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Understanding normative practical reasons

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TitleInfo
Title
Understanding normative practical reasons
Name (type = personal)
NamePart (type = family)
Antosh
NamePart (type = given)
Marcello
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Marcello Antosh
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author
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Chang
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Ruth
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Ruth Chang
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Advisory Committee
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chair
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Temkin
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Larry
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Larry Temkin
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Advisory Committee
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internal member
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Egan
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Andy
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Andy Egan
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Advisory Committee
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internal member
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Sobel
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David
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David Sobel
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Advisory Committee
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outside member
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Rutgers University
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degree grantor
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Graduate School - New Brunswick
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school
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theses
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DateCreated (qualifier = exact)
2016
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2016-10
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2016
Place
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xx
Language
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eng
Abstract (type = abstract)
Here I defend a version of internalism about normative practical reasons, which I call discriminative stimulus internalism. Discriminative stimuli feature prominently in explanations of human and non-human animal learning and behavior. And according to discriminative stimulus internalism, the property of being a reason is the property of being a discriminative stimulus of a special kind. To defend this theory of reasons I first attempt to resolve a much simpler question: what regulates the concept of a normative practical reason? This question can be answered by characterizing both the rule and property that regulate the concept. According to what I call the guidance account, the rule that regulates that concept is explained by a more basic rule which determines how a wide variety of entities - from animals to artificial forms of intelligence - can learn to respond to considerations in particular ways, which, to observers, may appear to be instrumentally rational. These more basic rules are captured by principles of classical and instrumental conditioning and reinforcement learning. Those more basic rules explain when a consideration may come to guide an entity's response. When it can do so it is a discriminative stimulus. According to the guidance account, the property of being a discriminative stimulus regulates the concept of a reason. The guidance account supports discriminative stimulus internalism in two major ways. First, it poses the parsimony challenge to a competing theory of reasons. This challenge casts doubt on the claim that normative beliefs and practices provide evidence for the existence of reasons offered by this competing theory. But it allows that those beliefs and practices provide evidence of the existence of reasons which are discriminative stimuli of a special kind. Second, the guidance account undermines two important objections against discriminative stimulus internalism: the extension and normativity objections. This straightforward, preliminary defense of discriminative stimulus internalism suggests it is well-positioned to emerge as the correct theory of normative practical reasons.
Subject (authority = RUETD)
Topic
Philosophy
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Rutgers University Electronic Theses and Dissertations
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ETD
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ETD_7511
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electronic resource
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application/pdf
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text/xml
Extent
1 online resource (viii, 145 p. : ill.)
Note (type = degree)
Ph.D.
Note (type = bibliography)
Includes bibliographical references
Subject (authority = ETD-LCSH)
Topic
Normativity (Ethics)
Subject (authority = ETD-LCSH)
Topic
Practical reason
Note (type = statement of responsibility)
by Marcello Antosh
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TitleInfo
Title
Graduate School - New Brunswick Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Identifier (type = local)
rucore19991600001
Location
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NjNbRU
Identifier (type = doi)
doi:10.7282/T3CF9SD9
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Rights

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The author owns the copyright to this work.
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Name
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Antosh
GivenName
Marcello
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Permission or license
DateTime (encoding = w3cdtf); (qualifier = exact); (point = start)
2016-08-24 22:20:13
AssociatedEntity
Name
Marcello Antosh
Role
Copyright holder
Affiliation
Rutgers University. Graduate School - New Brunswick
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Author Agreement License
Detail
I hereby grant to the Rutgers University Libraries and to my school the non-exclusive right to archive, reproduce and distribute my thesis or dissertation, in whole or in part, and/or my abstract, in whole or in part, in and from an electronic format, subject to the release date subsequently stipulated in this submittal form and approved by my school. I represent and stipulate that the thesis or dissertation and its abstract are my original work, that they do not infringe or violate any rights of others, and that I make these grants as the sole owner of the rights to my thesis or dissertation and its abstract. I represent that I have obtained written permissions, when necessary, from the owner(s) of each third party copyrighted matter to be included in my thesis or dissertation and will supply copies of such upon request by my school. I acknowledge that RU ETD and my school will not distribute my thesis or dissertation or its abstract if, in their reasonable judgment, they believe all such rights have not been secured. I acknowledge that I retain ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use all or part of this thesis or dissertation in future works, such as articles or books.
Copyright
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Copyright protected
Availability
Status
Open
Reason
Permission or license
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2016-08-24T21:13:40
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2016-08-24T21:25:42
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