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The primary aim of my dissertation is to set out one important role that cognitive science can play in debates in metaphysics. The focus of my dissertation is the appeal to intuitions in metaphysics. In certain metaphysical disputes, we often see common sense or folk intuitions being invoked in evaluating competing metaphysical theories. But when metaphysical theories are charged with violating common sense or folk intuitions, the charges tend to be met by claiming that the target theory is not, after all, at odds with what the folk think on the matter. As a result, we often end up with conflicting claims about what the folk think. Here is one of the key ways that I see cognitive science contributing to metaphysics: Cognitive science can enter into the discussion by helping to identify the content of the relevant folk view under consideration. But the usefulness of cognitive science to metaphysics doesn’t end there. Having identified the content of common sense on the target issue, a question remains as to how much weight, if any, should be placed on the folk view under consideration in evaluating target metaphysical theories. In other words: does the relevant folk view deserve to be respected or rejected in evaluating metaphysical theories? Empirical evidence from cognitive science can enter again here and play an important role in evaluating whether the relevant aspect of the folk view is respectable or based on an unreliable or otherwise poor cognitive process. Taken together, one of the key ways that cognitive science can contribute to metaphysics is by identifying what the relevant folk view under consideration is and whether the relevant folk intuitions deserve to be taken seriously. I focus on metaphysical disputes over composition, persistence and causation and the role of ordinary metaphysical beliefs in serving as a constraint on theories in these areas. Drawing on work in psychology, most notably the work of Deborah Kelemen, I find that the folk take a promiscuous teleological outlook on reality: all of nature—every rock and cloud—is viewed as being infused with agency and purpose. I bring the background psychological evidence into the discussion and also conduct various studies of my own, providing a range of evidence suggesting that this tendency toward promiscuous teleological thinking plays a significant role in folk intuitions about composition, persistence and causation. In light of this, I argue that folk intuitions about these matters deserve to be dismissed, that there is a debunking explanation for these folk intuitions. In short: metaphysical theories of composition, persistence and causation should not be beholden to folk intuitions since the folk view on these matters is tied into a primitive teleological view of nature. I take myself to have illustrated a key way in which cognitive science can contribute to metaphysics. When folk intuitions are invoked as a constraint on metaphysical theories, cognitive science can enter in to help determine not only what the content of the relevant folk view is but also to help decide whether the relevant folk intuitions deserve to be taken seriously. In this way, cognitive science can help provide empirically informed debunking explanations and thus liberate certain metaphysical theories from the demand that they conform to folk intuitions.

ETD_6024

Ph.D.

Includes bibliographical references

by David Rose

doi:10.7282/T3F76GGW

ETD doctoral

The author owns the copyright to this work.