Text

theses

ETD doctoral

The governments of Nigeria, Mali, and Somalia have employed varied military assistance tools in an attempt to protect their fragile security in the face of the domestic challenges mounted by jihadist groups. Primarily, Nigeria has refused to accept combat assistance from external forces, while the other two states, in different ways, have embraced such assistance. In this study I examine the various strategies and policies that these states have employed in attempting to answer the question of what explains the variation in the forms of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) these states request and use in fighting domestic jihadist insurgent threats.

I examine three major potential explanations in addressing this question: first, a state’s domestic resource capacity; second, its relationship with the international community; and third, the degree of military professionalism among members of its armed forces. In evaluating each explanation, I analyze data using both quantitative and qualitative methods. Qualitatively, I perform a content analysis based on 53 semistructured interviews. Quantitatively, I use NVivo 12 coding query tools to generate numerical data from my interviews and present the aggregate results. In tandem, these methods allow me to compare the relative utility of each explanation. I present the findings of both methods in national case studies, augmented by archival materials and secondary sources, in evaluating the causal patterns in each country.

My dissertation indicates two major factors that explain the variation in FID across my three cases. The first is a government’s ability to fund successful domestic military strategies. The second, a surprising explanation that I did contemplate at the outset of the study, is the ability of state leaders to leverage their external legitimacy for purposes unrelated to the war against extremist violence. My findings additionally suggest that state corruption may be extending the conflicts in Mali and Somalia. Elites have repeatedly resisted instituting effective security sector reforms that would have strengthened their forces’ independent military capacity, despite the large amounts of external assistance spent on improving each state’s security sector. This finding may have implications for the long-term resiliency of these states in fighting domestic insurgent threats.

ETD_10908

doi:10.7282/t3-yahr-6p75

Ph.D.

Includes bibliographical references

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