Differentiating Dominant and Minority Group Responses to Ingroup Transgressions:

A Cross-Status Collective Guilt Model

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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Collective guilt is an aversive emotional reaction to ingroup blame that motivates corrective action. Extensive research has examined collective guilt among dominant group members for historical atrocities such as slavery or colonialism. To date, minorities’ experiences of collective guilt have been largely ignored. This dissertation tests for the first time a Cross-Status Model of Collective Guilt. Yielding to group blame was expected to predict collective guilt and intentions to repair harm from ingroup transgressions regardless of group status. Unique moderators of acquiescing to group blame were expected: ingroup identification would moderate reactions to blame for dominants, while linked fate and awareness of disadvantage would moderate responses to blame for minorities. White (dominant; N = 913) and Muslim (minority; N = 1073) Americans were recruited to assess responses to ingroup blame for violent extremists from their respective groups. Collective guilt was pervasive among Muslims. Whites resembled Muslims in their yielding to group blame, where the three aforementioned moderators behaved similarly across status in three serial moderated mediation models. Data from a replication sample of Muslims (N = 536) reaffirmed the patterns found in the original sample. The implications of these findings are discussed.
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Introduction

In 2019, a landmark hearing of the House Judiciary Committee considered reparations to atone for the systemic oppression of African Americans due to eras of slavery, Jim Crow, and discriminatory laws. In response, Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell argued, “I don’t think reparations for something that happened 150 years ago for whom none of us currently living are responsible is a good idea” (Barrett, 2019). McConnell attempted to absolve Whites of collective guilt, which arises as “a consequence of belonging to a group that has done something that is perceived as illegitimate” (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2006, p. 326). Extensive research has examined collective guilt among dominant group members in the aftermath of slavery and colonialism (e.g., Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Steele, 1990; Swim & Miller, 1999), but not among minority groups. However, examples abound of minorities being held collectively culpable, as with Muslim Americans who are often blamed for attacks perpetrated by a Muslim extremist minority. The current work attempts to diversify existing theory on collective guilt to incorporate the minority group experience.

Dominant and minority groups typically differ in social status, defined as “the extent to which an individual or group is respected or admired by others” (Magee & Galinsky, 2008, p. 13). For example, in the U.S., dominant groups such as White and Christian Americans are afforded greater status than Black or Muslim Americans (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Such social hierarchies are justified with a range of ideologies, including social Darwinism (Rudman & Saud, 2020), which promotes the stability of social stratification. The current work relies on the nature of status divides to
explain potential differences in reactions to ingroup transgressions among dominant and minority group members.

A body of work shows that dominant group members respond to ingroup transgressions with collective guilt depending on their level of ingroup identification. Those who highly identify with their group typically deflect blame and guilt by exonerating their group and defending the status quo (e.g., Bilali, Tropp, & Dasgupta, 2012; Doosje & Branscombe, 2003; Miron, Branscombe, Biernat, 2010). By contrast, less identified group members tend to experience collective guilt and support compensatory policies, such as affirmative action (e.g., Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Iyer et al., 2003; Swim & Miller, 1999). Thus, intentions to remedy harm depend on whether dominant group members identify with the offending group.

How do minority group members react to collective guilt? To date, this question has been largely ignored. In my dissertation, I develop the Cross-Status Collective Guilt Model to compare the coping mechanisms of dominant and minority group members when confronted with social harms committed by ingroup members. As I later describe in detail, the model proposes that dominant and minority group members alike will experience collective guilt depending on whether they yield to blame, and that collective guilt will positively predict intentions to engage in atonement (e.g., reparations). However, the model diverges in its predictors of yielding to blame. Whereas ingroup identification is expected to negatively predict blame acquiescence for dominant group members, minority group members’ blame acquiescence is expected to be positively predicted by linked fate, defined as how strongly individuals' own fate is seen as linked to
that of the ingroup, but negatively predicted by awareness of the ingroup's cultural disadvantages (e.g., negative stereotypes and stigma).

**Dominant Groups and Collective Guilt**

Personal guilt is defined as accepting that one committed wrongdoing and seeking forgiveness (Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). Collective guilt, by extension, refers to the experience of guilt due to membership in a group that is perceived as having committed wrongdoing (Doosje et al., 2006). For instance, “White guilt” has been found among White Americans reminded of past abuses of Black Americans (e.g., Iyer et al., 2003) and among Dutch people reminded of the victims of Dutch colonialism (Doosje et al., 1998). The process involves first acknowledging ingroup responsibility for a transgression, which predicts collective guilt; in turn, collective guilt predicts engagement in reparative actions (e.g., McGarty & Bliuc, 2004; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Brehm, 2004; Zimmermann, Abrams, Doosje, & Manstead, 2011).

**Ingroup Identification**

As noted, collective guilt surfaces depending on identity strength. People who are highly identified with their group “extend their self-concept to include the group” (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006, p.700). Thus, they often vicariously experience what fellow group members are experiencing (Brown, Wohl, & Exline, 2008). For example, students who highly identified with their college vicariously experienced the cognitive dissonance of an ingroup member making a counter-attitudinal speech and changed their own attitudes to overcome their discomfort (Norton, Monin, Cooper, & Hogg, 2003).

Because highly identified group members incorporate their group into their self-concept, they respond to attacks on ingroup members as if they were attacks on the self-
(Brown et al., 2008). With respect to ingroup transgressions, they engage in a variety of strategies designed to refute blame and guilt, in line with motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990). Such strategies include motivated forgetting of committed atrocities (Rotella & Richeson, 2013), selectively recalling justifications for atrocities (Coman, Stone, Castano, & Hirst, 2014), shifting justice standards to absolve the ingroup of having committed an injustice (Miron et al., 2010), warding off responsibility for harm-doing (Bilali et al., 2012), attributing transgressions to external forces (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003), selectively recalling cases when the ingroup was a victim rather than a perpetrator (Sahdra & Ross, 2007), idealizing ancestors who engaged in atrocities (Welzer, 2005), or creating new narratives that absolve the dominant group (e.g., Wertsch, 2002). When group identity is threatened, dominant group members temporally distance past ingroup transgressions (i.e., as ancient history), effectively deflecting causal responsibility (Peetz, Gunn, & Wilson, 2010).

Among the aforementioned studies that subsequently measured collective guilt (all except Welzer, 2005 and Wertsch, 2002), exonerating strategies predicted lower levels of collective guilt. Thus, high-identifying dominant group members often report significantly less collective guilt than low-identifiers (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002; Doosje & Branscombe, 2003; Miron et al., 2010; Rotella & Richeson, 2013). This is true even when past ingroup transgressions are described in ambiguous terms (Doosje et al., 1998) or as causing minimal harm (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006). In sum, high-identifiers generally engage in various exonerating strategies, often attributed to motivated reasoning (e.g., Li, Leidner, & Fernandez-Campos, 2020). That is, high-
identifiers are motivated to defend the group (and therefore, the self) from a tarnished reputation, compared with low-identifiers.

In two exceptions, this pattern has not surfaced. First, researchers examined whether the source of own group transgression information (ingroup or outgroup) would influence collective guilt (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2004). They found that “when outgroups disapprove of the ingroup’s past behavior, high identification is associated with low levels of guilt. However, when the ingroup disapproves of its own past behavior, this may cause collective guilt in people who identify strongly with their group” (p. 105). Thus, high identifiers may be receptive to accepted criticism, provided it comes from ingroup members.

Second, Masson and Barth (2019) found a curvilinear relationship, such that moderately identified individuals expressed more collective guilt than either high-identifiers (who defend the ingroup) or low-identifiers (who are less attached to it). These findings depart from the usual pattern, perhaps because the authors described fictional transgressions, whereas prior research used historical facts. Specifically, Masson and Barth examined college students’ reactions to false information that their university accepted few handicapped students, and that fellow students did not support same-sex marriage or pro-environmental behaviors. By contrast, my proposed study will use actual transgressions that should result in greater defensiveness and warding off of guilt as identification increases among dominant group members.

**Dimensions of group identity.** Considerable evidence points to identity strength as a moderator of collective guilt for dominant group members, but do defensive reactions stem from ingroup attachment or ingroup glorification (i.e., believing one’s
group is superior)? When distinguishing between these among Israeli students, researchers found that "attachment was positively related whereas glorification was negatively related to group-based guilt for in-group's past infractions" regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Roccas et al., 2006, p. 698). Thus, maintaining an image of ingroup superiority (rather than ingroup attachment) may drive defensive motives to avoid collective guilt among dominant group members.

These findings lead to a second question: Are exonerating strategies used to maintain ingroup superiority, or are they driven by a desire to maintain the self’s superiority? If the former is true, group-affirmation should be more effective than self-affirmation (i.e., bolstering cherished personal values) in lowering defensiveness (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). However, studies manipulating group-based or self-affirmation support the latter explanation. Researchers found that self-affirmation resulted in higher reported collective guilt for past ingroup transgressions compared with a group-affirmation task (Cehajic-Clancy, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, & Ross, 2011), or a weak self-affirmation task that bolstered an unimportant value (Unzueta & Lowery, 2008). If ingroup superiority was at stake, then affirming the group's values should have alleviated defensiveness. Instead, only self-affirmation had the desired effect of reducing defensiveness and enhancing guilt for a collective wrong. Defensiveness, then, primarily serves to fortify the self and protect it from a tarnished image. These findings bolster the proposition that high ingroup identification involves expanding one’s self-concept to include the ingroup (Roccas et al., 2006).

By contrast, low ingroup identification affords dominants the psychological distance required to believe that their group ought to be better, and that victims should be
compensated for transgressions (McGarty & Bluic, 2004; Zhang, Zeelenberg, Summerville, & Breuglemans, 2020). Consequently, less identified dominant group members tend to accept responsibility and experience collective guilt; as a result, they support reparative action (e.g., Doosje et al, 1998).

Other moderators. Accepting responsibility for ingroup transgressions is a precursor to experiencing collective guilt (McGarty & Bluic, 2004). Beyond identity strength, other factors may reduce a sense of responsibility for transgressions, leading to lower levels of collective guilt. For example, framing discrimination in terms of outgroup disadvantage elicits less collective guilt than framing it in terms of ingroup privileges (Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005). In addition, providing legitimizing information for outgroup disadvantage further reduces collective guilt due to lowered distress (Miron, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2006). In other words, framing oppression of the outgroup as their problem rather than our responsibility reduces feelings of guilt, at least on the part of dominant groups. In my proposed research, I do not expect these moderators to play a role in dominant group members' responses to ingroup transgressions, but I include them here for the sake of completion.

Minority Groups and Collective Guilt

The picture that emerges from my review is that dominant group members have multiple ways of fending off responsibility for ingroup harms, and they are particularly likely to use them when they are highly identified to defend the self. What is largely missing from this body of work is an examination of collective guilt in minority group members. Why might that be? Perhaps dominant group members have been investigated because they make up the majority of college student samples, which have mostly been
used in past research. Alternatively, existing theory may assume that dominant groups are exclusively capable of exacting the types of transgressions against other groups that would warrant accepting blame and feeling collective guilt. In either case, further exploration of the minority group perspective is needed.

Notably, the hierarchy of intergroup relations allows dominants to construct cultural narratives that scapegoat minorities, blaming them for transgressions. For example, innocent Muslim Americans are suspected of harboring extremists, whereas White Americans are not held accountable for the violence perpetrated by White nationalists (e.g., Fam, Hajela, & Henao, 2021). Further, more White than Black Americans are on welfare (Delaney & Scheller, 2015; Jan, 2017; Shapiro, Trisi, & Chaudhry, 2017), but Black Americans are stereotyped as lazier and poorer than Whites, and as the primary recipients of government welfare in the U.S. (Brown-Iannuzzi, Dotch, Cooley, & Payne, 2016; Gilens, 1996a; Gilens, 1996b; Harell, Soroka, & Iyengar, 2016; Peffley, Hurwitz, & Sniderman, 1997). A stark illustration of this double standard concerns differences in White Americans' response to the crack cocaine epidemic that decimated Black communities, compared with the opioid epidemic harming White communities. Black Americans were blamed for becoming drug addicted, whereas society's ills are blamed for addicted Whites (Yankah, 2016).

Scapegoating is not fair or just, but like internalized racism, it has costs for minority groups (Allport, 1954; Jost & Banaji, 1994). Minorities may acquiesce to blame placed on their communities by the dominant group because they do not have the tools, resources, or social capital to effectively deflect blame. Acquiescence to group blame may lead to high levels of collective guilt in minority populations. To aid in my
theorizing of collective guilt among minorities, I will next examine the nature of vicarious guilt and shame, emotions which are well-documented among minority group members.

**Vicarious Guilt and Shame**

Vicarious guilt and shame have been studied extensively among minority group populations. The term “vicarious” in this context is used to indicate that a given emotion was experienced after a transgression was personally witnessed by participants or committed by perpetrators they knew. I will refer to these as “personalized transgression events.” Vicarious guilt is expected to arise when group members are interdependent (Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005) because members feel they could have exerted control over transgressors and prevented their actions (Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004). In other words, vicarious guilt is experienced when a sense of responsibility is felt for an ingroup transgression (i.e., “we did something wrong.” Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007). Note that vicarious guilt is different from collective guilt, which is experienced even though an individual could not have stopped a given transgression.

Vicarious shame is theorized to arise when ingroup transgressions confirm negative stereotypes of one’s stigmatized group, thus eliciting a self-image threat because the transgression is seen as diagnostic of ingroup character by outgroup members (Lickel et al., 2005). In other words, shame is experienced when a transgression is attributed to something inherently wrong with the ingroup (i.e. “we are bad,” Iyer et al., 2007). Both dominant and minority group members express vicarious shame and guilt when recalling
personalized transgression events (Lickel et al., 2005; Schmader & Lickel, 2006; Shelton, Richeson, & Vorauer, 2006).

To clarify the difference between these two emotions, guilt reflects acknowledgement of wrongdoing and wanting to make amends, whereas shame is described as “a state of heightened awareness of the self…it differs from guilt, in which one thinks more about one’s transgressions” (emphasis added; Roseman et al., 1994, p. 214). Developmental research suggests that children blamed for transgressions will either feel guilt and do what is required for compensation, or feel shame and withdraw (Zahn-Waxler, 2000). Thus, guilt differs from shame in that it results in a focus on one’s transgressions that motivates corrective action. To further elaborate, consider that when a group is blamed for committing a transgression, it is accompanied by demands for recompense. But only guilt should result in a desire to fulfill such demands, whereas shame should result in distancing oneself from the transgression (Schmader & Lickel, 2006; Zahn-Waxler, 2000).

**Summary.** Research on collective guilt has generally ignored the experiences of minority populations who are blamed for ingroup transgressions by dominant groups. This gap in the literature beckons examination of the conditions that propel minority group members to acquiesce to group blame and experience guilt for the wrongdoing of ingroup members. In particular, my thesis departs from prior research devoted to vicarious guilt and shame among minorities (e.g., Allport, 1954; Schmader & Lickel, 2006; Shelton et al., 2006). Specifically, I contend that collective guilt may be prevalent among minorities and dominants alike but moderated by different variables. How might collective guilt processes differ by group status? In the next section, I consider two
potential moderators unique to minority experiences of collective guilt: linked fate and awareness of ingroup disadvantage.

**Linked Fate and Perceived Ingroup Disadvantage**

Dominant group members experience the privilege of high status, including receiving more respect and admiration than minorities (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). By contrast, because minorities are devalued, they are vulnerable to prejudicial mistreatment, such as when unfair policing targets African Americans (Balko, 2018). As a result of experiencing pervasive discrimination due to group membership, minority group members tend to view the world in terms of their group (Abelson, Dasgupta, Park, & Banaji, 1998), thus drawing support for collective efforts such as the Black Lives Matter movement. Specifically, experiences of discrimination due to minority group status often result in higher identification with the ingroup, a process that evidence suggests is largely adaptive (e.g., it promotes psychological adjustment; Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999). Experiencing societal rejection without a strong group identity can be severely damaging. For example, when Indigenous people in the U.S. are adopted by White families, they face the difficulty of not being “treated as Anglo” while also being isolated from their own group, which contributes to adolescent suicide rates at “twice the highest tribal suicide rate” (Berlin, 1987, pp. 225-226).

Beyond facilitating contact with fellow group members, a critical dimension influencing minority group identity concerns the dominant culture's tendency to view minority groups as homogenous. Even though minority groups are complex and diverse (e.g., Latino Americans include Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Guatemalans, and other ethnic groups with unique histories), when they are “seen as homogenous by outsiders,” such
minorities band together “to protect and promote their collective interests” (Espiritu, 1992, pp. 2-3). For example, Espiritu (1992) notes that government-sanctioned discrimination and individual hate crimes targeting Asians in the U.S. often failed to differentiate between different Asian ethnic groups (e.g., Chinese Americans were attacked during World War II because they were mistaken for Japanese Americans). Such realities helped bring about the rise of a pan-ethnic Asian identity in the U.S.

Another example concerns Black immigrants, for whom occupying positions of power through hard work and ambition is standard in their home countries. Yet, assimilation in America is extremely difficult for Black immigrants because “race serves as a master status defining [them]” (Waters, 1999, p. 5). Although immigrants typically achieve higher status as they assimilate in American society, Black immigrants lose status because they are viewed not as Americans, but as Black Americans. Thus, Black immigrants describe seeing their hard work go to waste in a society that systematically devalues them due to their race. Such an experience frequently draws together Black natives and Black immigrants, whose experiences converge despite widely diverging nationalities and histories. In essence, when Whites treat various ethnic groups as a monolith, it results in strategic unification, promoting pan-ethnic group identity as a common cause, through linked fate.

**Linked fate.** Perceiving linked fate involves seeing “one’s own life chances [as depending] heavily on the status and fortunes” of the ingroup (Gay, Hochschild, & White, 2016, p. 118). In his seminal work, Dawson (1994) introduced the concept of linked fate by demonstrating that Black Americans across the spectrum of SES lead lives that “are powerfully shaped by race” (p. 61). Even when gaining higher economic status,
the *master status* of race precludes Black Americans from experiencing middle- or high-class status as other groups do. In other words, “because middle class blacks will almost always be easily identified as black and will be unable to hide or assimilate the way white ethnics have done in the past,” race will remain a salient aspect of Black Americans’ lives, whether in poverty or affluence (Hajnal, 2007, pp. 563-564). For Black Americans, then, the inescapability of race leads them to “embrace their group and pursue various means to improve its status” (Chong & Kim, 2006, p. 348).

Those holding a strong sense of linked fate with their group see personal outcomes “as closely linked to the fate of the group” (Chong & Kim, 2006, p. 349). For example, Muslim Americans in the post-9/11 era report a significant sense of linked fate with one another, likely due to increased anti-Muslim sentiment in the U.S. after 9/11 (Barreto, Masuoka, & Sanchez, 2008). Social psychologists have attested to linked fate as an important “psychological bond” that brings groups together (Jackson, 2002, p. 16). This literature demonstrates that minorities identify more with their group when experiencing discrimination (Branscombe et al., 1999). But what Dawson’s (1994) concept of linked fate uniquely captures is a recognition of shared outcomes resulting from pervasive stereotyping and discrimination from the dominant outgroup.

To elaborate, the key factor differentiating linked fate from ingroup identity is the critical dimension of feeling tied to the group *because* of how dominant outgroup members treat the ingroup. Ingroup identity encompasses attachment and pride; it fluctuates as a matter of a choice, as when sports fans identify most with their team after victory (Cialdini, Borden, Thome, Walker, Freeman, & Sloan, 1976). By contrast, linked fate stems from unchosen experiences of group-based discrimination. Although the two
constructs are conceptually distinct, they likely covary among minority group members. In the current work, I will examine this relationship and assess the influence of ingroup identification and linked fate on experiences of collective guilt as a function of group status. As I later describe in detail, I expect ingroup identity to moderate collective guilt for dominant group members, whereas linked fate should moderate collective guilt for minority group members.

Research on the black sheep effect (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1998) supports my prediction regarding linked fate. The black sheep effect is observed when ingroup members react more critically toward deviant ingroup members than outgroup members, particularly when the ingroup’s social position is at stake (Marques, Abrams, & Serodio, 2001). Minority groups are chronically in a state of tenuous social standing, and thus I expect minority group members high on linked fate to exhibit particularly strong responses to ingroup transgressors. Specifically, they should report greater acquiescence to group blame, compared with minorities low on linked fate.

**Perceived ingroup disadvantage.** Where a history of exploitation or disadvantage strengthens linked fate, it can also increase awareness of ingroup disadvantage. Indeed, I have argued that linked fate stems from perceiving common experiences of discrimination. But another potential outcome of awareness of ingroup disadvantage is attributing blame for a given transgression to outgroup prejudice, rather than to the ingroup’s failings. Research on stigma consciousness suggests that minorities who are aware of their group's disadvantages may attribute negative events (e.g., discrimination) to prejudice, rather than to personal failings (e.g., Major & Crocker, 1993; Operario & Fiske, 2001; Pinel, 2002; Shelton, Richeson, & Salvatore, 2005). I
contend that being blamed for the actions of a few ingroup members, which minorities routinely experience, is a negative event that could be attributed to outgroup prejudice. Taking the example of Muslims blamed for the actions of extremists, Muslims who are aware that the U.S. security apparatus unfairly targets them, and thus promotes a narrative that Muslims are terrorists ( Cainkar, 2009), might attribute this *Muslim blaming* to prejudice against the ingroup. Attributing ingroup blame to prejudice would effectively deflect blame, allowing minorities to avoid experiencing collective guilt.

Past work on competitive victimhood supports this prediction. For example, Canadian Jews expressed less collective guilt for the harm that Israelis perpetrate on Palestinians when reminded of the Holocaust, as did Americans responding to the Iraq war when reminded of 9/11 or Pearl Harbor (Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). Moreover, undergraduates confronted for harming staff members at their university claimed they were victimized by staff, and both women and men accused the other gender of sex discrimination when confronted with gender-based transgressions (Sullivan, Landau, Branscombe, & Rothschild, 2012). Thus, collective blame and guilt can be deflected through competitive victimhood, wherein the ingroup is seen as a victim to ward off threats to the group's moral identity (Sullivan et al., 2012). If minority group members attribute ingroup blame to prejudice against the ingroup, they should avoid accepting blame and experiencing collective guilt.

In sum, both minorities high in linked fate and high in awareness of disadvantage recognize the discrimination they face. But for the former, I posit that the strategy chosen to combat discrimination will be investment in efforts designed to increase the group's standing in society. When exposed to ingroup transgressions, I predict this will translate
into acquiescing to ingroup blame, which will predict experiencing collective guilt, which will promote engaging in reparative actions. For the latter, I suspect the chosen strategy will be to attribute minority group blame to prejudice against the ingroup. When exposed to ingroup transgressions, I predict this will translate into deflecting group blame, and thus expressing less collective guilt and reparative action intentions.

The Cross-Status Collective Guilt Model

Figure 1 illustrates a model of collective guilt that aims to capture both dominant and minority group members’ responses to ingroup transgressions. In line with the previous discussion, I anticipate that minorities’ perception of linked fate and awareness of their disadvantage have competing influences on a process of collective guilt that is unique from that of dominant groups. Given their presumably fewer experiences with discrimination, dominant group members are expected to respond to ingroup transgressions in a manner informed by their level of ingroup identification.

At a foundational level, this dissertation assumes that people are generally aware of how society views their ingroup. Dominant group members are accustomed to being individuated by others who “form detailed impressions of them” given their relative status and power in society (Fiske, 1993, p. 624). Thus, a dominant group member who identifies with their group has both the motivation (i.e., self-defense) and the tools (i.e., dominance) to dismiss collective blame for ingroup members' transgressions because the heterogeneity of their group is recognized by society. By contrast, dominant group members low on ingroup identity are expected to respond less defensively when confronted with the crimes of ingroup members. For example, when Whites feel less identified with the White racial group, they possess the psychological distance needed to
blame fellow Whites for transgressions such as a history of oppressing Black Americans (e.g., Iyer et al., 2003), and by extension attacks by White supremacists, as I posit.

Unlike dominants, minorities tend to be stereotyped “because no one needs to, can, or wants to be detailed and accurate about them” (Fiske, 1993, p. 624). Thus, minorities are more accustomed to being treated as part of a monolith. When a group member commits a crime, the dominant social narrative often blames the entire minority group. For example, Muslim Americans are habitually blamed for individual terrorist attacks both in the U.S. media (e.g., CNN, 2015) and by U.S. politicians (e.g., Fahrenhold & Boorstein, 2011). Minority group members are thus expected to respond to ingroup blame in a manner positively informed by linked fate and negatively informed by awareness of ingroup disadvantage.

Will linked fate and awareness of disadvantage uniquely appear among minority group members as moderators of blame acquiescence (and not dominants)? Not necessarily, given that American Whites now view themselves as disadvantaged in a diversifying social landscape (e.g., Norton & Sommers, 2011). For this reason, all moderators will be measured for both dominant and minority group members in the current work. Even if dominants and minorities report similar levels of linked fate and awareness of disadvantage, I contend they will uniquely inform minorities’ responses to ingroup transgressions. Only minorities are treated as a monolith and routinely blamed for their group's transgressions, experiences that I predict are necessary to produce the relationships outlined in the bottom row of the Cross-Status Collective Guilt Model (Figure 1).
When confronted with ingroup transgressions, minority group members’ responses are expected to be moderated by linked fate (high scores result in greater acquiescence to blame compared with low scores) and awareness of disadvantage (high scores result in less acquiescence to blame compared with low scores). By contrast, dominant group members’ responses will be moderated by group identification (high identification results in less acquiescence to blame compared with low identification). Because taking responsibility for ingroup transgressions predicts experiencing group-based guilt (i.e., Cehajic-Clancy et al., 2011), yielding to group blame is expected to predict collective guilt in the current work (see also Zimmermann et al., 2011). Collective guilt is then expected to predict reparative action intentions that penalize ingroup transgressors or repair harm, as past research has shown (e.g., Cehajic-Clancy et al., 2011; Doosje et al., 1998; Doosje et al., 2006; McGarty & Bluic, 2004; Peetz et al., 2010; Zimmermann et al., 2011).

**Overview of Research**

The proposed study will initially test the Cross-Status Collective Guilt Model by examining Muslim and White Americans’ reactions to ingroup members’ extremist attacks on U.S. soil. Four considerations led me to these transgressions. First, in line with prior research on collective guilt (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998), the transgression had to be committed by ingroup members, not participants themselves. Second, to examine group differences, the transgression had to be similar for both dominant and minority groups. Third, transgressions had to reflect minority group stereotypes in order to produce linked fate and disadvantage awareness. Finally, the transgressions had to be factual and of
consequence to avoid the curvilinear effects of ingroup identity observed with fictional transgressions which may be more readily dismissed (Masson & Barth, 2019).

From 9/11 onward, domestic terrorist attacks have claimed a number of innocent American lives, perpetrated predominantly by (1) White extremists associated with the far-right, and (2) Muslims associated with extremist elements abroad. Considering attacks between September 12, 2001 and December 31st, 2016, White extremists have been responsible for 158 deaths, and Muslim extremists have been responsible for 119 deaths (Islamist and Far-Right Homicides, 2017). These data excluded larger events including 9/11 and the Oklahoma City bombing as “outlier” events, whereas subsequent attacks were much smaller in scale. But 9/11 has shaped the narrative about extremism, such that only Muslim (not White) Americans are stereotyped as “violent and untrustworthy” (Sides & Gross, 2011, p. 34).

Because Muslims are a small religious minority in the U.S., most Americans learn about them through the media, which hyperbolizes the threat posed by Muslims (Lean & Esposito, 2012). A study of articles published in The New York Times and The Washington Post found that Muslim violence received twice as much media coverage as non-Muslim violence (Rao et al., 2019). A broader analysis of newspaper articles found that attacks by Muslims received 357% more coverage than attacks by non-Muslims (Kearns, Betus, & Lemieux, 2019). Thus, Muslim extremists are overrepresented in the media compared to White American extremists. Political leaders also promote this narrative, such as when President Trump’s executive order (the “Muslim Ban”) blocked citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the U.S. in the name of “protecting the nation” (Full Executive Order, 2017). In another example, Representative
Peter King (R-NY) called for a hearing on the radicalization of American Muslims in Congress in 2011, a move met with dissent from members of Congress, including Representative Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX) who called it “a way to demonize and castigate a whole broad base of human beings” (Fahrenthold & Boorstein, 2011). Considering that radicalization and violence on the part of Muslim Americans are extremely rare (Kurzman, Schanzer, & Moosa, 2011), and that White American extremists killed more Americans than Muslim extremists in recent years (Islamist and Far-Right Homicides, 2017), the media and politicians greatly exaggerate the threat that Muslims pose.

Ironically, Muslims are the group experiencing the most attacks from extremist elements around the world (Hayden, 2017). That is, Muslims are more likely to be victimized by terrorism than any other religious group. Moreover, Islam reveres peace and tolerance; its name is derived from the Arabic word salam, meaning peace. Yet, the American public is persuaded by the violent, untrustworthy Muslim stereotype propagated by media and political discourse. By 2010, 43% of Americans acknowledged they felt at least some prejudice toward Muslims, more than double the percentage who felt the same way about Jews, Christians, and Buddhists (Gallup Center for Muslim Studies, 2010). National surveys have shown that Americans are willing to violate the civil liberties of their fellow Americans who are Muslim. Two years after 9/11, almost 40% of Americans believed the US government “should have more power to monitor the activities of Muslims” (State of the First Amendment, 2003). In 2017, almost one-fifth of Americans would deny Muslim citizens their right to vote (Sides & Mogahed, 2018). Further, Muslims are the religious group toward whom Americans report the coldest
feelings (Pew Research Center, 2017a). This climate has had disastrous consequences. Muslim Americans have reported increased hostility from fellow Americans and profiling from law enforcement in the past decade (Pew Research Center, 2017b). Legislation, such as the PATRIOT Acts I and II, has targeted Muslim Americans in particular (Jamal, 2009). For example, federal and local law enforcement established surveillance tactics that infringed on Muslim Americans’ privacy and civil liberties post-9/11 (Murray, 2004).

By definition, extremists are rare, yet attributions for Muslim offenders differ starkly from those for White offenders. Newspaper coverage of comparable extremist attacks mentioned “mental health” 3.5 times more often for White perpetrators and mentioned “terrorism” over 3 times more often for Muslim perpetrators (Arva, Idris, & Pervez, 2017). Another study found that “when a perpetrator is Muslim, there’s a 488 percent greater chance an attack will be called terrorism” (Kearns et al., 2019). In essence, acts of extremism from Muslims are framed as intentional acts related to one another, whereas acts of extremism from Whites are framed as random displays of violence from mentally ill perpetrators. This narrative difference causes Muslims, but not Whites, to be blamed for ingroup extremism. Muslim Americans are asked repeatedly to denounce the crimes of their extremist ingroup minority, and Muslim leaders have responded with resounding condemnation of extremist attacks (e.g., Mahdawi, 2017). Despite this, Americans on the political left and right continue criticizing Muslims for not speaking out enough against such violence. For example, New York Times columnist Roger Cohen stated that he “hold[s] Muslims responsible” for acts of Muslim extremist violence until “moderate Muslims really speak out…[and] say this is not our religion” (CNN, 2015). This same idea was purported in a segment titled “The Silence of
Muslims” on Sean Hannity’s Fox News program. These messages implicate Muslims as responsible for acts of violence from extremists.

As Zimmermann et al. (2011) describe, collective blame is the precursor to feelings of collective guilt. Do Muslims acquiesce to ingroup blame and experience collective guilt for transgressions committed by ingroup extremists? And, in the absence of a narrative implicating their group, do Whites yield to ingroup blame and experience guilt for the transgressions of ingroup extremists? The current research seeks to answer these questions in the first test of the Cross-Status Collective Guilt Model.

**Pilot surveys.** Two pilot surveys were distributed to detect the internal reliability and any ceiling or floor effects for the scales developed for the current work. White Rutgers University students (N = 129) and Muslim Rutgers University students (N = 23) took part in the survey tailored to their respective group in exchange for 1 research credit during the Fall of 2020. All scales presented appropriate internal reliability (αs > .72). Floor effects were observed among Muslims who scored low on items assessing acquiescence to blame (e.g., “I blame Muslims [Whites] for acts of violent extremism that have taken American lives”) on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree) (Muslims: M = 1.35, SD = .57; Whites: M = 2.91, SD = 1.25). Items were thus modified to capture greater variance among Muslims and were similarly modified for Whites to ensure parallel wording (see Appendix D).

While Whites and Muslims supported reparative action items (Whites: M = 4.47, SD = 1.09; Muslims: M = 3.88, SD = 1.03), Muslim participants sent messages describing their discomfort with taking the survey, especially with items describing the need for programs that “fix” the Muslim problem (e.g., “Establishing community workshops in
mainly Muslim locations that describe the causes of extremism and how to avoid it’
). Whites did not express similar sentiments. Perhaps Muslims’ experiences with flawed federal countering violent extremism (CVE) programs, which supposedly work with community members to identify potential extremists, elicited these feelings of discomfort (Brennan Center, 2019). I thus amended reparative action items for Muslims and Whites to focus on individual reparative behaviors (see Appendix F).

**Predictions.** Hypothesis 1 states that group identification will moderate acquiescence to collective blame among dominant group members. Specifically, Whites who are less identified with their race will yield to blame more than Whites who highly identify with their race. I further predict that linked fate (Hypothesis 2) and awareness of structural disadvantage (Hypothesis 3) will moderate minority group members’ acquiescence to ingroup blame. Specifically, linked fate will positively inform blame acquiescence and awareness of disadvantage will negatively inform blame acquiescence. Thus, I expect group status to interact with ingroup identification, linked fate, and awareness of disadvantage when predicting blame acquiescence in separate regression models. Hypothesis 4 states that yielding to group blame will predict experiencing collective guilt regardless of group status. Finally, Hypothesis 5 states that experiencing collective guilt will predict supporting reparative action regardless of group status.

Overall, my research will build on prior evidence investigating dominant groups to uniquely incorporate the processes by which minority group members react to ingroup transgressions. In so doing, this project will illuminate how dominant and minority group members might cope differently with ingroup transgressions by uncovering the different
affective and behavioral patterns that arise when group members are exposed to ingroup transgressions for which they may be collectively blamed.

**Method**

**Participants**

A Monte Carlo power analysis for indirect effects with 1000 repetitions determined that a minimum sample size of $N = 600$ is needed to achieve 80% power when testing the proposed serial mediation models (see model in Figure 2). I sampled White American participants on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to take part in this study in exchange for $1.00. Because Muslim Americans are not easily accessible through crowdsourcing platforms such as MTurk, I collected data from Muslim Americans through snowball sampling. A message with the link to my survey was sent to Whatsapp and GroupMe groups as well as email listservs serving four different New Jersey Muslim American mosque communities on March 20th, 2021. The message read: “My name is Lina Saud and I am reaching out to fellow Muslim Americans to participate in my 15-minute survey (link below). I am a doctoral candidate in the psychology department at Rutgers University-New Brunswick examining group processes among U.S. Muslims for my dissertation. I will send a $5 virtual Amazon gift card to the first 200 survey participants as a token of my appreciation. Please forward this message to your Muslim American contacts.”

The survey remained open for participation through the end of April. A surge of participation ($N = 1936$) took place during the last week of April, likely because the survey was distributed widely through the newsletters of mosques in Delaware. Ultimately, $N = 2175$ Muslim Americans participated in this survey. Due to monetary
constraints, I could not match this sample with an equally large sample of Whites. Instead, I decided to split this unanticipatedly large sample into two parts: one part (~1,000) that could be compared to a sample of 1,000 White MTurk workers, and one part with the remaining responses that could be used to test the minority path of the Cross Status Collective Guilt Model (see Figure 1) for replication purposes. These parts will henceforth be referred to as the “primary sample” and the “replication sample,” respectively.

**Whites.** White American MTurk workers (N = 1023) completed this survey in exchange for $1.00. A screening questionnaire ensured that only White U.S. citizens were able to participate (i.e., those who answered “yes” to the screening question “Are you a U.S. citizen?” and chose “White” as their ethnicity). Among those who passed the screening (N=1023), 15 participants failed to complete the survey, and 13 identified as Muslim at the end of the survey. These participants’ data were removed before analyses. Of participants who remained, 82 failed one or both attention check questions, and their data were thus removed as well. This left N = 913 (491 female). Participant age ranged from 19 to 83 (M = 43.15; SD = 14.30).

**Muslims.** Muslim Americans (N = 2175) completed this survey for a chance to receive a $5 virtual Amazon gift card. Only Muslim U.S. citizens were allowed to move forward (i.e., those who answered “yes” to the screening question “Are you a U.S. citizen?” and who selected “Muslim” as their religious identification). Of those who passed the screening (N = 2275), 100 dropped out of the survey before completing the demographics section at the end. Among remaining participants, 566 failed either one or both attention check questions included in the survey. These participants’ data were
removed before analyses. This left a final $N = 1609$ (1011 male). Participant age ranged from 18 to 78 ($M = 31.74$, $SD = 8.11$).

To create a primary Muslim sample matched in size to the White sample, I randomly assigned a number (1, 2, 3) to each Muslim participant that divided the sample into thirds. Two-thirds of the original sample made up the new primary sample ($N = 1073$, 674 male), and the remaining one-third ($N = 536$, 337 male) made up the replication sample. Unless specifically stated, all descriptive statistics and correlations in the following sections are presented for the full Muslim sample for brevity, given the differences between the primary and replication sample were negligible. Specifically, an independent samples t-tests showed that scores on focal and demographic variables did not significantly differ between the primary and replication sample ($ps > .104$).

**Materials**

**Ingroup Identification.** Participants indicated their level of identification with their ingroup by responding to a four-item scale adapted from Bilali et al. (2012; see Appendix A). A sample item is, “Being [White/Muslim] is an important part of how I see myself.” Items were averaged to form the ingroup identification index (Whites: $\alpha = .94$, $M = 3.98$, $SD = 1.50$; Muslims: $\alpha = .91$, $M = 4.57$, $SD = 1.02$).

**Linked Fate.** Linked fate is commonly measured using two items: “Do you think what happens generally to [relevant ingroup] in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life? [Yes/No]” and (if yes) “Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much? [A lot/Some/Not very much]” (Dawson, 1994). The current work amended this measure for two reasons. First, participants who respond “no” to the first item would be excluded from analyses, precluding any comparison of those who score
high and low on linked fate. Second, for those who respond “yes” to the first item, the second item measures linked fate on an ordinal scale rather than a continuous scale, limiting analyses of linked fate to chi-square tests.

To resolve these issues, I used an author-designed measure of linked fate (see Appendix B). Participants rated their agreement with four items on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). A sample item is, “Whatever impacts [White/Muslim] people in the U.S. will also affect me.” These four items were averaged to form the linked fate index (Whites: $\alpha = .90$, $M = 3.97$, $SD = 1.25$; Muslims: $\alpha = .85$, $M = 4.21$, $SD = .91$).

**Awareness of Disadvantage.** To measure Muslims’ awareness of their disadvantage, I adapted four items from the Islamophobia Scale developed by Lee, Gibbons, Thompson, and Timani (2003). Participants rated each item on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Sample items are, “Mainstream American culture portrays Islam as a dangerous religion,” and “U.S. law enforcement agencies behave as though all Muslims support terrorist attacks” (see Appendix C for all items). Responses were averaged such that higher scores indicated greater awareness of disadvantage ($\alpha = .85$, $M = 4.00$, $SD = 1.02$).

To measure Whites’ awareness of disadvantage, I modified these items (see Appendix C). Sample items are, “Too many Americans treat all Whites as racists” and “U.S. policies like affirmative action are biased against Whites.” Items were again averaged ($\alpha = .87$, $M = 3.88$, $SD = 1.43$).

**Ingroup Transgressions.** All participants read what appeared to be the title and opening blurb of an opinion piece in an online newspaper. The text described a
transgression committed by participants’ ingroup members: extremist attacks on U.S. soil. Stimuli were developed such that (1) Whites and Muslims were exposed to similar content, and (2) the blurb presented strong language to provide the best chance of detecting collective guilt among participants.

The text was titled “Why Are So Many Violent Attacks in the U.S. Perpetrated by [White/Muslim] American Extremists?” and read: “Americans have faced a number of violent attacks by extremists, or individuals holding extreme views, in recent decades. FBI statistics show that [White/Muslim] American extremists are responsible for a large number of these attacks. Over [150/100] innocent Americans were killed by [White/Muslim] American extremists since 9/11.” Whites read: “Victims of White extremists include children and adults who did nothing wrong; they were murdered while praying, going to school, attending a concert, or shopping at Walmart.” Muslims read: “Victims of Muslim American extremists include children and adults from all walks of life who did nothing wrong; they were murdered while running a marathon, bicycling on a sidewalk, attending a work function, or dancing in a club.” At the end, everyone read: “All of these people woke up one day, never dreaming it would be their last. [White/Muslim] Americans need to figure out why so many in their community are turning to violent extremism, costing America so many lives.”

**Acquiescence to Blame.** Yielding to ingroup blame has been measured using two items previously (e.g., Zimmerman et al., 2011). To increase internal reliability, I used four items to assess participants’ level of agreement that their ingroup is to blame for extremist attacks (see Appendix D). Sample items are, “Because I am [White/Muslim], I feel some responsibility for acts of extremism committed in the name of my
“[race/religion]” and “I feel accountable for [Whites’/Muslims’] extremist attacks because we are members of the same [race/religion]” (adapted from Zimmerman et al., 2011). Items were rated on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). I averaged the four items to create the blame acquiescence index (Whites: $\alpha = .90$, $M = 2.47$, $SD = 1.45$; Muslims: $\alpha = .75$, $M = 3.89$, $SD = 1.04$).

**Collective Guilt.** Feelings of collective guilt were measured using four items adapted from Cehajic-Clancy et al. (2011), including “When I think about how so many violent extremists in the U.S. come from my group, I sometimes feel guilty” and “I occasionally feel guilt for the innocent lives taken by my group members who have turned to violent extremism” (see Appendix E for all items). Items were rated on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). After reverse-coding one item, the four items were averaged to generate the collective guilt index (Whites: $\alpha = .88$, $M = 2.79$, $SD = 1.53$; Muslims: $\alpha = .70$, $M = 3.81$, $SD = .97$).

**Support for Reparative Action.** Participants rated their agreement with three items measuring support for reparative action addressing the ingroup transgression (see Appendix F). A sample item was, “[Whites/Muslims] should work with law enforcement to identify extremists in their communities.” One item was reverse-coded so that high scores on all items corresponded with greater support for reparative actions. However, items had poor internal reliability (Whites: $\alpha = .48$; Muslims: $\alpha = .42$). Reliability statistics indicated that the second item in particular appeared to be capturing a different construct than the remaining items (i.e., “[Whites/Muslims] should not be expected to apologize for events like the [storming of the Capitol building/the Boston marathon bombing]” [reverse-coded]). I thus excluded the second item, and combined the
remaining two items to create the reparative action intentions index for Whites, \( r(911) = .59, p < .001, M = 4.85, SD = 1.20 \), and for Muslims, \( r(1607) = .54, p < .001, M = 4.42, SD = 1.04 \).

**Demographics.** To describe the sample and assess group differences, participants indicated their age, gender, political identification, voter preference in the 2020 election, SES, level of education, U.S. region of residence, and four measures of religiosity. Additionally, Whites indicated their religious identification and Muslims indicated their ethnicity.

Political identification was measured using the item, “What is your political orientation?” on a scale from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative). Voter preference in the 2020 election was measured with one item asking, “Which major party candidate did you prefer in the 2020 Presidential Election?” with two possible options: Donald Trump and Joe Biden.

Religiosity was measured with four items. The first two were “Would you describe yourself as religious?” on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much); and “What are your feelings toward orthodox (strict, devout) religious beliefs?” on a scale from 1 (very unfavorable) to 6 (very favorable). These two items were averaged to form a religious orientation score for Whites, \( r(910) = .70, p < .001 \), and Muslims, \( r(1607) = .57, p < .001 \). The third item asked, “Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?” using six options: (1) more than once a week, (2) once a week, (3) once or twice a month, (4) a few times a year, (5) seldom, (6) never. Responses were recoded such that high scores reflected greater attendance of religious services. The fourth item asked “How often do you wear a visible symbol that makes your faith identity
known to others, for example a hijab, skullcap, beard, kippah, yarmulke, turban, or visible cross in public?” with three options: (1) all of the time, (2) some of the time, (3) never. Responses were recoded such that higher scores indicated more time wearing visible religious symbols.

To assess SES, participants indicated, “Which of the following best describes your socioeconomic status?” using four options: (1) working class, (2) middle class, (3) upper middle class, (4) wealthy. For level of education, participants indicated, “What is the highest degree or level of schooling that you have completed?” using five options: (1) less than high school, (2) high school degree or GED, (3) some college, (4) 4 year college degree, (5) beyond 4 year college degree (e.g., master’s, PhD, or professional degree). To examine what region of the U.S. participants live in, participants responded to the item “If you live in the U.S., what region?” with 8 options: (1) Northeast, (2) Southeast, (3) Midwest, (4) Northwest, (5) Southwest, (6) South, (7) Other, (8) I don’t live in the U.S.

**Procedure**

After providing informed consent, participants completed measures of ingroup identification, linked fate, and awareness of disadvantage in randomized order. Next, participants were presented with stimulus materials describing their ingroup's transgression, followed by measures of acquiescence to group blame, collective guilt, and support for reparative action (in that order). Finally, participants completed demographic items and were debriefed and compensated.
Results

Group Demographic Differences

Whites and Muslims differed on a number of demographic markers. The primary Muslim sample was more likely to vote for Joe Biden (75%) than the White sample (63%) in the 2020 election ($\chi^2 = 31.56, p < .001$) and was significantly less conservative (primary sample: $M = 3.06, SD = 1.32$) than the White sample, $M = 3.93, SD = 1.93$, $t(1982) = 11.92, p < .001, d = .54$. Muslims were more religiously oriented (primary sample: $M = 4.38, SD = .96$) than Whites, $M = 3.34, SD = 1.56$, $t(1983) = 18.22, p < .001, d = -.82$. Muslims were also more likely to attend religious services (primary sample: $M = 4.33, SD = 1.14$) than Whites, $M = 2.74, SD = 1.66$, $t(1983) = 25.19, p < .001, d = -1.14$; and were more likely to wear a symbol of their faith (primary sample: $M = 2.25, SD = 1.36$) than Whites, $M = 1.36, SD = .63$, $t(1983) = 33.33, p < .001, d = -1.50$.

The Muslim sample was more racially diverse than the White sample, while the White sample was more religiously diverse, given screening procedures taken for each sample. In the White sample, the majority of participants identified as Christian (576, 63%), 105 as agnostic (11), 91 as nothing in particular (10%), 87 as atheist (10%), and the remaining 53 as something else (6%). In the Muslim sample, the majority of participants identified as White (748; 47%), 309 as Black (19%), 197 as Arab (12%), 145 as South Asian (9%), 91 as Hispanic (6%), 62 as East Asian (4%), 37 as biracial (2%), and the rest as “Other” (1%). The largest portion of Whites lived in the Northeast (24%) and the largest portion of Muslims lived in the Midwest (27%). Muslims reported significantly higher socioeconomic status (primary sample: $M = 2.96, SD = .87$) than Whites, $M = 2.85, SD = .89$, $t(1982) = 2.73, p = .006, d = -.12$; but significantly lower
education levels (primary sample: $M = 3.14, SD = 1.01$) than Whites, $M = 3.65, SD = .93$, $t(1982) = 11.67, p < .001, d = .53$.

**Preliminary Analyses**

Descriptive statistics and mean comparisons for focal variables are included in Table 1, including effect sizes for each difference (Cohen’s $d$). Looking at the primary sample of Muslims ($N = 1073$) versus Whites ($N = 913$), Muslims significantly outscored Whites on all focal variables (all $ps < .012$) except reparative action intentions, for which Whites scored significantly higher, $t(1984) = 8.39, p < .001$. A particularly large difference emerged for blame acquiescence, suggesting that Muslims may be conditioned by U.S. politicians and the media to take responsibility for extremist attacks. In terms of gender differences, independent samples $t$-tests showed that men significantly outscored women on blame acquiescence, $t(1984) = 7.07, p = .008$, and collective guilt, $t(1983) = 15.83, p < .001$. This is unsurprising given that men are generally the perpetrators of the transgression examined. Next, I examined the relationships among focal variables for Whites and the Muslim primary sample. Correlations among focal variables are shown in Table 2 (Whites) and Table 3 (primary Muslim sample). Correlations between focal variables and demographic variables are shown in Table 5 (Whites) and Table 6 (primary Muslim sample).

Hypothesis 1 stated that among Whites, ingroup identification would be negatively correlated with blame acquiescence. Unexpectedly, Whites high on racial identity were more (rather than less) likely to yield to blame for ingroup violence, $r(911) = .36, p < .001$. Thus, hypothesis 1 was not supported. To differentiate from predictions for minority group members, I also expected Whites’ ingroup identity to be significantly
more correlated with blame acquiescence than either linked fate (expected positive correlation) or awareness of disadvantage (expected negative correlation). Findings did not support these predictions because ingroup identity and linked fate were equally correlated with blame acquiescence, both \( rs(911) = .36, ps < .001 \). Moreover, while ingroup identification was significantly more correlated with blame acquiescence, \( r(911) = .36, p < .001 \), than awareness of disadvantage was, \( r(911) = .12, p < .001, Z = 6.75, p < .001 \), because both relationships were positive (rather than negative), my predictions were not supported. These initial correlational analyses hinted that the predicted moderated mediation models may not find full support.

Hypothesis 2 stated that, among Muslims, linked fate will positively correlate with blame acquiescence, which was supported, \( r(1071) = .42, p < .001 \). As expected, Muslims who perceived their own destiny to be intertwined with their ingroup’s fate took more responsibility for ingroup extremism. Hypothesis 3 stated that awareness of disadvantage will negatively correlate with blame acquiescence, which was not supported, \( r(1071) = .28, p < .001 \). Unexpectedly, Muslims aware of negative beliefs about their group were more, rather than less, likely to acquiesce to blame.

To differentiate minorities from dominants, I further expected ingroup identity to have a positive (as opposed to negative) correlation with blame acquiescence among Muslims, which was supported, \( r(1071) = .18, p < .001 \). Moreover, I predicted that the relationship between linked fate and blame acquiescence would be stronger than the correlation between ingroup identity and blame acquiescence among Muslims, which was supported, \( r(1071) = .41, p < .001, Z = 9.24, p < .001 \). Thus, compared with ingroup identity, linked fate was a stronger correlate of blame acquiescence for Muslims.
(whereas, for Whites, linked fate and ingroup identity were identically correlated with blame acquiescence).

Finally, I expected the absolute value of the negative correlation between awareness of disadvantage and blame acquiescence to be stronger than the positive correlation between ingroup identity and blame acquiescence for Muslims. As noted, awareness of disadvantage was unexpectedly positively correlated with blame acquiescence, $r(1071) = .28, p < .001$. This relationship was larger than the positive correlation between ingroup identity and blame acquiescence, $r(1071) = .18, p < .001, Z = 2.60, p = .009$. Thus, linked fate and awareness of disadvantage were stronger correlates of blame acquiescence than ingroup identity was for Muslims, as expected. However, because the direction of the relationships were not always as predicted, these analyses once again signaled that the moderated mediation in Figure 2 may not be supported.

To demonstrate initial support for the latter part of the model in Figure 2, I expected that blame acquiescence, collective guilt, and reparative action intentions would be positively correlated for both dominant and minority group members. Specifically, hypothesis 4 stated that yielding to blame will positively correlate with collective guilt and hypothesis 5 stated that collective guilt will positively correlate with reparative action intentions, regardless of group status. Both hypotheses were supported. For Whites, blame acquiescence significantly correlated with guilt, $r(911) = .73, p < .001$, and guilt significantly correlated with reparative action, $r(911) = .17, p < .001$. For Muslims, blame acquiescence also significantly correlated with guilt, $r(1070) = .57, p < .001$, and guilt significantly correlated with reparative action intentions, $r(1070) = .38, p < .001$. 
Next, I regressed collective guilt on status, blame acquiescence, and their interaction. The overall model was significant, $R^2 = .54, f^2 = 1.17, p < .001$. Blame acquiescence ($b = .53, p < .001$) but not status ($b = -.08, p = .100$) significantly predicted collective guilt. Unexpectedly, the Status x Blame Acquiescence interaction was significant, $b = .24, p < .001$. Simple effects showed that Whites reported more guilt with greater blame acquiescence than Muslims. These findings did not support hypothesis 4.

I then regressed reparative action intentions on status, blame acquiescence, collective guilt, and their interactions. The model was significant, $R^2 = .11, f^2 = .12, p < .001$. Status ($b = .68, p < .001$) and collective guilt ($b = .36, p < .001$) both emerged as significant predictors of reparative action, but not blame, $b = .07, p = .060$. Notably, the Status x Blame Acquiescence interaction was significant, $b = -.15, p = .003$, as was the Status x Collective Guilt interaction, $b = -.17, p = .002$. Simple effects demonstrated that greater blame acquiescence was associated with slightly higher support for reparative actions for Muslims and slightly lower levels of support for Whites. Moreover, greater collective guilt corresponded to a steeper increase in reparative action support for Muslims than for Whites. These findings did not support hypothesis 5. These preliminary analyses do not provide support for the latter part of the Cross-Status Collective Guilt Model.

**Main Analyses**

Using the bootstrapped PROCESS macro tool in SPSS (Model 83; Hayes, 2018), I tested three serial mediation models examining the role of status as the focal predictor of yielding to ingroup blame, collective guilt, and reparative action intentions. The models included ingroup identification (Model 1), linked fate, (Model 2) or awareness of
disadvantage (Model 3) as the moderator of the relationship between status (coded 1 = dominant, 0 = minority) and blame acquiescence. Results from all three models will be presented below. In all cases, the overall model was significant, $R^2 = .10, f^2 = .11, p < .001$. The direct effect of status on reparative action intentions (path $c'$ in the model) was significant, $b = .63, 95\% \text{ CI} [-.74, -.52]$. The positive relationship indicates that Whites are more willing to engage in reparative actions than Muslims, as previously described.

To test for moderated mediation, each analysis regressed blame acquiescence on status (path $a_1$), the given moderator (ingroup identification, linked fate, or awareness of disadvantage; path $a_3$) and their interaction (path $a_4$).

**Model 1: Ingroup Identification as the Moderator**

I expected a significant Status x Ingroup Identification interaction, and that simple effects would reveal that for Whites, higher ingroup identification results in less blame acquiescence, compared with lower ingroup identification (hypothesis 1). Moreover, this effect should be significantly stronger than any effect of ingroup identification on blame acquiescence among the minority group (see Figure 1). Figure 3 shows the results. The overall model was significant, $R^2 = .31, f^2 = .45, p < .001$. Both status ($b = -1.25, p < .001$) and ingroup identification ($b = .18, p < .001$) significantly predicted blame acquiescence. Moreover, a significant Status x Ingroup Identification interaction emerged ($b = .16, p = .003$). As depicted in figure 4, simple effects revealed that, for Muslims, higher ingroup identification was associated with a steeper increase in blame acquiescence ($b = .34, p < .001$) than for Whites ($b = .18, p < .001$). The positive direction of this relationship for Whites was unexpected. According to prior research, dominant group members high on ingroup identification should be less likely to yield to blame, compared with dominant
group members low on ingroup identification (e.g., Bilali et al., 2012; Doosje & Branscombre, 2003; Miron et al., 2010). Instead, stronger ingroup identification was associated with greater blame acquiescence among Whites. These findings did not support hypothesis 1.

**Comparing Full and Partial Models.** I predicted that the full serial mediation model tested using PROCESS (Model 83; Hayes, 2018) should find more support than either partial model nested within it. Indirect path $a_1b_1$ (Status -> Blame Acquiescence -> Reparative Action) as moderated by ingroup identification was not significant. Specifically, the indirect effect at the mean level of ingroup identification was $b = -.02$, 95% CI [-.09, .04]. Non-significance was determined because the 95% confidence intervals contained zero at all levels of ingroup identification. For indirect path $a_2b_2$ (Status -> Collective Guilt -> Reparative Action), the indirect effect was also $ns$ ($b = .01$, 95% CI [-.01, .04]); this was always the case regardless of the moderator included in the model. By contrast, the full serial mediation model $a_1d_2b_2$ (Status -> Blame Acquiescence -> Collective Guilt -> Reparative Action) was significant. The indirect effect at the mean level of ingroup identification was $b = .20$, 95% CI [.15, .25]. The exclusive significance of the full serial mediation model and not the partial models supported predictions. Moreover, a significant index of moderated mediation emerged when ingroup identification was the moderator in the model (-.03, 95% CI [-.04, -.01]). Overall, ingroup identification moderated the relationship between status and blame acquiescence, albeit in an unpredicted direction.

**Model 2: Linked Fate as the Moderator**
Figure 5 shows the results of using linked fate as the moderator variable. Hypothesis 2 stated that a significant interaction between status and linked fate would emerge. Simple effects should show that higher levels of linked fate correspond to greater acquiescence to blame among minority group members compared to lower levels of linked fate. Moreover, this effect should be significantly stronger than any effect of linked fate on blame acquiescence among the dominant group. The overall model was significant, $R^2 = .35, f^2 = .54, p < .001$. As expected, both status ($b = 1.30, p < .001$) and linked fate ($b = .49, p < .001$) significantly predicted blame acquiescence. However, the predicted Status x Linked Fate interaction did not emerge ($b = -.08, p = .133$). As shown in Figure 6, simple effects demonstrated that higher linked fate was associated with greater acquiescence to blame for both Whites ($b = .49, p < .001$) and Muslims ($b = .42, p < .001$), and thus did not differentiate by group status. These findings did not support hypothesis 2.

**Comparing Full and Partial Models.** I compared the full and partial models with linked fate as the moderator using PROCESS (Model 83; Hayes, 2018). Indirect path $a_1b_1$ (Status -> Blame Acquiescence -> Reparative Action) as moderated by linked fate was not significant. The indirect effect at the mean level of linked fate was $b = -.02, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.09, .05]$, and the 95% confidence intervals contained zero at all other levels of linked fate. The full serial mediation model $a_1d_2b_2$ (Status -> Blame Acquiescence -> Collective Guilt -> Reparative Action) with linked fate as the moderator was significant. The indirect effect at the mean level of linked fate was $b = .21, 95\% \text{ CI } [.16, .26]$. The exclusive significance of the full mediation model and neither partial model supported predictions. However, the index of moderated mediation was non-significant. Thus,
linked fate did not differentially predict blame acquiescence depending on status in any of the models, counter to predictions.

**Model 3: Awareness of Disadvantage as the Moderator**

Figure 7 shows the results of using awareness of disadvantage as the moderator. Hypothesis 3 expected that a significant Status x Awareness interaction would emerge. Simple effects should reveal that greater awareness of disadvantage corresponds to less acquiescence to blame among minorities compared to less awareness. Moreover, I expected that these effects would be stronger than any effect of disadvantage awareness among dominant group members. The model was significant, $R^2 = .27, f^2 = .37, p < .001$. Both status ($b = -1.38, p < .001$) and awareness of disadvantage ($b = .27, p < .001$) were significant predictors of blame acquiescence. As predicted, a significant Status x Awareness interaction emerged, $b = -.16, p < .001$. As shown in Figure 8, simple effects revealed that awareness of disadvantage was associated with a steeper increase in blame acquiescence for Whites ($b = .28, p < .001$) compared to Muslims ($b = .12, p < .001$). The positive relationships between awareness and blame were unexpected for both groups. Thus, hypothesis 3 was not supported.

**Comparing Full and Partial Models.** Using PROCESS (Model 83; Hayes, 2018), I examined whether the full serial mediation model found more support than the partial models when awareness of disadvantage was included as a moderator. Indirect path $a_1b_1$ (Status -> Blame Acquiescence -> Reparative Action) as moderated by awareness of disadvantage was not significant. The indirect effect at the mean level of awareness of disadvantage was $b = -.03, 95\% CI [-.10, .05]$, and the 95% confidence intervals contained zero at all levels of disadvantage awareness. As predicted, the full
serial mediation model $a_1d_2b_2$ (Status -> Blame Acquiescence -> Collective Guilt -> Reparative Action) was significant. The indirect effect at the mean level of awareness of disadvantage was $b = .22$, 95% CI [.17, .27]. Moreover, a significant index of moderated mediation emerged when awareness of disadvantage was the moderator in the model (.03, 95% CI [.01, .04]). Thus, awareness of disadvantage significantly moderated the relationship between status and blame acquiescence, although in an unexpected direction.

**Muslim Replication Sample**

Correlations among focal variables for the Muslim replication sample ($N = 536$) are shown in Table 4, and between focal and demographic variables in Table 7. Correlations replicate those found in the primary Muslim sample with slight variations.

Because group status could no longer be included in the model, I instead tested two serial mediation models using the PROCESS macro tool (Model 6; Hayes, 2018) with linked fate and awareness of disadvantage as the distal predictor in each model, respectively (see Figure 9). To test for discriminant validity, I also tested the model with ingroup identification as the distal predictor. A Monte Carlo power analysis for indirect effects with 1000 repetitions determined that a minimum sample size of $N = 306$ was needed to achieve 80% power in these analyses. Blame acquiescence and collective guilt were serial mediators, and reparative action intentions was the final dependent variable in the model (i.e., Distal Predictor -> Blame Acquiescence -> Collective Guilt -> Reparative Action).

In the first model, shown in Figure 10, linked fate significantly predicted blame acquiescence ($b = .50, p < .001$), blame acquiescence predicted collective guilt ($b = .53, p < .001$), and guilt predicted reparative action intentions ($b = .25, p < .001$). Moreover, the
full serial mediation model was significant (b = .07, 95% CI [.03, .11]), but not the two partial models. Specifically, the indirect effect in the first partial model (Linked Fate -> Blame Acquiescence -> Reparative Action) was non-significant, (b = .04, 95% CI [-.03, .10]), and the indirect effect in the second partial model (Linked Fate -> Collective Guilt -> Reparative Action) was similarly non-significant (b= .00, 95% CI [-.03, .04]).

In Model 2, shown in Figure 11, awareness of disadvantage significantly predicted blame acquiescence (b = .29, p < .001), blame acquiescence predicted collective guilt (b = .56, p < .001), and guilt predicted reparative action intentions (b = .25, p < .001). Moreover, the serial mediation model was significant (b = .07, 95% CI [.03, .11]), as was one of the partial models (Awareness -> Blame Acquiescence -> Reparative Action; b = .05, 95% CI [.02, .10]). Results for the other partial model (Awareness -> Collective Guilt -> Reparative Action) were not significant, b = -.02, 95% CI [-.04, .01]. These findings lend additional support to my hypotheses for minority group members.

Next, to test for discriminant validity, I included ingroup identification as a distal predictor, shown in Figure 12. Ingroup identification significantly predicted yielding to blame (b = .23, p < .001), blame acquiescence predicted collective guilt experiences (b = .55, p < .001), and guilt predicted reporting reparative action intentions (b = .29, p < .001). The full serial mediation model was significant (b = .04, 95% CI [.02, .06]), but not the partial models. The indirect effect in the first partial model (Ingroup Identification -> Blame Acquiescence -> Reparative Action) was not significant (b = .02, 95% CI [-.01, .05]), and the indirect effect in the second partial model (Ingroup Identification -> Collective Guilt -> Reparative Action) was also non-significant, b = -.02, 95% CI [.02,
Where linked fate and awareness of disadvantage were expected to uniquely influence minorities, the pattern of findings with ingroup identification as the distal predictor challenged predictions. These results failed to provide discriminant validity as ingroup identification followed the same patterns in the model as the two theorized predictors.

**Discussion**

The present research tested a Cross-Status Model of Collective Guilt to compare the often-studied dominant group experience of collective guilt with the largely unexplored minority collective guilt experience. The model found strong support for the expected positive relationships among blame acquiescence, collective guilt, and reparative action intentions when investigating White and Muslim American reactions to ingroup extremist violence. Specifically, moderated serial mediation models showed that the full model was uniquely supported in two out of three cases (see Figures 3 and 5). In these same cases, there was evidence for moderated mediation, such that group status interacted with two key predictors of blame acquiescence: ingroup identity (which was a stronger predictor for Whites than Muslims), and awareness of disadvantage (which was a stronger predictor for Muslims than Whites).

Of importance, I expected differences between dominant and minority group members in the factors that predict yielding to blame for ingroup transgressions. Specifically, I expected ingroup identity to uniquely and negatively predict blame acquiescence for Whites, whereas linked fate and awareness of disadvantage would uniquely predict blame acquiescence for Muslims (positively and negatively, respectively). On the contrary, I found more similarities than differences between the two
groups, and the direction of some relationships was unexpected. While this dissertation emphasized the differences between dominants and minorities that might inform collective guilt, the data told a different story.

Results from the current work suggest that Muslims and Whites both recognize that they are stigmatized because of ingroup extremists. Anecdotal evidence supports this finding. Consider University of Colorado student Heraa Hashmi who often hears classmates say: “not all Muslims are terrorists, but all terrorists are Muslims.” Heraa knows that her community is routinely indicted in this way. “I don’t view the KKK or the Westboro Baptist church or the Lord’s Resistance Army as accurate representations of Christianity,” Heraa says, “so it gets very frustrating having to defend myself and having to apologize on behalf of some crazy people” (Mahdawi, 2017). From Utah, Gunner describes his dismay over the cultural narrative that White southerners are racists. He writes to the Race Card Project, an online collection of Americans’ commentaries on race: “Just because I have confederate flags and my family comes from the South does not mean I am a racist” (The Race Card Project, 2015).

Both Heraa and Gunner push back against negative stereotypes of their group and refuse to be held accountable for actions that are not their own. Rather than the minority group uniquely perceiving stigmatization as this dissertation theorized, these accounts illustrate that both Muslims and Whites see a social landscape that vilifies them. This modern reality not only departs from the literature on linked fate and perceived discrimination outlined in the Introduction (e.g., Dawson, 1994), but also diverges from the extensive literature on the dominant group reaction to collective blame that assumed a level of advantage on the part of participants in their social context (e.g., Cehajic-Clancy
et al., 2011). As will be described, study findings challenged hypotheses for a number of reasons including the actively changing social dynamics in American society.

Dominant group members were expected to acquiesce to group blame only when they weakly identified with their group (hypothesis 1), consistent with considerable previous research (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998). By contrast, I hypothesized that minority group members’ chronic encounters with prejudice endows them with a unique sense of linked fate with their group and awareness of their group’s disadvantage that might influence their responses to group blame. Specifically, they might feel compelled to yield to blame if they feel a strong sense of linked fate (hypothesis 2); and feel less willing to acquiesce to blame if they are strongly aware of their group’s social disadvantage (hypothesis 3). Ultimately, blame acquiescence was expected to predict experiencing collective guilt (hypothesis 4), and guilt was expected to predict reparative action intentions (hypothesis 5).

I chose to test these predictions by comparing White and Muslim Americans’ reactions to information about violent ingroup extremists. In January of 2021, primarily White rioters staged an attempted insurrection at the U.S. capitol, and the 20th anniversary of 9/11 brought conversations about Muslim extremism to the fore. The chosen comparison thus proved especially relevant in the current time. Ultimately, study results provided mixed support for hypotheses.

**Hypotheses 1-3**

First, higher ingroup identification was associated with greater blame acquiescence regardless of group status, contradicting hypothesis 1. A serial mediation model with ingroup identification as the moderator showed that high-identifying Whites
actually yielded to blame significantly more than high-identifying Muslims. This finding diverges from literature demonstrating a negative relationship between ingroup identification and yielding to blame for dominants, whereby increasing identification corresponds with decreasing blame acquiescence (e.g., Bilali et al., 2012). Alternate patterns have been found, such as Masson and Barth’s (2019) curvilinear model of group identification and collective guilt, whereby low- and high-identifiers deflected guilt and only moderate-identifiers experienced guilt. However, fictional transgressions were used in that study, whereas I used genuine (and severe) transgressions. Moreover, I found a complete reversal in the expected relationship between ingroup identification and blame acquiescence for Whites (positive, rather than negative). Why might this be the case?

Consider findings from a second mediation model with linked fate as the moderator, which failed to support hypothesis 2. Linked fate was expected to play a unique role in Muslims’ reactions to blame given their status as a devalued minority group in the U.S. (e.g., Barreto et al., 2008). Instead, linked fate was similarly associated with greater blame acquiescence for Whites and Muslims. Linked fate, a construct that has been heavily theorized to capture the unique experiences of minorities who face discrimination in their daily lives, behaved similarly in a model testing the difference that status might play in yielding to blame.

Several factors may explain these unexpected findings for ingroup identification and linked fate. First, the measures used in this study were adapted from past work, not adopted verbatim. The slight variations in wording and measurement style could have influenced the strength of relationships with other variables, but likely would not be the reason for the reversed direction of these relationships. Unexpectedly, my assumption
that ingroup identification and linked fate would differentiate between dominants and minorities was not supported by the data in this study. Ingroup identification and linked fate were significantly correlated for both Whites and Muslims. Moreover, both constructs were equally correlated with blame acquiescence for Whites, and both significantly correlated with blame acquiescence for Muslims (although linked fate was a stronger correlate than ingroup identity, as predicted). Thus, ingroup identification and linked fate unexpectedly acted as tightly linked constructs in the current work.

Are ingroup identification and linked fate measures capturing separate constructs or one broader concept of ingroup attachment? One study showed that group consciousness (similar to ingroup identification) and linked fate could be used almost interchangeably for Black Americans in particular, but are less linked for Hispanic, Asian, and White Americans (Sanchez & Vargas, 2016). Specifically, a factor analysis showed that items measuring group consciousness and linked fate formed the two expected factors for Hispanic, Asian, and White Americans, but formed just one factor for Black Americans. For both Whites and Muslims in the current work, a factor analysis (method: principal components analysis, varimax rotation) examined whether ingroup identification and linked fate items loaded onto the two expected factors. Results demonstrated that a two-factor solution captures 81% of the total variance in data for Whites, and 73% in the data for Muslims. The two-factor solution had an eigenvalue greater than 1 in both cases (Whites: 1.50; Muslims: 1.19). Where items used to measure ingroup identification loaded onto the first factor, and items measuring linked fate loaded on the second factor, the current study did indeed measure two separate constructs that were nevertheless strongly related (all $rs > .50$; see Tables 5-7).
Unpredicted findings emerged regarding Whites’ and Muslims’ awareness of disadvantage as well. Hypothesis 3 stated that only Muslims would show a negative link between awareness of disadvantage and blame acquiescence. Yet, this was the focal variable on which Whites and Muslims presented the most similar scores (see Table 1). Contrary to predictions, awareness of their disparate disadvantages positively correlated with blame acquiescence for both groups. That is, regardless of whether participants were aware that their group was stigmatized as terrorist or as racist, high scores corresponded to yielding more to blame (although the association was stronger for Muslims). The replication sample of Muslims confirmed this positive relationship between awareness of disadvantage and blame acquiescence.

These findings present two puzzles. First, why does awareness of disadvantage relate to more (rather than less) acquiescence to ingroup blame? My predictions were based on prior research showing that minorities high on stigma consciousness tend to attribute discrimination to the dominant group’s prejudice rather than personal failings (Major & Crocker, 1993; Operario & Fiske, 2001; Pinel, 2002; Shelton et al., 2005). Thus, I expected Muslims to deflect blame for ingroup extremism to the extent that they were conscious of their stigmatization. But perhaps items measuring awareness of disadvantage in this study, which examined awareness of cultural stereotypes of their group, were too distant to capture stigma consciousness among participants. In past work, items examined personal perceptions of discrimination (e.g., “To what extent is your racial or ethnic group a target of discrimination” rated on a 9-point scale from not at all to extremely; Operario & Fiske, 2001). The current work more distantly measured stereotype awareness (e.g., “U.S. media promotes the narrative that all Muslims hate...
America”). Agreement with the item about discrimination entails a clear rejection of the group’s treatment in society, while agreement with the awareness item fails to capture participants’ reaction to their group’s treatment (i.e., acceptance, rejection).

As minority group members, Muslims may internalize stereotypes and experience doubt or disrespect toward their group as a result, as is documented in the literature on internalized racism among other minorities (e.g., David, Schroeder, & Fernandez, 2019). Considering results in this light, it is less surprising that those who know their group stereotypes felt more compelled to take responsibility for ingroup transgressions among Muslims, and even among Whites. Future work should amend items for this scale to capture whether participants reject their group stereotypes, and then examine whether the predicted negative relationship between awareness and blame acquiescence emerges.

Sample items could be, “It is wrong that U.S. media promotes the narrative that all Whites are racist” for Whites; and “Muslims suffer when mainstream American culture portrays Islam as a dangerous religion” for Muslims.

The second puzzle is this: Why does awareness of disadvantage relate to blame acquiescence in the same way for Whites and Muslims? In fact, both groups showed little difference in their blame acquiescence as a function of ingroup identity, linked fate, or awareness of disadvantage. Perhaps the mechanics of Whites’ group-based cognition, emotions, and behaviors are less informed by a sense of dominance and power than this research assumed. Predictions about Whites’ responses to blame were based heavily in the assumption that Whites will easily deflect blame because they are individuated as the dominant group in the U.S. (e.g., Fiske, 1993; Sears & Savalei, 2006). In their work on the diversifying U.S. landscape, Sears and Savalei (2006) found that ingroup
identification, common fate, and perceived discrimination (similar to disadvantage awareness in the current work) did little to predict Whites’ intergroup attitudes but were prominent in informing minorities’ attitudes. They concluded that “Whites’ Whiteness is usually likely to be no more noteworthy to them than is breathing the air around them” (Sears & Savalei, 2006, p. 91). This was a foundational assumption for the current work, leading to predictions that Whites would not feel compelled to respond to ingroup blame because society endows them the ability to shrug off ingroup transgressors without accountability.

Instead, patterns in Whites’ responses closely matched those in Muslims’ responses in the current research. Perhaps this is because Whites increasingly view themselves as a minority in the U.S. given the changing demographic landscape of the country (Craig & Richeson, 2017; Jardina, 2019; Schildkraut, 2015). Greater ethnic diversity threatens Whites’ majority status in the U.S., resulting in anti-immigrant attitudes, support for Donald Trump, and the belief that Whites are now more discriminated against than Black Americans (Craig & Richeson, 2014; Major, Blodorn, & Major Blascovich, 2018; Norton & Sommers, 2011). This threat of lost status culminates in the “Great Replacement” theory, “the argument that White populations are being replaced at an ethnic and cultural level through mass migration” (Obaidi, Kunst, Ozer, & Kimel, 2021, p.2). Research has thus far focused on how Whites’ sense of disadvantage predicts lashing back against immigrants and minorities, even producing violent intentions toward salient immigrant groups (Obaidi et al., 2021). But do Whites respond to intergroup situations similarly to minorities in domains where they perceive disadvantages? Extensive work shows that Whites experience stress (Trawalter,
Richeson, & Shelton, 2009) and stereotype threat during interracial interactions because they fear confirming the “racist” White label (e.g., Goff, Steele, & Davies, 2008). In the same vein, the current work would benefit from considering Whites’ responses to blame in the context of their perceived disadvantage.

This theorizing is especially important in a study assessing Whites’ reactions to White supremacists. White supremacy is surging in a moment when many Whites feel that their race is under attack, as the “Great Replacement” theory illustrates. Past collective guilt research assessed Whites’ responses to blame for historical atrocities when Whites solidly stood as the dominant group. But today, Whites may recognize that White supremacists’ attacks are at least partly motivated by the ongoing societal shift from White dominance toward racial parity (Kim, 2019). This would parallel realizations among Muslims that violent Muslim extremists are partly motivated by the historical shift of global dominance from the Muslim world to the Western world wherein Muslims are demonized (The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It, 2008). These shifts build resentment, leading to violence in extreme cases. For the majority of Whites and Muslims, then, agreement that their group is perceived and treated negatively by society should result in yielding to blame and wanting to rectify ingroup transgressions for the sake of repairing the ingroup’s status, as results show for the current study. Moreover, feelings of linked fate and identification with the group should similarly result in blame acquiescence, as was found in the current work.

Hypotheses 4 and 5

Adopting models from past work on collective guilt (e.g., Doosje et al., 2006; Zimmerman et al., 2011) I expected that yielding to blame would predict experiencing
collective guilt (hypothesis 4) and that guilt would predict reporting reparative action intentions (hypothesis 5) for both Whites and Muslims. Regression analyses testing the moderated mediation model in Figure 2 unexpectedly showed that status mattered for the predictive relationships between blame, guilt, and reparative action. Whites yielding to blame more compared to Muslims reported significantly more collective guilt. Moreover, Muslims who acquiesced to blame more or reported more guilt compared to Whites expressed significantly greater intentions to repair harm. These findings failed to provide support for hypotheses 4 and 5 and are difficult to interpret because patterns were nevertheless similar. Status also unexpectedly predicted reparative action intentions, where Whites reported greater intentions to repair harm than Muslims overall.

Given Muslim Americans’ experiences with targeted surveillance from law enforcement and contentious federal programs countering violent extremism, Muslims’ lower willingness to support these reparative measures is perhaps unsurprising. Following 9/11, the FBI and local law enforcement departments including the New York Police Department (NYPD) systematically established surveillance tactics that infringed on the privacy and civil liberties of Muslim American communities. Murray (2004, p. 28) points out that, under the guidance of then Attorney General John Ashcroft, FBI personnel would take “the number of mosques and Muslims in their areas and use this information to establish a yardstick for the number of terrorism investigations they are expected to carry out.” Beyond this, “federal prosecutors, the FBI, and the Department of Homeland Security” would also establish CVE programs claiming to prevent all extremist violence in the U.S. that almost entirely focused on the Muslim American
community (Brennan Center, 2019). In this sociopolitical milieu, Whites have more reason to agree with cooperating with police and promoting non-violence than Muslims.

**Implications, Limitations, and Future Directions**

This dissertation sought to broaden existing conceptions of collective guilt to incorporate the minority group experience. While prior research has investigated vicarious guilt for transgressions on the part of known perpetrators (Lickel et al., 2005; Schmader & Lickel, 2006; Shelton et al., 2006), to my knowledge this study is the first to investigate collective guilt on the part of a minority group often blamed for violent extremism: Muslims. The findings are critical in developing a clear understanding of the role collective guilt plays in our society. Collective guilt has been the driving force behind the drafting of new laws, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. But how do minorities attempt to assuage their guilt? With less access to positions of authority than dominants, minorities may be less able to repair ingroup wrongdoing than dominants, leaving the aversive state of guilt unassuaged. Future research should examine whether power disparities play a role in reparative action intentions (which could also explain why Whites outscored Muslims in the present research), and whether having less power to work toward solutions results in minorities suffering from unassuaged guilt.

The current work presents several limitations that should be addressed in future research. First, Muslim participants were recruited through a snowball sample, dampening the generalizability of findings. While geographically diverse, the Muslim sample scored higher than Whites on all measures of religiosity, and thus the mechanics of collective guilt for less religious Muslims were not necessarily captured in this
dissertation. Moreover, Muslims were far more likely to fail attention check questions than the White sample, likely because only high-performing White MTurk workers were allowed to access our study, and no similar vetting mechanism was available for the Muslim community sample. Ultimately, 8% of Whites recruited for the study failed one or both attention check questions compared to 26% of Muslims sampled. This presents further limitations on the generalizability of findings from the Muslim sample. And while the White sample performed better on attention check questions, it was nevertheless a convenience sample with limited generalizability to Whites nationally. To avoid these issues, future research should recruit a nationally representative sample of Whites and Muslims through a sampling platform such as Cloud Research or a Qualtrics panel.

Several measurement issues also need to be addressed in future iterations of this work. First, the awareness of disadvantage scales need to be amended to reflect rejection of negative stereotypes, not simply awareness that they exist. Second, the reparative action intentions scale presented poor internal reliability. The item relating to apologies did not coalesce with the two remaining items and was thus deleted, leaving just two items. Moreover, both remaining items described actions more likely to be taken by Whites than Muslims or any minority for that matter, as mentioned previously. Future research should reconstruct this measure entirely, describing actions that would feasibly be taken by both Whites and Muslims for the sake of fair comparison. The new measure could ask participants to rate their agreement with items including “I will attend vigils for those killed by [White/Muslim] extremists,” “I will speak out strongly against any violent extremist attack committed in the name of my [race/religion],” and “I will deliberately be a tolerant, healthy role model to change the negative cultural narrative about my
[race/religion] in America.” Beyond looking at intentions, future research could also measure actual reparative actions by asking participants whether they would be willing to donate their study compensation to support victims of ingroup extremist attacks.

Finally, this research tested the Cross-Status Collective Guilt Model only on Whites and Muslims regarding ingroup extremism. Future work should test this model on other groups, using other transgressions, to see whether current findings generalize across religious and ethnic boundaries. Immigrants in the U.S. occupy a unique space of dominant-status in the home country but minority-status in the host country. Research could assess various immigrants’ experiences with collective guilt in response to collective blame in the host country for a given transgression in the home country. This might include Chinese Americans’ reactions to instances of blame for the spread of the coronavirus throughout the current pandemic.

**Conclusion**

This dissertation presents an initial effort to test a model of collective guilt incorporating both dominant and minority intragroup dynamics. Whites’ and Muslims’ reactions to blame for ingroup violent extremism were assessed to determine (1) whether collective guilt would appear among a minority group as it has among dominants in past research (e.g., Cehajic-Clancy et al., 2011) and (2) what the mechanics of collective guilt look like among dominants versus minorities. Collective guilt was found among Muslims—in fact, Muslims outscored Whites on their acquiescence to blame for ingroup extremists and their guilt for extremist attacks. Moreover, the mechanics of collective guilt were very similar for Whites and Muslims, where ingroup identification, linked fate, and awareness of disadvantage behaved similarly as predictors of yielding to blame.
Future work should test the current model with other groups, such as immigrant groups in the U.S. who face collective blame for transgressions committed in their home countries.
References


Islamist and Far-Right Homicides in the United States (2017, February). *National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)*.


The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It: Hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Serial 110-942), 110th Cong. (2008).


Appendix A
Strength of Ingroup Identity

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following items using the provided scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree):

1. Being (White/Muslim) is an important part of how I see myself.
2. I am glad to be a (White/Muslim).
3. The fact that I am (White/Muslim) is an important part of my identity.
4. Being (White/Muslim) is an important part of my self-image.

Note. Adapted from Bilali, Tropp, & Dasgupta, 2012.
Appendix B
Perception of Linked Fate

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following items using the provided scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree):


2. Whatever impacts [White/Muslim] people in the U.S. will also affect me.

3. Because we are viewed as similar, the fate of American [Whites/Muslims] is linked.

4. Whatever people think about American [Whites/Muslims] influences how they think about me.

Note. Adapted from Dawson, 1994.
Appendix C
Awareness of Ingroup Disadvantage

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following items using the provided scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree): 

For Muslims:
1. Mainstream American culture portrays Islam as a dangerous religion.
2. Too many Americans treat Islam as an evil religion.
3. U.S. law enforcement agencies behave as though all Muslims support terrorist attacks.
4. U.S. media promotes the narrative that all Muslims hate America.

For Whites:
1. Mainstream American culture portrays rural White Americans as backwards.
2. Too many Americans treat all Whites as racists.
3. U.S. policies like affirmative action are biased against Whites.
4. U.S. media promotes the narrative that all Whites are racists.

Note. Adapted from Lee et al., 2003.
Appendix D

Acquiescence to Ingroup Blame

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following items using the provided scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree):

1. When a [White/Muslim] person commits an extremist attack, I feel blameworthy knowing that my society holds my group accountable for such acts.

2. When I hear about an extremist attack, I immediately hope it was committed by a non-[White/Muslim] person so my group will not have to take responsibility.

3. Because I am [White/Muslim], I feel some responsibility for acts of extremism committed in the name of my [race/religion].

4. I feel accountable for [Whites’/Muslims’] extremist attacks because we are members of the same [race/religion].

Note: Adapted from Zimmerman et al., 2011.
Appendix E

Collective Guilt

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following items using the provided scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree):

1. When I think about how so many violent extremists in the U.S. come from my group, I sometimes feel guilty.

2. I occasionally feel guilt for the innocent lives taken by my group members who have turned to violent extremism.

3. When I think about the way extremists from my group killed many innocent Americans, I sometimes feel guilty.

4. I do not feel any guilt for my group members’ violent extremism. (reverse coded)

Note: Adapted from Cehajic-Clancy et al., 2011.
Appendix F

Support for Reparative Action for Violent Extremist Attacks

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following items using the provided scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree):

1. [Whites/Muslims] should work with law enforcement to identify extremists in their communities.

2. [Whites/Muslims] should not be expected to apologize for events like the [storming of the Capitol building/Boston marathon bombing].

3. [Whites/Muslims] should work hard to promote non-violence in their communities.
Figure 1. The Cross-Status Collective Guilt Model.
Figure 2. Serial Mediation Models. In the first model, ingroup identification will be included as a moderator. In the second model, linked fate will be included as a moderator. In the third model, awareness of disadvantage will be included as a moderator.
Figure 3. Serial mediation model with ingroup identification as the moderator. Group status was coded 0 = minority, 1 = dominant. The index of moderated mediation was significant. Only the full model was significant. 

***p < .001. **p < .01.

Figure 4. Effects of ingroup identification on blame acquiescence as a function of status.
Figure 5. Serial mediation model with linked fate as the moderator. Group status was coded 0 = minority, 1 = dominant. The index of moderated mediation was not significant. Only the full model was significant.

***p < .001. **p < .01.

Figure 6. Effects of linked fate on blame acquiescence as a function of status.
Figure 7. Serial mediation model with awareness of disadvantage as the moderator. Group status was coded 0 = minority, 1 = dominant. The index of moderated mediation was significant. Only the full model was significant.

*** $p < .001$. ** $p < .01$. 

Figure 8. Effects of disadvantage awareness on blame acquiescence as a function of status.
Figure 9. Serial mediation models for the Muslim replication sample. In the first model, linked fate will be included as the distal predictor. In the second model, awareness of disadvantage will be included as the distal predictor. In the third model, ingroup identification will be included as the distal predictor.
Figure 10. Serial mediation model for the Muslim replication sample with linked fate as the distal predictor. Only the full model was significant.

\[ ***p < .001. **p < .01. \]
Figure 11. Serial mediation model for the Muslim replication sample with awareness of disadvantage as the distal predictor. The full model and the first partial model (awareness of disadvantage -> blame -> reparative action) were both significant. ***p < .001. **p < .01.
Figure 12. Serial mediation model for the Muslim replication sample with ingroup identification as the distal predictor. Only the full model was significant. ***$p < .001$. **$p < .01$.  

Ingroup Identification $\rightarrow$ Acquiescence to Ingroup Blame $\rightarrow$ Collective Guilt $\rightarrow$ Support for Reparative Action
### Table 1

*Descriptive Statistics and Mean Comparisons*

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*Note.* White Americans N = 913. Muslim Americans N = 1073.

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.*
Table 2

Correlations Among Focal Variables for White Americans

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*Note. N = 913.*

**p < .01. ***p < .001.
### Table 3

*Correlations Among Focal Variables for Muslim Americans, Primary Sample*

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Note. *N* = 1073.  
**p < .01. ***p < .001.
Table 4

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Note. N = 536.

**p < .01. ***p < .001.
Table 5

*Correlations Among Demographic and Focal Variables, White Sample*

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*Note. N = 913. Gender was coded 1 = male, 2 = female. High scores on political ID and religious ID reflect greater conservativism. High scores on SES and education reflect a higher socioeconomic status or level of education, respectively. High scores on prejudice reflect greater anti-Black prejudice.*

**p < .01, ***p < .001.
Table 6

*Correlations Among Demographic and Focal Variables, Muslim Primary Sample*

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*Note. N = 1073. Gender was coded 1 = male, 2 = female. High scores on political ID and religious ID reflect greater conservativism. High scores on SES and education reflect a higher socioeconomic status or level of education, respectively. High scores on prejudice reflect greater anti-Black prejudice.  
**p < .01, ***p < .001.*
Table 7

*Correlations Among Demographic and Focal Variables, Muslim Replication Sample*

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*Note. N = 536. Gender was coded 1 = male, 2 = female. High scores on political ID and religious ID reflect greater conservativism. High scores on SES and education reflect a higher socioeconomic status or level of education, respectively. High scores on prejudice reflect greater anti-Black prejudice.*

**p < .01, ***p < .001.