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theses

Although research on motivated reasoning has consistently shown that people's beliefs bias their evaluation of the quality of belief-relevant evidence (a subjective judgment), few studies have examined whether people are biased in an absolute sense - that is, in how they interpret and recall research findings. Furthermore, theorists argue that people are largely unaware of their bias because they quickly rationalize their automatic acceptance or rejection of the information; however, the existing evidence in the literature seems to suggest that people may sometimes possess some awareness of their bias. In six studies, I investigated the extent to which people (1) exhibit bias in evaluating, recalling, and maintaining (vs. changing) their beliefs in response to belief-relevant evidence and (2) are aware of the bias they exhibit. I also examined whether exposure to belief-inconsistent (vs. consistent) evidence reduces general support for science. Participants exhibited bias in evaluating the quality of the evidence but accurately recalled the findings and shifted their beliefs in the direction of the evidence presented. Participants expressed some awareness of their bias, although awareness varied under different conditions. Belief-inconsistent (vs. consistent) evidence reduced trust in research on the particular topic under investigation but did not strongly influence overall support for science. These findings extend previous research by clarifying the conditions under which defense and accuracy motivations guide information processing and contribute to belief maintenance vs. change. This work has important implications for determining how to reduce motivated reasoning to increase the broader impact of scientific research.

ETD_7443

Ph.D.

Includes bibliographical references

by Stephanie Miriam Anglin

doi:10.7282/T3H70J34

ETD doctoral

The author owns the copyright to this work.