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theses

Why did the post-Soviet states follow different foreign policy paths when compared to the rest of the former Communist states, after the dissolution of the USSR? Why states pursue inconsistent foreign policies and how do they choose alignment patterns? Why did some post-Communist governments in Europe take office promising one foreign policy orientation (either pro-West or pro-Russia) but later changed direction and adopted the opposite orientation? The research undertaken in this dissertation is based on extensive fieldwork activities in Eastern Europe: interviews with more than forty policymakers, including former Presidents, Prime Ministers, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ambassadors, diplomats and policy makers in both Ukraine and Moldova. In addition, the diplomatic archives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in Ukraine and Moldova, and the archives of the Moldovan Parliament were studied: more than 80,000 pages of diplomatic records, spanning from 1991 to 2006, were consulted. With insights from diplomatic archives and accounts from personal interviews with officials in charge of foreign policy making, the dissertation argues that political leaders in all post-Communist states chose alignment options based on a cost-benefit analysis, weighing whether the combination of incentives and constraints posed by orienting to the West or Russia did the most to further their overriding goal of acquiring or retaining power at home. In post-Communist countries where the EU and NATO offered a credible prospect for membership, political leaders from across the spectrum converged on a pro-Western foreign policy. In these cases, the promise of financial support and security guarantees from the West proved overwhelmingly attractive to domestic politicians, easily outweighing anything Russia might offer in hopes of reorienting the country’s foreign policy towards Moscow. By contrast, in the countries where the EU and NATO refused to grant a membership prospect, most notably to Ukraine and Moldova, the benefits of sticking to a pro-Western foreign policy were far less attractive and more uncertain, and less clearly superior to the incentives offered by Russia. In this context, vacillators and opportunists seeking national or personal gain from both the West and Russia – and potentially playing the two major poles off one another – came to the fore. Foreign policy alignments were therefore chosen strategically by national leaders depending on which they thought would best serve their interests. Both the pro-Western and the pro-Russia orientations were attractive alternatives: executive leaders picked one over another depending on their calculations as to whether Russia or the West would help them win and retain power at home. The EU’s refusal to offer binding commitments made its demands for political conditionality (such as pro-democracy and anti-corruption reforms) less effective and encouraged leaders in the region to vacillate in their foreign policy orientations. Meanwhile, with the West refusing to offer these states membership in its organizations, Russia exploited the internal weaknesses of these states to promote its foreign policy agenda and bolster its influence in the region.

ETD_8941

Ph.D.

Includes bibliographical references

by Ecaterina V. Locoman

doi:10.7282/T36Q21PB

ETD doctoral

The author owns the copyright to this work.