DescriptionWe study the phenomenon of opaque selling, where a seller uses price discounts and more guaranteed availabilities to entice buyers into accepting probabilistically assigned actual deliveries. While taking an inventory-management angle, we divide the project into two parts. The first part concentrates on why opaque selling has been widely adopted; meanwhile, the second part is more interested in how the seller can benefit from opportunities presented by opaque selling. In the first part, buyers’ aggregate behaviors may be either exogenously given or endogenously generated from strategic interactions. For both cases, we can rationalize the seller’s preference for opaque selling. When features of regular goods are roughly or exactly symmetric, this option affords the seller extra abilities to balance inventory levels to his own advantage when deciding on rationing: which product to use at a moment when an opaque request has just arrived. Our strategic case also yields monotone equilibrium trends that can help the seller reach judicious pricing decisions. The replenishment policy adopted by our study is also better suited than an existing alternative. Even the replenishment policy need not be given in the second part, where we attempt to simultaneously coordinate the two activities of replenishment and rationing. For the resultant continuous-time discrete-state control model, we succeed in identifying balance-inducing monotonicity (bim) property that, together with the more traditional notions of super/sub-modularity and in/de-creasing differences, lead to partially characterized optimal inventory management policies in the presence of opaque selling.