DescriptionThis dissertation is about whether those attracted to consequentialism can provide a plausible theory of the ethics of self-defense. I argue that they can. In Chapter 1, I summarize my motivations, approach, and conclusions. In Chapter 2, I discuss ‘Lesser-Evil’ Justifications for harming others. In Chapter 3, I argue that consequentialists can do justice to many of the claims philosophers want to make about simple cases of self- defense in which a culpable aggressor attempts to harm an innocent person. In Chapter 4, I discuss what the consequentialist should say about commonsense prohibitions against harming innocent bystanders. In Chapter 5, I dig deeper into the relationship between responsibility and the moral ideal of justice by discussing cases in which individuals non- culpably pose threats to innocent people. In Chapter 6, I argue that consequentialists can shed light upon a controversial family of cases of self-defense. In Chapter 7, I discuss what my conclusions imply about directions for future work.