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'Along an imperfectly-lighted path'
Descriptive
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Text
TitleInfo
Title
'Along an imperfectly-lighted path'
SubTitle
practical rationality and normative uncertainty
Identifier
ETD_2345
Identifier
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http://hdl.rutgers.edu/1782.2/rucore10001600001.ETD.000052151
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doi:10.7282/T3B56JWG
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English
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theses
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Philosophy
Subject
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Topic
Decision making
Subject
(authority = ETD-LCSH)
Topic
Ethics
Abstract
(type = abstract)
Nobody's going to object to the advice "Do the right thing", but that doesn't mean everyone's always going to follow it. Sometimes this is because of our volitional limitations; we cannot always bring ourselves to make the sacrifices that right action requires. But sometimes this is because of our cognitive limitations; we cannot always be sure of what is right. Sometimes we can't be sure of what's right because we don't know the non-normative facts. But sometimes, even if we were to know all of the non-normative facts, we'd still not be sure about what's right, because we're uncertain about the normative reasons those facts give us. In this dissertation, I attempt to answer the question of what we're to do when we must act under fundamentally normative uncertainty.
It's tempting to think that, in such circumstances, we should do what we regard as most probably right. I argue that this view is mistaken, for it is insensitive to how degrees of actions' values compare across different normative hypotheses; if an action is probably right, but, if wrong, is terribly, terribly, wrong, it may be rational not to do that action. A better answer is that we should do the action with the highest expected value. I spend the first part of the dissertation providing arguments for and rebutting arguments against this view of action under normative uncertainty. I spend the next part of the dissertation explaining what degrees of value are, and showing how they can be compared across normative hypotheses. In the remaining parts of the dissertation, I consider two questions related to our primary question -- first, what is one required, or obligated, to do under normative uncertainty; and second, what is it rational for one to do when one is not only normatively uncertain in the way we've been discussing, but also uncertain about what it is rational to do under this sort of normative uncertainty.
It's tempting to think that, in such circumstances, we should do what we regard as most probably right. I argue that this view is mistaken, for it is insensitive to how degrees of actions' values compare across different normative hypotheses; if an action is probably right, but, if wrong, is terribly, terribly, wrong, it may be rational not to do that action. A better answer is that we should do the action with the highest expected value. I spend the first part of the dissertation providing arguments for and rebutting arguments against this view of action under normative uncertainty. I spend the next part of the dissertation explaining what degrees of value are, and showing how they can be compared across normative hypotheses. In the remaining parts of the dissertation, I consider two questions related to our primary question -- first, what is one required, or obligated, to do under normative uncertainty; and second, what is it rational for one to do when one is not only normatively uncertain in the way we've been discussing, but also uncertain about what it is rational to do under this sort of normative uncertainty.
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electronic resource
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x, 305 p. : ill.
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Ph.D.
Note
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Includes bibliographical references (p. 300-304)
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by Andrew Christopher Sepielli
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Sepielli
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Andrew Christopher
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1979-
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Andrew Christopher Sepielli
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Ruth Chang
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Smith
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Holly
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Holly Smith
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Weatherson
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Brian
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Brian Weatherson
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Michael
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Michael Smith
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Rutgers University
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Graduate School - New Brunswick
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2010
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2010-01
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xx
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Rutgers University Electronic Theses and Dissertations
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ETD
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Graduate School - New Brunswick Electronic Theses and Dissertations
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ETD doctoral
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Rights
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The author owns the copyright to this work.
Copyright
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Copyright protected
Notice
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Open
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Permission or license
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Sepielli
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Andrew
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2009-12-24 14:05:29
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Andrew Sepielli
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Rutgers University. Graduate School - New Brunswick
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Author Agreement License
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I hereby grant to the Rutgers University Libraries and to my school the non-exclusive right to archive, reproduce and distribute my thesis or dissertation, in whole or in part, and/or my abstract, in whole or in part, in and from an electronic format, subject to the release date subsequently stipulated in this submittal form and approved by my school. I represent and stipulate that the thesis or dissertation and its abstract are my original work, that they do not infringe or violate any rights of others, and that I make these grants as the sole owner of the rights to my thesis or dissertation and its abstract. I represent that I have obtained written permissions, when necessary, from the owner(s) of each third party copyrighted matter to be included in my thesis or dissertation and will supply copies of such upon request by my school. I acknowledge that RU ETD and my school will not distribute my thesis or dissertation or its abstract if, in their reasonable judgment, they believe all such rights have not been secured. I acknowledge that I retain ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use all or part of this thesis or dissertation in future works, such as articles or books.
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