FROM CHALLENGES TO OPPORTUNITIES: INTERORGANIZATIONAL

RESILIENCE BROKERING FOR REFUGEE COMMUNITIES DURING COVID-19

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

From Challenges to Opportunities:

Interorganizational Resilience Brokering for Refugee Communities During COVID-19

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The COVID-19 pandemic swept through the global community causing health, economic, and social crises. In a system-wide disruption like the pandemic, refugee communities are more vulnerable than the general population. They are considered cultural and social minorities who lack the health and legal resources to successfully navigate a new country. Therefore, the refugees rely on humanitarian organizations for resettlement and integration, yet these organizations also face threats from the pandemic due to work stoppages, social distancing, and politically charged contexts. Unless the organizations that serve vulnerable people are resilient, disrupted operations can thwart their ability to execute their mission-driven work, compromising not only the organization's but also the refugees' resilience. This study examines how refugee organizations in the United States and South Korea facilitate their own and refugees' resilience through cross-sector partnerships and strategic uses of information and communication technology (ICT) during the COVID-19 pandemic.

This dissertation takes a communicative approach to understanding organizational and community resilience using community ecology and communication technology theories. Existing research demonstrates that interorganizational networks and ICTs facilitate organizational resilience building. However, organizing mechanisms and how the interdependencies of networks and ICTs cut across levels from organizations to communities is less understood. Furthermore, although community resilience underscores the importance of interdependent communication networks, research on resilience targeting social vulnerability and structural inequalities has been evasive. Ultimately, this dissertation seeks to understand what organizations that broker the resilience of refugee communities need for their own capacity and ability to withstand disruptions.

Through a mixed-methods design using archival analysis, online network surveys, and semi-structured interviews, findings show that resilient organizations are adaptable and communicative. Additionally, organizations and refugees engage in a co-brokering networks where refugees emerge from the background as networks during the pandemic to mitigate organizational challenges. In other words, while organizations broker resilience for refugee communities, the refugees also make significant contributions to organizations' routine operation and workflow, facilitating organizational resilience. The dissertation suggests that refugees are critical assets to organizational resilience, thus, engaging them within organizational structures is crucial for organizational survival.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic swept through communities globally, disrupting societal systems, organizations, and people. The pandemic quickly became a "cascading disaster" involving a combination of health, economic, and social crises resulting in more than 200,000 confirmed cases with an exceeding number of deaths worldwide (Stephens et al., 2020; World Health Organization (WHO), 2020). In a public health crisis, social disparities are especially noticeable because minorities, like refugees, are already at a disadvantage, lacking economic and health resources (Braverman et al., 2004; Vonen et al., 2021).

For decades, the influx of refugees from politically disrupted countries has increased in volume and global significance, transforming community dynamics (Castles, 2003; Edwards, 2016; UNHCR, 2015). Refugees are translocated populations in unfamiliar environments with higher chances of social and cultural exclusions, lacking substantial knowledge of language and culture, laws and regulations, and other life matters (Andrade & Doolin, 2016; Simmonds et al., 1983). The continuing refugee migration led to the creation of cross-sector humanitarian organizations such as faith-based organizations, government bodies, local/international nonprofit (NPOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). These organizations are critical resources and supporters for refugee communities in their migration and resettlement as they work for a humanitarian cause to respond to the needs of the migrants (Andretta & Pavan, 2018; Ferris, 2005). For instance, they provide on-the-ground aid services for refugees (Ramarajan, 2008) , like assisting them from community settlement and integration to advocating for their welfare and policy-related work (Benson, 2019; Trudeau, 2008;

Wolch, 1990; Yang & Saffer, 2018). In a crisis context, the role of humanitarian organizations becomes even more critical because they facilitate information and resources for the refugee communities.

However, the crisis also disrupts the organizations. Oftentimes, the organizations are doubly taxed because disruptions can thwart mission-driven work. If the organizations are disrupted, their dysfunctional operation can stymie services offered for refugees, hence, threatening both the organizations and the refugees' resilience. In other words, the refugee organizations also need to navigate uncertainty for *their* survival while attempting to continue to support their vulnerable constituents. I argue that unless the organizations that serve vulnerable people are resilient themselves, disrupted operations can thwart their ability to execute their mission-driven work. Even more critical is the resilience of organizations during a system-wide disruption, like the COVID-19 pandemic, to ensure their work remains undisrupted and services continue.

Resilience mitigates the effects of crises and reflects the way individuals, organizations, and communities sustain themselves through community networks (Norris et al., 2008). In general, resilience refers to a character or capacity to recover from adversity (e.g., death, disasters, loss) (Clarke & Chenoweth, 2006; Comfort, 1994; Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2002, 2003). For individuals, resilience is the capacity to build stability after traumatic experiences (Afifi, 2018a; Bonanno, 2004; Theiss, 2018). Organizational resilience brings sustainability and stable functioning to organizations in crisis (Buzzanell, 2010; Chewning et al., 2012; Doerfel, 2016; Doerfel & Haseki, 2013). Organizational resilience is also treated as a set of communication and coordinating

processes that mitigate how individual organizational members become resilient, reflecting their internal capacity for transformation (Lengnick-Hall & Beck, 2005).

Existing research emphasizes the development of resilience (e.g., how individuals gain or how organizations foster it) but has yet to capture the complexity of community resilience of the vulnerable mediated through organizational efforts or to determine organizational breaking points and their implications. Although community resilience underscores the importance of interdependent communication networks, research on resilience targeting social vulnerability and structural inequalities has also been evasive. For instance, research has often been more fixated on the resilience of property and people that matter (i.e., general community members) rather than the marginalized community (i.e., refugees) (Klinenberg, 2003; Uekusa, 2018). In more recent research, individual refugees' psychological resilience has been studied to understand how they recover from traumatic experiences of displacement (e.g., Carlson et al., 2012; Darychuk & Jackson, 2015; Doron, 2005; Hutchinson & Dorsett, 2012; Marfleet, 2007). However, little is known about the complex dynamics between refugees in their new communities of settlement and humanitarian organizations. The ways organizations communicate and collaborate with their networks and utilize information and communication technology (ICT) can further help us understand the resilience processes and how it furthers the resilience of the refugee communities they support.

In this dissertation, I focus on organizational communication processes and practices that enhance resilience for humanitarian organizations to negotiate their disrupted environment in two contexts—the United States and South Korea. Through a mixed-methods design approach, I explore the organizations' roles in the network and the

degree to which they negotiate resource-dependent relationships with other organizations in their cross-sector connections. Specifically, I assess the role each network plays in the relationship, and how the relationship evolved from before to during the pandemic. I also explore the sudden shift to virtual communication affected refugee organizations' resilience during the pandemic.

Findings show that organizations and refugees engage in co-brokering relationships, demonstrating resilience is relational, built through networked forms of communication. As the organizations thrive to continue their routine services for refugees, the refugee communities emerge as organizational assets, assisting organizational workflow and operation. Ultimately, both refugee organizations and the refugee communities are nested within a complex cycle of mutually influential relationships where refugees also contribute to organizational resilience.

The dissertation contributes to the interdisciplinary scholarship of communication, networks, and communication technology. Theoretically, it advances prior research on organizational resilience by underscoring the less explored social network roles and strategic ICT use by organizations working for marginalized communities. In doing so, the research offers theoretical insights into organizations and communities from local to global, expanding a more holistic definition of community resilience of the vulnerable and network.

The following chapters review the literature relevant to community and organizational crisis, resilience, interorganizational networks, and communication technology.

Chapter 2: The Case of Refugees

Refugees and Humanitarian Organizations

Refugees are forced migrants, translocated in unfamiliar environments with higher chances of social and cultural exclusions. In the last few decades, the influx of refugees from politically disrupted countries has increased in volume and global significance transforming the community dynamics (Castles, 2003; Edwards, 2016; UNHCR, 2015). The issues pertaining to refugees have been a critical transnational agenda and a chronic concern in world affairs (Gurtov, 1991). In 2015, the EU experienced a peak in refugee migration which has been identified as the *refugee crisis*, where an "average of 24 people per minute, or 34,000 people per day, were displaced from their homes" (Sánchez & Lillie, 2019, p.4240).

Refugees are often marginalized from both their country of origin and their newly arrived country (Caidi et al., 2010; Kissau, 2012; Kissau & Hunger, 2010). Refugees are expected to navigate basic information, laws and regulations, culture, and the community on their own (Andrade & Doolin, 2016; Simmonds et al., 1983). Refugees are also vulnerable to uncertain boundaries of the physical and social community. As refugees migrate to a new community, their physical community of settlement begins in temporary shelters, camps, government hostels, or boarding houses (Simmonds et al., 1983). Over time, these built environments either become a permanent place of residence for refugees, where they create their sub-communities, or they may seek to integrate into a new community—both physically and socially. However, the process of integrating into and becoming part of the physically co-located space within the host community is slow and requires social, political, and cultural compromises (Alencar, 2017). Furthermore, even if

refugees become physically bound in the new area of settlement, it does not guarantee social and cultural inclusion, both critical aspects of their migration. As a result, refugees often create and strengthen their homogenous networks, becoming a sub-community within the larger host community (Alencar, 2017; Andrade & Doolin, 2016). However, within the settlement community, refugees are marginalized, struggling to integrate.

Research argues that refugees often struggle with maladjustments to the new surroundings that affect their day-to-day lives, which also then stymie the integration process. While refugees are considered important social actors in their own community, their voices are marginalized (Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017) within the settlement host community. They are depicted as subjects of concern, needing assistance, often vilified, stereotyped, and viewed as hapless, passive victims (Anand, 2012). Malkki's (1996) seminal work on refugees of Tanzania revealed that refugees are considered "speechless" within political, historical, and cultural spaces (p.377). Refugees lack agency, particularly in political contexts, and are "objects of migration policies, beneficiaries of assistance or individuals with traumatic stories" (Godin & Doná, 2016, p.61).

In the United States, for example, refugees are depicted as inferior to non-refugee immigrants (including undocumented ones) because the latter is "more closely conformed to the preferred narratives of American immigration," creating a false hierarchy among immigrant groups (Steimel, 2009, p.68). Refugees live on the margins of the nation-state as inhabitants but not citizens; they are key producers in the economy but not an official part (de Genova & Peutz, 2010). Thus, refugees rely heavily on humanitarian organizations and their support (Andretta & Pavan, 2018).

The continuing migrations of refugees led to the creation of cross-sector humanitarian organizations such as faith-based organizations, government bodies, and local/international NGOs and NPOs. These organizations work for a humanitarian purpose emerging to respond to the needs of the vulnerable refugees (Andretta & Pavan, 2018; Ferris, 2005). The humanitarian organizations are critical resources and supporters for refugee communities in their settlement. For instance, they provide on-the-ground aid services for refugees (Ramarajan, 2008), like assisting them from community settlement and integration to advocating for their welfare and policy-related work (Benson, 2019; Trudeau, 2008; Wolch, 1990; Yang & Saffer, 2018). They also engage millions of civilians through advocacy and education (Lewis & Kanji, 2009).

Mainstream humanitarian organizations like United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the United Nations (UN) coordinate and collaborate as networks with governmental entities to resolve refugee issues (Lee, 2015). Major news media and social influencers (e.g., celebrity advocates, politicians, etc.) are part of the multi-dimensional community network as well. They contribute to the works and organizing narratives of individual refugees and humanitarian organizations (e.g., websites, reports, public statements, etc.). The media play a particularly important role as both gatekeepers and information brokers to the larger public (Sheufele, 1999). Notably, refugee issues are complex, and many humanitarian nonprofits are constantly under unsettled disruptions (e.g., policy change, dwindling funding, anti-immigrant movement, nationalism, etc.). After decades of refugee migration across the globe, refugees and their community dynamics differ by culture and political contexts. The United States and

South Korea, for instance, demonstrate the contrasting history and cultural *Othering* of refugees.

Refugees in the United States

The United States refugee policy initially began in the years after World War II without a systematic resettlement process. Although waves of refugee migration came from various countries in South America, Asia, and Europe, the resettlement system was not processed as federal efforts until 1960, forcing refugees to rely on their own resources and private aid to settle prior to that (Zucker, 1983). Over the years, refugee admission and resettlement in the United States became more systematic and institutionalized through networked efforts of private nonprofit voluntary agencies (VOLAGs) and public sectors. Prior to 1980, Cubans and Indochinese refugees were primary settlers to the United States as well as Soviet Jews who left Israel for the United States through the Carter administration's human rights initiatives and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Foreign Trade Act (Zucker, 1983).

The United States refugee program has been considered "one of the most successful humanitarian programs in US history" (Kerwin, 2018, p.207) since 1980. Programs like the United States Refugee Admission Program (USRAP) have resettled more than three million refugees since the passing of the Refugee Act of 1980 (Kerwin, 2018). However, the Trump administration used refugee programs as an attack on legal immigration programs in 2017, creating one of the most dire circumstances for refugees. During the Trump administration, refugees were framed as "a burden and a potential threat" to the United States rather than as a source of "strength, renewal and inspiration" (Kerwin, 2017, p.205). The dwindling political shifts on immigration policy radically

reduced refugee admission in 2018, where less than half of the initially planned number of admissions were granted. Furthermore, the pressing immigration reform denied refugees from Muslim-majority states, intentionally slow-walking the interview, screening, and admission processes followed by even higher admission cuts in the 2019 fiscal year (Miliband, 2018). Such attempts intensified public stigma because the malicious attacks framed refugees as "terrorists and criminals" questioning their willingness and ability to integrate into the United States (Kerwin, 2017, p. 209). However, contrary to the past administration's contentious framing of refugees, federal reports show that the refugee resettlement system helped refugees to become economically self-sufficient through high early employment rates. Refugees also make significant contributions by revitalizing economically depressed communities in the United States. Importantly, national migration records show that refugees pay more in taxes than they receive in public benefits (UNHCR, 2016b).

Refugees in South Korea

South Korea has not been a hospitable destination for international refugees. According to the Korean immigration service, between 1997 and mid-2012, only 6.5% of refugee applications were granted refugee status (*Refugee admission to South Korea*, 2021). Moreover, legal protection and social infrastructure for refugee resettlement have been extremely limited (Lee, 2018). However, South Korea is more amiable to North Korean refugees, and they are ethnically privileged (Žmegač, 2005) based on their shared Korean heritage. Unlike other international refugees (e.g., Afghani, Yemeni, etc.), North Korean refugees' resettlement process progresses more rapidly upon their arrival in South Korea. North Korean refugees are granted South Korean citizenship upon entry and are

immediately eligible for the government's resettlement programs (Lee, 2015). After weeks of inspection to verify their authenticity (i.e., validating that they are not spies or those of ill-intent), the North Korean refugees are required to stay at the Unity Institute (hanawôn) for twelve weeks to receive basic education about South Korea. Then, they are assigned to government-subsidized rental apartments located across the country and begin their lives as local residents (Lee, 2015). The state assigns three advocacy officers to each North Korean refugee who assist residential, vocational, and security concerns. The refugees also receive resettlement funds and are eligible for various social security benefits like pension. Younger North Korean refugees also can receive college tuition assistance. The government also established the North Korean Refugees Foundation in 2010 to coordinate and support long-term assistance, including counseling programs. The Ministry of Unification oversees this entire process in cooperation with other government entities (*Korea Institute for National Unification*, 2021).

As the cases of the United States and South Korea demonstrate, communities with a large population of refugees are inevitably more complex in terms of constituents, dynamics, and networks. Furthermore, regardless of where refugees settle, they struggle as the cultural, social, and political *Others*. The refugees may be part of a physical community residing within the built environment. However, both socially and structurally, these refugees are vulnerable and neglected, especially when disruptions emerge because they are considered cultural and social minorities (Uekusa & Matthewman, 2017; Xin et al., 2013). The next section explores and conceptualizes COVID-19 as a critical disruption that brought havoc to refugee communities but also humanitarian organizations.

Chapter 3: COVID-19

COVID-19 as Critical Community Disruption

The COVID-19 pandemic has challenged how we understand crises and disasters, advancing thought about resilience on multiple levels. The pandemic swept through communities globally, disrupting societal systems, organizations, and people. COVID-19 has become a "cascading disaster" involving a combination of health, economic, and social crises (Stephens et al., 2020, p.427). The World Health Organization (WHO) (2020) declared COVID-19 a pandemic, as it has involved more than 200,000 confirmed cases with exceeding number of deaths across over 160 countries. COVID-19 is considered as "a collective cosmology event" in which both "short- and long-term outlooks for the professional and quotidian aspects of our lives were shrouded in a fog of uncertainty" (Stephens et al., 2020, p.427).

The COVID-19 pandemic spread quickly and was difficult to control, especially in its early stages, shifting lives of people and organizations across (Wardman, 2020). The WHO recommended frequent handwashing, social distancing, and implementing rapid testing systems (Scally et al., 2020). Governments mandated social distancing and closure of nonessential businesses, and mask-wearing quickly became an international ordinance. Many organizations transformed their operations to slow the spread of the virus (Jung et al., 2020). Flexible working pattern, time, and wage systems were introduced. For instance, in the UK, the government issued a wage replacement scheme and shifted to remote work.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, many vulnerable populations, such as refugees, have continued to lack proper healthcare due to unstable legal status or limited

institutional supports. Social disparities are especially noticeable in health-related disasters because ethnic minority communities are already at a social disadvantage due to a lack of economic and health resources (Braverman et al., 2004). Refugees were especially vulnerable to the impact of COVID-19. For those in refugee camps, the infectious disease caused havoc given the social and physical conditions of being in confined spaces where social distancing was not an option (Raju & Ayeb-Karlsson, 2020). Refugee communities are often in high density spaces with poor access to sanitation and limited health services (Truelove et al., 2020; Vince, 2020). Living conditions for homeless refugees and migrants can undermine their ability to follow public health advice—including basic hygiene measures, quarantine, or self-isolation— because many people are in close contact and gather in large groups (Bajunirwe, 2020).

Responses to COVID-19 in the United States and South Korea

When the COVID-19 began, and in various phases of the pandemic, the United States and South Korea have responded differently. On January 20, 2020, both the United States and South Korea announced their first case of COVID-19 (Goodman & Schulkin, 2020). Two days later, former president Trump stated that the United States has the pandemic "totally under control" (Goodman & Schulkin, 2020, p. 6). At the same time, South Korea quickly began mobilizing diagnostic testing including drive-through screening centers and quarantines. The United States experienced deficient political commitment and dysfunctional institutional coordination that handicapped an effective and timely crisis response (Carter & May, 2020). Although forced interruptions like lockdowns were in place, policy scholars criticized the response among U.S. government

institutions and healthcare organizations as inefficient and uncoordinated. This expedited COVID-19's mass spread (Chernozhukov et al., 2021; Yong, 2020).

South Korea was one of the countries most affected by the pandemic at an early stage. However, by implementing a public-private partnership (PPP) model in which healthcare organizations and government entities collaborated, Korea mitigated rapid transmission of the virus, especially during its early stage. The networked efforts enabled mass testing—even available to undocumented migrants—along with patient triage and a transparent information flow with ICTs such as patient-tracking apps (Her, 2020). Strong border control and quarantine requirements, bans on gatherings, and mandated mask-wearing flattened the curve without forced lockdowns and the paralysis of national health and economic systems (You, 2020; Lee et al., 2020). Humanitarian organizations in South Korea also had access to healthcare resources for refugees including the distribution of testing kits and face masks (Jung, 2020). In putting such policies into place, organizational-level communication and planning were at the forefront in brokering community resilience building because the efforts were viewed as minimizing further threats for the entire community.

The pandemic has challenged how we view crisis, advancing our understanding of resilience on multiple levels. The pandemic swept through communities globally, disrupting societal systems, organizations, and people. Therefore, I conceptualize the COVID-19 pandemic as a critical crisis in this study. Because the pandemic continues, returning to normal is still a controversial matter and the possibility of building community resilience dwindles. However, the global community needs resiliency to adapt to change and move forward. Next, I review existing literature.

Chapter 4: Literature Review

This dissertation is informed by a constellation of research in communication with a particular emphasis on community, crisis, resilience, organizational networks, and communication technology.

Community

A community is an unrestricted, open system (Wilson, 2010), made up of ecological, physical, and social infrastructures in which populations, organizations, and structural norms coexist and form networks (Norris et al., 2008; Park & Burgess, 1925; Sampson, 2012). Within a community, there are: (a) individuals who receive services and who work on behalf of organizations; (b) organizations that carry out mission-driven work; (c) media that serve as gatekeepers for information; and (d) governments that institute policy and laws shaping how individuals and organizations work and are held accountable (Kim & Ball-Rokeach, 2006; Park & Burgess, 1925; Taylor & Doerfel, 2011). Communities undergo constant negotiation between structural environments and social features (e.g., crime, social inequality) (Sampson, 2012), and promote civil society where cooperative social relationships occur on multiple levels. Arguably, individuals, organizations, and ideological leaders collaborate and facilitate public goods which are network-driven (Doerfel & Taylor, 2004, 2017; Taylor & Doerfel, 2011).

As the community members—people and organizations—form relationships, not all constituents have access to organizational networks or resources. For socially and culturally marginalized populations with higher levels of vulnerability than others, the notion of a community doesn't equate to the general population. For example, refugees are translocated populations in unfamiliar environments with higher chances of social and

cultural exclusions. Refugees are expected to navigate basic information, laws and

regulations, culture and the community in under-resourced settings (Andrade & Doolin,

2016; Simmonds et al., 1983). Therefore, humanitarian assistance is crucial for their

survival and negotiating boundaries with the settlement community. Therefore, in this

study, I explore the networked dynamics of two communities—refugee communities and

community of organizations.

For refugee communities, their post-migration settlement requires lengthy

negotiation and integration process. As the refugees migrate to a new community, their

physical spaces of settlement begin in temporary shelters, camps, government hostels, or

boarding houses (Simmonds et al., 1983). In the United States, about 78 percent of

resettled refugees are placed in the cities (*UNHCR*, 2022). Urban cities offer more

opportunities for refugees to find employment and access resources although they often

live in non-functional public housing like collective centers (i.e., pre-existing communal

buildings that host populations displaced by conflict or disaster) (Huntoon, 2001; Patrick,

2004). In South Korea, refugees mostly reside in government-subsidiary housing upon

completing socialization training (Lee, 2015). Over time, these built environments either

become permanent places of residence where they create their sub-communities or they

may seek to integrate into a new community—both physically and socially. However, the

process of integrating into and becoming part of the physically co-located space within

the host community is slow and requires social, political, and cultural compromises

(Alencar, 2017). As a result, refugees often create and strengthen their homogenous

networks, becoming a sub-community within the larger areas of their settlement

(Alencar, 2017; Andrade & Doolin, 2016). Oftentimes, refugees can come together and

find their social community through local refugee organizations. Humanitarian organizations are critical resources for refugees as they seek community settlement and social inclusion (Ramarajan, 2008). They also engage community civilians through advocacy and education (Lewis & Kanji, 2009), while providing on-the-ground services to aid refugees' post-settlement life. Arguably, the humanitarian organizations and refugees are strongly connected.

Community of organizations, or community ecology theory (Monge & Contractor, 2003) demonstrates networks within and across sectors. As the cross-sector networks engage in active resource exchange, they create cooperative or competitive relationships (Hawley, 1950; Monge & Contractor, 2001). Especially in humanitarian sector, much of what the organizations do (or can do) for the refugees are dictated by its multi-level networks like the policymaking entities or sponsoring organizations that provide financial and material resources. For instance, at both national and international levels, mainstream organizations for refugees (e.g., UNHCR, Amnesty International) coordinate and collaborate with policymaking government entities to mitigate humanitarian crisis. Major news media and social influencers (e.g., celebrity advocates, politicians, etc.) are also part of the cross-sectoral and cross-level community network. These entities contribute to the work and organizing narratives (e.g., websites, reports, public statements, etc.) of individual refugees and organizations (Sheufele, 1999) and reproduce narratives that reflect values for and against the presence of refugees. As a result, communities with a large population of refugees are inevitably more complex in terms of constituent dynamics and networks.

Communication research emphasize the role of the storytelling as the key enabler of multi-level communication and networks that facilitate active resource exchange for ethnic minorities and vulnerable populations (e.g., low-income, immigrants). Particularly, communities are also comprised of a communication infrastructure that facilitates a storytelling network (Kim & Ball-Rokeach, 2006) enabling narrative-based constituent dynamics (e.g., individuals talking to one another for information sharing) (Matsaganis & Seo, 2014). Macro-level ideological leaders such as mass media systems and policymaking governmental institutions tend to focus their storytelling on larger urban areas (e.g., entire city, country)(Matsaganis et al., 2014). For community-based organizations and small-sized, ethnic media (i.e., media created by and for specific ethnic populations), narratives are shared within and across the built environments and with the populations of people and organizations. Organizations also rely on storytelling as a communication process for sensemaking among their stakeholder networks (Boje, 1991). The multiple levels that coexist and form networks through narratives facilitate processes of information sharing, civic engagement, and social capital exchange (Kim & Ball-Rokeach, 2006; Matsaganis & Seo, 2014). As such communication occurs within the community, humanitarian organizations may influence the ways in which refugees engage in with the storytelling network and community infrastructure. In other words, as organizations do their work for refugees, the way they communicate (e.g., decision-making, coordination, networking, etc.) may affect the narratives of the refugees within the settlement communities. Doerfel and Taylor (2017) showed that among civil society organizations, networks relied on institutions to perpetuate narratives germane to their

initiatives. For example, USAID and George Soros Fund served a vital role in reproducing prodemocracy narratives. Therefore, I ask:

RQ 1: What do humanitarian organizations communicate with the settlement community about refugees during the COVID-19 pandemic?

Next, I explore community disruptions that threaten communities.

Organizational and Community Crisis

Crises unexpectedly disrupt physical, social, and cultural systems, threatening fundamental values and norms of community systems (Rosenthal et al., 1989). In organizations, various internal and external crises threaten their reputation, operation and survival (Booth, 1993; Shaluf et al., 2003), and system, beliefs and goal priorities (Seeger & Ulmer, 2002). Moreover, crises can even limit access to various resources that organizations need to manage disruptions (Doerfel et al., 2010b; Dynes, 1970; Krackhardt & Stern, 1988; Runyan, 2006; Vandeford et al., 2007).

Crisis generally occurs through both "natural and manufactured events" (e.g., intentional harm, accidents, dangerous threats) (Dynes, 1970; Shaluf et al., 2003, p. 50). Organizational crises can also result in media or government scrutiny, damaging organization's reputation as well as impairing business operations (Fink, 1986). Sudden organizational crises could also draw media attention, and threaten public trust (Alexander, 2005; Sawalha et al., 2013).

Because organizational crises often result in ambiguous conditions, *how* organizations take actions in response to a crisis can affect both their short- and long-term survival (Chewning, 2015). Responding to a crisis requires information, material, and network resources (Runyan, 2006; Sellnow & Seeger, 2013; Vandeford et al., 2007) to

ensure timely reputation and image management (Adams & Roebuck, 1997; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993; Stephens et al., 2020). Organizations also need to come up with effective response tactics (Darling, 1994) because oftentimes the disruptions threaten the entire organizational system (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). Organizations that are able to handle crises promptly and honestly can reduce the severity of damage while regaining public trust (Coombs, 1999; Murry & Shohen, 1992; Seeger & Ulmer, 2001; Seeger, 1986). As the crises vary in intensity and severity (Stephens et al., 2005), they often require immediate attention and action although, these can also be outside of the organization's control (Adams & Roebuck, 1997; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993).

Existing research mostly focuses on crises as a public relations issue that needs to be managed for reputation and image repair and less is understood about a critical event like the COVID-19 that unfold over time into multi-level, cascading disaster. For instance, mainstream crisis literature illustrate how organizations communicate with stakeholders during a crisis or leverage networks to prompt rapid recovery (e.g., Coombs, 1999; Coombs & Holladay, 2012; Seeger & Ulmer, 2001).

However, community crises affect both people and organizations, resulting in destruction, loss, and damage to the entire society (Alexander, 2005; Jorgustin, 2012; Parker, 1992). Community crises are high-impact events that leave large-scale damage to the society and its infrastructure, often leaving the systems impaired (Cutter et al., 2003; Biswas & Choudhuri, 2012; Lindell, 2013; Wilson & Oyola-Yemaiel, 2001). For example, the COVID-19 pandemic cut across globally, affecting communities, organizations, and individuals all at once (Shibata, 2020). The pandemic is unlike most crises organizations or communities had to handle like typical public relations matters

(e.g., reputation, public image, etc.) or disruption to their profit goals. Additionally, most organizational crises can be averted either as time goes by or via strategic management plans (Spilan & Crandall, 2002). However, such aversion is very difficult in a community crisis, especially by a single organization alone. Thus, crisis management is collaborative and requires networks.

Crisis that emerge to the entire community requires active networking with community stakeholders for rapid response or mitigation (Moe et al., 2007; Parker, 1992; Chewning, 2015). However, in a cascaded, multi-level community crisis, even such networks are threatened. For example, when a community suffers from the massive destruction of infrastructures and systems, individual organizations also experience dysfunction (e.g., employees can't show up to work) and people are challenged, too (e.g., experiencing personal losses). Similarly, when organizations that serve vulnerable parts of the community experience internal or external crises, the disruptions could spiral from organizational dysfunction and stymied operation to impact the larger community when organizational productivity is compromised. Therefore, examining how a community disruption affects various parts of the community—infrastructural, systemic, social, and people—can help identify the ways in which particular actions and inactions are interdependent. To deal with unprecedented vulnerabilities such as those seen in a pandemic, resilience is an important construct to help us understand how communities respond to the disruptions. The notion of community disasters and crisis seek the urgent need for resilience research that models the way communities respond to, recover from, and eventually sustain during and after disruptions. The next section turns to resilience as a construct that addresses processes that may mitigate the impacts of disruptive events.

Resilience

Resilience is a multi-level construct that reflects the way individuals, organizations, and communities respond to, recover from, and eventually sustain themselves from disruptions. Individual resilience demonstrate how people recover from trauma through social support (Afifi et al., 2011; Afifi, 2018b; Maguire & Wilson, 2013). In organizational context, individual resilience is the ability for employees to process and respond to adverse events (Tonkin et al., 2018). When individual employees are resilient, they can accept adversity and make efforts to adapt to changing environments through communication (Agarwal & Buzzanell, 2015). They communicate, exchange information or network with others to legitimize negative experiences (Buzzanell, 2010).

Organizational resilience also reflects how they minimize the disruptions to ensure routine workflow (Boin & Comfort, 2010). Communication can mitigate the impacts of disruptions (Lengnick-Hall et al., 2011). More specifically, disrupted organizations become resilient through the following communication processes—crafting normalcy, affirming identity anchors, maintaining and using communication networks, constructing alternative logic, and foregrounding productive action while backgrounding negative feelings (Buzzanell, 2010). The communication for resilience is further supported when communication and information technologies (ICTs) enable leveraging information and social networks (Doerfel & Haseki, 2015; Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003, 2003; Majchrzak et al., 2007a).

As Wilson et al. (2021) highlight, networked forms of communication is a critical facilitator for organizational resilience. For example, in Barbour et al.'s (2020) study on local emergency planning committees, resilience was improved when response plans

involved cross-sector networks, suggesting that interorganizational networks enhance resilience.

Interorganizational networks enable both individuals and organizations to adapt after disruption, thus, become more resilient (Harris & Doerfel, 2017b; Houston, 2018b). During crisis, resilience is an outcome of networked forms of sensemaking where response planning becomes a collective effort (Hutter et al., 2013). Interorganizational networks contribute to resilience in two ways. First they enable organizations to assist one another while the affected organizations themselves can function and manage their internal workflow (Jung, 2017). Second, interorganizational partnerships can build social capital for the organizational communities to adapt and grow together (Aldrich, 2012; Rivera & Nickels, 2014). Within the organizational communities, social capital is induced by trust, interdependence, and ties within and across sectors that support organizational resilience (Doerfel et al., 2010a, 2013).

For communities in general, resilience also requires the collective and networked efforts of people and organizations to resist and cope with disruptions, and being capable of withstanding threats (Buzzanell, 2010; Houston, 2018). To build community resilience, collective efforts of community members resist and cope with threats and disruptions that are often short-term and punctuated as one-time events (Ahmed & Veronis, 2019; Coles & Buckle, 2004; Ganor & Ben-Lavy, 2003; Kimhi & Shamai, 2004; Norris et al., 2008; Paton & Johnston, 2001; Pfefferbaum et al., 2013; Sonn & Fisher, 1998).

Community members whether individuals or organizations, also demonstrate resilience as a process, outcome, or set of traits to recover from disruptions (Bonanno,

2004; Chewning et al., 2012; Comfort, 1994; Doerfel, 2016; Doerfel & Haseki, 2013).

For a community as a whole, being resilient also means being capable of withstanding

disruptions through community networks (Norris et al., 2008). Being networked as a

community enables the active exchange of information and resources, and this

strengthens community resilience (Barbour et al., 2020; Buzzanell & Houston, 2018;

Houston & Buzzanell, 2018). Community resilience involves multiple constituents to

communicate across levels through a complex and multi-level network (e.g., members

receiving organizational assistance from multiple sectors of organizations and

stakeholders drawing on information from each other as well as from media). Resilience

processes may be driven by a range of goals from sustaining normalcy to transformation

(Lengnick-Hall et al., 2011). Resilience can also be seen as an internal capacity that

affects organizational fitness or transformational ability (Lengnick-Hall & Beck, 2005)

and in turn helps communities recover from adverse events. Arguably, existing research

on organizational resilience underscores networked forms of communication as

resilience-building mechanisms.

In organizational literature, resilience is treated as a set of communication and

coordinating processes that mitigate disruptions like crises, disasters, and pandemics.

However, in community resilience research, an understanding of social vulnerability and

structural inequalities has been elusive. Research about refugee and resilience typically

emphasizes individual refugees' psychological resilience (e.g., overcoming traumatic

experiences) as they flee for life. Although communities have vulnerable and

underrepresented populations, their resilience is not accounted for in usual community

resilience assessments. Social disaster research has often fixated on the resilience of

people that matter (i.e., general community members) rather than the marginalized community (i.e., refugees) (Klinenberg, 2003).

A community is a combination of dominant and marginalized populations who have vastly different social and community agency. In a way, humanitarian organizations and their networks enable communities to embrace refugees as part of both built and social structures, and this may facilitate resilience building. In such cases, organizational networks and organizing extend beyond their organizational ecology. Organizations have to negotiate and navigate changing norms, systems, and policies, as well as the specific resources that help refugees. In these processes, refugee community's resilience may be compromised unless organizations and their networks interdependently resolve various issues related to the pandemic's disruption. Notably, refugees are tied to complex social issues and are particularly neglected during disasters due to societal, cultural, and even resource limitations; so are the organizations.

Even though each domain of research on resilience considers the development of resilience (e.g., how individuals become resilient or how organizations foster resilience), research has yet to capture the complexity of community resilience mediated through organizational efforts. Merely "having" resilient individuals or media systems won't generate community resilience. When organizing efforts are collectively coordinated and communicated (e.g., organizations reaching out to the media or individuals about certain threats), then resilience can be facilitated and brokered. For organizations, resilience is treated as a set of communication and coordinating processes that mitigate community resilience during pandemics. In a community where multiple constituents coexist and network across one another through complex relationships (e.g., members receiving

organizational assistance, multiple sectors of organizations and stakeholders), community resilience is collectively and interdependently built. However, how community resilience is brokered or mediated has been an elusive research agenda (Houston & Buzzanell, 2018). In other words, how resilience cuts across levels from organizations to vulnerable community can be further explored. For example, humanitarian organizations work directly with refugees and victims of disease, famines, and disasters by providing information, material, and life-related resources (Fu & Lai, 2020). In such a way, refugee organizations can also prevent further risks and building the resilience of vulnerable individuals and communities (Lindenberg & Dobel, 1999).

In this study, organizational resilience is conceptualized as a networked form of communication process that enables organizations to continue their routine work (Boin & Comfort, 2010) so that their mission-driven services for the refugees are not compromised. Resilience can also be seen as an internal capacity that affects organizational fitness or transformational ability (Lengnick-Hall & Beck, 2005) and in turn helps communities recover from adverse events. Resilience is a multi-level construct based on interdependent communication that results in a range of outcomes—effective to ineffective, organized to disorganized, coordinated to dispersed—within the community or organizations for vulnerable communities. Therefore, I ask:

RQ 2: How do large-scale disruptions, like the COVID-19 pandemic, affect the organizations and the services they offer for refugees?

H1: Large disruptions are likely to affect organizations and the services they offer for refugees.

Thus, the following section discusses organizational ecology and interorganizational networks of the humanitarian sector.

Humanitarian Sector and Interorganizational (IOR) Networks

Refugees rely heavily on aid organizations that offer resources, services, and assistance throughout their migration and settlement journey. For refugees, many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) serve paramount roles in navigating complex sociopolitical relationships (Lee, 2015). Specifically, humanitarian organizations help communities cope with risks posed by disruptions. Several mainstream humanitarian NGOs are particularly well-known as UNHCR or UN. These organizations coordinate and collaborate locally and globally with policymaking government entities to resolve refugee-related issues while engaging with community civilians through advocacy and education (Lewis & Kanji, 2009). The following section reviews organizational domains within the humanitarian sector.

NPOs, NGOs, and INGOs. Nonprofit organizations (NPOs) providing human services are critical occupants of the society (Sowa, 2008). In the United States, humanitarian NPOs "stand out as the quintessential expression of the nation's benevolent spirit" (Boris et al., 2010, p.3). Humanitarian organizations are often nongovernmental entities (i.e., NGOs) that are formal and goal-driven with specific objectives for rules and governance (Kim, 2012). Distinct from the government, NGOs do not support or promote political parties or campaigns, nor accept membership from official representatives of national governments (Heinrich, 2005; Martens, 2002; Willetts, 1996).

NGOs are also nonprofit (Anheier, 2004; Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992; Weiss & Gordenker, 1996; Wuthnow, 1991). Although they may appear private in form, they are

public in character through their non-profit-oriented objectives and activities (Anheier, 2004; Anheier & Seibel, 1990; Heinrich, 2005; Martens, 2002). For instance, NGOs participate in various social issues (e.g., environment, human rights, humanitarian relief, etc.) while also providing public services for underprivileged groups (e.g., homeless, disabled, unemployed, etc.). Policy and governance scholarship describes three types of NGOs—operational, educational, and advocacy (Kim, 1997; Weiss & Gordenker, 1996). Operational NGOs function as welfare assistance, providing relief services on-the-ground. Particularly for operational NGOs—which mostly engage in agenda-setting at the grassroots level—voluntary participation, commitment to community, and nonprofit-oriented activities are prominent (Anheier & Seibel, 1990; Kim, 1997, 2000). Educational NGOs engage with the public to educate, consult, and mobilize public opinion about particular social issues. Lastly, advocacy NGOs design intervention programs while supervising and monitoring agendas at the grassroots level.

NGOs intersect with the state sector and are often legitimized and regulated by formalized powers such as legislative, executive, and judicial organizations (Gunn, 2004; Holloway, 1993; Korten, 1990; Wolch, 1990; Wuthnow, 1991). The state and NGOs are nested in interdependent relationships where the state benefits from NGOs' field expertise and NGOs benefit from state funding (Nawyn, 2006; Winkler, 1981). However, as advocacy-oriented, nonprofit organizations, NGOs also strive to minimize governmental influence (Fernando & Heston, 1997) which causes tension between "the top-down policy and the demands of the bottom-up advocacy" (Lee, 2015, p. 2690).

International NGOs (INGOs) also actively advocate for human rights, mostly in transnational context (Ahmed & Potter, 2006; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). INGOs are at the

forefront of setting international human rights norms. This can happen through lobbying or through pleading on behalf of the affected individuals or communities to mitigate life-threatening dispute (Hafner-Buron & Twutsui, 2004; Hovey, 1997). For instance, INGOs build coalitions, raise public awareness about critical international issues, and offer legal consultations. In these ways, INGOs pressure governments to honor human rights and promote international governance institutions (Alger, 1997; McCorquodale & Fairbrother, 1999; Smith et al., 1997).

In recent years, Northeast Asia has begun to see a surge in the number of humanitarian NGOs. Particularly in South Korea, NGOs are not as fully developed as in the West and did not show any international presence until the 1980s (Kim, 2012). However, NGOs in South Korea emerged as key actors following the democratization movement in the 1980s in resistance to military-regime-based administration. For instance, South Korean humanitarian organization such as World Vision often collaborate with international campaigns and advocacy activities to raise civil society awareness and conduct education programs (Jung & Kim, 2012). However, the South Korean humanitarian sector often suffers from limited funding that hampers their service delivery.

South Korean NGOs are also active in organizing political advocacy programs. For example, humanitarian aid for North Korea had strong partnership with the governments during the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations (Lee & Huh, 2006). Despite the economic recession during that period, many NGOs centered their work on voluntary and humanitarian relief efforts—especially in response to flood and famine in North Korea—as well as peace and reunification. Even though the history of

NGOs in South Korea is relatively short, such organizations have made significant community-wide impacts. South Korean NGOs significantly reshaped the public's perception towards North Korea, contributing to the inter-Korean collaboration for peace reconciliation project (Moon, 2016). South Korean NGOs have also encouraged public participation in funding, including implementing the automatic response system (ARS) which is now the major fundraising tool for international issues.

More recently, South Korean humanitarian organizations have surged in number and in political significance, and NGOs have become active participants in the political process, including policy-making legislation (Kim, 2000; Kim et al., 2005). However, humanitarian NGOs operating at the grassroots level are not as prominent in South Korea as in the West. Policy research has criticized South Korean NGOs that are too narrowly focused on specific issues. This narrow focus limits the scope of interorganizational networking and limits resources for operation and service delivery.

Within the humanitarian sector, collaborative networks are crucial foundations for operation and advocacy work. Cross-sector collaboration plays a critical role in addressing community challenges (Quayle et al., 2019). Cross-sector relationships display reciprocal interdependence in a way that each cannot achieve their own goals— which are often mission-driven—without assistance from the other partners (Keast & Mandell, 2014). For instance, the refugee crisis is a grand challenge because it is complex and uncertain (Ferraro et al., 2015). Community challenges like this cut across organizational, national, and geographical boundaries and no single organization can mitigate such a crisis alone (Salignac et al., 2018). Through interdependent relationships and social capital exchange, cross-sector collaboration tackles some of the world's

biggest issues (Googins & Rochlin, 2000). Particularly in humanitarian nonprofits, interorganizational collaboration has dramatically increased, marking a new hallmark of organizational networks (Atouba & Shumate, 2015; Gazley & Brudney, 2007; Heath, 2007; Longoria, 2005; Sowa, 2008). Additionally, the increasing number and density of humanitarian networks have been credited as having positive effects on communities (Atouba, 2019; Heath, 2007). Therefore, within the humanitarian sector, cross-sector networks play an important role for the communities they serve. Thus, community ecology is discussed next as a theoretical framework to explore the cross-sector, interorganizational networks of the humanitarian sector.

Community Ecology

Community ecology theory explains how organizations emerge as a community through communication networks. The community ecology approach to organizations explores multiple "populations of differing organizations" that form interdependent networks (Monge & Contractor, 2003, p.257). These interdependent relationships become networks in which people, organizations, and societal structures based on ideology coevolve and communicate (Routledge & Cumbers, 2009). Oftentimes the interorganizational networks demonstrate either symbiotic (i.e., interdependence between dissimilar units) or commensalistic (i.e., competition and cooperation between similar units) relationships (Aldrich, 1999). The two types are both essential in community ecology and are foundational to interorganizational network formation (Hawley, 1950, 1986; Monge & Contractor, 2003). The interactions and communication organizations have with one another transform them within the larger environment (Bryant & Monge, 2008; Monge et al., 2008). For instance, humanitarian organizations are networked across

different sectors (government entities, faith-based organizations, for-profit organizations, etc.) within the meso-level where the interorganizational relationships are more prominent and visible but also compete for resources (Bryant & Monge, 2008).

From community ecology perspective, "resilience is a function of social networks" as organizations exchange social capital to facilitate recovery (Doerfel et al., 2020, p.326). However, as the disruptions or crises evolve, networks transform in myriad ways to adapt to changing environments (Diani, 1995). For instance, as disruptions unfold, the organizational networks may expand or lose connections. In a context of disruption, new forms of organizing and communication within and across each level in the community can also emerge (Harris & Doerfel, 2017a; Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003). These might include refugees, organizations, and the larger societal systems and culture. When the meso-level networks change, however, they may influence the entire community's multi-dimensional, multi-level network and further alter the process of resilience building. For example, individual refugee organizations may network with citizen's coalitions or volunteer networks, and thus create a new line of cross-level networks. These novel attempts to access information through networks manifest resilience processes for both the organizations and therefore, the communities of which they are part of. In one sense, these processes can be seen in how emergent networks influence the entire community. In an attempt to understand such networked forms of communication, this dissertation particularly focuses on how particular organizations' networks shape changes in the community over time during the pandemic. Applying community ecology, I ask:

RQ 3: How does the networks change over time for the humanitarian organizations during the pandemic?

H2: Community disruptions like the COVID-19 pandemic transforms the network over time.

Although resilience processes involve networks of organizations that work for refugees are also prone to formal structures which is discussed next.

Formal Structures and Networks. The internal structure of organizations dictates the way organizational ecology responds to changing environments and their networks. In classical approaches to organizational communication, the theory of bureaucracy was seen as the ideal type for organizations, suggesting how they should be managed based on control and codified rules (Gajduschek, 2003). As various types of disruptions have become more commonplace, these formal structures have become a critical backbone for effective operation during disasters that respond to community needs (Busch & Givens, 2013). Based on the internal organizational structures that are formally organized, they can build formal networks (e.g., legalized partnerships, regulatory bodies, grantors and grantees) that facilitate communication and information flow (Chewning et al., 2012; Monge & Contractor, 2003).

Importantly, along with the formal structures that drive formal networks for organizations, informal or emergent networks also contribute to organizations and their networked organizing. Changing dynamics of organizational networks also show a shift from formal structures to emergent relationships that are ad hoc, open and informal (Monge & Contractor, 2003; Monge & Eisenberg, 1987). These might include leaders who advocate for the cause, or mission-driven work undertaken to fulfill particular

community needs (Doerfel & Taylor, 2017). Informal networks and formal networks coexist across different parts of the cultural and social structural frameworks (Kadushin, 2011). If formal networks offer more structured network communication through hierarchy and formal organizational rules, emergent networks emerge from various sources from hierarchical and centralized authority to decentralized and spontaneous individual interactions (Fukuyama, 1999).

Resilience research highlights the way formal structures (e.g., hierarchical structures, authoritarian, centralized decision-making) and informal networks interact in response to disruption. For organizations, having formal structures and networks in place improves resilient processes (Salkin, 2016). For instance, during Hurricane Harvey, federal organizations followed the bureaucratic structures and plans (e.g., disaster plans, response protocols) in response to the disaster *(GAO, 2019)*. Resilience also derives from formally negotiated stakeholder relationships such as strategic partnerships and alliances with other organizations or even member management (Lengnick-Hall et al., 2011). Structure and routine can reduce the uncertainty of extreme challenges to organizational environments (Lengnick-Hall & Beck, 2005).

Arguably, the actual ways in which resilience strategies get enacted during an event are both planned and improvisational (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003; Mendonça & Wallace, 2015) as organizations adapt through improvisational responses to unexpected situations (Brown & Duguid, 1991; Huxham & Hibbert, 2004; Weber & Khademian, 2008). Individual members of organizations can sometimes become informal brokers for organizations, enabling resilience organizing for organizations (Majchrzak et al., 2007b). Also, formal organizing and informal networks coexist, establishing interorganizational

networks that become social infrastructures for community resilience (Barbour et al., 2020; Doerfel, 2016).

Existing research supports how formal organizational structures and network facilitate resilience (Kim et al., 2021). Humanitarian organizations form formal relationships with policymaking entities or media as they organize their work across different parts of the whole community. In such a context, the relationships and networks formed could influence the way the community strengthens resilience amid disruptions. To a certain extent, as organizations engage in their formal and/or informal networked forms of organizing, they are brokering resilience building for the community through meaning-centered and action-oriented work (Doerfel & Taylor, 2017). To further explore how resilience brokering is organized through formal structures, I ask:

RQ 4: How do formal structures intersect with the work of humanitarian organizations during the pandemic?

Formal structures reconfigure through information and communication technology (ICTs), enabling the organizations to be more flexible and responsive (McPhee & Poole, 2001). Moreover, because ICTs are integral part of organizations' work process they make formal structures much more "enforceable" (p.525). Thus, the discussion extends to communication technology in organizations as mobilizer of resilience which follows next.

Communication Technology

In a crisis context, information and communication technology (ICTs) are integral to resilience building. Digital tools such mobile devices, programs, and the Internet facilitate creative ways for organizations to communicate when disruptions emerge

(Chewning et al., 2012). ICTs also improve organizational operations and sustain organizational networks (Espinosa et al., 2007). Especially with the flexibility of the Internet, communication with the community can be facilitated through organizational-level efforts (Taylor & Kent, 2007). For example, the Internet can manage a crisis because it helps organizations to strategize their response and aids in decision-making and stakeholder communications (Perry et al., 2003). Collaborative organizational technologies, especially, enhance network communication and coordination (Ellison et al., 2015).

Besides making communication easier, ICTs can also transform networks and communities (Segerberg & Bennett, 2011). Because ICTs are integral parts of the everyday lives of people and organizations (Castells, 1996, 2011) they are crucial resources for community connections and social networks (Rainie & Wellman, 2012). ICTs enable weak ties to become strong ties across geographical restrictions, thus expanding networks and enhancing various relational dynamics within communities (Castells, 1996; Hampton et al., 2011; Hampton & Wellman, 2003; Haythornthwaite, 2002; Miyata et al., 2005).

In migration studies, scholars recognize ICTs as the main tools that facilitate information and network-building within the migrant communities (Brettell & Hollifield, 2008; Panagakos & Horst, 2006; Wilding, 2006). For instance, forced migrants like refugees gain access to their own migrant networks and become part of "deterritorialized" community via ICT use (Gifford & Wilding, 2013). For humanitarian organizations, ICTs are important tools to communicate with their at-risk or vulnerable constituents. Research argues that utilizing effective technology strategies can help facilitate service delivery

and increase the resilience of vulnerable populations (Madianou et al., 2015; Merchant et al., 2011; United Nations, 2015). However, the COVID-19 pandemic radically changed the notion of how ICTs affect work and communication in organizations.

ICTs and COVID-19. The COVID-19 pandemic created an inevitable yet sudden surge in the use of digital technologies due to social distancing mandates and lockdowns. People and organizations around the world were forced to adjust to the digitization of work and life (De et al., 2020). Organizational digitization (i.e., transitioning from a physical working environment to digital) (Khan, 2016) affects operations and the logic of their work across all sectors (Verhoef et al., 2021). As a result, organizations depended heavily on the Internet and Internet-based services to communicate, interact, and work as they rapidly switched to remote work environment (Bajaj, 2020; Leonardi, 2020; *Outmanoeuvre Uncertainty: Navigating the Human and Business Impact of Covid-19*, 2020). For example, video-conferencing services like Zoom have seen a ten times increase in usage since the beginning of the pandemic (Branscombe, 2020). Remote working became the new normal almost overnight (Wang et al., 2021). The changes came suddenly, and organizations and employees barely had any time to plan, forcing adaptability (De et al., 2020).

The forced shift to remote working brought some positive changes to organizations. The COVID-19 experience has helped organizations define the necessary technology skills and competencies needed to continue work and survive the crisis (Mollenkopf & Gaskill, 2020). To support remote working, organizations need digital infrastructure although not all organizations are equipped to adapt new changes (Bajaj, 2020; Iansiti & Richards, 2020). Research suggests that organizations that are more

successful in digital adaptation tend to produce higher profits than those that are not (Westerman et al., 2014). However, the majority of such successful organizations tend to be in resourceful industries like retail and banking that are equipped with higher digital capacity (Berghaus & Back, 2016; Westerman & McAfee, 2014). To be more successful in adapting to the new operation mode, a systematic change—which typically includes higher digital literacy and maturity—is needed (Murashkin & Tyrväinen, 2020). A technology infrastructure is a critical asset that helps organizations be better prepared for disruptions. COVID-19 pandemic was a driving force for organizations to reinforce digital operation, but it also made digital divides more apparent.

Concerns with the digital divide can be seen on multiple levels. Reasons for the digital divide may vary. People, organizations, and countries may not have access to affordable devices or the Internet, and may lack necessary skills (Armbrecht, 2016; Scheerder et al., 2017). During the pandemic, the Internet became a global resource, though local access and availability of connections remained as an issue (Chhibber, 2020). Additionally, not all organizations are digitally prepared or equipped to cope with changes that challenge their operation (Murashkin & Tyrväinen, 2020). On the individual level, similar issues can perpetuate, reinforcing social inequalities (Ragnedda, 2017).

Although existing research recognizes ICTs as critical tools for mobilizing networks and resilience, during the pandemic, the sudden and rapid shift of operation is likely altered opportunities for resilient operation and communication. Therefore, I ask:

RQ 5: What decisions did organizations make about using technology in new or

expanded ways during the pandemic to continue to address the needs of refugees?

Next, I discuss research design and methods.

Chapter 5: Research Design and Methods

This study explored how refugee organizations in the United States and South Korea withstood a system-wide disruption like the COVID-19 pandemic and facilitated resilience for themselves and the refugee communities. To answer the proposed research questions and test hypotheses, this study employed a mixed-methods design to enlarge the spectrum and richness of the data. I employed archival analysis, an online survey, and semi-structured interviews.

Research Context and Site Selection

The Case of COVID-19

The World Health Organization (WHO) declared COVID-19 a pandemic as it involved more than 200,000 confirmed cases with exceeding number of deaths across over 160 countries (World Health Organization (WHO), 2020). During the COVID-19 pandemic, many vulnerable populations such as forced migrants have continued to lack proper healthcare due to their unstable legal status and/or lack of institutional support. Amid large-scale disruption, nonprofit organizations and policymaking institutions have been at the forefront of facilitating the public health of vulnerable communities by attempting to secure resources (Andretta & Pavan, 2018). This dissertation, therefore, explored the resilience building of refugee communities and organizations through a consideration of the pandemic as a critical disruption. Studying COVID-19 with an emphasis on refugee organizations captured real-time changes in organizing and resilience processes for refugee populations. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic calls for timely research because the experiences of organizations and their informants are still fresh.

United States vs. South Korea

To research resilience in responding to the pandemic, this dissertation compared two culturally and organizationally contrasting contexts—the United States and South Korea. The two countries showed uniquely contrasting responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Although they differ in size or population, they shared some key moments during the pandemic. On January 20, 2020, both the United States and South Korea each announced that their first case of COVID-19 was found. The Center for Disease Control (CDC) in the United States confirmed the first case in Washington State. South Korea, immediately after reporting its first confirmed case, began to mobilize vast resources for diagnostic testing, including drive-through screening centers and quarantine measures (Goodman & Schulkin, 2020). On January 27, 2020, Acting White House Chief-of-Staff Mick Mulvaney criticized the Trump administration for mishandling the pandemic, arguing that the administration needed to take the virus spread more seriously. Meanwhile, in South Korea, government officials informed private companies of the need to expedite testing kits development, promising fast regulatory approval. By February 2, 2020, former president Trump announced restricted border control from China, while the South Korean government announced quarantine guidelines including a 14-day self-quarantine for people who come into routine contact with a confirmed case (Goodman & Schulkin, 2020). Thus, while going through the same pandemic, the two countries approached their response communication in different ways. These differences inevitably changed the way the United States and South Korea—and entire communities within each nation—interacted with the infectious disease.

Undoubtedly, refugees and refugee organizations were also affected by national-level responses and communication. Since 1980, the United States has admitted more than 3 million refugees (*Refugee Admissions*, 2020). In South Korea, there have been more than 10,000 incoming refugees since the 1990s, the majority being North Korean defectors (*Statistics: Inflow and outflow*, 2020). Refugees continued to migrate to both countries even during the pandemic, although in the United States the number was significantly lower because the Trump administration put a temporary halt to admission. Refugee organizations, international NGOs, and local activists of coalitions continued to support refugee rights and sustainability during the pandemic, although their work was heavily affected as well. By exploring these two countries with contrasting culture, community dynamics, and political agendas, this study can enrich our understanding of how organizations outside the United States withstood the pandemic and point to best communication practices for enhancing organizational resilience for vulnerable refugees.

Given the contrasting size, population density, and the scale of resource distribution in the United States, I focused on the tri-state area—New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut (referred to as the United States throughout). The tri-state area and South Korea have similar population density and size, composing a more comparable size and scale. The two target locations represent different community composition, structure, networks, and cultural approaches to organizing and resilience. Ultimately, comparative research can offer insights that may advance the way we understand, prepare for, and respond to disruptions from an organizational perspective. Moreover, comparative cross-cultural research can advance our understanding of the changing dynamics of

communities on a global level by virtue of refugees being culturally, nationally, and ethnically diverse.

Variables and Measures

In this study, the COVID-19 pandemic was identified as the primary independent variable and organizational resilience as the primary dependent variable. These variables were operationalized in several ways to answer the proposed RQs and test the hypotheses. In this section, I describe how each variable was operationalized and measured.

COVID-19 Pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic affected organizations in a number of ways. In this research, the COVID-19 pandemic was operationalized as disruptions to the routine workflow, operation, and communication that stymied refugee organizations. More specifically, the disruption refers to barriers to operations such as: (a) resource shortages; (b) forced shifts to remote working; (c) the inability to offer routine services due to social distancing mandates; (d) temporary or permanent closures or service terminations; and (e) blocked resource exchanges between with interorganizational networks and refugees as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Organizational Storytelling

Organizational storytelling reflects the content and narratives organizations communicate in their spaces open to the public (e.g., websites, publicly released materials, social media contents, etc.) about their work, mission, and services. Organizational storytelling was operationalized as publicly available narratives that organizations share and narrate to the settlement community and refugees. This

storytelling could include narratives involving the scope of the organization's work, mission statements and core values, reports, newsletters, press materials.

Resilience

Organizational resilience is defined as the capacity to: (a) create or retain interorganizational networks that facilitate resource and communication flows (Doerfel et al., 2020); (b) utilize ICTs in creative, novel ways (Chewning et al., 2012; Fu & Lai, 2020); (c) operate without interruptions and build adaptability (Boin & Comfort, 2010); and (d) recognize formal structures as foundations to induce work flexibility (Kim et al., 2021) in the midst of adverse events. In this study, organizational resilience was operationalized in four ways, capturing the definitions of existing research. Measures for each operationalized variables representing resilience were reflected in the survey questionnaires and interview protocol.

Interorganizational Networks. Robust interorganizational networks enhance resource and communication flows, thus strengthening the refugee organizations' capacity to serve refugees. Interorganizational networks are cross-sector formal partnerships that facilitate social capital exchange such as information, material, financial, and organizational resources to help refugee organizations accomplish their mission. To assess the types, characteristics, and contents of networks, a network measure developed by Doerfel and Taylor (2017) was employed. The network survey asked informants to identify and list their organizations' key networks in multiple sectors (e.g., government, nonprofits, community partners, for-profits, coalitions, outsourcing agencies, sponsoring organizations, etc.). Then, using automatic name-generating survey tool on Qualtrics, the listed networks were automatically carried over to the next series of

questions that asked about various properties and relational dynamics of the networks across different purposes, characteristics, and exchanges of social capital (e.g., funding, resource, information). For each questionnaire, informants were asked to define their networks and types of relationships between the two time periods: before and during the pandemic. Before referred to times leading up to March 2020 and During referred to the time thereafter.

Questionnaires also asked informants to specify the types of resource and communication exchange among mission, COVID, and general resources pertaining to the refugees. COVID network referred to connections regarding pandemic-related information and resources such as vaccines, testing, and PPE. Resource network referred to general resource exchange relationships such as immigration-related policy and protocols, border control, and general resources for refugees (e.g., housing, clothing, etc.). Mission network referred to the connections where the partnerships assist refugee organizations to achieve their mission. In each question, the informants were asked to respond Yes or No for each time period for each network they identified.

With the network data, a matrix for each network connection and time period resulted in an organizations-by-organizations network where a 1 or 0 in a cell ij indicates the presence or absence of a communication link. This process was repeated for each type and time period resulting in sixteen different networks (see Table 1 for descriptions of each network). For the two countries, there were 172 nodes representing the organizational connections in the United States and 108 for South Korea, respectively.

Table 1

Network Measure Overview

Types		Description	Country	Number of nodes
Overall network before & during	▪	Generic organizational relationship not necessarily bound to a particular type	United States	172 nodes each
COVID network before & during	▪	COVID-related resources (e.g., vaccine, testing, PPE)		
Mission network before & during	▪	Connections for mission accomplishment	South Korea	108 nodes each
Resource network before & during	▪	General resource exchange about refugee issues (e.g., immigration policy, resettlement resources)		

Technology Capacity and Competency. Organizational resilience was

operationalized as technology adoption and utilization capacity (Hackler & Saxton,

2007). Technology capacity refers to having competency to use and adopt technology

resources such as being equipped with in-house technical support and up-to-date devices

(e.g., computers, smartphones, database systems, etc.). Additionally, communication

technology capacity was operationalized as individual members' capacity to utilize the

ICTs (e.g., social media, use of various platforms, etc.) for networking and

communicating with refugee clients. To measure the organizations' capacity to utilize

communication technology, I employed Fu et al.'s (2019) study on nonprofit technology

use in which fixed a standard set of ICTs like emails and phone was the most prominent

to facilitate their network collaboration. Furthermore, I employed Hackler and Saxton's

(2007) notion of technology capacity in which informants were asked to assess

organizational support in terms of technology adaptation and use. To assess overall

organizational technology capacity and competency, informants were asked to first

identify the types of communication technology used to do their work, for networking with stakeholders, and with refugee clients. Then, they were asked to rate the difficulty level of using the selected technology by rating 5-point Likert-type scales ranging between 5(very difficult) to 1 (very easy). The survey asked about informants' technology experiences in terms of identifying whether the organization supported their technology use through processes such as internal technology training, in-house technician, and help navigating challenges with technology use.

Operation Mode and Capacity. In the midst of a crisis, organizational resilience can be seen through operational capacity and work mode flexibility. In this research, refugee organization's resilience was operationalized as the scale and scope of field activities and services provided for refugees, funding and revenue, and resource securement. To assess operational capacity, I employed Child and Grønbejerg's (2007) work on advocacy characteristics. Informants were asked to report on the robustness of their services and activities for refugees by rating the strength of their financial and human resources capacity as well as access to information about COVID-19 and refugee-related issues using 5-point Likert-type scales ranging between 5(strongly agree) to 1(strongly disagree). Second, informants were asked to count how many days per week they worked in the office, virtually, and with flexibility before and during the pandemic. In this research, the physical office referred to a place an employer had designated for workers to commute to and work together physically. A virtual office was defined as any space in their private residences or other locations that did not physically convene them or their co-workers (Di Martino & Wirth, 1990). The notion of flexibility referred to

organizations giving each employee the autonomy to decide where to work and continue operation in providing services for the refugees.

Perceived Effectiveness. Third, refugee organizations' resilience was operationalized through the perceived effectiveness of services and operation for the refugees. Employing Fu and Lai's (2000) perceived effectiveness scale developed for nonprofit sector, informants were asked to rate perceived effectiveness of their work for refugees for the following items: (a) use of the organization's information, material, and financial resources; (b) services and activities; (c) mission-driven work making positive immediate and long-term impacts; and (d) service alignment with the needs of refugees. The informants were asked to rate using a 5-point Likert-type scales ranging between 5(strongly agree) to 1(strongly disagree).

Procedures

Sampling Frame

The sampling frame for this research drew on three key literatures that exploring refugees and refugee organizations (Brick et al., 2010; Patrick, 2004; Steimel, 2017). Based on the literature, the sampling frame identified refugee organizations as those that help refugees negotiate various aspects of their resettlement in a new host country by addressing refugees and their needs with the goal of ensuring a beneficial resettlement process. More specifically, adapting the definitions of Weiss and Gordenker (1996) and Kim (1997), the sampling frame for cross-sector refugee organizations included those offering: (a) operational services to refugees such as welfare assistance (e.g., financial, material, medical, legal), developmental/relief services (e.g., educational), technical services (e.g., vocational) upon their arrival in their host communities; (b) educational

services to the public and donor agencies (e.g., public education, consciousness raising, public opinion mobilization); and (c) advocacy services such as program design and activity coordination for refugees. Additionally, for inclusion in the sampling frame, the organizations must have been in operation before and throughout the pandemic and be physically located in either the United States and/or South Korea.

Recruitment

To recruit organizations and informants, I first employed purposive sampling. This sampling technique is used to "select respondents that are most likely to yield appropriate and useful information" (Kelly, 2010, p.317). Because the study sought a specific type of organizations, purposive strategy was appropriate to filter suitable cases. As researchers argue, adopting purposive sampling is based on the assumption that, given the aims and objectives of the study, specific kinds of people may hold different and important views about the ideas and issues at question (Mason, 2002; Robinson, 2014; Trost, 1986). In this study, those would be the informants of participating organizations.

To reach out to refugee organizations and their employees, I used online resources to create a seed list of organizations in the United States and South Korea. First, I used search terms like "refugee organizations," "refugee resettlement organizations," "humanitarian organizations," and "nonprofit refugee organizations" in multiple search engine sources including Google, GuideStar (i.e., directory of nonprofit organizations in the United States), and Naver (i.e., Korean version of Google). The initial search rendered thousands of registered organizations. After reviewing each of their websites and/or social media as well as description of their work based on the sampling frame, I narrowed the list down. The final seed list for the United States (*n*=142) and South Korea

($n= 76$) was created after removing: (a) duplicates; (b) non-refugee organizations; (c) organizations that were permanently or temporarily closed at the time of recruitment; and (d) organizations not located in either the United States or South Korea.

After finalizing the seed list, I contacted each organization using multiple modes of communication. For organizations without website or social media presence, I sent postal mails that enclosed a description of the study and a QR code linking to the online survey. If the organizations had email addresses available on their websites, I sent an email directly to organizational leadership describing the rationale of the study and asking for their participation or referral to their employees. I also: (a) made cold calls to organizations with phone numbers but no email addresses; (b) submitted an online inquiry form if no contact information was found; or (c) sent cold emails to information desks asking for participation. In addition, I posted a recruitment flyer on online advocacy groups' on social media with a QR code and direct links to the survey. I also employed snowball sampling where I: (a) extended recruitment invitations through my personal networks via social media; (b) asked informants to refer their colleagues or networks at the end of the survey or interview; and (c) asked online communities for refugee advocacy (e.g., refugee book club, refugee support coalitions, etc.) referrals by sharing the description of the study.

Data Collection

After extensive and multi-modal recruitment processes, the data collection took place from June to November, 2021 via archival data collection, online surveys, and semi-structured interviews. The three forms of data were collected simultaneously.

Online Survey. The online survey was created and distributed via Qualtrics and both a URL link and QR code were shared with participating informants representing refugee organizations. Invitations to the survey were sent via postal mail, email, and social media. The online survey was live upon IRB approval and informants—once had the URL link or QR code—could participate in the survey at their convenience. The survey was published in two languages. The default language was set to English and included instruction to switch the language setting at the top of the first page of the survey for Korean organizations.

The survey was organized in four parts. Upon consenting to the survey, informants were asked to share their affiliated organization's name and its sector. Then, they were asked to list their active interorganizational networks using the actual names (for record-keeping purposes). Using an automated name-generating survey tool, once informants typed in their interorganizational networks, they were automatically taken to the next series of network-related questionnaires where reported on the types of relationships, network content, and network characteristics before and during the pandemic. Then, the survey asked informants to report on their communication technology use and competency. Informants were asked to identify types of organizational technology support such as in-house technicians, technology training, and financial support for devices. The survey also asked about the types of technologies used to communicate with their networks and refugees and the difficulty level of communication in using these technology platforms. The third section of the survey asked about operation mode and capacity. Informants were asked to report how their organizations operated before and during the pandemic, and to rate the scope of their

activities and services to refugees, the degree of external funding and resource securement, and the perceived effectiveness of their services and advocacy work for refugees. Lastly, informants were asked to report on their position in the organization, the size of the organization, and whether they were willing to participate in the interview and/or refer another informant who might be a good candidate for the study. The responses to the survey ($n=113$) composed a 21% response rate for the United States and a 34% response rate for South Korea. There were incomplete and unidentifiable surveys ($n=22$) that were stopped after the informed consent and were removed from the analysis. After removing the incomplete and unidentifiable surveys, a total number of 91 surveys from 83 organizations were analyzed.

Interviews. To obtain a more detailed description of refugee organizations' work and experiences throughout the pandemic, I employed semi-structured interview with informants in the United States ($n=36$) and South Korea ($n=26$). Interviewing is a helpful tool to further understand, clarify, or even obtain additional details in a research study (Schutt, 2019). All interviews were virtual via Zoom or phone calls except a few in-person ($n=3$), based on the informants' preferences. The interviews were conducted if an informant: (a) indicated they would like to participate in the interview at the end of the online survey; or (b) contacted me directly about interest in participating in the interview without completing the survey. Informants who wished to participate in the interviews communicated with me via text messages, phone calls, or emails to schedule an interview. Informants provided informed consent and interviews were digitally recorded if they allowed. For unrecorded interviews, I took copious notes to capture the essence of the conversations.

During the interview, informants were asked to share their: (a) main roles and responsibilities in their affiliated organization; (b) work during routine times and how the pandemic transformed their operation; (c) networks and how they changed; (d) types of services and activities; (e) use of technology and any challenges or impacts associated with technology; and (f) any other issues pertaining to their organizations and work for refugees. All informants' names and their affiliated organizations were assigned pseudonyms to protect their identity upon the completion of the interview. The total length of interviews in the United States was 1299 minutes and 1783 minutes for South Korea. Each interview lasted between 25 and 150 minutes generating total of 284 pages of single-spaced transcripts for the United States and 290 for South Korean organizations.

Documents. Document analysis acknowledges that society is discourse-driven (e.g., texts, talk) and that understanding language is critical to understand social phenomena (Bowen, 2009). Studying organizational documents (e.g., reports, website materials, e-mails, newsletters, etc.) as well as media messages (e.g., news coverage on the organizational activities, PR statements, archival coverage from past, etc.) informs us about how organizations have interacted with refugee community during disruption. I collected organizational documents primarily from the participating organizations' websites and social media. These virtual spaces are distinct communication space with their "own rules and requirements independent of traditional offline media" (Nitschke et al., 2016, p.746).Websites and social media are often used as outreach channels because they: (a) are direct and controllable (Coombs, 1998); (b) provide organization-centered information and resources for the public (Callison, 2003); (c) are spaces for communication *with* the general public (Yang, 2013); and (d) are spaces where

information about organizational activities are publicly displayed (Hayes-Smith &

Hayes-Smith, 2009;Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). Websites and social media are valuable

sources for researchers due to their accessibility and up-to-date information availability

(Kousis et al., 2018). In essence, the organizational websites and social media of

organizations in this study communicated critical ideas about their work and their clients,

constructing narratives that weave the two together.

I collected archived organizational data through publicly available sources like

website announcements, periodical newsletters, press materials (e.g., press release,

feature articles), and social media postings. Archival data revealed the organizations'

mission and core values that ground their work for refugees, providing a clear rationale of

their work and how they present themselves within both the settlement communities and

to the refugees. Each piece (e.g., newsletter from Q1, weekly post, etc.) was the unit of

analysis. In total, I was able to access available information on most participating

organizations' websites ($n=75$) and social media ($n=22$). Not all organizations had active

websites or social media, but a review of available data provided information regarding

how and what the refugee organizations communicate with refugees and other

stakeholders such as the settlement community, government entities, and collaborative

partners. When possible, the documents were downloaded in PDF or were screen

captured and saved to a protected folder. The archival resources are reflected in findings

using pseudonyms.

Analysis

I employed both quantitative and qualitative analysis to better understand and

interpret the collected data.

Network analysis

To answer RQ 3 and test H2, I conducted quantitative social network analysis. The social networks were analyzed using UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002) to examine the interorganizational networks and how they transformed over time. The network data was reconfigured as a data matrix of organizations-by-organizations where a 1 or 0 in cell *ij* indicates the presence or absence of the various communication link. To further understand how the pandemic affected the networks, I conducted three tests. First, I conducted two-mode network analysis before and during the pandemic to generate the overall network composition across the two countries. Second, I conducted Quadradic Analysis Procedure (QAP), a nonparametric statistic that allowed for conducting Pearson's r correlations between two matrices of equal size without violating the assumptions that traditional statistical modeling requires. The QAP was performed to assess how three different types of networks—COVID, Resource, and Mission—changed over time from before to during the pandemic. Third, I performed the E-I (external-internal) index analysis to calculate the proportion of interorganizational relationships to an external group relative to the number of relationships to an internal group. In other words, the E-I index shows how much of the networked relationship was within the same sector versus not. The E-I statistics produces network and nodal level normalized values that can range from -1.0 (only internal relationships exist) to +1.0 (only external relationships exist) (Krackhardt & Stern, 1988). Finally, I conducted network visualization using NetDraw feature in UCINET.

Survey Analysis

To analyze the survey data, I conducted a series of tests using SPSS software. To answer RQ 2 and H1, I conducted one-way ANOVA to explore how the disruptions affected refugee organizations' services and advocacy activities for refugees. For RQ 4, I calculated Pearson's r correlations to explore how existing formal structures like policies of crisis protocol affected the organizations' funding, operation pivot, and adaptability during the pandemic. Finally, to answer RQ 5, I ran descriptive analyses to assess how organizations supported employees and their communication technology for work. I also conducted a One-way ANOVA to explore which technology posed the most difficulty when communicating with refugees.

Interview and Document Analysis

To answer RQ 1 and add depth to the quantitative data, I conducted qualitative thematic analysis. To analyze the interviews, I first transcribed the recorded interviews using two software packages. I used the Otter AI program for the English data and Amazon Web Services for the Korean data. Both software packages auto-generated transcripts in the two respective languages. Then, I reviewed the raw transcripts and compared them with the recordings to ensure that the transcribed data were accurate depiction of the interviews. Finally, Korean transcriptions were translated twice by two individuals—myself and professional translator—before analysis.

Contextual Translation. In the analysis phase, I adopted contextualized translation technique (Buzzanell, 2011) for the Korean transcriptions of the interviews. This technique is a set of strategies for international research involving "simultaneous online or face-to-face interaction with translators" (p. 6). I collaborated with a professional translator approved by the IRB who is fluent in both Korean and English. I

conducted a round of translation and then the professional translator back-translated the initial version. During this process, the translator and I engaged in constant comparative methods to clarify any discrepancies or disagreements to ensure linguistic and cultural accuracy. In this phase, rather than literal translation (which often misses the critical nuance), we tried to capture the sensitivity and complexity of cultural nuances that may transfer multiple meanings. For instance, the term "network" carries multiple meanings in Korean with different connotations. To encapsulate what the interviewees meant, we compared the overall context of the interview and came to include a few other terms that may carry the same definition and connotations such as "relationships," "connections," "ties," "links," that are used interchangeably in the translated version. We worked through each emerging theme by adding notes, making links to other materials, and inserting different interpretations of words and contexts to ensure the integrity of culture and language (Buzzanell, 2011).

Thematic Analysis. After all the interview and archival data was prepared for analysis, I reviewed the data and began taking notes on emerging themes. I first created an excel spreadsheet to conduct open coding, noting key themes that repeatedly emerged in all interviews. The initial open coding began by identifying emerging themes based on the key variables—resilience, technology, disruption, networks, communication with refugees, and differences between the United States and South Korea. These major themes were also broken down to sub-themes. Then, I conducted a thematic analysis (Braun & Clark, 2006) by following the process of familiarizing myself with the data, searching for themes, reviewing themes, then defining and naming themes. I used NVIVO 12 software to further categorize the emerging themes and began taking memos.

Table 2 illustrates the initial themes that guided the coding. The next chapter presents key findings from the data collection and analysis.

Table 2

Qualitative Codebook, First-level Codes

Key Variables	Codes	
Technology	- Tech divide between members - Digital inequality of refugees - Low Competency of older members - Zoom challenge - Pivot working adaptability - Digital brokering of & for refugees	- Multi-level digital divide - Emerging tech brokers as pivot assistance - Competency vs. Infrastructure for technology use
Resilience	- Uncompromised mission - Flexibility of work and network - Communication via social media - Robust resources from government entities - Refugee resilience vs. organizational resilience - Reverse pivot	- Mission-driven work - Relational robustness - Adaptability to changing situation - IOR as sources of resilience - Refugees contribute to org resilience
Disruption	- COVID-19 in passing - Cultural divide - Technology divide - Political disruption/divide - Human rights and crisis	- Crisis as opportunity - Existing threats and new disruption of COVID
Networks	- Resource- driven networks - Cross-sector vs. homophily - Tiered/Ranked networks - Government network vs. other entities - Hidden networks - Formality for flexibility	- Inertia vs. stable networks - Symbiosis vs. Commensalism - Mission-driven networks and stability over time
Communication	- Language and cultural barrier - Vaccine hesitancy, lacking social distancing - Difficulty communicating about the work or services - Communicating compassion vs. empathy - Inclusive storytelling online	- Mutual resilience cycle - Engagement of refugees, multiple-levels - Refugee empowerment

Between United States vs. South Korea	- Cultural differences in political context - Othering vs. tiering refugees - Views on refugee engagement - Ways to include refugees in an organizational space - Refugees vulnerable or empowered? - Political centralization vs. decentralization - Limited resource - Trust issues for refugee orgs	- Cultural barriers within and outside organizations - Stigma and othering due to political narrative vs. historical - Pro-North Korea propaganda

Table 3

Overview of Methods

Theme	RQ/H	Variables	Operationalization	Measures & Analysis
Org Comm	RQ 1: What do organizations communicate with the settlement community about refugees?	IV: COVID pandemic DV: Organizational storytelling	IV: Disruptions to workflow and operation DV: What organizations communicate to the settlement community (newsletter, social media posts)	▪ Thematic Analysis
Operation	RQ 2: How do large-scale disruptions, like the COVID-19 pandemic, affect the organizations and the services they offer for refugees? H1: Large disruptions are likely to affect organizations and the services they offer for refugees.	IV: COVID pandemic DV: Organizational Resilience	IV: Disruptions to workflow and operation DV: Changes in operation mode and organizational functioning ▪ Field of activities for refugees ▪ Funding sources	▪ Advocacy characteristics (Child & Grønbjerg, 2007) ▪ Perceived effectiveness (Fu & Lai, 2020) ▪ One-Way ANOVA
Networks	RQ 3: How does the networks change over time for the humanitarian organizations during the pandemic? H2: Community disruptions like the COVID-19 pandemic transforms the network over time.	IV: COVID pandemic DV: Network structures; nature of network ties	IV: Routine (pre-COVID) vs. during disruption (COVID) DV: Existing network partnerships	▪ (Doerfel & Taylor, 2017) ▪ Two-Mode network ▪ E-I index ▪ QAP Correlation
	RQ 4: How do formal structures intersect with the work of humanitarian organizations during the pandemic?	IV: Formal structure (e.g., policy, crisis plan) DV: Operation, funding and improvisation	IV: Formal protocols in routine DV: Work flexibility, funding, resource exchange during	▪ Pearson's r
ICT	RQ 5: What decisions did organization make about using technology in new or expanded ways during the pandemic to continue to address the needs of refugees?	IV: COVID DV: Org use of technology	IV: Routine (pre-COVID) vs. during disruption (COVID) DV: Types & ways of technology use; Organizations' ability to utilize technology	▪ Technology capacity (Hackler & Saxton, 2007) ▪ NPO Technology (Fu et al., 2019) ▪ One-Way ANOVA

Chapter 6: Results

This chapter reports findings from the archival document analysis, surveys, and interviews to answer the research questions and test hypotheses that examine the impact of COVID-19 on refugee organizations and their resilience. This section begins with an overview of descriptive analysis on the organizations followed by quantitative and qualitative findings. When reporting the findings, pseudonyms are used to describe each organization and informant as well as their networks[1].

General Descriptive Overview of Organizations

Participating informants represent various refugee organizations across multiple sectors in the United States and South Korea. All (*n=92*) participating informants reported that they communicate and interact directly with refugees, and provide on-the-ground services. First, the participating organizations are currently located in either the United States (66.3%, *n=61*) or South Korea (33.7%, *n=31*). Organizational types for both countries varied across different sectors like faith-based houses of worship (2.2%, *n=2*), faith-based non-profit (40%, *n=37*), faith-based for-profit (1.1%, *n=1*), secular nonprofit (35.9%, *n=33*), government offices (15.2%, *n=14*), and others (5.4%, *n=5*) such as local school or county libraries that offer direct education services to refugees. For the United States, faith-based nonprofits represented the highest number (39.3%, *n=24*) followed by secular nonprofits (27.9%, *n=17*) and government entities (21.3%, *n=13*). For South Korea, the highest was secular nonprofit (51.6%, *n=16*) followed by faith-based nonprofit (41.9%, *n=13*) and a very low number of government

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[1] All participating organizations are assigned pseudonyms. However, some of their networks kept the original names if they are nationally and internationally recognized entities (e.g., Office of Refugee Resettlement, UN, UNHCR, etc.) without specific indication of the particular departments or divisions.

entities (3.2%, n=1) (See Tables 4~6 for descriptive statistics on participating

organizations). Following sections report key quantitative and qualitative findings.

Table 4

Location Distribution

	N	%
United States	61	66.3%
South Korea	31	33.7%

Table 5

Organizational Types

	N	%
Faith-Based House of Worship	2	2.2 %
Faith-Based Nonprofit	37	40.2 %
Faith-Based For-profit	1	1.1 %
Secular Nonprofit	33	35.9 %
Government	14	15.2 %
Others	5	5.4 %

Table 6

Organizational Types By Country

		Faith-Based House of Worship	Faith-Based Nonprofit	Faith-Based For-profit	Secular Nonprofit	Government	Others
United States	N	2	24	1	17	13	4
	%	3.3%	39.3%	1.6%	27.9%	21.3%	6.6%
South Korea	N	0	13	0	16	1	1
	%	0%	41.9%	0%	51.6%	3.2%	3.2%

RQ 1: Communication about Refugees

RQ 1 asked what humanitarian organizations communicate about refugees with

the settlement community during the pandemic. To answer the RQ1, I analyzed publicly

available archival document data collected from organizations' websites such as annual

reports, announcements, periodical newsletters, press materials as well as their social media postings depending on what were available in each participating organization. For instance, government organizations only communicate through their websites whereas nonprofit organizations are active users of social media or producers of newsletters. Some smaller-sized, grassroots organizations had neither active websites nor social media. However, in general, the United States organizations had more robust website establishments where they had up-to-date content communicated to their stakeholders as well as newsletters to subscribed readers. In contrast, South Korean organizations relied mostly on social media platforms than websites and rarely engaged in communication through newsletters. The following section starts with how the organizations in the United States communicated about refugees with the settlement community.

United States Communicating Vulnerability

United States and their organizational storytelling focused on vulnerability framing of refugees and organizations. Organizations mostly reported on their activities, sharing what kinds of support refugees receive and how much attention they need. This, ultimately led to donation requests more so than anything.

First, organizations actively communicated about: (a) their organizational agenda such as fundraising efforts; (b) statistical fluctuations on the settlement of refugees; (c) ongoing efforts to secure material resources; and (d) how difficult it is to be a refugee. Furthermore, recruiting volunteers was another frequently communicated agenda. Organizations in the United States heavily focused on their work for refugees, showcasing various organizational endeavors and demonstrating the community-wide impact on refugees. For example, many organizations shared information on newly

settled refugees during the pandemic, and what their journey during the public health crisis has been like. W-GOV 2, shared on their website about the various COVID-19 measures the organizations took as they pivoted to virtual home visits and case management. An informant of W-GOV 2 said in the interview that most of her work pivoted to online. To ensure volunteers and refugees could follow their up-to-date operation procedure, they utilized website to share their work mode rather than calling individual clients or stakeholders. NE-FBNPO 8 and their communication was also reporting on their accomplishments throughout different periods in the pandemic, sharing critical agenda organizations planned and executed to support existing and/or newly settled refugees. However, such narratives also frame refugees as vulnerable and needy.

Vulnerability Framing. The United States organizations continued to post or share narratives about the vulnerability of refugees via virtual means of communication. The organizations highlighted how much help refugees need, how under-resourced they are, and the instability of their lives post-migration unless the organizations can help them. For instance, NE-NPO 6 frequently shared the intense migration journey and marginalization of female refugees faced upon arriving in the United States through newsletters. Other organizations like MW-FBNPO 1 emphasized the brutal rescue missions and realities of North Korean refugees' migration journey to the United States. An informant of NE-NPO 5 shared in the interview that refugees are truly "vulnerable and many don't have proper access to nutritious foods," therefore, have to rely on her organization for support. Such narratives also become foundational to their ultimate message which mostly led to donation requests.

Direct Donation Requests. Another prime pattern of communication in the United States organizations was direct donation requests. Donation requests were frequently and actively communicated via multiple modes of communication—emails, newsletters, phone calls, website lead pages, and social media. For instance, NE-NPO 6, in their weekly Tuesday emails said, "We never want to turn a refugee away, and you can help us ensure that. In honor of Giving Tuesday, your donation will allow us to say "Yes" to more women and families looking to use for help and belonging." Other nonprofit organizations in the United States frequently sent out pop-up windows on their websites or emails to subscribers with "Give Now (NE-NPO 8)," "Support our work (NE-NPO 9)," "Please help refugees (NE-NPO 14)," or "Refugees need your help (NE-NPO 5)" that link to online donation platforms. While this is a common expectation and activity for nonprofit organizations this is an important difference between the United States and South Korea.

South Korea and Communicating Inclusivity and Empowerment

The findings show that South Korean organizations focus more on elevating refugees' voices and status through the communication of empowerment and inclusivity. Unlike the United States, South Korean organizations rarely had active websites or subscription newsletters. Instead, they communicated with the settlement community about refugees via social media.

Shifting Refugee Perception. Most South Korean organizations relied heavily on social media platforms like Facebook and Instagram where they showcased refugees and their settlement success stories. South Korean refugee organizations prioritized communicating self-sufficiency and growth of refugees in their post-migration phase and

what organizations do to help them become more engaged. For example, K-NPO 4 and their work on, and with refugees attempt to reconstruct refugee narratives as self-sufficient, reliable, and independent by providing spaces on their social media. First, they showcased refugees' creative artworks and sold them to the public, introducing refugees as "artists." But in such a case, K-NPO 4 is not framing refugees as needing money. Instead, by introducing them as artists, they shift the focus to refugees' talents and ability to produce meaningful artwork. K-Biz 1 is another South Korean organization that partnered with local coffee shops to train refugee women to acquire barista licenses so they can be employed by food and beverage businesses across the nation. By communicating about their journey as aspiring baristas, K-Biz 1 is creating a storytelling space on their social media for refugees and for the community to see them differently. Refugees, in the social media space, are thriving individuals in a new place of settlement, wanting to achieve professional goals rather needy, incompetent people waiting to be helped and served by the organizations.

Education and Advocacy. The South Korean organizations also communicated about their advocacy activities ranging from protests or participating in a public forum to support refugee-related issues. Through such efforts, the organizations also underscored existing stigma and stereotypes of refugees and debunked such misconceptions through official statements of support in response to a particular political uprising (e.g., Afghanistan and Taliban conflict of 2020). In such a narrative, they also endorsed various legal, political, and social influencers to support refugee movements in South Korea. South Korean organizations shared frequent updates to educate the public about rapidly changing policy on migration as well as about the evolution of refugee-resettlement

policies or lack thereof. South Korean organizations actively communicated about refugee issues intersecting policy and law as well as the ongoing anti-refugee movements and public stigma. For example, K-Law 1 and K-NPO 7, which are both major refugee support and advocacy organizations, often organized public protests before the Ministry of Foreign Affairs building, raising awareness about refugee migration and post-settlement life. These activities were candidly shared or sometimes live-streamed on their social media with detailed descriptions of the current legal, political, and social shortcomings on refugee-related issues. K-FBEdu 5, which is an organization serving refugees through education tutoring for college entrance exam support also engages with the local public through community engagement discussion forum where their advocacy work was shared while reinstating the values and mission of the organization in the larger community they are nested in. K-FBEdu 5 also hosted webinars that live-streamed through their Instagram page where they held discussion forums and workshops to help audiences understand more about the lives of refugees and the educational struggles they go through in South Korea.

In addition, they also educated the settlement community about challenging refugee cases (e.g., sudden forced relocation of Yemeni refugees to an isolated island in South Korea) that the general public was unaware of. Raising awareness about the unfair treatment or lack of sustainable policy on refugee resettlement was one of the focuses of South Korean organizations' communication with the settlement community. K-NPO 4 also participated actively in their social media space to host an education forum to discuss the "realities of North Korean refugees." K-NPO 10 hosted live-streamed book club

events entitled "Getting Closer Project" leading an online book reading of non-fiction books on refugees living in South Korea.

South Korean organizations also created storytelling through the eyes of their seasonal employees, oftentimes showcasing their interns' or volunteers' experience working in the organization and with refugees. For example, K-NPO 13 had a weekly social media post of their interns taking turns to share their experiences working with refugees and the organization's mission. These voices highlighted their roles in the organizations, involvement with refugee advocacy work in South Korea, how their perceptions changed about the humanitarian work, and future plans for advocacy. K-NPO 1, an organization that had one of the most frequent online communication often shared various inside narratives about the organizations such as introducing staff members and their work with refugees through an interview-format newsletter, or posting stories about the relationships between employees and refugees, and various success stories of refugees in their settlement community (e.g., school, work, etc.). These postings allow the settlement community to view the inner workings of the organizations but also to hear about others' motivations to join the advocacy work and that the opportunities are available.

Indirect Resource Asking. For South Korean organizations, direct financial or material donation requests were extremely rare. Instead, they occasionally shared what material or financial inflow from their partners or local communities. For example, K-NPO 2 had recently received six million Korean won from the local house of worship donated for North Korean refugees along with gift boxes. By sharing such resource inflow, they are achieving two things. First, it showcases their resource flow and

partnerships while showing gratitude in public to the donors. Second, it gently motivates the community about the do-gooding and sharing resources for refugees. K-NPO 4 utilized major national holidays (e.g., Korean Thanksgiving, New Year's Day, etc.) as times to ask for donation exchange with female refugees in South Korea but not in a traditional sense. For instance, prior to the Korean Thanksgiving Day in 2021, K-NPO 4 began posting daily introductions to recruit "Holiday Family" who can serve as big sisters to refugee women by donating their time to spend with them over the holidays. Rather than donating money or goods to the organizations, K-NPO 4 attempted to connect local community members with refugees, creating a bonding relationship and more meaningful interaction and communication. In a way, refugee organizations are attempting to broker human resources to refugees so they can also create direct relationships and communication with the local community. The way South Korean organizations communicate is unique in a way that lessens the burden of financial or material donations but provides an opportunity for the local communities to think and reflect on who refugees are.

RQ 2 & H1: Disruptions and Organizational Communication

RQ 2 asked how large-scale disruptions, like the COVID-19 pandemic affected the organizations and their services for refugees. H1 proposed that large disruptions affected organizations and services they offer for refugees. To test H1 and answer RQ 2, a one-way ANOVA was performed.

First, the relationship between the two periods—before and during the pandemic—across the organizations' services and advocacy activities for refugees was examined. The informants indicated robustness, stability, and quality of their services for

refugees using 5-point Likert-type scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) before and during the pandemic. The results indicated no significant differences between the two countries before the pandemic in providing and executing services and advocacy activities for refugees   (F=.009, df= 1/63. P>.001, eta²=.123). Similarly, during the disruption, there were also no significant differences between the two countries (F=.032, df=1/63, p>.001, eta²=.051).

In the United States, the results showed that there was a higher level of activities before the disruption (M=4.21, *SD*= 1.189) than during (M= 4.05, SD= 1.251) although the differences were small. In terms of meeting refugees' needs through the organizational services, United States showed very similar means between before (M=4.55, *SD*= .828) and during (M=4.55, *SD*= .686). In South Korean organizations, before the pandemic (M=4.19, *SD*= .786) had higher service activities for refugees than during (M=4.0, *SD*= 1.038) although the differences were small. In terms of meeting refugees' needs through these activities and services, before (M=4.33, *SD*= .832) was higher than during (M=4.15, *SD*= 1.027) (see Tables 7~12 for the analysis on organizational services for refugees and disruptions). Therefore, H1 was not supported indicating that the disruption was not a critical interruption to their services for refugees nor disturbed their attempts to ensure the advocacy work met the needs.

Table 7

Organizations' Services and Activities for Refugees

Groups		*n*	M	*SD*
United States	Before	38	4.21	1.189
	During	38	4.05	1.251
South Korea	Before	27	4.19	.786
	During	27	4.0	1.038

Table 8

Intersection of Organizational Services and Meeting Refugees' Needs

Groups		*n*	M	*SD*
United States	Before	38	4.55	.828
	During	38	4.55	.686
South Korea	Before	27	4.33	.832
	During	27	4.15	1.027

Table 9

One-Way Analysis of Organizations' Services/Activities for Refugees_Before

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p
Between groups	.010	1	.010	.009	.923
Within groups	68.390	63	1.086		
Total	68.400	64			

Table 10

One-Way Analysis of Organizations' Services/Activities for Refugees_During

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p
Between groups	.044	1	.044	.032	.858
Within groups	85.895	63	1.363		
Total	85.938	64			

Table 11

One-Way Analysis of Organizations' Services/Activities Meeting Refugees Needs_Before

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p
Between groups	.759	1	.759	1.102	.298
Within groups	43.395	63	.689		
Total	44.154	64			

Table 12

One-Way Analysis of Organizations' Services/Activities Meeting Refugees Needs_During

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p
Between groups	2.582	1	2.582	3.631	.061
Within groups	44.802	63	.711		
Total	47.385	64			

Although H1 was not supported, interviews offer additional insights to RQ 1 and H1.

United States: Opportunistic Disruption and Challenges

Generally speaking, the pandemic was a disruption that interrupted every aspect

of organizations, especially at the beginning. However, the findings in this study suggest

that it actually was more opportune than disruptive. Many organizations in the United

States said the pandemic was an opportunity to secure unexpected financial gains through

the influx of donations. An informant from MW-FBNPO 1 said,

> It's really interesting, because we expected that at the beginning of the [pandemic] time that we're going to suffer for a little bit. But it was the opposite. I think this is why outside of government funding, I think people were not able to have, you know, vacation, or go out to eat, or anything like that. And so because of that, you know, there was a lot more cash floating around and the government again, and a lot of families money. And so families were cash heavy. And, you know, there was a segment of US population, my service workers who suffered a lot, and I feel for them, but those typically weren't the type of people who were doing anything to us [making donations] anyway. It was usually like white collar workers who were able to continue their work online. So because of that, if you were able to retain your job last year, and it was a really good financial times, your family and you know, that worked in our favor, last year, and this year (MW-FBNPO 1 Informant).

In addition, an informant of S-FBNPO 2 said, "Upon the onset of the pandemic, and

within the first three to four months the federal government provided us some [resource]

waivers, which meant [refugee] clients who had exited [our education] programs could

come back in for more resources." Ultimately, such waivers allowed the organizations to

look after refugee clients who weren't actively involved with the organizations anymore

but were able to continue receiving needed supports granted by the federal resource flow.

Her statements are also echoed in another organization. An informant from NE-NPO 3

said,

> So this is why the new grant that we received [during the pandemic] for the
> family integration program is to help the children and the parents know how to be
> computer literate, learning more English, and getting more support for job
> training. There are a lot of the wraparound support services that encompasses all
> of that (NE-NPO 3 Informant).

For the United States organizations, unexpectedly generous resource flow from external

donors and federal grants enabled undisrupted organizing for refugees and enhanced their

capacity to handle the pandemic with stability.

In terms of the organizations' work, the disruption created more connected and

communicated organizations. Organizations wanted to ensure the members were

connected to each other and to ensure the workflow does not stop. For instance, an

informant at NE-NPO 3 said, the communication at her organization increased. She said,

> Once the pandemic hit, we actually increased staff meetings to weekly. And just
> to make sure that we had that weekly touch point with everyone, and we were
> especially concerned for young team members who were either living alone or
> away from family. And so we wanted to make sure that they felt connected. And
> you know, that they had an opportunity to sort of, raise any concerns or just didn't
> feel like they were part of the larger team without having an in person interaction
> (NE-NPO 3 Informant).

And she also said their efforts to remain connected enabled her organization to launch

new programs and to continue existing ones with adjustments on service delivery

channel. She said,

> We actually launched a new domestic program. But the [in-person] work was in
> the first few months of the program, [then] it was all virtual as well. Now it's
> picking up and it's working with migrants and asylum seekers and providing legal
> assistance and psychosocial support. We also have a long standing government

funded program, a chaplaincy program, where we place a chaplain and five
federal detention centers and they offer religious services of all faith backgrounds.
And that program, certainly, it's still continuing. But there have been challenges
and just having access to dementing means over the course of the pandemic, so a
lot of that work has had to happen virtually as well. Especially because there were
concerns about infection rates within detention centers (NE-NPO 3 Informant).

In addition, some organizations leveraged the pandemic as an opportunity to expand the

scope of their work. For instance, an informant from W-NPO 1 said,

I would say our impacts on the community has increased significantly during the
pandemic as a result of the shift in this scope of work. So previously, we were a
program serving nonprofit, and now we have direct services. And so before [the
pandemic], it was like, we only connected people who were interested in certain
programs, but now we do providing direct services to any refugee who wants
them or needs them (W-NPO 1 Informant).

Intensified Communication Challenge. While the pandemic brought various

unexpected opportunities, the organizations in the United States also struggled with

communication challenges mainly due to cultural and language barriers. In response to

rapidly changing political ordinances such as social distancing, testing, vaccinations, and

PPE mandates, communication with refugees became difficult. For example, an

informant of NE-GOV 7 who specializes in refugee healthcare said,

We do have some, there is some hesitancy there's definite hesitancy in particularly
Muslim populations, especially women who want a female provider, which is not
always possible so that is challenging. But the flip side of that is there are certain
immunizations that are required for adjustment of status to legal permanent
residents. So there's certain vaccines that they have to have in order to apply for
their green card. And so you try and use it as a teaching opportunities to say,
okay, "but you need these in order to apply for your green card. (NE-GOV 7
Informant).

Her statement reveals that refugees from certain cultural groups have hesitancy toward

male doctors or general modern medicine which are required to follow to processing their

legal status. Ultimately, the tension between system-level mandate and personal

preferences intensified refugees' perception toward healthcare that challenged the

service-providing organizations. Additionally, an informant from S-FBNPO 1 said,

> We had many [refugee] clients that they were ready to take the vaccine, we were
> ready to take the information about the vaccine. And, you know, we had
> information translated to different languages regarding the vaccine. And we hand
> out those information to our clients with different languages. And also we had
> cultural orientation that we have and we explained to them the importance of the
> vaccine. So, you know, we still have some people at some point that they're
> hesitant to take the vaccine, and then you can't really, you know, like, enforce that
> or, you know, push them to take the vaccine, that's just, you know, their choice.
> But, we explained to them even like, you know, on daily basis when they came to
> their appointments, you know, we talked to them about "Did you take your
> vaccine?" "Are you willing to take the vaccine?" "So what's your concern about
> the vaccine?" you know, to make sure like, you know, they understand the
> importance of that (S-FBNPO 1 Informant).

For S-FBNPO 1, they had language resources to translate vaccine related information.

However, due to refugees' vaccine hesitancy coming from cultural norms, the

organizations had difficulty persuading them to be vaccinated during the pandemic.

Communication difficulty due to the language barrier was also a common, even expected

challenge. Organizations either struggled to communicate with refugees or had

challenges helping those who had language issues in their settlement community such as

school or work. For example, an informant from NE-NPO 4 said,

> You know, frankly, COVID wasn't that big a challenge. The biggest issue was,
> you know, communicating, you know, in cases where language was still an issue,
> you know, we've got to stay distant from one another, and you need to wear the
> mask and all that kind of stuff. We rely, you know, again, we have a pretty robust
> network of people who are, say, from Afghanistan, or from Pakistan, or from
> various African nations that we've been resettling (NE-NPO 4 Informant).

Another informant from W-FBNPO 2 said,

> I think it's fair to say one of the biggest challenges was dealing with school,
> online, has all [refugee] kids struggled. But our [refugee] kids are dealing with a
> language barrier on top of online learning. They're dealing with maybe some sort
> of mental health stuff that makes it even harder to concentrate. And now you want
> me to concentrate on the screen. And I don't always understand the language. So I

think that was a really huge challenge that the clients are facing in terms of our service delivery as well, to address that point we are able to provide, like we pay we contract for you choose to have three hours a week of tutoring available, right. Sometimes the foster parents will get additional. But we upped it during the pandemic to five hours, we were able to advocate and get funding for that. So that's one service delivery area, we also tried to get creative and creative (W-FBNPO 2 Informant).

While cultural and language barriers are expected challenges, these were not necessarily caused by the pandemic but already existing issues that became more apparent and difficult.

South Korea, Greater Threats than COVID

South Korea was also heavily affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, it did not affect the organizations' work or stymied their operation any more than what was expected. South Korean organizations generally reported that the beginning stage of the pandemic was challenging due to increased uncertainty and lack of information regarding the disease. However, a few months into the pandemic, the South Korean government rolled out quota-based PPE distribution and mandated mask-wearing as well as national testing center expansion. The forced lockdown was not enforced and most refugee organizations continued operating and their offices remained open. Some made the decision to limit in-person services like home visits until the spread settled down a bit.

However, participating organizations reported that factors other than COVID-19 were greater threats to their work, compromising their resilience. For example, an informant from K-FBNPO 1 who is also a seasoned refugee herself said,

We're not afraid of COVID. I had it and all it was a minor aches and flu-like symptoms. That didn't even affect out work. This doesn't stop us. What we're afraid of is the financial cut-off from the government, especially the current administration. I honestly think they are turning into communists. Refugees cannot survive in this country because of the Moon administration (K-FBNPO 1 Informant).

Her extreme discontent about the government continued as she explained the inequitable resource infrastructure where not every refugee organizations receive equal chances for grant applications or project fees from the Ministry of Unification or Ministry of Foreign Affairs. An informant from K-FBEdu 5 also shared that social stigma and misconception about refugees from the local communities challenged their work more than the pandemic itself. As a direct service provider for college entrance exam education for refugees, he said, "people have their own perceptions about what refugees are like and they like to tier different types of refugees."

However, that is not to say pandemic was not a root cause of the organizational disruption. For some others, unexpected border control and mandated quarantine after international travel due to COVID-19 caused unexpected shifts in their operation and communication. For example, K-FBNPO 10 informant said,

> Some of our staff are from the Philippines, where they were on like a multiple entry visa. So which means that they can come to Korea for a month, and they have to go back. And basically do visa runs every other month back and forth between Korea and the Philippines. When Corona first happened, like first exploded, they were on a visa run in the Philippines. So these two ladies, we thought could probably come back in a month but that didn't happen with mandated quarantine (K-FBNPO 10 Informant).

Since the staff members could not freely travel back and forth as they used to, K-FBNPO 10 pivoted to Zoom operation which enabled a more flexible workflow for both the staff in Korea and in the Philippines. Additionally, K-Biz 1 also said the pandemic caused unexpected loss to the organization but also became an opportunity. The informant said,

> At the time [before the pandemic] we were preparing our first program and we were partnering with one company called [name of the company] and they're based in Ireland and they have lots of these online courses. So we were in talks, and we still have contact with them. But when COVID-19 started to take hold here, we started to see kind of the fragility of the business, especially the B2B

side, because, you know, we had some big customers who relied on people being present in offices (K-Biz 1 Informant).

While the initial business and service expansion did not occur due to the pandemic threat, he said other opportunities came. He further elaborated that,

> We ended 2020 with another program that we wanted to try to reach out to, which was, you know, relationships with the refugee community and so on. We learned about like another dimension, which was, there's like a group, a small group of activists in Seoul, and they're asylum seekers, and some of them refugees. And, you know, this is how our knowledge evolved in a way is that we realize, okay, obviously, trying to help people get decent jobs, because that's our ultimate goal is to provide some sort of empowerment that leads to decent jobs [for refugees] in the future. So it could be education, it could be access to contacts, but you know, we focused mostly on the education side" (K-Biz 1 Informant).

For South Korean organizations, the impact of the pandemic was short-lived because it was either a lesser threat to the operation than some other major, existing communication issues or because the disruption became an opportunity to pivot their operation and adapt flexibility which was not easily done in the past. Next, I report on the network findings.

RQ 3 & H2: Communication Networks and Disruptions

RQ 3 asked how networks changed over time for refugee organizations during the pandemic. H2 proposed that community disruptions like the COVID-19 pandemic transform the network over time. To answer RQ 3 and test H2, I conducted a quantitative network analysis to compare and contrast the networks in two different time periods, before and during the pandemic. The following section begins with the overall network of the United States and South Korea.

Overall Networks Between the United States and South Korea

In order to evaluate the overall network composition across the two different countries, I conducted network analysis of the general relationships based on how each

informant identified as their organizations' network. The general relationships indicate formal partnership without specifying the network content or characteristics. It simply shows that these are interorganizational networks each refugee organizations connects with. First, the two-mode network before and during the COVID-19 both the United States (p>.001, *SD*=0.7217) and South Korea (p>.001, *SD*=0.0108) reported no statistically significant differences (see Figures 1~2 for network visualization of the United States and 3~4 for South Korea before and during the pandemic).

The two-mode networks show that in the United States, networks demonstrate unique connections across different sectors. First, the United States is politically centralized and a few federal and state-level government entities such as the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) is at the center of many networked connections. ORR oversees refugee resettlement system and also brokers the connections to other refugee agencies across the state and nation. Many local-level government entities like the police station, school district, and city offices are also active actors in refugee network. They also had extensive connections with large businesses like Uber, Starbucks, Air BnB, and Cisco. An informant from NPO 7 said the private entities were mostly sponsoring organizations but during the pandemic, they also emerged as COVID-resource networks. NPO 7 in NJ said Uber offered COVID-19 education initiatives for refugees in their organization.

For South Korea, there were no significant differences between before and during the pandemic either. During the pandemic, a couple of organizations were added to one organization (K-NPO 5) but in most cases, the same networks and connections remained. In South Korea, North Korean refugee organizations are more politically connected

where government entities like the Ministry of Unification and Ministry of National Defense were primary resource-holding and distribution organizations. However, organizations that serve foreign-born refugees are not as politically connected as the North Korean refugee organizations. The foreign-refugee organizations were mostly networked with local activist groups or organizations outside Korea such as European diplomats or the US Department of State. They were also mostly networking with voluntary organizations, and human rights advocacy firms. The networks in Korea suggest that political entities and their resources are unequally distributed and that there is a dissonance between the types of partnerships between North Korean refugee organizations and foreign-refugee organizations. For example, K-NPO 11, K-FBEdu 2, K-FBNPO 1, and K-NPO 1 are networking with the Ministry of Unification, and K-NPO 3 is networking with the Ministry of National Defense. However, foreign-refugee serving organizations like K-FBEdu 5 or K-NPO 7 are mostly networking with community foundations, local schools, human rights commissions, or refugee coalition. Similar to the United States, South Korean organizations continued to rely on their existing networks to pivot operations. An informant who's also the founder of K-FBEdu 4 said, "We initially planned to host a summer camp in 2020 but because of COVID it was canceled. But our sponsoring foundation gave us extra grants to hold summer classes for North Korean refugees virtually." She further elaborated that the sponsoring foundation has been funding her organization from the start—prior to the pandemic—and that she'd been relying heavily on their financial support through the development of the pandemic. While the initially planned summer camp was cancelled, the sponsoring organization still funded K-FBEdu 4 so they can pivot to classes instead.

Figure 1

US Two-mode Network Before Pandemic

Pink: Faith-based house of worship
Sky-blue: Faith-based nonprofit
Black: Secular nonprofit
White: Secular for-profit

Green: State-level government offices
Orange: Federal-level government offices
Navy: Coalitions or Advocacy
Purple: Others (e.g., schools)

Figure 2

US Two-mode Network During Pandemic

Pink: Faith-based house of worship
Sky-blue: Faith-based nonprofit
Black: Secular nonprofit
White: Secular for-profit

Green: State-level government offices
Orange: Federal-level government offices
Navy: Coalitions or Advocacy
Purple: Others (e.g., schools)

Figure 3

South Korea Two-mode Network Before Pandemic

Pink: Faith-based house of worship
Grey: Faith-based nonprofit
Black: Secular nonprofit
White: Secular for-profit

Green: State-level government offices
Olive: Federal-level government offices
Navy: Coalitions or Advocacy
Purple: Others (e.g., schools)

Figure 4

South Korea Two-mode Network During Pandemic

Pink: Faith-based house of worship   Green: State-level government offices
Grey: Faith-based nonprofit   Olive: Federal-level government offices
Black: Secular nonprofit   Navy: Coalitions or Advocacy
White: Secular for-profit   Purple: Others (e.g., schools)

Network Analysis of Different Types

　　To further investigate whether the networks transformed due to the disruption, QAP Pearson's r correlation analysis was performed across three different types of networks—COVID, resource, and mission—between the two time phases, before and during the pandemic. There was generally a high significant correlation between the three types of networks—mission, COVID, and resource—before and during the pandemic ($r=.602\sim.985$, p<.000) (see Table 13 for correlation table which depicts the three network types and their correlations). The results show that all three types of networks in the United States had a high correlation indicating that they were similar and that there was no significant change. Mission network displayed the highest correlation ($r=.985$, p<.001) followed by resource network ($r=.956$, p<.001) and COVID network ($r=882$, p<.001). The results indicate that for all three types of networks, refugee organizations in the United States saw little change in the connections. In other words, the same relationships remained from before the pandemic and throughout to access and exchange resources to accomplish their mission, to navigate uncertainties of COVID, and securing general resources to continue their operation and services. Figures 5~10 show each type of network in two time phases.

Table 13

Pearson's r (based on UCINET's Quadradic Analysis Procedure) of Networks Across Different Types_Before and During United States

	Before_ Mission	Before_ Resource	Before_ COVID	During_ Mission	During_ Resource	During_ COVID
Before_Mission						
Before_Resource	0.8443					
Before_COVID	0.6029	0.7409				
During_Mission	**0.9581**	0.8255	0.6051			
During_Resource	0.8157	**0.9565**	0.7361	0.8473		
During_COVID	0.6386	0.7429	**0.8822**	0.6899		

Figure 5

United States COVID Network Before Pandemic

Circles: faith-based nonprofit
Square: secular nonprofit
Up-triangle: for-profit
Checkered Box: Federal government
Down-triangle: Coalitions
Circle in the box: Others (e.g., education institution)

Figure 6

United States COVID Network During Pandemic

Circles: faith-based nonprofit
Square: secular nonprofit
Up-triangle: for-profit
Checkered Box: Federal government
Down-triangle: Coalitions
Circle in the box: Others (e.g., education institution)

Figure 7

United States Mission Network Before Pandemic

Circles: faith-based nonprofit
Square: secular nonprofit
Up-triangle: for-profit
Checkered Box: Federal government
Down-triangle: Coalitions
Circle in the box: Others (e.g., education institution)

Figure 8

United States Mission Network During Pandemic

Circles: faith-based nonprofit
Square: secular nonprofit
Up-triangle: for-profit
Checkered Box: Federal government
Down-triangle: Coalitions
Circle in the box: Others (e.g., education institution)

Figure 9

United States Resource Network Before Pandemic

Circles: faith-based nonprofit
Square: secular nonprofit
Up-triangle: for-profit
Checkered Box: Federal government
Down-triangle: Coalitions
Circle in the box: Others (e.g., education institution)

Figure 10

United States Resource Network During Pandemic

Circles: faith-based nonprofit
Square: secular nonprofit
Up-triangle: for-profit
Checkered Box: Federal government
Down-triangle: Coalitions
Circle in the box: Others (e.g., education institution)

In South Korea, there was a moderately low to high significant correlation

between the three types of networks (r=.302~.977, p<.001) (see Table 14 for correlation

table). Similar to the United States, South Korean organizations reported that the mission

networks had the highest correlation (r=.977, p<.001) while the COVID networks had the

lowest significant correlation (r=.302, p<.001). Therefore, H2 was partially supported.

While most networks demonstrated fairly similar connections overall, South Korea's

COVID network showed relatively low correlation compared to all the other networks.

According to the interview, an informant from K-NPO 2 said that the South Korean

government distributed quota-based PPE starting in April, 2020 which ensured all residing individuals were granted with guaranteed number of PPEs. In addition, the South Korean government implemented free, frequent testing available in major parts of the cities as well as establishing systems to ensure resource and information flow including tracking apps, mandated quarantine at a special facility. South Korean organizations were not as overwhelmed with the pandemic because there was a nation-wide system protocols that facilitated resource, minimizing the needs to network over COVID-related matters between and among organizational partners. Figures 11~16 show three types of networks in South Korea over the two time periods.

Table 14

Pearson's r (based on UCINET's Quadradic Analysis Procedure) of Networks across different types_Before and During_South Korea

	Before_ Mission	Before_ Resource	Before_ COVID	During_ Mission	During_ Resource	During_ COVID
Before_Mission						
Before_Resource	0.8295					
Before_COVID	0.6415	0.5729				
During_Mission	**0.9775**	0.8147	0.6480			
During_Resource	0.8121	**0.9475**	0.5792	0.8252		
During_COVID	0.4089	0.4429	**0.3021**	0.4563	0.4468	

Figure 11

South Korea COVID Network Before Pandemic


Circles: faith-based nonprofit
Square: secular nonprofit
Up-triangle: for-profit
Checkered Box: Federal government
Down-triangle: Coalitions
Circle in the box: Others (e.g., education institution)

Figure 12

South Korea COVID Network During Pandemic

Circles: faith-based nonprofit
Square: secular nonprofit
Up-triangle: for-profit
Checkered Box: Federal government
Down-triangle: Coalitions
Circle in the box: Others (e.g., education institution)

Figure 13

South Korea Mission Network Before Pandemic

Circles: faith-based nonprofit
Square: secular nonprofit
Up-triangle: for-profit
Checkered Box: Federal government
Down-triangle: Coalitions
Circle in the box: Others (e.g., education institution)

Figure 14

South Korea Mission Network During Pandemic

Circles: faith-based nonprofit
Square: secular nonprofit
Up-triangle: for-profit
Checkered Box: Federal government
Down-triangle: Coalitions
Circle in the box: Others (e.g., education institution)

Figure 15

South Korea Resource Network Before Pandemic

Circles: faith-based nonprofit
Square: secular nonprofit
Up-triangle: for-profit
Checkered Box: Federal government
Down-triangle: Coalitions
Circle in the box: Others (e.g., education institution)

Figure 16

South Korea Resource Network During Pandemic


Circles: faith-based nonprofit
Square: secular nonprofit
Up-triangle: for-profit
Checkered Box: Federal government
Down-triangle: Coalitions
Circle in the box: Others (e.g., education institution)

RQ3 and H2 mainly examined interorganizational networks where informants

were asked to name other organizations they networked with. There were no significant

differences in the way networks transformed due to the pandemic which indicates that the

participating organizations retained their existing relationships with their networks. For

instance, NE-FBNPO 16 identified 3M as a network that helped them achieve their

mission before the pandemic. This relationship continued throughout the pandemic where

3M still was a critical network for mission achievement. NE-HoW 1 networked with

Advocacy Assistant Coalition for mission and sustained that relationship during the pandemic. Resource networks in the United States showed similar pattern. For instance, NE-FBNPO 7 networked with AirBnB and Amazon where these were sponsoring organizations for resources. Before the pandemic they only offered financial resources and during the pandemic the same connections remained even though both AirBnB and Amazon might have experienced some negative setbacks dur to COVID.

While the types of networks remained the same the actual contents of networks were slightly changed. Although the network survey did not capture, interviews revealed that the pandemic enabled the organizations to extend their informal networks with ethnic communities through their work. For example, an informant of W-NPO 1 said,

> As a result of COVID we've been able to expand our network, and refugees who know people who work here, refugees who participate in our in our systems, that program, that's something that we're really well known for, was probably our most significant program, or is our most significant program that we will continue, which has been really exciting. And so, you know, that's one thing that was kind of a blessing, but it gave us the urgency to shift our programming and our services in a way that we didn't have plan or like reason to before. And I don't I mean, I don't know if I can say like a percentage of the people that know us. We have relationships like all of the Latinx businesses in the community. So whenever we have an event or even just like a general COVID event, they'll let us go and put fliers up in their phones. So I would say pretty much every ethnic business in the community is familiar with us now. Almost all of the agricultural employers we've worked with our team will go and do workshops there. I mean, I would say, yeah, we are impacted and our reach has expanded (W-NPO 1 Informant).

Interorganizational networks did not change or were critically affected due to the pandemic. The findings indicate that organizations continued their communication with their networks throughout the pandemic to operate and do their mission-driven work.

Sector Distribution of Networks

To assess the homogeneity (similarity) and heterogeneity (difference) among networks based on a categorical attribute of types of organizations by sector, E-I (external-internal) index was tested. The E-I index calculates the proportion of the interorganizational relationships to an external group relative to the number of relationships to an internal group (Saffer, 2019). In this study, the organizations were classified into six sectors: faith-based nonprofit, secular nonprofit, for-profit, government, coalitions and advocacy, and others. The E-I index uses the categorical attribute and calculated the proportion of a network's external relationships to others who are in different sectors relative to the relationships to others who are in the same sector. The E-I statistics produces network and nodal level normalized values that can range from -1.0 (only internal relationships exist) to +1.0 (only external relationships exist) (Krackhardt & Stern, 1988). Six E-I indices (before COVID, during COVID, before resource, during resource, before mission, during mission) per country assessed each organization's relationships across sectoral network boundaries to support RQ 3 and H2.

According to the findings, both United States and South Korea had robust cross-sector networks and strong interorganizational relationships. In the United States, networks also had higher external indices although it was slightly lower than South Korea (Table 15 describes the sector distribution of the three networks in the two different phases, before and during pandemic.). However, the United States organizations showed relatively high external indices throughout especially in COVID network and Resource networks. Both networks had the same external indices indicating that in the two time phases, both networks had more robust cross-sector relationships than homophily (i.e., networks within the same sector or type). For mission network, the cross-sector level

slightly increased during the pandemic than before. For example, NE-FBNPO 10 had no homophily network but thirteen different cross-sector networks. NE-FBNPO 16 also had no homophily network but ten different cross-sector mission network during the pandemic. This indicates that even though their networks are not within the same sector, they still help them achieve their mission.

Table 15

United States Network Level E-I Indices

	External	Internal	E-I Obs.	E-I Min.	E-I Max.	P≤Obs.
Before_COVID	0.698	0.302	0.397	0.285	0.788	0.055
During_COVID	0.698	0.302	0.397	0.263	0.777	0.052
Before_Resource	0.698	0.302	0.397	0.274	0.765	0.057
During_Resource	0.302	0.698	0.397	0.251	0.788	0.050
Before_Mission	0.713	0.287	0.427	0.227	0.787	0.133
During_Mission	0.723	0.277	0.447	0.270	0.799	0.183

According to the E-I index analysis, South Korean organizations were also mostly cross-sectoral. Table 16 shows the overall E-I indices for three different networks before and during the pandemic. COVID network before the pandemic had the highest external relationships whereas during COVID, the external index was reduced to .720. However, this still represents a relatively high external relationship index indicating that cross-sector networks were robust. Between the two periods, both resource network and mission network had relatively high external indices as well. For instance, K-NPO had one internal network and twenty external networks, indicating that they were primarily networking with different sectors. K-NPO is a secular nonprofit and its networks were mostly faith-based nonprofits or private businesses or foundations. K-NPO 3 is another organization that has more robust cross-sector networks than homophily networks.

Table 16

South Korea Network Level E-I Indices

	External	Internal	E-I Obs.	E-I Min.	E-I Max.	P≤Obs.
Before_COVID	0.802	0.198	0.604	0.208	0.830	0.756
During_COVID	0.680	0.320	0.360	-0.200	1.000	0.182
Before_Resource	0.774	0.226	0.548	0.190	0.905	0.525
During_Resource	0.782	0.218	0.563	0.126	0.839	0.596
Before_Mission	0.787	0.213	0.574	0.255	0.851	0.633
During_Mission	0.779	0.221	0.558	0.221	0.895	0.569

In all three types of networks, the two countries demonstrated stronger cross-sector relationships. The finding suggests that in order to access resources for routine services but also for COVID-related resources cross-sector networks are able to offer more than their homophily networks. In addition, when it comes to achieving their mission, in large part perhaps the networks are also resource driven. Next, I report the findings on formal structures and organizing.

RQ 4: Formal Structures and Organizing

RQ 4 asked how formal structures of organizations intersect with the organizations operation and services for refugees and community-wide impact. To assess the relationship between formal structures like organizational policy or crisis plans in place, Pearson's correlation test was performed for both countries together. The informants indicated robustness and stability of their financial circumstances, services offered to refugees and the impact of their mission-driven work for refugees using 5-point Likert-type scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) in before and during the pandemic. First, having policy in place before the pandemic was positively correlated to the organizations' ability to improvise their work ($r(65)=-.452$

(p<.01) and also positively correlated to the capacity to continue the stability of policy during the pandemic (r(65)=.895 (p<.01) (See Table 17 for the correlation between formal structure and intersection of work). Additionally, there were a number of other positively correlated variables regarding organizational operation and capacity to serve refugees. Having a strong financial status was positively correlated to offering strong services both before (r(65)=.797 (p<.01) and during (r(65)=.472, p<.01) and making a positive community impact (r(65)=.584 (p<.01). Organizations with strong services to refugees before the pandemic also was positively correlated to strong financial status (r(65)=.430 (p<.01) and making a positive community impact (r(65)=.472 (p<.01) during the pandemic.

Table 17

Formal Structures and Intersection of Work

		B_Policy	B_Finance	B_Service	B_Mission	B_Improv	D_Policy	D_Finance	D_ Service	D_Mission
B_Finance	r	.000								
	p	.998								
B_Service	r	-.025	.656**							
	p	.843	<.001							
B_Mission	r	.115	.797**	.704**						
	p	.360	<.001	<.001						
B_Improv	r	-.452**	.222	.263*	.191					
	p	<.001	.076	.035	.128					
D_Policy	r	.895**	-.068	-.093	.057	-.360**				
	p	<.001	.591	.460	.655	.003				
D_Finance	r	**.065**	.671**	.430**	.582**	.163	.145			
	p	**.605**	<.001	<.001	<.001	.196	.251			
D_Service	r	**.055**	.472**	.749**	.526**	.141	.112	.728**		
	p	**.662**	<.001	<.001	<.001	.263	.373	<.001		
D_Mission	r	**.169**	.584**	.472**	.740**	.109	.192	.811**	.762**	
	p	**.178**	<.001	<.001	<.001	.388	.126	<.001	<.001	
D_Improv	r	**-.207**	.194	.176	.162	.742**	-.152	.344**	.242	.288*
	p	**.099**	.122	.161	.196	<.001	.226	.005	.052	.020

The findings show that formal structures like having a solid policy or crisis plans in place before disruptions emerge can become foundational forces to enable organizations to improvise in response to changing situations and become more adaptable. Additionally, strong financial status can render robust services to refugees and making positive community impact. This indicates that mission-driven work requires robust resources, not just good will. Having well-established services prior to the pandemic can also lead to retention of strong financial status which shows that performance draws resources in for organizations to continue their work. In the interview, organizations from both countries echoed that adaptability was critical during the pandemic and that their organizations had formalized protocols in place.

RQ 5: Communication Technology and Disruptions

RQ 5 asked what decisions organizations made about communication technology in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and disruptions it had brought. To assess the way organizations used communication technology with their networks and refugee clients and the capacity to handle the sudden shifts to remote working, I examined: (a) the types of organizational technology support; (b) the difficulty level of communicating with networks and refugees via various communication technology; and (c) the types of communication technology used by the organizations.

First, descriptive analysis was performed to assess how the organizations supported employees and their use of communication technology for work. Three categories were evaluated: (a) in-house IT support; (b) technology training; and (c) organizational help on technology difficulty (see Table 18~21). Before the pandemic United States had significantly higher technology support from organizations where IT

support (*n*=23, 69.7%), technology training (*n*=20, 71.4%), and receiving organizations'

help on technology difficulty (*n*=26, 54.2%) than South Korea where IT support (*n*=10,

30.3%), technology training (*n*=8, 28.6%) and organizations' help on technology

difficulty (*n*=22, 5.8%) were lower. During the pandemic, South Korea continued to see a

drop in these supports whereas the United States reported heightened support by a small

increase. This demonstrates that the United States organizations provided needed support

to navigate the challenging transition to virtual work mandated by COVID-19 protocol.

Table 18

Organizational Technology Support_Before

		IT Support	Technology Training	Organizational Help
United States	*N*	23	20	26
	%	69.7%	71.4%	54.2%
South Korea	*N*	10	8	22
	%	30.3%	28.6%	45.8%

Table 19

Organizational Technology Support_During

		IT Support	Technology Training	Organizational Help
United States	*N*	24	23	28
	%	70.6%	74.2%	56%
South Korea	*N*	10	8	22
	%	29.4%	25.8%	44%

Table 20

Organizational Communication with Refugees Using Technology_Before

Groups		N	M	SD
Cell Phones	US	31	3.74	1.032
	SK	27	4.33	.620
Laptops	US	30	3.07	1.015
	SK	27	3.59	1.047
Internet	US	30	3.47	.973
	SK	27	3.78	1.121
Social Media	US	30	3.13	.973
	SK	27	3.33	1.209
Video-conferencing	US	30	3.00	1.017
	SK	27	3.19	1.178
Instant Messaging	US	29	3.52	1.056
	SK	26	3.92	1.164
Emails	US	30	2.90	.995
	SK	27	3.52	1.189

Table 21

Organizational Communication with Refugees Using Technology_During

	Groups	N	M	SD
Cell Phones	US	29	3.62	1.237
	SK	27	4.04	.980
Laptops	US	29	3.10	1.205
	SK	27	3.26	1.163
Internet	US	29	3.34	1.143
	SK	27	3.56	1.188
Social Media	US	29	3.10	1.145
	SK	27	3.07	1.174
Video-conferencing	US	29	3.07	1.132
	SK	27	2.70	1.171
Instant Messaging	US	28	3.46	1.232
	SK	26	3.54	1.303
Emails	US	29	2.90	1.145
	SK	27	3.19	1.210

While South Korea experienced a slight decrease in organizations' technology support, they did not have forced lockdown nor completely transition to virtual work. According to K-Law 1, some of their home visits were temporarily terminated at the beginning due to rapidly increasing cases of COVID-19. However, their office remained open where refugees could still visit and receive legal services or consultations in person throughout the pandemic period. After about a year into the pandemic home visits also resumed following mandated face-covering protocols, according to the informant at K-Law 1. K-Law 1 also said, "refugees don't have data plan that supports unlimited internet. And that's why we can't connect with them over videocall." Additionally, K-FBNPO 3 informant said using Zoom was already in place due to some of their employees were located in the Philippines. While Zoom presented issues for some refugee clients, the challenge was not induced by organizations' lack of technical capacity. According to an informant from K-FBNPO 3,

> There were some differences in digital literacy. Unfortunately, there's this one student, North Korean refugee […] it was harder for her like, she's not used to that kind of format [Zoom], and I still haven't been able to really, like help her, like, adjust to that. And maybe that, you know, if level four, like, you know, lessons to, hopefully, the level of social distancing will be lowered a little bit and I can like, actually go visit her and explain it in person, at least if I explain them person, then I think it could work better. But like, even like trying to explain it online, like through text message, or even like, that just wasn't really effective. So there will be some that like, it is harder for them to adjust to that. And even if they were to, I think that it wouldn't be as   you know, obviously, as effective as meeting in person (K-FBNPO 3 Informant).

These statements highlight the digital divide between refugee clients and the organizations as some of the clients may not have the bandwidth to handle technology shifts due to sudden social distancing and service pivot. In large part, this is due to infrastructural barrier than the organizations' technology competency or capacity.

Secondly, to assess the difficulty level of using technology with their networks to coordinate tasks and to communicate and service refugees, I performed a one-way ANOVA (see table 22 and 23). The informants indicated their difficulty level of communicating with refugees using communication technology by using 5-point Likert-type scales ranging from 1 (very difficult) to 5 (very easy) before and during the pandemic. The results indicated that before the pandemic United States organizations had the easiest time communicating with refugees via cell phones (M=3.74, SD= 10032) whereas the had the most difficulty communicating via emails (M=2.9, SD= 0995). During the pandemic cell phones remained as the easiest channel of communication (M=3.62, SD= 1.237) while emails remained as the most difficult communication means (M=2.90, SD=1.145). For South Korean organizations, cell phone (M=4.33, SD=.620) was the easiest way to communicate with refugees while videoconferencing like Zoom (M=3.19, SD.1.178) was the most difficult to use before the pandemic. During the pandemic, both cell phone (M=4.04, SD=.980) and videoconferencing (M=2.70, SD=1.171) remained as the easiest and the most difficult means of communication respectively. While both cell phones were reported as the easiest means of communication for both countries, there was no significant differences between the degree of easiness or difficulty between the two nations across the different communication technologies used to communicate with refugees. Before the pandemic, the variance was reported for the following communication technology: cell phones (F=6.740, df= 1/56, p>.001, eta^2=.107), laptops (F=3.703,df=1/55, p>.001, eta^2=.063), internet (F=1.258, df=1/55, p>.001, eta^2=.022), social media (F=.478, df=1/55, p>.001, eta^2=.009), videoconferencing (F=.406, df=1/55, p>.001, eta^2=.007), instant messaging

(F=1.839, df=1/55, p>.001, eta^2=.034) and email (F=4.569, df=1/55, p>.001, eta^2=.077).

During the pandemic the variance was reported for the following communication

technology: cell phones (F=1.931, df= 1/54, p>.001, eta^2=.035), laptops

(F=.242,df=1/54, p>.001, eta^2=.004), internet (F=.458, df=1/54, p>.001, eta^2=..008),

social media (F=.009, df=1/54, p>.001, eta^2=.000), videoconferencing (F=1.409,

df=1/54, p>.001, eta^2=.025), instant messaging (F=.841, df=1/52, p>.001, eta^2=.001)

and email (F=.841, df=1/54, p>.001, eta^2=.015).

Table 22

One-Way Analysis of Organizations' Communication with Refugees Using
Communication Technology_Before

		SS	df	MS	F	p-value
Cell Phones	Between Groups	5.047	1	5.047	6.740	.012
	Within Groups	41.935	56	.749		
	Total	46.983	57			
Laptops	Between Groups	3.931	1	3.931	3.703	.060
	Within Groups	58.385	55	1.062		
	Total	62.316	56			
Internet	Between Groups	1.375	1	1.375	1.258	.267
	Within Groups	60.133	55	1.093		
	Total	61.509	56			
Social Media	Between Groups	.568	1	.568	.478	.492
	Within Groups	65.467	55	1.190		
	Total	66.035	56			
Video-conferencing	Between Groups	.487	1	.487	.406	.527
	Within Groups	66.074	55	1.201		
	Total	66.561	56			
Instant Messaging	Between Groups	2.258	1	2.258	1.839	.181
	Within Groups	65.088	53	1.228		
	Total	67.345	54			
Emails	Between Groups	5.436	1	5.436	4.569	.037
	Within Groups	65.441	55	1.190		
	Total	70.877	56			

Table 23

One-Way Analysis of Organizations' Communication with Refugees Using Communication Technology_During

		SS	df	MS	F	p-value
Cell Phone	Between Groups	2.424	1	2.424	1.931	.170
	Within Groups	67.791	54	1.255		
	Total	70.214	55			
Laptops	Between Groups	.339	1	.339	.242	.625
	Within Groups	75.875	54	1.405		
	Total	76.214	55			
Internet	Between Groups	.621	1	.621	.458	.501
	Within Groups	73.218	54	1.356		
	Total	73.839	55			
Social Media	Between Groups	.012	1	.012	.009	.925
	Within Groups	72.542	54	1.343		
	Total	72.554	55			
Video-conferencing	Between Groups	1.865	1	1.865	1.409	.240
	Within Groups	71.492	54	1.324		
	Total	73.357	55			
Instant Messaging	Between Groups	.074	1	.074	.046	.831
	Within Groups	83.426	52	1.604		
	Total	83.500	53			
Emails	Between Groups	1.165	1	1.165	.841	.363
	Within Groups	74.764	54	1.385		
	Total	75.929	55			

There was no significant differences in the way organizations utilized communication technology for communicating with refugees in both countries. How they experienced challenges and mitigated such difficulty were different which is reported next.

Digital Divide and Emergent Technology Brokering

Interviews revealed that both the United States and South Korea experienced a heightened digital divide on multiple levels where the gap existed among employees and with refugees. For the United States, there was a minor digital divide for older employees and with their refugee clients especially with the heightened use of Zoom. However, in the United States, the digital gap was mended when younger organizational members began helping out older members how to figure out challenging technology platforms. For example, an informant from NE-FBNPO 13 said, "I'm the youngest person in the office and have been delegated quite a few of the technical questions. I'm probably the point person in the office for some of that stuff." For these organizations, the internal technology challenge was mostly a short-lived issue because the forced lockdown and remote working mandate needed time to adjust but organizations had internal support and ORR also distributed necessary resources for technology adaptation like providing tablets to local refugee agencies (NE-GOV-2).

However, when it comes to communicating with refugee clients or providing services virtually that had been in person, there was a greater digital divide. An informant from NE-GOV 8 who manages refugee education programs at the public library emphasized the severity of the digital divide across refugees who come in to use their technology (e.g., e-books, computers, etc.). She said over the pandemic the digital divide intensified because everything shifted to remote education and she had been working on "getting more grants to find digital literacy support." In addition, organizations also made improvised efforts to find ways to combat service delivery challenges due to digital limits. An informant from W-FBNPO 2 said,

> [Before the pandemic] If something's happening, maybe they all will get together and have a meeting that way. So always be in person to our social workers have a

minimum requirement of doing a home visit and meeting with these family face to face once a month, right? All of a sudden, we're like, how do we do that? So a lot changed into Zoom meetings, there was a lot going on, at the state level dictating what foster care should do in light of the pandemic. So again, this is mostly all from our kind of foster care, right? Are we allowed? What do we do, we're supposed to be having eyes on them at least once a month. So there were accommodations made for like, video calls could be found, or sometimes, especially we would like open a little closed back down a little. So with those changes also came like you could meet outside of the house, if everyone had masks on so you can see them in person but outdoors, or certain emergencies, you could go into the house with the proper PPE and getting the parents to sign the consent form those kinds of things (W-FBNPO 2, Informant).

The data showed that digital limits were recognized as additional layers of challenges that stymied communication with refugee clients which then doubled the service delivery.

In addition, refugees became digital brokers. NE-CAO 1 said, seasoned refugees who had already been in the United States for a while emerged as technology brokers for newly arrived ones. He said that teaching new refugees about Zoom was much more challenging because of the language barrier. To remedy the situation, he reached out to refugees who once received help from his organizations and locate someone who could speak the language and teach them about the technology use. NE-FBNPO 9 informant also said that she was able to "recruit refugees" to create videos instructing about social distancing and handwashing in various languages to distribute to newly settled refugees without high English proficiency. Utilizing technology merged with cultural and language sensitivity enabled organizations to serve their new clients better. In large part, the seasoned refugees became an important network for organizations to get through the challenges of the pandemic.

Findings suggest that the pandemic presented various opportunities and challenges in both countries. They also illustrate how organizations persisted with the difficulty by searching for solutions by leveraging existing and hidden networks like

refugees. Forthcoming sections discuss theoretical and practical implications of the findings, consolidating insights from communication networks, communication technology, and organizational storytelling. Table 24 displays the overview of proposed RQs and Hs and summarizes key findings.

Table 24

Overview of the Results

RQ or H	Brief Result	Analysis & Summary
RQ 1: What do humanitarian organizations communicate with the settlement community about refugees during the COVID-19 pandemic?	Communicating vulnerability vs. inclusivity	US: ■ Refugees as vulnerable constituents that need help ■ Organization's work on refugees ■ Donation requests ■ Mostly mediated forms of communication via newsletters and websites SK: ■ Refugees as empowered individuals ■ Highlighting refugees' capacity as self-sustainable and contributing members Facilitate inclusive dialogue, connecting refugees to the settlement community via social media outreach
RQ 2: How do large-scale disruptions, like the COVID-19 pandemic, affect the organizations and the services they offer for refugees? H1: Large disruptions are likely to affect organizations and the services they offer for refugees.	Not supported	US: ■ No critical change in the operation ■ Minimal disruption to operation ■ Major tech divide within organizations and outside with refugees ■ COVID was an opportunity than threats ■ Recognized underlying challenges that existed before the pandemic (e.g., language, culture divide) SK: ■ No significant challenges in operation ■ Tech divide of refugees due to infrastructural barrier ■ Reduced funding and resources from the government
RQ 3: How does the networks change over time for the humanitarian organizations during the pandemic? H2: Community disruptions like the COVID-19 pandemic transforms the network over time.	Partially supported for South Korea COVID network	US & SK ● Networks were stable and similar overall except for South Korea's COVID network ● Three types of networks showed similar composition and contents in the United States ● Strong cross-sector relationships than homophily ● Kept the same networks but what the networks did for the organizations were slightly different during the pandemic

RQ 4: How do formal structures intersect with the work of humanitarian organizations during the pandemic?	Formal structure is positively associated with operation	US & SK: • Having formal structures in place (e.g., policy about operation, funding, HR, services, etc.) enabled organizations to be able to perform without disruption and retained their services to refugees • Solid policy from pre-pandemic rendered high perceived effectiveness, met refugees' needs
RQ 5: What decisions did organization make about using technology in new or expanded ways during the pandemic to continue to address the needs of refugees?	Flexible pivots between remote and virtual work, utilizing younger members as technology assistants	US • Employed virtual work via Zoom, case management system, instant messaging within organizations and with refugees • Older members had difficulty adjusting to new technology platforms (e.g., Zoom) • Younger organizational members emerged as technology brokers • Seasoned refugees became technology brokers between newly settled refugees and organizations SK • Operation did not shift to virtual but some organizations reduced in-person services • Refugees experienced technology divide due to infrastructural barrier (e.g., devices lacking bandwidth, cell phone plans without data) • Members had high technology capacity but experienced digital gap with refugees due to their lacking technology resources

Chapter 7: Discussion

This dissertation explored how a system-wide disruption like the COVID-19 pandemic affected refugee organizations and their resilience-building. According to the findings, organizations serving the vulnerable in the community sustained and stabilized their operation through communication networks and by leveraging digital resources. Additionally, the dissertation also demonstrated that organizations and refugees were engaged in co-brokering communication processes in which refugees emerged as critical network and communication assets for organizational resilience building. Ultimately, the study suggests that refugees contribute to the organizational resilience-building while, concurrently, organizations elevate the voices of refugees through inclusive dialogue. This discussion section extends our understanding of the intersection of mission-driven work and meaningful inclusion and empowerment of refugees within the settlement community. The discussion begins by arguing that a crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic was an unprecedented interruption to refugee organizations. It then considers how the organizations' communication efforts served to strengthen their resilience while incorporating refugees as part of their networks. Theoretical, policy, and practical implications are discussed, followed by limitations and directions for future research.

Discussion of Findings: Crisis and Resilience

The COVID-19 pandemic was an unprecedented crisis for organizations worldwide. Unlike general organizational crises that often concern public relations, the pandemic presented humanitarian organizations with multiple interruptions that cascaded to prolonged disruptions. Uniquely, COVID-19 also unveiled underlying challenges that became particular threats for refugee organizations. First, COVID-19 is a distinctive type

of crisis compared to previous disruptions many organizations experienced (e.g., public relations, natural disasters, economic or political crisis, etc.). Second, much of our knowledge regarding organizational crisis is contextualized in for-profit or business sectors rather than the nonprofit sector. At the same time, however, the pandemic also provided an opportunity to recognize undervalued resources while adapting to new possibilities. Arguably, COVID-19 was a critical disruption unlike a typical organizational crisis as it doubled the threats in scope but also created opportunities for growth, adaptability, and capacity building to continue operation. The following sections discuss how refugee organizations faced this critical crisis and built resilience.

From Crisis to the Pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic is a distinctive type of disruption to organizations compared to what we generally view as an organizational crisis. The literature identifies organizational crises as threats to organizational reputation and survival. The crisis generally occurs through both "natural and manufactured events" (e.g., intentional harm, accidents, dangerous threats) (Dynes, 1970; Shaluf et al., 2003, p. 50). Organizational crises can involve unexpected threats to operation and reputation (Booth, 1993; Shaluf et al., 2003); system, beliefs and goal priorities (Seeger & Ulmer, 2002); and physical, human, and material resource retention (Doerfel et al., 2010b; Dynes, 1970; Krackhardt & Stern, 1988; Runyan, 2006; Vandeford et al., 2007). The pandemic, however, was unlike most organizational crises that pertain to public relations matters (e.g., reputation, public image, etc.) or disruption to their profit goals. COVID-19 posed significant threats to organizations, but those threats were not issues of public relations.

A threat like COVID-19 cannot be managed by an organization alone. In theory, mitigating such a crisis requires creative tactics and communication (Darling, 1994; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). Given that organizational crises often result in ambiguous conditions, *how* organizations take actions in response to a crisis can affect both their short- and long-term survival (Chewning, 2015). Responding to a crisis requires information, material, and network resources (Runyan, 2006; Sellnow & Seeger, 2013; Vandeford et al., 2007) to ensure timely reputation and image management (Stephens et al., 2005; Adams & Roebuck, 1997; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). Organizations that are able to handle crises promptly and honestly can reduce damage to their reputations while regaining public trust (Coombs, 1999; Murry & Shohen, 1992; Seeger, 1986; Seeger & Ulmer, 2002). Such crisis communication and management, however, is nested within stakeholder communication (Chewning, 2015), highlighting how organizations can escape tarnished reputations and minimize the risk of business goal failure. Additionally, scholars like Spilan and Crandall (2002) argue that most organizational crisis can be averted either as time goes by or via strategic management plans. However, such aversion is very difficult in a crisis such as COVID-19. Indeed, the pandemic cuts across levels, affecting individuals, organizations, communities, and the global all at once (Shibata, 2020), unfolding into even greater disruptions (Stephens et al., 2020) with no sign of prevention or avoidance. Arguably, the COVID-19 pandemic provides a sharp contrast with how existing scholarship defines crisis in organizations; thus, it is a critical disruption. Research acknowledges the importance of the unintentional and externally-controlled crisis environment, in which organizations may hold no blame. However, the pandemic is beyond the scope of what and how existing literature define organizational

crisis. Thus, a pandemic may not be associated with organizational reputation or public image but still can break the operation of organizations, hampering them from doing the work. In the long term, such a crisis requires organizations and the community to persist against cascading threats that snowball into greater long-term disruptions and consequences.

Lastly, an important distinction should be made between sectors. For the non-profit sector, the pandemic poses another layer of challenge as their primary goals differ from those of the business sector. A large volume of research on organizational crisis and communication centers on business sectors in the United States (Lee et al., 2007). However, the nonprofit sector is a different context where "the disposal of organizational assets is less important than concerns regarding continuing care for service recipients" (Searing et al., 2021, p.180). The nonprofit sector's primary role and goals involve providing services for the community (Spilan & Crandall, 2002). However, research at the intersection of crisis and nonprofit organizations has been seen as less consequential, receiving little attention (Spilan & Crandall, 2002). For nonprofits, an organizational crisis has less to do with their public image and more to do with whether they can continue to serve their vulnerable constituents throughout the crisis. The nonprofit sector provides a unique context where survival matters not just for the organizations but also for the vulnerable people they serve. Arguably, nonprofit organizations are pressured to continue sustainable operation and to be resilient so their constituents are not negatively affected by the crisis. The pandemic represents an interruption to normalcy that may seem like a crisis that can easily be managed or mitigated in the short term. I argue that in the long-term, however, a pandemic requires multi-level efforts between organizations

and their networks and community members—whether vulnerable refugees or part of a settlement community—to persist in order to minimize the damage and suffering for both the community and the organizations serving those constituents. COVID-19 is unique because it compounded organizations with additional challenges integral to survival. One of the most critical challenge the pandemic brought to refugee organizations is a heightened digital divide.

Technology Divide. In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, communication technology and a sudden shift to virtual work emerged as a critical challenge to refugee organizations. The findings of this research illustrate that the digital divide spans across levels and that individual-level and organizational-level divides mutually influence organizational resilience. Chewning et al. (2012) argue that organizations can utilize technology in a novel way when disruptions like natural disasters emerge. However, when the disruption is unprecedented, long-term, and cannot be managed solely through efforts of the organization, mobilizing resilience through technology becomes more challenging.

Research about the digital divide is mostly concerned with haves and have nots, considering issues of accessibility, capacity, and literacy toward technology platforms and devices. The digital divide generally refers to individuals not having equal access to technological resources (Wellman et al., 2001) whether it be a lack of digital connection (e.g., broadband, Internet) or not having access to devices such as computers or cell phones (Zimmer, 2003). At an individual-level, the digital divide brings inequality regarding community members' access to information and resource (Katz & Gonzalez, 2016; Rainie & Wellman, 2012). Interestingly, most research on the digital divide has

considered how individuals from underprivileged communities (e.g., low income, migrants) lack digital resources (Katz et al., 2019; Katz & Gonzalez, 2016; Mansell, 2002; Norris, 2001). For example, refugees generally have difficulty accessing and using communication technology (Ritchie, 2018; Van Dijk, 2006; Harney, 2013). This limitation often lead to further social exclusion (Tsatsou, 2011).

For organizations, the digital divide originates from insufficient resources (e.g., financial capacity to pay for devices or services or in-house technician) to support technology adoption or integration in organizations (Burt & Taylor, 2000; Grobman, 2001; Grobman & Grant, 1998). Technology, if incorrectly integrated, can also inhibit an organization's performance (Thomke, 2006). In other words, communication technology must be combined with proper adaptation, along with the evolution of organizational processes and structures, to be effective (Gressgard et al., 2014). Effective technology use means organizations can manage change or adapt to the changing environments better (Duarte & Snyder, 2006), helping organizations to gain a competitive advantage (Massini et al., 2005; Zhu et al., 2006). Particularly in the humanitarian sector, technology plays an increasingly transformative role that expedites aid opportunities for refugees and creates new pathways for resilience (Betts et al., 2015). Mobile technology, in particular, is heavily used to deliver services as well as digital communications between organizations and refugees (Leung et al., 2009; UNHCR, 2016a). Existing research views the individual-level and organizational-level divide as a separate issues. However, the findings of this study demonstrate that they are mutually influential when organizations work directly with the vulnerable refugees.

Within the rapidly changing environment of the COVID-10 pandemic, refugee organizations were concerned not only with how to effectively use technology resources, but also with devising creative ways to provide services despite technological limitations. Arguably, the pandemic intensified the need for refugee organizations, and their work was doubly taxing because of multiple divides. For organizations, aiding refugees via technology hampered their service delivery, whether because of refugees' low digital literacy or a lack of infrastructural supports. For individual refugees, the technology divide was a challenging struggle that brought even greater barriers between them and the organizations' communication and services. K-Law 1's description illustrates such a dilemma. Their operation initially switched to virtual so they follow social distancing mandates while continuing to provide counseling and legal services to refugees. However, because refugees lacked digital connectivity (e.g., cell phone plans without enough data, having phones without the bandwidth to operate videoconferencing apps, etc.), the organizations ended up re-opening their offices to resume in-person visits. Here, an organization's operations were adapted to mitigate the individual-level technology divide. This demonstrates that the technology divide is not simply an individual-level concern but one that perpetuates to organizational-level concerns, too and vice versa.

The technological divide, intensified due to COVID-19, created opportunities for organizations to mitigate challenges by encouraging refugees to become an integral part of organizations' operations—hence, resilience. In order to fully take advantage of technology resources, organizations must have access to both the technology and to the human capacity that can turn the technology into an effective tool (McNutt, 2008). For the organizations in this study, the human talent came from younger members and

seasoned refugees who brokered technology resources so the organizations' work could continue. Ritchie (2022) demonstrates that in urban Kenya, Somali refugees became technology brokers to aid the local grassroots community's ICT adoption. Furthermore, organizations, especially nonprofits serving the community, are seen as bridges that can mend digital divides among individual community members (Fryer & Granger, 2008; Gonzales & Yan, 2020). Existing research recognizes the capacity of refugees and organizations to mitigate technology divides. This study showed that co-brokering can take place within the humanitarian context when organizations and refugees engage in direct communication, enhancing each other's resilience. Ultimately, whether organizational or individual, the digital divide across multiple can often hinder organizational resilience. However, although digital divides within organizations and for refugees were critical challenges during the pandemic, organizations' strategic use of social media and online space aided in showcasing their work and their inclusion of refugees.

Advocacy Communication for Refugees. Refugee organizations utilized online spaces to promote advocacy communication for their work and refugee communities. For refugee organizations, one way to engage refugees as part of their organizing—and also within policymakers and the settlement community—is through mediated communication. Particularly through social media, refugee organizations in this study created spaces to debunk stereotypes and combat stigma and prejudice. In large part, this finding also demonstrates the organizations' strategic uses of communication technology, leveraging technology as critical tools to facilitate inclusive dialogues than merely for routine operation. Arguably, the organizations are creating space for a meaningful

communication about refugees as part of the settlement community. Existing research has explored how nonprofit organizations use social media for advocacy communication, especially to network, exchange information, and conduct promotional campaigns. Advocacy communication is one of the core functions of nonprofit organizations (Child & Grønbjerg, 2007; LeRoux & Goerdel, 2009; Schmid et al., 2008). Through advocacy, nonprofit organizations promotes policy change and represents the interests of the constituents who are often socially vulnerable (Guo & Saxton, 2014).

For the nonprofit organizations in this research, mediated communication, especially social media like Facebook, advanced their organizational communication goals. Social media sites introduced new channels of communication for organizations to facilitate network building and engagement (Guo & Saxton, 2014). Social media fosters present and future stakeholder networks, mobilizing joint actions in real-time (Golbeck et al., 2010; Greenberg & MacAulay, 2009) and allowing decentralized and interactive communication with larger community audiences while exposing issues that are often disregarded by the traditional media (Bontree & Seltzer, 2009; Lovejoy et al., 2012). For nonprofit organizations, social media is a useful tool to generate awareness of their cause (Petray, 2011), facilitate civic engagement and collective action (Obar et al., 2012), and lead political and advocacy campaigns (Ammann, 2010). Lovejoy and Saxton (2012) demonstrate that social media like Twitter serve as an information platforms to showcase activities, facilitate online community engagement, and promote advocacy campaigns.

Much of the existing research on refugee organizations and their storytelling demonstrates that organizational narratives are central to their mission and agenda. Social media play an important role in message distribution and inviting private refugee lives to

enter the public sphere that often lacks empathy toward refugees (García, 2021). Humanitarian organizations build their refugee-aid agenda by mobilizing global networks via online spaces (Yang & Saffer, 2018). Sigona (2014) reveals that organizational narratives for refugees portray their voices being silenced and muted. Narratives of humanitarian organizations also depict refugees as helpless and lost, denying them the right to represent their own narratives (Martens, 2002; Rajaram, 2002). An ethnographic study by Horstmann (2011) found that organizations may encourage refugees to become proselytizing agents for the community and to join the organization's Christian faith. The mission of many NGOs is to advocate for or provide services for people who lack the voice to tell their stories. However, instead of promoting the interests of their refugee clients, many organizations advance only their own causes; refugees are shown only in relation to how their lives have been improved by the NGOs (Hahn & Holzscheiter, 2013).

This dissertation illustrates ways in which refugee organizations' use of social media has changed. This study makes contributions to the existing literature by recognizing the depth of social media messages as facilitating inclusivity and engagement for communities that have largely been stereotyped and excluded. Existing studies have focused on how nonprofit organizations advocate for their cause and for the constituents they support. However, much of the existing literature excludes the actual constituents as part of the advocacy narrative, underscoring the organization-centered narratives typically presented to the larger public. This dissertation showcases service-receiving populations entering the mediated space through organizational storytelling, emphasizing their capacity to withstand stigma and stereotypes, debunking the misconception of these

populations as needy, vulnerable, and incapable of self-sufficiency. Echoing existing research, in this dissertation, organizational storytelling worked as a sensemaking process (Boje, 1991) for organizations and their stakeholders, as tools to shape social relationships (Beigi et al., 2019) and encourage organizational change (Driver, 2009; Rhodes et al., 2010); as knowledge management (Geiger & Screyöegg, 2012; Patriotta, 2003); and as marketing and branding strategy (Hernández-Serrano et al., 2002; Randazzo, 2006). The types of messages communicated by the organizations were more than information exchange or building an online community but served to create unique organizational storytelling.

In addition, the way refugee organizations in South Korea used social media in a creative way showed their technology capacity not just in knowing how to use social media but also in strategically crafting messages to elevate marginalized voices to the center. Fu & Lai (2020) argue that organizations' capacity can be seen through their use of social media for interorganizational communication. The spread of new media increased nonprofit organizations' ability to engage in direct and meaningful communication with regulators, volunteers, and the general public (Waters, 2007). Arguably, through strategically targeted content, organizations can mobilize stakeholders, build meaningful relationships, and foster accountability and public trust (Saxton & Guo, 2011). The findings in this study demonstrated that organizations take on a critical role to establish an inclusive storytelling infrastructure where refugees virtually engaged in dialogues with the settlement community. Refugee organizations and their narratives about refugees served as critical sensemaking tools that reshaped the public perception about refugees from margins to centers and from vulnerable to empowered. Ultimately,

embracing refugees within as part of the mission and routine work enhanced resilience for both organizations and refugee communities.

Brokering Resilience: Who's Brokering for Whom?

This study demonstrated a complex networked relationships at the organizational level while also showcasing how hidden networks emerge through disruptions. Refugees emerged as an important asset for organizational resilience as they became technology and cultural brokers for organizations during the pandemic. This, ultimately aided the organizations operation and services to refugees. Therefore, while organizations broker resilience by ensuring their routine workflow, their resilience is also brokered by refugees. In other words, both organizations and refugees were brokering for each other, demonstrating co-brokering communication for resilience.

Organizational resilience indicates that organizations have the capacity to withstand disruptions and ensure that their workflow continues. Resilience research across individual, organizational, and community levels argues that multi-level collaborative communication can facilitate resilience after a crisis or traumatic experience (e.g., Afifi et al., 2020; Houston & Buzzanell, 2018; Kim et al., 2011; Doerfel et al., under review). However, existing research has yet to capture how the complex dynamics between organizations serving the vulnerable and service-receiving constituents mutually broker resilience that ultimately enhances organizational resilience. Particularly for nonprofit organizations, resilience is enacted through both formal structures and informal ties (Kim et al., 2021). Interorganizational networks of refugee organizations (e.g., ORR, official partnerships) constitute the formal ties where social capital exchange and flow sustain resilience. Refugees in this research, on the other hand, became informal

networks that emerged through crisis experience, facilitating unexpected challenges like a digital or cultural divide. Having only the formal or informal would not be a sufficient resilience building mechanism. However, with compounded meaning and mission-centered approaches, the combination of formal and informal resource networks can facilitate robust resilience building so organizations can navigate the doubly-taxed context of the pandemic. Richardson (2002) argues that the resilience process brings "insight or growth through disruptions" (p.312). For refugee organizations going through the pandemic, their resilience processes involved recognizing novel connections, particularly from the least expected sources. With the new recognition of refugees as critical network assets of mission-driven organizing, refugee organizations can have opportunities to redesign their communication and workflow. Arguably, the resilience of refugee organizations in this research cycled between organizations' efforts to minimize interruption due to COVID and refugees emerging as brokers to facilitate efficient workflow. This indicates that nonprofits are truly nested between networks where their work and resilience is driven by collaborative, meaningful, and mission-centered networks.

This study elevates the notion of refugees from service recipients to key actors within organizational networks that contribute to resilience organizing. The novel connections between refugee organizations and refugees show complex, multi-level dynamics. Refugees are the central focus of organizations and the reason why organizations attempt to ensure rapid recovery. Refugees emerging as networks resulted in an expanded ecology where it is no longer organizational actors occupying the center of the community. While the pandemic barred certain resources—language and culture,

for example—it also became an opportunity for organizations to recognize refugees as invaluable assets to help them continue their work for the newly-settled refugees. In this case, the organizations and refugees are in symbiotic relationships within their populations and the larger network (Shumate & O'Connor, 2010).

Opportunity For Inclusivity

Crisis can be an opportunity for organizations to recognize underrated factors as resilience building facilitators. Findings in this study revealed that refugees are more than vulnerable service recipients but are also resilience broker *for organizations* as part of the engaged network. Refugees emerged as equal partners who became part of the organizing, mitigating organizational challenges such as the technology divide or the cultural divide. Seasoned refugees who had been settled in the United States longer helped newly-arrived refugees as technology and cultural brokers. This enhanced the organizations' routine work and facilitated work efficiency. Within and outside the organizations, refugees became critical assets to help their work and ensure successful service delivery despite the communication barrier caused by the digital and cultural divide. Resilient organizations were able to mobilize their networks with refugees or their internal communication systems to resolve the digital divide issue and ensure successful work completion. In doing so, refugee organizations were promoting advocacy communication that engages refugees as part of the settlement community. Figure 5 captures the conceptual model of organizational resilience in the context of refugee communities. The figure demonstrates the mutual resilience brokering between organizations and refugee communities. In this model, as organizations continue to work and provide services through their networks while communicating positively with the

settlement community, refugees also become part of their organizing, mitigating digital and cultural gaps. Within the environmental threats such as COVID-19 and existing stigma, refugees combat crisis situations by engaging in networked forms of communication.

Figure 17.

Conceptual Model of Organizational Resilience During Disruptions

As refugees emerge as important stakeholders to assist organizations' operation and routine work, they become an engaged part of the organizations network. Engaged networks activate another dimension of relational dynamics between members and organizations (Doerfel, 2018). Engagement is dialogic and becomes a vessel to building social capital (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Taylor & Kent, 2014) and shared sensemaking (Heath, 2018). Engaged scholarship suggests that organizations should connect with stakeholders through "relational communication" (Heath, 2018). Engaged networks can nurture relationships in organizations and their networks, creating space for resistance

and change (Krackhardt, 2009). Heath (2018) argues that engagement is the ultimate "relational decision-making tension" between individuals, groups, organizations, businesses/ industries, communities, and societies (p.33). Engagement is a process in which both parties are fully involved in an ongoing conversation (Johnston, 2016) requiring a commitment to change. Taylor and Kent (2014) assert that engagement is two-way and relational and involves conversations aimed at improving understanding and coming to mutual decisions that benefit both sides. Dialogic communication (i.e., mutual listening, reflecting, responding, and accepting the possibilities of change) and relationship are foundational for engagement (Lane & Kent, 2018). Further, dialogic relationships are nurtured between participants through repeated and intentional interactions in which mutual regard is placed above the needs of any particular partner (Botan, 1973). Engaged communication and transaction is possible within a trusted environment marked by mutuality, supportiveness, commitment to conversation, and an awareness of the rules (Lane & Kent, 2018). Organizational level networks and ties are one of the key elements that identify the roles of particular organizations and the types of groups they are part of (Doerfel, 2018). What refugee organizations do with their social media certainly enhances the dialogic process, embracing opportunities for inclusivity. As Fu & Lai (2020) what nonprofit organizations can do with their social media demonstrates their capacity to communicate with their interorganizational networks.

In this study, refugees emerged from vulnerable to engaged, making significant contributions to organizations' resilience by enhancing their workflow. Within the organizations' workspaces, refugees emerged as important brokers of cultural and linguistic information and resources. This finding also intersects with organizations'

efforts to engage refugees through communication. Research has demonstrated that

refugees have been entitled to the creation of their own networks, particularly in virtual

spaces lacking direct or strong connections to other key actors including refugee

organizations (e.g., Dekker & Engbersen, 2014; Witteborn, 2018). In addition, refugees

have largely been marginalized and disengaged from organizing networks; while the

work and networks have been created *for* refugees, refugees themselves are *not* part of

the networks. Nonprofit organizations often facilitate refugee well-being, and resilient

organizations can facilitate refugee community's resilience. But, in order for this to

happen, refugee engagement is critical. This dissertation reveals that how refugee

organizations function is largely dependent on refugee engagement. In a way, resilience

brokering itself is occurring within multi-level, interactive circles. At the same time, they

are also brokering community well-being where refugees are not seen as threats but as

integrated community members, communicating strength and capacity than vulnerability.

In this research, informants in the United States repeatedly echoed that refugees

can and should be meaningful participants in organizing. They believed that refugees are

especially resilient, given the tumultuous migration journey they took to find a safe and

secure place to resettle. However, these informants also believed that refugees have not

been given the opportunity to contribute to organizations. Interestingly, through the

pandemic, some organizations recognized refugees as important assets to help them pivot

and navigate the work. An informant from NE-GOV 2 who is, himself, a former refugee

from Burma said:

> Proper education to the public about what refugee actually means I think is so
> important and that cultural sensitivity and training, so that it's not just about
> accepting needy people who just need a place to sleep and be safe, but we are
> helping them establish and live as part of a community member so that they can

integrate and contribute to the society that they have settled in by working by making whatever contributions that they can make (NE-GOV 1 Informant).

Refugee organizations are doing mission-driven work that extends beyond direct services. Their resilience is critical for brokering resilience of refugees in a way that promotes engagement while reshaping the public dialogue about vulnerable and marginalized migrant populations.

Implications

This dissertation has theoretical, policy, and practical implications.

Theoretical

This study suggests theoretical implications about the community ecology of interorganizational networks and its configuration during a system-wide disruption. Theoretically, the findings help us understand what aspects of professional networks are sufficient and fit versus necessary during a crisis. Additionally, the study extends our understanding of community ecology and how multi-level networks emerge across different organizational and individual populations.

First, findings illustrate strong stability of interorganizational networks from before to during the pandemic crisis. Theories on organizational and community ecology argue that a few traits predict how a population of organizations will react to external threats. From a population ecology perspective, Hannan and Freeman (1984) argue that the inertia of organizations can lead to difficulty adapting to environmental changes. They further document that organizational inertia comes from structural and environmental constraints. However, the current study demonstrates that, despite the stability of networks in two time phases, refugee organizations are not necessarily displaying inertia or resisting adaptation. To the contrary, refugee organizations were

more adaptable during the pandemic than during any other period in their organizational evolution, mainly because they worked under a mission centered on those outside of their organizations with resilience. Refugee organizations, while retaining their networks between the two phases, ensured that their missions were not compromised by adapting quickly to the changing situations and pivoting accordingly. Through political and institutional pressures to follow certain mandates (e.g., social distancing, shift of work mode, etc.), the stable networks remained as critical resources for social capital flow. In large part, the network stability also came from recognizing a network strength from an unexpected resource—refugees who had been in the background of organizing.

Second, resilient organizations require both similar and dissimilar units to cooperate. This study demonstrates that resilient refugee organizations are nested within both similar and dissimilar units. Aldrich (1999) argues that organizations display two types of interdependencies that drive organizational community dynamics: commensalism (i.e., competition and cooperation between similar units) and symbiosis (interdependence between dissimilar units). The commensalism and symbiosis are both required and predominant in organizational ecology, comprising the community of interorganizational networks (Monge & Contractor, 2003). Additionally, Hawley (1950, 1986) argues that as the demand of interdependency increases, outside populations can enter the community ecology. For humanitarian community ecology, unlike the view from traditional theory, this research evidenced refugees emerging as the new population in symbiotic relationships with refugee organizations. Organizational networks are multilevel (Aldrich & Kenworthy, 1999) and are mutually influential (Baum & Singh, 1994; Brittain, 1994; Bugelman & Mittman, 1994) rather than consisting of a single

population of organizations occupying the ecology and evolutionary process (Hawley, 1986). For refugee organizations in this study, social capital came through commensalistic relationships whereas creative adaptability to respond to external threats like technology and cultural brokering came through symbiotic relationships. In a way, this demonstrates that commensalistic and symbiosis networks do not exist within an either/ or situation but rather require co-occurrence to be more resilient, adaptable, and stable throughout a crisis. In the pandemic, co-occurrence of commensalistic and symbiotic networks facilitated resilience and were mutually influential between refugees and organizations. These networks were not either/or but were simultaneously enacted to strengthen the connections and resilience.

Humanitarian ecology throughout the disruption also demonstrates hierarchical network structure rather than heterarchy. Findings from this research imply that cooperative and competitive networks are nested in a hierarchy that either grants or stymies resource access within the domains of humanitarian community ecology. Community ecology recognizes that networks may configure differently either as opportunities or as constraints during a crisis like the pandemic. As existing research argues, similar organizations support each other, creating cooperative networks (Bryant & Monge, 2008). However, hierarchical network configuration also stymies resilience for grassroots organizations that are falling behind the competition. An informant from NE-NPO 8 said,

> Working within the NGO space, we're all working towards the same goal that organizations would be willing to work together. But you know, there's never enough support for the communities that we work with. So you'd think, kind of working together, we'd be able to reach that goal sooner. And yet, one thing that you do notice is that organizations are very territorial, not willing to share resources, information, not even willing to kind of just get together and say, "Ok,

we're going to do this, you're going to do that to not duplicate the efforts and make sure that resources are getting spread as far as they can (NE-NPO 8 Informant).

This informant's statement indicates that, despite working toward the same mission, the lack of support and access to resources for grassroots organizations can disconnect the system within the ecology. Yet, these local organizations are the ones who are always short of financial and material resources. He further stated that "if grassroots, local organizations didn't exist, UN or UNHCR would be left with more work to do."

The community ecology of refugee organizations is shown through its cross-sector networks and active resource-driven relationships (Doerfel et al., 2020; Monge & Contractor, 2003). If a centralized systems exist, it can facilitate cooperative networks to enhance resilience organizing as it ensures rapid and robust resource flow. According to the findings in this study, organizational resilience is also enacted through the networks where it is presented as an opportunity to leverage disruptions for opportunities. While networks might configure in new ways in disruptive contexts, the findings in this dissertation argue that when organizations are resilient, they are faced with the expectation of remaining resilient for their vulnerable constituents. This expectation for resilience demonstrates the dark side of resilience.

Dark Side of Resilience

Community ecology represents a dynamic configuration of organizational social networks and relationships (Monge & Contractor, 2003). Earlier stages of organizational evolution experience more *slack* in the system, rendering more opportunities for organizations to serve their needs and facilitate cooperative networks (Bryant & Monge, 2008; Doerfel et al., 2020; Schermerhorn Jr., 1975).

Throughout the evolution of the pandemic, however, the humanitarian organizational networks saw little to no slack in the system. Slack in relationships open up possibilities for cooperation (Schermerhorn Jr., 1975). However, this was not the case for refugee organizations because they were already efficient in harnessing their network resources, demonstrating a fairly lean industry with less competition. Refugee organizations work under the same mission—to help and serve refugees as they settle in a new community. In this research, cooperative networks and relationships were already in place because of a shared mission, and such dependent relationships forced refugee organizations to be sustainable and resilient. As the findings demonstrate, humanitarian organizations have already suffered through continuing external crises such as political upheavals, precarious policy, anti-refugee movements, and stigmatized perception about refugees. All these environmental threats resulted in dwindling funding and oppressive discourses about their work. To combat such a stigmatized context, organizations were already in cooperative networks and, throughout the pandemic, strengthened the mission-driven ties by establishing resilience of their own. Seeing little to no change in their network composition and dynamics throughout the pandemic, the study demonstrated not inertia but rather a humanitarian ecology with a stable and resilient network structure. In other words, humanitarian organizations' resilience is relational. This, however, poses questions regarding the dark side of resilience—how do we study resilience in an already resilient community? Refugee organizations are already prepared for disruptions compared to small, local business sectors that lack crisis response plans. Particularly during COVID-19, many NPOs had to be creative with their services to offer innovative solutions and practices to support their vulnerable clients. For instance, a recent study in

European context showed that NPOs were "pushed to diversify its activities" in the face of the pandemic (Raeymaeckers & Van Puyvelde, 2021). Similarly, refugee organizations were also expected to remain stable with their services. Given that refugee organizations experience multiple threats on top of the pandemic, their cooperative communication network ecology prepared them with the capacity to handle disruption better than other industries. The dark side of resilience is that some sectors or organizations are forced to be resilient no matter what, thus requiring a relational communication networks.

Resilience research emphasize the ways in which individuals, groups, organizations, and communities recover and become more sustainable in response to adverse events. Existing research has explored how negative interruptions affect multiple domains of the society and has studied how to become more resilient as the solution to combat adversity. Recent media reports argue that a return to normal does not necessarily reflect resilience (Hsu, 2021) which has been how community resilience was typically defined. Arguably, resilience may not be just about responding to disruptions but may involve retaining normalcy to ensure that organizational priorities are not compromised and enhance adaptability to changing environments. Ultimately, such stability then can prevent disruptions in the first place. Findings in this study show that organizations were confident that their services met the needs of refugees, promoting positive community-wide impacts and showing a high level of perceived effectiveness. Unlike in many business organizations, service closures did not happen for the nonprofit refugee organizations. While the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in massive disruption worldwide, refugee organizations retained their networks, service delivery, and continuity of operations. As Spilan and Crandall (2002) argue, organizations serving the community

have different sets of priorities and disruptions cannot compromise their mission.

Refugee organizations in both countries repeatedly stated that their mission-driven core

values and advocacy work facilitated a hopeful outlook toward the future and their

impact on refugees. Underneath these efforts was robust interorganizational networks and

communicating across the domains of their work to ensure refugee community's well-

being. Having the capacity to retain an uncompromised mission grounded organizations

to be resilient and adaptable; this allowed them to combat the pandemic disruption better

than many other entities.

Policy

This dissertation has several policy implications that could further systematize

refugee engagement within the settlement community and also strengthen their

interorganizational networks and their work with refugees. The findings suggest that

refugees can be helpful assets to organizations as they pursue mission-driven advocacy

work for refugees. Refugees as contributing members of a settlement community is not a

new idea. Migration research demonstrates that refugees have been making significant

contributions to the economy and well-being of the settlement community for decades

(e.g., paying more taxes, higher employment rates, etc.) (Kerwin, 2010, 2017, 2018).

Refugees, especially seasoned ones, are cultural brokers who have substantial knowledge

as community members and settlers from the outside world. A few informants who were

former refugees themselves echoed the notion that their experiences with settlement have

been crucial to helping other refugees survive and integrate. International NGOs and

local organizations have long advocated for refugee participation in governance because

the experiences of refugees are crucial in policy making (Johnson, 2016; Nyers, 2006;

Panizzon & van Riemsdijk, 2019). However, due to cultural and language barriers, such demand from grassroots and local refugee organizations have not been in place (Clarke, 2014; Griffith et al., 2005). Therefore, national and local government entities have deferred this responsibility, and encouraged refugees to be organized through local or community organizations regarding education, vocational, health, housing, and social issues with government entities as resource-holding and distribution organizations (Mencütek, 2020). Findings in this study imply that organizations' work to can be more effective by engaging refugees as resources to improve their workflow and operation. Therefore, having a systematic structure where seasoned refugees can be part of the policy-making body can ensure more appropriate resource securement and identification of what's needed and how it can be distributed.

Second, a solid policy on refugee resettlement, especially in South Korea, is needed. What South Korea lacks for foreign refugees, in contrast to North Korean refugees, is political systems to help refugees access necessary resources at the time of immediate post-settlement. K-Law 1 informant said that there is "no policy to help refugees become self-sufficient." She referenced the system in the United States where refugees receive sums of financial aid for the first three months upon arrival as a start-up fund. In South Korea, such a stipend is only given to North Korean refugees. The discrepancy between North Korean refugees and refugees from outside the Korean peninsula further elevate stigmatization which may stymie the healthy integration of migration populations in South Korea. Extending how the South Korean organizations utilize social media and policymaking institutions (e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Ministry of Public Health) can assist campaigns and interventions to continue to combat structural inequalities.

Practical

Practically, this dissertation highlights how to equip organizations that may be vulnerable themselves while serving the most vulnerable people in society—refugees. This study offers organizations an opportunity to strategize their communication and network plans to better provide services for refugees and ensure that their work can remain undisrupted. First, the study demonstrated the intense technology and digital divides occurring at both organizational and individual levels. Therefore, refugee organizations should find resources to equip themselves with technology to ensure their operation can become more flexible and adaptable should future disruptions emerge. This could include internal technology trainings or equipment updates, as well as having in-house technicians who can immediately assist both the organization and refugees. As seasoned refugees who were more competent with technology use emerged as critical assets, providing opportunities for them to educate newly-settled refugees would be an effective way to stabilize such a system.

In addition to extending their networks and technology capacity for efficient workflow and operation, organizations can adapt communication practices to strengthen their micro-level communication for employees. When organizations navigate rapidly changing situations due to disruption, their employees are burdened with emotional labor and burnout that require organizational support. For instance, K-NPO 6, while serving refugees in the South Korean community, also cared for those that help refugees. An informant of K-NPO 6, who has been running counseling communication programs for

translators who help refugees upon settlement, described the difficulty translators go through while helping refugees. As an extension of the direct, on-the-ground services K-NPO 6 offers, they are also providing "care-well" services to volunteer translators and caseworkers to enhance their work experiences and provide spaces for emotional recovery. As such, this research recognizes the challenge of burnout for organizations serving communities navigating post-migration life. Practical communication support can be a helpful mechanism to ensure that organizational resilience is built at not just macro-level but at an interpersonal level as well.

Overall, this project advances resilience research that recognizes socially and culturally vulnerable populations who experience even greater adversity due to disruptive events. By conducting interculturally diverse research in two different locations, it generated a more complex and richer understanding of community resilience as an active co-brokering between multiple levels—the organizations and the vulnerable community. Furthermore, the two different research sites offered strategic and educational insights that can advance our understanding of community from a local to global level. As a result, this research suggests more holistic approaches to understanding and defining community resilience as heterogeneous compositions of community constituents and systems.

Limitations and Future Research

This study has several limitations. First, engagement—which indicates the impact of organizational storytelling on the settlement community—was not directly measured. Therefore, future research should examine the engagement and interaction between organizations and the community through employing different measures for social media

signals (e.g., likes, comments, re-tweets, shares) and website visitation traffic to obtain more robust data on engagement. In addition, collecting longitudinal data to assess public opinion on refugees and the evolution of refugee perceptions could add depth to such research. For example, measuring public reactions (Bonsón et al., 2017; Kim & Yang, 2017) can capture how the settlement community engages with social media or website contents.

Second, the design of the network survey did not accurately capture different chronologies of the disruption. While the network survey asked participating organizational informants to identify and characterize their network dynamics and types, the time phases were vague and not period-specific. The terms before and after can be arbitrary (although before indicated prior to March 2020 and after represented points thereafter). Because the pandemic lasted much longer than expected and is still ongoing, clarifying the different phases based on critical political decision-making or important milestones (e.g., vaccination start date, mask mandate start date, etc.) could ensure a more accurate depiction of network composition in response to the evolution of the pandemic. Furthermore, the quantitative approach to studying networks did not capture refugees as part of networks; thus, the study was unable to assess their engagement. Qualitative data revealed that refugees were in the background, and this was not represented in quantitative data.

Third, all participating organizations were located in metro areas where primary migration support and access to resources are readily available for organizations. This poses new questions about grassroots organizations located in rural areas that serve re-located refugees after certain periods in the point of entry. Assessing the networks of

rural area organizations and their capacity to offer services for refugee resettlement is needed for a more holistic understanding of humanitarian networks. Future research should extend the scope of geographical regions to encapsulate under-resourced and isolated organizations.

Finally, this research only examined organizations in support of refugees in the United States and South Korea. However, there is a substantial number of anti-refugee organizations or coalitions that organize against refugees. Including these organizations and comparing the effect of anti-refugee movements to the humanitarian support and organizing for resilience will render new insights into the political, social, and communicative tensions refugee support organizations navigate within their ecology.

Conclusion

This dissertation explored how organizations serving the vulnerable built resilience in the face of the massive and system-wide disruption of the COVID-19 pandemic. Through robust interorganizational networks, organizations facilitated active social capital flow to ensure that their services for refugees were not compromised. By employing strategic uses of communication technology, refugee organizations engaged in organizational storytelling in which they combatted stereotypes and misconceptions about refugees within the settlement community. In doing so, the organizations brokered communication for engagement where refugees were empowered and became an inclusive part of the community dialogue.

As disruptions continue to emerge, organizations with robust social networks and the capacity to utilize communication technology can turn disruptions into opportunities, strengthening their organizational resilience. An informant from NE-FBNPO 1 said, "The

Chinese word crisis means both challenge and opportunity." In line with this, refugee organizations turned tumultuous disruptions into opportunities for growth and sustainable mission-driven work. Ensuring that their mission wasn't compromised was a critical driving force to become resilient in times of precarity and uncertainty. After all, their resilient, mission-driven, networked organizing were critical communication processes to build resilience for themselves, and also for refugee communities. At the same time, refugees were also contributing to organizational resilience and we can see how the mission-driven work circles around, creating a multi-level collaborative network not just within and across organizations but also with the very constituents they serve. Arguably, organizational and community resilience is relational, collaborative, and communicative.

This dissertation offers insights to organizations and communities from local to global, expanding a more holistic definition of community resilience. The study also prompts community-wide engagement by offering organizations the necessary resources to strategize their communication and networking for resilience building. Lastly, the study provides unique insights into how communities can build the resilience of more vulnerable people through organizational efforts during a major disruption; including, but not limited to the pandemic. In short, studying the COVID-19 pandemic offers insights into organizational responses that embrace vulnerable populations during a major disease outbreak and promote long-run health and well-being for the entire community. An informant from K-Law 1 said,

> Let's say someone broke a bike and they come to us because we can help them repair it. But for some reason, people keep returning with broken bikes. That means there is a bigger problem. Perhaps it's the poor road structure or lack of high-quality manufacturer. To us, that's the political system and our social infrastructure that marginalize the refugees. That's why organizations like us

should do more than just repairing the minor damages but find ways to amend the larger structural or systematic issues (K-Law 1 Informant).

Ultimately, refugee organizations take on a critical role in refugees' resilience and integration, and also in reshaping public perception about migration and social justice and about minimizing structural inequalities. Refugee organizations are critical mobilizers of communication for engagement and inclusivity that embrace refugee communities to elevate from margins to center and from vulnerable to empowered.

Appendix A.

Survey-English

I **TITLE OF STUDY:** Organizational resilience and COVID-19

Principal Investigator: Minkyung Kim, Doctoral student

Co-Principal Investigator: Marya Doerfel, Ph.D., Professor

This online consent form is part of an informed consent process for a research study and it will provide information that will help you decide whether you want to take part in the study. It is your choice to take part or not. Ask questions if there is anything in the form that is not clear to you. If you decide to take part, instructions at the end of the document will tell you what to do next. Your alternative to taking part in the research is not to take part in it.

Who is conducting this research study and what is it about?

You are being asked to take part in research conducted by Minkyung Kim (doctoral student) and Dr. Marya Doerfel at Rutgers University in the Dept. of Communication. The study is to find out how humanitarian organizations in the US and in South Korea servicing and supporting refugees in their communities of settlement, build resilience through cross-sectoral networks and technology use before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. We are interested in the ways in which cross-sector networks and organizational partners were/are a part of sustaining operation and workflow and how organizations use technology as the pandemic affected the mode of operation. Data collected will give us a sense of your organization's general story of how the pandemic affected networking and operation and how this may impact the services refugees receive. Ultimately, such findings will help us understand how organizations build

resilience and minimize any form of interruption to the work and its effect on the communities they serve. If you have any questions, please contact Minkyung Kim (mk.kim@rutgers.edu) and/or Dr. Marya Doerfel (mdoerfel@rutgers.edu).

What will I be asked to do if I take part?

You will be asked to complete a brief online survey that asks about organization-level communication and coordinating activities with external stakeholders, use of technology, and operation mode before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. The survey will take approximately 20 minutes.

Participation is completely voluntary and informants can end participation at any time during the study. At the end of the survey you will be asked whether you're interested in participating in an optional follow-up phone/Zoom interview to further share your organizations' experiences. The schedules will accommodate your availability and preference.

All data will be stored in a secure location accessible only to the researchers.

Upon completion of the survey, the researcher will de-identify any personal information about you in the data that is observed. The survey can be completed in parts. In other words, you may save your work and return to the survey until it is completed. As you take this survey, if you believe other people in the organization could help or are better suited to participate, please share the survey with them.

Who is eligible to participate?

To participate in the study, you must be 18 years of age or older and currently work or volunteer for an organizations that service and support refugees in the United States and/or in South Korea. Informants must be able to understand written or spoken English

and/or Korean.

What are the risks and/or discomforts I might experience if I take part in the study?

Participation in this survey does not pose any foreseeable risks to you. This survey should not make you feel embarrassed or discomfort when answering questions. However, there is a small risk of breach of confidentiality regarding personal identifiers. To ensure full protection of your privacy, the PI will be the only person with access to the data and all identifiers will be changed to pseudonyms and/or subject ID# upon completion of the data collection. The researcher of this study will protect your confidentiality by not including your name, your job title, or your organization's name, in the data reports we publish. Your organization's name and the names of other businesses and organizations you mention will only be used in data management to assure accuracy and will not be publicly shared with anyone. If in any way the survey makes you feel uncomfortable, you can skip those questions or withdraw from the study altogether. If you decide to quit at any time before you have finished the survey your answers will NOT be recorded.

Are there any benefits to me if I choose to take part in this study?

There is no direct benefits to you for taking part in this research. However, the knowledge that we obtain from your participation, and the participation of other informants, may help us to better understand how organizations deal with global public health threats and sustain their operations serving vulnerable refugees.

Will I be paid to take part in this study?

You will not be paid to take part in this study.

How will information about me be kept private or confidential?

All efforts will be made to keep your responses confidential, but total confidentiality cannot be guaranteed.

We will ask you to share your organization's name and other organizations that network with for accuracy of record-keeping only. Upon the completion of the study, we will de-identify all organizational names and assign pseudonyms. In the survey you may also assign your own pseudonym should you wish. Your IP address and identifiable information will not be stored with your responses. Instead, your responses will be assigned a subject # which will be stored separately from your responses so others will not know which responses are yours. Once data collection is complete we will securely store the key code linking your responses to your identifiable information in a separate password-protected computer and server which will be destroyed after data analysis is complete and study findings are professionally presented or published.

No information that can identify you will appear in any professional presentation or publication.

What will happen to the information I provide in the research after the study is over?

The information collected about you for this research will not be used by or distributed to investigators for other research.

What will happen if I do not want to take part or decide later not to stay in the study?

Your participation is voluntary. If you choose to take part now, you may change your mind and withdraw later. In addition, you can choose to skip questions that you do not

wish to answer. If you do not click on the 'submit' button after completing the form, your responses will not be recorded. You may also withdraw your consent for use of data you submit, but you must do this in writing to the PIs by contacting Minkyung Kim (mk.kim@rutgers.edu).

Who can I call if I have questions?

If you have questions about taking part in this study, you can contact the Principal Investigator: Minkyung Kim, School of Communication & Information at Rutgers/ mk.kim@rutgers.edu/ 1-732-668-0805). You can also contact my faculty advisor Dr. Marya Doerfel (mdoerfel@rutgers.edu).

If you have questions about your rights as a research subject, you can contact the IRB Director at: Arts and Sciences IRB (732) 235-2866 or the Rutgers Human Subjects Protection Program at (973) 972-1149 or email us at humansubjects@ored.rutgers.edu.

Please print out this consent form if you would like a copy of it for your files.

If you do not wish to take part in the research, close this website address. If you wish to take part in the research, follow the directions below:

II **I acknowledge that I am 18 years of age or older and have read and understood the information. I agree to take part in the research, with the knowledge that I am free to withdraw my participation in the research without penalty.**

Click on the "I Agree" button to confirm your agreement to take part in the research. Once you click "I Agree" it will automatically direct you to the survey.

○   I agree.

○   I disagree.

1 **As noted in the informed consent form,** the purpose of this study is to gather ways a variety of organizations managed their operation and use of technology before and during the COVID-19 pandemic.

 This survey will ask you about cross-sector networks as they pertain to your organization's operation mode and advocacy work, and technology use before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. **Cross-sector networks refer to any official/unofficial partnership, relationship, connection, collaboration, and co-work your organization does with other organizations, businesses, civic groups, government agencies, volunteers, etc.**

We will ask you about these networked relationships before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. We will use your answers to generate summaries about how organizations communicate with and use their external partnerships through the course of business interruption. Your answers will also be aggregated with others so we can generate knowledge about how professional communities of practice recover their own partnerships after system-wide interruptions.

 We ask that you only name the names of the entity (e.g., group, organization, business), not the specific people. Should you mistakenly name specific individuals, we will permanently strike that information from our records.

2 **For our record keeping and accuracy,** please tell us the name of the company or organization **you work/volunteer for** (see next question regarding privacy and use of pseudonyms):

3 **To protect yours and your organization's privacy, we will use a** pseudonym and we will NOT disclose the identity of your pseudonym to any other who might name you or

other organization, firm, etc. Please tell us your preferred pseudonym. If you prefer, we can assign one for you.

○ I'd like you to assign my organization's pseudonym.

○ I'd like to decide my own pseudonym. I'd like it to be: (please share your own pseudonym below) _____

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4 Where is the organization you work/volunteer for physically located?

○ United States

○ South Korea

○ Both in the United States and in South Korea

○ Other locations not listed above (please specify)
_____

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5 **How would you categorize your organization's type?**

○   Faith-based/House of worship (e.g., Church, Synagogue, Temple, etc.)

○   Faith-based/ Non-profit

○   Faith-based/ For-profit

○   Secular (non-religious) / Non-profit

○   Secular (non-religious) / For-profit

○   Government offices

○   Coalitions

○   Other (please specify)

_____

6 **This section will ask you to identify your organization's cross-sector networks.**

Think about other organizations, businesses, agencies, or groups your organization

or department/unit interacts/communicates/collaborates/partners with. These cross-

sector networks may have a direct impact on your work or have a more secondary

role in the routines of your organization.

You or colleagues at work may connect with these external stakeholders as part of your

professional obligations for matters such as (but not limited to):

- outsourcing needs

- professional organizations or peers to stay current about professional practice

- compliance/regulatory issues for your company or organization

- suppliers

- coalition partners

- donors or patrons

- partners to run events or complete tasks requiring multiple partners

- information and resource sharing

- professional networking other information sources that enable your organization to

- accomplish mission-driven work

- community partners

Please fill in the following with the names of your organization's cross-sector network organizations. To protect the privacy of all organizations, we will change these names to pseudonyms but we need actual names of these entities for accurate record-keeping. When entering the names of organizations, please include both the acronym (if applicable) and full name (ex. United Nations (UN)).

If your organization has more than one location, please indicate which region you are affiliated with (ex. Rutgers University-New Brunswick).

Please write up to 3 names of each category to the boxes to the right below.

○   **Government agencies:**   1

_____

○   2 _____

○   3 _____

○   **For-profit businesses**   1

_____

○   2 _____

○   3 _____

○   **Nonprofit organizations:** 1

_____

○   2 _____

○   3 _____

○   **Advocacy groups:** 1 _____

○   2 _____

○   3 _____

○   **Outsourcing agencies:** 1

_____

○   2 _____

○   3 _____

○   **Community partners:** 1

_____

○   2 _____

○ 3 _____

○ **Sponsoring organizations: 1**

_____

○ **2** _____

○ **3** _____

○ **Others: 1** _____

○ **2** _____

○ **3** _____

Only the names of organizations you listed above will continue to display as you

answer the following questions.

Based on the names you listed, the following questions will ask about the types and

nature of the relationships between your organization and listed networks.

Please reflect on the relationships before and during the COVID-19 pandemic and

answer the following questions.

7 **This organization helps my organization by providing goods (e.g., masks, hand sanitizers, office materials, building materials, etc.).**

	Before COVID-19		During COVID-19	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Government agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
For-profit businesses 1	○	○	○	○
Nonprofit organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Advocacy groups: 1	○	○	○	○
Outsourcing agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
Community partners: 1	○	○	○	○
Sponsoring organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Others: 1	○	○	○	○

8 **This organization is a primary funding source for my organization.**

	Before COVID-19		During COVID-19	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Government agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
For-profit businesses 1	○	○	○	○
Nonprofit organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Advocacy groups: 1	○	○	○	○
Outsourcing agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
Community partners: 1	○	○	○	○
Sponsoring organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Others: 1	○	○	○	○

9 **This organization helps my organization achieve our mission.**

	Before COVID-19		During COVID-19	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Government agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
For-profit businesses 1	○	○	○	○
Nonprofit organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Advocacy groups: 1	○	○	○	○
Outsourcing agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
Community partners: 1	○	○	○	○
Sponsoring organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Others: 1	○	○	○	○

10 **This organization collaborates with my organization to achieve the same mission.**

	Before COVID-19		During COVID-19	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Government agencies: 1	◯	◯	◯	◯
For-profit businesses 1	◯	◯	◯	◯
Nonprofit organizations: 1	◯	◯	◯	◯
Advocacy groups: 1	◯	◯	◯	◯
Outsourcing agencies: 1	◯	◯	◯	◯
Community partners: 1	◯	◯	◯	◯
Sponsoring organizations: 1	◯	◯	◯	◯
Others: 1	◯	◯	◯	◯

11 **This organization collaborates with my organization by providing information about refugee issues (e.g., policy and regulation, visa, border control, migration and settlement resources, etc).**

	Before COVID-19		During COVID-19	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Government agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
For-profit businesses 1	○	○	○	○
Nonprofit organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Advocacy groups: 1	○	○	○	○
Outsourcing agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
Community partners: 1	○	○	○	○
Sponsoring organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Others: 1	○	○	○	○

12 **This organization collaborates with my organization resulting in creative**

solutions to our shared problems about helping refugees.

	Before COVID-19		During COVID-19	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Government agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
For-profit businesses 1	○	○	○	○
Nonprofit organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Advocacy groups: 1	○	○	○	○
Outsourcing agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
Community partners: 1	○	○	○	○
Sponsoring organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Others: 1	○	○	○	○

13 **This organization collaborates with my organization by providing** general

information resources (e.g., visa, housing, language lessons, school, etc.) **so we can help**

refugees.

	Before COVID-19		During COVID-19	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Government agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
For-profit businesses 1	○	○	○	○
Nonprofit organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Advocacy groups: 1	○	○	○	○
Outsourcing agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
Community partners: 1	○	○	○	○
Sponsoring organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Others: 1	○	○	○	○

14 **This organization collaborates with my organization by providing general information resources** (e.g., visa, housing, language lessons, school, etc.) **for refugees.**

	Before COVID-19		During COVID-19	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Government agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
For-profit businesses 1	○	○	○	○
Nonprofit organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Advocacy groups: 1	○	○	○	○
Outsourcing agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
Community partners: 1	○	○	○	○
Sponsoring organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Others: 1	○	○	○	○

15 **This organization collaborates with my organization by providing goods (e.g., clothes, furnitures, household items, etc.) for refugees.**

	Before COVID-19		During COVID-19	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Government agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
For-profit businesses 1	○	○	○	○
Nonprofit organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Advocacy groups: 1	○	○	○	○
Outsourcing agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
Community partners: 1	○	○	○	○
Sponsoring organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Others: 1	○	○	○	○

Page Break

16 **This organization collaborates with my organization to gain information about COVID-19 (e.g., CDC guidelines, testing and vaccine, etc.).**

	Before COVID-19		During COVID-19	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Government agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
For-profit businesses 1	○	○	○	○
Nonprofit organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Advocacy groups: 1	○	○	○	○
Outsourcing agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
Community partners: 1	○	○	○	○
Sponsoring organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Others: 1	○	○	○	○

17 **This organization collaborates with my organization to provide information** about

COVID-19 (e.g., CDC guidelines, testing and vaccine, etc.) **to refugees.**

	Before COVID-19		During COVID-19	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Government agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
For-profit businesses 1	○	○	○	○
Nonprofit organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Advocacy groups: 1	○	○	○	○
Outsourcing agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
Community partners: 1	○	○	○	○
Sponsoring organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Others: 1	○	○	○	○

18 **This organization collaborates with my organization to pivot operations when we learned about the spread of COVID-19 and the need to social distance.**

	Before COVID-19		During COVID-19	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Government agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
For-profit businesses 1	○	○	○	○
Nonprofit organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Advocacy groups: 1	○	○	○	○
Outsourcing agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
Community partners: 1	○	○	○	○
Sponsoring organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Others: 1	○	○	○	○

19 **This organization collaborates with my organization to gain information about**

funding resources to recover from COVID-19 pandemic.

	Before COVID-19		During COVID-19	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Government agencies: 1	◯	◯	◯	◯
For-profit businesses 1	◯	◯	◯	◯
Nonprofit organizations: 1	◯	◯	◯	◯
Advocacy groups: 1	◯	◯	◯	◯
Outsourcing agencies: 1	◯	◯	◯	◯
Community partners: 1	◯	◯	◯	◯
Sponsoring organizations: 1	◯	◯	◯	◯
Others: 1	◯	◯	◯	◯

20 **This organization collaborates with my organization to gain resources to help**

protect refugees from the effect of COVID-19 pandemic.

	Before COVID-19		During COVID-19	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Government agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
For-profit businesses 1	○	○	○	○
Nonprofit organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Advocacy groups: 1	○	○	○	○
Outsourcing agencies: 1	○	○	○	○
Community partners: 1	○	○	○	○
Sponsoring organizations: 1	○	○	○	○
Others: 1	○	○	○	○

21 **This organization competes with my organization in ways that hurt both organizations' ability to serve refugees.**

	Before COVID-19		During COVID-19	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Government agencies: 1	◯	◯	◯	◯
For-profit businesses 1	◯	◯	◯	◯
Nonprofit organizations: 1	◯	◯	◯	◯
Advocacy groups: 1	◯	◯	◯	◯
Outsourcing agencies: 1	◯	◯	◯	◯
Community partners: 1	◯	◯	◯	◯
Sponsoring organizations: 1	◯	◯	◯	◯
Others: 1	◯	◯	◯	◯

End of Block: Part II- Organizational Networks

Start of Block: Part III. Technology Use

22 This section asks about the technology resources your organization provides you to complete its mission-driven work.

	Before COVID-19		During COVID-19	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
My organization provides a desktop or a laptop computer for work.	○	○	○	○
My organization provides a cellphone for work.	○	○	○	○
My organization pays some or all of my cellphone bills.	○	○	○	○
My organization employs one or more information technology (IT) specialists.	○	○	○	○
My organization provides technology training in support of our use of various digital tools at work.	○	○	○	○
Whenever I have difficulty navigating technology, I can rely on my organization for help.	○	○	○	○
Please Choose NO for both columns.	○	○	○	○

23 **This section asks about the technology uses in your organization.**

Please think about how your organization used technology BEFORE and AFTER COVID-19 to communicate with

organizational partners such as those you listed at the beginning of this survey. (Click all that apply OR leave blank if

your organization does NOT use any of the technology listed below.)

	Before COVID-19			**During** COVID-19		
	Cellphone	Laptop/Desktop Computer	Password-protected intranet	Cellphone	Laptop/Desktop Computer	Password-protected intranet
What communication tools does your organization use when collaborating with other organizations, businesses, or agencies?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

24 **Technology Programs and/or Platforms** (Click all that apply OR leave blank if your organization does NOT use any of

the technology listed below.)

	Before COVID-19					During COVID-19				
	Social Media	Video-conferencing	Instant messaging	E-mails	Case management technology	Social Media	Video conferencing	Instant messaging	E-mails	Case management technology
What technology program/platform(s) does your organization use when collaborating with other organizations, businesses, or agencies?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

25 **Online Activities** (Click all that apply OR leave blank if your organization does NOT use any of the technology listed below.)

	Before COVID-19				**During** COVID-19			
	Online petitions	Online fundraising	Online advertisement	Database management	Online petitions	Online fundraising	Online advertisement	Database management
What online service(s) does your organization use when collaborating with other organizations, businesses, or agencies?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

26 **Generally speaking, does your organization work and interact directly with refugees?**

○   Yes

○   No

27 For the next questions, please think about the work and communication your organization has WITH REFUGEES.

How does your organization use technology to communicate and work with the refugees **BEFORE and AFTER** the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak?   (Click all that apply OR leave blank if your organization does NOT use any of the technology listed below.)

	Before COVID-19			**During** COVID-19		
	Cell Phone	Laptop/Desktop Computer	Password-protected intranet	Cell Phone	Laptop/Desktop Computer	Password-protected intranet
What communication tools does your organization use to connect with refugee clients?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

28 **Technology Platform/Program** (Click all that apply OR leave blank if your organization does NOT use any of the

technology listed below.)

	Before COVID-19					During COVID-19				
	Social Media	Video-conferencing	Instant messaging	E-mails	Case management technology	Social Media	Video-conferencing	Instant messaging	E-mails	Case management technology
What technology platform/program(s) does your organization use to connect with refugee clients?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

29 **Online Services for refugees** (Click all that apply OR leave blank if your organization does NOT use any of the

technology listed below.)

	Before COVID-19				During COVID-19			
	Web search engine (ex. Google)	Online banking (e.g., account management, bill paying)	Online shopping (ex. Amazon)	Online training (ex. webinar)	Web search engine (ex. Google)	Online banking (e.g., account management, bill paying)	Online shopping (ex. Amazon)	Online training (ex. webinar)
What online services does your organization use to connect with refugee clients?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
What online services do refugees rely on your organization for help the most?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

30 **Please think about how your organization communicates with refugees through technology to answer the following questions.** (Leave blank if your organization does NOT use any of the technology listed below.)

	Before COVID-19					During COVID-19				
	Very easy	Easy enough	Neutral	Difficult	Very difficult	Very easy	Easy enough	Neutral	Difficult	Very difficult
Cellphone communication with refugee is easy.										
Laptop/desktop computer communication with refugee is easy.										
Internet makes communicating with refugee clients easy.										
Social media communication with refugee clients easy.										
Videoconferencing makes communicating with refugee clients easy.										
Instant messaging with refugee clients is easy.										
Emails make communicating with refugee clients easy.										

31 **This section asks about the organization's operating mode.**

 Physical location of work. Please consider the following:

OFFICE = a place your employer has designated for workers to commute to and work together physically

Virtual OFFICE = space in your private residence or other locations that don't physically convene you and your co-workers

32 **How did your organization operate BEFORE and AFTER the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak? Think about the** *number of days* **your organization operated and answer the following questions.**

	Before COVID-19							During COVID-19						
	5+	5	4	3	2	1	0	5+	5	4	3	2	1	0
In an average week, how many days do/did you work in a physical office?	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
In an average week, how many days do/did you work remotely in a virtual office?	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
In an average week, how many days do/did you work wherever you liked with flexibility?	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

33 **Organization's Operation BEFORE and DURING the COVID-19 pandemic.**

	Before COVID-19					During COVID-19				
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

My organization relies on external funding resources for operation (e.g., government grants, external funds, and donations, etc.).	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
My organization operates daily without interruption (e.g., closing).	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
My organization has little to almost no furloughs and/or layoffs.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
My organization must comply with policy-based protocols when working in the service of refugees.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
My organization improvises the work we do for refugees.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

34 Organization's Work on Refugees

	Before COVID-19					During COVID-19				
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
My organization offers a variety of activities and services for refugees (e.g., language class, job training, education, etc.).	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
My organization has a substantial financial capacity to help and service refugees.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
My organization has enough employees and volunteers to design and carry out refugee services.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

35 **We'd like to know the perceived effectiveness of your organization's work BEFORE and DURING COVID-19.**

	Before COVID-19					DURING COVID-19				
	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree

My organization's information, material, and financial resources are used efficiently for refugees.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
My organization provides services and activities for the refugees in a timely manner and achieve their objectives.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
My organization's mission-driven work has positive immediate and long-term impacts on the refugees.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
My organization's services are in line with the needs of the refugees.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

You are almost finished! We have a few final questions about your organization.

----

36 **How many employees are in your organization? (Please enter '0' if there is none.)**

○   Full-time staff

_____

○   Part-time staff

_____

○   Volunteers   _____

○   Board members

_____

○   Seasonal workers or temporary staff not included in above types

_____

○   Other (please specify)

_____

----

37 **What best describes your position in your organization?**

○   Full-time employee

○   Part-time employee

○   Volunteer

○   Executive leader

○   Board member

○   Seasonal worker or temporary staff not included above

○   Other (please specify)

_____

38 **What is your race? (one or more categories may be selected)**

○   American Indian or Alaska Native

○   Black or African American

○   Asian

○   White

○   Pacific Islander

○   Other (please specify)

○   Prefer not to say

39 **Would you be willing to help us understand more about the answers you provided or things we did not ask that helps us better understand your organization's challenges and opportunities in the past year? If so, please provide us with your contact information (e-mail address and/or phone number based on your preference). Please double-check to make sure the correct information is listed.**

☐   Name and E-mail address (please share your below)

☐   Phone number (please share your phone number below)

40 Are there other professionals whose experiences may help us understand how organizations copes when the COVID-19 pandemic challenged the ability to provide support to refugees? If so, please provide us with their name and contact information.

_____

41 **Do you have any general comments to share?**

_____

 Thank you so much for taking this survey! Please contact the principal

investigator, Minkyung Kim (mk.kim@rutgers.edu) or Dr. Marya Doerfel

(mdoerfel@rutgers.edu) if you have any other questions.

Appendix B

Interview Protocol-English

Thank you very much for agreeing to speak with me today. My name is Min Kim. I am a doctoral candidate at Rutgers University in the Department of Communication. I am conducting a dissertation research about humanitarian organizations that serve refugees in the United States and in South Korea. The focus of my study is to explore how the organizational networks, use of technology and mode of operation changed due to COVID-19 and how these can contribute to organizations to be resilient so their work and services for the community remains uninterrupted.

As a follow-up to the survey you completed, I'd like to ask you some questions about your organizational experiences in terms of the work you do on behalf of your organization.

Before we begin, do you have any questions about the study, the survey you completed, or informed consent I shared with you?

I also want to remind you that your participation is completely voluntary and you can choose not to answer any question that I ask. You can also stop the interview at any time.

Before we begin, may I record this interview to help with note-taking? Please confirm by saying "Yes, I agree," or "No, I disagree." If you disagree, I will not record this conversation.

1. Could you describe your organization's roles and responsibilities in your organization?

2. What kind of services does your organization provide for the refugees and their communities of settlement?

3. How did the COVID-19 impact your organization in general?

    A. How did the COVID-19 impact your organizations' services for the refugee community?

4. Please describe your routine day at work before COVID-19 outbreak.

5. Please describe your routine day at work now as the pandemic continues.

6. Please share your organization's funding resources.

    A. In what ways have you witnessed changes in funding since the pandemic began?

7. What's the biggest change your organization experienced since the pandemic outbreak?

    A. What remained the same?

8. Please describe the organizational networks before and during the pandemic.

    A. How did the networks affected your organization's services to the refugees?

9. Please describe the technologies you use at work before the pandemic and now.

    A. What was the most challenging thing you experienced using the technologies?

    B. Could you describe the transition of the work mode (if remotely working)?

10. Are there specific policies or standard operating procedures or protocols you must comply with when you serve refugees?

    A. What are they?

    B. What constraints do you feel they generate?

    C. Do you believe these also provide opportunities or protect your organization's functioning in various ways?

11. Is there anything else that you'd like to share about your organization as the COVID pandemic hit?

12. Anything else I should ask that I didn't ask?

13. Any final thoughts or comments?

Thank you for participating in the interview.

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