Petain bunch.423

This interpretation of events saw the official myth of resistance that was developing as a way for opportunistic state-builders to accumulate political capital. It reprised some narratives about "fake" resistance in an anarchist key. Instead of seeing the "fake" resistance as anti-social outsiders, this analysis positioned them as political insiders. Many anarchists remembered their participation in the resistance in the same ideological framework in which this excerpt was rooted: as necessarily both antifascist and against nationalism of all kinds.

Decimated European anarchist movements slowly recomposed themselves in a political climate in which political parties and states laid claim to the legacy of antifascism. Many of the people and records that could document anarchist history from the ground-up had not survived the war. To remedy this, in 1948 Parisian anarchist bookseller André Prudhommeaux, who edited *Le Libertaire* in which Vivier’s article appeared, called for "Archives of Anarchy." Prudhommeaux wrote,

> Periods of war and reaction bring the massive, often absurd destruction of all the subversive literature accumulated over the centuries, including manuscripts of unpublished works, precious letters, etc. Anything that is not destroyed by the adversary is destroyed, as a "precautionary measure," by militants, sympathizers, overzealous friends, etc.\(^{424}\)

An excerpt of this article is how CIRA chose to contextualize their founding on its 40th anniversary in 2005. It created a mnemonic link between the destruction of the physical material of anarchist memory in World War II and the creation of the postwar anarchist archive twenty years later.

CIRA was one among numerous anarchist archival and library projects to emerge from the milieu whose political education was marked by the Spanish Civil War and WWII-era antifascist resistance, and that still exist today. Notable examples include the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam whose major collections were rescued from Europe's rising dictatorships, CIRA-Geneva (Prudhommeaux helped drive the truck collecting documents and books over the Franco-Swiss border with volunteer in the Durruti Column, WWII resister, and anti-colonial activist André Bössinger in 1957),\(^ {425}\) the Biblioteca Social Reconstruir in


\(^{425}\) André Bössinger, *Souvenirs d'un rebelle: 60 ans de lutte d'un libertaire jurassien* (Lausanne: Canevas Éditeur, 1998), 93.
Mexico City founded by Spanish Civil War exile Ricardo Mestre, and the Kate Sharpley Library which included several volunteers who were involved in Spanish exile solidarity networks and was originally located in the squatted 121 Centre in Brixton. These projects had widely varying politics, from the institutional and state-aligned approach of the IISH for which anarchism was the object of study more than an influence on their archival practices, to the militant resistance to state cooptation of the BSR and KSL. CIRA’s politics could be located somewhere in between: the center filed official paperwork with the French government to become a formal association and donated materials to the departmental archives of Bouches-du-Rhône for safekeeping at various points when their location was not secure, but its everyday practices and donation-based budget more closely resembled those of the BSR and KSL than the IISH.426

These organizations sought to broaden access to the living culture of remembrance of anarchist movements. However, the Kate Sharpley Library identified a central paradox of this project, of which Prudhommeaux had been considerably more optimistic:

There should be a very old saying along these lines: "only historians and policemen love people who keep note books" and herein lies the problem for all well-meaning anarchist historians. Anarchists by the very nature of their social philosophy are in permanent opposition to the state, and therefore the object of continuing surveillance. Keeping diaries, notes-books and journals may make fascinating reading for future generations but they can cause great problems for the living.427

427 Col Longmore, "Some notes on the founding of the Kate Sharpley Library," KSL: Bulletin of the Kate Sharpley Library no. 40 (November 2004).
In this sense, anarchists found a somewhat unique opportunity in World War II memory. Although sharing their experiences publicly was not without risk, particularly to those still active in criminalized political organizing, the postwar French state suspended moral, and more importantly criminal, judgment on underground opposition to the regime during the four years between 1940 and 1944. Anarchists might not be celebrated as heroes of the resistance, but they were unlikely to be imprisoned for crimes that were unambiguously carried out in its service.

The irony of a temporary period of state-sanctioned lawbreaking did not escape anarchists in France. Anarchist commentators pressed on the contradictions of state memory of World War II resistance from the earliest days after the liberation, arguing that the bourgeoisie "did the best it could to glorify the making and use of explosives, to invoke sabotage as a sacred right, but reserved it to a given historical period," going on to say that by this logic, class warfare using the same tactics could be understood as a right, and that if the resistance was any example, that laws could not stop working class militancy from happening.\footnote{"A bas les lois scélérates," \textit{Le Libertaire} 7 (July 1945), 1, accessed February 25, 2021, https://archivesautonomies.org/IMG/pdf/anarchismes/apres-1944/lelibertaire/libertaire007.pdf.} It was fear of these implications of uncontrolled commemoration of the resistance that ran between the lines of the CVR legal code. Although discussion of the resistance in this style was not rare, few anarchists publically shared more personal recollections of their role in the resistance until decades later.

CIRA became a productive "social framework" within which to develop wartime memories, which Saulière and Carpeña, along with other collective
members, began to disseminate in the 1980s. Between May 1983 and February 1989, four issues of the CIRA Bulletin included testimonies of anarchists in World War II resistance movements, mostly in the French Midi. One of these issues exclusively featured the testimonies of Spanish anarchists, compiled with the assistance of Spanish exile historian Antonio Telléz Solà, who also worked on the Dossiers noirs five years before.⁴²⁹ CIRA’s memory work promoted expansive, alternative commemorative narratives of resistance, even as it grappled with the anarchists’ ambivalent attitude toward World War II. These issues of the Bulletin faced the challenge of squaring anarchist politics of the war years with postwar heroic narratives of the resistance, and are notable for a conspicuous absence of contributions from and consideration of Jews in discussions of fascism and antifascism, except on rare occasion. Part of this owed to the geographic scope of CIRA’s communities, which were politicized by Italian and Spanish fascisms rather than central European Nazism. The personal recollections shared in the Bulletin often imported analysis of the dynamics of Mussolini’s Italy and Franco’s Spain—in which they saw antisemitism as present but not central—into their accounts of German-occupied France. However the silences regarding Vichy’s anti-Jewish laws and deportations targeting Jews allowed for some Bulletin contributors to dismiss the importance of the resistance to a greater degree than they otherwise might.⁴³⁰

CIRA's memory work in the 1980s does not attempt to erase the unease with which many anarchists participated in the resistance, or the fact that some militants entered into a period of relative inaction during this time. Instead, the Bulletin takes as a starting point that anarchist organizing, in all its forms, was resistance to fascism, even when it was not geared toward national liberation for a return to republican rule. As René Bianco said, the point of sharing these memories was to disrupt any attempt to offer a singular commemorative narrative of the period, and, he emphasized, "NOT TO JUDGE." At the same time, the last three issues of the '80s indicated a desire to affirm the overlooked contributions of anarchists to the resistance in World War II, even as they reframed the resistance as not essentially French and part of a longer, transnational struggle against Franco as much as it was against Vichy.

The first of the CIRA Bulletins dealing with the period 1939 to 1945 addressed the war years only peripherally. Bulletin 19-20 of 1983 included the unpublished memoirs of Martial Desmoulins. Written in 1967, Desmoulins reflected with "one foot in the grave" on a life of militancy that he believed had brought the Midi no closer to "true socialism." His pessimism, rooted in an understanding of the anarchist movement's peak before the world wars, stood in stark contrast to the triumphant official resistance narrative.

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The resistance occupied a space of mere sentences, in passing references to the fates of other anarchists and in a biographical footnote by René Bianco, in an account that began in 1914 and ended in 1939. Desmoulins devoted the bulk of the manuscript to describing a transnational anarchist milieu in Marseille that coalesced into the Groupe Action Libertaire in the interwar period (not to be confused with the older militants of the Groupe Action Anarchiste). Thirty to forty anarchists from Italy, Spain, and France would meet every Sunday morning in the Bar Provence on the Cours Lieutaud. Eventually, this group became the Fédération Anarchiste, which included autonomous Spanish and Italian sections, which defined themselves linguistically more than nationally. While Desmoulins guarded a strict silence over his own actions in the war, he briefly described several of the interwar federation members’ participation in resistance activities. Towards the end of the Bulletin, in Bianco’s biographical footnote, the reader learns that Desmoulins had been involved in the underground press, syndicalist organizing, and that he helped roughly a dozen comrades get out of the Sisteron camp during the war. While the CIRA Bulletin 19-20 only nibbled around the edges of resistance memory, it established the transnational political context in Marseille for subsequent issues that directly addressed the war years.

The following year, CIRA’s commemorative work dealing with the resistance began to unfold in earnest in response to the emerging historiography of anarchism.

434 "Souvenirs, ou la fin d’une vie par Martial Desmoulins," CIRA Bulletin 19-20, 9, 14, and 52.
and the resistance.\footnote{"Les Anarchistes et la résistance," CIRA Bulletin 21-22 (1984), 30-31, CIRA Archives, Marseille, France.} After the 1983 issue dedicated to Desmoulins, Bulletin 21-22 of the summer of 1984 focused on André Arru’s account of his Marseillaise resistance group and his war experiences. The editors characterize the period in anarchist history as "little known and, above all, rarely studied."\footnote{"Les Anarchistes et la résistance," CIRA Bulletin 21-22, np.} They go on to describe how CIRA’s attempts to encourage anarchists who lived through the \textit{années noires} to share their recollections had met with limited success up to that point. Thus, the editors explained, "we publish today in hopes that this contribution will provoke reactions, give rise to other testimonies, provoke additional research perhaps..."\footnote{"Les Anarchistes et la résistance," CIRA Bulletin 21-22, np.} This logic ran parallel to the historiographical motivations of CIRA for taking up the theme in the first place, despite the reluctance of many people in the movement. The commemorative account in the pages that followed was shaped positively by Madeleine Baudoin’s recent PhD dissertation, and in critical reaction to the work on French anarchism published in the mid-’70s by historians Jean Rabaut and Jean Maitron.\footnote{"Les Anarchistes et la résistance," CIRA Bulletin 21-22, 29-31.} A historiographical note followed Arru’s account. In it, the editors publish excerpts of Rabaut and Maitron’s work, and a heated correspondence between Arru and Rabaut. This correspondence showcases Arru’s attempt to confront Rabaut over a serious misquote of one of the leaflets Arru distributed during the war. Rabaut indicates that Arru opposed Nazism and Jews, when Arru’s leaflet took aim at Nazism and Stalinism; Rabaut confused the “five pointed star” of the Soviet Union with the Star of David.\footnote{"Les Anarchistes et la résistance," CIRA Bulletin 21-22, 29.} At the end of the Bulletin,
the editors once again solicited testimony from any anarchists active during the period from 1939 to 1945.

CIRA's scheme of provoking its World War II generation readers to remember was a resounding success. Bulletin number 23-25 of 1985 included recollections by or about 167 anarchists. Many more were mentioned within the individual accounts and in the press clippings that CIRA reproduced in this issue. René Bianco included several of the testimonies from his research for his masters' thesis in history in the mid-1960s. Many others, however, were the fruit of CIRA's commemorative efforts through their recent issues of the Bulletin.

As in the previous issue, Bianco's editorial note introducing the volume began its commemorative work by documenting the many absences in the narrative. First, he expressed his wishes that he could document the entire European anarchist movement from 1939 to 1945, but leaves it to the CIRA-Geneva branch to "approach the issue from a more international angle." Nevertheless, while the testimonies focus on the war years in France, the anarchists that Bianco interviewed were from numerous different countries and their narratives were internationalist in their message and transnational in scope. Second, Bianco explained the irretrievable absences within the France-based testimonies. He describes CIRA-Marseille relying on personal networks to write every anarchist resister that they knew and whose address they had, but that "Many letters were returned to us with the notice, 'No longer at this address...' or, more sadly: 'Deceased.'" He goes on to describe that of the letters reaching their recipients, several anarchist former resisters never

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responded, others had ceased political activity or no longer considered themselves anarchists, and that many more could not participate due to the fragile state of their health which made writing difficult. He added that CIRA lacked the funds to send a member to record their testimonies in person.

Most fascinatingly, Bianco also includes excerpts from two letters of anarchist resisters who chose not to participate for other reasons. One wrote, "I absolutely do not want to be in the next newsletter... because, you see, I truly hate to be put in the spotlight... Anonymous work as a team, always. I'll stick to it until I die. I'm counting on you to respect these wishes." Another respondent who Bianco mentions had "suffered terribly during this period," wrote, "What good would it do to send you a story about a small piece of my life? Without a doubt it would interest no one... Why have me remember, one again, that which I would like to forget?"

By documenting the diverse reasons for silences alongside the commemorative narratives themselves, Bianco’s project gives substance to commemorative absences. Whether it was political opposition to what some anarchists saw as the glory-seeking résistancialisme of the postwar period or desires to avoid reliving past trauma, the explicit discussion of commemorative processes in the introduction to this volume is evidence of anarchist opposition to totalizing memory practices. This approach to resistance memory departed dramatically from the CVR, which sought to produce official memory and obscure official silences.

Bianco’s invitation of dialogue with readers of the Bulletin, followed by the publication of highlights from that dialogue, was a second significant departure from

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state-produced memory practices. Usually the reception of commemorative narratives is notoriously difficult to track, but in the Bulletin it was not only plain, but also suggested a greater degree horizontal cooperation that openly rejected the idea of a master commemorative narrative. Bulletin 23-25 reproduced six pages of articles from anarchist presses and letters reacting to the previous issue. Many of these letters continued to critique French historiographical treatment of the anarchist movement.

Third, the anarchist emplotment of their war experiences presents an ideological fight against fascism and state communism, rather than a patriotic struggle for the soul of the French nation. Bianco included a timeline before the testimonies, beginning with the assassination of Buenaventura Durruti in November 1936 in Spain, and ending with Voline’s death in Paris on September 1945 followed by the congress of the Fédération Anarchiste a few weeks later in December.

446 Bianco wrote, "Tout au long de ce dossier, nous nous sommes également efforcés d'éviter toute 'glorification'. Ce qui nous intéressait c'était de pouvoir raconter et, si possible expliquer, et NON DE JUGER. ... Si les comportements on été si variés, c'est sans doute qu'il n'y a pas de 'vérité anarchiste', chaque individu devant se forger, jour après jour, son propre 'credo' et adopter devant tel ou tel évènement l'attitude qu'il juge le plus en accord avec sa conscience." "Les Anarchistes dans la résistance, Volume 2," CIRA Bulletin 23-25, 3.

447 CIRA's selection of these events as chronological bookends is significant. Durruti's mysterious death in Madrid has been the subject of debate in anarchist circles since 1936. The official story was that a nationalist sniper fired into Durruti's car from a distant window in the Clinical Hospital. However, the powder burns on the anarchist's jacket and an autopsy concluded that he was shot at point blank range, resulting in wide-ranging theories, from speculation about a tragic misfire of a companion's "Naranjero" to a targeted assassination by a Stalinist agent. The U.K. anarchist publisher, Christie Books, released a book devoted to theories on Durruti's death about ten years before this issue of the CIRA Bulletin. Regardless of CIRA's specific camp on the matter, Durruti was an important symbol of the anarchist revolution unfolding within the Spanish Civil War. After his death, the numerically inferior Stalinist camp began to gain ground. The war within a war they waged against anarchists culminated in the May Days in Barcelona, just six months later. Bianco's selection of Durruti's death to open his chronology, rather than the beginning of the Spanish Civil War or the far-Right street demonstrations of February 6, 1934 in Paris or the birth of grassroots antifascism in Italy for example, suggests both the central importance of Spain in anarchist memory and the multiple fronts of anarchist struggle.
figures were important symbols of antifascist currents that opposed both fascism and state communism. In this vein, most of the testimonies describe several decades of anarchist organizing, often traversing geopolitical borders, of which 1940-'44 figured as a small, and often less active, chapter. In fact, not all go into substantive detail regarding their participation in wartime resistance, if any, similar to Martial Desmoulins’s reticence.

The final issue of the Bulletin corresponding to CIRA’s resistance memory boom of the 1980s continued to challenge the chronological and spatial boundaries of official narratives and rejected the patriotic framework for understanding underground movements during the war. CIRA Bulletin 29-30 focused on the Spanish exile in France and North Africa from 1939 to 1945. The resistance occupied one chapter of a volume that also featured testimony, documents, and photographs from the French camps in the metropole and North Africa, the CTE and GTE, and the Leclerc Division. Bulletin 29-30 was a collective effort between CIRA members and non-members who were part of the Spanish exile diaspora, notably anarchist historian Antonio Tellez Solà.

In his introductory remarks, Tellez situates the Bulletin as responding to what he saw as a crisis in historiographical misrepresentation and erasure that

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Voline was another important figure that represented antifascist opposition to both fascism and authoritarian communism. Voline was a Russian Jewish revolutionary who took part in the revolution of 1905, helped create the first St. Petersburg Soviet and endured a double political exile in France, then the United States, before returning to Russia during the revolution of 1917. His gravitation toward anarchism and support for the Makhnovists in Ukraine ran afoul of the regime, which imprisoned him numerous times. The state agreed to release him from prison—along with ten others—after an international campaign, under the condition that he would be banished from the USSR for life. His exile began again, this time in Germany, which he soon fled for France. He settled in Marseille during the war years, destitute and in very fragile health, where he befriended André Arru.
would soon be exacerbated by the loss of aging Spanish exiles who could offer alternative accounts. Tellez instructs the reader,

Let us take, for example, the Robert Aron’s "material" on the resistance: 722 pages of dense text and the author found a way to devote two measly lines to the Spaniards, and what lines they were! 'In the south, on the other hand, there were turbulent spots. Spanish brigades committed a number of excesses there.' If that could be written in 1959, what might one say when memory fades?448

Aron’s emphasis on the "crimes" of the resistance, and his claim that resisters had executed thirty to forty thousand people, had been widely cited in the earlier historiography.449 By the time of the Bulletin’s publication in 1989, this narrative faced many historiographical challenges. It is also true that Tellez himself had provided detail regarding the "excesses" of the Unión Nacional Española in the Dossiers noirs several years before, as discussed in the previous chapter. However he was also quick to affirm then, and in the current volume, that Spanish exiles of many different political tendencies made substantial contributions to resistance efforts in France. Rather, his objection was to the still-entrenched tendency to homogenize the resistance as the sum of French efforts, and the Spanish contribution as limited to internecine frictions. He spoke as both a witness and a historian when he wrote, "Those who lived through these historical events and see how the era is presented today would think they were dreaming. Not a single image of FOREIGNERS is evoked. The magic of editing!"450 Tellez goes on to evoke Spanish

participation in the liberation of Auch, Foix, Toulouse, Limoges, Mende, Ales, Nîmes, Valence, Rodez, Albi, Clermont-Ferrand, Royan, Point-de-Grave, and Marseille to drive his point home.\footnote{451}

As in the \textit{Dossiers noirs}, French official paperwork played an ambivalent legitimizing role in this issue of the Bulletin, alongside a scathing critique of the state’s narrative of the resistance. For instance, Tellez shared an image of his FFI card,\footnote{452} included a transcription of the text of FFI certifications from French commanders for Ramón "Caraquemada" Vila Capdevila,\footnote{453} and devoted a full page to photocopies of the posthumous honors bestowed upon Francisco Ponzan Vidal from the governments of the United States, England, and France.\footnote{454}

As in the previous Bulletin, the collection of testimonies and documents is also prefaced with a chronology. However, the starting and end points differed from the previous issue, suggesting a specific chapter marked by events as viewed from within the Spanish anarchist exile community. This chronology began with the entrance of Franco’s troops into Barcelona on January 26, 1939. It goes on to feature numerous events in Marseille, including the December 1943 national conference of the anarcho-syndicalist Movimiento Libertario Español and exiled members of the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (MLE-CNT) and the September 1944 release of the first issue of \textit{Ruta} by the Juventudes Libertarias/Jeunesses Libertaires (JJLL), part of the larger anarcho-syndicalist Federación Ibérica de Juventudes Libertarias

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{451}"Les espagnols dans la tourmente, 1939-1945," CIRA Bulletin 29-30, 7.}  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{452}"Les espagnols dans la tourmente, 1939-1945," CIRA Bulletin 29-30, 125.}  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{453}"Les espagnols dans la tourmente, 1939-1945," CIRA Bulletin 29-30, 155.}  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{454}"Les espagnols dans la tourmente, 1939-1945," CIRA Bulletin 29-30, 149."}
Francisco Botey Badosa, a young Spanish exile from Barcelona and member of the JJLL, formed part of the editorial committee of *Ruta*. He shared a political biography of many who were associated with CIRA in the 1980s. During the war, Botey was closely associated with Italian antifascists in Marseille, including Fioro del Conte and Tony Peduto of the Italian section of the Fédération Anarchiste, and participated in the work of the international resistance cell of André Arru. After the war he joined the Fédération Anarchiste—of which Tellez and the Groupe Puig Antich were also members—and became involved with CIRA in the 1960s. The Bulletin’s chronology ends in November 1945 with the schism of the MLE-CNT in exile into two principal tendencies, a seismic event that shaped postwar anarchist exile political organizing and memory.

In a later subsection tracing the reorganization of the CNT in exile during the occupation to its split in 1945, Marseille emerges as an important node in the resistance to Vichy and Franco, secondary only to Toulouse and Perpignan. It was the site where some of the significant disputes precipitating the split took place. After the German invasion, CNT militants including Lucio Gomez, Francisco Huguet, José Saez, and Antonio Alorda reconstituted a committee of former CNT members in 1941 in Marseille with that served as a coordinating hub for Spanish anarcho-syndicalists across the French Midi until summer of 1942. That December they...
hosted the MLE-CNT conference that Tellez mentioned in the chronology, taking up the contentious question of how to understand the political implications of the war. Spanish anarchists were divided over this question, similarly to their French counterparts. Some considered the war to be a capitalist or imperialist conflict that they should not involve themselves in. Others considered it best to commit to resistance, even if they found themselves fighting alongside people they would normally consider to be political enemies, because fascism posed the greater risk. Adherents to the first line of thinking included the committees from Bordeaux and Béziers in attendance, who proposed a motion for militants, "in the event of a struggle between the French resistance fighters and the Germans, to camouflage themselves within the civilian population."\textsuperscript{459} The opposing motion ended up being more popular at the Marseille conference, which recommended, "it is up to all the CNT and MLE militants to join the French resistance rather than let ourselves be taken to Germany."\textsuperscript{460} Those active in Marseille, who were later affiliated with \textit{Ruta} and CIRA, were more sympathetic to the first line of thinking, as was Tellez. However, it is important to remember that this milieu in Marseille was a heterogeneous and often uneasy mix of pacifists, syndicalists, individualists, and anarcho-communists who, though dubious of the Allies and attempts by aspiring politicians to manage the underground resistance, nevertheless included many dedicated, lifelong militants who would not remain on the sidelines of the war. Several of this group found a way to take action in the local resistance in line with their principles and were enthusiastic about grassroots militant antifascism. They

stopped short of full-throated endorsement of the Allied war effort. It is difficult to overstate the sense of betrayal behind this cynicism regarding antifascist credentials that many Spanish exiles harbored toward the Allies, whose policy of non-intervention in Spain, and blind eye to violations of non-intervention pacts on the part of Italy and Germany, resulted in Franco’s victory.461

By the end of World War II, the split that began to open with CNT members' entrance into the Republican government of Spain in 1936, and intensified in the exile, was definitive. The CNT was operating clandestinely in Spain, and the exiles organizing across the border to support it were divided. The Marseille group called their opposites "collaborationists." This side, which became the "official" exile conduit to the clandestine CNT in Spain under Federica Montseny and Germinal Esgleas, in turn issued communiqués recommending against reading Ruta and Impulso, which was published by the FAI in Toulouse, calling these two publications "private initiatives" that did not represent official positions.462 In addition to Ruta, the Bulletin notes two other anarchist exile publications in Marseille that emerged from Spanish circles after the liberation. Geronimo Rodriguez edited Acción Libertaria, a regional organ of the MLE in France, from 1944 to 1946.463 Acracio Bartolome edited Hoy from 1945 to 1949.464

These issues of the Bulletin did not attempt to paper over the significant political disputes anarchists had with each other, or the divergent ways in which

they remembered their wartime resistance, *attentisme*, or somewhere in between.

The documents in these Bulletins indicate the limits of unifying national myths from the earliest postwar period. While countermemory in the form of detailed personal testimony of anarchists was slower to follow the general critiques of state narratives, when it emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s it was rooted in transnational communities and disseminated through the CIRA Bulletin and reproduction of these texts in anarchist newspapers. CIRA-Marseille made the city an important node in anarchist resistance memory more broadly, inflecting it with the local composition of a milieu that included many Spanish and Italian exiles. The memory they promoted was plural not totalizing, international and anti-national, part of a long tradition of struggle, and concerned with laying bare the process of its own formulation.

### Le Amicale du Groupe Marat

The *Amicale du Groupe Marat* is a local association dedicated to resistance memory in Marseille that was founded in 1998 by historians and former resisters, particularly those associated with the non-French fighters of the communist FTP-MOI. The association has promoted the memory of foreign resisters and colonial soldiers through the production of documentaries, photo installations in public places around Marseille, public events in the region, and exhibitions and lectures at local lycées. Many "friends of" organizations sprung up in postwar France as a place for people who shared certain politics or experiences of the war to gather. As years went on, these associations increasingly shifted their focus to promoting the
memory of specific resistance organizations and survivors from particular camps. Like CIRA, the *Groupe Marat* envisions a form of resistance memory that is not bound by geopolitical borders and emphasizes the contributions of ordinary people who endured repression and erasure by French Republican governments.

The association took its name from a Marseille section of the FTP-MOI, the *compagnie Marat*. The FTP-MOI of Marseille included a large number of communist veterans of the Spanish Civil War, particularly international volunteers. For instance, Teresa Noce (codename Estella) was a founding member of the Italian Communist Party, volunteered in Spain where she edited the Italian-language newspaper *Il volontario della libertà*, and joined the exile to France. The Third Republic interned her in the Rieucros Camp, later transferring her to Marseille to await immigration, whereupon she served as the MOI delegate for the Southern Zone until her arrest and deportation to Ravensbruck in 1943.⁴⁶⁵ Former volunteers of the International Brigades who fought in Marseille’s FTP-MOI included Basil Serban (codename Abel or Jeannot) and Mihail Florscu (Georges) from Romania, Apolonio de Carvalho (Apo) from Brazil, Ilio Barontini (Job) from Italy, Ljubomir Ilic and Vlajko Begovic (Stéphanovic) from Yugoslavia, and Norbert Kugler from Germany, among others.⁴⁶⁶ Although Spain appears occasionally as part of the biographies of resisters in the *Groupe Marat*’s commemorative activities, it does not take on the same central importance as it does in CIRA’s narratives. The difference

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has to do with the center of gravity of each group’s transnational approach. For CIRA, transnationalism includes the multiple territories of a long antifascist struggle as well as the origins of their protagonists. By contrast, the Groupe Marat’s transnationalism emphasizes a pluralistic resistance milieu fighting on French soil.

Other members of the FTP-MOI did not trace their political histories to Spain, including Julia Pirotte, an exiled Jewish communist and photojournalist from Poland, who took iconic photographs of the liberation of Marseille. Her haunting image of a fellow member of the compagnie Marat, Sarkis Bedoukian from Armenia, hours before he was killed in the assault on the Prefecture would become one of the most famous photographs of the war in Marseille. Bedoukian appears in the foreground of an unnamed street in the battle for the liberation of Marseille, his lips pressed tightly together and a rifle in his hands, while fellow resister Vassilas Stamboulis from Greece adopts the same pose in the background. Pirotte’s photographs of the resistance would be the subject of a short documentary that the Groupe Marat would promote in the 1990s.

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467 Also lost in the commemorative concern for rendering the FTP-MOI as French in their battle for the Prefecture is discussion of how it fit into a larger communist strategy of gaining power and legitimacy by gaining control of Vichy's paperwork. Alexandra Steinlight discusses the bureaucratic and "future-historical" dimensions of these events, "In several departments, but particularly in the former "free zone," the [communist] CDL prevented the government’s anointed prefects from assuming their duties. They did so by occupying prefectures before the arrival of Gaullist officials, often gaining access to the archives of the police in the process. Such documents would prove essential—and dangerous—during the early and more uncontrolled stages of the purge, when local notables and resisters still commanded considerable clout. These battles for sovereignty and legitimacy are reflected in the archives, and they took place over the archives. Indeed, the Gaullists and their opponents came to acknowledge a critical truth, one that the experience of the Occupation had sharpened: functionaries cannot administer the state if they do not control its files." Steinlight, "The Liberation of Paper," 303-304.

The postwar afterlives of Julia Pirotte's photography parallel the commemorative trajectory of the FTP-MOI of Marseille. In the early years after the war, newspapers printed her photographs while obscuring the nationality of the resisters they featured. On August 25, 1944, La Marseillaise published Pirotte's photo of Bedoukian and Stamboulis on the front page as part a triptych entitled "The Capture of the Prefecture of Marseille." Although Pirotte is cited by name, the individual fighters are not. Instead, editors labeled them as men of the FTP, which allows for the possibility that these men were French, when an FTP-MOI label would mark them as immigrants. The newspaper's framing of the protagonists as French is even more clear in the second photo, which depicts several FTP-MOI resisters holding a French flag with the caption, "Patriots manifest their joy..." The newspaper's gesture toward a homogenous resistance echoed the state's discursive moves to render colonial troops as French while denying them equal rights as full citizens. The French framing was also reminiscent of the manner in which the Spanish exiles that dominated "La Nueve," the Ninth Company of Leclerc's Second Armored Division that played a prominent role in the liberation of Paris, were popularly remembered as French. This was in spite of the names these veterans painted in bold letters on their half-tracks and other military vehicles recalling battles of the Spanish Civil War, like "Madrid," "Guernica," "Teruel," "Ebro," "Brunete," "Guadalajara," and "Belchite." As it would happen, La Nueve's half-

track named by the French, "Don Quichotte," more closely resembled the fates of exiles' and refugees' early efforts to assert that the resistance was not only French. It was not only major newspapers that adopted a national and patriotic frame, but often French Communist Party narratives as well, whose "ostentatious patriotism" promoted a "desire for integration that made it inappropriate to highlight [a resister's] status as foreign." In this vein, the French communist newspaper *Combattre* published forty-two of Pirotte's photos of the insurrection in Marseille in August 1945, presenting a "people's war" narrative of the liberation that captioned all the liberators as French. While widespread French narratives were happy to make foreign fighters an avatar of the nation, the state would not forget their legal status so easily when they came face to face with its administrative arm seeking recognition and citizenship. For instance, FTP-MOI veteran Galiano Zara remembered that he felt "more French than the French" to frame his unhappy surprise that he had to pay for his naturalization and "overcome so many difficulties to obtain his CVR card." It would take almost five decades for Pirotte's photographs to resurface. Individuals who would go on to form the *Groupe Marat* would help with some of the early promotion of her work and her resistance, this time in a transnational frame that highlighted the varied origins of the FTP-MOI.

Grégoire Georges-Picot, historian and cofounder of the *Groupe Marat*, began his commemorative activities years before the group formed. His earliest project on the *Groupe Marat* website is his aforementioned 1992 short film that featured Julia

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Pirotte's work, entitled *21 août, 21 images.* On the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the German occupation two years later in 1994, he created a longer documentary, *La libération de Marseille,* which used archival footage as well as several testimonies of FTP-MOI members and colonial soldiers who participated in the liberation. This film told a story from below and the margins, decentering metropolitan forces on what was an important national anniversary. That year, as a result of the efforts of artists, curators, and memory activists like Georges-Picot to draw attention to Pirotte's work leading up to the fiftieth anniversary of the liberation, the city of Marseille decided to create an exhibition that included her photographs at city hall as part of its official commemorative activities. The city's promotion of Pirotte's work marked the beginnings of a shift in official commemoration, as the participation of foreigners in the resistance no longer represented the threat, or at least the same degree of threat, that it once did to French pride and national cohesion. On the local level, it also corresponded to officials' gradual embrace of Marseille's plural image, if not its plural communities.

Georges-Picot co-founded the *Groupe Marat* in 1998, and documentary film screenings in local cafes and high schools became an important part of their memory work. The association screened several of Georges-Picot's earlier films focusing on immigrant resisters in the decades that followed. Venues were as diverse as activist-oriented cafes and working-class high schools. The association also created several additional documentaries, this time shifting their focus to the

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Army of Africa in the liberation of Marseille. These films included _Opération Dragoon_ in 2003, _Baroud d'honneur_ in 2006 billed as a "road film" that followed the trajectory of two Moroccan soldiers, and _Soldats de la plus grande France_ in 2009 based on testimonies of colonial veterans.476

This collection of documentaries became a point of departure for the _Groupe Marat_'s commemorative work, with ongoing significance tied to social environments in Marseille. It was not a matter of creating and releasing a film, only to quickly move on to creation and promotion of the next film. Rather, the association presented the documentaries again and again, almost always accompanied by a discussion with the audience and directors. Clément Taich, son of local FTP-MOI resister Hélène Taich, presides over the association and brings this intimate connection to their public programming. Sometimes surviving local veterans of the FTP-MOI join for a panel discussion as well. Often the screenings formed a part of a larger commemorative program of events that made use of multiple forms of media and invited multigenerational participation.477 The films themselves are hard to find online. Instead, they are meant to be part of a shared, participatory experience.

476 _Opération Dragoon_, directed by Grégoire Georges-Picot (Marseille, France: Le groupe Marat, 2003); _Baroud d'honneur_, directed by Grégoire Georges-Picot and Moustapha Delleci (Marseille, France: Zeugma films, Cityzen TV, 2006); and _Soldats de la plus grande France_, directed by Grégoire Georges-Picot and Claire Reinhart (Marseille, France: Le groupe Marat, 2009).

The *Groupe Marat* developed two major exhibitions that could be restaged multiple times, "Nos libérateurs" and "Les visages de la Libération." The association initially installed "Nos libérateurs" in the Vieux Port metro station. The exhibit included a series of large panels featuring photographs, excerpts from testimonies, and interpretive texts that "paid homage" to those who fought in the liberation of Marseille. The installation was a very rare example of the contributions of colonial soldiers and members of the interior resistance being portrayed as fully entangled. The exhibition enjoyed wide accolades, and the *Groupe Marat* was invited to stage it at the *Musée d’Art de Toulon* for several months from 2003 to 2004. "Nos libérateurs" also traveled to Dakar in 2004, Paris in 2005, and Nancy in 2007, among other settings. It is remarkable that this commemorative work, relating to a hyper-local history, would resonate with so many different locales. Like the tongue-in-cheek title of Alèssi Dell’Umbria’s book, it presented a "universal history of Marseille." This mnemonic approach rejected the invisible norms of French universalism and instead did not shy away from what might be seen as "difference," or "particularism," but for most people in Marseille reflected the human composition of daily life.

The exhibit entitled "Les visages de la Libération" adopted the same aesthetic and pluralistic approach and applied it to a broader history. The story it told tracked two narrative threads: a repression characterized in terms of its xenophobic elements on one side, and a transnational, racially and religiously diverse resistance on the other. The exhibition included photographs and texts that began with the internment camps for "undesirable" and "suspect" foreigners in Provence under the
Third Republic.\textsuperscript{478} It moved on to portray the Free French in the Pacific islands, Syria, and Morocco, before returning to life under Vichy and the emerging resistance in Provence.

A quotation from Franz Fanon’s \textit{Wretched of the Earth} frames the narrative turning point from life under the occupation to the advance of Allied and resistance forces:

\begin{quote}
Not long ago, Nazism transformed the whole of Europe into a veritable colony… The struggle that a people undertakes for liberation drives them, according to circumstance, to either reject or explode the supposed truths that colonial civil administration, military occupation, and economic exploitation installed in their consciousness. And, only struggle can truly exorcise those lies about man that devalue and literally maim the most conscious among us.\textsuperscript{479}
\end{quote}

The \textit{Groupe Marat} uses the opportunity to offer not only a philosophical meditation, but also to introduce Fanon as a historical figure who was a part of the story. An interpretive caption under a photograph of Antillean Free French volunteers places Fanon, the resister, in Saint-Tropez as a participant in the liberation of Provence, who went on to be injured in battle at the Vosges. The caption also notes his role in Algerian decolonization struggles. This approach epitomizes multi-directional memory, situating anti-Nazi struggle in World War II as part of a longer history of struggle against dehumanizing regimes. This instance both thinks back on World War II with Fanon the theorist and forward to the Algerian War with Fanon the historical figure. "Les visages de la Libération" showed for two months at the \textit{Musée}

\begin{footnotes}
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d’histoire de Fontaine de Vaucluse in 2015. The association also installed it at local high schools in Marseille.

Although the Groupe Marat engages in many participatory, innovative commemorative activities, it also performs more traditional forms of remembrance. For instance, on February 21, 2021, in collaboration with the Marseillaise association AncrAges (discussed below), members of the group participated in a wreath-laying ceremony in front of the memorial to Missak Manouchian in the Pharo neighborhood, overlooking the mouth of the Vieux Port, to commemorate the anniversary of his execution. The visual components of the ceremony shared a common language with most public rituals of World War II remembrance in France: a wreath, several French flags, a local official, a survivor or their descendant, and local commemorative association members. The memory activists in attendance set themselves apart from this schema, however, in drawing a connection between Manouchian’s execution by the Nazis and the murder of Ibrahim Ali in Marseille by poster-hangers for the National Front on the same day, 51 years later.480 Clément Taich concluded the ceremony, "If we forget them, their struggle is lost."481

The association’s mnemonic messaging rejects the bounded, national framework of official narratives. Their recognition of the varied origins and motivations of people who participated in the war effort connects to a broader politics that embraces Marseille as a working-class, immigrant city. However, the Groupe Marat does not entirely dispense with the patriotism of official

481 Thomas, "A la mémoire de Manouchian."
commemoration. Rather than emphasizing the Frenchness of the resistance to promote an exclusionary vision of the nation, the association emphasizes the foreign status and political ideas of many resisters and liberators to put forth an inclusive vision for France. They model this inclusion in their choice of settings and media for their commemorative work.

**AncrAges**

In 2000, Mohamed Chabani, Samia Chabani, Kamal Dachar, and Mourad Madjoubi founded the association *AncrAges* in Marseille. turnout In the twenty years since, the association has engaged in a variety of commemorative and educational activities highlighting Marseille's immigrant diasporas, particularly from former French colonies in Africa and the Caribbean. *AncrAges* established a research center, recorded oral histories for its archive, holds regular walking tours on a variety of themes, teaches classes for people who recently arrived in France, conducts educational programs in schools, and holds lectures. In 2007, the association created a website hosting free educational content, and in 2010 expanded their web presence on to Facebook and Twitter. Historian Sophie Gebeil characterizes the association's commemorative activities as constituting a "counter-patrimony." Rather than confronting the idea of a national patrimony, this work seeks to reform the scope of the stories France tells about its past to be more pluralistic.

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*AncrAges* does not limit itself to World War II memory, but has offered several contributions in this arena that exemplify its counter-patrimonial approach. Most notably, in 2006 Samia Chabani released the short documentary film "Les soldats inconnus," featuring oral histories of World War II veterans from Algeria and Morocco. Chabani invited historian Belkacem Recham to contextualize the oral histories and Sonacotra social housing caseworker Stéphanie Launaro to describe the postwar economic situation of the veterans, particularly in light of the differential pension regime resulting from "crystallization" legislation.\(^484\) The documentary combined advocacy for surviving veterans from the former empire with a commemorative corrective to the exclusions of official memory. As Chabani said, "there are some episodes that should not fall into oblivion."\(^485\)

The film emerged at the crest of the wave of grassroots pressure against the state's discriminatory treatment of colonial World War II veterans that had been building since the 1990s. *AncrAges*' timed the release of the documentary to coincide with the debut of Rachid Bouchareb's feature film *Indigènes* (released in English as *Days of Glory*). *Indigènes* drew a substantial amount of attention to the commemorative and economic marginalization of the Army of Africa. Jacques Chirac credited his decision to embark on the final legislative stages of pension decrystallization to his response to a private screening of the film; he timed his


announcement with the theatrical release of the film. This storybook version of French politics asserts a kind of innocence on the part of government leaders. It suggests that the spell could be broken by the right argument, beautifully presented, and removes power from the equation. Chirac's was an interesting political maneuver that recognized the fictionalized product of the auteur while sideling the importance of the many years of activism of the veterans themselves as well as the collective organizing of the filmmakers. Indeed, the *Groupe Marat* released their documentary *Baroud d’honneur* the same year, also featuring testimony from Maghrebi World War II veterans. These films were not simply cultural artifacts, but part of larger campaigns to confront France's colonial legacy; for example, Bouchareb launched an education tour that followed the military route of his characters.

Bouchareb described his hope that the film would assert a place for North African soldiers as part of French national identity. In an interview, he elaborated, "These kids from the *banlieue*, having reexamined this history, are going to get back the pride and dignity. And [the rest of the] French will see why these people are just as French as they are." As in official narratives, participation in the war effort against the World War II occupation is conjured as a powerful sign of national belonging. However, Bouchareb does not broach the issue of if these soldiers wanted to be French. While the film does not suppress historic racist discrimination, its impulses toward union and reconciliation under the mantle of pluralistic French

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national pride glosses over the fact that the characters’ countries of origin ultimately chose independence. This tension between victimization and heroism, between exploitation and free choice, and—if the postwar, pro-colonial counterinsurgency deployments of some of these same soldiers is taken into account—between liberators and perpetrators, is at the heart of the difficulty of disentangling the politics of the colonial soldier as an abstract symbol.

Although Chabani and Bouchareb shared several commemorative goals related to an expansive notion of national inclusion, *Les soldats inconnus* takes a different approach. While *Indigènes* leaves the characters while they are still in Europe, *Les soldats inconnus* tracks the lives of Mohamed Zennaf, Bouchaïb Boumahdi, and El Ouam Hoummane from their recruitment, or conscription, through the war to their postwar lives. Zennaf, conscripted by force into the Seventh Regiment of Algerian *Tirailleurs*, the same unit fictionalized in *Indigènes*, remembers his struggles upon demobilization,

> It was utter misery... When I returned home I found that the situation was very difficult; there was no work. I went to town, I questioned the functionary, I said to him, "Look, I have two children, a girl, a boy. There is no work. I am looking for work. I'm not looking to take refuge behind a desk. Give me a mason’s job, I'll break rocks or cut wood." He replied, "At the moment this would be difficult." "So what can I say to you, if I ask you to help me immigrate to France," "Ah, hmm, leave for France? No. To go there now is much more complicated because the French have priority. You, you are from here, those from the metropole have priority..." I responded, "To die, we are equal, but today they are worth more than me?" ... I returned on May 6, 1946. I remember it, at 10 am I was in La Joliette in Marseille.\textsuperscript{488}

*AncrAges* thus sketches a narrative of continuing discrimination that complicates overly simple narratives of heroism and reconciliation. However, at the same time,

\textsuperscript{488} *Les soldats inconnus*, directed by Samia Chabani (Marseille, France: Association Ancrages, 2007), 8:55’ - 10:48’.
Zennaf suggests the power of invoking the memory of World War II sacrifice to shame French officials, and ultimately achieve his goal. Hoummane attaches very different meaning to his presence in France,

[To be in Morocco] would be better than here. If they give me my due at home, it is better. I am only here in spite of myself. I am 80 years old, I am losing my sight, what can I cook? What can I do? I have nothing to do here... We feel like we are imprisoned. What can I tell you, I pray to God that they will let us go.\footnote{Les soldats inconnus, Chabani, 12:42'-13:23'}

For him, France does not represent economic opportunity, but rather an economic snare. By "crystallizing" pensions, in this view, the French state locked colonial soldiers in an ongoing relationship of colonial dominance of which they would prefer to be free. Both of these narratives of protracted struggle underscore the impossibility of assimilating the memory of colonial soldiers absent a reckoning of neo-colonial structures. However, Chabani's approach to the subject was not necessarily at odds with Bouchareb's. Indeed AncrAges participated in Bouchareb's education tour stop in Marseille.

\textit{AncrAges} critiques municipal narratives and French patrimony, but does not set itself in opposition to them. The organization is happy to partner with and derive legitimacy from state institutions such as Mucem and the \textit{Musée d'histoire de l'immigration}, which "approaches immigration as a shared experience."\footnote{Gebeil, "La patrimonialisation numérique des mémoires de l'immigration maghrébine en France," np.} Indeed, in February 2021, Chabani joined the scientific committee chaired by historian Pascal Blanchard to compile a list of 315 historical figures to present to the government for

\footnote{Les soldats inconnus, Chabani, 12:42'-13:23'.}
consideration in the renaming of local streets.\textsuperscript{491} The association provides a platform for a heterogeneous set of politics, welcoming anti-authoritarian author Bruno le Dantec one week, and Deputy Mayor and municipal councilman Ahmed Heddadi the next.\textsuperscript{492} In short, AncrAges works as a civic partner, rather than producer of a counter-city.

The association's commemorative work sets it apart from the persistent neo-colonial attitudes of the French state's brand of universalism. Instead, AncrAges' approach to memory—in narrative content and social dimensions of diffusion—holds many commonalities with the Groupe Marat, with whom they partner on occasion. Their work differs from CIRA in that their goals are ultimately to reform the boundaries of French patrimony to be more inclusive, rather than to use memory to challenge the foundations of the nation-state.

\section*{Conclusion}

When I first travelled to Marseille in 2015, efforts to make Marseille's reputation as a "global city" synonymous with transnational tourism as opposed to transnational immigration were accelerating rapidly. As part of the campaign promoting its new routes to southern France, Eurostar was running an ad on the English language SNCF page that described Marseille as London's new suburb, a patronizing reduction of the city to a possession of English tourists. (The reverse

\textsuperscript{491} Béatrice Bouniol, "Paulette Nardal, Slimane Azem, Do-Hûu Vi... Ils sont venus de loin et ont fait la France," \textit{La Croix} (February 12, 2021), accessed February 28, 2021, https://www.la-croix.com/France/Paulette-Nardal-Slimane-Hazem-Do-Huu-Vi-sont-venus-loin-fait-France-2021-02-12-1201140298?fbclid=IwAR0lTkMpV1J1_RiAS4el-vV9uGUx1oH3ve8AMF7AuWoXgqxyD1MljTlgc8.

\textsuperscript{492} Bruno le Dantec, \textit{La ville-sans-nom: Marseille dans la bouche de ceux qui l'assassinent} (Marseille: Chien rouge, 2007).
was never true: no ads appeared in French describing London as Marseille's newest suburb.

While promoters of this type of global "Tourist City" exist in Marseille—the developers building a luxury hotel in the working class west African neighborhood of Noailles immediately come to mind—the city has a long history as an example of an alternative, working class global city. This was the ville-monde of the AncrAges walking tour: popular and immigrant.

However, the popular and immigrant imaginary of Marseille represents a malleable commemorative politics. This imaginary can help form what memory scholar Ann Rigney identified as the memory of hope. Both CIRA and the Groupe Marat engage in this orientation of commemoration when they act as transmitters for stories of liberatory internationalist solidarities. Their work, especially that of CIRA, is more concerned with disseminating a radical political inheritance for activists of the present, constructed from below, than consolidating the state or producing national exclusions. On the other hand, a popular and immigrant imaginary can be deployed to expand the stories and actors who are included in the

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nation. The *Groupe Marat* and *Ancrapes* are concerned with orienting (or provincializing) the nation in relation to Marseille in this way, rather than defining Marseille in accordance to the nation. These efforts toward commemorative inclusion can sometimes be taken up by institutional "culture" projects to produce new forms of exclusion through neoliberal development. None of this work fits cleanly into a dichotomy of resistant versus assimilationist, and each carries with it different risks of cooptation.
Epilogue

My final PhD research trip to Marseille took place over the summer of 2019. I retraced my steps to the studio on rue de la Loubière in La Plaine where I had stayed in 2015 when I was first getting to know the city. A massive crack split the masonry above the front door, spiderwebbing out above the second story windows. I wondered if the neighbor from that floor four years before remained, who called me, a visitor, *ma petite fille*, but would remain stone-faced when she saw my Algerian-French friend who actually had been living in the unit above hers for over a year. Red metal beams now supported the front windows where her laundry used to flutter like banners in the wind. My eyes travelled upwards. In fact, my former studio had the red beams too; all the front windows in the building as well as the next-door building's windows had them. Presumably to prevent a collapse like 63 and 65 Rue d'Aubagne just six months before.

Neoliberal development was accelerating in La Plaine. A temporary wall covered in spray paint and wheat paste surrounded the central square and the city was in the process of cutting down the tall plane trees inside. Stretching across the Cours Julien side of the barrier was memorial graffiti in a blue-green that matched the sea, "ZINEB REDOUANE ASSASSINÉE PAR LA POLICE. NI OUBLI NI PARDON." The police killed Zineb by striking her head with a tear gas canister they fired into her fourth floor window as she was closing the shutters during a Yellow Vest protest, a month after the Rue d'Aubagne building collapse killed Chérif, Fabien, Julien, Marie-Emmanuelle, Niasse, Ouloume, Simona, and Taher only a few steps away. In the months between then and my visit to my old studio, the city rushed to
evict roughly 1500 people from crumbling apartments in working class neighborhoods with no plan to ensure their return home. The cherished memories of places and people I had encountered four years before returned in dystopian form. A permanent cloud of construction dust hung in the air.

Is it any wonder that commentators complained about Marseille’s lack of memory? The state and capital had been ritualistically hollowing out the city for ages, emptying it of its people and suppressing its working-class, diasporic cultures. The French (and Marseillaise) ruling-class attitude toward most inhabitants went beyond greed, approaching hatred. In 2000, deputy-mayor Gérard Chenoz said, "In order for people to mix, certain among them must leave." The city of 250,000 Muslims still prays in storefront mosques. The city announced in the fall of 2020, as massive legal backlash advanced Islamophobic and pro-police measures across France, that it is now considering building a "City of Film" on the land it had previously allocated to building a grand mosque. The people who have kept the city running are treated like they are disposable and face tremendous obstacles to leaving a commemorative mark. This was the logic of the twentieth century Marseille system at the port, the Defferre system that followed, and now the redevelopment plans. Something felt definitive about the narrowing possibilities for life in the city this time, with the displacements from Noailles paired with the influx of tourists.

494 Quoted in Bruno Le Dantec, La Ville-sans-nom: Marseille dans la bouche de ceux qui l’assassinent (Marseille: Chien Rouge, 2007), 101.
496 Lewis, Boundaries of the Republic, 26.
In fact, later in the summer I attended a local architectural history lecture at the tony Docks Village that invited Emmanuel Dujardin of Tangram Architectes, responsible for the redevelopment of the Canebière and Cours Lieutaud, including a new luxury hotel under construction between the Canebière and popular Noailles market. The computer-generated mock-up that he projected on a large screen only had white people in the digital street scene. It looked like Aix, which looks like a J. Crew catalogue come to life. A chilling sight for anyone who knows the active Maghrebi, West African, and Comorian presence on that corner in the everyday life of the actual city. In 2012 Alèssi Dell’Umbria called it "the sinking of Marseille." Later that year, Keny Arkana called it the "Capitale de la Rupture." People will not forget Zineb Redouane when the grim redevelopment plan is carried out and the construction barriers come down, but the visual trace of that memory in the urban landscape will be gone.

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When Henri Michel’s Comité d’histoire de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, attached to the Prime Minister, tasked a local Marseillaise historian, Pierre Guiral, to write an official history of the liberation of the city, the resulting volume broke the national mold. The city’s infamous mayor, Gaston Defferre, penned the introduction. Local anarchist, André Arru, wrote the epilogue. Guiral must have had a sense of humor because bookending his volume with Defferre and Arru surpassed

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what any reasonable person could expect of scholarly even-handedness. More importantly, it signals the broad spectrum of politics, people, and approaches to clandestine struggle that presented a challenge for those who wished to create a homogenous, patriotic national myth, and how the city of Marseille so often stood for the breakdown of these commemorative efforts.

After the Second World War, France’s new central government seized the moment to remedy their diagnosis of localized amnesia in its oldest city and to instill it with national memory. Vast and complex bureaucracies formed the everyday work of maintaining the boundaries of official memory of resistance from the end of the war to the present day. Yet Marseille challenged the masculine, military, and patriotic official memory on numerous fronts, and the state project to render the resistance legible was never fully successful. During the war, it was a place with a cosmopolitan resistance composed of many non-citizens. Prominent local figures included many women. Rescue, or "civil resistance," took on tremendous importance in the only active port in the southern zone. A contestable and very blurry line separated resistance from criminality, occasionally in step with one of the city’s many nicknames, the "Capital of Crime." Lastly, Marseille’s liberators of the so-called French "external resistance" came primarily from North and West Africa. People from all of these sectors applied for CVR cards. While not all of them were formally recognized, their applications form part of an important archive for historians of the resistance, ready for systematic investigation into official memory’s rejects.
Lawmakers and administrators attempted to discipline and coopt memories of resistance as a dual project of assimilating the underground and taming unruly cities with the introduction of national commemorative narratives. While the state was able to allay its most pressing security concerns through this process, it only succeeded in promoting a mythology of the resistance as a nationally-rooted affinity between French men for a time. However these very acts of erasure provoked an active local culture of countermemory that imagined the resistance as plural, feminine, foreign, and driven by antifascist politics.

Ben Kafka talked about how administrative paperwork and encounters tends to obscure state power to a greater to degree than other tools of coercion and control. The same can be said for bureaucracy’s power to mediate cultural memory. The false expectation of CVR or carte du combattant applications is that they represent only a private interaction between the applicant and the administrative state. If cultural memory requires a public to take shape, what is the public of the CVR? Particularly in consideration of French archival rules which seal records containing personal information for decades, how can this body of sources reflect anything other than the accumulation of material traces of individual moments of frustration, confusion, relief, or validation?

This division into public or private, collective or individual, is deceptive. A number of different publics, operating on different spatial scales, were involved in mediating memory through the CVR. Most obviously, in Paris lawmakers and associations pushed to have their notions of legitimate resistance, and how to prove

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500 I thank Henry Rousso for this crucial question in my dissertation defense.
it, enshrined in law. A second public formed across the Hexagon with the state’s invitation of members of civil society to join career civil servants to participate in its administrative functions through the CVR committees. Between the former resisters making recommendations, the career functionaries, secretarial staff, prefects, and police inspectors who investigated the lives and backgrounds of applicants, thousands were involved in this project. While the law established a loose framework for mediating the memory of resistance, interministerial circulars provided finer grained instruction regarding the process of formal recognition. Committees and police inspectors refined commemorative narratives further in the review process.

Perhaps most interestingly, the CVR also formed a third public, comprised of former resisters and veterans who were drawn into the terms of the debate laid out by the state. The CVR provoked some resisters to attempt to disaggregate and reconfigure the relationship between nation, state, citizenry, and resistance that the bureaucracy hoped to unify. Alternately, resister and veterans’ associations discussed the CVR in their organizations’ publications. Spanish Communist exiles published the names of their members awarded the CVR to bolster their claim on resistance memory. Anarchists made use of CVR documents in their publications to defend against characterizations of criminality from the communists, while also critiquing the terms of state memory. Furthermore, associational bulletins further refracted the power of bureaucratic processes of recognition by disseminating advice on compiling a successful application to their readers, such as La Koumia’s instructions regarding the carte du combattant, legal updates on military pensions,
and notes on new developments in the CVR code. These various publics engaged with bureaucratically mediated commemorative narratives before the archive became available to researchers. Rather than an atomized, private quest for the personal satisfaction of state recognition, the CVR engaged mass society around questions designed to render political struggle the property of the state.

In taking the memory of resistance as my point of departure, my dissertation reflects on how memory work produces political inclusion and marginalization. In its official and unofficial guises, it articulates different ideas of spatial and political community and belonging, whether national, local, colonial, international or some combination thereof. In a contemporary context of rapid change in Marseille, my work excavates the deeper roots of the pressure from without and within that has sought to smooth the city’s rough edges and to remake it in the image of France and Europe, decades before the EU Capital of Culture initiatives began.

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The last days of that 2019 research trip rekindled some sense of possibility for Marseille’s working class to resist cooptation by national or neoliberal memory practices. It was the Africa Cup quarterfinals. In every neighborhood I walked through, bars and shops had plugged their televisions into extension cords and set them up in their doorways, facing the street, so that anyone who wanted to could watch Algeria play the Ivory Coast. People planted plastic chairs on the sidewalks and in the alleys to follow the match while others looked on from astride their parked motorcycles. Algerian flags were everywhere. When Algeria won, the atmosphere in the street was electric.
After that match, I grudgingly left for Paris to finish a few days work in the National Archives ahead of my flight back to the U.S. I watched the final between Algeria and Senegal with my Marseillaise roommate, projected on a large screen in the back of a bar in Paris’ 20th arrondissement. With Algeria’s win, the bartender turned the audio off the live stream and blasted "Mamamia" by Torino Palermo Catania. The packed room burst into jubilant dancing and singing. I overheard good-natured congratulations from the Senegal supporters. Soon breathless, I joined my roommate outside where our sweat could dry in the night air. Another friend texted to ask me about the atmosphere in Paris; she was sharing videos of the celebrations in Marseille, which had encircled the police station on the Canebière. The red glow of flares illuminated the supporters jumping on police cruisers. It was not a soccer riot, or at least not primarily, but a postcolonial diaspora confronting institutions of historic and contemporary repression. After all, the targets of Russian and English fans were bars, shops, and passersby at the UEFA Euro Championship in 2016 in Marseille, not symbols of state power. I imagined the real estate speculators in a panic.

Looking up from the phone, I saw my roommate’s friend approach us as passing motorists honked and hung out their windows shouting happily back and forth with people standing in front of the bar. She passed him a cigarette and he contemplated the element of "bread and circuses" to this Africa Cup, which was taking place during a mass uprising against Bouteflicka’s fifth presidential bid in
Nevertheless, he found the day momentous for the postcolonial diaspora in France, "In 1961 the French police murdered us in the streets and dumped us in the Seine. Tonight we are celebrating Algeria's victory in these same streets."  

Memory of twentieth-century protest and resistance is strong in everyday urban life in Marseille. This seemed apparent to me, even as a visitor just beginning to get to know the city. However this memory takes a wide variety of forms that are not legible to the state. Sometimes this memory carries a living legacy of resistance that can threaten the foundations of empire, as Madeleine Baudoin articulated it, or the impermeability of geopolitical boundaries, as Spanish exiles and CIRA demonstrated. Even state attempts to make memory legible and geared toward instantiating the nation locally were rife with inconsistencies and internal conflicts. The CVR paperwork itself documented the lack of consensus among Marseille’s resisters regarding what aspects of their clandestine lives should be recognized, even as it attempted to flatten distinctions.

Direct observation of any single body of Marseillaise sources in isolation reveals seemingly irreconcilable and incoherent clues about the city. Mexican author Valeria Luiselli also struggled to describe her birthplace of Mexico City to her own satisfaction. She wrote, "certain things—a territory, a map—elude direct observation. Sometimes it’s necessary to create an analogy, a slanting light that illuminates the fugitive object, in order to momentarily fix the thing that escapes

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502 I rushed back to the apartment to write down in English what he said in French soon after, so the quote is approximate, but very close. I did not want to forget.
Similarly, the presence of the wartime past in the surface of the city—absent neighborhoods, monuments, material traces of battle—tell a partial story. The past is also present in the bureaucratic record and grassroots memory work. This everyday work is the slanting light that illuminates a dynamic of mnemonic cooptation and contestation, producing a multi-scalar and pluralistic, but by no means egalitarian, local space.

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