DescriptionExperts play a crucial role in modern organizations, but evidence regarding the soundness and reliability of their decision-making is mixed and often contradictory. Drawing on theories of identity threat, my dissertation argues that experts are more susceptible to bias following disconfirming feedback from others. A series of lab experiments show that (a) experts are more likely than novices to double-down and produce overly precise predictions following disconfirming feedback; (b) this feedback-induced overprecision by experts is mediated by perceived level of expert identity threat; (c) the source of the feedback (i.e., other experts, novices, actual outcomes) matter for identity threat and overprecision; and (d) self-affirmation attenuates identity threat and reduces overprecision. I supplement these experimental findings by investigating experts’ response to disconfirming feedback in a real-world setting: Major League Baseball umpiring. Ultimately, my dissertation proposes a moderated-mediation model of expert decision-making to understand “when” and “why” experts offer overly precise judgments, and “how” experts can cope with disconfirming feedback that is unavoidable and prevalent in organizational settings.