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This dissertation investigates the problem of oligarchic state capture in postcommunism. It shifts the analytical emphasis from state capture previously conceptualized as a form of corruption to state capture defined as a form of temporary control established by members of the new wealthy elites (i.e. oligarchs) over the political institutions of the transitional state. In Chapter 1 (“What do we know about state autonomy during transitions to market?”), I review the existing literature on state autonomy and state capture. Drawing on the state-centered literature, in Chapter 2 (“The oligarchic intermezzo”), I construct a theoretical framework explaining the onset, unfolding, and end of oligarchic state capture. The framework centers on the concept of oligarchic intermezzo, a brief period of oligarchic dominance, describing a situation in which one or several of the wealthiest individuals in the country exercise control over the state. As such, the intermezzo represents an episode of state autonomy deficit in the evolving relations between the state and the postcommunist economic elites. In Chapter 3 (“Revisiting the nomenklatura capitalism hypothesis”), I rely on a novel dataset of approx. two hundred biographies of the wealthiest individuals in the post-Soviet region to test the nomenklatura capitalism hypothesis. In Chapter 4 (“Using crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to identify the structural determinants of oligarchic state capture”), I detect the configurations of structural conditions leading to oligarchic state capture across post-communist countries. Two paths lead to the presence of the oligarchic intermezzo, while three distinct configurations result in its absence. Given the presence of both equifinality and causal asymmetry, I use the QCA results to select four cases suitable for an in-depth analysis of the causal mechanisms leading to oligarchic state capture. In Chapter 5 (“Oligarchs and state threats: from perfect information to signaling games”), I design and analyze three game structures – a perfect information game, an imperfect information game, and a signaling game. They reflect the dilemmas of weak states, when faced with powerful oligarchs. Thus, states endowed with varying degrees of strength (i.e. capacity) and oligarchs will interact differently depending on the cost of the credible threat incurred by the state and the subjective probability beliefs regarding state strength held by the oligarchs. In Chapter 6 (“Oligarchs in power: a structured, focused comparison of the Russian and Latvian intermezzos”), the influence of oligarchs on the state is investigated through a structured, focused comparison of the Russian (1996–1998) and Latvian (2006–2011) cases. In Chapter 7 (“Unpacking the oligarchic intermezzo in Moldova”), I investigate the theft of the century, the working of patronage networks during the oligarchic interlude, and the anti-oligarchic backlash. Chapter 8 (“Wealthy elites and the party-state in China: a permanent nexus?”) was published as a working paper by the Center for Chinese Studies (National Central Library, Taipei). In Chapter 8, I explore the connections between the party-state and the process of wealth accumulation in the People’s Republic of China. Specifically, I examine how the wealthiest Chinese work toward building Socialism with Chinese characteristics (中国特别社会主义) and a moderately well-off society (小康社会). In addition to that, I analyze survey data to detect whether and how party affiliation and income levels in the PRC are related. In the concluding section, I summarize the major findings, discuss several policy implications of the study, and reflect on the role of the oligarchs in the postcommunist region.

ETD_8385

doi:10.7282/T3WQ06ZF

Ph.D.

Includes bibliographical references

by Ion Marandici

ETD doctoral

The author owns the copyright to this work.